ML042670334

Corrected Pages for Exemption from the Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.B

ML042670334
Person / Time
Site:	Monticello
Issue date:	09/23/2004
From:	Padovan L NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD3
To:	Thomas J. Palmisano Nuclear Management Co
Padovan L, NRR/DLPM, 415-1423
References
TAC MC0751
Download: ML042670334 (9)

Text

September 23, 2004 Mr. Thomas J. Palmisano Site Vice President Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Nuclear Management Company, LLC 2807 West County Road 75 Monticello, MN 55362-9637

SUBJECT:

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT CORRECTED PAGES FOR EXEMPTION FROM THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX R, SECTION III.G.2.B (TAC NO. MC0751)

Dear Mr. Palmisano:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions letter of August 6, 2004, approved an exemption from the automatic fire suppression system requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2.b, applying to Fire Area IV/Fire Zone 1F at the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. Your Monticello staff requested some changes to our exemption evaluation to correct minor errors and clarify the licensing basis in Monticellos Fire Hazards Analysis. Enclosed are corrected pages with the changes identified by vertical bars in the right margin.

Sincerely,

/RA/

L. Mark Padovan, Project Manager, Section 1 Project Directorate III Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-263

Enclosure:

Corrected Evaluation Pages cc w/enclosure: See next page

ML042670334 NRR-048 OFFICE PDIII-1/PM PDIII-1/LA PDIII-1/SC D:PDIII D:DLPM NAME MPadovan THarris LRaghavan WRuland LMarsh DATE 09/23/04 09/23/04 9/23/04 9/23/04 09/23/04 In Northern States Powers (the licensee for Monticello at that time) letter of June 30, 1982, it requested a permanent exemption from the automatic suppression system requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G.2.b for the suppression pool torus area. The NRC l indicated the following in its June 16, 1983, exemption approval: l

. . . the area is separated from other plant areas by three-hour fire rated barriers.

Fire protection consists of smoke detectors, manual hose stations, and portable fire extinguishers. The only redundant safe shutdown equipment in the area consists of instrumentation for measuring the water temperature and level in the torus. The redundant trains are separated by one hundred feet and are free of intervening combustibles. Essentially no combustible material is stored or located in the area. Furthermore, all surfaces are concrete except for the torus, which is steel. All cables are installed in conduit.

The technical requirements of Section III.G.2 were not met in fire zone 1F (the torus compartment at MNGP) because cables and components of redundant shutdown divisions were not protected with area-wide automatic sprinkler system.

The NRCs letter of June 16, 1983, granted the exemption request, citing the following:

. . . because of the restricted access to this area, the probability of an exposure fire from the accumulation of transient combustibles, during normal operation, is low. We find that this feature, in conjunction with the one hundred feet of separation between redundant trains and early warning fire detection, provides reasonable assurance that one train will be maintained free of fire damage.

NMCs letter of September 15, 2003, as supplemented February 24, 2004, resubmitted its request for a permanent exemption from the requirements of Section III.G.2.b for fire area IV/fire zone 1F, stating the following:

. . . in 1985, a new safe shutdown analysis crediting only the minimum systems and equipment required to achieve safe shutdown was developed. This new shutdown methodology required the use of Core Spray, Safety Relief Valves and Residual Heat Removal (RHR) in the Suppression Pool Cooling mode. Prior to that time, these systems were not required to achieve safe shutdown given a fire in Fire Area IV/Fire Zone 1F. Both Division I and Division II components and cables for the Core Spray and Residual Heat Removal systems are contained within this fire area. Only one division of Safety Relief Valve control and indicating cables is located with this fire area. The impact of this revised shutdown methodology on the Fire Area IV/Fire Zone 1F exemption was not addressed when the shutdown model was revised. In addition, the Division II suppression pool temperature cable exit from the Torus Compartment and the

NMCs letter of September 15, 2003, said MNGPs Fire Hazards Analysis shows that the l equivalent (fixed plus transient combustibles) fire severity for the suppression pool torus area is l less than 1 minute. NMCs letter also said that the fixed combustibles consist of a single 3/4- l inch diameter radiax antenna cable, routed around approximately 70 percent of the perimeter wall. This amount of fixed combustibles is negligible. Other cables within the torus l compartment are in conduit except for short runs of exposed cable that may exist between a device and its associated junction box or conduit. NMC also said that transient combustibles were controlled by procedure.

The NRC staff sent NMC a request for additional information (RAI) dated January 30, 2004, asking NMC to clarify the type and quantity of transient combustibles it allowed into fire zone 1F. NMCs RAI response letter of February 24, 2004, disclosed the transient combustible loading for fire zone 1F. The loading consisted of two gallons of general-purpose solvent and three fiberglass ladders for a total of 1.7 million British thermal units (BTUs) equating to 142 BTUs per square foot. NMC evaluated additional combustibles for outage pre-staging that have been in the fire zone and totaled them to be 12.4 million BTUs. This is less than 1100 l BTUs per square foot. These amounts of transient combustibles are minimal.

The arrangement of the core spray valves is shown on Figure 1 of NMCs September 15, 2003, submittal. Division 1 core spray valve MO-1749 is located just below the ceiling of the torus compartment near column lines N and 8.7. Division 2 core spray valve l MO-1750 is located in the same compartment near column lines N and 3.5. Approximately l 130 feet separate these valves and their associated cables. The drywell also blocks the direct line-of-sight. Smoke detectors, that are annunciated in the control room, are near each core spray valve with three more detectors intervening on each of the two paths around the torus compartment.

The arrangement of the RHR cooling valves is also shown on Figure 1 of NMCs submittal. Division 1 RHR cooling valves MO-2006 and MO-2008 are located in the torus compartment. MO-2006 is located at column line N and 8.5, and MO-2008 is located at column l line P and 7.8. Division 2 RHR cooling valve MO-2009 is located in the same compartment l between column lines N and P and 4.5 and 5.1. Approximately 85 feet separate the Division 1 l valves and their associated cables from the Division 2 valves. The drywell also blocks the direct line-of-sight. Smoke detectors, that are annunciated in the control room, are near each RHR cooling valve with three more detectors intervening on each of the two paths around the torus compartment.

As previously discussed in Section 2.0 of this evaluation, the NRCs letter of June 16, 1983, granted an exemption for the suppression pool level transmitters. However, during the NRC staffs evaluation of NMCs September 15, 2003, exemption request, the staff identified discrepancies between Figures 1 and 2 concerning the routing of conduit for Division 1 and Division 2 suppression pool level transmitters LT7338A and LT7338B. The l NRCs RAI of January 30, 2004, questioned the location of the conduit and the associated penetrations exiting the fire zone. NMCs RAI response corrected the location and placed all of the information on Figure 2 of the revised submittal. Division 1 and Division 2 components are separated by at least 75 feet. Smoke detectors that are annunciated in the control room are near each level transmitter, with additional detectors intervening between the divisions in the torus compartment.

The SPOTMOS at MNGP consists of two redundant divisions. Each of the divisions has eight resistance temperature detectors (RTDs). Cabling inside conduit connects the RTDs in each division, runs around the suppression pool in close proximity to each other, and then exits the fire zones at least 75 feet apart. NMCs letter of September 15, 2003, stated that the

system could operate in an operable but degraded mode to support post-fire safe shutdown with as little as one detector in one train being operable.

Due to the close proximity of the conduits, and the concern that a single fire could involve both Division 1 and Division 2 conduits, the NRC staff requested further information on the SPOTMOS in its RAI. Specifically, the NRC staff requested NMC to address how the SPOTMOS would automatically eliminate 1) a failed temperature sensor, and 2) a fire-induced failure (hot short, short to ground, open, or increased/decreased resistance or voltage) of the cable to the temperature elements that is inside conduit. NMCs RAI response of February 24, 2004, described the operation of the system, addressing each of the failure modes. The critical distance between Division 1 and Division 2 for operation in the operable-but-degraded mode is at least 85 feet (where the cables enter the torus compartment). Smoke detectors, that annunciate in the control room, are located near each cable entry. Additional smoke detectors are distributed throughout the torus compartment.

The NRC staff concludes that NMC has met the underlying purpose of Appendix R,Section III.G.2.b, without having an automatic fire suppression system in the suppression pool torus area at MNGP considering the following:

• equivalent (fixed plus transient combustibles) fire severity for the suppression pool torus l area of less than 1 minute l

• smoke detector provisions

• minimum separation distance between redundant function components/circuits of safe l shutdown equipment of at least 75 feet l

• ability of SPOTMOS to continue to operate with at least one RTD on one train in the operable-but-degraded mode for any fire in fire zone 1F that involved both conduit trains

The NRC staff further concludes that pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), application of the regulation in these particular circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. Therefore, NMCs exemption request is acceptable.

4.0 CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants NMC a permanent exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.b, to not provide an automatic fire suppression system for fire area IV/fire zone 1F at MNGP.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment (69 FR 46187).

This exemption is effective upon issuance.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 23rd day of September 2004.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA/

Ledyard B. Marsh, Director Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant cc:

Jonathan Rogoff, Esquire Commissioner Vice President, Counsel & Secretary Minnesota Department of Commerce Nuclear Management Company, LLC 121 Seventh Place East 700 First Street Suite 200 Hudson, WI 54016 St. Paul, MN 55101-2145 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Manager - Environmental Protection Division Resident Inspectors Office Minnesota Attorney Generals Office 2807 W. County Road 75 445 Minnesota St., Suite 900 Monticello, MN 55362 St. Paul, MN 55101-2127 Manager, Regulatory Affairs John Paul Cowan Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Executive Vice President & Chief Nuclear Nuclear Management Company, LLC Officer 2807 West County Road 75 Nuclear Management Company, LLC Monticello, MN 55362-9637 700 First Street Hudson, WI 54016 Robert Nelson, President Minnesota Environmental Control Nuclear Asset Manager Citizens Association (MECCA) Xcel Energy, Inc.

1051 South McKnight Road 414 Nicollet Mall, R.S. 8 St. Paul, MN 55119 Minneapolis, MN 55401 Commissioner Mr. Thomas J. Palmisano Minnesota Pollution Control Agency Site Vice President 520 Lafayette Road Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant St. Paul, MN 55155-4194 Nuclear Management Company, LLC 2807 West County Road 75 Regional Administrator, Region III Monticello, MN 55362-9637 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 801 Warrenville Road Lisle, IL 60532-4351 Commissioner Minnesota Department of Health 717 Delaware Street, S. E.

Minneapolis, MN 55440 Douglas M. Gruber, Auditor/Treasurer Wright County Government Center 10 NW Second Street Buffalo, MN 55313 October 2003