ML041670642
| ML041670642 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 06/15/2004 |
| From: | Mallett B Region 4 Administrator |
| To: | Gody A Operations Branch IV |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2004-0307 | |
| Download: ML041670642 (5) | |
Text
June 15, 2004 MEMORANDUM TO: Anthony T. Gody, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety FROM:
Bruce Mallett, Regional Administrator /RA/
SUBJECT:
AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM CHARTER; PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3, COMPLETE LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND MULTIPLE MITIGATING SYSTEM FAILURES In response to the complete loss of all offsite power sources, the trip of all three units, and the Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator A, failing to function as required at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station on June 14, 2004, an Augmented Inspection Team is being chartered.
There was no impact to public heath and safety associated with the event. You are hereby designated as the Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) leader.
A.
Basis On June 14, 2004, at 9:45 a.m. CDT, all offsite power supplies to the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station were disrupted, with a concurrent trip of all three units.
Additionally, the Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator A failed to function as required.
As a result, the licensee declared a Notice of Unusual Event (NOUE) for all three units at about 9:50 a.m. CDT and elevated to an Alert for Unit 2 at 9:54 CDT. The licensee and NRC resident inspectors also reported a number of other problems, including the failure of Unit 2 Charging Pump E, the failure of a Unit 3 steam bypass control valve, multiple breakers failing to operate during recovery operations, and emergency response facility and security interface issues which may have impeded emergency responders. This event meets the criteria of Management Directive 8.3 for a detailed follow up inspection, in that, it involved multiple failures to systems used to mitigate an actual event. The initial risk assessment, though subject to some uncertainties, indicates that the conditional core damage probability was in the range of high E-4.
Because the initial risk assessment was in the range for consideration of an AIT and because of multiple failures in systems used to mitigate an actual event, it was decided that an AIT is the appropriate NRC response for this event.
The AIT is being dispatched to obtain a better understanding of the event and to assess the responses of plant equipment and the licensee to the event. The team is also tasked with reviewing the licensees root-cause analyses.
Anthony T. Gody B.
Scope Specifically, the team is expected to perform data gathering and fact-finding in order to address the following:
1.
Develop a complete sequence of events related to the loss-of-offsite power, the multiple unit trips, and the Unit 2 emergency diesel generator failure.
2.
Assess the performance of plant systems in response to the event, including any design considerations that may have contributed to the event.
3.
Assess the adequacy of plant procedures used in response to the event.
4.
Assess the licensees response to the event, including operator actions and emergency declarations, and any emergency response facility or security interface issues that may have adversely affected response to the event.
5.
Assess the licensees determination of the root and/or apparent causes of offsite power loss, emergency diesel generator failure, and other mitigating system(s) failures.
6.
Based upon the licensees cause determinations, review any maintenance related actions which could have contributed to the event initiation or produced subsequent response problems.
7.
Review the licensees assessment of coordination activities with off-site electrical dispatch organizations prior to and during the event.
8.
Provide input to the regional Senior Reactor Analyst for further assessment of risk significance of the event.
C.
Guidance The Team will report to the site, conduct an entrance meeting, and begin inspection no later than June 16, 2004. A report documenting the results of the inspection should be issued within 30 days of the completion of the inspection. While the team is on site, you will provide daily status briefings to Region IV management. The team is to emphasize fact-finding in its review of the circumstances surrounding the event, and it is not the responsibility of the team to examine the regulatory process. The team should notify Region IV management of any potential generic issues identified related to this event for discussion with the Program Office. Safety concerns that are not directly related to this event should be reported to the Region IV office for appropriate action.
Anthony T. Gody For the period of the inspection, and until the completion of documentation, you will report to the Regional Administrator. For day to day interface you will contact Dwight Chamberlain, Director, Division of Reactor Safety. The guidance in Inspection Procedure 93800, Augmented Inspection Team, and Management Directive 8.3, NRC Incident Investigation Procedures, apply to your inspection. This Charter may be modified should the team develop significant new information that warrants review. If you have any questions regarding this Charter, contact Dwight Chamberlain at (817) 860-8180.
Distribution:
B. Mallett T. Gwynn J. Dixon-Herrity J. Dyer R. Wessman T. Reis H. Berkow S. Dembeck M. Fields D. Chamberlain A. Howell C. Marschall T. Pruett J. Clark V. Dricks W. Maier N. Salgado G. Warnick J. Melfi
Anthony T. Gody ADAMS: Yes
No Initials: ______
Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available
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Non-Sensitive C:EB DD:DRP NRR D:DRS RA JAClark/lmb MSatorius HBerkow DDChamberlain BMallett
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6/15/04 6/15/04 6/15/04 6/15/04 6/15/04 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax