ML041900178
| ML041900178 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 07/01/2004 |
| From: | NRC/EDO, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC/SECY |
| To: | |
| Licata L, NRR/DLPM/LPDI, 415-4090 | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML041900210 | List: |
| References | |
| G20040422, LTR-04-0387, NRC-1578, TAC MC3622 | |
| Download: ML041900178 (36) | |
Text
Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
Petition Review Board RE Mary Lampert Docket Number:
(not provided)
Location:
(conference call)
Date:
Thursday, July 1, 2004 Work Order No.:
NRC-1578 Pages 1-35 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433
1 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
+ + + + +
3 PETITION REVIEW BOARD (PRB) 4 CONFERENCE CALL 5
+ + + + +
6 THURSDAY 7
JULY 1, 2004 8
+ + + + +
9 The conference call was held, Herb Berkow, 10 presiding.
11 12 PETITION REVIEW BOARD:
13 HERBERT N. BERKOW, Chair 14 DONNA M. SKAY 15 LEE A. LICATA 16 PETITIONER:
17 MARY ELIZABETH LAMPERT, Duxbury, Massachusetts 18 ENERGY NUCLEAR, PILGRIM POWER STATION:
19 STEVE BETHAY, Director of Nuclear Safety 20 and Assessment 21 BRYAN FORD, Licensing Manager 22 NRC STAFF PRESENT FROM REGION I:
23 CLIFF ANDERSON, Projects Branch Chief 24 DON FLORES 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 LOCAL 369, UTILITY WORKERS OF AMERICA:
1 DAVID LIEB, ESQ., Spiegel & McDiarmid, D.C.
2 UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS:
3 DAVID LOCHBAUM 4
5 6
7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 P R O C E E D I N G S 1
CHAIRMAN BERKOW: Good morning.
2 PARTICIPANT: Are all the other people 3
known to everyone on the call?
4 MS. LAMPERT: Im not sure. This is Mary 5
Elizabeth Lampert from Duxbury, Massachusetts, the 6
petitioner.
7 MR. LIEB: And David Lieb. I am at the 8
law firm of Spiegel & McDiarmid in Washington, and I 9
represent Local 369, the Utility Workers Union of 10 America.
11 CHAIRMAN BERKOW: And then we have some 12 people form the plant?
13 MR. BETHAY: Thats correct, yes. Steve 14 Bethay. I am the Director of Nuclear Safety and 15 Assessment, and with me I have Bryan Ford who is our 16 Licensing Manager.
17 CHAIRMAN BERKOW: And from Region I?
18 MR. ANDERSON: Cliff Anderson, Projects 19 Branch Chief, and --
20 MR. FLORES: Don Flores (Inaudible).
21 CHAIRMAN BERKOW: And the Union of 22 Concerned Scientists?
23 MR. LOCHBAUM: David Lochbaum.
24 CHAIRMAN BERKOW: David, you dont have 25
4 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 anyone else with you?
1 MR. LOCHBAUM: Unfortunately, no.
2 CHAIRMAN BERKOW: Ms. Lampert, could you 3
tell us what the roles of Mr. Lieb and Mr. Lochbaum 4
are going to be on todays call?
5 PARTICIPANT: Who is speaking, just so we 6
know?
7 PARTICIPANT: Can you identify yourself?
8 CHAIRMAN BERKOW: Oh, Im sorry. Yes.
9 Herb Berkow. Wed like to know what the roles are of 10 Mr. Lochbaum and Mr. Lieb are going to be for this 11 telecon.
12 MS. LAMPERT: David Lochbaum is a nuclear 13 engineer, as you know, an analyst with the public 14 interest group, Union of Concerned Scientists. I have 15 asked David to be my, I guess you would call it, 16 expert in this call.
17 I know we all are looking out for public 18 safety, and Im sure he can contribute from his 19 experience questions and commentary that will 20 enlighten the NRC so that the best decision can be 21 made on my important petition.
22 CHAIRMAN BERKOW: Okay. So this is Herb 23 Berkow again. So you are going to ask Mr. Lochbaum to 24 participate as a speaker.
25
5 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 MS. LAMPERT: Correct.
1 CHAIRMAN BERKOW: Okay.
2 MR. LIEB: And this is David Lieb 3
representing Local 369. We are not representing Ms.
4 Lampert in this. Local 369 represents the majority of 5
the workers at the Pilgrim plant. We are generally 6
supportive of this petition that Ms. Lampert has 7
filed.
8 We strongly believe that the plant cannot 9
be operated within an adequate margin of safety 10 (inaudible) highly experienced workforce and, if there 11 is a strike or other work stoppage, it is our position 12 that the plant should be shut down.
13 CHAIRMAN BERKOW: This is Herb Berkow 14 again. So, Ms. Lampert, now I would assume then that 15 Mr. Lieb is just going to be an observer on this 16 telecon.
17 MS. LAMPERT: That is my understanding, as 18 he just stated.
19 MR. LIEB: If I can just finish, please.
20 CHAIRMAN BERKOW: Go ahead.
21 MR. LIEB: Okay. Now what I was going to 22 say is that Local 369 (inaudible) in a mediated 23 bargaining session on Saturday morning, and I 24 understand those were to continue through Tuesday.
25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 If we are not able to reach an agreement 1
by Tuesday, Local 369 intends to file with NRC an make 2
public a statement of the reasons for the Unions 3
belief that the plant should be shut down in the event 4
of a work stoppage, and we would request that, if and 5
when we file that statement, it will be made a part of 6
the record of the proceeding, and we will indicate 7
that when we file it.
8 PARTICIPANT: Yes, that is -- This is 9
Steve Lewis (Phonetic) speaking. I was going to say 10 that there is a point to which this process is really 11 (inaudible), you know, a very informal process, and we 12 are -- We dont even always have lawyers participating 13 at many of the stages of it.
14 So you know, we are going to try to be 15 very nonlegalistic here.
16 MR. LIEB: Okay. Well, thats fine.
17 PARTICIPANT: In effect, I think that what 18 Im really trying to say is that, when the union files 19 something with the NRC, it would be to our benefit 20 and, I think, to the unions benefit, to identify 21 specifically what you are asking us to do.
22 We may very well -- The 2.206 that Ms.
23 Lampert has filed is her 2.206. It may well be that 24 you are filing a paper of your own or -- But just make 25
7 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 clear what it is you are filing and what your reasons 1
are.
2 MR. LIEB: Okay.
3 PARTICIPANT: And what the remedy is that 4
you are seeking.
5 MR. LIEB: Okay. I appreciate that, and 6
we will certainly do that, and I promise I will 7
endeavor not to inject any unnecessary legalism into 8
this.
9 PARTICIPANT: Okay. I promise, too.
10 MR. LIEB: My reason for being here is to 11 listen.
12 PARTICIPANT: Okay.
13 CHAIRMAN BERKOW: This is Herb Berkow 14 again. For purposes of the record, the subject of 15 this teleconference is a 2.206 petition submitted by 16 Mary Lampert, petitioner, dated June 12, 2004. The 17 petitioner has requested that the NRC not permit 18 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station to continue to operate 19 in the event of a strike.
20 The purpose of this teleconference is to 21 allow the petitioner to address the Petition Review 22 Board and is an opportunity to provide additional 23 explanation and support for the requested action. It 24 is also an opportunity for the staff and licensee to 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 ask any clarifying questions.
1 I want to make it clear that the purpose 2
of this teleconference is not to debate the merits of 3
the petition. Following this phone call, the PRB will 4
meet to determine whether the NRC accepts the petition 5
under the 2.206 process or whether it will be dealt 6
with under another process.
7 The PRB is meeting today that I just 8
referred to will not determine whether or not we agree 9
or disagree with the contents of the petition.
10 This teleconference is being recorded and 11 will be transcribed. So I ask that anybody, including 12 myself, making a statement first state their name 13 clearly. The transcript will become a supplement to 14 the petition and will be made publicly available.
15 We requested that the petitioners keep 16 their remarks to about 30 minutes. Now if the PRB 17 decides that the petition will be considered under 18 2.206, then the NRC will issue an acknowledgment to 19 the petitioner.
20 The usual process that we follow calls for 21 the NRC to issue a directed decision within a 22 reasonable period of time. In this case, the request 23 relates to a specific event, namely a potential strike 24 at the Pilgrim plant.
25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 Should the strike occur before completion 1
of the directed decision, we would have to consider 2
the petitioners request for immediate action and make 3
a decision as to whether to grant or deny the request 4
for immediate action.
5 Should we decide that the petition does 6
not satisfy the criteria for review under 2.206, the 7
petitioner will still receive a complete written 8
response to the concerns. However, in this case, too, 9
should a strike occur before our response is completed 10 and issued, we would again have to make an immediate 11 decision on the request.
12 Are there any questions on our process?
13 Okay, if not, then, Ms. Lampert and the other people 14 with you, we will turn the call over to you. We are 15 specifically interested in further explanation of two 16 paragraphs in your petition on page 3, specifically 17 stating that some components do not operate as 18 designed and require special training to compensate 19 for mechanical glitches, and some components were 20 identified by the Government Accounting Office as 21 counterfeit and substandard. Union workers were 22 trained to respond to emergencies up to and including 23 area evacuation and terrorism, vulnerability to 24 (inaudible). Implementing procedures vary from site 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 to site.
1 Then you follow in the next paragraph: I 2
do not believe the plant can be operated safely by 3
replacement workers that have not received site 4
specific training, do not have user experience at the 5
site, do not have a specific history to Pilgrim 6
Nuclear Power Station, and so on.
7 So it is primarily those two paragraphs in 8
your petition that we are asking you to expound on.
9 MS. LAMPERT: Correct. Mary Lampert, the 10 petitioner. I wish to make my statement without 11 interruption, so I dont lose my train of thought or 12 I forget to include an item of importance. It will 13 serve both our interests if I am given that 14 opportunity and courtesy.
15 Due to confidentiality, I cannot provide 16 copies of any communications from work or 17 documentation or identify sources other than workers 18 at the plant.
19 Inspection requirement 92709-02.06 used by 20 the region to help review preparations for a strike 21 states: Determine if licensed personnel who will be 22 performing, are performing licensed activities are 23 qualified and proficient in these activities.
24 This recognizes the importance NRC gives 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 to human performance in order to decrease risk at 1
nuclear power plants. The petitioner agrees and 2
asserts in the petition that Entergys plant to 3
substitute workers for those on strike would 4
jeopardize public safety and increase risk.
5 Therefore, I ask enforcement action.
6 First, the importance of human performance 7
to reduce risk: Research commissioned by the NRC 8
demonstrates the importance of human performance.
9 Profiles of human performance contributes 10 contributions to operating events.
11 The NRC saw a need to better understand 12 how human performance influences risk associated with 13 nuclear power plant operations, and NRC Office of 14 Research requested Idaho National Engineering and 15 Environmental Laboratories to identify and 16 characterize the influence of human performance in 17 significant operating events.
18 In that report on Table 1 it shows that 19 operators are most likely to make active errors -- in 20 other words, to make a decision -- that immediately 21 causes problems. Other workers can and do make latent 22 errors, such as writing down the wrong steps in 23 maintenance work orders, so that the problem occurs 24 later when the work is done.
25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 On Table 2 they rank the results of recent 1
plant events by event importance. The right-most 2
column of that table explains how much human error 3
contributed to the event. (Inaudible) of 100 means 4
that the event would not have occurred or would not 5
have been serious, had human error mistakes not 6
happened.
7 All but four out of the 23 reactors 8
sampled ranked 100 in that column, and two of the 9
remaining four had scores of 80. In the summary, the 10 report states that human performance was found to be 11 a major contributor to the risk increases in 12 significant operating events, and all operating events 13 involved multiple human failures.
14 The summary states, "Findings from this 15 work underscore the significant contribution human 16 performance makes to nuclear power plant risk."
17 Pilgrim workers themselves say that human performance 18 would be degraded if substitute workers are used to 19 replace those on strike.
20 Facility designs, layouts and operating 21 procedures vary significantly from plant to plant. In 22 Pilgrims case, the degree of variation is especially 23 pronounced, because Pilgrim is one of the nations 24 oldest reactors. It operates under a patchwork 25
13 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 effect.
1 At Pilgrim it is often more difficult to 2
find needed spare parts or to know where parts are 3
needed to maintain or repair equipment. I am told 4
that the special practices developed to deal with such 5
challenges and generally to ensure Pilgrims 6
(inaudible) and safe operation are part of the 7
institutional knowledge that Pilgrims workforce 8
brings to the performance of their jobs but may not be 9
written down.
10 We are told by workers that operators must 11 be able to do more than follow written procedures 12 which tend to provide guidance about how to respond to 13 isolated events for one equipment failure at a time.
14 However, as in any complicated system, more than one 15 problem often occurs at one time.
16 Thus, operators must know how to address 17 situations in which multiple events are happening at 18 the same time for which there may be no specific 19 written protocol. In those instances, the importance 20 of having experienced personnel on hand to make an 21 informed judgment cannot be overstated.
22 The current workforce has decades of plant 23 specific experience, but contract replacement staff 24 (inaudible) to run Pilgrim following a work stoppage 25
14 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 will, obviously, will not have the same on the job 1
experience with the plant.
2 The strike contingency plan calls for the 3
replacement of experienced reactor operators with 4
personnel who do not have plant specific experience.
5 Pilgrims Operations Department has 23 licensed 6
reactor operators who, we understand, are members of 7
Local 369.
8 We are told that these 23 reactor 9
operators are responsible for the day to day operation 10 of the plants control room. They have an average of 11 9.5 years of experience as Pilgrim reactor operators 12 and a cumulative experience of 219 years as Pilgrim 13 reactor operators.
14 This means that on average those in charge 15 of controlling the plant, including reading gauges, 16 meters,turning switches, turning dials, and pulling 17 the levers in response to those meter and gauge 18 readings, have nine and a half years of performing 19 these task.
20 This experience is essential, because 21 there are thousands of gauges and meters, and many of 22 them are highly sensitive, requiring familiarity and 23 (inaudible) to operate them properly.
24 In the event of a strike or work stoppage, 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 we understand that Entergy intends to use senior 1
reactor operators from Pilgrim to replace the current 2
contingency of reactor operators. We are told that, 3
applied to Pilgrim, the term "senior reactor operator" 4
is a misnomer, because most of the SROs, senior 5
reactor operators, at Pilgrim have no hands-on 6
experience operating the control board at Pilgrim.
7 The SROs at Pilgrim, unlike their RO 8
counterparts, have no experience turning dials, 9
pulling levers or reading gauges and meters, because 10 as a matter of practice at Pilgrim SROs do not operate 11 control room equipment.
12 Indeed, we understand from workers that 13 the management personnel who will be used by Entergy 14 in the event of a strike, only six have any experience 15 actually touching control room equipment.
16 Specifically, on the management side, we understand 17 from workers that there are only eight Operations 18 Department employees with any licensed operator 19 experience.
20 As licensed operators, those eight 21 personnel have an average of 4.1 years of experience, 22 and cumulative experience of 33 years. Two of the 23 eight management personnel who have experience as 24 licensed operators currently do not have active 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 operator licenses and, thus, would not be permitted to 1
work as a reactor operator.
2 The qualifications of these SROs, turned 3
into ROs in the event of a strike, may also be 4
suspect. Workers said that Entergy is changing its 5
policy for qualifying a work as an RO in the Pilgrim 6
control room.
7 We understand that normally reactor 8
operators have to be tested on their knowledge of a 9
number of plant systems before they are permitted to 10 work in plant control. However, in order to replace 11 reactor operators in the event of a work stoppage, 12 senior operators are now being asked to self-assess 13 their qualifications to operate the plant.
14 In preparation for the strike, Pilgrim 15 senior operators are apparently being asked to 16 identify any systems about which they think their 17 knowledge may be deficient. If they identify an area, 18 they will be tested on their knowledge of that system, 19 but will not be tested on their knowledge of other 20 systems about which they do not acknowledge a 21 deficiency.
22
- Thus, whether these personnel are 23 permitted to take control of Pilgrim will be based 24 substantially, if not entirely, on their own self-25
17 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 assessment of what they know.
1 The contingency plan will result in 2
replacement workers performing the functions currently 3
performed by experienced personnel. We are told that 4
throughout the plant significant surveillance 5
functions are being performed every day, but is 6
dependent upon the experience of the existing 7
workforce.
8 For example, technicians working in 9
Pilgrims Instrumentation and Control Department are 10 called upon to test and maintain devices that report 11 information to the ROs in the control room. This is 12 the work of testing systems to ensure that under 13 certain parameters they perform certain automatic 14 functions.
15 The procedures for conducting these tests 16 are highly plant specific. Even among nuclear plants 17 of the same vintage, equipment testing is sequenced by 18 procedure. Failure to follow the procedures correctly 19 may constitute a prohibited action outside the 20 parameters of the plants operating license.
21 The same concerns arise with respect to 22 employees in Pilgrims Chemistry Department where, 23 among other things, they are called upon to do 24 (inaudible) testing and other forms of environmental 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 monitoring. All of these tests must be conducted by 1
fully qualified technicians.
2 Until now, full qualification status for 3
instruments and controls personnel has required at 4
least three to four years of Pilgrim experience.
5 (Inaudible), like most nuclear plants, Pilgrim has a 6
master equipment list. It serves as a database to 7
permit a user to look up a piece of equipment and 8
determine its component parts and relevant maintenance 9
history.
10 We are told that master equipment list is 11 substantial, as there may be anywhere from 300,000 to 12 400,000 component parts in a nuclear plant. This form 13 of configuration control is critical to ensuring that 14 maintenance work is planned and conducted based on the 15 facts on the ground.
16 At Pilgrim, we understand that the master 17 equipment list is incomplete and unreliable, despite 18 years of effort to bring the list up to industry 19 standards either in terms of completeness or accuracy.
20 Unless and until the master equipment list is complete 21 and accurate, maintenance work cannot be properly 22 planned based on the contents of the list.
23 The experienced workforce that deals with 24 the plant and its equipment components on a day to day 25
19 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 basis will be aware that information on the list 1
cannot be relied upon, and will know the actual status 2
of a given plant component because of direct 3
experience with it.
4 Contractors brought in to perform the same 5
functions on an ad hoc basis will not have that 6
experienced based knowledge. Significant problems may 7
arise to the extent that outside contractors or others 8
who have plant specific experience need to perform 9
maintenance tests based on inaccurate configuration 10 information. By analogy, it would be impossible to 11 navigate the plant without an accurate map.
12 Substandard and counterfeit parts were 13 identified in TAO 91-6, October 1990, nuts, bolts, 14 pipefitting, circuit breakers, fuses. It is the 15 petitioners understanding that all of those 16 substandard and counterfeit parts have not been 17 replaced with standard parts.
Therefore, 18 institutional knowledge is required to know what is 19 standard and what isnt standard.
20 Entergy has started strike implementation 21 of its plan, weakening, we understand, emergency 22 plans. We were informed that on June 29, 2004, 23 Entergy started weakening its emergency plan.
24 Although characterized to us as minor, it is still a 25
20 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 weakening.
1 As licensed operators left work June 29th 2
-- I believe the date is correct -- Assistant 3
Operations manager Bryan Tolvin (phonetic) started 4
collecting operator keys. These keys are used by 5
operators to open storage lockers that contain 6
firefighting equipment and gain access to toolboxes to 7
the plant during equipment malfunctions and minor 8
maintenance.
9 If the operators are required to respond, 10 as required in the emergency plan or fire emergency 11 procedure plan and do not have the keys in their 12 pocket, their response time will be reduced and add 13 needless delay, compromising everybodys safety.
14 Workers also stated that the Chemistry 15 Department is attempting to delete required actions of 16 the on-shift chemistry technician from the emergency 17 upgrading procedures, to relieve the Department from 18 27/7 coverage after July 13th.
19 It does not look like safety of the plant 20 and of the public is the major focus anymore, as it 21 should be. Instead, managements primary focus is on 22 how to operate during the strike without qualified 23 staff.
24 The real question is what other early 25
21 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 posturing will Entergy employ, and what effect will it 1
have on the staff? Distractions are a common 2
contributor to human error. Unreasonable and 3
unwarranted action weeks before the expiration date of 4
its labor contract (inaudible) to have generated an 5
error-like situation. Therefore, public safety is 6
compromised even before the fact by a negative and 7
otherwise distracted workforce.
8 As their final directive, we understand, 9
the operators were also told to clean out their 10 lockers, and Mr. Sullivan said your personal items 11 will not be safe after July 13th. And not to be 12 overlooked, the publics personal items, like my 13 house, may not be safe either, which is the point of 14 my petition.
15 A negative environment with workers at 16 Pilgrim that we have now due to the lack of 17 cooperation by Entergy with its workers and focused 18 instead, I believe, on the bottom line, like a bad 19 marriage does disservice to a whole.
20 The focus is distracted from the primary 21 and larger goal of protecting the kids in the interest 22 of the family. In this case the public can see 23 functioning of the reactor.
24 The union workers, apparently, from press 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
- reports, and the security workers are both 1
disgruntled.
Something is going wrong with 2
management.
3 On another level, it is important to 4
recognize that Pilgrim has already substantially cut 5
their workforce over the past decade. The workforce 6
is stressed, part of the reason behind the strike, and 7
so it is a bad time to pull in substitutes.
8 In anticipation of and as a result of 9
deregulation, Pilgrims workforce had been 10 substantially cut, and since Entergy took over, it has 11 declined further. So there is no time for tinkering 12 with new kids on the block.
13 In 1990 the total staff at Pilgrim was 14 939. In 2004 it is either 550 or 580.
15 Site security: The instruction procedure 16 92709-02.07-B, Evaluate the Effectiveness of Site 17 Security, is post-9-11, and this means we are 18 concerned only about the potential of violent workers 19 that are terrorists or a combination of the two.
20 Question, not to be answered right now but 21 at the conclusion: When were the inspection procedure 22 section for the security last revised? Were they 23 revised post-9-11? If so, how were they revised to 24 include terrorists and the potential of compounding 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 factors of a strike, violent workers, terrorists added 1
altogether?
2 The two-man rule, for example, to 3
safeguard against internal attacks is very important.
4 Are there added measures required by the NRC to 5
require -- not make it an option -- require the two-6 man rule during a strike?
7 It is my understanding that the union 8
security force and Local 369 workers have been very 9
supportive of one another in the past. So despite the 10 strike, the two-man rule must be followed. During a 11 strike, (inaudible) a lower possibility of misguided 12 supporters attempting to ignore the rule to sort of 13 level the playing field by some act of desperation.
14 Post-9-11 nuclear reactors, we know, are 15 terrorist targets. For example, the 9-11 Commission 16 and its witnesses stated last week that additional 17 air-based terrorist attacks have already been 18 attempted, that more major attacks are likely in the 19 near future, and that nuclear power plants are top 20 targets.
21 Pilgrim is located in Americas hometown.
22 As such, it could have symbolic value as a target.
23 Add to that the Democratic National Convention, and it 24 puts the Commonwealth at heightened risk.
25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 One simply cannot assume that a target 1
would be inside Boston city limits. In fact, it is 2
hard to think of a target that has the potential of 3
resulting in more devastation to Boston than a 4
successful attack on Pilgrim.
5 As you are aware, the Sandia National Lab 6
in their consequence analysis of a core melt at 7
Pilgrim stated that the first year peaks (inaudible) 8 radius would be 20 miles, and the first year peak 9
injury radius would be 65 miles. Boston is, I 10 believe, 37 miles.
11 A spent fuel pool disaster would result in 12 far worse consequences due to the huge amount of 13 radioactivity now stored in the dense packed pool.
14 The pools are high up in the reactor, the worst 15 placement outside primary containment, with a thin 16 roof overhead.
17 Inspection procedure 92709-02.08, Verify 18 that Report from Local Agencies is Adequate to Ensure 19 the following list, which is enumerated in the guide:
20 Security personnel and emergency workers in 21 Massachusetts are taxed. There are not enough 22 personnel. There isnt enough money. This was 23 established at formal three-day hearings held at the 24 Statehouse September 2003 called by Senator Mark 25
25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 Pachico (Phonetic).
1 Already, two scale 3 sources are being 2
concentrated in Boston. Hence, off-site assistance 3
will be less, if needed in the Pilgrim APV (Phonetic) 4 area. The reality and impact of increasing the 5
probability of attack because of attack because 6
terrorists keep track of our vulnerability.
7 For example, Pilgrim is vulnerable from 8
attack in the air. However, current security plans 9
for the convention simply restrict noncommercial 10 aircraft within a 30-mile radius of Boston. Pilgrim 11 is just beyond that 30 miles, and it is summertime.
12 So the traffic to and from secondary airports, like 13 the Vineyard which is five-mile flight from Pilgrim, 14 and Nantucket, is heavy.
15 Pilgrim is also vulnerable to an attack by 16 water, and July is an especially hectic time in these 17 waters where there are many, many pleasure craft 18 outside and around Pilgrim.
19 The Boston Globe ran a story June 30th 20 that, "some 600 personnel, one of the largest U.S.
21 Coast Guard contingents in Boston history, will be 22 deployed in both helicopters and on land to enforce 23 restriction." This means that less surveillance will 24 be here.
25
26 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 Inspection procedure 92709-042-09:
1 Confirm that personnel are sufficient in number and 2
qualifications to implement the site emergency plan.
3 Personnel were not sufficient in number and 4
qualification yesterday. They are not sufficient in 5
number and qualification today. Therefore, it would 6
not be sufficient in number and qualification during 7
a strike, compounded by the fact of increased threat 8
due to the convention.
9 The Project on Government Oversight 10 interviewed security guards at 24 reactors, and only 11 one out of four were confident that their plant could 12 defeat a terrorist attack. The guards major concerns 13 were that they were undermanned, undertrained, 14 underequipped, underpaid, unsure of how to respond.
15 The guards interviewed were from 16 Wackenhutt (Phonetic), the same security firm used by 17 Pilgrim. The security workers at Pilgrim have 18 publicly stated that they, too, are undermanned, 19 undertrained, underequipped, underpaid.
20 We cannot afford to put additional stress 21 on security at Pilgrim at a time when Entergys 22 security contractor, Wackenhutt Corporation, is in the 23 spotlight for all its problems at nuclear plants.
24 Last year, Entergy canceled its contract 25
27 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 with Wackenhutt at the Indian Point Nuclear Plant 1
north of New York City. In December 2002 an internal 2
report leaked to the press showed that Wackenhutt cut 3
corners on security at Indian Point.
4 In the last four years Wackenhutt has been 5
involved in four different security incidents at the 6
St. Lucie Nuclear Reactor in Florida where Wackenhutt 7
security guards were found to have taken shortcuts on 8
their controls.
9 Wackenhutt has ignored security concerns 10 raised by guards and illegally punished the guards who 11 raised them, and Wackenhutt was caught cheating on 12 security drills at a nuclear weapons plant in 13 Tennessee.
14 Clearly, the risk is reduced if the 15 reactor is shut down during the strike. Dr. Edward 16 Lyman, a physicist at the Union of Concerned 17 Scientists, when asked what the results would be if 18 the reactor were shut down, stated that the risk of a 19 core meltdown is considerably reduced within hours of 20 the reactor being closed. He reasoned that it is 21 easier to protect and monitor a reactor that is closed 22 because it is less likely the safety systems could be 23 compromised.
24 A core melt can be triggered by cutting 25
28 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 off outside power, destroying core and (inaudible),
1 sabotaging, destroying safety systems, destroying the 2
control room. According to a preliminary analysis by 3
Dr. Lyman of Indian Point, reactor shutdown of 20 days 4
would greatly reduce the radioactive inventory in the 5
core to a half-life decay.
6 Lessons learned can be readily transferred 7
to Pilgrim. The number of fatalities from a core melt 8
and breach of containment could be reduced by 80 9
percent, and the number of long term cancer deaths by 10 50 percent.
11 Last, lets look at need. We recognize 12 that temporarily closing Pilgrim during the strike 13 would not cause the lights to go off. As you know, 14 Massachusetts relies on electricity drawn from the 15 ISO, New England Electric grid, ISO pools generated 16 throughout New England.
17 The Pilgrim nuclear generating station 18 contributes only about two percent to this capacity.
19 Because (inaudible), Massachusetts is not specifically 20 dependent on electricity generated at Pilgrim.
21 Indeed, we tap into power from hundreds of generators 22 throughout the six New England states. After all, we 23 know that when Pilgrim is shut down for refueling or 24 for repairs, the lights stay on.
25
29 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 Based on the facts brought forward, I 1
request the NRC require Pilgrim to cease operations 2
during a strike of its workers, if the strike occurs, 3
and be particularly cognizant of the human performance 4
factors and of security.
5 I would like to invite David Lochbaum to 6
add any other technical matters that I have 7
overlooked.
8 MR. LOCHBAUM: This is David Lochbaum with 9
the Union of Concerned Scientists. I just have a few 10 things to supplement Mary Lamperts remarks, and they 11 are short comments and should stay within the 30-12 minute window.
13 I looked at inspection procedure 92709 14 that the NRC would use to review the licensees plans 15 for the upcoming strike. Step 03.04 would have the 16 NRC verify that the staffing -- the planned staffing 17 requirements are adequate.
18 It appears that the NRC basically would 19 verify that the staffing requirements meet the minimum 20 standards established in Tech Specs and other places.
21 I guess it appears as though the NRCs position is 22 that the temporary and/or reassigned workers are as 23 productive, efficient and effective as the workers 24 being replaced, which seems a very tenuous assumption 25
30 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 at best.
1 Since replacement and temporary workers 2
are not likely to be as productive, it looks like the 3
NRC should be verifying that it is not the minimum 4
complement that is being (inaudible). It is enough 5
people there to do the job right, which brings up the 6
second comment.
7 That same procedure Step 03-06 has the NRC 8
verify that plans provide ample time for replacement 9
and temporary workers to become proficient at the 10 functions they will be performing during the period.
11 The current workers demonstrate that 12 proficiency through on-the-job qualification cards and 13 exams on paper and in a simulator. Is it the NRCs 14 position -- or it appears to be the NRCs position 15 that replacement workers can self-declare proficiency, 16 because the procedure doesnt have things like 17 considering the efforts during the strike to be an 18 infrequently performed test revolution, which existing 19 workers, if they are performing such a task, would 20 have to demonstrate proficiency by simulator or other 21 means to assure that they can handle that task. This 22 step doesnt provide that same level of assurance.
23 NRC Inspection Procedure 92711, which 24 would actually be used during the strike itself, has 25
31 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 similar problems in that the -- For example, step 1
03.01 verifies minimum staffing levels, but again it 2
is not the number of workers needed to do the job. It 3
is just simply a head count, which is probably the 4
wrong standard to be applied.
5 The other one is that, in the event of an 6
accident at Pilgrim during the strike, some of the 7
workers covering striking workers posts have 8
emergency preparedness or emergency response duties 9
that require them to be in a technical support center, 10 the emergency operating facility, the operating 11 support center and other places.
12 The NRCs strike preparedness procedures 13 dont seem to ensure that the staffing in the event of 14 an emergency will be adequate. For example, if the 15 replacement workers last performed training in 16 emergency preparedness drills and exercises with a TSC 17 hat on, yet they will be in the control room or other 18 places during the strike, there seems to be a mix 19 between what they have been trained to do and what 20 functions they may actually be performing if an 21 accident occurs during the strike.
22 The NRCs preparedness procedures or 23 strike preparedness procedures dont seem to ensure 24 that the emergency preparedness role will be 25
32 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 adequately covered, should one occur.
1 Those are the only comments I had. Thank 2
you.
3 CHAIRMAN BERKOW: David? That was the 4
completion of your --
5 MR. LOCHBAUM: Yes. Thats all I had.
6 Thank you.
7 CHAIRMAN BERKOW: This is Herb Berkow 8
again. Ms. Lampert, do you have any other statements?
9 MS. LAMPERT: Thats all, folks.
10 CHAIRMAN BERKOW: Okay. Just one 11 question. Perhaps I missed it. But you had a 12 statement in -- whether you addressed it or not, you 13 have a statement i your petition saying some 14 components do not operate as designed, and require 15 special training to compensate for mechanical 16 glitches.
17 If you expounded on that and gave it, I 18 missed it.
19 MS. LAMPERT: No. What I had in mind was 20 the example of the condensate pot, the device to 21 measure how much water is over the control mod. For 22 many years, Paul Blanch (Phonetic) from the Millstone 23 discussed how it had to be fixed. As opposed to being 24 fixed, the NRC allowed operators to receive training 25
33 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 on how to read inaccurate dials. That is what I had 1
in mind.
2 MR. LOCHBAUM: This is Dave Lochbaum of 3
the Union of Concerned Scientists. If I could just 4
add to that.
5 Ms. Lampert during her remarks talked 6
about the master equipment list and how that is still 7
a work in progress, and the current workers know how 8
to deal with that work in progress, and the 9
replacement workers might struggle with that same 10 task. So that speaks to the same issue of what is on 11 paper versus what is in the field.
12 CHAIRMAN BERKOW: Okay, thank you. This 13 is Herb Berkow again. Region, do you have any 14 questions?
15 MR. ANDERSON: Nothing from the region.
16 CHAIRMAN BERKOW: Okay. How about the 17 licensee? Does licensee have any questions or issues 18 for clarification?
19 PARTICIPANT: No, we do not. Thank you.
20 CHAIRMAN BERKOW: Okay.
21 PARTICIPANT: I do have one question, and 22 that is -- Ms. Lampert, I understand --
23 MS. LAMPERT: Im sorry. Would you say 24 who is speaking?
25
34 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 PARTICIPANT: Can we have a copy of that 1
document with the specifics that she has there?
2 MS. LAMPERT: Yes. Who would I e-mail it 3
to? Lee Licata?
4 MR. LICATA: This is Lee Licata. Ms.
5 Lampert, you can e-mail it to me, and I will ensure 6
that it gets distributed to Mr. Cliff Anderson who was 7
asking for it.
8 MS. LAMPERT: I mean, I dont have any 9
objection. Do you, David?
10 PARTICIPANT: Not at all.
11 CHAIRMAN BERKOW: Okay. This is Herb 12 Berkow again. I guess it is our understanding through 13 some of the comments made earlier that the 14 negotiations between the Union and Entergy are 15 continuing at this time.
16 MR. LIEB: This is David Lieb. That is my 17 understanding.
18 MR. BETHAY: This is Steve Bethay. That 19 is correct.
20 CHAIRMAN BERKOW: Thank you. Any other 21 questions? Okay. This is Herb Berkow again. If 22 there are no further questions or --
23 MR. LIEB: This is David Lieb. I do have 24 one small question. Does anyone know how long the 25
35 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 transcription usually takes, and then where the 1
transcript is available?
2 MR. LICATA: This is Lee Licata. The 3
transcription should take approximately seven working 4
days, and then at that point, once I get it, I have an 5
opportunity to review it, make sure that it is 6
accurate, reflects who said what as best as I can 7
tell, and then it gets posted publicly in (inaudible) 8 MR. LIEB: Okay. Thank you.
9 MR. LICATA: Youre welcome.
10 CHAIRMAN BERKOW: This is Herb Berkow 11 again. If there are no further comments or questions, 12 then we will end the phone call. We thank you all for 13 participating.
14 MS. LAMPERT: And thank you.
15 (Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off 16 the record.)
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25