ML043090544
| ML043090544 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 10/29/2004 |
| From: | Morton T Progress Energy Carolinas |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| BL-04-001, HNP-04-134 | |
| Download: ML043090544 (4) | |
Text
Progress Energy Serial: HNP-04-134 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OCT 2 9 2004 ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NO. I DOCKET NO. 50-400/LICENSE NO. NPF-63 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING NRC BULLETIN 2004-01 FOR INSPECTION OF ALLOY 82/182/600 MATERIALS USED IN THE FABRICATION OF PRESSURIZER PENETRATIONS AND STEAM SPACE PIPING CONNECTIONS AT PRESSURIZED-WATER REACTORS Ladies and Gentlemen:
On October 6, 2004, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) received from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) a request for additional information (RAI) regarding the Harris Nuclear Plant response (HNP-04-097 dated July 27, 2004) to NRC Bulletin 2004-01, "Inspection of Alloy 82/182/600 Materials Used in the Fabrication of Pressurizer Penetrations and Steam Space Piping Connections at Pressurized-Water Reactors" (dated May 28, 2004). This supplement will facilitate the NRC's review of the HNP response to NRC Bulletin 2004-01. provides the requested supplement for the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP). Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. David H. Corlett at (919) 362-3137.
I declare, under penalty of perjury, that the attached information is true and correct.
(Executed on OCT 2 9 2004 )
Sincerely, Terr C rton Manager, Support Services TM/rgh Attachments
- 1. Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding NRC Bulletin 2004-01 c:
Mr. R. A. Musser (NRC Senior Resident Inspector)
Ms. B. 0. Hall (Section Chief, N.C. DENR)
Mr. C. P. Patel (NRR Project Manager, NRC)
Dr. W. D. Travers (NRC Regional Administrator, Region II)
Progress Energy Carolinas. Inc.
Harris Nuclear Plant P.O. Box 165 Nmv Hill. NC 27562
PROGRESS ENERGY CAROLINAS, INC.
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400/LICENSE NO. NPF-63 ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding NRC Bulletin 2004-01
("Inspection of Alloy 82/1821600 Materials Used in the Fabrication of Pressurizer Penetrations and Steam Space Piping Connections at Pressurized-Water Reactors")
- to Letter HNP-04-134 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding NRC Bulletin 2004-01 The NRC Staff has completed its review of your response dated July 27, 2004, to NRC Bulletin 2004-01, "60-day Response to NRC Bulletin 2004-01 for the Inspection of Alloy 82/182/600 Materials Used in the Fabrication of Pressurizer Penetrations and Steam Space Piping Connections at Pressurized-Water Reactors." Based on the NRC staffs review, please provide a supplemental response that addresses the following question.
Your response to NRC Bulletin 2004-01 Question (1)(c) did not clearly communicate your intentions with respect to ensuring that an appropriate dialogue would be established with the NRC technical staff in the event that circumferential primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) is identified at any locations covered under the scope of Bulletin 2004-01. The NRC staff addressed this issue, in part, on page 5 of Bulletin 2004-01 stating, "... the NRC staff believes that the topic of NDE scope expansion should be discussed with the NRC if circumferential PWSCC is observed in either the pressure boundary or non-pressure boundary portions of any locations covered under the scope of this bulletin to ensure that the licensee has performed an adequate extent-of-condition evaluation."
Because of the potential plant-specific and generic significance of circumferential PWSCC at locations covered under the scope of Bulletin 2004-01, it is the NRC staffs position that cognizant members of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation's Materials and Chemical Engineering Branch (EMCB) should be promptly made aware of any emerging issue regarding this degradation phenomena at your facility. This is important not only for the reason cited in the passage above from Bulletin 2004-01, but also so that the NRC staff can evaluate any such information andfulfill its obligation to inform other U.S. nuclear power plant licensees of new operational experience that may be relevant to the continued safe operation of their facilities.
It is the NRC staffs expectation that if you obtain inspection results in the fiture that indicate that circumferential PWSCC may be occurring at any location covered uinder the scope of Bulletin 2004-01, you should contact your NRC Headquarters Project Manager (PM) and request a teleconference or meeting with EMCB technical staff. Notification of your NRC PM should allow ample time for you to incorporate any insights from the aforementioned teleconference or meeting into your plans for evaluating the extent of the condition at your facility prior to the end of the outage during which the degradation was discovered.
In order to document your intent to follow the guidance provided above, please provide a supplement to your Bulletin 2004-01 item (1)(c) response that states:
"If circumferential cracking is observed in either the pressure boundary or non-pressure boundary portions of any locations covered under the scope of this bulletin, [ive] will develop plans to perform an adequate extent-of-coniditiont evaluation and [we] will discuss those plans with cognizant NRC technical staff prior to restarting the affected unit. "
Page Al-2 of 3 to Letter HNP-04-134 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding NRC Bulletin 2004-01
Response
The following paragraph supplements Response 1(c) in Attachment 1 of HNP's 60-day response (BNP-04-097 dated July 27, 2004) to NRC Bulletin 2004-01:
"If circumferential cracking is observed in either the pressure boundary or non-pressure boundary portions of any locations covered under the scope of this bulletin, HNP will develop plans to perform an adequate extent-of-condition evaluation and will discuss those plans with cognizant NRC technical staff prior to restarting the unit."
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