ML042890081
| ML042890081 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 01/23/2004 |
| From: | Betlack J Facility Risk Consultants |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Tennessee Valley Authority |
| References | |
| TVA/BFN-01, USI A-46 TVA/BFN-01-R-001, Rev 0 | |
| Download: ML042890081 (102) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:ENCLOSURE 3 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNIT 1 RESPONSE TO NRC GENERIC LETTER 87-02, SUPPLEMENT 1 TRANSMITTAL OF SUPPLEMENTAL SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 2 (SSER No. 2) ON SQUG GENERIC IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURE, REVISION 2 AS CORRECTED ON FEBRUARY 14, 1992 (GIP-2) USI A-46 / SEISMIC IPEEE RELAY EVALUATION BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 (See attached)
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TVA/BFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 USI A-46 / SEISMIC IPEEE RELAY EVALUATION BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 Preparedfor: BROWNS FERRY UNIT 1 RESTART PROJECT Preparedby: FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC. Page i FAcILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVA/BFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 APPROVAL COVER SHEET
Title:
USI A-46 / Seismic IPEEE Relay Evaluation, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Report Number: TVA/BFN-01-R-001 Client: Browns Ferry Unit 1 Restart Project Project Number: TVA/BFN-01 Revision: Approval .N uumb~er -- er . ;:f
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TVABFN-01 -R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 TABLE OF REVISIONS
- Descri ion..of R o D ..........
0 ORIGINAL ISSUE 1/23/04 This report contains 99 pages total Page iii FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVANBFN-01 -R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1(BFN-1) relay evaluation for Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 and the seismic portion of the Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) was performed in accordance with the appropriate industry guidance documents developed by the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), and approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The relay evaluation also utilized results of the similar relay evaluations for BFN-2 and BFN-3. In summary, the relay evaluation findings are as follows:
- Inherent ruggedness of contact devices, chatter acceptability and seismic adequacy were sufficient to satisfactorily resolve the seismic acceptability of contact devices affecting the USI A-46 Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) components.
- No outliers were identified in the evaluation.
- No low ruggedness (bad actor) relays were found to be essential relays.
- No operator actions were identified in the evaluation as necessary to correct relay-chatter-caused malfunctions.
Essential relays and the cabinets housing those essential relays were identified for the seismic capability engineers performing the seismic verification walkdowns and evaluations. Page iv FACLuTY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVANBFN-01 -R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Approval Cover Sheet .......................... ..................................... ii Table of Revisions ............................................................... iii Executive Summary ........................ ........................................ iv
- 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................ 1-1 1.1 Report Organization ............................................................... 1-2
- 2.
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS ........................................................ 2-1
- 3. APPROACH ................................................................ 3-1
- 4. SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM COMPONENTS .............. ......................... 4-1
- 5. RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION RESULTS (G.4 FORMS) ........... 5-1
- 6. REFERENCES ................................................................ 6-1 APPENDIX A: FLOOR SPECTRA ............................................................... A-1 APPENDIX B: SYSTEM, CIRCUIT, AND COMPONENT DESCRITPIONS ............. B-1 B.1 Common Relays ...................... B-1 B.1.1 HFA ...................... B-1 B.1.2 Agastat ...................... B-1 B.1.3 CR1 20A ...................... B-2 B.1.4 HGA ...................... B-2 B.2 Motor Control Centers (MCCs) ...................... B-3 B.3 Switchgear ...................... B-3 B.3.1 4KV Switchgear ...................... B-4 B.3.2 480V Switchgear ...................... B-4 Page v FACtLuTY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVANBFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT.) Page APPENDIX C: ESSENTIAL RELAY LIST ........................................................ C-1 APPENDIX D: RELAYS SCREENED USING SWITCHGEAR GERS ......... ............ D-1 APPENDIX E: WALKDOWN RESULTS ........................................................... E-1 APPENDIX F: ESSENTIAL RELAY CABINETS ....................... ......................... F-1 TABLES Page 4-1 RELAY SSEL FOR USI A-46 & SEISMIC IPEEE - MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ITEMS ................................................... 4-2 4-2 RELAY SSEL FOR USI A-46 & SEISMIC IPEEE - ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ITEMS ..................................................... 4-14 5-1 A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION. PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 ...................... ......................................... 5-2 A-1 PSA AND ZPA VALUES FOR SEISMIC DEMAND CALCULATIONS ......... A-2 F-1 LIST OF PANELS CONTAINING ESSENTIAL RELAYS F-2 FIGURES Page E-1 Example relay mounting in 480V RB Vent Board1B ............ ................... E-2 E-2 Example relay mounting in 250V DC RMOV Board1C ........... ................. E-2 E-3 Example relay mounting in 250V DC RMOV Board1A .......... .................. E-3 E-4 Example relay mounting in 480V SD Board1A ............... ....................... E-3 E-5 Example relay mounting on face of 4KV SHDN BD B ........... ................... E-4 Page vi FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVANBFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 FIGURES (CONT.) Page E-6 Relay mounting in Common Board Logic Panel 25-44 Bi1 ......... .............. E-4 E-7 Example relay mounting in RPS Circuit Protector Cabinet lAl .E-5 E-8 Relay mounting and stiffeners in 1-PNLA-009-0015 ............ .................... E-5 E-9 Relay mounting (HFA's) in 1-PNLA-009-0042 ................. ....................... E-6 E-1 0 Example HFA relay mounting in 1-PNLA-0043 ................ ....................... E-6 E-1 1 Relay mounting (HFA's) in 1-PNLA-009-0033 .................. ...................... E-7 E-12 Relay mounting (Agastats) in 1-PNLA-009-0033 .............. ...................... E-7 E-13 Example Agastat relay mounting in RPS ATU Cabinet 9-86 .E-8 E-1 4 Relay mounting on face of 1-PNLA-009-0036A .E-8 E-1 5 Relay mounting in 1-PNLA-009-0030 .E-9 E-16 Plug-in relays in 1-PNLA-009-0028 .E-9 E-17 HFA & HGA relay mounting and internal vertical stiffeners in 1-PNLA-925-0031 .E-10 F-1 Essential relay panel 1-PNLA-009-0030 (SSEL 19127) .......... ................. F-3 F-2 Essential relay panel 1-PNLA-009-0033 (SSEL 19129) .......... ................. F-4 F-3 Essential reiay panel 1-PNLA-009-0042 (SSEL 19131) .......... ................. F-5 F-4 Essential relay panel 1-PNLA-009-0042 (SSEL 19131) .......... ................. F-6 F-5 Essential relay panel 1-PNLA-009-0043 (SSEL 19132) .......... ................. F-7 F-6 Essential relay panel 1-BDBB-268-0001 A (SSEL 19030) ............. ................. F-8 F-7 Essential relay panel 1-BDBB-268-OOO1B (SSEL 19031) ......................... F-8 Page vii FActurT RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVAIBFN-01 -R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004
- 1. INTRODUCTION This report documents the combined USI A-46 and Seismic IPEEE relay evaluations for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (BFN-1). The evaluation was performed to assess the seismic adequacy of relays and other contact devices in the control circuits of equipment selected to bring the plant to safe shutdown in the event of an earthquake. It was performed in accordance with guidance documents discussed below and followed the approach discussed in Chapter 3. The evaluation provides traceability between each safe shutdown system component, the relays, including contact devices, that effect control of that component and the seismic adequacy of those relays.
Seismic adequacy of equipment in operating nuclear power plants was identified as a potential safety concern in U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46, "Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Nuclear Power Plants." In response to this issue, a number of nuclear plant owners formed the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG). SQUG undertook a pilot program to show the feasibility of using earthquake experience data to demonstrate the seismic adequacy of similar equipment in nuclear power plants. The Senior Seismic Review and Advisory Panel (SSRAP), the NRC staff and the Advisory Committee for Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) reviewed and concurred in the SQUG results. As a consequence, the NRC plan for demonstrating seismic adequacy of equipment in operating nuclear plants, Generic Letter 87-02 (Reference 6-1) is based on the use of seismic experience data. The SQUG developed methodology for performing this verification is documented in the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP, Reference 6-2). The functionality of electrical relays during the strong motion period of an earthquake, however, cannot be readily ascertained because the most common seismic failure mode is contact chatter during the strong motion with little evidence of the occurrence afterward. Accordingly, SQUG, working with the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) developed a methodology to evaluate relays. This methodology is documented in the "Procedure for Evaluating Nuclear Power Plant Relay Seismic Functionality," EPRI NP-7148-SL (Reference 6-3). This methodology and report were reviewed and approved by the NRC staff and a four member NRC staff relay review group. Three Page 1-1 FACILfTY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVANBFN-01 -R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 changes resulting from the NRC Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report Number 2 (SSER-2) to the GIP were incorporated in an Addendum to EPRI NP-7148-SL (Reference 6-4). The overall approach of the relay screening and evaluation procedure is to narrow the scope of relays to those that affect each component required for safe shutdown so that only a minimum number of essential relays need to be examined for seismic adequacy. Seismic capacity versus demand assessments are then made for these essential relays. NRC relay review guidance for the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for severe accident vulnerabilities, Generic Letter 88-20 (Reference 6-4) and NUREG 1407 (Reference 6-6) also include the use of EPRI NP-7148-SL. For focused scope plants such as BFN-1, NUREG 1407 recommends a "bad actors" review for the relays affecting additional IPEEE designated components. The "bad actors" are low ruggedness relays listed in Appendix E of EPRI NP-7148-SL and a check for them is included as one of the steps of the NP-7148 procedure. Accordingly, a "bad actor" check is made as part of the A-46 review of all SSEL components. 1.1 Report Organization This report is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides the overall summary and conclusions from the relay review for USI A-46 and IPEEE. The approach used for the relay evaluation is described in Chapter 3. The relay safe shutdown equipment list is provided in Chapter 4. The detailed results of the relay screening and evaluation are provided in Chapter 5. This includes the G.4 forms signed by the relay reviewers. References are listed in Chapter 6. There are 6 Appendices to this report. Appendix A contains a summary of the in-structure floor response spectra for BFN-1. Appendix B provides descriptions of the systems, circuits, and components reviewed. The essential relay list generated by this relay evaluation is provided in Appendix C. The relays that were screened using the switchgear GERS are summarized in Appendix D. Walkdown results are summarized in Appendix E. This includes example photographs of relay mounting configurations. The cabinets that house essential relays are listed in Appendix F. Photographs of the essential relay cabinets are also provided. Page 1-2 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVANBFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004
- 2.
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS The BFN-1 relay evaluation was performed in accordance with EPRI NP-7148-SL (Reference 6-3) and other guidance discussed in Chapter 1. It included certain special evaluation methods discussed in Chapter 3 since BFN-1 is essentially identical to BFN-2 and BFN-3 which have been previously evaluated and some BFN-1 equipment is shared with BFN-2 and BFN-3. Equipment items common to BFN-2 and BFN-3 which were evaluated in the BFN-2 and BFN-3 evaluation are reported in Reference 6-7 and were not reevaluated or included in this report. Traceability between each relay SSEL component of Chapter 4 is provided on the G.4 tabulation forms (see Chapter 5 of this report). This includes traceability from the component identification to the appropriate control circuit drawings, to each contact of contact devices affecting the component control and the resultant resolution for those contact devices. Appendices A through F provide supporting and summary information for the evaluations tabulated on the G.4 forms. The relay evaluation findings are as follows:
- Inherent ruggedness of contact devices, chatter acceptability and seismic adequacy were sufficient to satisfactorily resolve the seismic acceptability of contact devices affecting the SSEL components.
- No outliers were identified in the evaluation.
- No low ruggedness (bad actor) relays were found to be essential relays.
- No operator actions were identified in the evaluation as necessary to correct relay-chatter-caused malfunctions. Note that the Unit 2 & 3 report (Reference 6-7) includes some operator actions for equipment common to Unit 1. However, those actions were found to be acceptable by the SER (Reference 6-8) and that equipment was not reevaluated or included in this report.
Essential relays were identified (see Appendix C of this report). The cabinets housing the essential relays were also identified (see Appendix F of this report). This information was provided to the seismic capability engineers performing the seismic verification walkdowns and evaluations. The anchorage and structural inspection Page 2-1 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVANBFN-01 -R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 corrective actions will address any structural or anchorage modifications necessary to resolve relay cabinet, panel or mounting inadequacies. These corrective actions will be included in the anchorage and structural inspection Screening Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS) prepared by the seismic capability engineers performing the USI A-46 walkdowns for BFN-1 as documented in WDP-CEB-1-A46/Seismic IPEEE (Reference 6-16). Page 2-2 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVANBFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004
- 3. APPROACH The EPRI NP-7148-SL methodology was used in performing the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (BFN-1) relay evaluation. In general the methodology consists of the following steps:
- 1. Examine the control circuits for the safe shutdown system components.
- 2. Screen out non-essential relays using systems and circuit evaluation techniques. Also screen out contact devices such as large switches, which are considered not vulnerable to seismic motion and relays considered inherently rugged such as solid state relays.
- 3. Assess the seismic adequacy of the remaining, essential relays.
- 4. Provide a traceable documentation of the evaluation.
- 5. For IPEEE additional components, perform a "bad actors" review.
Certain additional special evaluation methods were utilized for BFN-1 since it is essentially identical to BFN-2 and BFN-3 which have already been reviewed. This commonality is documented in the BFN Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), which applies to all three units, and based on safe shutdown equipment identification and seismic verification walkdowns of the equipment. These special case evaluation methods included:
- 1. Maintain compatibility with BFN-2 and BFN-3 by utilizing the BFN-2 and BFN-3 USI A-46/1PEEE review results, resolutions, calculations, Request for Additional Information (RAI) responses and conclusions of the NRC issued SER (Reference 6-8) for that review.
- 2. Do not reevaluate BFN-1 equipment common to BFN-2 or BFN-3 which was evaluated in the prior review for those units.
- 3. Utilize qualification data for new replacement switchgear, MCC buckets and relays which are being purchased as qualified equipment. Note that this planned evaluation method was not used because during the evaluation, replacement switchgear, MCC buckets and relays had not yet been installed. Accordingly, installed equipment was evaluated. However, TVA Page 3-1 FACILIy RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVABFN-011-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 design criteria BFN-50-C-7105 (Reference 6-14) specifies that new equipment is qualified by current or USI A-46 methods, so the new equipment will maintain or improve the seismic ruggedness of the safe shutdown equipment. The G.4 forms of Chapter 5 provide a traceable evaluation path from each component on the SSEL of Chapter4. Foreach SSEL component, the control circuit drawings which identify the contact devices affecting the operation of that device are listed. These drawings were reviewed and the contacts of those devices which affect component operation are identified. EPRI NP- 7148 screening and evaluation methods were then applied to arrive at a resolution which is noted on the G.4 forms. Supporting information and discussions are provided on the G.4 forms and in the appendices of Chapter 7. Often more than one screening method can be used. Usually one method is simpler or more efficient. Two of the screening methods were chosen whenever possible. Chatter acceptable screening is used for cases in which contact chatter leads to an acceptable system or component safe shutdown state. This screening method is useful for contact devices where the seismic demand is high or when seismic capacity data is not available. An additional benefit of chatter acceptable screening is that it reduces the number of essential relays, which are those that must pass a seismic capacity versus demand screen, and it reduces the number of panels and cabinets having essential relays. This in turn reduces walkdown efforts. Appendices B and C of EPRI NP-7148 provide numerous examples of chatter acceptable screening. These examples were reviewed and approved for chatter acceptable screening guidance by the NRC staff and a four member NRC staff relay review group. For safety systems such as reactor protection, ECCS and containment isolation, relay chatter in the control logic may cause actuation of the system, just as a valid initiation signal would. Chatter in failsafe systems such as reactor protection and containment isolation, however, will not prevent or reverse the actuation of the system. These design features provide the basis for the use of relay chatter acceptability for the initiation logic of these systems. Although USI A-46 does not assume a Loss of Cooling Accident (LOCA), initiation of the ECCS is acceptable, and may be desirable for some situations. These fluid systems have protective features to prevent damage Page 3-2 FACtLTY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVANBFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 during unneeded operation and operators in the control room can shut down any of the ECCS not needed. The second screening method chosen whenever possible is the Level 1 screen. This seismic acceptability screen was developed as a simple screen for cases in which high capacity relays are located low in the plant. Specific criteria for this screening method are discussed in EPRI NP-7148, Section 3.6. In general, relay contacts with a seismic capacity of 8g or more located less than about 40 feet above grade satisfy the Level 1 seismic adequacy screen. The 8g capacity screen can be used for most panels and cabinets when the other Level 1 criteria are met. For moderate capacity relays, a 5g screen can be applied when the relay is in a low amplification cabinet or panel and the other Level 1 criteria are met. Appendix I of EPRI NP-7148 provides guidance in determining cabinet and panel amplification categories. Page 3-3 FACILflY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVANBFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004
- 4. SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM COMPONENTS The safe shutdown system components for relay evaluation listed in this Chapter are evaluated and results are provided on the G.4 forms in Chapter 5. The method of selecting and the bases for the selection of the components are provided in Reference 6-9. Table 4-1 provides the relay SSEL for the mechanical equipment components.
Table 4-2 provides the relay SSEL for electrical equipment components. In Tables 4-1 and 4-2, items with a single strikethrough drawn through (eXanple) are on the composite SSEL but are not on the relay SSEL. Items with a double strikethrough (&xaQ4pl) are those specifically associated with the diesel generator systems. The diesel generator systems are not included on the relay SSEL because they are common to Unit 2, were evaluated in the BFN-2 and BFN-3 relay evaluation, and were specifically addressed in the SER (Reference 6-8). Page 4-1 FACILITY RIsK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVA/BFN-01 -R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 TABLE 4-1: RELAY SSEL FOR USI A-46 & SEISMIC IPEEE
- MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ITEMS SSEL I NUMBER lCLASSl EOUIPMENT I.D. I I DESCRIPTION II BUILDING IIELEV.
10001 00 1-HCU-85,1-185 CRD/HYDRAULIC CONTROL UNIT Ul RB 565 10002 07 1-FCV-85-82A CRD/WEST SDV VENT VALVE U1 RB 565 10003 07 1-FCV-85-82 CRD/WEST SDV VENT VALVE U1 RB 565 10004 07 1-FCV-85-37C CRDIWEST SDV DRAIN VALVE U1 RB 565 10005 07 1-FCV-85-37D CRDAWEST SDV DRAIN VALVE U1 RB 565 10006 07 1-FCV-85-83A CRD/EAST SDV VENT VALVE U1 RB 565 10007 07 1-FCV-85-83 CRD/EAST SDV VENT VALVE Ul RB 565 10008 07 1-FCV-85-37E CRD/EAST SDV DRAIN VALVE Ut RB 565 10009 07 1-FCV-85-37F CRD/EAST SDV DRAIN VALVE Ui RB 565 40.4 4- :444 104 .~...CBP'WEST SC1NISTRUM~r TVOL'JME .. J-....-.... U5:61 40044t u4 4-6-0 10012 CRDEaST SCRAM MAL JN$TRUMENT VOLUME C/R08B .. V.7.......... . .....
- LR& ....
466 10012 08B 1.FSV-85-37A CRD/SCRAM DUMP VALVE Ut RB 565 10013 08B 1-FSV-85-37B CRD/SCRAM DUMP VALVE Ul RB 565 10014 08B 1-FSV-85-35A CRD/BACKUP SCRAM VALVE U1 RB 565 10015 08B 1-FSV-85-35B A CRD/BACKTP SCRAM VALVE Ul RB 561 10016 20 1-HS-99-5A/S1A RPS/REACTOR MANUAL SCRAM CHANNEL IA Ul CB 617 10017 20 1-HS-99-5A/SlB RPS/REACTOR MANUAL SCRAM CHANNEL BV UECB 617 10018 20 1.HS-99-5A-S1 RPS/REACTOR MODESWITCH U CB 617 10019 8B 1-FSV-85-70A CRDEBACKUP PILOT SCRAM VALVEA_ U1 RB 565 10020 8B 1-FSV-85-70B CRDI BACKUP PILOT SCRAM VALVEB_ U1 RB 565 40 4--. .6- 1.330 CRDISOL TION CHECK VA ':
.- ... . ........ CRD. ISOLAT ON CHECK V---- ALVE:-k :..-.:.:.:.:.:. _ >
10023 8B ;-FSV-85-39A CRDISOLATIONUVALVE UVRB 565 10024 8B 1-FSV-85-398 CRDHISOLATIONUVALVE UARB 565 10025 18A -PI-85-88 PRESSURE INDICATOR U2 RB 519 10026 18 1-PI-85-89 PRESSURE INDICATOR U1 RB 565 10027 18 1-PI-85-90 PRESSURE INDICATOR U1 RB 565
.......RSXH.B RIO.TI." .............. ....... .....
. p.........
11006 08A 1-FCV-74-1 RHRPPUMP 1A SUCTION VALVE FROWVLV Ul RB 519 SUPRESSION POOL 11002 08A 1-FCV-74-2 RHRIPRIMP A SUCTION VALVE FROM SHUTDOWN U1 RB 519 COOLING 110031 08A 2-FCV-74-961 RHR/U2 TO U1 RHR X-TIE ISOLATION VALVE U2 RB 519 11004 06 1-PMP-74-5 RHR/PUMP 1A U1 RB 519 m..,- - -wq. .....-. .......
;....UM. ..rIC.E IMMFO C........
AV. .. . .... 11006 08A 1-FCV-74-7 RHR/PUMP 1A & IC MINIMUM FLOW VALVE U1 RB 519
- -1 1. 0a.R;...... R S .1 ;CAG CaEK:YLVE.
11013 OSA 2-PCV-74-97
- RHR/U2 TOUAT RHR-ANGIE ISOATION V ALE .. U:::RB . .5 1 11010- 08A 2-FCV-74-100- RHRIU2TOU1 RHRDISCHARGEX-TIEISOLATION U2RB 565 VALVE (A,C)
.___ _ _ ___ ___ _ _ _ CO LN 11011 08A 1-FCV-74 12 RHRIPUIMP 1C SUCTION VALVE FROM U1 RB 519 SUPRESSION POOL 11012 08A 1-FCV-74 13 RHRIPUMP 1C SUCTION VALVE FROM SHUTDOWN U1 RB 519 COOLING I -
11013
- 08A 2-FCV-74-97
- RHRIU2 TO U1 RHR X-TIE ISOLATION VALVE U2 RB 519 Page 4-2 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVA/BFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 TABLE 4-1, Continued: RELAY SSEL FOR USI A-46 & SEISMIC IPEEE _____________ __I BUILDING ELEV.
- MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ITEMS lCLASS' 1 NUMBER EQUIPMENT I.D. I DESCRIPTION 11014 06 1-PMP-74-16 RHR/PUMP 1C U1 RB 519 44:014S-$ RF . .r-KV 71 '6 5604 RHR'FUMP:1C MINIMUM FLOW CHECK YALVE ' 4'- .;
~404... :F. . 1 CY.V 71 EseC
.. .. .. .. ... . iH. R'PUMP '1CDlSCR RGE CHECY.VALVE': :........
; ... ; . - 4-F& . .. ......................
. $.9:'5.. 'i
- ,4~.,~ :~.. lNX7 a00 J* RH/E.TECA~RC :......... .. ' U:,;::f6i.
11018 18 1-FI-74-50 RHR/LOOP I FLOW INDICATOR UI RB 519 11019 18 1-FI-74-56 RHRILOOP I FLOW INDICATOR U1 RB 519 11020 08A 1-FCV-74-57 RHRILOOP ITORUS CONTAINMENT U1 RB 519 COOLING/SPRAY VALVE 11021 08A 1-FCV-74-59 RHRJLOOP I SUPRESSION POOL COOLING VALVE Ul RB 519 11022 08A 1-FCV-74-58 RHRILOOP I SUPRESSION POOL SPRAY VALVE Ul RB 519 11023 08A RHR/LOOP IOUTBOARD INJECTION VALVE UI RB 66 _-FCV-74-52 11024 08A 1-FCV-74-53 RHR/LOOP I INBOARD INJECTION VALVE U1 RB 56S 11025 R 1-FCV-74-54 RHRILOOP I TESTABLE CHECK VALVE U1 DW 11026 08A 1-FCV-78-61 FPC/SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING X-TIE TO RHR UI RB 621 11027 08A 1-FCV-74-60 RHRILOOP I OUTBOARD DRYWELL SPRAY VALVE U1 RB 565 11028 08A 1-FCV-74-61 RHRILOOP I INBOARD DRYWELL SPRAY VALVE U1 RB 565 11029 08A 1-FCV-74-24 RHR/PUMP lB SUCTION VALVE FROM U1 RB 519 SUPRESSION POOL 11030 08A 1-FCV-74-25 RHR/PUMP 1B SUCTION VALVE FROM SHUTDOWN Ul RB 519 COOLING _ _ 11031 06 1-PMP-74-28 RHRIPUMP lB U1 RB 519 44-c3K F 4 c4 - G:O. RHI.'P UM 1 .CNIK 1 AFL, ' OW C-CK-- .. AUI i . 11033 08A 1-FCV-74-30 RHR/PUMP 1B & iD MINIMUM FLOW VALVE U1 RB 519
.F 4.44 R . .:iHP PUMP 2 1INIUM FLRW "CHECKVALVE>>:
A-PC u4-Ri 4 - ......-.. :.: X...... X X X. ..X ., .. ..,, ,. ........... 11037 08A 1-FCV-74-35 RHRIPUMP ID SUCTION VALVE FROM U1 RB 519 SUPRESSION POOL 11038 08A 1-FCV-74-36 RHRIPUMP 1DSUCTION VALVE FROM SHUTDOWN U1 RB 519 COOLING 11039 06 1-PMP-74-39 RHR/PUMP ID
- U1 RB 519 F 4'44040 A60
' , .:.R'PMI. .MU FLOW CWV.ICK , LVF.'. -:I:. 540 4404-4 F ..KV:471 85 PSGHAR;;GCCGE-CHECVALYVe.l8i:
RJ9 .,: . $40. 4-4 ,.: . HE 71 00D. PHPJEAT EXCH~kJGER '1D: :..:,',..0 . '$': 11043 18 1-FI-74-64 RHR/LOOP II FLOW INDICATOR U1 RB 519 11044 18 1-FI-74-70 RHRILOOP II FLOW INDICATOR Ul RB 519 11045 08A 1-FCV-74-71 RHR/LOOP IITORUS CONTAINMENT Ul RB 519 COOLING/SPRAY VALVE 11046 08A 1-FCV-74-73 RHR/LOOP II SUPRESSION POOL COOLING VALVE U1 RB 519 11047 08A 1-FCV-74-72 RHRILOOP II SUPRESSION POOL SPRAY VALVE Ut RB 519 11048 08A 1-FCV-74-66 RHR/LOOP II OUTBOARD INJECTION VALVE U1 RB 565 11049 08A 1-FCV-74-67 RHRILOOP II INBOARD INJECTION VALVE U1 RB 565 11050 R 1-FCV-74-68 RHRILOOP II TESTABLE CHECK VALVE Ut DW 11051 08A 1-FCV-74-74 RHRILOOP II OUTBOARD DRYWELL SPRAY VALVE U1 RB 593 11052 08A 1-FCV-74-75 RHRtLOOP II INBOARD DRYWELL SPRAY VALVE U1 RB 593 11053 08A 1-FCV-74-101 RHR/U2TO U1 RHR DISCHARGE X-TIE ISOLATION Ul RB 565
. VALVE (BD)
Page 4-3 FAClLinY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVA/BFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 TABLE 4-1, Continued: RELAY SSEL FOR USI A-46 & SEISMIC IPEEE
- MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ITEMS jSSEL I NUMBER ICLASSl EQUIPMENT I.D. I DESCRIPTION I BIDN lBUILDING1EV LV 12001 07 1-PCV-1-4 MS/MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE Ul DW 584 I-12003 07 1.PCV-1-5 MS/MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE U1 DW 584 RVVMgV 5DSCHAGUEAUt .-4 .:..{....:.. :,i ..... ,.,:
...4 200' . RVVD,'MSRV1 6 DISCHARGE LINlE VACUI. '~.:.:
.W
.. ..x, P.
12006 07 1-PCV-1-18 MS/MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE Ul OW 584 RVD'MSRV4!1 1 DISCHARGE LINE VACL RVVD/ISRV! 18 DISCHARGE L1NEVACI
.... X.;.
12009 07 1-PC V-1-19 MS/MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE Ul U4 : DW : 584 i GXVP40Q' 12012 07 1-PCV-1-22 MS/MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE Ul DW 584 DQl ll In& C101A "in r'lC!PUA Or' 11= IKIC Iff 01 DV U1-DW 58 U DW . .......... 12015 07 1-PCV-1-23 MS/MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE .U1 DW 58 R-VV9XAARV 1 423 DISCH.RG E.LINE VACUUJM 81< 4204 P. 1-CV4 0 r.I 12018 07 1-PCV-1-179 MS/MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE Ul DW _ 584 RVVD/MSRV 1 1Q 7DIScH&ARGE LIME VACUUM B U11DW.: FI'AD'M4V'! 1:4 79 DISCH1ARGELIPIE:VAWUUM B U1 W 12021 07 1-PCV-1-30 MS/MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE Ul DW 584 RWDMSR' 1 30 D!SCHIARGE LlNE VACUUM BK RWD'MSRV.1 30 DISCHARGE LANE VACUUM PI 12024 07 1-PCV-1-31 MS/MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE U1 DW 584 RVVWDI4SRV-1 :3 DISCWARGE:L4NE- VACUIJIAUB (t '::: .
.X f. f.- .'.}'
RVVIM4SRV 1 21 DISCMARGE L NEVACUUM BX .: 12027 07 1-PCV-1-34 MSIMAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE Ul DW 584 RVVWtDMSRV1314DISCHARGrE LINE VACUUM 'A .:w.Wr0 c :::: : ::0:: 0629x ::::-: 1 ,,:.... RWD/MSRV!-1 431 DISCHARGE LINEVAICUUM BR 12030 07 1 -PCV- I -4 1 MS/MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE Ul DW 584 FW3UM8RV+114 DISCHARGE L VACUU II U,I : .DW 4 .L 8 :tC.V1f6~ RWD/MARV ST1EIACAFT REL'E E VACUUM LV 12033 07 1 -PCV- 1-4 2 MS/MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE U1 DW 584
,:,4 2 4'.. R . I cil.
CV B7'.:...' 12036 07 1-PCV-1-180 MS/MAIN STEAM SAFETY RE_LIEF VALVE U1DW 584
.. . . P...,.p:1-C 4.... RVVD/MS4RV, "I GIE LIPIELVACUUh B;0R.: U ..
RI0SISCHARGrWE- LINE VAC 'I 1 It] wnZ :l - - P .' RPVVD'4SR-'1 - AG DISCMAR9E LINIE- 3 -I-. 13001 07 1-FCV-1-14 MSIV 'A' INBOARD ISOLATION VALVE Ul DW 563 13002 07 1-FCV-1-15 MSIV 'A OUTBOARD ISOLATION VALVE Ul RB 564 13003 07 1-FCV-1-26 MSIV 'B INBOARD ISOLATION VALVE Ul DW 563 13004 07 1-FCV-1-27 MSIV *B OUTBOARD ISOLATION VALVE Ul RB 564 13005 07 1-FCV-1-37 MSIV C INBOARD ISOLATION VALVE Ul DW 563 13006 07 1-FCV-1-38 MSIV C OUTBOARD ISOLATION VALVE Ul RB 564 13007 07 1-FCV-1-51 MSIV *D- INBOARD ISOLATION VALVE U1 DW 563 Page 4-4 FACILiTY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVA/BFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 TABLE 4-1, Continued: RELAY SSEL FOR USI A-46 & SEISMIC IPEEE
- MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ITEMS SSEL [
NUMBER lCLASS1 EQUIPMENT I.D. I I DESCRIPTION II BUILDING II ELEV. 13008 07 1-FCV-1-52 MSIV D OUTBOARD ISOLATION VALVE Ul RB 664 13009 08A 1-FCV-1-55 MAIN STEAM LINE DRAIN ISOLATION VALVE U1 DW 563
.. 4300.. ,R% 4 CV.VQ.. 6L.. FEEDWATER *A INPOA.1D ISOLA.TIOPI VALVE -. .::.::.::........
FEEDWATER 'T OARD iO L A 5 5. R.K... F...EEDWATER '9 INBARD ISOLTIOPJVALVE... M tJI1DW
~~~~~~~~. .FEEDI.AITER
.. ....... *B OUT.OA.RDISOLA.T!OI V~ALV£ :. .. ,.,....
13014 07 1-FCV-32-63 DRYWELLCONTROLAIR SUCTION VALVE U1 RB 565 13015 07 1-FCV-64-17 CONTAINMENT VENTILTION ISOLATION VALVE Ul RB 565 13016 07 1-FCV-64-30 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION VALVE Ul RB 621 13017 07 1-FCV-64-33 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION VALVE Ul RB 665 13018 07 1-FCV-64-139 CONTAINMENT DW DP ISOLATION VALVE U1 RB 565 13019 07 1-FCV-64-140 CONTAINMENT DW DP ISOLATION VALVE U1 RB 665 13020 07 1-FCV-64-28A SUPPRESSION CHAMBER/DRYW ELL VACUUM U1 DW <550 __ BREAKERS 13021 07 1-FCV-64-28B SUPPRESSION CHAMBER/DRYWELL VACUUM U1 DW <550 BREAKERS 13022 07 1-FCV-64-28C SUPPRESSION CHAMBER/DRYWELL VACUUM Ul DW <550 BREAKERS 13023 07 1-FCV-64-28D SUPPRESSION CHAMBERJDRYWELL VACUUM U1 DW <550 BREAKERS 13024 07 1-FCV-64-28E SUPPRESSION CHAMBERIDRYWELL VACUUM U1 DW <550 BREAKERS 13025 07 1-FCV.64-28F SUPPRESSION CHAMBER/DRYWELL VACUUM U1 DW <550 __ BREAKERS 13026 07 1-FCV-64-28G SUPPRESSION CHAMBER/DRYWELL VACUUM U1 DW <550 BREAKERS 13027 07 1-FCV-64.28H SUPPRESSION CHAMBER/DRYWELLVACUUM U1 DW <550 BREAKERS 13028 07 1-FCV-64-28J SUPPRESSION CHAMBER1DRYWELL VACUUM U1 DW <550 BREAKERS 13029 07 1-FCV-64-28K SUPPRESSION CHAMBER/DRYWELLVACUUM U1 DW <550
._______ _BREAKERS <
13030 07 1-FCV-64-28L SUPPRESSION CHAMBER/DRYWELL VACUUM U1 DW <550 BREAKERS 13031 07 1-FCV-64-28M SUPPRESSION CHAMBERIDRYWELL VACUUM U1 DW <550 BREAKERS 13032 08A 1-FCV-69-1 RWCU INBOARD ISOLATION VALVE Ul DW 584 13033 08A 1-FCV-69-2 RWCU OUTBOARD ISOLATION VALVE U1 RB 593 I cwtG-57.g RWCV. SYSTEM RETFURN CHECK VALVE.: .:. ..- 13035 08A 1-FCV-70-47 RBCCW DRYWELL RETURN VALVE U1 RB 519 43.036.. R . C.. 0 , I7,. ,.0 ......
.BCCW ..:DR. .1L'SUPP.LY. CHECK VALVE!9 -..,X,......
U- X__ >. 13037 08A 1-FCV-71-2 RCIC INBOARD ISOLATION VALVE U1 DW 584 13038 08A 1-FCV-71-3 RCIC OUTBOARD ISOLATION VALVE U1 RB 665 13039 08A 1.FCV-71-18 RCIC OUTBOARD SUCTION VALVE U1 RB 519 13040 08A 1-FCV-73-2 HPCI STEAM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE Ut DW 563 13041 08A 1.FCV-73.3 HPCI STEAM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE U1 RB 519 13042 08A 1-FCV-73-81 HPCI STEAM SUPPLY ISOLATION BYPASS VALVE U1 RB 519 13043 08A 1-FCV-73-27 HPCI OUTBOARD SUCTION VALVE Ut RB 519 13044 07 1-FCV-75-57 PSC PUMP SUCTION ISOLATION VALVE Ut RB 519 Page 4-5 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVA/BFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 TABLE 4-1, Continued: RELAY SSEL FOR USI A-46 & SEISMIC IPEEE
- MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ITEMS SSEL l I I NUMBER jCLASSI EOUIPMENT l.D. I DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV.
13045 07 1-FCV-75-58 PSC PUMP SUCTION ISOLATION VALVE U1 RB 519 13046 07 1-FCV-76-24 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE Ul RB 565 13047 07 1-FCV-77-2B DRYWELL FLOOR DRAIN SUMP DISCHARGE U1 RB 519 13048 07 1-FCV-77-15B DRYWELL EQUIPMENT DRAIN SUMP DISCHARGE Ul RB 519 13049 07 1-FCV-84-19 CAD ISOLATION VALVE Ul RB 621 13050 07 1-FCV-84-20 CAD ISOLATION VALVE Ul RB 621 13051 20 1-LI-3-58A RPV LEVEL INSTRUMENT U1 CB 617 13052 20 1-LI-3-58B RPV LEVEL INSTRUMENT U1 CB 617 13053 20 1-PI-3-74A RPV PRESSURE INSTRUMENT Ul CB 617 13054 20 1-PI-3-74B RPV PRESSURE INSTRUMENT U1 CB 617 13055 20 1-XR-64-159 TORUS LEVEL AND DRYWELL PRESSURE U1 CB 617 INSTRUMENT 13056 20 1-LI-64-159A TORUS LEVEL INSTRUMENT U1 CB 617 13057 20 1-TI-64-161 TORUS TEMPERATURE INSTRUMENT U1 CB 617 13058 20 1-TI-64-162 TORUS TEMPERATURE INSTRUMENT U1 CB 617 13059 20 1-PI-64-67B DRYWELL PRESSURE INSTRUMENT U1 CB 617 13060 20 1-PI-64-160A DRYWELL PRESSURE INSTRUMENT U1 CB 617 13061 20 1-TI-64-52A/B DRYWELL TEMPERATURE INSTRUMENT U1 CB 617 13062 20 1-XR-64-50 DRYWELLTEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE Ul CB 617 _ __ _ INSTRUMENT 13063 07 1-FCV-76-17 CONTAINMENT INERTING N2 MAKEUP U1 RB 565 13064 07 1-FCV-64-222 HARDENED WETWELL VENT U1 RB 565 13065 20 1-NM-92-7/41A CHANNEL A IRM INDICATOR U1 CB 617 13066 20 1-NM-92-7/41B CHANNEL 'B IRM INDICATOR Ul CB 617 4.O3068 ... ... . .IM3ARY6 COWTANMENT: I,SOATION CHEGK VAL U44 , 13069 08A 1-FCV-71-40 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE U1 RB 565 44O'
- ...70 . :~4. K1 R' 8O'
.4661CK .: RIMARY
... ........... 7 CNTAfNMNT-ISOLATION
;... . CHtECK
.. . ... VALVE
......... : J.4-.& .... .
..43074 P. 4..::A:.:1C4Q71
'01 : >PRIMARY'CONTAIPJMENT. ISOLATION CHECK VAWEV U- .........................
43: : R t-!v 3 603 .. P1.:.FARY, CONTAl1lME^ ,TS'.A 'E : .': 4473::: ,;: .:44=34 PRIMARY CO TAINMjE T ISOLATION CHECK VAtVE Y.-. 13074 08A 1-FCV-71-17 RCIC INBOARD SUCTION VALVE U1 RB 619 13075 08A 1-FCV-1-56 MAIN STEAM LINE DRAIN ISOLATION VALVE U1 RB 565 13076 08A 1-FCV-73-26 HPCI INBOARD SUCTION VALVE U1 RB 519 440Th7 U:.P." 1>V4 j :.:rCHECK VALVE. 13078 20 1-XR.64-156 TORUS LEVEL AND DRYWELL PRESSURE U1 CB 617 INSTRUMENT I 13079 07 1-FCV-32-62 DRYWELL CONTROL AIR SUCTION VALVE Ut RB 565 13080 07 1-FCV-77-2A DRYWELL FLOOR DRAIN SUMP DISCHARGE Ut RB 519 13081 07 1-FCV-77-15A DRYWELL EOUIPMENT DRAIN SUMP DISCHARGE U1 RB 519 13082 07 1-FCV-64-18 COOLI NG/PURG E AIR TO DRYW ELL Ut RB 565 13083 07 1-FCV-64-19 COOLING/PURGE AIR TO SUPPRESSION CHAMBER U1 RB 565 13084 07 1-FCV-76-18 CONTAINMENT INERTING DRYWELL N2 MAKEUP U1 RB 565
._ VALVE 13085 07 1-FCV-76-19 CONTAINMENT INERTING - PSC N2 MAKEUP VALVE U1 RB 565 14001 10
_ -CLR-67-917 EECW/RHR PUMP ROOM COOLER Ul RB 519 _A 14002 10 1-CLR-67-919 EECW/CS PUMP 1AROOM COOLER U1 RB 519 Page 4-6 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVAIBFN-01 -R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 TABLE 4-1, Continued: RELAY SSEL FOR USI A-46 & SEISMIC IPEEE
- MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ITEMS SSEL j
NUMBER CLASS]_EQUIPMENT I.D. IDESCRIPTION 11 IBUILDING IELEV 14003 10 1-CLR-67-921 EECWIRHR PUMP iC ROOM COOLER UI RB 519 404 0 44-4.IX47--1 48 EECwiRHR SEA. -X1 4 4c~W-6-68g rECW WORTH HE5ADER SWUPPLy G CHEKVLET 4. G 4-400 4 .. 4 CKV-Q7-G886:: ~EWr- NORTH H-ADERp SUPPLY CHECGKVAlIVET 4 4405 4 914j rEECAW NORTH- WEA DER SUPPLY*CHECK)~YVAV T J4 165X 14014 10 1CLR67-9 ECWlICS PUM lBROO.COLE _4H X -Q ~ EC 'H .__ .EA.......... 66ECWGSOTW. HEADER.KV~-6 SUPPLYV CHECK UVNtVET O:- J4-3R 6 94 ,:' I-="'4-64& =EClW SOUTH4 HEADER aL IPPLYV CHE-CK VALVE-TO 4 ~ 1 141 10 -CK4-67591 EECW CHECPUPALVE M OOE U RB 5193 14014+/- 00 I-CLR-67-920 ~ EECWIC PUMP ISCHROOECORAIER U RBK 5196 14034
- 0A 1-FCL-67-92 AEECWRH PUMP DISHRGEM STRAIER DRAN ITAK 565 X.Zn A -YA7- 2
.:.Q44:EW
=I=
YTM OT HEDE X:jixxVALVE X xHEC IX' i4-Q i :. i: 6 4A 40 .:-+/-: 0CJt64. EC SSEMNRT SUP *EAE HECK VALVIE W 1666:: 0 1401 0 0-M-31 RRWPUPC NTK 6 Page 4-7. FAClWTY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVANBFN-01 -R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 TABLE 4-1, Continued: RELAY SSEL FOR USI A-46 & SEISMIC IPEEE
- MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ITEMS SSEL l 1 1 NUMBER jCLASS EQUIPMENT l.D. DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV.
--. 4 A i -: 0.CJ4143-S9 RRRSW 'MP CS DISCH...E.CHEC..VALVE '. A
-14013_ Q ::::0TN679-7.:.., C EECWPUMP DISCHARE £TRNER Mp M0mS- .
14044 08A 0-FCV-67-8 C EECW PUMP DISCHARGE STRAINER DRAIN INTAKE 565 ____ VALVE 14045 08A 0-FCV-67-49 RHRSW PUMP Cl TO EECW SYSTEM CROSS- INTAKE 565 CONNECT 14046* 07 1-FCV-67-50 EECW NORTH HEADER BACKUP TO RBCCW U1 RB 593 14049
- 07 0-FCV-67-53 EECW NORTH HEADER BACKUP TO THE AIR UI RB 565 COMPRESSORS x O: V7 .
NORTH EAXER:... SUPPL. X :" .ECW YCHECK ,...... VALVE
. TO : .-
_ ;. ..-:.-..-...h. _4--~ .. .-
- '::::::..:.:...: .:.:.:..::. .:.:....:.:....:...:.:.::.:.:.:. .::.i.:.:
...:.:.:.i:
. .::.:.'.-. : :. :::i:::.;: :i:.: .'.:.::. : . , ... . . ...
~ .iR.-.- 0CKVL4 C,66' ECW GNORTH HEADER SUPPLY CHECK '.ALVETO U14^,:W 161ii-..'
ii.............................. ii-i.
.;ii'.y:.
.::iP.i-.;"':TE8D'i
;X; . '2 'EECW .. . ;. :.;E WORTH WEADER SUPPL4
- 44:6..+/-
,.,1', ..'.EECW,
. ;.;;.. j.;,..r.... .
ORT.H HEADER .... .- ,-...'.. CHECK VALYE SUPP.LYCHECK ALVE TO TO. U1J2 ' . EECW -NGORT14WEADER O'.WCHECK\VALVE SUPS TO . .:.i16 1472: 0 3-11 EC PUM AMERG INICTONF/ X XI 14071* 20 -EI-23-85/3 EECW PUMP A3 AMPERAGE INDICATION NUA R5A 14072* 20 O-EI-23-91/3 EECW PUMP C3 AMPERAGE INDICATION WJA NIA 14074
- 06 0-PMP-23-88 RHRSW PUMP B3 INTAKE 665 14077 ' 08A D-FCV-67-5 B EECW PUMP DISCHARGE STRtAINER DRAIN INTAKE 565 VALVE O
.. . .. 0. EECW SOUHHEADER P CHECKVALVETO i U4 -, - 6 44.3 4 : C IOECW SO' 'TH HEADER P4 PL CHECK AA L TO .; i :6 14084 ' 06 0-PMP-23-94 RHRSW PUMP D3 INTAKE 565 i::: -- ~~~~RH-:W. MH2WP-3 DISCHARGE CHECK-VALV -.- ....................i-..
t 4sT-A*71:29.g D rEE-G4A P21AAP DI SCWAS4GrTR AMXRE:;.,.- 14087
- 08A 0-FCV-67-11 D EECW PUMP DISCHARGE STRIAINER DRAIN INTAKE 565 VALVE 14088
- 08A 0-FCV-67-48 iRHRSW PUMP DI TO EECW SYSTEM CROSS- INTAKE 565 CONNECT 14089
- 07 1-FCV-67-51 tECW SYSTEM SOUTH HEA DER BACKUP TO U1 RB 565 RBCCW
-440;g:~~~~.
...::..i: E EW -SALVET)DC-.d.l HC THrEADRSULY 44: .0 .: =3 : CIl :: ---EWSOUH 9tADrR SUPPL2CEC VA VT . O . 2M WrC .. i
-.. . ....... E DE S P L ~
UH Z V.. ......
..... L E... C. .. .........
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.... -.....<-j.
., ., .,,.,.j;;-
Page 4-8 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVAIBFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 TABLE 4-1, Continued: RELAY SSEL FOR USI A-46 & SEISMIC IPEEE
- MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ITEMS SSEL I IIII NUMBER lCLASSl EQUIPMENT ID. I DESCRIPTION IBUILDING I ELEV.
44094+/- R Q.. 0 SS.. EECWSOUTH HADER SURFLY CHECK-VALVE TO ... . . ...
. ,....TX ,G .. . .....................::{:.
.;j 0 S jE..EECWSOUTH HEADER SUPPLY CHECK VALVE TO... ,....
Q...QJ44...I EECW SOUTH HEADER S UPPLPCHECK VALVE TO. U,4,2 6
~~~~~~~~~~~T o a ..........--. , TE :.::
. .~ .- ~.1R0C44 6 S08.-EECW SOUTH HEADER SUFPLY CHECK VALVE TO U4-C . 66...........
- . ~~.-- ~ TE~ ~: :~ .... -E .. ...-
14098 *20 0-EI-23-88/3 EECW PUMP B3 AMPERAGE INDICATION N/A N1A 14099
- 20 0-EI-23-94/3 EECW PUMP D3 AMPERAGE INDICATION N/A N/A 15001 08A 1-FCV-75-2 CS/PUMP IA SUCTION ISOLATION VALVE Ul RB 519 15002 06 1-PMP-75-5 CS/PUMP IA U1RB 519 R... :,... :C,::PUMP1ADISC.ARGE.C
- R . iC.-.-. 76517A> (SiFUMP1A MINI FLOW CHECK ........ ,-,
.AE 15005 08A 1-FCV-75-9 CS/PUMPS 1A & IC MINI-FLOW VALVE U1 RB 519 15006 08A 1-FCV-75-11 CS/PUMP 1C SUCTION ISOLATION VALVE Ul RB 519 15007 06 1-PMP-75-14 CS/PUMP IC U1 RB 519
.. 8 : ;R - . CSIPUPi..C DISCHARGE CHECK VAL. . - ..
4 .KV 75 70. CS'PUM S4 RCHECK t: Nl.:FLOW
>F : H VALVE f : ::. - - :r .:
15010 08A 1-FCV-75-22 CS/PUMPS 1A & iC TEST ISOLATION VALVE U1 RB 519 15011 18 1-FI-75-21 CS/PUMPS IA& iC FLOW INDICATOR U1 RS 15012 08A 1-FCV-75-23 CS/DIV I OUTBOARD INJECTION VALVE Ul RB 593 15013 08A 1-FCV-75-25 CS/DIV I INBOARD INJECTION VALVE U1 RB 593 15014 R 1-FCV-75-26 CS/DIV I TESTABLE CHECK VALVE Ul DW 15015 08A 1-FCV-75-30 CS/PUMP 1B SUCTION ISOLATION VALVE Ul RB 519 15016 06 1-PMP-75-33 CS/PUMP lB U1 RB 519
.. 0 RH4. LR- .7 .. 6- 16:/FUMP:1 PG L ..................-
...- .75 - 7 .R : CSIPUMP.1B MAIN' FLOW.CECK AL.E.- V ::. A4 ...... ....
15019 08A 1-FCV-75-37 CS/PUMPS 1B & iD MINI-FLOW VALVE Ul RB 519 15020 08A 1-FCV-75-39 CS/PUMP ID SUCTION ISOLATION VALVE U1 RB 519 1b021 06 1-PMP-75-42 CS/PUMP iD U1 RB 519
,. 76 -C ARGEC.ECKVALVE. ..............D.ISC.,.
4$Q .~ .. ::.~U -.R 0V 7 D C 0PUMPID Ir.. FLOW.CHECK VA LVE - ..-...... 15024 08A 1-FCV-75-50 CS/PUMPS 1B & 1D TEST ISOLATION VALVE Ul RB 519 15025 18 1-FI-75-49 CS/PUMPS lB & ID FLOW INDICATOR U1 RB 15026 08A 1-FCV-75-51 CS/DIV II OUTBOARD DISCHARGE VALVE Ul RB 593 15027 08A 1-FCV-75-53 CS/DIV II INBOARD DISCHARGE VALVE Ut RB 593 15028 R 1-FCV-75-54 CS/DIV II TESTABLE CHECK VALVE Ut DW 16001 08B 1-FSV-84-8A CAD/CAD TO DW (1-FCV-64-18) SOLENOID VALVE Ut RB 565 16002 088 1-FSV-84-8B CAD/CAD TO DW (1-FCV-64-19) SOLENOID VALVE U1 RB 565 16003 07 1-PREG-84-52 CAD/CAD SYSTEM 'A TO UNIT 1 DRYWELL Ul RB 565 CONTROL AIR 16004 08B 1-FSV-84-48 CAD/CAD SYSTEM *A-TO UNIT 1 DRYWELL U1 RB 565 CONTROL AIR _ 4 R 13!CHECK 'VALVE FROM DWACA CMPRSSRTO . -I-;AX 4C066 ...~ P..l 4~-4 V .CCHECI. A.' VALVE- FROM DWCA CMPRSS R TO *W@4 U- .F
.: i. ..- .:-.. . . .... .................................. D E
;.ii sRWL 4-::
- i:-:i:i. . ... . . .:,
Page 4-9 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVA/BFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 TABLE 4-1, Continued: RELAY SSEL FOR USI A-46 & SEISMIC IPEEE
- MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ITEMS SSEL NUMBER lCLASSl EQUIPMENT I.D. I DESCRIPTION IBUILDING ELEV.
C EC V . . .. . ..- ................... t O..... ...... .... 4.08 :4 . -A G G . ,,'i CACC14,LU TOR FOR PSV 1 . .'..'..
. ...... 4 16010 089 1-PSV-1-19 MS/SOLENOID VALVE FOR PCV-1-19 U1 DW 584
... 4.
464
. R
* -- CIO . ii322 4-AGG4246407,:~.C!C'M2AO
.CADR WPM WELLW1COPTROL':IRTOP.SV O P~L2.~U4-1MA
.1 22:'j.N~~i ~j j,-,,,,
UI DW;;;;*8 .i 16013 08B 1-PSV-1-22 MS/SOLENOID VALVE FOR PCV-1-22 Ul DW 584 4604.6 f4 AGCC4401; C M1W.
!nCCUMULATOR FORfPS 4 S. > -W. ;;;
16016 08B 1-PSV-1-5 MS/SOLENOID VALVE FOR PCV-1-5 U1 DW 584 16017 08B 1-PSV-1-23 MS/SOLENOID VALVE FOR PCV-1-23 U1 DW 584 16018 08B 1-PSV-1-179 MS/SOLENOID VALVE FOR PCV-1-179 Ut DW 584 16019 088 1-PSV-1-4 MS/SOLENOID VALVE FOR PCV-1-4 U1 DW 584 16021 08B 1-PSV-1-18 MS/SOLENOID VALVE FOR PCV-1-18 U1 DW 584 16023 08B 1-FSV-84-8C CAD/CAD TO DW (1.FCV-64-19) SOLENOID VALVE Ul RB 565 16024 08B 1-FSV-84-8D CAD/CAD TO DW (1-FCV-64-18) SOLENOID VALVE Ut RB 565 16025 07 1-PREG-84-54 CAD/CAD SYSTEM B TO UNIT 1 DRYWELL Ut RB 565 CONTROL AIR 16026 08B 1-FSV-84-49 CAD/CAD SYSTEM B TO UNIT 1 DRYWELL Ut RB 565 CONTROL AIR 4.-'16027 .. 4c4. . i. NCHRECK VALVEFROM WCA CMPRSSRTO -'.
-IXDR : .... PA4h 2n.;I ..
4608 24 41ACC-22-6444 CNFOW . 16030 08B 1-PSV-1-30 MS/SOLENOID VALVE FOR PCV-1-30 U1 DW 584
.0 24 .- AGCC3^608> V GNCCUMGULAT P. FOR4L' u
':iiu .J-1W 684 16033 08B 1-PSV-1.31 MS/SOLENOID VALVE FOR PCV-1-31 Ul DW 584 4604 f4nL44Q nAIMRYEL COWROL AIR TO P2SX' 4i:,i: -- W
.406 :4 ACS32-6 1 W ":ATOR ATACCUMUL FOR FSV123:~ : : '-. -;
16036 088 1-PSV-1-34 MS/SOLENOID VALVE FOR PCV-1-34 U1 DW 584 16038 08B 1-PSV-1-41 MS/SOLENOID VALVE FOR PCV-1-41 Ul DW 584 16040 08B 1-PSV-1-42 MS/SOLENOID VALVE FOR PCV-1-42 U1 DW 584 16041 08B 1-PSV-1-180 MS/SOLENOID VALVE FOR PCV-1-180 U1 DW 584 'i.... -: RI> 4CJ. 3::CCONTROL
. A!PCADCHECK\VALVE t!:-Ri 16043 07 1-FCV-64-20 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION VALVE Ul RB 665 16044 07 1-FCV-64-21 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION VALVE Ul RB 565 46046 1 GV6 440Q "2NPNMN ENT"L'ATICIS IWL'6.TION CHECrK tt- 6 4;046 1 04 ... .>;'ONAIMENT.VE.TiL TION .n ... .
16i054S 0 F -2 CANTANK SOLATION VIA IAE C YARD 565 1 .6.0 0 . C....N T-AN A- IS.OA... TION S.OLEN ID-VALV:. .. AR 1-FCV-84-20 See SSEL Item No. 13049 1-FCV-84-19 See SSEL Item No. 13050_ 16052 ' 07 0-FCV-84-5 CAD/N2TANK 'A'ItSOLATION VALVE YARD 565 16053
- 086 0-FSV-84-5 ICAD/N2 TANKW SOLATION SOLENOID VALVE IYARD 565 Page 4-1 0 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS. INC.
TVA/BFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 TABLE 4-1, Continued: RELAY SSEL FOR USI A-46 & SEISMIC IPEEE
- MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ITEMS NUMBER lCLASSl EQUIPMENT I.D. DESCRIPTION BUILDING IELEV.
16064Z 00 0- oo OR448 'YCAN2 TrNK A~ VPORIZER NH...H:Hi-: gJ-.,6s 16055. 00 0-HTR-84-5 CAD/N2 TANK A ELECTRIC HEATER YARD 565 1 07 TNFCS CAD/N1TROANK OR'BSOLTENTANK 41602 16062.* 16063w 07 846316 0-FCV-84-16 0-FS V-8 4-1 6 __..... ICAD/N2 TANK .B ISOLATiON VALVE CAD/N2 TANK ISOLATION SOLENOID VALVE
. 8.
~YARD 1565 565 565 08B .B YARD
.40064 +/-.j goIo-844 I 16065 . 00 0-HTR-84-16 CAD/N2 TANK
- ELECTRIC HEATER YARD 565 I-, I _
- 1"00W'" ... 4....
; .. I c
- .. 1:,.
- 1
-4 AZ .... w.c
... 21 U. . . .
..J..I
'I4.
_ I._-
- .:,.: 6'..'.
- .-::I
....... -T r '"':'
4;4.S g'. A rl OG-FA-
-. 1 40;.::
4;044 R40. eI c s
.. .. .. I. I L AIR R~QWI"Efl '4; *:~ ~' rkV 1 - n :.:
PECEP'SR AIR WJ :R ra ."w. ___ 00I0~Aw1 'i' .. ............. :' .' Page 4-11 FACIrTY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVANBFN-01 -R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 TABLE 4-1, Continued: RELAY SSEL FOR USI A-46 & SEISMIC IPEEE
- MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ITEMS SSEL NUMBER CLASS EQUIPMENT I.D. DESCRIPTION BUILDING I ELEV.
.,,7,.... ... 4 .. 0 rGon -on9e, .... *-::
- ss ;.
If14 I - -
'.s'
`..-
44- 0ZW0-8Q-1 04 a 4C 1W4
:1'-
*'s:-
; T-;;I4G Cas - -..
A....... I:.
- .wa
- 40 Q:--+ I.,.FGQA4Q-, 8 "4';wsC4: -` '683G
.-4:b -'
"U0.rG
. s ..
9. A:
-~8~
.]. i C:' ,
Page 4-12 FACLITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVABFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 TABLE 4-1, Continued: RELAY SSEL FOR USI A-46 & SEISMIC IPEEE
- MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ITEMS SSEL l l NUMBER ICLASSI EOUIPMENT I.D. I DESCRIPTION BUILDING I ELEV.
4Q8: 40> 498~ 40 ~~GQ-8GROO;A o-rco ao 171g -~ ~'LbST c'^Mrc;P FOnM . rc frl" m INOC -
.1A.G wr~t 68 1- 3 t t 40& 9 'FCC' 20 171C .~ 1 rluc 1FPOrR FX lga frJ rROOcj~ Ur-t .G 683 0.4: 1-G CY.V-23b10.... HXA NLET CHECK VALVE WRHWTO _ __ : 81 18002 08A 1-FCV-23-034 RHRIRHRSW HXA OUTLET VALVE Ul RB 665 4303 41C02 EGO RWRGW4TQ HXG C LE-T:CHECK VAtYE U . 1-86 18004 08A 1-FCV-23-040 RHR/RHRSW HX C OUTLET VALVE Ul RB 565
.- 8-1C
,R 33a
- i. ZDRWRSTX 2 INI C .:.:s-IT vC ......
18006 08A 1-FCV-23-046 RHRIRHRSW HX B OUTLET VALVE U1 RB 565 4-800 R TO HXDINLET.CECK HR VALVE _ 18' 18008 08A 1-FCV-23-052 RHRIRHRSW HX D OUTLET VALVE Ul RB 565 18009 20 1'FI-23-36 RHRSW HXA FLOW INDICATOR U1 RB 565 18010 20 1-FI-23-42 RHRSW HX C FLOW INDIC U1 RB 565 ATOR 18011 20 1-FI-23-48 RHRSW HX B FLOW INDICATOR U1 RB 565 18012 20 1-FI-23-54 RHRSW HX D FLOW INDICATOR U1 RB 565 18021 ' 06 0-PMP-23-005 RHRSW PUMP A2 INTAKE 5665
.:R:.: 0 18022- o i RHRSI' P'A2DISCHARGE CHECKV,"AL 'i,4NTA.K&-
18023 08A 1-FCV-23-034 RHRIRHRSW HXA OUTLET VALVE U1 RB 665 18024' 06 0-PMP-23-012 RHRSW PUMP C2 INTAKE 665
.. ,,.. +/-A.';
'.'.',' -C04-K34 .': ,R.'D-'.',
K 568' 18026* 08A 1-FCV-23-040 RHRIRHRSW HX C OUTLET VALVE U1 RB 565 18027
- 06 0-PMP 19 RHRSW PUMP B2 INTAKE 565
_ _ . :. . 42 :. R W PtP S2 D!SCHARGE CHECt .VALVE . . 5 . . ;' WA> . 18029- 08A 1-FCV-23-046 RHR/RHRSW HX B OUTLET VALVE Ul RB 565 18030- 06 D-PMP-23-027 RHRSW PUMP D2 INTAKE 565
- ...A:.0-CtV234 S6:.RRSW P t tPD DtS tAGEC EC L-.: KVALVE sAK6 8 18032 O0A 1-FCV-23-052 RHRIRHRSW HX D OUTLET VALVE U1 RB 565 18033
- 08A 1-FCV-23-57 RHRIRHRSW CROSS CONNECT VALVE Ui RB 565
- Note that these equipment items are either common to or shared by both Units 1 & 2, and have previously been evaluated under the Unit 2 USI A-46 program. These items are included here in the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Equipment List for completeness.
Page 4-13 FACIL17Y RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVA/BFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 TABLE 4-2: RELAY SSEL FOR USI A-46 & SEISMIC IPEEE
- ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ITEMS SSEL NUMBER CLASSI EQUIPMENT I.D. DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV.
... . . . .. l .. . crl'C r~j'A I rf'fKtrrnf:'QlAtj1 - 4'
- -1 U4 C Y..
- ,49003 -.
- 2:.20' 6411
..:' 06 . .- :20': II U5 7
- I:
.w
.:490; I-
- 20:: J4~--7-s-17=
4- E 64-
.944I
- 44 :: 1O2B268 Q 59 MGST1D C0-OLST.A.TION (1 'HS 269.
494 44 8 MG SET 1EN CONTROL STATION9 (1 HS 268 L 6 4904 2+/- -44 ' 1 JSOX462 59017 MG SET 1DIN COPITROL OX (RELAYS) SEALED '- 624 19013- 14 V.R. Box 1DN MG SET 1DN VOLTAGE REGULATOR BOX U1 RB 621 4904.4 - 44. 1 JBQ OX 26U 010:, MAG SL4 &N t DCORIS 0 6-::R( R ALED .. 19015S- 13 1-MGEN-268- LPCI MG SET 1DN Ul RB 621 0001 DN 19016" 01 1-BDBB-268-OOO1D 480V RMOV BOARD 1D Ul RB -593 19017" 13 1-MGEN-268- LPCI MG SET 1EN Ul RB 639 0001 EN 19018^^ 01 1-BDBB-268-OOO1E 480V RMOV BOARD 1E U1 RB 621 19019^^ 14 VR Box 1EN MG SET 1EN VOLTAGE REGULATOR BOX Ul RB 621 19030 01 1-BDBB-281-OOO1A 250V DC RMOV BOARD 1A U1 RB 621 19031 01 1-BDBB-281-OOO1B 250V DC RMOV BOARD 1B Ul RB 593 19033 01 1-BDBB-281-OOO1C 250V DC RMOV BOARD 1C U1 RB 565 49039 44 1 J f i i l 1: ) C ~ = flC=C m U & T 6~. :. . 19040 04 1-XFA-253-00OIAl I&C BUS 1A480/208-120VTRANSFORMER Ul RB 621 19041 04 1-XFA-253-0001A I&C BUS IA REGULATING TRANSFORMER U1 RB 621 4-904 - 44. tJBOX 253 -6l17 I 8C BUS
- r. 1tA;-6 D l SC -SWt1 : : :. ., ,, , '
494043 .44 1I&C BLUSA DISC SWtrCr-{ES 1A2,4,A4,4G; IA5 t 6.:
.90 2 .6 .....
1904 i;C 2: I&C 8US 1A DISC SWITCH4 ,'4 ___ __ 4904 24 1FP LA 006 O09 P CP CN 09 U4- &, 19046 20 t-PX-64-160B POWER SUPPLY (PNL 1-9-19: 1-LI-64-159B,160B) Ul CB 593 19047 20 I-PXMC-23-114 POWER SUPPLY (PNL 1-9-18: FI-23-36,42: FI-74-50) U1 CB 593 19048 20 1-PXMC-23-115 POWER SUPPLY (PNL 1-9-19: FI-23-48,54; FI-74-64) U1 CB 593 A&B 19049 04 1-XFA-253-OOO1B1 I&C BUS 1B 480/208-120V TRANSFORMER U1 RB 593 19050 04 1-XFA-253-0001B2 I&C BUS 1B REGULATING TRANSFORMER Ul RB 593 49054-I 4 I: BX12S264 _ 1 SC SW 122 = . cm s 93 4903 .m-4 1 JBOX262866. I&CMUS:1p tSC SWiCH r.R 5..*, 4:053. :X44-: 14J02 -1 IRr- 8U5 1BDISC SWITCrES1B3, 01, 1B6;1B6 ': 4-RI - 3
-404 i20 1 PNUN A006 0006 I&C2BUSi 1CA 30FPNL199) 14-CR 19055 20 1-PX-64-159B POWER SUPPLY (PNL 1-9-19) Ul CB 593 49068 ;4 1JBOX2537160 _-cRlaUI - - 93 19070 16 1-INVT-256-0001 DIV I ECCS ATU INVERTER U1 RB 593 19071 20 1-PX-71-60-1 ECCS ATU CAB 1-9-81 POWER SUPPLY U1 CB 593 Page 4-14 FACILITy RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVA/BFN-01 -R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 TABLE 4-2, Continued: RELAY SSEL FOR USI A-46 & SEISMIC IPEEE
- ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ITEMS SSEL NUMBER CLASSj EOUIPMENT I.D. I DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV.
19072 20 1-PX-71-60-1A ECCS ATU CAB 1-9-81 POWER SUPPLY U1 CB 593 19073 20 1-PX-64-50 POWER SUPPLY (PNL 1-25-31: XR-64-50 [DEV BA U1 RB 621 __ TERM 11/12]) 19074 20 1-PX-74-56 POWER SUPPLY (PNL 1-9-18: Fl-74-56) U1 CB 593 19075 16 1-INVT-256-0002 DIV II ECCS ATU INVERTER Ut RB 621 19076 20 1-PX-71-60-2 ECCS ATU CAB 1-9-82 POWER SUPPLY U_CB 593 19077 20 1-PX-71-60-2A ECCS ATU CAB 1-9-82 POWER SUPPLY U1 CB 593 19078 20 1-PX-74-70 POWER SUPPLY (PNL 1-9-19: Fl-74-70) U1 CB 593 19079 20 _ -PX-64-159A POWER SUPPLY (1.9-18) Ul GB 593 19080 20 1-PX-64-160A POWER SUPPLY (1-9-18) U1 CB 593 19081 20 1-PX-64-67B POWER SUPPLY (1-9-19) U1 CB 593 19082 20 1-PX-64-161 POWER SUPPLY (PNL 9-87) U1 CB 593 19083 20 1-PX-64-162 POWER SUPPLY (PNL 9-88) U1 CB 593 19084 18 1-PS-67-50 PRESSURE SWITCH FOR 1-FCV-67-50 (14046) U1 RB 593 19085 18 1-PS-67-51 PRESSURE SWITCH FOR 1-FCV-67-51 (14047) U1 RB 565
- 4A0U2:: 1 I LP2 : 26 : C OMMONGB LOGICRELAYPANEL2, 4'1' A '.: . -: :..
- 4.080 : . 1N 92S COMMON BD LOCIC RELAY PANEL 26' I-U B1:'- 11 R .P :
_ . g4... .4 3 * *... .. i ........ rr.a.......... 40090 0' A PA"'-26 COMMON BD ',GIC RELAY PAN NO 25 '41 1 I An . 2 490-- 24 1-LPNL D926 - : COMMFONl BO LOGICRELAY PANEL 26. '1,1. B.12 . J.4.-R, : : 6 4. 19100' 14 3-ECAB-231-OOIA 250V DC CONT PWR TRANSFER SW - 480V SD BD U3 RB 593 _ 1A 19101 ' 14 3-ECAB-231-OOIB 250V DC CONT PWR TRANSFER SW - 480V SD BD U3 RB 593 1B .
*:40-44.,: 4.::0 _ MA0003 REACTOR SD-&CONT. COOLING PNL: ' : :-,': :64: :-'U4:,.:
'45-4i ;- . :,L O09, .2 REACTOR SD-COr'!T:COOLlING PNL U4. r.;¢ &.B1.;
49 44 4-:1
- 4.: 20 , 4-21P?'AL'04090005 4 A.. 009 a CLEANUPP-COTOL REA.CTOR PNL : : ;-.P:
RECIRC NT U'CB': CGI:.: ~ 44- .2:0X: P6LA 1 009 0016 :. GONE)J.:-:- ;-;
'424 20 M:. PIRPSCHA;9Or _::::::
4 , 2. .7:: . . .) RP.......2 G____ __u-4012-3 :I N' A0I a0n 00glp:.IF'MA' RCRC~mj~~l PNLK.. :":+ . 592-..
- 40424 20 1PNLA009 00122 . j A .
- . . _ _ __C _ _
4042. 2 1PNL A.0040021 - Iu4cR 4. 4043 26, 20J. ?a..OO02: +: u.& L 4042 20 PNA 009 0022" tl ?TrVI ,-.
- ,:::,,. - " -:I u 1693'.;":
4 4 0 20. 1 PWLA. 00000902 -
. U .- -,-...
4.40 20 tPRNLA 009 002G.:- I :-,-:. :., L 0 -
........ ~ 4--.. s... ..
40442V :20 .1NA00I; U4-C4' :.:: I 442 20 I 4NL'A O9'004 a. I rrczn' uG-: 1::::a :;
- _ , _ _ _ .__. _.', _ _ '., . 4 -
403+/- 2 411 A 000064:* 4 , -'.-: - 1 6 - 403+/- 20'- 4-12WLADOG0OS:- 1u4.-Cae::: ;.I647 49.6 20 0PLOO0SI ; ATU-C I= R . .,.+ ... 15"
. .... ,. . . t. . _
Page 4-15 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVAIBFN-01 -R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 TABLE 4-2, Continued: RELAY SSEL FOR USI A-46 & SEISMIC IPEEE
- ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ITEMS SSEL NUMBER ECLASS EUIPMENT l.D. DESCRIPTION BUILDING IELEV.
- 4. 20 1 PNL00 0 0082 DtVItECCS CABINOt ATU R:: .'9' 404 20 1 'NA '00000CR:-uc: 4~& .5 4 -20 1 PrLA oo000 00: RPS ATI IACAR ::. U:-.-
4-140 20:. 1 PrAtoo00809E PATPU4A& I:-CA -. 4:4 ;:.20 1,PNLA009:0086:: RPS-A-U4AB,:-:,..'.P'.:..: ::.g 4J4..:P: .::: 49:44 20 1 PNLA 000 0097 DtV 1TORUS TEMP MONITORING . :P-.. .: 1 40442 2_ ... 1N 'A 2 . .I009 __
!40441m 20..- 4-1 -ALX000002-: NE'!PNL(IST -E DCNW1OI23) U4t-C&493 19146 18 1-HS-74-7B LOCAL HS STATION U1 RB 641
- :44447 .. :44 WS40B66 :.:: JUCTION EtOX (TERM BLOCK), SEALED OX :.: : -:.:. 144 19148 18 1-HS-74-57B LOCAL HS STATION U1 RB 651 40440 4 BOX TERM BLOC)S440-1W4 SEALED
. BOX:.:: : 4RI 11. -
19150 18 1-HS-74-598 LOCAL HS STATION Ut RB 551 19151 18 1-HS-74-58B LOCAL HS STATION U1 RB 551 19153 18 1-HS-74-52B LOCAL HS STATION U1 RB 565 40941.4 4444-49 2 UMCTION BOX (TERM B LOCK) SEALED1 POX2:>: U4-RI: 183 19155 18 1-HS-74-53B LOCAL HS STATION Ul RB 565 19156 18 1-HS-74-60B LOCAL HS STATION Ul RB 593
.. :... 44::JN: 4. NBX(TR LOK SELDBO: 4RI 193 19158 18 1-HS-74-61B LOCAL HS STATION Ul RB 593 19160 18 1-HS-74-30B LOCAL HS STATION Ul RB 541 4:.:6- 44. 1 JB74 9 :: JUNCTION BOXTERM BLOC.). SEALED BOX U4 R: 1A.4.0:
19162 18 1-HS-74-71B LOCAL HS STATION U1 RB 551 19164 18 1-HS-74-72B LOCAL HS STATION Ul RB 551 19165 18 1-HS-74-66B LOCAL HS STATION UI RB 583 4.416 .,JUNCTION
.OX44 (TERM BC L O.RI__. 1 19167 18 1-HS-74-67B LOCAL HS STATION U1 RB 583
- ,4044 : 44' 1 X J 1000 UNrTION EOX(TERMBLOC) ,-,.: BOX, . 1J4-R "SEALED 19170 18 1-HS-74-75B LOCAL HS STATION U. RS . b.
19171 18 1-HS-70-47B LOCAL HS STATION U1 RB 551 4447:2 :44.: 4-0-24 . UNICTIONl BOX (TERM BLOCK)j SEALED BOX 14-I.wo 11 19173 18 1-HS-75-09B LOCAL HS STATION Ul RB 519 410474 44 1't 0X6 :;B JUNCTIONBOX(TERAt BLOCK) SEALED BOX ".:::m., ;. 14 19175 18 1-HS-75-25B LOCAL HS STATION Ul RB 593
- 401 7-PX01444 JUCMTlON BOX (TERM BLOCK) _ EAlED BOx ' Pl y: 3 19177 18 1-HS-75-37B LOCAL HS STATION U1 RB 519 40714 .- 8X7W4GVJNTION BOX (TERMA BLOCK), SErAlD BOX 1444-RR. 4 19179 18 1-HS-75-534 LOCAL HS STATION (TERM BLOCK) SEALED BOX Ul RB 593 19 44 4:. s ' .:'
- L STATION (TERM BLOCK)'.4., SEALED BOX . 193 19181 18 1-HS-23-34B LOCAL HS STATION (TERM BLOCK) - SEALED BOX U1 RB 565
- 44 :.44 :: r. ,40 . JUNCT10N BOX (TERM SLOCK)' SEALED BOX .-RI. 111 19183 18 1-HS-23-40B LOCAL HS STATION (TERM BLOCK) - SEALED BOX Ul RB 565 19184 18 1-HS-23-46B LOCAL HS STATION U1 RB 565 19173 8 4 -HS- 75-53 LOCA TIONBX (TERM 8LOCK) S - EALED BOX U14RRB 59 19186 18 1-HS-23-52B LOCAL HS STATION 0U1 RB 565 Page 4-16 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVANBFN-01 -R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 TABLE 4-2, Continued: RELAY SSEL FOR USI A-46 & SEISMIC IPEEE
- ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ITEMS SSIEL NUMBER ICLASSJEQUIPMENT I.D. I DESCRIPTION I BUILDING IJELEV.
19187 18 1-HS-74-0005B LOCAL HS STATION.- RHR PUMP lA UI RB 519 19188 18 1-HS-74-0028B LOCAL HS STATION - RHR PUMP lB Ul RB 519 19189 18 1-HS-74-0016B LOCAL HS STATION -RHR PUMP1IC UI RB 519 19190 18 1-HS-74-0039B LOCAL HS STATION -RHR PUMP 1D Ul RB 519 19191 18 1-HS-75-0005B LOCAL HS STATION -CS PUMP 1A Ul RB 519 19192 18 1-HS-75-0033B LOCAL HS STATION -CS PUMP l B Ul RB 519 19193 18 1-HS-75-0014B LOCAL HS STATION - CS PUMP iC Ul RB 519 19194 18 1-HS-75-0042B LOCAL HS STATION -CS PUMP 10D UI RB 519 49491 44 1LNL 06 DOS : LCAL PAWEL 25 56A,~UR
-49491; 441 06 06 9N LOCAL. PANSEL 256B' .. -Rs. S93 44 44 1. LPNL -926 006 ILCAL -PAWEL 2651001 U1-R 9
- ~49499:- 49. W121PNL 02:~~:LCLAE255 00 U 4 R6 0 49200. :494~ 1 L1PML 026, 0059 LOAL PADEA MM 2 0 4904: PL060 62:GLOAL6PANEL1626 52 4-6249; 4012:1NL.0022 ' OC ALPANEL2E25-22 ______
490 4 4 12PJ
-1 2 00: OCLPNL251J4R 16449 19208" 13 I-MGEN-268- LPCI MG SET 1DAUlR 62
______ 0001DA_ _ _ _ 19209" 14 VRBOXIDA MG SET 1DA VOLTAGE REGULATOR BOX Ul RB 621 .492IO!' ::44 f Bx 268 09A7- AG GE 10GCNRLS ATIO(1HS26 1J4- 63
- 4924-4+/-+/- :' : 14OXZ269-601 : MG SETl DA CONTROL BPOX (RELAYS) J4.B 54 19212- 13 I-MGEN-268- LPCI MG SET l EAUlB 63 D001EA __ __ _
19213** 14 VRBOX lEA MG SET IlEA VOLTAGE REGULATOR BOX Ul RB 621
- 492-14".4 :44 :- 1-R-OX 26E -6080 SLT. I EA. CO0NTROLI STATON1 S29J4R AMG 54
. 0004.4A~-::::2Q:: _II_=________
4.202 -FO.Q- RPa C'RCU IT PROTECTOR CAINT A1 J.0
'A922-1-, :20 4 PR= 099- ApaCIR WIT PROTE=CTOR ARIWE1A 44.453 004A2_
4922 2 4PR~OT099-~'-P ICI PROTECTO3R CABINErT413.4-:!' 19 4'9223' I0PR= ~099- RPS~CIRCUI T PROTE-CTOR C 1B 24R& 1ABINET 59 49226 20 4-PROT-'99- RPR CIRCUIT PROcTECTOR CABINETc 106J4R1 9 000.C2 49225 248 1 NL_026 217A' ILOC.AL _P/AW'NL1 2 247A (CAD1RPRVEL I AUP 4-1 34 19227 01 1-BDBB-265-0001B 480V RB VENT BD lB Ul RB 565
- 40_228 204 PL 0 02APNL1 6 U 4-R 3 Page 4-17 FAcILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVA/BFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 TABLE 4-2, Continued: RELAY SSEL FOR USI A-46 & SEISMIC IPEEE
- ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ITEMS SSEL I I I NUMBER lCLASSl EQUIPMENT L.D. I DESCRIPTION IBUILDING ELEV.
4823 48 1 LPNL D250T LOCAL PA~NEL 1 25 7A -_____;-..__._.-_WB 19232 14 1-HS-74-IOIB HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-74-101 (11055) Ul RB 565 19239 18 I-TS-64-68 HANDSWITCH FOR 1-CLR-67-917 (14001) U1 RB 541 19240 18 1-HS-64-69 HANDSWITCH FOR 1-CLR-67-918 (14013) U1 RB 541 19241 18 1-TS-64-70 HANDSWITCH FOR 1-CLR-67-921 (14003) Ul RB 541 19242 18 1-HS-64-71 HANDSWITCH FOR 1-CLR-67-922 (14015) Ul RB 541 19243 14 1-HS-69-2B HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-69-2 (13033) U1 RB 593 19244 14 1-HS-71-18B HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-71-18 (13039) Ut RB 519 19245 01 I-HS-71-2B HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-71-2 (13037) Ul RB 593 19246 14 1-HS-73-27 HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-73-27 (13043) Ul RB 519 19247 18 1-HS-73-3B HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-73-3 (13041) U1 RB 551 19248 18 1-HS-73-81B HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-73-81 (13042) U1 RB 551 192498 14 2-HS-74-1OOB HANDSWITCH FOR 2-FCV-74-100 (11010) U2 RB 565 19250 14 1-HS-74-12B HANDSWITCH FOR 2-FCV-74-12 (11011) Ul RB 519 19251 14 1-HS-74-13B HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-74-13 (11012) U1 RB 541 19252 14 1-HS-74-1B HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-74-1 (11001) Ut RB 519 19253 14 1-HS-74-24B HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-74-24 (11029) Ul RB 519 19254 14 1-HS-74-25B HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-74-25 (11030) Ut RB 541 19255 14 1-HS-74-25B HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-74-2 (11002) Ut RB 541 19256 14 1-HS-74-35B HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-74-35 (11037) Ut RB 519 19257 14 1-HS-74-36B HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-74-36 (11038) U1 RB 519 19258 18 1-HS-74-73B HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-74-73 (11046) U1 RB 551 19259* 14 2-HS-74-97B HANDSWITCH FOR 2-FCV-74.97 (11013) Ut RB 519 19260 18 1-HS-75-11B HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-75-11 (15006) Ut RB 519 19261 14 1-HS-75-22B HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-75-22 (15010) Ul RB 541 19262 18 1-HS-75-23B HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-75-23 (15012) U1 RB 593 19263 18 1-HS-75-2B HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-75-2 (15001) Ut RB 519 19264 18 1tHS-75-30B HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-75-30 (15015) U1 RB 519 19265 18 1-HS-75-39B HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-75-39 (15020) Ul RB 519 19266 14 1-HS-75-50B HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-75-50 (15024) Ut RB 541. 19267 18 1-HS-75-51B HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-75-51 (15026) U1 RB 593 19268 14 1-HS-78-61B HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-78-61 (11026) Ut RB 621 19269 14 1-HS-64-72 HANDSWITCH FOR 1-CLR-67-919 (14002) Ut RB 541 19270 14 1-HS-64-73 HANDSWITCH FOR 1-CLR-67-920 (14014) Ul RB 541 19271 18 1-TS-64-68 TEMPERATURE SWITCH FOR 1-CLR-67-917 (14001) Ut RB 519 19272 18 1-TS-64-69 TEMPERATURE SWITCH FOR 1-CLR-67-918 (14013) Ut RB 519 19273 18 1-TS-64-70 TEMPERATURE SWITCH FOR 1-CLR-67-921 (14003) U1 RB 519 19274 18 1-TS-64-71 TEMPERATURE SWITCH FOR 1-CLR-67-922 (14015) Ut RB 519 19275 18 1-TS-1-17A MAIN STEAM VAULT TEMPERATURE SWITCH Ut RB 565 19276 18 1-TS-1-17B MAIN STEAM VAULT TEMPERATURE SWITCH Ut RB 565 19277 18 1-TS-1-17C MAIN STEAM VAULT TEMPERATURE SWITCH Ut RB 565 19278 18 1-TS-1-17D MAIN STEAM VAULT TEMPERATURE SWITCH U1 RB 565 19279 18 _ -TS-1-29A MAIN STEAM TUNNELTEMPERATURE SWITCH UtTB 565 19280 18 1-TS-1-29B MAIN STEAM TUNNELTEMPERATURE SWITCH UI TB 565 19281 18 1-TS-1-29C MAIN STEAM TUNNEL TEMPERATURE SWITCH UI TB 565 Page 4-18 FACILty RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVA/BFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 TABLE 4-2, Continued: RELAY SSEL FOR USI A-46 & SEISMIC IPEEE
- ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ITEMS SSEL 1 1 - 1 NUMBER 1CLASSj EQUIPMENT l.D. I DESCRIPTION BUILDING IELEV.
19282 18 1-TS-1-29D MAIN STEAM TUNNELTEMPERATUFE SWITCH Ul TB 565 19283 18 1-TS-1-40A MAIN STEAM TUNNEL TEMPERATURE SWITCH Ul TB 586 19284 18 1-TS-1-40B MAIN STEAM TUNNELTEMPERATURE SWITCH Ul TB 586 19285 18 1-TS-1-40C MAIN STEAM TUNNEL TEMPERATURE SWITCH U1 TB 586 19286 18 1-TS-1-400 MAIN STEAM TUNNEL TEMPERATURE SWITCH Ul TB 586 19287 j 18 1-TS-1-54A MAIN STEAM TUNNEL TEMPERATURE SWITCH U1 TB 586 19288 18 1-TS-1-54B MAIN STEAM TUNNEL TEMPERATURE SWITCH Ul TB 586 19289 18 1-TS-1-54C MAIN STEAM TUNNELTEMPERATURE SWITCH U1 TB 586 19290 18 1-TS-1-54D MAIN STEAM TUNNEL TEMPERATURE SWITCH U1 TB 586 19291 18 1-TS-64-72 TEMPERATURE SWITCH FOR 1-CLR-67-919 (14002) U1 RB 519 19292 18 1-TS-64-73 TEMPERATURE SWITCH FOR 1-CLR-67-920 (14014) Ul RB 519 19293^ 14 2-HS-74-96B HAND SWITCH FOR 2-FCV-74-96 (11003) RB 519 19294 00 1-AMP-092- IRM CH. 'A' VOLTAGE PREAMPLIFIER 7-34A RB 565 0007141A 19295 00 1 AMP-092- IRM CH. 'B VOLTAGE PREAMPLIFIER 7-34B RB 565 0007/41 B
- 44 1 IPL 2507: .PANEL 1 26 47 IRM PREAMP:RPSi 1::-_:_:-_,_,___. ,
19297 00 1-AMP-092- IRM CH. 'C' VOLTAGE PREAMPLIFIER 7-34C RB 577 __ 0007141 C 19298 00 1-AMP-092- IRM CH. 'D' VOLTAGE PREAMPLIFIER 7-34D RB 577 __ 0007/41D__ _D
-: .44 1-LL PANEL1 2661 IRM I2REiMP. RFSPI 77 19300 20 1-NM-92-7/41A CHANNEL 'A' IRM INDICATOR CB 617 19301 20 1-NM-92-7/41B CHANNEL 'B' IRM INDICATOR CB 617 19302 20 1-NM-92-7/41C CHANNEL 'C' IRM INDICATOR CB 617 19303 20 1-NM-92-7/41D CHANNEL 'D' IRM INDICATOR CB 617
*2Q I1P2ILA.00012-
-4: ,ANCL4a _ ,:--
19305 15 1-BATD-283-00OA1 24V NEUTRON MONITORING BATTERY, Ul CB 593 CHANNEL A 19306 15 1-BATD-283-OOOB1 24V NEUTRON MONITORING BATTERY, U1 CB 593 CHANNEL B 19307 16 1-CHGD-283-A1-1 24V NEUTRON BATTERY CHARGERS Al-I CB 593 19308 16 1-CHGD-283-A2-1 24V NEUTRON BATTERY CHARGERS A2-1 CB 593 19309 16 1-CHGD-283-B1-1 24V NEUTRON BATTERY CHARGERS B1-1 CB 593 19310 16 1-CHGD-283-B2-1 24V NEUTRON BATTERY CHARGERS B2-1 CB 593 19311 14 1-HS-74-71B HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-74-71 (11045) U2 RB 565 19312 14 1-HS-71-17B HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-71-17 (13074) UI RB 519 19313 20 1-HS-1-56A HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-1-56 (13075) U1 CB 617 19314 14 1-HS-73-26B HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-73-26 (13076) Ul RB 519 19315 20 1-HS-32-62A HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-32-62 (13079) UI CB 617 19316 20 1-HS-77-2A HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-77-2A (13080) U1 CB 617 19317 20 1-HS-77-1SA HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-77-15A (13081) UI CB 617 19318 20 1-HS-64-18 HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-64-18 (13082) U1 CB 617 19319 20 1-HS-64-19 HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-64-19 (13083) U1CB 617 19320 20 1-HS-76-18 HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-76-18 (13084) U1 CB 617 19321 20 1-HS-76-19 HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-76-19 (13085) U1CB 617 19323 14 1-JB-0375 JUNCTION BOX (TERM BLOCK) - SEALED BOX U1RB 519 Page 4-19 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVAIBFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 TABLE 4-2, Continued: RELAY SSEL FOR USI A-46 & SEISMIC IPEEE
- ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ITEMS NUMBER CLASS EUIPMENT Q L.D. I DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV.
19324 14 l1JB.0662 JUNCTION BOX (TERM BLOCK)-SEALED BOX U1 RB 541 19325 14 1-JB-0658 JUNCTION BOX (TERM BLOCK) - SEALED BOX U1 RB 541 19326 14 1-JB-1032 JUNCTION BOX (TERM BLOCK) SEALED BOX U1 RB 593 19327 14 1-JB-1095 JUNCTION BOX (TERM BLOCK) - SEALED BOX U1 RB 665 19328 .14 -JB-1559 JUNCTION BOX (TERM BLOCK) - SEALED BOX Ut RB 565 19329 14 1-JB-0670 JUNCTION BOX (TERM BLOCK) - SEALED BOX U1 RB 541 19330 14 1-JB-0791 JUNCTION BOX (TERM BLOCK) . SEALED BOX U1 RB 519 19331 14 1-JB-0681 JUNCTION BOX (TERM BLOCK) - SEALED BOX Ut RB 541 19332 14 1-CS-75-9B CONTROL STATION FOR 1-HS-75-9B U1 RB 519 19333 14 1-CS-75-37B CONTROL STATION FOR 1-HS-75-37B U1 RB 519 1933A 14 1-JB-1231 JUNCTION BOX (TERM BLOCK) - SEALED BOX Ut RB 565 19404
- 04 D-OXF-219-TDA 4KV/480V XFMR TDA U1/2 DG . 583.
19405
- 04 O-OXF-219-TDB 4KV/480V XFMR TDB U1/2 DG 583 19412* 03 0-BDAA-211-OOOOA 4KV SHDN BD A Ut RB 621 19413
- 03 O-BDAA-211-0000B 4KVSHDN BD B Ul RB 593 19414
- 03 O-BDAA-211-OOO0C 4KV SHDN BD C U2 RB 621 19415' 03 O-BDAA-211-OOOOD 4KV SHDN BD D U2 RB 593 19418 ' 02 1-BDBB-231-OOOIA 480V SHDN BD 1A U1 RB 621 19419
- 02 1-BDBB-231-0001B 480V SHDN BD 1B Ut RB 621 19423* 01 1-BDBB-268-0001A 480V RMOV BD IA U1 RB 621 19424* 01 1-BDBB-268-0001B 480V RMOV BD lB Ul RB 593 19431 ' 01 0-BDBB-219-OOOOA 480V DSL AUX BD A U1/2 DG 583 19432* 01 O-BDBB-219-OOO0B 480V DSL AUX BD B U1/2 DG 583 19437
- 14 O-BDDD-280-0001 250V BATTERY BD 1 Ul RB 593 19438
- 14 O-BDDD-280-0002 250V BATTERY BD 2 U2 RB 593 19439* 14 O-BDDD-280-0003 250V BATTERY BD 3 U3 RB 593
- j.+/- 2 OPUL.flOO.e' PANJELO O237.:;~> :;.: :;U2...................
.... ;. ,:;. o::.....;::-
A945l! 20 $41PNA -00900:23 I2ANE-L4O0 239 _-______ 40.7 2 0 923..-4.
.PANE 000.0029 PAW4-R2 ' -,.
4948 :T,,20 0-LPNLA OD 9 00025 12AWRI-026-4 'U4-: 497 20::Q &-LML2~19600411A:1AWV4.:2&-4iA`:Je442- 588
.4948 ;,I 20 . PAN::L-;
-. 2-44. :- .. -:-...; .
.. 4048 '20 0k..
IPWL 92EL .2G : 26: 11A, _ 220:: I4s125-MA=04' PANELW1B. _ _ _ _ __44M"
.- & ;5624.
7_ . 12.F..: .; ERR614At ;. .:. 4Q4.+/- .: 444:-::.:..:.::-.i.-..:.-- i::.:
- - : 4~- . .;.. PAdE 1. - - ; -.. , .,U2-R ,62 MG:-.: ::,P-:,::.,,:.-:
.........:.-LI - 9,6 .444- :2 0:1PNI WE- PA. .26 ' 42A :Z:::6 .4 Q _ 00,.. _ .._ _ __. 494g5ZO20 0L'92i- rPAfWIEL ^S 12FAN - - . .J.
.¢-14DG-
... .Q .8
.3. 2-0 0 LNL-926- zA NE'
.... 26 13B1 . . ... 4. :.- .... ;83.. .-- ;
.0 4 8 _ _ _ _ ___... .'-.:.i.:......................
r.... Page 4-20 FAclLntY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVA/BFN-01 -R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 TABLE 4-2, Continued: RELAY SSEL FOR USI A-46 & SEISMIC IPEEE
- ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ITEMS SSELI II NUMBER lCLASSl EQUIPMENT I.D. I DESCRIPTION BUILDING IELEV.
. ,0 .... .. .A ~s6o o6 :::.:;.::.:..........................:.:::.
9 :)l -:..:-::.: .
- .:4 :-::4LN 0 2 0016C PAPIEL26E4BA'-C 3-:
4.9492- 20':~l0505~ AiL2-.AU1.5 64 A.494. .: .:. 0 2LPNL 0-1D RA 6 44-2G-.11 p-R .:- 4.495+/- 20 . 0t : . AN-'264'
............ D,: U12- -
,4949: 0.1oLPNL92O0 1.GA PANEL2-C1CB4A:-: U 42-rG .MG6. 49497.. 20 :0P! 2006 PANEL25-.469 or,~2~G
- 9498 9 ..P0ML 2c 0 16C PANEL-2c,16C :;::.::.::;
0.4 .:20 : 0 LPNL 92c 01 OOIGD ,b' /25:, 2-;- Z4 9.,00 2 0 -PNL6 92b 00 4 1A : QLo .:-::. : 490 a20 LPIIL 9226c 17B PAWEL _6 .4:-.G 1D -6. 6i 49.2A 2
- 1.PNL a126 0017C: PA=EL 0a264247 2 C ...
453 2.: 0;4LPNL 92c0017D PANiEL.026.17D .:-............'.- . .--. UJ44Q DG . _ L 0182A00000 DG A ELECTRIC'A.L CO-TROLGCA8 NII: U42D-,Q :-;
- 20: p DG BELECTRICCLACONTROLCBINET ; 2 ":U- 56
. DG C ELECTRICAL CONTROLCGA8INET U--42 Dr ;6
.49+/-+/-4 ::4 - OP-rLA 082:OOO DG D ELECTRICAL COQTROCABINET .- U42DC 19516 14 O-XSW-248-0001 250V MAIN BATT CHGR OUTPUT XFR SW 1 Ul RB 593 19517
- 14 O-XSW-248-0002A 250V MAIN BATT CHGR OUTPUT XFR SW 2A U2 RB 593 19518
- 14 D-XSW-248-0003 250V MAIN BATT CHGR OUTPUT XFR SW 3 U3 RB 593 19519
- 15 O-BATA-248-OOOOA 250V BATTERY SB-A U1 RB 621 19520* 14 O-PNLA-248-A 250V DISTRIBUTION PANEL SB-A U1 RB 621 19521
- 16 O-CHGA-248-OODOA 250V BATTERY CHARGER SB-A U1 RB 621 19522* 15 O-BATA-248-OOOOB 250V BATTERY SB-B U1 RB 621 4952.3 -;44: W 260V DlSTRIBU2TtON PAPJELS~B B U;-R ; 624-19524' 16 D-CHGA-248-OOOOB 250V BATTERY CHARGER SB-B Ul RB 621 19525
- 15 O-BATA-248-OOOOC 250V BATTERY SB-C U2 RB 621 495 . 44:. 0VPl'21 0Dcl 2 STRIBUTIOJPAPELS:C 2 . -
19527
- 16 O-CHGA-248-OOOOC 250V BATTERY CHARGER SB-C U2 R8 621 19528 15 O-BATA-248-OOOOD 250V BATTERY SB-D U2 RB 621
- 929 :44.:: r - D; 20VDlSTRIBUTIOrPAPEL S 624 19530
- 16 O-CHGA-248-OOOOD 250V BATTERY CHARGER SB-D U2 RB 621 19534* 16 0-CHGA-248-0001 250V BATTERY CHARGER 1 Ul RB 593 19535 16 0-CHGA-248-0002A 250V BATTERY CHARGER 2A U2 RB 593 19536' 16 D-CHGA-248-0003 250V BATTERY CHARGER 3 U3 RB 593 4937- - 46 .. 0 DATA 2190001-: 260V MAIN-BATTERY-1 - - . iJ4RR- -
-4913! 4 D ATA 219 000D 0 2560VfMAIN BATTRY 2 - .-. 593 .9 DBATA 214 0003 a4 2S0V MAIN RBAT ERY J3- 6 3-_
419944-! 4 0 RATB 25104 125XG'. Z0S6EBATTA-r I01PC , J4U~ 56": 19.617 45 - 46 _ - OCOD : 1AT 126V 1G 6V1 DSL BATT-tB DC DSLBATT A; ; ; ; J42.Q 142 W .-586 ' 195466 14 >-BDGG-254-OOOOA 12SV DC DSL BATT BD A U1/2 DG 565 19547
- 14 >-BDGG-254-OOOOB 125V DC DSL BATT BD B .U1/2 DG 565 19548' 14 >-BDGG-254-OOOOC 125V DC DSL BATT BD C U112 DG 565 Page 4-21 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVA/BFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 TABLE 4-2, Continued: RELAY SSEL FOR USI A-46 & SEISMIC IPEEE
- ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ITEMS SSEL NUMBER CLASS EOUIPMENT I1D. DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV.
19549
- 14 0-BDGG-254-OOOOD 125V DC DSL BATT BD D U112 DG 565 19550' 16 0-CHGB-254- 125V DSL GEN A BATT CHGR A U1/2 DG 565
_ OA _A 19551* 16 0-CHGB-254- 125V DSL GEN B BATT CHGRA U112 DG 565 OOOBA 19552' 16 0-CHGB-254- 125V DSL GEN C BATT CHGR B U1/2 DG 565 0000CB 19553 - 16 0-CHGB-254- 125V DSL GEN D BATT CHGR B U11/2 DG 565 0000DB 19560
- 04 0-XFA-082-OOOAA DG-A NEUTRAL GRN XFMR DGB 1/2 665 19561 ' 04 0-XFA-082-OOOBA DG-B NEUTRAL GRN XFMR DGB 1/2 565 19562' 04 0-XFA-082-OOOCA DG-C NEUTRAL GRN XFMR DGB 1/2 565 19563' 04 0-XFA-082-OOODA DG-D NEUTRAL GRN XFMR DGB 1/2 565 19594* 04 1-XFA-231-TSIA 4KV/480V TRANSFORMER TS1A Ul RB 621 19595' 04 1-XFA-231-TS1B 4KVW480V TRANSFORMER TS1B U1 RB 621 19643 ' 18 0-HS-23-5B LOCAL HS STATION - RHRSW PUMP A2 INTAKE 565 19644' 18 0-HS-23-85B LOCAL HS STATION - RHRSW PUMP A3 INTAKE 565 19645' 18 0-HS-23-19B LOCALHSSTATION-RHRSW PUMP B2 INTAKE 565 19646' 18 0-HS-23-88B LOCAL HS STATION - RHRSW PUMP B3 INTAKE 565 19647
- 18 0-HS-23-12B LOCAL HS STATION - RHRSW PUMP C2 INTAKE 565 19648 ' 18 0-HS-23-91B LOCAL HS STATION - RHRSW PUMP C3 INTAKE 565 19649' 18 0-HS-23-27B LOCAL HS STATION - RHRSW PUMP D2 INTAKE 565 19650
- 18 0-HS-23-94B LOCAL HS STATION - RHRSW PUMP D3 INTAKE 565 49C+/-: ;:44::: DiBROXO401 :: JUrINCT-O BOX (TERM BLOCK) U1/2-DC :'
19656
- 18 0-HS-30-64 LOCAL HS STATION - DG A EXH FAN A U1/2 DG 583 4+/- -1 jBlox2 187 jUNGTION 6OX(TSrBlfA WJ44V253 19658 - 18 0-HS-30-65 LOCAL HS STATION - DG A EXH FAN B U112 DG 583 4965. -. 44 0 IIN2. TION BOX (TER i :-OK
, U4;2., 8,,
19660
- 18 0-HS-30-66 LOCAL HS STATION- DO B EXH FAN A U1/2 DG 683 4964: :44::: o 2016 , JU ERM BLO RXcTION9OX . -:. .:-
19662 ' 18 0-HS-30-67 LOCAL HS STATION - DG B EXH FAN B U1/2 DG 583 .,'.$~ 440" J:O 20182 IUNCTION EOX(TERPM8LOCK . . ;t a-Q ........ . 19664' 18 0-HS-30-69 LOCAL HS STATION - DG C EXH FAN B U1/2 DG 583 4915-4 JOXI117 JUNCTION N BOX (TERM BOCK) IIJ12 DQ-::'.: 3 19666' 18 0-HS-30-68 LOCAL HS STATION - DO C EXH FAN A U6/2 DO 583
'3f 196 :44;:
BO 201?~0::: j.JUNiCTION 80O. (TERMA BLOCK) .':;: :'DG5::3;"U1/Z-19668 - 18 0-HS-30-71 LOCAL HS STATION - DG D EXH FAN B U1/2 DG 583
- 498-! :44,: B 1 : JUNCTIONBOY (TER :M :OCK) U1/2,X~Q.G, 19670' 18 0-HS-30-70 LOCAL HS STATION - DG D EXH FAN A U11/2 DG 683 19691 , .: 0Ec-o67 .02 :ECW n-rQ PUMP0ISCARG E STRAlINER ACONTROL:. -.. E.',
496-2' 0 Q A6467 0026. .-.EECW PUMP DISCHARGE STRAIAER A CONTROL. '.AK:..:5 2 . EC. IC- 067 09W7E ECW PUMP DIWHARGE STRAiNER C CONTROL: ,*.--.'; - _... AR , __. .;,.7.7 44_. - I:. 20 OBA-+/-4' X jO.1 ECG-AB067- .0028 +-.IEECW PUMP DISCHARGE STRAINER D CoNPROL** A .. *. t i.. . . I: . ... - : .. . . i I: Page 4-22 FACILIfY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVA/BFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 TABLE 4-2, Continued: RELAY SSEL FOR USI A-46 & SEISMIC IPEEE
- ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ITEMS SSEL NUMBER lCLASSl EQUIPMENT I.D. I DESCRIPTION I BUILDING I ELEV.
- G04-; 2 0 L 02168 U26 PNL fANEL262^68(CAD N2,SUPPLY-PNL B) . ...'.: '..:.
URNL'A=O04020 PAW--
- . : CO^ RE AY PNL FOR 2976 14 .-- ;.:..
- 407t6 -.'2:: 48 LPNL a26 0222:.' LOCAL;PANIEL' 5 3_:f....'-.~.:- :':}.' ;0- . :
4P2, . 4.8 :,- IPHI 026 0223'V :, OCAL PANIEL 2 26 23a .;: .: . .:. -: ....... -~4 Da.... 44................... i...:......:j 4Q24Z 48 .LN 2002 LOCAL PANEL 25267A 544 ......................*,,. 19722
- 18 >-HS-67-48B HANDSWITCH FOR 0-FCV-67-48 . .INTAKE 665 19723 - 18 0-HS-67.49B HANDSWITCH FOR 0-FCV-67-49 . .INTAKE 565 19794*
19724 049 18 2441 XA09:2-OO0
'-HS-73-81B )00RPS HANDSWITCHCAFORTR24-ANSORETR-REGU-IATING 2-FCV-73-81 U2 C U B RB 9 519 19729
- 14 1-HS-23-57B HANDSWITCH FOR 1-FCV-23-57 U1 RB 665 19795 148 D-HUS.099-4 RANSWREG XFMRDISCVSW6ROM480VROBDB UINTCB 593 494 0 1 PNLA00000 08 PAN-4-9 U-C 6 -- -
4 0 48 I-LPNI92$6-0N LOCAL PANEL 2S6B 2-a}r 19796 04 2UP1 UNIT PREFERRED XFMR U1 CB 593 19797 14 I-FUDS-099- RPS BUS XFMR DISC SW U1 CB 593
)00_1CB II
- Note that these equipment items are either common to or shared by both Units 1 & 2, and have previously been evaluated under the Unit 2 USI A-46 program. These items are included here in the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Equipment List for completeness.
- DCN 51216, Stages 3 and 4, will remove all four Ul LPCI MtG S:es and associated automatic transfer capability for the 480V RMOV Boards 1Dand 1E respectively. New cable feeds will be installed directly between the 480V Shutdown Boards 1A & 1B and the 480V RMOV Boards ID & 1E replacing the LPCI M/G Set feeds.
Page 4-23 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVA/BFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004
- 5. RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION RESULTS (G.4 FORMS)
Relay screening and evaluation for the Chapter 4 safe shutdown system components are documented on the G.4 forms of this Chapter. See Table 5-1, sheets 1 through 32, as follows:
- 1. Nomenclature and 17. RHR Valves Conventions
- 2. Not Vulnerable Components 18. RHR Valves
- 3. Handswitches 19. RHR Valves
- 4. Temperature Switches 20. I & C Power
- 5. Instrumentation 21. Power Supplies
- 6. Reactor Protection 22. Undervoltage & Degraded Voltage
- 7. Components Common to Unit 23. Emergency Equipment Cooling 2 or3 Water
- 8. 125 VDC 24. 4KV & 480 VAC
- 9. 250 VDC 25. LPCI MG SETS
- 10. Control Rod Drive 26. Main Steam Valves
- 11. 24 VDC 27. Containment Atmospheric Dilution Valves
- 12. Core Spray Pumps 28. Containment Atmospheric Dilution Valves
- 13. Core Spray Valves 29. Various Valves
- 14. Core Spray Valves 30. Various Valves
- 15. RHR Pumps 31. Various Valves
- 16. RHR Valves 32. Various Valves Page 5-1 FACIL Ty RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVA/13FN-01-R-001 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I Revision 0 23 January 2004 System: Various - Nomenclature and Conventions Sheet I Subsystemlcomponent Ref Dwg(s) it Contact / Contact Group Relay Type I Location SAr The following nomenclature and conventions are used in the G.4 forms: I HS and XS contacts satisfy the not vulnerable (NV) criteria defined in EPRI NP-7148-SL, Section 3.3.1 and will not be footnoted on other G.4 Sheets. 2 TS &LS contacts on the standard Limitorque operators used at BFN-1 satisfy the not vulnerable (NV) criteria as discussed InSection C.3.6 of EPRI NP-7148-SL and will not be footnoted on other G.4 Sheets. 3 Breaker 52 auxiliary and limit contacts are mechanically actuated and are not vulnerable (NV) as discussed in Section C.3.1 of EPRI NP-7148-SL. 4 General Electric (GE) Isthe relay manufacturer unless otherwise noted. 5 HFA relays are GE HFA51 unless otherwise noted. 6 HGA relays are GE HGAI I unless otherwise noted. 7 AGA will denote Agastat relays 8 1E note Inthe G.4 SAT column indicates the relay was purchased qualified to current standards 9 DWG Rev, when not noted, Is the Revision Ineffect on 3130103. 10 The notatton used for seismic capacity and demand in the 4-16 HZ region, peak spectral acceleration(PSA), and Inthe 33HZ and higher region, zero period acceleration(ZPA) will be PSANZPA. 11 Chatter isacceptable (CA) for contacts feeding the alarm system as discussed InEPRI NP-7148 Section 3.5.3 and will not be noted on other G4 Sheets. 12 RMOV BDs are 480V unless otherwise noted
- identify reason for ContactContact Group being satisfatoiy cr unsasfactory CA Chafter acceptable NV Not vulnerable(mechanically-actuated contacts and soied state relays)
GERS Selsmically adequate based on GERS___.; Include GERS number NA Component not affected by relays Prepared by /DateOllo7/2004 CR Corrective action required OA Operator action Noenty necessary Reiviwed byB 4/
- Mate01/13/2004 Page 5-2 FACILTY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVAIBFN-01-R-001 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I Revision 0 23 January 2004 System: Varlous-Not Vulnerable Components Sheet 2 Subsystemkcomponent I Ref Dwg(s) I Contact/ Contact Group I Relay Type I Location I SAT* The following components are not affected by relays. Any contact devices in these components will be addressed as part of the component control circuits they affect. O-BDBB-219-OOOOA, B 1-ECAB-231-OOOA, B 1-BDBB-265-OOO1B 1-BDBB-268-0001A, B,D,E 1-BDBB-281-0001A, B,C
- Identify reason for Contact/Contact Group being satisfactory or unsatisfactory CA Chatter acceptable NV Not vulnerable(mechanically-actuated contacts and sorid state relays)
GERS Selsmically adequate based on GERS ; include GERS numberw NA Conponent not affected by relays Prepared by eDateOl/07I2004 CR Corrective action requiredx . OA Operator actionI No entry necessary R - Reviewed_____-j~t011/20 Page 5-3 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVAtBFN-01-R-001 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I Revision 0 23 January 2004 System: Various - Handswitchos Sheet 3 Subsystemkcomponent I Ref Dwg(s) l Contact I Contact Group I Relay Type I Location SA The following handswitches are large manual switches which require the application of reasonable force to change state and are considered not seismically vulnerable(NV); EPRI-NP-7148-SL, Section 3.3.1. 0-HS-23-5B, 12B, 198, 278, 858, 88B, 91B, 94B 0-HS-30-64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70,71 0-HS-67-48B, 49B 1-HS-1-56B 1-HS-23-34B, 40B, 46B, 528, 57B 1-HS-32-62B 1-HS-64-18B, 19B,68, 69,70,71,72, 73 1-HS-69-2B 1-HS-70-478 1-HS-71-2B, 178, 18B 1-HS-73-3B, 268, 27B, 81B 1-HS-74-11B, 28, 58, 78, 12B, 138, 168, 248, 258, 288, 30B, 35B, 36B, 398, 528, 538, 578, 588, 598, 608, 618, 668, 678, 718, 728, 738, 758, 978, 1008, 1018 1-HS-75-2B, 5B,9B,11B,14B, 228,238,258, 308, 338, 378, 398, 428, 508, 518, 538 1-HS-76-18B, 19B 1-HS-77-2B, 15B 1-HS-78-61B 2-HS-73-81 B 2-HS-74-96B Typical drawings include: 0-730E930-10 RI I 1-730E927-IA R02 1-730E920-2 R02 1-730E929-1 R02
- Identify reason for Contact/Contact Group being satisfactory or unsatisfactory CA Chatter acceptable NV Not vulnerable(mechanically-actuated cont-cts and solid state relays)
GERS Seismically adequate based on GERS_ ; include GERS number NA Component not affected by relays e by - 10/2004 CR Corrective action required Prepared b___/O 2 OA Operator action
- No entry necessary Reviewedby - /DateO113t2004I Page 5-4 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVA/BFN-01-R-001 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I Revision 0 23 January 2004 System: Various -Temperature Switches Sheet 4 Subsystemkcomponent Ref Dwg(s) Contact I Contact Group Relay Type / Location SAT 1-TS-1-17A, B,C,D VTD-F081-0060 l NxW) 1-TS-1-29A, B,C,D I-TS-1-40A, B,C,D 1-TS-1-54A, B,C,D _ 1-TS-64-68, 69, 70, 71, VTD-H260-2060 CAM2) 72 ,7 3 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _I__ _ _I_ 1 The temperature switches are mechanically actuated, do not have relay dynamics, are not electromechanical and are not small microswitches. Accordingly, they are considered not seismically vulnerable; EPRI NP-7148, Section 3.3.1 2 Chatter during the 30 seconds of strong motion would have little or no effect on the pump room cooling.
- Identify reason for Contact/Contact Group being satisfactory or wnsatisfactory CA Chatter acceptable NV Not vulnerable(mechanicaly-actuated contacts and sofid state relays)
GERS Selsmicay adequate based on GERS._._ Include GERS number NA Cormponent not affected by relays Prepared by -. ;fi /DateOlIO7t2004 CR Corrective action required -1Ik OA Operator action A- ____d_
- No entry necessary Reviewedby
; G li b tDateOI113/2004 Page 5-5 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVAtBFN-01-R-001 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I Revision 0 23 January 2004 System: Various -Instrumentation Sheet 5 Subsystemicomponent RefDw(s) I Contact I Contact Group lTRelay Type I Location 7 SAT* There are no contact devices with seal-in or lockout features inthe following instrumentaUon loops. Accordingly, any contact chatter would be acceptable during strong motion when levels, pressures, etc could be varying as a result of the strong motion. 0-EI-23-85/3, 8813, 91/3, 9413 1-LI-3-58A, B 1-PI-3-74A, B 1-FI-23-36, 42, 48, 54 1-LI-64-159A 1-PI-64-67B, 160A 1-TI-64-161, 162, 52AB 1-XR-64-50, 156,159 1-FI-74-50, 56, 64, 70 1-FI-75-21, 49 1-PI-85-88, 89, 90 1-NM-92-7/41A, B,C,D Typical drawings include: 1-730E920 SH10 REV8 0-730E930 SH29 REV13 0-730E921 SH5 REV2 1-730E928 SH5 REV3
^ Identify reason for ContactContact Group being satisfactory rr unsatisfactory CA Chatter acceptable NV Not vulnerable(mechancally-actuated contacts and solid state relays)
GERS Seismically adequate based on GERS_ , include GERS number NA Component not affected by relays Prepared by, /DateOl/07/2004 CR Corrective action required OA Operator action C/ ate He / 2
- No entry necessary by/DateOl112004 Page 5-6 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVA/BFN-01-R-001 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I Revision 0 23 January 2004 System: Reactor Protection Sheet 6 Subsystemkcomponent Ref Dwg(s) fContact I Contact Group Relay Type I Location SAT 1-HS-99-5ANS1A, B,C,D 730E915-6 R28 lHS WNV1,2
)
1-HS-99-5AS3A&B 730E915 series, Rev HS .NW1. 2) effective 3121103 1 See G4 Sheet 3 discussion on handswitches. 2 Also CA-chatter of these contacts and associated logic could cause atrip but not prevent ademanded trip. This isthe desired safe shutdown state. See EPRI NP-7148, C.3.2 discussion
- Identify reason for Contact/Contact Group being satisfactory or unsatifactory CA Chatter acceptable NV Not vulnerable(mechanically-actuated contacts and solid state relays)
GERS Selsmically adequate based on GERS_ : include GERS number NA Component not affected by relays Prepared by e/ate01/07/2004 CR Corrective action requited OA Operator action t;13/0
- No entry necessary Reviewed by ~ ' /Dt~l11Z0 Page 5-7 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVAtBFN-O1-R-001 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I Revision 0 23 January 2004 System: Various - Components Common To Unit 2 or 3 Sheet 7 Subsystem/component Ref Dwg(s) Contact I Contact Group Relay Type I Location SAT* Diesel Generators A,B, - In C,D and support equipment O-PMP-23-5, 12,19, 27, - (l) 85,88,91,94 _ 0-FCV-67-1, 5,8, 11, 48, - (t 49,53 0-FSV & FCV-84-5, 16 ) 0-HTR-84-5, 16 . (1) O-XFA-082-AA, BA, CA, . (l) DA 1 These components are common to Unit 2 or 3 and were evaluated as part of the BFN-2&3 relay evaluation. See Reference 7 for the evaluation and Reference 8for the NRC SER acceptance of that evaluation.
- Identify reason for Contact/Contact Group being satisfactory onunsatisfactory CA Chaffer acceptable NV Not vulnerablefmechanically-actuated conLdcts and solid state relays)
GERS Seismically adequate based on GERS Include GERS nurber NA Cormponent not affected by relays Prepared by 07t200/4 ______MX CR Corrective action requred re e OA Operator actionb
- No ently necessary Reviewed by __- ________________1____
Page 5-8 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVA/BFN-01-R-001 PLANTr: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 Revision 0 23 January 2004 System: 125V DC Sheet 8 Subsystemkcomponent Ref Dwg(s) Contact I Contact Group Relay Type / Location SAT* O-BDGG-254-OOOOA, B, 0-761E580 SHI RES3,1 C, D (DSL BATT BD A, 0-731E700 SHI REV2 B, C, D) O-CHGB-254-OOOOM, 0-761E580 SH1 RES13, NV() BA, CB, DB (DSL BATT 0-731E700 SHI REV2 CHGR) I Fuses, manual breakers and manual switches provide interconnection and control
- Identity reason for ContactContact Group being satisfactoy or unsatisfactory CA Chatter acceptble NV Not vulnerable(mechanlcally-actuated cortacts and solid state relays)
GERS Seismically adequate based on GERS__ Include GERS number NA Component not affected y relays Prepared by ateO 1/07/2004 CR Corrective action required OA Operator action
- No enty necessary Reviewed by0111312004 Page 5-9 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVANBFN-01-R-001 PLANT: BROWVNIS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I Revision 0 23 January 2004 System: 250V DC . Sheet 9 Subsystemicomponent Ref Dwg(s) Contact I Contact Group Relay Type I Location SAT* 0-BDDD-280-0001, 2,3 0-731E700-1 R02 HS WI) (RMOV BOARD 1A, B, 0-731 E722-1 R02 (typical) C) 0-45E702-1 (3-23-88) 0-PNLA-248-OOOOA, B, (typical) HS NW) C,D (Distribution Panel SB-A, B, C, D) 0-CHGA-248-OOOOA, B, HS . NWl) C,D(Battery charger 27,59 CAM2 SB-A, B,C,D) 0-CHGA-248-0001, 2A, 3 HS NWI) (Battery charger 1,2A, 3) 27,59 CA( 2) 0-BATA-248-0001, 2,3 NA (Main battery) 0-BATA-248-0000A, B, NA C,D(Battery SB-A, B,C, D) 0-XSW-248-0001, 2A, 3 NA (Main battery charger output XFR SW) 1 Fuses, manual breakers and manual switches provide interconnection and control 2 A30 second interruption inoutput would be acceptable. There are no seal-in or lockout features
- Identify reason for ContactlContact Group being satisfactory or unsatisfactory CA Chatter acceptable NV Not vulnerable(mechanically-actueted contacts and solid state reLys)
GERS Seismically adequate based on GERS__:. include GERS number NA component not affected by relays Prepared by -VIDate0107/2004 CR Corrective action required Peae _ nt~/720 OA Operator action
- No entry necessary Reviewed by, ateOl/13i2004 Page 5-10 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVANFN-01-R-001 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT i RevisIon 0 23 January 2004 System: Control Rod Drive Sheet 10 Subsystemkcomponent Ref Dwg(s) Contact I Contact Group l Relay Type I Location SAT* 1-HCU-85-1-185 0-730E915-14 R03 All CA(1) 1-FSV-85-35A&B, 39A&B, (typical) 70A&B 1-FCV-85-37A, B,C,D,E,F 1-FCV-85-82, 82A, 83, 83A I Automatic or manual scram will take place during the 30 second strong motion. Chatter of contacts controlling these valves causing the scram will support the scram since the system Isafail safe design (BFN-50-7085) inwhich loss of power will lead to ascram. Areset of the Mode switch, see G.4 Sheet 6,Isrequired (FSAR 7.2.2) prior to any rod movement. Operating procedures (0-AO1-100-5 REV 25) do not allow reset and rod withdrawal during an earthquake.
- Identity reason for Contact/Contact Group being satisfactory or unsatisfactory CA Chatter acceptable NV Not vulnerable(mechanically-actuated contacts and solid state relays)
GERS Seisicaly adequate based on GERS : Include GERS number NA Component not affected by relays - ateO 1D07/2t00 CR Correcttve action required repa OA Operator action
- No enry necessary Reviewed by/ ____11 __004 Page 5-11 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVAIBFN-01-R-001 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I Revision 0 23 January 2004 System: 24V DC Sheet 11 Subsystemlcomponent Ref Dwg(s) Contact I Contact Group Relay Type I Location SAP 1-BATD-283-000A1, Bl GE731E717(8-28-69) NA (Battery) 1-CHGD-283-0000AI-1, NW) A2-1, 81-1, 82-1 (Battery Charger) I Fuses, manual breakers and manual switches provide Interconnection and control
- identify reason for ContactfContact Group being satisfactory o unsatisfactory CA Chatter acceptable NV Not vulnerable(mechanically-actuated contacts and solid state relays)
GERS Seismically adequate based on GERS____ include GERS nurtber NA Component not affected by relays Prprdb 7t~/720 CR Corrective acifon requited Prepared by /D1100/2004 _______ OA Operator action
- Noenbyn Nova etry ecesary Reviewedby Ilfate0113/2004 Page 5-12 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVAIBFN-01-R-001 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 RevisIon0 23 January 2004 System: Core Spray - Pumps Sheet 12 Subsystemicomponent Ref Dwg(s) Contact I Contact Group Relay Type I Location SAT* 1-PMP-75-5,14,33,42 1-45E765-7(12-2-70) HS NV (Pumps 1A,IC,IB,1D) 0-223R0379-7 R00 NVA,DGVA CA( 0-730E930-3 ROO _________ 0-730E930-4 R03 14A-KIOA&B, 11A&B, 12A&B, 14A&B, 24A&B, HFA CA())& GERSM 2 0-730E930-13 R16 25A&B, 26A&B, 29B, 31B 0-730E930-18 R15 14A-K21A&B, 22A&B, 29A, 30A&B, 31A, 32A&B HGA CAM)& GERSM 14A-K123A&B, 124A&B, 125A&B, 126A&B, 14A- AGA70121Panels 9-32&33 GERSP K127B, 128B,129B,130B 4KV SHDN BD A,B,C,D 52X&Y GERS(') 52(other) NVt) 50151/83 IAC66 GERSM 5OG PJC11 GERS(4 27 ITE27&HFA GERS(4) I Contact chatter leading to the start of any or all four pumps isacceptable. Per DCD BFN-5007075, ' the four core spray pumps shall start approximately seven seconds after its respective standby power (diesel generator) becomes available to avoid overloading the source of standby power.
'Each pump discharge shall be provided with alow flow bypass line to protect the pump from overheating during operation against aclosed discharge.
2 Trip signals to the pumps would require chatter of HFA NO, HGA NO or protective relay contacts, which are seismically adequate; see App. B.1.1, App. B.1.4 and App. B.3.1 3 See App. B.1.2 4 See App. 8.3.1
- Identify reason for Contact/Contact Group being satisfactory or unsatisfactory CA Chatter acceptable NV Not vulnerable(mechanically-actuated conbcts and sofld state relays)
GERS Seismically adequate based on GERS include GERS number NA Component not affected by relays Prepared by M ate0 1/07/2004 CR Correctve acflon required _ OA Operator action
- No entry necessary Re byewed
_y____ __ __ __ __ __ __004 Page 5-13 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVA/BFN-01-R-001 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I Revision 0 23 January 2004 System: Core Spray - Valves-1 Shoot 13 Subsystem/component Ref Dwg(s) Contact I Contact Group Relay Type I Location SAT 1-FCV-75-26,54 0-730E930-5 R03 HS N 1-FCV-75-25,53 0-730E930-4 R03 HS, TS, LS NV 0-730E930-17 (8115188) 42 RMOV BD lA&B CA(1) 0-730E930-13 R16 42.RMOV________ _CA_) 0-730E930-14 R14 14A-K4A&B, 9A&B, 13A&B, 23A&B, 25A&B, HFA/Panel 9-32 &33 GERS( 2&:), CA(2) 26A&B I-FCV-75-9,22,37,50 0-730E930-17 (815188) HS, TS, LS NV FS & 42; (valves 9 &37) CA(1) 42 RMOV BD IA&B CAM _ 14A-10A&B, 13A&B, 23A&B HFANPanels 9-32 &33 GERS02&3), CA(M) 1 MOV Isthrottling valve with no seal-in feature. Brief periods of chatter would result inlittle, if any, valve movement because of the slow response and movement (inorder of 100ms) of the valve relative to relay chatter pulses Inthe order of 10-30ms duration. 2 SeeApp. B.1.1. 3 Other relays associated with pump control which affect these relays are covered on G4 Sheet 12. 4 Chatter during 30 second strong moron, though unlikely, would have little effect on slow moving valve. FS has no seal-in feature and valve would go to demanded position after strong motion.
- Identily reason for ContactiContact Group being satisfactory or unsatisfactory CA Chatter acceptable NV Not vulnerable(mechanically-actuated contacts and solid state relays)
GERS Seismically adequate based on GERS__ include GERS number / 7 NA Component not affected by relays Prepared by ate0i/07/2004 CR Corective action required a OA Operator action bIK ed
- No entry necessary Reviewed __ __y_ _ __ _ __ _ _ ______l~O0 Page 5-14 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVAEBFN-01-R-O01 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I Revision 0 23 January 2004 System: Core Spray - Valves -2 Sheet 14 Subsystem/component Ref Dwg(s) Contact I Contact Group Relay Type I Location SAT I-FCV-75-2,11, 23, 30, 0-730E930-6 R01 HSTS,LS NV 39,51 42 RMOV BD IA&B GERS(M), CAM1) 14A-Kl3A&B HFA/ Panels 9-32&33 GERS( 2 14), CA( 2) 1-FCV-75-57, 58 0-730E930-8 ROl HS,LS NV 86-75-57.58 CR1 20A/ Panels 9-42&43 GERSM 16A-K17, 18 Panels 9-42&43 CA( 3) I See App. B.2 2 SeeApp. B.I 3 Valve operation requires manual action of HS or chatter of 86 NO contact which Isseismically adequate; see App. B.1.The 86 NO contact blocks the effect of any chatter of the 16A contact. 4 Other relays associated with pump control which affect these relays are covered on G4 Sheet 12
- Identify reason for Contact/Contact Group being satisfactory o,unsatisfactory CA Chatter acceptable NV Not vuinerable(rnechanically-actuated contacts and sorld state relays)
GERS Seismically adequate based on GERS____ include GERS nurnber NA Comnponent not affected by relays Prepared by - S D te / a-7 te0l/07/2004 CR Corrective action required OA Operator action Reviewed b y/Date0 1/13/004 No entry necessary Reviewed ____________________________________ Page 5-15 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVAtBFN-01-R-001 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I Revision 0 23 January 2004 System: Residual Heat Removal - Pumps Sheet 15 Subsystem/component Ref Dwg(s) Contact I Contact Group J Relay Type I Location SAT* 1-PMP-74-5,16,28,39 0-223R0379-7 ROO HS, XS, LS NV (Pumps 1A,1C,1B,1D) 0-730E920-4 R04 PS, LITS CA( 0-730E920-5 R02 PLT 0-730E920-4 R04 1OA-K23A&B, 24A&B, 72A&B, 76A&B, 97A&B, HGA GERS( 2M,CA() 0-730E920-7 R04 104A-D, 105A-D 0-730E920-8 R26 1OA-K9A&B, 1IA&B, 14A&B,15A&B, 16A&B, HFA GERS( 2M,CA( 1) 0-730E920-14 RF0 18A&B, 19A&B, 21A&B, 22A&B, 25A&B, 65A&B, 0-730E920.26 R02 74A&B, 98A&B, 102A&B, 103A&B 10A-K11OA&B, 111A&B, 112A&B, 113A&B, AGA 7012/Panels 9-32&33 GERS(3 114A&B, 115A&B, 116A&B, 117A&B, 118A&B, 119A&B 52X&Y 4KV SHDN BD A,B,C,D GERS( 4M 52(other) NW) 50/51/83 IAC66 GERSM 50G PJCII GERSM 27 ITE27,HFA GERS( 4 ) I Contact chatter leading to the start of any or all four pumps isacceptable. Per DCD BFN-50-7074 Section 3.9.6.2, the pump start sequence Is coordinated (using seismically adequate delay relays, see note 3)to prevent overloading the diesel generators. Also, pump control circuitry (using rugged LS contacts) prevents pump start unless suction path islined up and each pump discharge has aflow bypass line to prevent pump overheating if operating against aclosed discharge. 2 Trip signals to the pumps would require chatter of HFA NO, HGA NO or protective relay contacts, which are seismically adequate; see App. B.1.1, App. B.1.4, and App.B.3.1 3 SeeApp. B.1.2 4 See App. B.3.1
- Identifj reason for ContactContact Group being satisfactory cr unsatisfactory CA Chatter acceptable NV Not vulnerable(mechanicaly-actuated conticts and soid state relays)
GERS Seismicaity adequate based on GERS____ include GERS numnber NA Cornponent not affected by relays Prpard by Date0l/07/004 CR Corrective acbon required P b OA ec5 Operatoy action Ri e _
- No entrynecessary Reviewedby / C o ' /Date0j1/1312004 Page 5-16 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVANBN-01-R-001 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I Revision 0 23 January 2004 System: Residual Heat Removal - Valves - I Sheet 16 Subsystemicomponent Ref Dwg(s) Contact I Contact Group Relay Type I Location SAr 1-FCV-74-1, 2,12,13, 1-730E920-15 R26 HSXS,TSLS NV 24,25,35,36 1-730E920-17 R03 42 MOV BD 1A&B GERS(M), CAIN) I-FCV-74-7,30 1-730E920-2 R03 HSXS,TSLS,52 NV 1-730E920-8 R02 42 MOV BD ID&E GERS( 1), CAD) 1-730E920-21 R03 IOA-K1O8A&B HFAN Panels 9-32&33 GERSM), CAM 10-124B, TDC Panels 9-32&33 CA() 1-FCV-74-54,68 1-730E920-24 ROO HS NV 1-730E920-25 R03 I See App.B.2 2 SeeApp. B.1.1 3 Chatter might briefly delay valve operaton during the 30 sec strong motion, which would be acceptable. There isno seal-in feature so the valve would go to its demanded state after the strong motion.
- Identify reason for Contact/Contact Group being satisfactory or unsatisfactory CA Chatter acceptable NV Not vulnerable(mechanically-actuated contacts and solid state relays)
GERS Seismically adequate based on GERS__. Include GERS number NA Component not affected by relays Prepared by 9__"eg.Date(10/07t2004 CR Corrective action required OA Operator action Rge _ ______ No enby necessary Reviewed________________________ Page 5-17 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVA/BFN-01-R-001 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I Revision 0 23 January 2004 System: Residual Heat Removal -Valves - 2 Sheet 17 Subsystemkcomponent Ref Dwg(s) Contact I Contact Group Relay Type I Location SAT* 1-FCV-74-52, 57,58, 59, 1-730E920-1 R02 HS,XS,TS,LS NV 61 1-730E920-5 R02 42 MOV BD 1A&D GERS(O), CA) 1-730E920-16 R01 10A-KI4A, 35A&B, 36A&B, 50A&B, 518, 58A, 59A, HFA Panels 9-32&33 GERS( 2&5),CAM 60A&B, 61A, 68A, 100A&B, 106A&B,46A 10A-K89A&B, 69A HGA GERSM 10A-K45A AGA 7012/Panel 9-32 GERS(3 1-FCV-74-53, 60 1-730E920-1 R02 HS,XSTSLS NV 1-730E920-15 R26 42 MOV BD 1A&D GERS(O), CA(V) 10A-K14A, 27A, 35A, 59A, 60A&B, 61A, 63A, HFA/ Panels 9-32&33 GERS( 2&s), CAM 65A&B, 67A&B, 69A&B, IOOA&B, 106B, 108A 16A-K29,PS CA(4) 1 See App. B.2 2 See App. B.1.1 and B.1.4 3 See App. B.1.2 4 See note 3,Sheet 16 5 Other relays associated with pump control wtich affect these relays are covered on G4 Sheet 15
- Identify reason for Contact/Contact Group being satisfactory or unsatisfactory CA Chatter acceptable NV Not vulnerable(mechanically-actuated contacts and sotid state relays)
GERS Seismkcally adequate based on GERS_ Include GERS nurber NA Component not affected byr relay's Prepared by ate0 1/07/2004 CR Corrective action required OA Operator action e ______
- No enty necessary eew by ate01/13/004 Page 5-18 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVA(BFN-01-R-001 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I Revision 0 23 January 2004 System: Residual Heat Removal -Valves - 3 Sheet 18 Subsystemkcomponent Ref Dwg(s) Contact I Contact Group Relay Type I Location SAr 1-FCV-74-66, 101 1-730E920-9 R02 HS, XS, TS, LS NV 1-730E920-18 R03 1-730E92D-22 R04 42 RMOV BD 1B GERS(1) IOA-K35B, 36B,46B HFA GERS(2 &5),CAM 10A-K45B AGA 7012/ Panel 9-33 GERS(3 1-FCV-74-67, 74 0-730E920-1 R02 HS, XS, TS, LS NV 0-730E920-5 R02 42 RMOV BD 1B&E GERS(1), CAM 0-730E920-17 R03 10.K27B, 65A&B, 66A&B HGA/Panels 9-32&33 GERS( 2 &5),CA(2) 10-K35A&B, 36A&B, 59B, 61B, 63A&B, 99A HFAIPanels 9-32&33 GERS(2&5),CAM 16A-K30 CA( 4 1 See App. B.2 2 See App. B.1.1 and B.1.4 3 See App, B.1.2 4 See note 3, G4 Sheet 16 5 See note 5,G4 Sheet 17
^ Identily reason for Contact/Contact Group being satisfactory or unsatisfactory CA Chatter acceptable NV Not vulnerable(mechanically-actuated contbcts and sorid state relays)
GERS Selsmically adequate based on GERS__, Include GERS nunber NA Cniponent not affected by relays P r by a lt CR Corrective action required Prepared by J_ Mate01/07/2004 OA Operator action
- No eniy necessary Reviewedby _Dato0/13/2004 Page 5-19 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVA/BFN-01-R-001 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 Revision 0 23 January 2004 System: Residual Heat Removal - Valves - 4 Sheet 19 Subsystemicomponent Ref Dwg(s) Contact I Contact Group Relay Type I Location SAT` 1-FCV-74-71, 72, 73,75 1-730E920-8 R02 HS, XS, TS, LS, 52 N 1-730E920-18 R03 42 RMOV BD 1B&1E GERSM, CAM 1OA-K1 4B, 50A, 51A, 588, 59B, 60A&B, 61 B,68B, HFA/Panels 9-32&33 GERS(293), CA(7) 99A, I OOA&B 1OA-K69B, 89A&B HGA/Panels 9-32&33 GERS( 2&3), CAM PS, FIS CA(4 2-FCV-74-96, 97, 100 1-45E779-10 (9-17-70) HS, XS, TS, LS N 1-FCV-23-57 2-45E779-10 R030 C,0, OL RMOV BD 18&2 GERS(M 1-FCV-23-034, 040,046, 1-45E779-49 HS, XS, TS, LS NV 052 (9-17-70) 52a,b,z N C,0, OL CA(4 1 See App. B.2 2 See App. B.1.1 and B.1.4 3 Other relays associated with pump control which affect these relays are covered on G4 Sheet15 4 Chatter might briefly delay valve operaton during the 30 sec strong motion, which would be acceptable. There Isno seal-in feature so the valve would go to its demanded state after the strong motion. Page 5-20 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVAIBFN-01-R-001 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I Revision 0 23 January 2004 System: Various-l&C Power Sheet 20 Subsystemicomponent Ref Dwg(s) Contact I Contact Group Relay Type I Location SAT* 1-INVT-256-0001, 2 BFN-VTD-S625-0050 all CA() (Inverters) 1-XFA-253-0001 Al, A2, 0-731E752-1 R27 NA B1, B2 (I&C Transformers) 1-AMP-092-0007/41A, B, BFN-VTD-G080-3770 NA C,D (IRM CH PREAMP) I UPS operation could be briefly Interrupted during the 30 second strong motion. This would be acceptable since there isno seal-in or lockout feature and the UPS would then resume normal operation. See EPRI NP-7148, Section 3.5.3 for adiscussion on the acceptability of spurious indications during the 30 second strong motion.
- Identify reason for Contact/Contact Group being satisfactory or unsatisfactory CA Chatter acceptable NV Not vulnerable(mechanically-actuated contacts and solid state relays)
GERS Selsmicaty adequate based on GERS_ , Include GERS number w NA Component not affected by relays Prepared by -ID le01i)/2004~ CR Corrective action required OA Operator action Reviewed ______ Page 5-21 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVAIBFN-01-R-001 PLANT: BROWN'S PLANT:23 FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 Revision January 2004 System: Various-Power Supplies Sheet 21 Subsystemicomponent Ref Dwg(s) Contact I Contact Group Relay Type I Location SAP 1-PX-64-50, 67B, 1-730E920-10 R08 . NV') 159A&B, 160A&B, 161, (typical) 162 0-730E930-29 R13 1-PX-71-60-1, lA, 2,2A (typical) . N\1' 1-PX-74-56, 70 . NV ) 1-PXMC-23-114, . NV0) 11 5A&B I The power supplies are not controlled by relays
'Identify reason for Contact/Contact Group being satisfactory nr unsatisfactory CA Chatter acceptable NV Not vulnerable(mechanically-actuated contacts and solid state relays)
GERS Seismicaly adequate based on GERS -; include GERS number X1 NA Component not affected by relays Pry /Date01/07/2004 CR Corrective action required OA Operator action O ff g
- No enty necessary Reviewed Mat______20 4 Page 5-22 FACLITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVANBFN-01-R-001 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I Revision 0 23 January 2004 System: Various-Undervoltage & Degraded Voltage Sheet 22 Subsystemicomponent Ref Dwg(s) Contact I Contact Group Relay Type I Location SAT* Various 0-731E761-1 (10-7-88) 27_& associated logic CAO) 0-45E765-8 (4-22-88) 1-45E779-1 (2-13-88) (Above drawings for Board A) (Typical for others) 0-45E724-1,2,3,4(2 68) 1-45E749-1,2 (6-27-68)_i 1 Load shedding from 4160V Shutdown Boards A,B,C&Dand 480 Shutdown Boards A &B,accompanied by start of diesel generators A,B,C &D,and time sequenced reconnection of selected loads islikely to result from loss of off-site power caused by the earthquake. Contact chatter in the undervoltage or degraded voltage circuits could cause the same result. This would be acceptable since load shedding, diesel start and selected load reconnection Is desired inthe event of an earthquake. Ifoff-site power isnot lost, chatter caused load shedding and load reconnection could occur but the diesel generators would not be needed. Ifthe load shedding were initiated by contact chatter after the diesel generators were started, the diesels would continue to run and any stripped and reconnected loads would again be stripped and reconnected. See EPRI NP-7148 Section C.3.12 for further discussion.
- Identit reason for Contact/Contact Group being satisfactory or unsatisfactory CA Chaffer acceptable NV Not vulnerable(mechanically actuated contacts and solid state relays)
GERS Selsmically adequate based on GERS include GERS number NA Component not affected by relays P by ate01I07/004 CR Corrective action required Prpaedb______/at~/0/20 OA Operator actbon 1
- No entry necessary Reviewed 3104 Page 5-23 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVA/BFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I 23 January 2004 System: Emergency Equipment Cooling Water Sheet 23 Subsystemlcomponent Ref Dwg(s) lContact I Contact Group Relay Type I Location SAT 1-CLR-67-917, 918, 921, 1-47E610-67-1 (7-10-69) - NA( 1) 922 (RHR Pump Room Coolers) 1-CLR-67-919, 920 (Core 1-47E61D-67-1 (7-10-69) - NA(M Spray Pump Room Coolers) Cooler Fans 1-45E779-16 (10-27-71) HS,52A NV
. TS,OL CA(2) 1 Relays affecting flow control valves will be addressed for valves 2 Abrief delay in operation during the 30 second strong motion would be acceptable. There are no seal-in or lockout features.
- identify reason for Contact/Contact Group being satisfactory or unsatisfactory CA Chatter acceptable NV Not vulnerable(mechanIcally-actuated contacts and solid state relays)
GERS Selsmically adequate based on GERS_, include GERS number NA Component not affected by relays Prepared by /DateO1/07/2004 CR Corrective action required Reiee _____Q2
- No enby necessary __________Reviewed______________ _____________ 3____
Page 5-24 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVA/BFN-O1-R-001 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I Revision 0 23 January 2004 System: 4KV &480V AC Boards Sheet 24 Subsystem/component Ref Dwg(s) Contact I Contact Group Relay Typo I Location SAT O-BDAA-21 1-OOOOA, B, 0-45E724-1, 2,3,4 (2 HS NV C, D 68) 5xyGERSM 1 (4KV SHDN BD 1A, B,C, 0-223R0379 R01 52,y D)(Breakers, e.g95& 21 52 (other) NW) to 4KV/480V 50151 IAC51,53,66 GERSM1) transformers) 50g PJC11/SHDN BD GERS(' IA,B,C,D 1-BbBB-231-0001A, B 1-45E749-1, 2(6-27-68) HS, 43 NV (480V SHDN BD-A, B) 1-45E779-1 (2-12-88) 52x-y GERS (Breakers, e.g.52A&B, 5 . 3A&B to bus and MOV 52 (other) WI) boards; also see note 2) 50151 IAC53 GERS(3 86 HEA61/SSHDN BD IA&B GERS(3 1-XFA-231-TS1 A, B 0-45E749 (6-27-68) NAM O-OXF-219-TDA &TDB 0-45E724-1, 2&3 (2 (4KV/480V transformers) 68) 1 See App.B.3 2 Feeder breakers are manual with current sensors and trip devices 3 SHDN BD Ademand Is(2.15/0.38 see APP.A)x2.6(see Ref.7, Sect. 3.4.2) = 5.611.0g and SHDN BD Bdemand is(1.35/0.32)x2.6 =3.6/0.83g. IAC53 capacity is 7/2.8g (see GERS-RLY-PP1 of E!PRI NP-7147) and HEA61 capacity Is14/5.6 (see Ref. 13) 4 Relays affecting power to the transformers are addressed for the breakers they affect
- Identiy reason for Contact/Contact Group being satisfactory or unsatisfactory CA Chatter acceptable NV Not vulnerable(mechanically-actuated contacts and solid state relays)
GERS Seimically adequate based on GERS ; Include GERS nunber NA Cornponent not affected by relays Prepared by /DateeO1/07/2004 CR Corrective acton required /0 0 OA Operator action Reviewed
- No entry necessary Reviewed by _/ DateO1 113_04 Page 5-25 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVA/BFN-01-R-401 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I Revision 0 23 January 2004 System: LPCI - MG SETS Sheet 25 Subsystem/component Ref Dwg(s) Contact I Contact Group Relay Type I Location SAT* 1-MGEN-268-0001DA, 1-45E779-24, 25, 26, 27 HS, 26RS, 52A, 52CS NV EA, DN, EN (10-10-79) [2s 2ETN 1-45E749-1, 2 (6-27-68) 52PS, 52TEST NV 52T AGA 7022 GERS(O) 26XX HFA51A GERS(1 ) 50151/83 IAC531SHDN BDs IA&1B GERSO) 26X HGA1 1/JBOX5947,48,49, GERSM
. 50 27 CA(2)
Voltage Regulator Box . . NA 1 See App. B.3 for MVS/LVS GERS and 480V SHDN BD 1A&B discussion 2 Alarm indication
- Identify reason for Contact/Contact Group being satisfactory or unsatisfactory CA Chatter acceptable NV Not vulnerable(mechanafly-actuated contacts and solid state relays)
GERS Selsrnic'Hy adequate based on GERS Include GERS number NA Comnponent not affected by relays P by Ial/20 CR Corrective action required Prepared by_ M - X7Date.L t10/2004 OA Operator action
- No entry necessary Reviewed iuate0 1113/2004 Page 5-26 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVAJBFN-01-R-001 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 Revision 0 23 January 2004 System: Main Steam -Valves Sheet 26 Subsystemicomponent Ref Dwg(s) Contact I Contact Group Relay Type I Location SAT 1-PSV-1-4, 5,18, 19, 22, 1-730E929-1 R02 HS, XS, 2E-S, PS N 23,30,31, 34, 41, 42, 1-730E929-2 R04 2E-K32,33 CAM 179, 180 (SRVs) 1-730E929-3 ROO 1-730E929-4 ROI 1-FCV-1-14, 15, 26, 27, 1-730E927-lA R02 HS (16A-SJ, XS, LS, TS NV 37,38,51,52, 55,56 1-730E927-10 R01 CA(3 (MSIV & Drain) 1-730E927-11 ROO0 C,OL 1-730E927-12 R02 16A-K (all) CAM) 1 HS, XS, 2E-S contacts are rugged manual switch contacts. The PS switch isaspring mechanism inthe pilot valve and Is not vulnerable to chatter. 2 Chatter of these contacts could briefly delay, during the 30 second strong moUon, operator demanded opening of valves 22 and 30. This would be acceptable since the other II valves would open if demanded. The PS switch would not be affected and all valves would open on overpressure. 3 Chatter could cause valve closure, but not reopening. This would be acceptable since the desired shutdown state isclosed. 4 Note the PSVs identified in the above list are the solenoid control valves associated with the Safety Relief Valves which are designated as PCVs. The PCVs themselves have no associated relays.
- Identify reason for Contact/Contact Group being satisfactory or unsatisfactory CA Chatter acceptable NV Not vulnerabie(mechanicaily-actuated cont&CtS and solid state relays)
GERS Seismically adequate based on GERS_ ; include GERS number NA Component not affected by relays CR Corrective action required OA Operator action
- No enby necessary Page 5-27 FACIITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVA/BFN-01-R-001 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I RevIsIon 0 23 January 2004 System: Containment Atmospheric Dilution - Valves Sheet 27 Subsystemcomponent Ref Dwg(s) Contact I Contact Group Relay Type I Location SAT* 1-FCV-64-17, 30, 33 1-730E927-17A R07 HSLS V (Misc Valves) 1-730E927-17 ROB 86-64-17, 30,33 CR120AIPanel 9-43 GERS(1 1-730E927-17 R13 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 16A-K65A CA(2) 1-FCV-64-28A, B,C,D, 1-730E927-20 R01 HS(16A-S). NV E,F,G,H,J, K,L,M (Vacuum Breakers) 1-FCV-64-20, 21 1-730E927-19 R02 HS(16A-S-) NV (Torus Vacuum Relief) 16-19-32A&B CA( 3) 1 See App. B.1 2 ActuaUon or chatter of relay could cause valve to close but not open. Closed isan acceptable safe shutdown position. 3 Chaffer during the 30 second strong motion could, though not likely due to slow valve movement, cause brief valve openings. This would be acceptable since there Isno seal-in feature and valve would return to Its prior state.
- identify reason for Contact/Contact Group being satisfactory or unsatisfactory CA Chatter acceptable NV Not vutnerable(mechanialty-actuated contacts and sold state relays)
GERS Seismicaly adequate based on GERS____ include GERS nwuber NA comiponent not affected by relays Prepared b y U4 ate0107t2004 CR Corrective action required OA Operator action A .
- No entry necessary Reviewed by iDateOl3I2004 Page 5-28 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVAJBFN-01-R-001 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 Revision 0 23 January 2004 System: Containment Atmospheric Dilution - Valves Sheet 28 Subsystemkcomponent Ref Dwg(s) Contact I Contact Group Relay Type I Location SAT* 1-FCV-64-18, 19 (Air 3-730E927-16 RI 1 HS NV purge) 86-64-18,19 CR120NPanel 9-42 GERSM 16A-K23, 66B CAM) 1-FCV-64-222 (Wetwell DCN 51205 &51094 HS NV( Vent) 1-FCV-64-139, 140 1-730E927-17A R07 l HS, LS NV (Containment Isol.) 1-45E777-21 (5-21-76) 86-64139,140 CR120APanel 9-43 GERS) i 16A-K24,K. M,PSCAR) I See App. B.1 2 Actuation or chatter of relays could cause valve to close but not open. Closed Isan acceptable safe shutdown position. 3 Valve control logic isbeing modified per DCN's. Design criteria of Reference 14 require compliance with USI A-46 or current methods.
- Identify reason for Contact/Contact Group being satisfactory ay unsatisfactory CA Chatter acceptable NV Not vulnerable(mechanicafly-actuated contacts and solid state relays)
GERS Seismicafly adequate based on GERS__ include GERS numrber NA Component not affected byj relays Prepared by- Dato01107/2004 CR Corrective action required P OA Operator action
- No entry necessary Reviewed by 1/13/2004 Page 5-29 FACILWrY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVANBFN-01-R-001 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 23 January 2004 System: Various - Valves Sheet 29 Subsystemkcomponent Ref Dwg(s) Contact I Contact Group Relay Type I Location SAT* 1-FCV-69-1, 2 (RCWU) 1-730E927-13 R03 HS, LS, TS, 16A-S15&16, 11A-Si NV 42,72, OL RMOV BD 1B GERSM COM CA(2 16A-25, 26, 27, 47, 48 CRI20A/Panels 9-42&43 GERS( 3 _16A-K6A-D, 59A-D,60A-D CAQ) 1-FCV-70-47 (RBCCW) 1-45E779-8(9-21-70) HS, XS, LS, TS NV C,0, OL RMOV BD IB GERS() l-FCV-76-17, 18,19, 24 3-730E927-16 R11 HS,LS NV (Prim. Cont Isol.) 1-730E927-17A R07 86-76-17, 18,19, 24 CR120AIPanels 42&43 GERS(3 16A-K23, 24,34, 35, 42, 43, 65B CAMt I See App. B.2 (480V RMOV 80 lB &250VOC RMOV BD 1B) 2 ActuaUon or chatter of relay could cause valve to close but not open. Closed isan acceptable safe shutdown position. 3 SeeApp.B.1
^ Identify reason for ContactVContact Group being satisfactory or unsatisfactory CA Chatter acceptable NV Not vulnerable(mechanically-actuated contacts and solid state relays)
GERS Selsmically adequate based on GERS____ include GERS number NA Canponent not affected by relays Prepared by ateO1/0712004 CR Corective action required OA Operator action
- No enty nem Rveweby /Date0 1/13/2004 Page 5-30 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVAtBFN-01-R-001 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I Revision 0 23 January 2004 System: Various - Valves Sheet 30 Subsystemlcomponent Ref Dwg(s) (Contact/ Contact Group Relay Type I Location SAT* 1-FCV-78-61 (Fuel Pool 1-45E779-6 (9-21-70) HS, LS, TS NV X-Me to RHR) 0OC,OL RMOV BD 1B GERSM 1-FCV-32-62, 63 (Drywell 1-45E614-9(2-15-72) HS NV Cont. Air Suction Valve) 86-32-62, 63 CAM 16A-K37,38 CAQ) 1-FCV-67-50, 51 (&1- 1-45E614-3(10-14-88) HS NV PS-67-50, 51) PS CAM3 1 See App. B.2 2 IfHS is inthe close position, chatter or operation will not open valve. IfHS isInthe open position, chatter causing valve closure would be acceptable, since closed isan acceptable safe shutdown position. 3 Chatter during the 30 second strong motion could, though not likely due to slow valve movement, cause brief valve openings. This would be acceptable since there isno seal-in feature and valve would return to its prior state.
- Identily reason for ContacVContact Group being satisfactory or unsatisfactory CA Chatter acceptable NV Not vulnerable(mechanically-actuated contacts and solid state relays)
GERS Seismically adequate based on GERS__: include GERS nwber NA Component not affected by relaysPrpedb DtQ0724 CR Corrective action reqited Prepard by /Aate0110712004 OA Operator action
- No entry necessary Reviewed G _A i l._ d__
_ate(_1/1312004 Page 5-31 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVABFN-01-R-001 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I Revisionu 0 23 January 2004 System: Various - Valves Sheet 31 Subsystemkcomponent Ref Dwg(s) Contact I Contact Group Relay Type I Location SAT* 1-FCV-71-2, 3,17, 18, 40 1-45E779-12 (9-6-88) HS, XS, LS, TS, PB NV (RCIC) 1-45E714-5 (12-18-70) C O.OL CA(') 1-45E626-3 (3-8-71) . C 13A-K2, 3, 4, 14,15,16,33 CA(1) 1-FCV-73-2, 3,26, 27, 81 1-45E779-13 (9-21-70) HS, LS, TS NV (HPIC) 1-45E779-43 (9-8 03) C,0, OL, lCX, lOX, 63 CAM 1-45E714_2__ 4_8_03_ 23A-Ki, 2, 3,12,13,15,25,27, 28, 37 CAM3 I The RCIC Isnot selected as a safe shutdown system, so its Isolation through valve closure isacceptable. However, RCIC actuation would be acceptable since itwould relieve some steam that the SRVs would otherwise relieve and would assist in core cooling. Its pump isprotected with aminimum-flow bypass line, see FSAR Section 4.7.5, inthe event of valve misalignment. Failure of this system to operate would be acceptable since it Isnot credited as a safe shutdown system 2 The HPIC Isnot selected as asafe shutdown system, so its isolation through valve closure isacceptable. However, HPIC actuation would be acceptable since Itwould assist Incore cooling and not hinder maintenance of reactor inventory or pressure. Its pump Isprotected with aminimum-flow bypass line, see FSAR Section 6.4.1, in the event of valva misalignment. Failure of this system to operate would be acceptable since it isnot credited as a safe shutdown system
- Identity reason for Contact/Contact Group being satisfactory or unsatisfactory CA Chaffer acceptable NV Not vulnerable(mechanicaly-actuated contacts and solid state relays)
GERS Seismically adequate based on GERS____ Include GERS number / 19* NA Component not affected by relays Prepared by so- / vDate01a704 CR Corrective action required OA Operator action
- No entry necessary Reviewed by_<2 -zEg _ _ateO___004 Page 5-32 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TABLE 5-1: A-46 RELAY SCREENING AND EVALUATION FORM G.4 - RELAY TABULATION TVA/BFN-01-R-001 PLANT: BROWN'S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I Revision 0 23 January 2004 System: Various - Valves Sheet 32 Subsystemkcomponent Ref Dwg(s) Contact I Contact Group Relay Type I Location SAP 1-FCV-77-2A&B, 15A&B 1-730E927-15 R17 I HS, LS N (Drywell Isol.) 86-77-2A&B, 15A&B CR120A/Panefs 9-42&43 GERSM
. 16A-K5A-D, 7A-D, 17,18, 47, 48 CA(
1-FSV-84-8A, 8B, 8C, 1-45E684-1 (11-6-73) HS NV 8D, 48, 49 1-FCV-84-19, 20 (Vent 1-730E927-17A R07 HS, LS N valves) 1-45E684-1&2 (11-8-73) CA(3) LR, PS, 16A-34&35, 84-1K2B&3B A 86-84-20 CR120A/Panel 9-43 GERSM 1-PREG-84-52, 54 2-47E862-1 (6-7-73) NA I See App. B.1 2 Actuation or chatter of relay could cause valve to close but not open. Closed isan acceptable safe shutdown position. 3 Chatter during the 30 second strong motion could briefly delay operator demanded vent valve opening. This would not occur during the strong motion. Chatter of the PS or the 16A-K34 or 35 could cause the valve to close briefly. This would be acceptable since there isno seal-in or lockout and the valve would return to its demanded position.
- identiy reason for Contactl/Contact Group being satisfactory or unsatislactory CA Chatter acceptable NV Not vulnerable(mechanically-actuated contact and solid state relays)
GERS Seismically adequate based on GERS____ include GERS nurnber NA Compnent not affected by relays Prepared by IDateOl/07/2004 CR OA Corrective action Operator actiones required R ie ____-_
- No entry necessary __-- - -- - -Rev ewed b y :< te O 1/1 3atelt2 0 204 Page 5-33 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVANBFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004
- 6. REFERENCES 6-1. Generic Letter 87-02, 'Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington D. C., February 19,1987.
6-2. SQUG report entitled, "Generic Implementation Procedure for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment, Revision 2," June, 1990. 6-3. Electric Power Research Institute report EPRI NP-7148-SL entitled, "Procedure for Evaluating Nuclear Power Plant Relay Seismic Functionality," dated December, 1990. 6-4. EPRI NP-7148-SL Volume 2 entitled "Procedure for Evaluating Nuclear Power Plant Relay Seismic Functionality Volume 2: Addendum," Electric Power Research Institute, dated September 1993. 6-5. Generic Letter 88-20, "Individual Plant Examination of External Events for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities," dated September 21, 1992. 6-6. NUREG 1407, Procedural and Submittal Guidance for Individual Plant Examination of Extemal Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities," dated June 1991. 6-7. Letter from TVA to NRC entitled "Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant - Units 2&3 - Generic Letter 87-02, Supplement 1, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mcchanical and Elecirical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue A-46 and Generic Letter 88-20 Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of Extemal Events for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities," - Submittal of Seismic Evaluation Reports, dated June 28,1996. 6-8. Letter from NRC to TVA entitled, "Browns Ferry, Units 1, 2 and 3 Re: Completion of Licensing Action for Generic Letter 87-02(TAC Nos. M69430, M69431 and M69432), dated March 21, 2000. 6-9. TVA Calculation CDQ1 999 2003 1199, Rev. 1, "Relay Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) for USI A-46 and IPEEE Seismic Programs." Page 6-1 FACILTy RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVANBFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 6-10. TVA Calculation CD-Q0000-940339, "Calculation of Basic Parameters for A-46 and Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) Seismic Program," dated October 16,1995. 6-11. Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), effective March 30, 2003. 6-12. EPRI NP-7147-SL, "Seismic Ruggedness of Relays," and Addendums, Electric Power Research Institute, August 1991. 6-13. Merz, Kelly, "SQURTS-TO-GERS Conversion," SQUG Newsletter, Volume 3, Issue 3, October, 1995. 6-14. General Design Criteria Document BFN-50-C-7105, titled "Pipe Rupture, Internal Missiles, Internal Flooding, Seismic Qualification and Vibration of Pipes," dated March 2, 2001. 6-15. EPRI NP-5223 Rev.1, "Generic Seismic Ruggedness of Power Plant Equipment," Electric Power Research Institute, February 1991. 6-16. WDP-BFN1-CEB-A46-IPEEE, -USI A-46 and Seismic IPEEE Screening Evaluation Documentation for Browns Ferry Unit 1." Page 6-2 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVANBFN-01 -R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 APPENDIX A: FLOOR SPECTRA Floor spectra and the safe shutdown earthquake(SSE) spectrum used in the relay evaluation seismic capacity versus demand comparisons are described in TVA Calculation CD-Q0000-940339 titled, 'Calculation of Basic Parameters for A46 and Individual Plant Examination of External Events(IPEEE) Seismic Program," dated October 16, 1995. The calculation applies to all three units. Effective grade differs for the three units but the floor response spectra apply to all three units. Evaluation of relay seismic capacity versus demand requires comparison of both the peak spectral acceleration (PSA) and the zero period acceleration (ZPA). The PSA is the highest value in the 4 to 16 Hertz (HZ) frequency region of the spectra. The ZPA is the highest value in the 33 HZ and higher region. These values are calculated using either the SSE ground spectrum or a floor response spectrum with appropriate amplification factor and required multipliers for conservatism in some cases. Sample calculations are provided in Appendix B. The PSA and ZPA values applied in demand calculations using the SSE ground spectrum and floor response spectra listed are taken from tables on pages 17, 20 and 43 of the calculation CD-Q0000-940339. Page A-1 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVANBFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 TABLE A-1: PSA AND ZPA VALUES FOR SEISMIC DEMAND CALCULATIONS Building Elevation (ft) Peak Spectral Zero Period Buldng FlorElvaio (t) Acceleration (a) Acceleration (a) Reactor & 561 0.31 0.20 Control Bay (effective grade) 565 0.72 0.24 593 1.34 0.32 621 2.15 0.38 639 2.48 0.44 Diesel 573 0.31 0.20 Generator (effective grade) 561 1.58 0.38 583 2.08 0.46 594 2.23 0.50 607 2.41 0.48 Page A-2 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVAIBFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 APPENDIX B: SYSTEM, CIRCUIT AND COMPONENT DISCUSSIONS B.1 Common Relays Some relay types occur numerous times in safe shutdown system control circuits. The seismic capacity of these common relays and other components discussed in this Appendix will be referenced on G.4 forms where they occur to simplify documentation. Seismic demands and capacity versus demand comparisons will also be discussed for some common locations and levels. Relay contacts with a seismic capacity of 8g or more and located below plant levels of about Elevation 600 feet satisfy the Level 1 seismic adequacy screen of EPRI NP-7148, Section 3.6. These include high capacity relays on panels 9-15,16,17,18,19,28,30,32,33,36A,39,42 and 43, 4KV SHDN Boards 1B & D, 480V SHDN BD B and RMOV Boards 1B & D. Moderate capacity relays with at least a 5g seismic capacity also satisfy the Level 1 screen for cabinets such as 9-30, 32 and 33 which were determined during walkdowns by seismic capability engineers to be low amplification cabinets with an amplification factor of 3 or less. B.1.1 HFA GE HFA relays are widely used in the BFN-1 control circuits. These are mostly model HFA51 A which has a seismic capacity of 6g for the NO contacts and 1g for the NC contacts in the deenergized state; see GERS ARH in EPRI NP-7147. Both NO and NC contacts have a 7g capacity in the energized state. The HFA151 has higher capacities. Accordingly, all but the NC contacts pass the 5g Level 1 seismic capacity screen for low amplification cabinets, including those noted above in Section B.1.0. The de-energized NC contact is normally used only as a permissive for which chatter is acceptable, because the chatter in most cases, would only cause a brief delay in the component operation during the 30 second strong motion. A possible 20-30 second delay in valve operation or pump operation would be acceptable since no LOCA is assumed to occur. If contact chatter is unacceptable, the G.4 form will specifically address the chatter effect. B.1.2 Agastat Agastat relays are commonly used for timed logic operation, including load sequencing, at BFN-1. The model 7012 is the most common. Both the 7012 and 2412 Page B-1 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVANBFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 have a seismic capacity of 12.5g for both the NO and NC contacts in both the de-energized and energized states; see GERS PNT in EPRI NP-7147. These high capacities make the 7012 and 2412 relays seismically adequate for most plant locations, including the panels listed in Section B.1.0. The model ETR14 has a 9g NO and 3.8g NC seismic capacity in the non-operate state and 1Og capacity for both NO and NC contacts in the operate state; see Addendum 2 to EPRI NP-7147. Section 1.1 above discusses possible chatter of a low capacity NC contact. The model 7022 has a seismic capacity of 6g for deenergized NO and NC contacts and 1Og when energized. B.1.3 CR120A GE CR120A relays are also widely used in the BFN-1 control circuits. The model CR1 20A has a seismic capacity of lOg for the NO and 9g for the NC contacts in the de-energized state; see GERS A12 in EPRI NP-7147. Both NO and NC contacts have a 1Og capacity in the energized state. Accordingly, all of the CR1 20A contacts pass the Level 1 seismic capacity screen for most standard cabinets, including those listed above in Section B.1.0. B.1.4 HGA GE HGA relays are another common relay used in the BFN-1 control circuits. These are mostly model HGA1 1 which has a seismic capacity of 8.8g for the NO contacts and Og for the NC contacts in the de-energized state; see GERS ARH in EPRI NP-7147. The NC contacts have a 1Og capacity in the energized state and the NO contacts have a 4.4g capacity in the energized state. Accordingly, the de-energized NO and energized NC contacts pass the Level 1 seismic capacity screen for many common cabinets, including those listed above in Section B.1.0. The de-energized NC contact is a "bad actor," see Appendix E 6f EPRI NP-7148, and must be dealt with as a special case if its chatter is unacceptable. However, the de-energized NC contact is normally used only as a permissive for which chatter is acceptable, because the chatter in most cases would only cause a brief delay in the component operation during the 30 second strong motion. A possible 20-30 second delay in valve operation or pump operation would be acceptable since no LOCA is assumed to occur. If contact chatter is unacceptable, the G.4 form will specifically address the chatter effect. Page B-2 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVANBFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 B.2 Motor Control Centers (MCCs) Most MCCs, commonly referred to as RMOV Boards at BFN-1, have a standard GE 7700 frame with cubicles or "buckets" which contain a molded case circuit breaker, 480V/120V transformer, contactors and wiring. A few standard ITE MCCs are also used. The contactors are typically GE CR105,106 or 109. EPRI NP-7148, Section C.3.1 provides additional discussion of this type GE MCC and contactors. 250VDC RMOV boards have similar components. GERS MCC in EPRI NP-5223 show a floor capacity of 1.5g PSA and 1.0g ZPA (denoted 1.5/1.0). 480V RMOV BDs 1B & 1D and 25OVDC BD 1B are at Elevation 593 ft. of the RB (denoted RB593), which has a floor demand (see Appendix A) of 1.345/0.32. 250VDC RMOV BD 1C is at level RB565. Accordingly, contactors in these MCCs are seismically adequate. 480V RMOV BDs lA & 1E and 25OVDC RMOV BD 1A, located at level RB621 with a floor demand of 2.15/0.38, are seismically adequate if the 0.6 narrow peak reduction factor is applied; see EPRI NP-7148 Section 3.6 and Section 1.2 of EPRI NP-7148 Vol.2 for discussions of the 0.6 narrow peak reduction factor. Reference 6-10, Figure B.1 shows the narrow peak which meets the criteria provided in EPRI NP-7148. For the Core Spray, RHR and RHRSW pumps and their associated valves, two pumps provide 100% maximum system flow as discussed in FSAR Sections 4.8, 6.3 and 10.9. Without a LOCA this is more than adequate flow. This capability is provided by pump switchgear and valve MCCs located on RB593 level or lower for which the equipment is seismically adequate without tile 0.6 narrow peak reduction. If the pumps powered and controlled by equipment on RB621 did not start or their associated valves misaligned (circuit interlocks prevent pump start if a potentially damaging misalignment occurs), the valves could be aligned and pumps started from the main control room at a later time, if needed. B.3 Switchgear BFN-1 safe shutdown equipment pumps and valves are powered through 4160V (4KV) and 480V switchgear. Redundant trains of switchgear are used to satisfy single failure criteria and are located in different plant areas to reduce the chance of common mode failure. The 4KV switchgear is discussed in Section 3.1 and the 480V switchgear is Page B-3 FACILiTY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVANBFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 discussed in Section 3.2. Seismic capacities, demands and screening methods are provided to allow simple referencing on G.4 pages. B.3.1 4KV Switchgear The BFN-1 4KV switchgear breakers are mostly standard 1960's vintage GE 4KV Magne-Blast breakers or replacement Siemens breakers which satisfy form, fit, and function considerations and were procured qualified. EPRI NP-7148 Appendices B and C discuss the operation of and contact devices on these types of breakers. In particular, the auxiliary contacts on the breaker are mechanically-operated and are not vulnerable to chatter. Also, the use of SWGR GERS to screen 52x closing relays and 52y antipump relays which are special purpose relays provided with the breakers by the breaker manufacturer and are not low ruggedness relays, is discussed for both low and medium voltage breakers. The standard set of protective relays for the pump 4KV switchgear is a 50/51/83 (GE lAC) and 50g (PJC). The 4 KV switchgear shutdown boards 1B &1D are located at RB593 with a seismic demand of 1.345/0.32 and 1A & 1C at RB621 with a seismic demand of 2.15/0.38; see Appendix A. The relays and contact devices are seismically adequate based on SWGR GERS MVS/LVS in EPRI NP-5223. These GERS show capacities of 1.8/1.0 and 2.5/1.5 (with additional cabinet inspections for breaker vertical restraints and arc chute restraints). The additional inspections were made for the switchgear on RB621 and the vertical restraints were determined adequate. The second additional requirement does not apply since the Siemens breakers in SHDN BD 1A on RB621 are vacuum breakers which do not have arc chutes. Note also that the specific MVS/LVS criterion that the protective relays directly feed the trip coil, without an interposing lockout relay, is satisfied. B.3.2 480V Switchgear The BFN-1 480V breakers are standard GE type AK. Sections C.3.1 and C.3.13 of EPRI NP-7148 discuss AK breaker operation and contact devices on the breaker. The AK-15 and AK-25 are solenoid operated and the AK-50 is operated by charged springs. Both have mechanically-operated auxiliary contacts which are not vulnerable to chatter. Protective relays, when used, are of the same types as discussed in Section 3.1 above. 480V switchgear shutdown board B is located at RB593 and board A at RB621. The floor demands and MVS/LVS GERS discussed in Section 3.1 apply Page B-4 FACILTY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVANBFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 and accordingly the relays and contact devices associated with the 480V switchgear are seismically adequate. Feeder breakers to the buses have a lockout relay associated with the protective relays and screening methods other than the switchgear GERS are used for them as discussed in Table 5-1 (G4 form, sheet 24). Page B-5 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVAIBFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 APPENDIX C: ESSENTIAL RELAY LIST The following relays were determined to be essential relays, which are those relays which must pass a seismic capacity versus demand screen. Relay G.4 Page(s) Agastat 7012 12,15,17,18 Agastat 7022 25 GE HFA51,151 12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,25 GE HGA11 12,15,17,18,19,25 GE CR120A 14,27,28,29,32 GE IAC51 24 GE IAC53 24,25 GE IAC66 12,15,24 GE PJC11 12,15,24 ITE 27 12,15 GE HEA61 24 GE CR105/106/109 13,14,16,17,18,19,28,29,30,31,32 Page C-1 FACLTy RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVA/BFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 APPENDIX D: RELAYS SCREENED USING SWITCHGEAR GERS The following relays were screened as seismically acceptable using switchgear GERS. Relay G.4 Pages(s) GE HFA51,151 12,15 GE IAC51 24 GE IAC53 24 GE IAC66 12,15, 24 GE PJC11 12,15,24 ITE27 12,15 4KV Breaker closing (52x)- relay 12, 15, 24 4KV Breaker anti-pump (52y) relay 12,15, 24 480V Breaker closing (52x) relay 24 480V Breaker anti-pump (52y) relay 24 Page D-1 FACuLITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVANBFN-01 -R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 APPENDIX E: WALKDOWN RESULTS The relay walkdown to identify cabinet types which house essential relays, to spot check relay mountings, relay types and locations, and to verify the adequacy of the anchorage and structure of cabinets and panels was done as part of the anchorage and structural inspections by seismic capability engineers. Example relay mounting details for SSEL items are shown in Figures E-1 to E-17. Results of the seismic verification walkdowns are provided in the Screening Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS) contained in WDP-BFN1-CEB-A46-IPEEE (Reference 6-16). Walkdown photographs and relay lists from the cabinet and panel inspections were used during the relay evaluation to confirm that the installed relays were consistent with control circuit drawing information. Any relay cabinet/panel anchorage or structural inadequacies identified are to be resolved as part of the corrective actions (outlier resolutions) resulting from the seismic capability engineers' evaluations as documented in Reference 6-16. Page E-1 FACILIY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
TVA/BFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 Figure E-1: Example relay mounting in 480V RB Vent Board IB Figure E-2: Example relay mounting in 250V DC RMOV Board 1C Page E-2 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS. INC.
TVA/BFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 Figure E-3: Example relay mounting in 250V DC RMOV Board 1A Figure E-4: Example relay mounting in 480V SD Board 1A Page E-3 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS. INC.
TVAIBFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 Figure E-5: Example relay mounting on face of 4KV SHDN BD B _MM Figure E-6: Relay mounting in Common Board Logic Panel 25-44 BI1 Page E-4 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS. INC.
TVA/BFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 Figure E-7: Example relay mounting in RPS Circuit Protector Cabinet 1A1 Figure E-8: Relay mounting and stiffeners in1-PNLA-009-0015 Page E-5 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS. INC.
TVA/BFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 _¶F~ vi Figure E-9: Relay mounting (HFA's) in 1-PNLA-009-0042
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Figure E-10: Example HFA relay mounting in 1-PNLA-0043 Page E-6 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS. INC.
TVA/BFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 Figure E-11: Relay mounting (HFA's) in 1-PNLA-009-0033 Figure E-12: Relay mounting (Agastats) in 1-PNLA-009-0033 Page E-7 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS. INC.
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<i-j Figure E-14: Relay mounting on face of 1-PNLA-009-0036A Page E-8 FACILIrY RISK CONSULTANTS. INC.
TVA/BFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 F, E R md Figure E-15: Relay mounting in I -PNLA-009-0030 _ _ ~ .. I Figure E-16: Plug-in relays in 1-PNLA-009-0028 Page E-9 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS. INC.
TVA/BFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 Figure E-17: HFA & HGA relay mounting and internal vertical stiffeners in 1-PNLA-925-0031 Page E-10 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS. INC.
TVAfBFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 APPENDIX F: ESSENTIAL RELAY CABINETS The cabinets and panels that house essential relays are listed in Table F-1. These are the panels whose relays which must pass a seismic capacity versus demand screen. Photographs of these panels are provided in Figures F-1 through F-7. Details of the seismic verification for these panels are contained in Reference 6-16. Page F-1 FACILTY RISK CONSuLrANTS, INC.
TVA/BFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 TABLE F-1: LIST OF PANELS CONTAIING ESSENTIAL RELAYS Component ItemEL. Comments 1-PNLA-009-0030 19127 See Figure F-1 1-PNLA-009-0032 19128 See Figure F-2 1-PNLA-009-0033 19129 See Figure F-3 1-PNLA-009-0042 19131 See Figure F-4 1-PNLA-009-0043 19132 See Figure F-5 O-BDAA-211 -OOOOA 19412 4KV SHDN BD previously addressed by BFN-2 A-46 program O-BDM-211-OOOOB 19413 4KV SHDN BD previously addressed by BFN-2 A-46 program O-BDM-211-OOOOC 19414 4KV SHDN BD previously addressed by BFN-2 A-46 program O-BDAA-211 -0000D 19415 4KV SHDN BD previously addressed by BFN-2 A-46 program 1-BDBB-231-OOO1A 19418 480V SHDN BD previously addressed by BFN-2 A-46 program 1-BDBB-231 -0001B 19419 480V SHDN BD previously addressed by BFN-2 A-46 program 1-BDBB-268-0001 A 19423 480V RMOV BD previously addressed by BFN-2 A-46 program 1-BDBB-268-0001B 19424 480V RMOV BD previously addressed by BFN-2 A-46 program 1-BDBB-268-0002B (9026) 480V RMOV BD, previously addressed by BFN-2 A-46 program (this Rem isnot on the BFN-1 SSEL, only on the BFN-2 SSEL) SSEL-related function will be performed by 1-BDBB-268-0001 Aper 1-BDBB-268-OOOID 19016 DCN 51216Awhich replaces the MG sets with the newvariable frequency drive system SSEL-related function will be performed by 1-BDBB-268-0001 Bper 1-BDBB-268-0001 E 19018 DCN 51216A which replaces the MG sets with the new variable frequency drive system 1-BDBB-268-OOO1A 19030 See Figure F-6 1-BDBB-268-OO1B 19031 See Figure F-7 Page F-2 FACILUTY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.
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TVAIBFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 19128) Figure F-2: Essential relay panel 1-PNLA-009-0032 (SSEL Page F-4 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS. INC.
TVAIBFN-01 -R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 Figure F-3: Essential relay panel 1-PNLA-009-0033 (SSEL 19129) Page F-5 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS. INC.
TVA/BFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 Trw N3,I 7 I a,! .E1l El, Figure F-4: Essential relay panel 1-PNLA-009-0042 (SSEL 19131) Page F-6 FACILI1Y RISK CONSULTANTS. INC.
TVAIBFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004 3 ,. \ .; . :_ mn:aN Figure F-5: Essential relay panel 1-PNLA-009-0043 (SSEL 19132) Page F-7 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS. INC.
TVA/BFN-01-R-001 Revision 0 23 January 2004
'II Figure F 6: Essential relay panel 1-BDBB-268-OOOIA (SSEL 19030)
_ S~~ r-. _L: s , . 'It1 Figure F-7: Essential relay panel 1-BDBB-268-0001B (SSEL 19031) Page F-8 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS. INC.
ENCLOSURE 4 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNIT 1 RESPONSE TO NRC GENERIC LETTER 87-02, SUPPLEMENT 1 TRANSMITTAL OF SUPPLEMENTAL SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 2 (SSER No. 2) ON SQUG GENERIC IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURE, REVISION 2 AS CORRECTED ON FEBRUARY 14, 1992 (GIP-2)
SUMMARY
OF COMMITMENTS
- 1. BFN Unit 1 USI A-46 outliers will be resolved prior to restart of BFN Unit 1.
- 2. TVA will complete the Operations review of the BFN Unit 1 A-46 verification following approval of BFN Unit 1 procedures, and notify the NRC of the results of that review prior to restart of BFN Unit 1.}}