ML041410016

Exercise Report St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant

ML041410016
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	04/23/2004
From:	US Dept of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML041410016 (85)

Text

- -

Exercise Report ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR PQWER PLANT Licensee:

Exercise Date:

February 18,2004 Report Date:

April 23: 2004 Florida Power and Light Coinpany

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TAI3I.E OF C:ONTEN'I'S.................................................................................................................

i I

I.

F, X ~ C L m ' E S ~ J M M A R Y I

[I.

INTRODUC I ION...............................................................................................................

2 111.

EXERCISE OVERVIEW....................................................................................................

4 A.

Plume bPL Description...........................................................................................

4 B.

Exercise Participaiits...............................................................................................

4 C:.

Exercise Timeline....................................................................................................

5 IV.

EXERCISE E\\'ALI!ATION AND RESI!KTS...................................................................

7 A.

B.

Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation - Table 2................................................

9 Status ot Jurisdictions Evaluated.............................................................................

9 i.

STATE OF F[.ORIDA..............................................................................

I O 1.1 State Emergency 1.2 f.br\\+ard State Ei I.i Enrergency New I.4 Dose Assessment 1.5 Emergency Ope 1.6 Radiological lield Monitoring l'catis,.

1.7 Radiological 1.a RISK JI,'KISDICTIONS............................................................................

i 3

2.

2.1 St. I.UCIE C'OCNTY....................................................................

1.3 2.1.1 2.1.2 2.1.3 2.1.4 I'mcrgency Operations Center...........................................

13 Protective Actions for Schools..........................................

14 F,mergency Worker & Vehicle Decontamination.............. 14 Traffic and Access Control................................................

I5

2.2 MARTIN COl;N'TY.......

15 2.2.1 Emergency Operations Center..................

2.2.2 Protective Actions for Sclioois..............................

2.2.3 Emergency Worker & Vehicle I~ceontamination.............. 17 2.2.4 Traffic Control Points 17 II SIJPI'ORT JLIRISDIC'I'IONS 18 z.

3. I 3.2 1 -

-1. J HREVARD COIINTY..................................................................

18 3.1.I Reception Center.........

18 3.1.2 Temporary Care..............

3.1.3 'l'raffiic Control Points..

INDIAN RIVER C O l N W.................................

-3.2.1 Reception Center...................................................

3 2.2 Temporary Care.....................................................

32.3 Traffic Control Points............

20

?

PA1.M BEACk1 COUNTY I

3.3.1 Reception Center 21 3.3.2 Temporary Care..

...................................... - J 7 -

7-

- J

? - ?

J.J.J Traffic Control Poin

4.

S\\JMMAKY OF AREAS REQI!IRINC; CORRF.VTIVF AC-fION......... 25 4.1 2001 AKCAs.................................................................................

25

4. I, 1 4.1.2 04-55-1.e. I-A41 Palm Beach County 0-1-55-6.a. I-A-02 Palm Beach Cormty Reception

~.

Reception Center Equipment.............................................

25 Center-Evacuee Monitoring and Decontamination........... 26 I1

List of Appendices AI'PENI>IX 1 - ACRONYMS AND ADRREVIATIONS................................................

28 APPENDIX 2 - EXERCISE EVALLA'IORS..................................................................

30 APPENDIX 3 - EXERCISE CRITERIA AND EX'I'ENT-OF-PLAY ACiREE>hlEN.........................................................

33

.4PPENDIX 3 - EXERCISE SCT:NrZRIC).........................................................................

33 List of Tables Table 1 -

Exercise I imelint:....................................................................................................

6 Table 2 -

Summary of Exercise Evaluation............................................................................

8 111

I.

E:XECIJTIVE SUMlClARY On February 18, 2004. the Depxtnient of Ilomcland Security-Fcdcrcil Emergcnsy Manageinent Agency (FEMA) Reg.ion IV conducted a fill1 participation pliinie exposure pathway exercise in the emcrgency-planniiig zone (EII) around the St, Lucie Nuclear Iowcr Plant. The purpose ofthe exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was conducted in accordance with Ft:MAs policies and g~iidaiice for offsite preparedness exercises in order to reach a determination of reasonable assurance that tlie State and County governnients are able to protect the health and safety of the public. The previous federally evaluated exercise at this site \\vas conducted on Fehruary 20. 7002. lhc qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted February 10-1 2. 1982.

The State of Florida. Risk Counties of Maitin and St. Lucie. and Support Counties 01 Hrevard, Indian River. and Pa1111 Reach participated in this exercise. The State Emergency Operations Center (SEW) in Tallahassee played in this exercise until direction and control uas lranded off to the Forward State Emergency Response Teain (FSEKT). FEMA Region I\\ wishes to acknowledge the exceptional efforts of the many individuals who planned. prepared for and participated in this exercise. The enthusiasm.

cooperation and teamwork displayed by all participants highlighted the obvious training and preparation invested in this successful dcmonstrrttion. Protecting the puhlic health and safety is the full-time Job of some exercise participants and an assigned responsibility for others. Others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities.

Although this was a plume exposure pathmay exercise. all three Support Counties participated as well in order to demonstrate the distribution of potassium iodide (Kl) to tlrc piiblic for the first time in the State of Florida.

This report contains the evaluation of the exercise. as well a5 oiit-of-sequence activities demonstrated during the week of Sanuai-j 19-7.;. 2004. uhich includcd: Distributinn of K1 to the public. traffic control points (TCP). emergency worker decontamiiiation (EWD).

protective actions for schools. reception centers. registration cinci congregate care.

The State and local organizations demonstrated tlie knowledge and ability to implenirnt their emergency response plans and procedures. No Deficiencies were noted during. the exercise, however, two Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) were identified during out of sequence activities in Palm Eieach C.ounty. One ARCA was due to cross-contamination during the initial monitoring phase and was immediately coirected by on the spot training and re-demonstration; the other was a result of equipment calibration and has been corrected by documentation provided by the manufacturer. through Palin Beach County, specifying calibration requirements, 1

11.

INTRODIJCTlON On December 7. 1970. the I'resident directed FEMA to asstinie the lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response. FEMA's activities are conducted ptirstiaiit to Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations (,CFR) Parts 350, -35 1 and 352. 'These regulations arc a key element in the Radiologicai Emergency I'reparedness (REP) I'rogram that vas estahlishcd following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.

Title 44. CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for E'EbZA's initial and continued approval of State and local governments' radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent. in part.

on State and local governinent participation in joint exercises with licensees.

I.'E?r'lA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities (Fh'i:) include the following:

Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans (RERP) and procedures developed by State and local governments:

Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments:

Responding to requests by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Meinorandim of Understanding bct\\veen the NRC and FEMA (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14. 199.7).

Cool-dinating the ai.ti\\ities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:

Department of Agriculture Department of Commerce Department of Energy Department of Health and Human Services Ikpartment of the Interior Department of Trmsportation Environmental Protection Agency

~

Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

~

Food and Drug i\\dministration. and Representatives of these agencies serve on the FEMA IZegion 11' Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) which is chaired by FEMA.

3

F o r d suhniission of the RERI's for tlie St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant to Department of Homeland Security, FEMA Region IV by the State of llorida was made on August 26, 1983. Formal approval ofthese RERPs was granted on February 14. 10X-l.

A REP exercise was conducted on February 1 X, 2004. with out of sequence activities conducted during tlie bveek of January 19-23 in both risk and host counties, hy FEMA Region iV to assess tlie capabilities of State and local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their KERl's and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiologicai emergency indving the St. Lucie Niclear Power Plant.

This report presents the exercise results and tinding,s on tlie perfornutice of tlie oftsite response organirations (ORO) during a siniulated radiologicai emergency.

The findings presented are hased on the evaluations of the Federal evaluator team. with final determinations being made by the FEMA Kegion IV RAC' Co-Chair and Chief Evaluator with tinal approval by the Regional Director.

'lhe criteria utilized in the F E M h evaluation process are contained in:

~'IJKEC;-06j4/FEMA-R~P-l~

Rev. I, "Criteria for l'rcparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants." Kovember 1980; EMA-KEP-14. "Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual."

Sections A. R and C dated September 1991 ; and FEMA "Interim Kadiological Emergency I'reparedness hlanual." dated August 2001.

Section 111. entitled "Exeicise C)vcrvie\\v." presents basic informntion and data relcvant ti) the exercise. This section contains a description of the piume pathway EPZ, a listing of all paiticipatingjiirisdictiotis and functional entities. which were evaluated. and n table presentation ofthe time of actuai occurrence of key exercise events and activities.

Section IV. entitled "Exercise Evaluation and Results." presents summary information on the demonstration of applicable exercise criteria at each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a results only format.

111.

EXERCISE OVERVIEW Contained in this section are data and basic inforination relevant to the February 18. 2004 exercise and out of sequence activities during. the week oE.lanuarq, 19-23. to test tlie ofkite enierg,ency response capabilities i n the area surrounding the SI. 1.11cic Nuclcar Eower P h t.

A.

Plume El% Description The St. I.ucie Nuclear Power Plant is located on Hiitchinson Island approximately 4 miles east-northeast of the City of Port St. Lucie. approsimately 8 iiiilcs southeast ofthe City of Fort Pierce in St. Luck County, approximately 5.5 miles north of the Martin CountyISt. Lucie County boundary line. This Facility is owncd an operated by the Florida Power & Light Conipany (FPL).

Both Hutchinson Island and the southern portion of North Ilutcliinson Island are located M:ithin the E M. Three causeways link Hutchinson Island to the mainland.

which leads to U S Highway L and 1-95, Parts of St. I.ucie and Martin Counties lie within the IO-mile EPZ. The main use of tlie land is residential and recreational. Approximately 170.000 people reside within the 1 0-mile El%.

B.

Exercise Participants The following agencies. organizations. and units of government participated in tlie St. Isicie Nucleor Power Plant exercise on February 18. 2003.

STATE OF FLOR1D.A Ikparlment of Health. Bureau of Kadidon Control Ikpartnient of Transportation I>i\\ ision of Fnieigency hlana, wneiit Florida H i g h ~ a y Patrol RISK JURISDiCTlONS Martin County St. Lucie County SIJPPQRT.IlrRISDICTIOS Brevard County Indian River County Palm Beach County 4

American Red Cross Amateur Padio I.:mergency Serviccs (ARES)

Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Servicc (RACES)

C.

Exercise Timeline Tctblt: 1. on the following pugs. presents the tiiiic' at which hey events and activities occiirrcd during the St. Lucie Nuciear Power I'lant esercise on 1:ehru:riy 18. 2004.

i

Table 1. Exercise Timeline DATE AND SITE: St. Lucic Nuclear Power Plant - Iebruarv 1 X. 2004 I.P\\Cl or Kwn1

= I 1

I\\'.

EXEKCISE EVALUATION AND REStrLTS Contained in this section are tlie results and preliminary findings oftlie evaluation ofall jurisdictions and functional entities. \\\\liich pticipated in the Felmiary 18. 2003 exercise and out of sequence activities during tlie week ofJanuary 19-23, 2003. to test tiit oll'site emergency response capahilities of State and local governments within tlie 10-mile EPZ around the St, LLicie Nucledr Power Plant.

Each.jurisdiction and fiinctional entity was evaluatcd on tlie basis of its' demonstration of criteria as delineated in REP Exercise Evaluation Methodology, dated December 2001.

Derailed information on the exercise criteria and the extent-of-play agreenicnt used are found in Appendix 3 of this report.

A.

Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation - Table 2 The matrix presented in Table 2. on the following page. presents the status of all exercise criteria that were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise. by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise criteria are listed by number. The demonstration status ofthose criteria is indicated by the use of the following letters:

M Met (No Deficiency or ARCAs assessed and no unresolved ARCAs from prior exercises)

D Deficiency assessed A

AKQ'A(s) assessed or unresolved AKC.'A(s) from prior exercise(s)

N Not Demonstrated (Reason explained in Subsection R) 7

TABLE 2. Summary of Exercise Evaluation

B.

Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated This subsection provides infonuation on the evaiu3tion of each participating jurisdiction and functional entity in a jurisdictional results based fomrat. I'resented below is a definition of the tcnns used in this subsection relative to (:riterion demonstration status.

Met - L.isting of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which no Lkticicncies or AKCAs were assessed during this exercise and under which no ARCAS assessed during prior exercises remoin unresolved.

Deficiency - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criterion under which one or more Deficiencies was assessed during this exercise. Included is a description ofrach Deficiency and recommended corrective actions.

Area Requiring Corrective.4ctions - Listing ofthe demonstrated exercise criterion under which one or more ARCAs were assessed during the current exercise or ARC'As assessed during prior exercises that remain unresolved. Included is a description of the ARCA assessed during this exercise and the recomniended corrective action to be demonstrated before or during the nest biennial esercise.

Not Demonstrated - Listing of the exercise criteria. which were not demonstrated Prior ARCAs - Resolved - I)eseription(s) of ARCA(s) assessed during previous as scheduled during this exercise and the reason. they were not demonstrated.

exercises, wlriclr were resolved in this exercise and the corrective actions demonstrated.

Prior ARCAs ~ L!raresolved - Description(s) of AKCA(s) assessed during prior cxercises. wiiich uere not rrsvivcd in this exercise. Included is the reason the ARCA remains unresolved and recomiiiended corrective actions to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

The following are definitions of the two types of exercise issties. which may be discussed in this report.

A Deficiency is defined in FEMh Interim REP Manual as "...an ohsewed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety ofthe public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant."

An ARCA is defined in Interim REP Manual as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational perfomlance in an exercise that is not considered. by itself. to adversely impact public health and safety."

9

1.

STATE OF FLORIDA 1.1 State Emergency Operations Center The S E W Director successfully managed the radiological emergency response by Federal, State and local agencies. The SEOC staff conducted recurring briefings and held discussions on protective action recommendations (PAR). Decisions were made between the State and Counties and coordinated through the SEOC. All members of the staff displayed a positive attitude as they carried out their functions and procedures. The SEOC was equipped with communications technology and supplies to support the emergency response personnel and operations.

2.

MET: Criteria l.a.1, I.c.1, l.d.1, 1.e.l and5.a.l

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE E.

AREAS REQtJlRING CORRECTIVE ACTK9N: NONE

d.

rwr DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONF.

f.

PRIOR ARCAS - IJNWESOB~VED: NONE 1.2 Forward State Emergency Response Team The F-SERT staff was pre-positioned. ?'hey were professional and proficiently cmied cut their duties. The F-SEKT assumed direction and control ofthe operation at 1045. They used the EM2000 tracker computer system to inform the SEOC and to process requests for assistance. They coordinated actions with the County decision-makers who were also present in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The arrangement aiiowed for excellent coordination ktween the licensee and the offsite authorities. Protective action decisions (P.4Dj were discussed among the State and County representatives, concurred by the County Emergency Operations Center (EOC j managers and effectively impieinented by the Counties. 'The State provided additional resources ani1 called for assistance From both the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center

( F M A C ) and the Southern Mutual Kadiation Assistance Plan (SMKAPJ.

a.

MET: Criteri;ll.a.1,i.c.l,i.d.l,i.e.l,2.a.1,2.b.2~d~.a.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.

AREAS REQtJEUNG CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE io

e.

I'RIOR ARCAs - IZESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRlOIZ ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: %ONE 1.3 Emergency News Center The joint staff of the St. I.ucie Nuclear Power Plant Emergency News Center (ENC) is well-trained and acconrplished their rcsponsihilities in a highly professional niiiiincr. I n the preparation and conduct of tlirce media hriefings and development and release of10 news releases. this I..cderaliStateilocal and utility team exhibited a uell-coordinated effort focused on safeguarding the interests of the public. The effective inedia management effort included the development of aides to enhance operations. such as the ENC Procedural Manual in the emergency management power-point presentation. This operation should he considered an exanipie of the "best practices" for the ENC.

a.

MET: Criteria I.a.1. I.e.1 and 5,h.l

h.

DEFICIENCY: NONE

6.

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE AREAS REQlrIRIIVG CORWEC1'IVIE: ACI'ION: KONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARCAS - ILJNRESOLV'ED: NONE I.4 Dose Assessment State officials professionally conducted independent accident analysis. including radiological dose assessment. Dose assessment cdculations were perfomred to confirm actual field team measurements and to develop projected dose conseqiiences to snpport. if necessary. revising the protective actions. Both the utility operator and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) projections were in excellent agreement with the indepcndcnt results calcdated by the State.

a.

MET: CriteriaI.n.1. i.c.l.I.d.1. i.e.1.2.a.1,2.b.l.2.b.2.3.h.I (DOLI-Kltopublic) and 4.a.7

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE E.

AREAS REQt'lRlNG CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

Nor DEMONSTRATED: NONE

C.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONti 1.5 Emergency Operations Facility The utility operator's E:OF is an excellent facility from which all participating organizations can effectively manage ongoing emergency operations. Command and control, decision-niakiiig. eonimunicatioiis. coordination. and the flow of technical information between the utility operator and the State and applicable locai government oflicials. and representatives of the NRC were exempiary. All State and local government officials. deployed to the EOF \\vue well trained, followed applicable procedures: and o\\wdl, carried out their respective responsibilities in an eftiicieiit and professional manner. consistent with the preservation of public health and safety.

a.

MET: Criteria l.a.1. l.e.1, 1.d.l and 1.e.l

h.

DEFICIENCY: NOKE C.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIOK: NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR AKCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.6, Radiolagi~al Field Monitoring Teams The Florida Bureau of Radiation Control (BIPC) deployed three tield-monitorin, I' teams (F'MT). FMTs were equipped with appropriate, calibrated instruments. The teams uere dispatched to fixed monitoring locations identified within the St. Lucie 10-mile EPZ.

The teams demonstrated their ability to L I S ~

the equipment to measure antbieiit radiation levels and collect air samples. The FMTs demonstrated an understanding of their mission and were aware of their dose limits.

a.

MET: Criteria 1.d.l. 1.e.I. 3.a.l. 3.b.l. 4.a.1.4.a.2 and 4 x 3

h.

DEFICIENCY: NONE C.

AREAS REQlJIRlKG CORREC'TIVE ACTION: NOKE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR AKCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRlOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.7 WadiQEOgiCal LalbOratOry The personnel assigned to the Mobile Emergency Response Laboratory (MERl.)

siiccesshlly demonstrated their assigned duties. The MERL was equipped to perform analyses of gamma emitting radionuclides. Samples were properly prepared and documented in accordance with procedures to avoid contamination of equipment and facilities, and to maintain the chain of custody. Survey meters used for contamination control functioned properly and had cunent calibration dates. All laboratory personnel had appropriate dosimetry and were aware of dose limits and administrative reporting levels.

a.

MET: CriteriaI.e.l.3.a.1and4.c.l

h.

DEFICIENCY: NONE (8.

N0'r DEMONSTRATED: NONE 21-1 Emergency Operations Center The St. Lucie EOC staff, although pre-positioned for the exercise per the extent-of-play, demonstrated through interview and staff rosters the Capdbibty to receive: notification of an emergency and to mobiiire approprkcte personnel. The Emergency Operations Chief and REP Coordinator provided excellent leadership as well as direction and control. Stafl' niernbers inipiemented the plm and followed procedures, ensuring a well organked and coordinated response. Staff briefmgs were conducted regularly. The public information effectively responded to public inquiries. PADS were caordir~ated and implemented per plans and procedures, ensuring the safety ofthe public. The staff, including volunteers and federal partners, is commended for their exceptional display of teamwork. The investment of the County and the responding staff eftiort was evident and reflected an excellent, well managed and coordinated effort.

13

a.

MET: Criterial.a.1. 1.c.l. I.d.1. 1.e.l,~.a.I.~.b.?.I.c.l,3.a.1,3.b.l,~.c.l.~.c.2.

j.d.l.j.a.l.j.a.3and5.b.L

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE C.

el.

NOT DEMONSI'RAI'ED: NONE AREAS REQIIIRING CORRECTIVE ACI'ION: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.1.2 Protective Actions for Schools I'he St. Lucie County School District demonstrated protective actions for schools through a series of interviews ci)nducted at 15 public schools. The school administrators interviewed were knowledgeable of Ilistrict procedures. had individual school policies in place. and took actions to maintain staff. faculty and parental awareness of evacuation policies and procedures. Procedures also addressed requirements of students with special needs. All personnel intcnicwed were professional and had planned for the well being ofstudents.

staff and faculty in the event of an emergency.

a.

M E I : Criterion 3.c.2

h.

DEFICIENCY: KONE C.

tl.

M Y I ' DEMONSTRATED: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTWE ACTION: i4OW

e.

PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRtOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.1.3 Emergency Worker $r Vehicle Decontamination The St. Lucie County Public Safety Ilivision. Fire Rescue District and Sheriffs Office suecessfiilIy demonstrated emergency worker equipment monitoring and decontamination at St. Lucie West kfiddic School. There was sufficient space and facilities to handle the anticipated number of emergency workers. vehicles and equipment. Personnel were knowledgeable of dosimetry, turn-back values and their individual responsibilities. They demonstrated the ability to monitor personnel and material, and manage contamination control. The Team displayed cooperation, control of resources and teamwork. The quality of training was quite apparent.

14

a.

MET: Criteria 1.e.l, 3.a.l,3.b.l, 6.a.l and 6.b.l

b.

I)I.:I;ICIENC:Y: NONE

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARC'hs - UNRESOLVED: &ONE 2.1.4 Traffic and Access Control TCPs were demonstrated through interview with two County Sheriffs Deputirs and evaluation of the representatives from the Sheriff-s Office i d County Public Works in the EOC. The staff5 were very familiar with traffic and access control procedures.

evacuation routcs. procedures necessary to remove impediments to evacuation and thc location ofthe reception centers to which they were required to direct traffic. Public Works staff fiilfilled a request to deliver barricades to several TCPs. The Deputies atso demonstrated g,ood knowledge of the use of dosimetry. KI. and exposure limits for emergency workers.

a.

MET: ~riterial.L'.l.i.a.I.3.b.I.3.Lf.l and3.d.2

c.

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: KONF AREAS REQUIRING CCPWRECT%F'F: ACTiON: NONE 2.2 MARTIN COUNTY 2.2.1 Emergency Operations Center The well-coordinated EOC was led by the Director of Emergency Management. The REP program administrator. serving as operations Chief provided capable leadership to a competent and supportive staff. The EOC staff coordinated with St. I.ucie County. the State and the EOF in the formulation of the evacuution and shelter-in-place PADS. siren sounding and issuance of Emergency Alert System (EAS). Periodic EOC briefings and 15

inforniati\\:e agency updates were conducted. 1)emonstrations of public inquiry.

relocation of school children and special populations. policy discussion on KI distrihution and ingcstion and public infm-niation were professionally accomplished. The presence of the Chairman ofthe County Commission and participation of State. utility and local responders represent the commitment of the community to attain and sustain the capacity demonstrated in this successfill EO(.' operation.

a.

MET: CriteriaI.a.l,i.c.l.I.d.l.l.e.1.2.a.1.3.b.2,2.c.l.3.a.1,3.h.1.3.c.1.3.c.2.

3.d.1, 5.a.1, 52.3 and 5.b.l

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE C.

AREAS REQrIRlYC; COIERECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

NOT DEMOR'STRATED: NOKE C.

PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NOKE

f.

PRLOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.2.2 Protective Actions for S c h o ~ k An interview \\+as conducted with the Administrator oftlie Environnientai Studies Center in Jcnsen Beach in the Martin County Independent School District. The Adininistrator is very knowledgeable ofthe plans and procedures for preparing students for relocation to host schools. The Administrator and teachers are equipped with Nexkl telephones and all buses arc equipped with 800 blegahertz radios. Buses are kept at the school and available when needed. Other buses are available for ciispalch tu the two elementary schools within the IO-mile El'% so all students could be evacuated in one pickup.

as.

MET: Criterion i.c.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE E.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSI'RATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONIl

f.

PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 16

2.2.3 Emergency Worker & Vehicle Decontaniination 7he Martin County [Fire Services demonstrated emergency worker monitoring and decontamination. The team was briefed o n assignments. issued appropriate persomil dosimetry. monitoring and decotitatiiitiation equipment and performed pre-operational checks. The demonstration included the proper niotiitoring of four emergency workers and three vehicles. llre operational area \\\\us well laid out facilituting the process. The team demonstrated excellent cotitatiiiiiatioti control. and displayed good communications and team\\iork.. IPersonnel were knowledgeable and \\veil trained.

3.

MET: Criteria l~e.l.3.a.l~3.h.l.6.a.l and6.b.l

b.

1)EFlCIENCY: NONE C.

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE ARE.AS REQUlKlNC CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONF E.

PRIOR ARCAS - RESOL.VED: NONE

f.

PREOK ARCAs - I!KRESOLVED: NONE A deputy from the County Sherift-s Department demonstrated TCP procedures by interb~iew. IIe described Iris responsibilities in rstablishing and stafting both traffic control and acsess points. E ie was f:miiliar with iiifnrmation he might he required to impart to evacuees to include evacuation routes and locations of shelters. The deputy was provided persenal dosimetry and described the iise of direct-reading and perinanent-record dositnrtry. exposure limits. KI and its side effects. He M R S familiar with impediment removal and the means IO access cones. barriers and other materials required to support his activities.

a.

MET: Criteria I.e.l.3.a.l. 3.h.l. 3.d.l and 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE E.

d.

NOT DEMONSTKATED: NONE AREAS REQlllRlhG CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARCAS - IJNKESOLVED: NONE

3.1 BREVARD COUNTY 3.1.1 Reception Center I'ersonnel demonstrated the ability to manage contamination control, displayed good communications and teamwork. The County Fleaith Department demonstrated the ability to dispense KI to evacuees in an inforniative and efficient process. American Ked Cross

(.4RC) registration of the evacuees was well organized. Although approximately 8.000 evacuees are anticipated. there is ample space and facilities to handle npproxiiiiately 100.000 evacuees and vehicles. should the need arise. Special equipment for survey and decontamination of non-amhulatory evacuecs was also uvailahle. Emergency workers werc issued the appropriate dosimetry. All personnel wcre well trained and demonstrated a high degree of knowledge on evacuee processing procedures.

a.

MET: Criteria l,e.l,3.a.l, 3.h.l and 6.a.l

b.

DEFIC'IEKCY: NONE

c.

ti.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECI'IVE ACTION: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: KONE 3.12 Tearaporary care The Space Coast Chapter of the ARC professionally demonstrated congregate c3rt at Peace Lutheran Church. Five evacuees were processed at the reception center o n 1-95.

'The evacuees carried their registration fiirins to the shelter. All personnel were knowledgeable of their responsibiiities, professional. and very cooperative. The Hrevard County Sheriffs L)epartment provided security and tralfic management at the shelter and ARES provided back up communications.

a.

MET: Criteria 1.e. I and 6s. 1

b.

DEFICXENCY: NONE E.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

NQT DEMONSTRATED: NONE 18

e.

PRIOR 4RCAs - RESOI,\\'ED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARCAS - LNRESOLVED: NONE 3.1.3 Traffic Control Points Personnel from the Rrcvard County Sheriff 1)epartment and Florida E 1ighu:ay Patrol successfully demonstrated 'TCPs on January 22. 7004. The TCPs were established at the Valkeria Rest Area on 1-95 to direct evacuees to the nionitoring and decontamination station. They clearly explained their duties in directing traffic. how 10 remove traffic impediments. and knew what procedures to follow in case they were exposed to radiation.

They had a working knowledge of KI and the dosimetry they carried.

a.

MET: Criteria l.e.l,3.a.l. 3.d.l and 3.d.2

h.

DEFICIENCY: NONE

e.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

KC)!' DEMONSI'IUTED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PlZlOR ARCAS

~ UNRESOLVED: NONE 3.2 INDIAN RIVER COUNTY 3.2.1 Reception Center Evacuee monitoring. registration and rcccption \\vas demonstrated at the Indian River County Regional Park. The County Fire arid Rescue Service assisted by the Ucpartments of Health and REI) provided a full display and superb demonstration of established procedures. The available area was well organized with appropriate signage and control mechanisms to control the tlow of the anticipated evacuees. Personnel demonstrated excellent knowledge of personal dosimetry. monitoring equipment. procedurcs and contamination control protocols. They displayed good communication arid teamwork.

The County IIealth D e p a r t ~ ~ e ~ ~ t demonstrated the ability to dispense KI to evacuees in an efficient and informative process. Personnel representing each agency were highly professional, motivated. knowledgeable and well trained.

a.

MET: C'riteriaI.e.l.3.a.l,i.b.l and6.a.I be DEFICIENCY: NONE

E.

AREAS REQIIIRING CORKECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: W N E

f.

PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: KONE 3.2.2 Temporary Care The 'Ireasure Coast Chapter of the ARC ~ ~ i c ~ e ~ ~ f i i l l y demonstrated activities during an out-of-sequence interview conducted at the Sebastian River Middle School Evacuee Center. The manager interviewed was well aware of his responsibilities and how to request additional personnel. equipment. supplies and food to support the evacuee population. The manager \\vas aware of xklitional assistance that could be provided by the School District and the County EOC. He is very experienced, professional. and displays a positive attitude.

a.

MET: Criteria l.e.l and 6.c.i

h.

DEFICIENCY: NONE E.

AREAS REQIllRING COKKEC'TIVE ACTION: hONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTKATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 3.2.3 Trsffic Control Paints County SheriEfs Office personnel succrssftilly demonstrated TCPs by interview. 'The Deputy interviewed was \\vel1 aware of his responsibilities and how to request additional equipment required from thc EOC. The Deputy also described the standard process to request or other assistance to clear the road of vehicles that break down or other impedinienis to traffic flow. He was aware that he would be issued dosimetry and a detailed radiological briefing prior to being dispatched to the T C T. The Officer understood his responsibilities. was ready to follow instructions. provided correct information, was professional and displayed a positive attitude.

a.

MET: Criteria l.e.1,3.a.l,3.d.l and3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE AREXS REQIliRING CORREC'I't\\'E ACTION: NONE

f.

PRIOR AIICXs - IINRESOLVEI): NONE 3.3.1 Reception Center The County Emergency Management Coordinator established a unified command to coordinate the activities of supporting elements from the Counly Fire and Rescue, 1)epartment of Ilealth. Sheriffs Office, Pubiic Information. and the ARC. Personnel demonstrated all phases of personnel and equipment registration. monitoring and decontamination. 'l'he Incident Commander \\vas advised of concerns with aspects of the clemonstration concerning cross-contaniinatioii, and after a short training period the procedures were satisfactorily re-demonstrated. Additionally, it was noted that the portal monitors used for initial and post decontamination nionitoring werc outside the required calibration date. Personnel were generally well versed in their responsibilities and displayed a positive attitude.

a.

MET: Criteria 3.a.1 and.3.b.l

b.

DEFICIENC\\': NONE E.

AREAS REQUIRING CORKECTlVE ACTION:

Issue NO.: 04-55-1.e.1-A-01 Condition: Portal Moniton are used to identify contaminated evacuees. The facility utilizes Ludlum model 52-1 portal monitors to check all incoming evacuees fur contaminatiun and again after any needed decontamination. Both portal monitors used utre labeled with the calibration due date of July 29. 2003.

Monitoring staff did not revert to using hand held instruments to check incoming evacuees.

Possible Cruse: Monitoring staff did not identify this condition as a fatal probleni during instrument setup.

Reference:

NUREG-06.54, iI.7, IO; J.10 a,b,e; 1.1 1; K.3.a, Interitn RFP Manual, dated August 2002. criterion 1 x.1.

Effect: Lse of instruments beyond recommended calihration date would not provide assurance that a11 contaminated evacuees were identified. The result could cause the contamination of clean areas. previously clean evacuees and emergency workers.

Recommendation: Bring portal monitors into current calibration or provide documentation with other than annual requirements. Provide evacuee-nionit~~ring personnel with calibrated instruments in sufficient numbers to enable checking the required 2036 of the evacuees assigned to this location within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Provide training for monitoring personnel including actions to be taken wheii this condition is identified. Develop and iniplement a meins for checking that monitoring equipment is within the current calihration timeframe and meets operational requirements.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The County obtained and provided a letter from the manufacturer. Pulcir, incorporated stating "The Model 52-1 series Portable portal h4onitors are designed by Ludlum Measurements to he used without calibration as long as operational check is performed prior to use using the check source provided with the instrument."

Issue Yo: 04-55-6.a.I-A42 Condition: The first simulated e\\'acuee was identified as being contaminated on the feet. He was directed to return to his vehicle and drive it to the impound area.

[lis returned to his vehicle using the sanie path as he entered on. Monitoring personnel did not check this path or the portal monitor for contamination after he let?. There was no use of a step-off pad o r replaseable surfxe \\valk\\uy was not used. The nest evacuee was directed to use the same path. Effective corrtamination control was not in place.

Possible Cause: Clean and contaminated walkways were not appropriately identified at the initial monitoring point. Procedures did not call for the monitoring of kvalkways after containination was detected.

Reference:

Nt!REG-0654 J.1O.h; 5.12; K.5.a. Interim KEP hlanual. dated August 2002.

Effect: C'ontamiiiation \\could he spread to other evacuees M h o may not have been contaminated.

Recommendation: Provide training for monitoring personnel on actions to take

&hen contamination is identified. Rebise procedures to reflect the process that was implemented for the re-demonstration, Provide visuai aids for monitoring personnel to ensure these critical steps are consistently perfomied. Provide a supply of shoe covers and contaminated material waste hag at this location.

22

Corrective Actions Demonstrated:.A re-dcmoiistratioii \\vas performed succcssfully alter the Unilied Command reviewed this problem and provided direction to nionitoring staff. Clean and contaminated flow paths were impleniented. Ilse of reinovahle surface of brown paper was simulated at the entrance and exit ofthe portal monitor. A change ofthe simulated rernovahle surface and checking of the monitor was demonstrated a h

foot contamination was found.

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATE[): NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - ItESOLVED: NONE

6.

PRIOR AKCAs - UNRESOLVEI): NONE 3.3.2 Temporary Care Interview and a M;alk-through of eight shelters successfully denionstrated congregate care on Januay 21, 2004. by the Greater Palm Beach Cliapter ofthe ARC. The Greater Palm Beach ARC includes L lenry. Glade. Okeechobce and Palm Beach Counties. All oflicials were knowledge of the ewcuee registration, feeding. sleeping, health. and nientai health services offered at each of the eight congregate care centers visited. The right shelters visited provided sufficient restroom. feeding, shower. and administrative space. The ARC has arrangements with the schools and local vendors to provide food and owlis twenty-one trailers loaded with cots. blankets. signs and other necessary sheltering supplies.

a.

MICT: Criteria 1.e.l and 6.c.l

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.

AREAS %PF:QtIIRENG CORRECTIVE: ACTEgBY: NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 3.3.3 Traffic Control Points

'I'CPs were successfully demonstrated by the County Sheriff Department through interview on January 20,2004 at John Prince Park. The Deputy knew the purpose ofthe TCPs. He explained how evacuees corning from Martin and St. Lucir Counties would come down 1-95 and the Florida Turnpike. IC knew the location of the shelters. how to remove traffic inipediments and explained that his duty was to keep traffic flowing.

Another officer inanifested a working knolvledge of dosimetry. call and turn hack values.

23

and exposure control. The Officers lrad maps. direct reading and permanent record dosimetry.

a.

MET: Criteria I.e.1. 3.a.1,3.d.l and.3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE E.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACI'ION: NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PREOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR AIZCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 24

4.

SUMhIARY OF AREAS REQIIIKING CORRECTIVE ACTION 4.1 2004 ARCAs 4.1.I 04-55-l.e.1-A-01 Condition: Portal Monitors are used to Palm Reach County Reception Center Equipment screen evacuees for contamination ewcuees.

The Facility uses LudIi~ni model 52-1 portal iiionitors to check all incoining evacuees for contamination and again after any needed decontaniination. Both portal monitors used were labeled with the calibration due date of July 29, 2003. Monitoring staff did not revert to using hand held instruments to check incoming evacuees.

Possible Cause: Monitoring staff did not identify this condition as a fatal problem during instrument setup.

Reference:

NLREG-0654, lI.7. IO: J.10 a.b,e; J.1 I ; K.3.a. Intcrini REP Manual.

dated August 2002. criterion 1.e. 1.

Effect: Use of instruments beyond recommended calibration date w u l d not provide assurance that all containinated evilcuees were identified. The result could cause the contamination of clean areas.

previously clean evacuees and emergency workers.

Recommendation: Bring portal monitors into current calibration or provide documentation with other than annual requirements. Provide evacuee-irronitoring personnel with calibrated instruments in sufficient numbers to enable checking the required 20% of the evacuees assigned to this location within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Provide training for monitoring personnel including actions to be taken when this condition is identified. Develop and inipleinent a IllYdnS for checking that nionitoring equipnient is within the current calibration timeframe and meets operational requirements.

25

Corrective Action 1)ernonstratcd: The County obtained and provided a letter from the manufacturer. lulcir: incorporated stating The Model 52-1 series Iortable portal Monitors are designed by Ludluiu Measurements to be used without calihration as long as operational check is perfornied prior to use using the check source provided with the instrnment.

4.1.2 0-1-55-6.2.1-A-02 Condition: The first simulated esacuce was identified as being coiitaniinnted on the feet.

He was directed to return to his vehicle and drive it to tlie impound area. lis returned to his \\:chicle using the same path as he entercd on. Monitoring personnel did not check this path or the portrtl monitor for contamination after he left. There was no use ofa step-off pad or replaceable surface walkway was not L

I

~

The next evacuee was directed to use the same path, E ffe c t i ve co ntamintit ion control \\vas not in place.

Palm Reach County Reception Center -

Evacuee Monitoring end Decontamination Poqsiblc Cause: Clean and contaminated

\\\\alkua) s \\\\ere not appropriately identified at the initial monitoring point. Irocedures did not call for the monitoring of \\ralli~a)s aftcr contnniination \\\\as detected.

Reference:

NiUREG-065-1 J.1O.h: J.12; K.5.a. lntcrini RLP R4anual. dated August 2002.

Effect: Contamination would be spread to other evacuees who may not have been contaminated.

Recommendation: Provide training for monitoring personnel on actions to take when contamination is identified. Revise procedures to reflect the process that was implemented for the re-demonstration.

Provide visual aids for monitoring personnel to ensure these critical steps are consistently performed. Provide a supply of shoe covers 26

and contaminated material waste hag at this iocation.

Corrective Actions Demonstrated: A re-deliionstration was performed siiccessfiilly after the Unified Cominand reviewed this problem and provided direction to monitoring staff. Clean and ccintxiiinated flow paths were implemented. Use of removable surface of brown paper was simulated at the entrance and exit of the portal monitor. tZ change of the simulated removabit: surface and checking of the monitor uas demonstrated after foot contamination was found.

27

APPENDIX 1 AC KO N Y M S A N D A B B KE V I A T I OX S The follo\\ving is a list o f the acronyms and abbreviations. which may have been iised in this report.

ARC ARCA hIlES HRC CFR DEM DFliIS LX)I-i EAS ENC EOC EOF EPZ FEMA FhlT FPL FR FRERP FRMAC F-SERT cr E ICF KI MERL.

NRC NIJREG-0654 American Red Cross Area Requiring Corrective Action Amateur Radio Emergency Services Bureau of Radiation Controi Code o f Federal Regulations Division of Emergency bianagement Department o f Health and Human Services Department o f I Iealth Emergency Alert System Emergency News Center Emergency Operation Center Emergency Operations Facility hiergency Planning Zone Federal tmergency Management Agency Field Monitoring Team Florida Power and Light Federal Register Federal Radioiogical Emergency Response Plan Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessmellt Center Forward State Emergency Response Team General Emergency ICF Consulting, Incorporated Potassium Iodide Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratoly Nuclear Regulatory Conmission NUREG-0654iFEMA-R~P-I, Rev. 1. Cr;!wici$)r Prq~trrtrlion tinti R.dii(i!ioiz of Rndiologird Emergency Response P h 7 s tmd Prepcirc~r~t7~.ss in Sjpporr ofMirkwr-P(JWW Plon!s, Xovm7hrr. 1980

O R 0 P A D PAR P I 0 KRC REP REKP KACES TCP Otkite Response Organization Protective Action Decision Protective Action Recommendatioii Public Information Officer Regional Assistance Committee Radiological Emergency Preparedness Radiological Emergency Response Plan Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services Site Area Emergency State Emergency Operations Center Standard Operating Procedure Southern Mutual Radiation Assistance Plan Traffk Control Point(s)

APPENDIX 2 EXERCISE EVALUATORS

'rlre following is a list of the personnel who evaluated tile St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant exercise on February 18, 2001. The orguiization represented by each evaluator is abbreviated below.

DFWFEMA - Department of Horiieland Security

- Federal Emergency Managenwit Agency FDA

~ Food & Drug Administration IC'F

- ICF Consulting. Incorporated N RC

- Nuciear Regulatory Commission EVALlJATION SITE EVALCATOR STATE OF FLORiDA State Emergency Operations Center For\\\\arcl State Emergency Response Team Pat Tenorio I.arn Robertson Roy Smith Eniergi-ncy Kerns Center Riil Larrabee Quirino lannazzo Dose Assessment Robert Trqianowski Emergency Operations Facility Robert Trojanowski Radiological Field I4onitoring Teams Deborah Hlunt Edward Wojnas ORGANIZATION Radiological I.ahoratory James Hicke)

St. LUCIE COUNTY Emergency Operations Center Protective Action for Schools Stan Copelanti James McClanahan Bill Ixrabee Ernie h a z e DHS-FEMA HQ ICF IC17 N R r NiiC ICF ICF ICF ICF ICF 30

E'mergency Worker Decontamination Roy Smith Rosemary Samsei B i I i Ncidernieyer Rob Noecker

'I raftic Control Points MARTIN C011N'I'Y Eniergency Operations Center Robert Perdue Rosemary Sanisel Tom Trout Protective Action for Schools Ernie Boue Emergency Worker Decontainination Roy Smith Rosemary Satnsel Rill Neidermeyer Traffic Control Pints Rill Neidermeyer INDIAN RIVER COUNTY Reception Center Congregate Care Traffic Control PoiriLs DKEVARD COUNTY Reception Center Congregate Care Traffic Control Points Rosemary S a n d Bill Neidemieyer Bill Larrabee Roy Smith Ro). Smith Roy Smith Bill Neidermeyer Rosemary Satnsel Robert Perdue Robert Perdue ICF ICF iC'F rcF DIIS-FEMA iCF FDA ICF ICF ICF ICF ICF ICF ICF ICF ICF ICF ICF ICF ICF Dt IS-FEMA 31

1AAI.M BEACH COUNTY Reception Center Congtepte Care Trafiic Control Points 1% I I Neidrriueyer Rosemary Samsel Roy Smith Robert Perdue Robert Perdue ICF ICF ICF DNS-FEMA 32

APPENDIX 3 EXERCISE CRITERIA AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMEKT This appendix contains the exercise criteria and the extent-of-play that were scheduled for denionstration during the Saint Lucie Nuclear Power Plant exercise on February 18.2004.

A.

Exercise Evaluation Area Criteria (In Final Report Only)

B.

Extent-of-play Agreement The extent-of-play agreenlerlt on the following pages was submitted hy the State of Florida. and was approved by FEMA Kegion I\\.

The extent-of-play agreement includes any signilicant modification or change in the level of demonstration of each criterion listed.

(In Final Report Only) 33

1.a - Mobilization:

Criterion 1 ~ 1 :

0 R O s use effestiue prosedmres to alert, notify, and niobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4;D.3,4; E.l,2; FI.4)

Extent of Play Kespcmsible OROs should demoitstrate the capability to receive notification of an emergency situation from tlie licensee, verify the notification, and c.ontact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely iiianner. Rcsponsible OKOs should demonstrate the activation of facilities for immediate use by niobili7,ed personnel wlien thcy arrive to begin emergency operations..kctivation of facilities should be completed in accordance with the plan and:or procedures. Pre-positioning of emergency personnel is appropriate, in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement, at those facilities located beyond a normal commuting distance from tlie individuals duty location or residence.

Further, pre-positioning of staff for out-of-sequence demonstrations is appropriate in ac.cordatice with the extent-of-play agreement.

All activities must be based on the OKOs plans arid procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otlienvise indicated in tlie extent-of-play agreement.

,4f(irtiri: hlnrtiri coiifitj k 24-horir tirtsweririgpoirit will orisw ciricifi// (lift t/fe p/or.idfL iVot$crifioii Forni wifii !lie ii?for.iriutiort I j r o i d d hy the iitilitj:. Tiic cirisiwririg poirtt li,ill tlrcrr prwide LI ~ o p y to. or r e d the copy 10 Eiiiergericj~ Af~i~ingeriierrt SI[#;

SI. Ikccicj EOC: AI1 persoiirrcd will he pre-positiortetl. Respori.w to Floririti Power CY.

Light k Eiiiergeriq 0,twztioris Fciciiity id[ he scrriurio driveri BRC: RRC will pi-rj~osiriarr fieltl temiix, the riiohi!e lcihor-titory iiritl suriipic prep i~eliicle.

EOF pcrsoririel ii,ii! cirriiv witJiiir I-hoiir. (Ifiei the Aier-f eriteigeirrcy clciss[fific.orioir tieclllicltiorl.

1. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS RIIANACIEMENT 1.a - Mobilization:

Criterion la.1: OROs use effective procedures to akrt, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel arid activate facilities in a tinrely manner. (NUREG-0053, AA;D.3,4; E.1, 2; HA)

Extent of Play Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to receive notification of an eiiierr.eiicy situation from the licensee, verify the notification, and contact, alert. and mobilize key emergency perscmicl in a tiiiiely iiianncr. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the activation of Ftcilities for iiiimediate use by mobilized personnel when they arrive to begin emergency opcrations. Activation of facilities should be completed in accordance with the plan andior procedures. Pre-positioning of emergency personnel is appropriate, in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement, at those facilities located beyond 3 noniial coinmuting distance from the individual's duty location or residence.

Further, prc-positioning of staff for out-of-sequence demonstrations is appropriate in accordance with the extent-of-play agreeiiient.

All activities must be based on the ORO's pla~rs and procedures and completed as thcy would be in an actual emergency, unless noted 3bove or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

,bfrirtiii: Miriiii C'oiiiitj, 's ~4-hoiir-cirisweriiifi poilit will ciri.sivcr ci/itlf?i[ oirt the Florith h'ot(jicdori Form ivirh the ir$orrrimioii pi.o~~itieil by the 11tIlit.13. The ciiis~vrirrg poiiit it.ill rheii provide ti copy 10, or i.cncl the cop)' io Eilicrgenc St. Liicie EOC: d/f personilel will hepr~-posiiini!cLj. Rr~.~ponst.

10 Fllorirkr Poit~er LP-Lighr '.Y Er~ii~rgcric~~

Opcrrrtioris Fticility will he.sceiiuin iIr.i~~ei!

BRC: BRC will prepositior~field teiiriis, tile iiiohiie Iiihorcitor~~

niid sciriip[e prep whicle.

E(IFpersoriric1 i d 1 crrrivc witliiii I-liour afier tlie Aleri ciiicr;Scric~' cln.ss~ficcitiori rleclmutioti.

fcicrtrgcwicrri.Sic@

1.b -- Facilities:

Ckiterion 1 h. I : Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.

(NUREG-0654, H.3)

Extent of PI:w Facilities will only he specifically evaluated for this c.riterion if they are new or have substantial changes in structure or mission. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the availability of facilities that support the accomplishment of enicrgency operations. Some of the areas to be c,onsidered are: adequate space, fiirnisliings, lighting, restroom, ventilation: backup power andior alternate facility (if required to support operations).

Facilities must be set itp based on the OROs plans and proccdiires and demolistrated as they would be used in an actual eniergency, unless noted above or othcnvise indicated in the extent-of-play agreenient.

BRC: BHC u~illfollon:

proce~~lirres us siaieil iri SOPS A,fcw/it1: )V/A DEM: Vh4 1.c - Direction and Contra!:

Criterion 1x.l: Key personnel with leadership roles for the O R 0 provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible (NUREG-0654, A.1.d; 1i.2.a~

h)

Extent of Play Ixadership persoiinel should demonstrate the ability to carry out essential ftinctions oftlie response effort, for example: keeping the staff informed through periodic briefings andior other means, coordinating with other appropriate OROs, and ensuring completion a f requirements and requests.

Ail activities associated with direc,tion and control must he performed based oil the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an a~tliid emergency, 2

Pulm Becicii: N/A 1.d - Communications Equipment:

Criterion 1.d.l: At !cast two commuuication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communicatioiis capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUKEG-0654, F.1,2)

Extent of Play OROs will demonstrate that a primary and at least one backup system are fully functional at the beginning of an exercise. If a c,onimunications system or systems are no1 functional, but exercise perfoiniaiice is not afikted, no exercise issue will be assessed.

Communications equipment and procedures for facilities and field units should be used as needed for the transmission and receipt of exercise messages. All facilities and field teams should have the capability to access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system. Responsible OKOs should demonstrate the capability to nianage the communication system and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt the conduct of emergency operations. OKOs should ensure that a coordinated communication link for fixed and mobile niedical support facilities exists. The specific communications c.apabilities of OROs should be commensurate with that specified in the response plan andor procedures. Exercise scenarios could require the failure of a coninrunications system and the use of an alternate system, as negotiated in the extent-of-play agreement.

All activities associated with the inanagetilent of eoninnmications capabilities must be demonstrated based on the OKO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise noted above or in the extent-of-play agreement.

3

P h i Beiicli: NL4 1.e - Equipment and Supplies to Support Operation:

Criterion l.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (Kl), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H.7,10;.J.lO.a, b,e, J.11; K.3.a)

Extent of Plav Equipment within the facility (facilities) should be sufficient and consistciit with the role assigned to that facility in the OROs plans and/or procedures in support of emergency operations. Use of maps and displays is encouraged.

All instruments, should be inspected, inventoried. and operationally chcckcd before each use. Instrunients should be calibrated in accordance with the nianufacturcrs recoiiiniendations. Uiiiiiodified CDV-700 series instruments and other instruments without a manufacturers recommendation should be calibrated annually. Modified CDV-900 instruments should be calibrated in accordance with the reconinlendation of the modific.ation manufacturer. A label indicating such calibration should be on each instrument or c.alihratcd frequency can be verified by other means. Additionally, instruments being used to measure activity should have a range of readings sticker affixed to the side of the instrument. The above considerations should be includcd in 4.a.l for field team equipment; 4.c.l for radiological laboratory equipment (does not apply to analytical equipment); reception center and emergency worker fxilities equipment under 6 x 1 ; and alnbularice and medical facilities equipment under 6.d.l.

Sufficient quantities of appropriate direct-reading and pem~ancnt record dosimetry and dosimeter chargers should be available for issuance to all categories of emergency workers that could be deployed from that facility. Appropriate direct-reading dosimetry should allow individuaI(s) to read the adininistralive reporting limits and maximum exposure limits contained in the OKOs plans and procedures.

4

Dosimetry should be inspected for electrical leakage at least annually and replac,edl if nec.essary. U)WI38s. due to their documented history of electrical leakage problems, should be inspected for electrical leakage at least quarterly and replacxd if necessary.

This leakage testing will be verified during the exercise, tlirougli docurnentation submitted in tlie Annual Letter of Certification, aiidior through a staff assistance visit.

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to maintain inventories of KI sufficient for use by emergency workers: as indicated on rosters; institutionalized individuals, as indicated in capacity lists for facilities; and, where stipulated by the plan aiid!or procedures. menihers of the general public (including transients) within the plume pathway EPZ.

Quantities of dosimetry and KI available and storage locations(s) will be confirmed by physical inspection at storage location(s) or through documentation of current inventory submitted during the exercise, provided in the h n u d Letter of Certification submission, and/or verified duriiig a Staff Assistance Visit. Available supplies of KI should be within tlie expiration dale indicated on KI bottles or blister packs. As an alternative, the OK0 may produce a letter from a certified private or State iaboratory indicating that the KI supply remains potent, in accordance with U.S. Pliamiacopoeia standards.

At locations wliere tralfic arid access control personnel are deployed, appropriate equipment (e.g.. vehicles, barriers, traffic cones and signs, etc.) should be available or their availability described.

All activities must be based on tlie OROs plans and procedures and completcd as they would be in an actual emergency. unless noted above or otherwise indicated in thc extent-of-play agreement.

Martin:,Wnp,c, tlicigrariis arid visua[ [lids ivill he rrsctl iri the EOC as iicedecl, iriure irforintrtiori caii he gtitliwcd by iritervitw US r:ee(kccl. Srrrivy iiisrririiieiits tlosiriietws, t i r i d K I ivere till clicckcd tlirririg site visits St. Lricie: Deriioristrtrtioii yfecluipriicrir arid strpplics 10 siipport the Eriiergeric:j~

Opercitioris Ceriter will he sceiiario driven diiriiig the e.uercise. Irispectioii of iristririiieiits, ciosiriieteis and KI will be coridircted cliiririg n FEMA sire visit scliec(lilct1 for Dcccriihcr 8.

2003. 4 report ofthe visit will be avciiltiblcjbr review trpori rccpest. I f the visit is ciiricelletl, irispectioii of iristriiriieiitnticiri nrid K/ will he codirctecl dicririg the evolirirtiori.

RRC: IVill rise eqiriprirerit crrrd supplies ns stated iri the SOPS.

DE3f: The SEOC will have sirfficierlt equipiiicwt to siipport their riiission CIS rkejrieil iri the REP Pluit.

DEM: The F-SERT will huiv siifficieiif eqiii/merit to siipport their missio?i as tlyfii:ecl iii the REP Plurz. Dosirnet? arid KI will not he distributedfrorii the SEOC O ~ ~ ~ O I J I tlic EOF.

5

2.a - Emergency Worker Exposure Control:

Criterion 2.8.1 : OROs use a decision making process, considering relevant factoi-s :ind appropriate coordination, to ensure that >in exposiire control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (Nll!RE6-0654, K.4, J.lO.e, f)

Extent of Play OROs aulhorized lo s e d cinergeiicy workers intci the plume exposui-e pathway "7.

should demonstrate a capability to meet the criterion based on their emergency plans and procedures.

Responsible ORCOs should demonstrate the capability to make decisions concerning the authorization of exposure levels in excess of preauthorized levels and to the number of eniergeiicy workers receiving radiation dose above pre-authorized levels.

As appropriate, OROs should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administriition of KI as a protective measure, based on the ORO's plan andior procedure:; or projected ihyoid dosc compared with the established Pratectivc Action Guides (I'AGs) for K1 administration.

All activilies musl be I,ased on [lie OKO's plans and procedures and colirpleted as they wouid be in an actual einergeircy, unless noted abow or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

hftirfin: b~~sl~tlon~ii, Decori, irrid Field E.q~osiire ('oiitrol %.ill be deriiorlstrciteci out of scyut.nce. KI clecisio,r niakirig iidl uccw in tlre EOP; m d EO(', ifdr.iveri h i 1 the sccwur.io Uerisioris to cillow e~pos"'s"r.e irhove ctlrthorizetl levels curt he evnluatetl !JY irirerview.

SI. I.iicie: Iri qqwerirerit BKC': BRC' will use dosiritetg~ mid irutri4.~,ircntiitJnrr CIS stcited in SOPS.

6

2.b-Radiological Assessnaenit and Protective Action Reconamendatiores and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency:

Criterion 2.b.l: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on auailable information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and (3110 dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite enviroiimental conditions. (NllJREG-O454,1.8, 10 and Supplement 3)

Extent of Play During the initial stage ofthe emerzency response, following notification of plant conditions that may warrant offsite protective actions, the O R 0 should demonstrate the capability to L I S ~

appropriate means. described iii the plan and:or proccdurcs, to devclop protec.tivc action recommeiidations (PAR) for decision-makers based on available information and recommenJaticns~iis from the licensee and field monitoring data, if available.

When release and meteorological data are provided by the licensee, the OK0 also considers thcsc data. The OR0 should demonstrate a reliable capability to independently validate dose projections. The types of calculations to be demonstrated depend on the data available arid the need for assessments to support the PARS appropriate to the scenario. In all cases, calculation of projected dose should he demonstrated. Projected doses should be related to quantities and units of the PA(; to which they \\vi11 be compared. P.4P.s should be promptly transmitted to decisioii-makcrs in a prearranged format.

Differences greater than a factor of 10 between prijcctcd doscs by the licensee and the O R 0 should be discussed with the licensee with respect to the input data and assumptions used, the use of different models, or other possible reasons. Resolution of these differences should he incorporated into the PAR if timely and appropriate. The O R 0 should demonstrate the capability to use any additional data to refine projected doses and exposure rates arid revise the associated PARS.

All activities must be based on thr: ORO's plans and procedures and conipleted as they ivould be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play a~reement.

BRC': BRC' ivill use R/1SC'AL dose ti~s~ssiiieiit cocle cis sfciteti in SOPS, 7

Criterion 2.8~2: A decision-malting process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PAD) for the general public (including the recoinmendation for the use of KI, if O R 0 policy). (NIJREG-0654, J.9, 10.f: in)

Extent of Plav Offsite Response Organi7ations (OKOsj should have the capability to make both initial and subsequent PADS. They should demolistrate the capability to make initial PADS in a tiinely manner appropriate to the situation, based on notification fiom the licensee, assessment of plant status and releases, and PARS froiii the utility and OR0 staff.

The dose asscssincnt personnel may pi-ovide additional PARS based on [lie subsequcnt dose projcclions, field nionitoring data, or infomiation on plant conditions. The decision makers should denionstrate the capability to change protective actions as appropriate based on these projections.

If the OK0 has detemiined that K1 will be used as a protective nieasure for the general public under offsite plans, then the O K 0 sliould demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administratioii of KI as a protective measure lor the general public to supplement sheltering and evacuation. This decision should be based on the OROs plan n d h r procedures or projected thyroid dose coiiiparcd with thc established PA(; for KI administration. The KI decision making process should invol\\,e close coordination wid1 appropriate assessment and decision-making staff.

If more than one OR0 is involved in decision-making, OROs should communicate and coordinate PADS with affected OROs. OKOs should demonstrate the capability to cominunicate the contents of decisions to the affected jurisdictions.

All decision-making activities by OK0 personnel must be perfcimed based 011 the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

8

P~iliil Becicli: Ni.4 2.e -Protective Action Decisions for Protection of Spcciil Populations:

Criterion 2.c.l: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups. (NI!KEG-064, J.9, J.10.d, e)

Extent of Plav IJsuallp, it is appropriate to implement evacuation in areas where doses are projected to cxcccd the lower end of the range ofPAGs, except for situations where there is a high-risk environment or where higli-risk groups (e.g., the immobile or intiiin) are involved. In these cases, exainplcs of' factors that should be considered are: Rcathcr conditions, sheltci-availability, availahility of transportation assets, risk of evacuation vs. risk from the avoided dose, and precautionary school evacuations. In situations whcrc an institutionalized population cannot be evacuated, thc administration of KI should be considered by the OROs.

Applicable OKOs should demonstrate the capability to alert and notify all public school systcnis/districts of emergency conditions that are expected to or may necessitate protective actions for students. Contacts with public school systeniddistricts must be actual.

I n accordance with plans and/or procedures. OROs and/or officials of public school systenis/districts should demonstrate the capability to make prompt decisions on protective actions for studenrs. Officials should demoiistrate that the decision making process for protcctive actions considers (that is, either accepts automatically or yives hcavy weight to) protective action recommendations made by OR0 personnel, the ECI,

at which thesc recommendations are received, prcplannrd stratesies for protective actions for that E(:[,, and the location of students at the time (for example, whether tlie students are still at home, en route to the school, or at the school).

All decision-making activitics associated with protective actions, including considel-ation of available resources, for special poputatioii groups must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and c.ompletcd as they would be in an actual einergency, uirless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agceiiient.

JMtwtiri: h 4 ~ 1 i i i Coiin!,: will rircike tlecisioris o r i Specid hwtls tirrrl Schoois hcrsd ofphiif coriilitioirs. pluiif trcrrrls. PARS w i t 1 lotul coriditioris.

S I. Liicic.:.4cFltd iiiiticil riot(f;eotioir ir,ill he riiricle to the St. Lircie Seliool I h f r i c t Sii/ieririfri~tlei.,ir tirid the Trcrrisporttrtiorr Dircrtor. :fll ollier rolls ivili he siiiiiilirted.

BrevNrrl: NL4 IIFAf: VL4 2.d. -Radiological Assessment aaad Decisioa-Rfakiaig for Lfre Ingestion Expc~sure Pathway Criterion 2.d.l: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective :iction decisions are made based on the (PRO plaiinirng criteria.

(NUREG-0654, I.%, J.I I)

Extent of Play It is expected that the OK0 will take precautionary actions to protect food and watcr supplies, or to niininiize exposure to potentially contaminated water and foodl in accordance with their respective plans and procedures. Often such precautionary actions are initiated by tlie OROs based on criteria related to the facilitys emergency classification levels (XI<). Such actions nray include reconmiendations to place milk animals on stored feed and to use protected wJter supplies.

The OR0 should use its procedures (for example. development of a sampling pian) to assess the radiological consequences of a release on the food and water supplies. The OR0 assessment should include the evaluation of the radiological analyses of representatke samples of water, food, and other ingestible substances of local interest from potentially impacted areas, the characterization of the releases from the facility, and the extent of areas potentially impacted by the release. During this assessment, OKOs should consider the use of a-gicultural and watershed data within tlie SO-

mile EPZ. The radiological inipacts on the food and water sllould then be cornpawl to the appropriate ingestion P.4Gs contained in the OROs plan and!or procedures. (The plan a d o r procedures may contain PAGs based on specific dose conimitnient criteiia or based on cfiteria as recommended by current Food and Drug Administration guidance.) Timely and appropriate recoinmendations should he pi-ovided to the O R 0 decision-malters group for impleiiientation decisions. As time peiiiiits, the O R 0 may also include a comparison of taking or not taking a given action on the resultaiit ingestion pathway dose commitinents.

Tlie OR0 should demonstrate timely decisions to mininiize radiological impacts from Ihe ingestion pathway, based on the given assessments and other infomiation available. Any such decisions should be comniunicated and to the extent practical, coordinated with neiglrhorin_g and local OROs.

OROs should m e Federal resources, as identified in tlie I k k r a l Radiological Emergency Kcspoiise Plan (FRERP), and otlter resources (e.g., compacts, nuclear insurers. etc), if available. Ewlcation of this criterion will rake into consideration the level of liedera1 and other resources paiticipating.

All activities must be based on tlre OROs plans and procedures and c.omplcted as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent o f play agreement.

iWirr/iri: Mcirtirl Cbriilty will provide iiiJect irr the EOC for lnw rllforccrrierrf u i d cijirititilliird crge;.olcies,for prclctice miel irciiuiriji. i\\otfor e~dztcitiori St. Lircir: NL4 2.e. - Radiological Assessment and Decision-hlaking Concerning Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Criterion 2.e.l: Timely relocation, re-entry, and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the OROs plan and/or procedures. (NUREG-0654, A.l.h., 1.10; M I )

Extent of Plav Relocation: OROs should demonstrate tlie capability to estimate integrated dose in contaminated areas and to compare these estimates with PAGs. apply decision criteria for rerocation o f those 11

individuals in the general public who have not been evacuated but where projected doses are in excess of relocation I'AGs and control access to evacuated and restricted areas. Decisions are made for relocating members of the evacuated public \\vho lived in areas that now have residual radiation levels in excess of the PAGs. Lktemiination of arms to he restricted should be based on factors such as the mix of rJdionticlides in deposited matei-ials, calculated exposui-e rates vs. the PAGs and field samples of vegetation and soil analyses.

Re-entry: Decisions should be made regarding the location of control points and policies regarding access and exposure control for emergency workers and inembcrs of the general public. who need to temporarily enter tlie evacuated area to perfomi spec.ific tasks or missions.

Examples of control procedures are: the assignment 01; or checking for direct-reading and noli-direct-reading dosimetry for emergency workers; questions regarding tlie individual's ohjmtives and locations expected to be visited and associated time frames; availability of maps and plots of radiation exposure rates; advice on areas to avoid; and procedures for exit including: monitoring of individuals, vehicles, arid cquipinent; decision criteria regarding dccontarnination and proper disposition of emergency worker dosimetry and maintenance of emergency worker radiation exposure records.

Kespoiisible OROs should deliionstrate the capability to develop a strategy for authorized re-entry of individuals into the resti-ictcd zone, based on established decision criteria. OROs should dcrnonstrstc thc capability to modify those policies for security purposes (e.&? police patrols), for maintenance of essential serviccs (e.g., fire protection and utilities). and for other critical functions. They should demonstrate the capability to use decision making criteria in allowing access to the restricted zone by the public for various reasons. such as to maintain property (e.g., to care for fami aninials or secure machinery for storage), or to retrieve important possessions.

Coordinated policies for access and exposure control should be developed among all agencies with roles to perform in the restricted zone. OROs should demonstrate the capability to estahlish policies for provision of dosimetry to all individuals allowd re-entry to the restricted zone. The extent that OKCis need to develop policies on re-entry will be determined by scenario events.

Return: Lkcisions are to be based on environmental data and political bouiidxics or physical'geological features, which allow identification of the bountlaries of areas to nrhich members ofthe general public may return. Return is pennitted to the boundary of the restricted area that is based on the relocation PAC; Otlicr factors that the OR0 should consider are, for example: conditions that pemiit the cancellation of the Emergency Classification Level and the relaxation of associated restrictive measures; basing return reconimendations (is,, permitting populations that were previously evacuated to reoccupy their homes and businesses on an unrestricted basis) 011 ineasurenicnts of radiation from ground deposition; and the apability to identify services and facilities that require restoration within a few days and to identify the procedures and resources for their restoration.

Examples of these services and facilities are: medical and social services, utilities, roads, schools, and intermediate tenn housing for relocated persons.

12

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and proceddures and completed as they rvould be in an actual emerxenc>, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extcnt of play agreement.

M~rrtiri: hfurtiii <oiiiity-ilotJi>r Eimliiotioii, \\vi11 ciililress o r i d [iisciiss theses issiies $

ilriwii hv the sceiicirio.

3. PROTECTIVE ACTION INIPLEMENTAIION 3.a - Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control:

Criterion 3.a.I : The OMOs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and ut the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record OK chart. (NUKEC-0653, 1(.3.a, b)

Extent of Play OROs shoiild dcmonstrate rhe capahiliiy 10 prwide appropriate direct-rcadinz and pernianent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, arid instructions on the use of dosimetry to emergency workers. Pot evaluation purposes, appropriate directmading dosimetry is defined as dosimetry that allow individual(s) to read the administrative reporting liniils (that are pre-established at a level low enough to consider subsequent cakulation of Total Effective Dose Equivalent) and inaxirnuin exposure limits (for those emergency workers involved in life saving activities) contained in the OROs plans and procedures, Each emergency worker should have the basic knowledge of radiation exposure limits as specified in the OKOs plan andior procedures. Procedures to monitor and record dosimeter readings and to manage radiological exposure control should be demonstrated.

During a plume phase exercise, eniergeney workers should denionstrate the procedures io be followed dien administrative exposure limits and tumhack values are reached. The emergency worker should report accumulated exposures during the exercise as indicated in the plans and procedures. OROs should denionstrate the actions described in the plan 13

a d o r procedures by detemrining whether to replacc tbe worker. to authorize the workcr to incur additional exposures or to take other actions. If scenario events do not require emergcnc,y workers to seck authorizations for additianal exposure, evaluators should interview at least two emergency workers, to determine their knowledge of whom to contact in thc event authorization is nccded and at what cxposure levels. Emergelicy \\rorkcrs may use any available rcsotirces (e.g., written procedures and/or coworkers) in providing responses.

Although it is desirable for all emergency Lvorkers to each have a direct-reading dosimeter, tliere may be situations where team nieinbcrs will be in close proximity to each other during the entire mission and adequate control of exposure can be effect4 for all members oftlie team by one dosimeter woni by the team Icader. Emergency workcrs who are assigned to low exposure rate areas, cg., at reception ccnters, counting laboratories, emergency operations centers, and communications centers, may ha\\^

individual direct-reading dosimeters or they may be monitored by dosimeters strategically placed in the work area. It should he noted Illat, even in these situations, each team member must still have their own peniianent record dosimetry.

lndividuals without specific radiological response missions, such as fanners for animal care, essential utility service personnel, or other members of the public who must re-enter an evacuated area following or during the plume passage, should be limited to the lowest radioloS.ica1 exposure coinmrnsurate with completing their missions.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and cornpleted as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

,bfcirtiri: Mcrrliii ( ' o i r r i i ~ ~ ii'ill cieriiorrstnirr Errier~~eri~~i:

rvorkcr E.ip?sirw? C'oritrol out of seqiierii-e ut Fire Statiori 14 ut tlie soirtlierri erid of Hiitchisoii Islarid. Dosiriietq. will he 0-20 REMAritI 0-200 riiREA. TLD Iiolrlers ivili he itserl to.sirriitkitr T I A T, Cot?& will hc.

iised to rqirrseiit I;% Persoririel will rleriioiistr~ite u i*asliLIowri u i i d tlecori operaticri.

Per.s:xr:cl will rlmcrrstr(itc ilic i r x of:;im~;i, i::strnri:ciit.s, riiitl ii dosiriieters. Ariv criterici riot seeri b.v ow1iicitor.s will be detrrriiiiied h.v iriterview.

St. Lircic: This ilcriiorisirdotr will he u;r[ of seyireiice rirril wiil wcitr tlioirig tlir erriergcricy wrisli dowi d i d 1 ori./mictrry 21. 3004. All criiergericj' workers will rccciiv the npprwpritite l!osinrctiy c i s specified iii tlie REP Pluri. Dosiriieter haciges will he sirtiiil~itcd with plmtic hut1ge.s. KIpills will he siriiirlntetl with nspiriri tohlots. Ariy proiw!icres riot ohser-ved [liiririg the rlerrroristrcitiori ii,ill he crcldresserl h.v iriterview Br<w;rcl: Brevnrd Coiiritv udll dcviioristrnte ori J(iriir(iiy 22. 200.7 ut tlie I-95 Rest Stop Site.

3.h - lmplemeiitation of MI Decisioiis Criterion 3.b.B : ME and appropriate instrnctioais are awilable should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the adrniiiistration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is maintained. (NUREG-0654, E. 7., J. 10. e., f.)

Extent of Plav OKOs should demonstrate the capability to make IC1 available to ernergency workers, institutionalized individuals, and, where provided for in the OR0 plan and/or procedures, to members of the general public. OKOs should demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of til consistent with decisions made. Organizations should have the capability to develop and maintain lists of emergency workers and institutionalized individuals w41o have ingested K1, including documentation of the date(s) and riuie(s) they were instruc.led to ingest 3.

The ingestion ofK1 recommended by the designated OK0 health official is voluntary. For evaluation puiposes, the actual ingestion of t i 1 is not necessary. OROs should demonstrute the capability to formulate and disseminate appropriate instructions on the use of KI for those advised to take it. Ifa recoiimeiidation is made for the general public to take KI, appropriate information should be provided to the public by the iiieaiis of notification specified in the OR()s plan and/or proccdures.

Emergency workers should demonstrate the basic knowledge of procedures for the use of K I whether or not the scenario di-ives the. use ofKi. This can be accomplished by an interview with the evaluator.

All activities must be based on the OROs plnns and procedures and completed, as they would he in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otlienvise indicated in the extent of play ayxriient.

A4ur:irt:,\\4artiri Court!,?-~riiergeric~

Worker KI decisiorts itdl be rriride a the EO(. RRC will provide close projcctioits, EOC stciflwill deterrrtirie iffkdcl pcrsoriricl ore irt the c@ecred arms. Pcr.sortrie1 kitowledge ofK1 will he deterririrted liy iritrrt~iew (it tlic waslidowrt, dccort sire.

Sr. Lucie: This procediire will be scerinrio clriveri. Donioitstrcitioii will he doric rhroirglt irttci-view with cippropriute EOC per~.roriitel.

15

rmi: ~4 3.c - lmplementatiorm of Protective Actions for Special Populations:

Criterion 3.c.l: Protective action decisions are irnplemeatbed for special populations other than schools within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREC-0654, J.lO.c,

& E9 Extent of Play Applicable OKOs should denionstrate the capability to alert and notify (for example, provide protective action recommendations and emergency infomiation and instructions) special populations (hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities, mobility impaired individuals, transportation dependent, etc. j. OKOs should demonstrate the capability to provide for the needs of special populations in ac.cordancc with the OKO's plans and procedures.

Contact with special populations and reception facilities may he actual or simulated, as agreed to in the Extent o f Play. Some contacts with transportation providers should he actual, as negotiated in the cxtcnt o f play. All actual and simulated contacts should be logged.

All ir1iple.mcntii;g activitics associated -wit11 protective actions for special popalations must be based on the OKO's plans and procxdures and conlplcted as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

h4wciii: hftzrtiri (~.'oiir?y itill pruidi? ti ciirrerit sjiccid "feeds dierit roster, The +ecitil iVeeds Coordirrutor r r r i d Triirisportcrtiori Coorrlirrtrror njill he uvtrilahlefor iriteri'iew. All qftheir nctioris dirrirtg the drill will he siiiiiilc~tioris. Tliere will he 110 rrctuirl corittrct ii?tli Special,VcedsClierirs. A i i j elciiieiils oj~tliis criteriu riot ohserved rw~v he tieteririirietl h?,

iritewiew.

• St. Lircie: A cwreiit list ofspecid ricetts popiilrrlion will hc provided to tire St. Lucie

(-'ozoity evaInator(s) jir review. ~,~iiciccition:i-elocut;~~~i rcyuirwnerits wiil he tlerriorisfrutecl tlrrotrgli discussioirs (it the EO(: hosed OII the sccr?nrio rrtid courlty iriiplenicritaiiorr procedures. AN cd1s will be sinifikutc?d.

16

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools.

(NCREG-0654, J.lO.c, d, 9)

Extent of Plrv Public school systeiiiddistricts shall demonstrate the ability to implement protective a c h i decisions for students. The demonstration shall be inade as follows: At least one schooi in each affected sc.hooi system or distric,t, as appropriate, needs to demonstrate the implerrrentiition of protective actions. 'The implementation of caiiceling the school day, dismissing early, or sheltering should be simulated by describing to evaluators the procedures that would he foliowed. If evacuation is the iinplemented protective action, all activities to coordinate and complete the evacuation of students to reception centers, congregate care centers, or host schools niay actually he deiiionstrated or accomplished thi-ough an iiitrrview process. lfaccomplished through an interview process, appropriate school personnel including decision making officials (e.g., superintendelitiprincipal, transportation tiirrctorlbus dispatcher). and at least one bus driver (and the bus driver's escoit, if applicable) should hc available to demonstrate knowledge of their role(s) in the evacuation of school children. Communications c.apabilities between school officials and the buses. if required by the pian andlor procedures, should be verified.

OTficials of the sc;hool system(s) should dciiionstratc the c:ipability to develup and provide timely information to OROs for use in messages to parents, the getieral p~iblic, and the inedia on the status of protective actions for schools.

The provisions of this criterion also apply to any private schools, private kiiidei-gartens and day care centers that participate in REP exercises pursuant to the OKO's plans and procedures as negotiated in the extent-of-play agreeinent.

All activities must be based on tlie C3RO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

Mtzi-tiii: A;kii.tiii Cotiiir~~-Scl~ool district persoiinc~l will be ir7 the EOC, mid will tiike cictioiis io s(;fegiiwd sirctleiits nrid stu8 Iffor stme ~iifore~eeri reiisoii district persoilriel c m iiot he: in tlie EOC they will be cuirmrted vici plintie cincl directed ro tukc the uppropritztr actioris. Mizrtiii C'oiirttj~ does riot iiiiiwti to liiivc a bus driver uvailablefor

3.d ~- I tripleineaatation of Traffic and Access Control.

Criterion 3.d.I : Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access controi personnel. (NUREG-0654, J.1 O.g, j)

Extent of Plav OROs should deiilonstrate the capability to select, establish. and staff appropriate traffic and access control points, consistent with protective action decisions (for example, evacuating, shelterins, and relocation), in a timely manner. OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide instructions to traffic and access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.

3.d. - Iinplesrientation of Traffic and Access Control Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654,.J.lO., k.)

Extent of Play OKOs sl~ould demonstrate the capability, as required by the scenario, to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation. Actual dispatch of resources to deal 19

All activities must be based on the OKOs plans and procedurcs and completed as they would bc in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agrceiimit.

hlUl~lilI., u 1 3.e - Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions Criterion 3 t. 2 : Appropriate measures, strategies, and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminateil water, food prodiicts, milk, and agricultural production. (NUREG-0654, E.5, 7, J.9, 11.)

Extent of Flav

[)eveloprnent of measures and strategies for implementation of ingestion pathway zone (IPZ) protrclive actions should bc demonstrated by formulation of protective action infoiniation for the general public and food producers and processors. Iliis includes the capability for the rapid reproduction and distribution of appropriate reproduction-ready information and instrucrions to pre-determined individuals and businesses. OROs should demonstrate thc capability to control.

restrict or prcvent distribution of contaminated f ~ i d by cuniincrcial sec.!ors. Exercise pl-1 1 sliould iiiclride demonstration of conin~nnications and coordination between organizations to impienient protective actions. However, actual field play of implementation activities may be simulated. For example, c.ornniunic,ations and coordination with agencies responsible for enforcing food controls within the IPZ should be demonstrated, but actual comiiiunications with food producers and processors may be simulated.

All activities iiiiist be based on the OROs plans and procedures and c.ompleted. as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or othemisc indicated in the extent ofplay agreement.

Mirtiu: Ax/$

Si. Lucie:.Wl

3.f-Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry and Return Decisions Criterion 3.f.l: Decisions regnrdiiig controHed re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return afthe public are coordiaated with appropriate organizations and implemeiited. (NUREG-0654, X I, 3.)

Extent of Plav Relocation: OROs should clemonstrate the capability to coordinate and implement decisions coriceiming relocation of individuals, not previously evacuated, to an area where radiological contamination will not expose the general puhlic to doses that excced the relocation IAGs.

OROs sIiould also demonstrate the capability to provide for short-tern1 or long-term relocation of evacuees \\vho lived in arcas that have residual radiation levels ahove the PAGs.

Areas of coiisideration should include the capability to communicate with OROs regarding timing of actions, notification of the population of the procedures for reloc.ation, and the notification of. and advice for, evacuated iiidividuals who will be converted to relocation status in situations where they will not he able to return to their homes due to high levels of contamination. OKOs sliould also demonstrate the capability to comnrunicare instructions to the public regarding relocation decisions.

Re-entry: OROs sliould demonstrate the c.apilhility to control re-entry and exit of iiidividu;ils who need to tcniporrxiiy rc-enter the restrictcd area, to protect tl?cm f r w ~

iinnecessary radiation exposure and for exit of vehicles and other equipment to control the spread of contamination outside tlie restricted area. Monitoring and decontamination hcilities will be established as appropriate.

Examples of control procedure subjects are: ( I ) the assignment of, or checking for, direct-reading and non-direct-reading dosimetry for eniergency workers; (2) questions regarding the individuals objectives and locations expected to be visited and associated timefraiiies; ( 3 ) maps and plots of radiation exposure rates; (4) advice on areas to avoid; and procedures for exit.

including monitoring of individuals, vehicles and equipment. decision criteiia regardins contamination, proper disposition o f emergency worker dosimetry and maintenance of emergency worker radiation exposure records.

Return: OROs should demonstrate the capability to implement policies concerning return of members of the public to areas that were evacuated during the plume phase. OROs should

denionstrate the capability to identify and prioi-itire services and facilities that require rcsloration within a few days: and to identify the procedures and resources for their restoration. Exaniples ofthese services and facilities are medical and social services, utilities, roads aid schools and intermediate tertii housing for reiocated persons.

Coiiiiiiunicatioi7s among OROs for relocation, rc-entry and return may be simulated; however all simulated or actual contacts should be documented. These discussions may be ac,cotnplished in a grotrp setting.

OROs should u se F ederal r esources a s i dentified i ii I he F RERP, a ntl other r esotirces (e.2..

compacts, nuc,lear insurers, etc), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities iiiust be based on [he ORO's plans and procedures and c.ompleted as they would be in an actual eniergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement,

.Mariiii: XIA

4. FIELD WHEA SUREMENT AND ANALYSIS 4.a -- Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analysis:

Criterion 4.a.l: The field teams are equipped to perform field niessuremerits of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. (NUREG-0654, EI.10; 1.7, 8,9)

Extent of Play Field teams should be equipped with all instrumentation and supplies necessary to accomplish their mission. This should include instruments capable of measuring gamma exposure rates and detecting the presence of beta radiation. These instruments should be capable of measuring a range of ac,tivity and exposurel including radiological prorec.tioiv'exposnre control of team members anti detec.fiorl of activity on the air sample collection media, consistent with the intended use ofthe instrument and the ORO's plans 23

and proccdures. h n appropriate radioactive check source should be used to verify proper operational response for each low range radiation measiirenient instrument (less than 1 W i r ) and for high range instruiiients when availahle. Ifa source is not available for a high range instrument, a procedure. should exist to operationally test the instrument before entering an area wlme only a high range inslnrment can make useful readings.

All activities must be based on the OKOs plans and procedures and completed as they wotrld be in an actual eniergenc,y, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the exten-of-play agrcenient.

.bi%irtiii:.hloriiii Coriiity Ficilii Tetrrirs will he rrssigiwrl to prctl~terrrrirred sires to ttrhc huckgrouird rccitlirigs cl~rrl rcpoi-t to the EOC. :tot for ewliuitiim.

St. Lircie: XI%

BRC: BRL will irse iiisiriii)r~iiir~tioii ilritl riretisrrrcmeIrt techrlirlues U S stcitc?il irt.~Ol.v.

Urc~wrtl: :VIA D I W : &CIA Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient itiformation to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (KUKECX653,t1.82; 1.8, 18; J.1O.a)

Extent of Plnv Responsible Oftsite Response Orgaliizations (,OROsj should demons!rate the capabili!?

to brief teams on predicted plume location and direction, travel speed, and exposure control procedures hefore deployment.

Field measurements are needed to help characterize the release and to support the adequacy of implemented protective actions or to be a factor in modifying protective actions. Teams should be directed to take measurenrents in such locations, at such times to provide infonnation sufficient to characterize tlie plume and impacts.

If the responsibility to obtain peak measurements in the plume has been accepted by licensee field monitoring teams, with concurrence from OKOs, there is no requirement for these measurements to be repeated by State and local monitoring teams. If the licensee teams do not ohtain peak measurements in tlie plume, it is the OROs decision as to whether peak measurements are necessary to sufficiently characterize the plume. The sharing and cowdination of plume measurement information among all field teams 24

(licensee, Federal. and ORO) is essential. Coordination conceiiiing transfer of samples, iiicluding a chain-of-custody form, to a radiologic.al laboratory sl~ould be demonstrated.

OROs should use Federal resoLirccs as identified i n the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), and other resources (for example, compacts, utility, etc.), if available. Evaluation of lliis criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they wouid he in ail actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play-agreement.

BRC: BRC will iise ir:st~iriiioiteition crrrtl iiiecisirtwiietit t~~c111iiqircs (1s.sf61ted iii SOs.

hfwtit?: V4 Criterion 4.2.3: Ambient radiation measurements are inade and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to zn appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) anaouot ~f radioactivity has been collected on the sampling nnedia.(NhTR~~-Q65.1,1.

9)

Extent of Plav Field teams shouId denionstrate the capability to report nieasurements and field data pertaining to the nieasurenient of airborne radioiodine and particulates and ambient radiation to lhe field team coordinator, dose assessment, or other appropriate authority. If samples have radioactivity significantly above background, the appropriate authority should consider the need for expedited laboratory analyses ofthese samples. OROs should share data in a timely manner with all appropriate OROs. Ali nietliodology, including contamination control, instrumentation, preparation of samples, and a chain-of-custody form fim transfer to a laboratory, will be in accordance with the OROs plan andior procedures, OROs should we Federal resources as identified in the FKEW, and other resources (for example, compacts, utility, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into 25

considcration the level of Federal and other resources psi-licipating in thc excrcisc.

All activities mist bc must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would be in 311 actual eincrgency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

BRC: RRC will use ii!sfriiiii~,irtiili~i?

( ! i d ii:c(isiuwiwil ccdriiiqires (Is st~r.Vil in SOPS Murriii: NL.4 4.b - Post Plume Phase Field Measurernerits and Sampling Criterion 4.b.l: The field teams demonstrate the capability to innlie appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action deeision-making. (NblREG-0654,1.8., All.)

Extent of PBav The OKOs field teams should demonstrate the capability to take nieasurctnents and samp!es, at such times and locations as dirested. to enable an adequate assessment ofthe ingxtioii pathway and to support re-entry, relocation, and return decisions. When resources are available, the use of aerial suricys and in-situ gairmia me3stirenic:?t is appmpriate. All methodology, includirig contamination control, insmtmentation, preparation of samples, and chain-of-custody fomi for transfer to a laboratory, w3ill be in ac.cordaiice with the OROs plan andior procedures.

Ingestion pathway samples sh9uld be secured from agricultural products and water. Samples in support of relocation and return should be secured from soil: vegetation, and other surfaces in areas that received radioactive ground deposition.

OROs should use IWeral resources as identified in the FKEKP, and other resources (c.g compacts, nuclear insurers, etc), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

26

All activities must be must he based on the OROs plans and procedures anti completed, as they would he in an actual emergency, unlcss noted above or otlienvise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

hiirftii:,V/2 4.c-Laboratory Operations Criterion 4 ~ ~ 1 :

The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions. (NUREG-0654, (3.3; J.11)

Extent of PBav

?he laboratory staff should deliionstrate the capability to follow appropriate procedures for receiving samples, including logging of iiifcumation. preventing contamination of the laboratory, preventing buildup of background radiation due to stored saniples, preventing cross contamination of samples: preserving samples that may spoil ( for example, milk).

and keeping track of sample identity. In addition, the laboratory staff should demonstrate the capability to prepare samples for conducting measurements.

The laboratory should he appropriately equipped to provide analyses of media, as requested, 011 i1 timely basis, of sufficient quality and sensitivity to support assessiiieiits and decisions as anticipated by the OROs plans and procedures. The laboratory (laboratories) instniment calibrations shoiild he traceable to standards provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Laboratory iiwthods used to analyze typical radioiiuclides released in a reactor incident should be as described in the plans and procedures. New or revised methods may be used to analyze atypical radionuclide releases (for example, transuranics OF as a result of a terrorist event) or if warranted by circumstances of the event. Analysis may require resources beyond those of the OKO.

The laboratory staff should be qualified in radioanalytical techniques and contamination control procedures.

OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the. FREKP, and other resources (for 21

example, compacts, utility, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of l'ederal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All ac,tivities must be based on the OKO's plans and pi-occdures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

BKC': BRC' will tisc irrsir.riiilcrittrtiorr t r r d riiiwstircvirerit leclitiicpes NS sttried it! SOPS Miwtiti: h7.4

5. EMERGENCY N0'~IFICATIOK AND PUBLIC INFORMATION 5.a - Activation of the Prompt Alert and Kotification System:

Criterion 5.a.I: Activities associated with primary alerting and notifiratinn of the public are completed in a timely manner foilowing the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situatior]. The initial iastrmctianal message to the public nailst inchide as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. ( I O CFW Part 50, Appendix 1LIV.D and NIJWEC-0654, E.§, 6, 7)

Extent of Play Responsible Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should demonstrate the capability to sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident and transientj throughout the IO-mile p l u m pathway EPZ. Following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures, completion of system activation should be accomplished in a timely manner (will not be subjrc.1 to specific time requirements) for priniary alerting'notification. The initial message should include the elements required by current FEMA REP guidanw.

Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) with route alerting as the primary method of 28

nleiliiig and notifying the public should demonstrate. the capability to ac.coinplish the priniary route alerting, follciu~ing the decision to activate the alert and notification system.

in a timely nianner (will not be subject to specific time requirements) in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or proc.edurcs. At least one route needs in be denionstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) should vary froin exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route should be tiemonstrated at least once every six years. All alert and notific.ation activities along the route should he simulated (that is, the message that would actuaily he used is read for the evaluator, but not actiially broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent-of-play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some agreed-upon location. 'Ihe initial message should include the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.

Foi-exercise purposes. timely is defined as "the responsible O R 0 p~rsonnclirepressntatives Jcmonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate inforiirationi'instructioiis with a sense of urgency and withoLit undue delay." If message dissemination is to be identified as not having been accon~plished in a timely nianner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

Procedures to broadeast the message should be fully demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission. Broadcast ofthe message(s) or test nressages is riot required. ?'he alert signal activation niay be sirnniated. Hobvever, the procedures should be denionstrated up to the point of actual activation.

The capability of the primary notification system to broadcast an instructional message on a 24-hotl~' hasis should he verified during an interview with appropriate personnel koni thc primary notificatior! system.

AI( activities for this criterion must be based on the OKO's plans and procedures and complettxl as they would he in an actual ernergencp, except as noted above or otherwise indic.ated in the extent-of-play agreement.

A4tirtirr: :Wcirtiri ( b i r r ~ t y CVill siriiriltite the siroi soirridirig crt sire cirril gerieriil eriiergeitq i i i d ur~y otiim tiriie plirrit ecirdiliorr, or P/lDs c/icrr?ges ii'trrrtiill. The EOC' P I 0 udi htr19c till of the riieiliti caiitm-t ii$~rriitition Tile Ops CIiieJ arid or the EM I%.

wili coor. ivith St.

Imci? Co. curd The EOF.

29

Crircrinn S.n.2: Acfivntion oftlie Prompt.4lert atid Nof$cration Sj'sleni

[RESERVED at this time]

C'riterionm 5.21.3: Activities associated with FLMA approved exception areas (n here applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situ a t' ton.

Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes folloning the detection by the O W 0 ofa failure of the primary alert and notification system.

(NUREG-0654, E. 6, Appendix 3.B.2.e)

Extent of Ylav Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) with FEMA-approved exception areas (identified in the approved Alert and Notificatioi? System Design Report) 5-10 miles from the nuclear power plant should denionstrate the capability to accomplish primary alerting and notification ofthe exception areais) within 45 minutes following the initial decision by autlioriz,ed offsite emergency official!: to notify the public of ail emergency situation. The 45-minute clock will begin when the OROs make the decision to activate the alee and notification system for the first time for a specific emergency situation. The initial message should, at a minimum7 include: a statement that an emergency exists at the plant and where to obtain additional information.

For exception area alerting, at least one route needs to he demonstrated and evaluated.

The selected rouk(sj should \\:ary from cxerc.ise to exercise. Iio\\vcwr, the most difficult route should he demonstrated at least once every six years. All alert and notification activities along the route sliould be simulated (that is, the message that would actually he used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as agrccd upon in the extent-of-play Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some agreed-upon location.

Backup alert and notification of the public should he completed within 49 minutes following the detection by the OR0 of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. Backup route alerting only needs to be demonstrated and evaluated, in accordance with the OKO's plan and/or procedures and the extent-of-play agreement, if the exercise scenario calls for failure of any portion of the primary systemis), or if any portion of the primary system(s) actually fails to function. If demonstrated, only one route needs to he selected and demonstrated. All alert and notification activities along the route should be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the 30

5.b - Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the hledia:

Criterion 5.h.I : OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the neats media in a timely mmner. (NhREG-0654. E. 5. 7: G.3.a, G.4.c)

Extent of Play Subsequent emergency inforination and instructions should be provided to the public and the media in a timely manner (will not be subject to s p i f i c time requirements). I;or exercise purposes, timely is defined as the respoirsible O R 0 personnel/representatives denionstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate infonnation!instnletiolls with a sense of urgency and without undue delay. If message dissemination is to be identified as not having been accomplished in a timeiy manner, the evaluator(s) wdl document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

Thc OR0 shauld ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with protective action decisions made by appropriate officials. The emergency information 31

shwld contain all ne.ccssary and applicable instructions ( for example, evacuation instructions, evacuation routes, reception center locations, what to take when evacuating.

information concerning pets, shelter-in-place instructioiis. information concerning protective actions for scliools arid special populations, public inquiry telephone niimber, ctc.) to assist the public in carrying out protective action decisions provided to them. The O K 0 sl?ould also be preparcd to disclose and explain (he Emergency Classification Ixvcl (ECL) of the incident. At a minimunj, this infonnatioii must be included in media briefings andior iiiedia releases. OKOs should demonstrate the capability to use language that i s clear and understaiidable to the public within hoih the plume and ingestion pathway EPZs. This includes detiionstration of the capability io use familiar landinarks and bouridaries to desc,ribe protective action areas.

The emergency infomiation should be all-inclusive by including previously identified protective action areas that are still valid, as well as n e w areas. The OROs should demonstrate the capal,ility to ensure that emergency infomiation that is no longer valid is rescinded and not repeated by broadcast media. In addition, the OROs should dcnionstrate the capability to ensure that current emergency infomiation is repeated at prc-established intervals in accordance with the plan a d o r procedures.

OROs should demonstrate the c.apability to develop emergency infortnation in a non-English language when required by the plan and/or procedures.

If ingestion pathway measures are exercised, OROs should demonstrate that a system exists for rapid dissemination of ingestion pathway infonnation to pre-determined individuals and businesses in accordance with the OROs plan andior procedures.

OROs should drmonstrate the capability to provide timely. accurate, concise. and coordinated infonnation to the news media for subsequent dissemination to the public.

This would include demonstration of the capability to conduct tinicly and pertinent media briefings and distribute media releases as the situation \\vorrants. The OROs should demonstrate the capability to respond appropriately to inquiries from the news media. All inforrrtlttion presented iii n-rcdia briefings and media d e a s e s shwld be consistent with protective action decisions and other emergency information provided to the public.

Copies of pertinent emergency infonnatioii (for example, Emergency Alert System LEAS] messages and media releases) and media infonnation kits should be available for dissemination to the media.

OKOs should demonstrate that an effective system is in place for dealing with calls to the public inquiry hotline. IIotline staff should demonstrate the capability to provide or obtain accurate infonnation for callers or refer them to an appropriate information source.

Infomiation from the hotline staff, including information that correct!: false or inaccurate information when trends are noted. should be included, as appropriate, in emergency information provided to the public, media briefings, andior media releases.

All activities for this criterion must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and conipleted as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise 32

6.a - Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers and Registration of Evacuees:

Criterion 6.a.l: The reception ccnter/ernergancy worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of esacuees andlor emergency workers.

(NUREG-0654, J.1O.h: 5.12; K.5.a)

Extent of Plav Radiologic,al monitoring, decontamination. and registration facilities for evaciieesiemcrgency workers shouid he set up and demonstrated as they would be in an actual emergency or as indicated in the extent-of-play agreement. ?'Iris would include adequate space for evacuees' vehicles. Expected demonstration should include 1/3 of the nroniloring teams!portal monitors required to inonitor 20% of the population allocated to the facility within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Before using monitoring instnunent(s), the monitor(s) should demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation.

Staffresponsjhle for the radiologicai monitoring of evacuees should demonstrate the capability to attain and sustain a monitoring productivity rate per hour needed to monitor the 20?4 emergency planning zone (EPZ) population planning base within about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. This monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that can be 33

monitored per hour by tlie total complement of monitors using an appropriate monitoring procedure. A minitnuin of six individuals per monitoring station shouid he monitored, using equipment and procedures specified in ihe plan and/or procedures, to allow demonstration of monitoring, decoiitamiiiation, and registration capabilities. The monitoring sequences for the first six simulated evacuees per monitoring team will he timed by tlie evaluators in order to detemiine whether the twelve-hour requirement can be met. Monitoring of emergency workers does not have to meet the twelve-hour requircment. I Iowever, appropriate inonitoriug procedures sliould he demonstrated for a niinimuni of two emergency workers.

Dec.ontatninatiou of evacueesemergeney workers may be simulated and conducted by interview. The availability of provisions for separately showering should he demonstrated or explained. The staff should demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of containination.

Provisions could include floor coverings, signs and appropriate iireans (for example, partitions, roped-off areas) to separate clean from potentially c.ontaiiiinatcd areas. ProXJisions should also exist to separate contaminated and uncontminated individuals, provide changes of clothing for individuals whose clothing is contanzinatcd, and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of evacuees or facilities. In addition. for any individual found to be contaminated, procedures should be disc.ussed concerning the liandling of potential contamination of vehicles and personal belongings.

Monitoring personnel should explain tlie use of action levels for detennining the need for decontamination. They should also explain the procedures for referring evacuees who cannot he adequately decoirtamiiiated for assessment and follow ~ t p in accordance with tlie OROs plans and procedures. Contamination or the individual will bc dc:ennined by controller inject and not simulated with any low-level radiation source.

The capability to register individuals upon completion of the inonitoring and decontamination activities should he demonstrated. The registration activities demonstrated should include the estahlisliment of a rcgistration record for each individual, consisting of the individuals traixc, addracss, results of monitoring: and time of decontamination, if any, or as otherwise designated in the plan. Audio recorders, c.anicorders, 01-written records are all acceptable ineans Cor registration.

All ac.tivities associated will1 this criterion must he based on the OKOs plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otltcnvise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

hfurtili: Mirtiii Courity-Will tierriu~i.str.cire G77ergerrcy Worker ~ecurtinririr7c1rio11 out of seipewe ut the iunshiloizw site. See 6.h.

,y!. hcie: 7%is ohjcctiw wi/i he c~err1o11.~6rfr!ec/

drcrirtg the eiircrgc??~]

l~~orkeric.c/tiiprllcrrl wcwh dou.17 drill 0 1 7 Jni7um:v 21. 2004. The St. Lircie Coutify Fire District will tler~zorrsrriite nroriitoriii,q 2 er~tergcircy peisonirel, ful/owirrg Iocril pro mi we.^.

34

L1E.M: iV/'i 6.b - Monitoring and Decontaniination of Kmergency Worker Equipment:

Criterion 6.Q.1: The facilityiORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accornp!ishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment, including \\rehicBes. (XIJMEG-0654, K.5.b)

Extent of Plav The monitoring staff siioiild demonstrate the capability to inonitor cquipnient, including vehicles, for contamination in accordance with the Offsite Response Organization's (OKO's) plans and procedures. Specific attention should be givcii to equipment, including vehicles, that was in c.ontact with iudividuals found to be contaminated. The monitoring staff should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of equipment, including vehicles, based on guidance levels and procedures stated in the plan and/or procedures.

The area to be used for monitoring and decontamination should be set up as it would be in an actual emergency, with all route markings, instrumentation, record keeping and contamination control measures in place. Monitoring procedures should be de.monstrated for a minimum of one vehicle. It is generally not necessary to inonitor the entire surface 35

of vehicles. However, the capability to monitor areas such as radiator grills, bumpers, wheel wells, tires, and door handles slroiild be demonstrated. Interior surfaces of vehiclrs that were in contact with iiidividuals found to be contaminated should also be checked.

Iridiurt River: N!4 6.c - Temporary Care of Evacuees:

Criterion 6.c.l: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accornmodations conhistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines. (Found in hMSS CARE-Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031). Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination ;and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care Facilities. (NURECX654,9.10.h, J.12) 36

Extent of Plav Under this criterion, demonstration of congregate care centers may be conducted out of sequence with the exercise scenario. The evaluator should conduct a walk-through of thc center to deterniine, through observation and inquiries, that the services and accommodations are consistent with ARC' 3031. In this simulation, it is not iiecessary to set up operations as they would be in an actual cmergency. Alternatively, capabilities may be demoiistrated by setting u p stations for various services and providing those services to simulated evacuees. Given tlie substantial differences bet\\veen denionstration and simulation of this objective, exercise denionstratioii expectations should bc clearly specified in extent-of-play agreements.

Congregate care staff should also denionstrate tlie capability to ensure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination, have been decontaminated as appropi-inte, and have been registered before entering tlie facility. This capability may be determined through an interview process.

If operations at the center are demonstrated, material that \\vould he difficult or expensive to transport (e.g., cots, blankets, sundries, and large-scale food supplies) need not he physically available at the facility (facilities). However, availability of such i t e m should be verified by providing the evaluator a list of sources with locations and estimates of quantities.

All activities associated with this criterion must he based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless notcd above or othenvise indicated in the extent-of-play agreemcnL Breviird: To he clfmxrsrrcited oii Junimiy 22, 2003. in the rriorriirg TRD. At thc Rrcwrcl C'oiiiity receptiori ceritcy locured (if the 1-95 R a t Stop Site.

Iiriliciic River: Irrdikir Riwr Cortrq rlemoristratio~i q' Tcriiporur?: (?are ifEv~ii~rvxs will i d i ~ p k i c ~

oi;t ofstyiic'iicc oil J ~ I L K I ~ ~ ~

22, ZOO4 (11 the lrrdinri River (.70ztrity llegioricil Pnsk/Scbnstiuii Hiiw A.liC(ri[c. W ~ o o l 9450 C.R. 512, Sehiisticiri FI.

6.d - Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals:

Criterion 6.d.l: The facilityiOR0 has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated hnjlrred individuals. (KCREG-0654, F.2; K.10; K.5.a, b; L.I9 4)

Extent of Plav Monitoring3 decontamination, and contamination control efforts will not delay urgent niedical care for the victirn.

Offsite Kesponse Organizations (OROs) should demonstrate the capability to transport contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities. An aiiibulance should be used for the response to the victim. However, to avoid taking an ainbulance out of service h r an extended time. any vehicle (e.g., car, truck, or van) may be utilized to transport thc victim to the mzdical facility. Ncrnial coiiiiiiuiiications bctneen the anibulaiiceidispatclier and the receiving medical facility should be demonstrated. Ifa substitute vehicle is used for transport to the niedical fac.ility. this communication intist occur before releasing the ambulance from the drill. This communication would include reporting radiation monitoring results, if available. Additionally, the ambulance crew should demonstrate, by intcrview, Itnowledge of where the ambulance and crew would he monitored and decontaminated, if required, or w3hom to c0ntac.t for such information.

Monitoring of the victim may be performed before transport, done enroute, or deferred to the medical facility. Before using a monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) should demonstrate the process of checking the instrunient(s) for proper operation. All monitoring activities should be completed as they would he in an actual emergency.

Appropriate contamination control measures should he denionstrated before and dur-ing transport and at the receiving medical facility.

38

The medical facility should demnnstrate the capability to activate and sct up a radiological cmergency area for treatment. Equipment and supplies should be available for the treatment of contan-~inated injured individuals.

The medical facility should delimistrate tlie capability to make decisions on the need for dt.contamination of the individual, to follow appropriate deco~ltan~inalion procedures, and io maintain records of all survey iiieasureiiients and samples taken. All procedures for the collection and analysis of samples and the decontamination of tlie iridividual should be deliionstrated or desc.ribed to the evaluator.

All xtivities associated wit11 this criterion must bc based on the OKO's plans and procedures and completed as iliry would be in an actual c~nerger~cy, unless noted above or othenvise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

MNrtill: '%/.,I st. I.ucic: ;VIA RRC: Ni.4 39

APPENDIX 4 EXERCISE SCENARIO This appendix contains a summary of the sitnulated sequcnce of rvrnts. ~ l i i c h was used as the basis for invoking emergency responsc actions by offsite response organizations in the Saint Lucie Nuclear Power Plant exercise on FebrLiary i 8. 2001.

Iliis exercise scenario was submitted by the State of llorida and approved by FEMA IZegion I\\'

(lo Firiui Report Only) 34

COKFIDENTUL (until 2-IS-04)

FLoFuiPA POWER AND L m r r CO~IPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT 2004 EhlERGESCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATED EXERCISE FEBRUARY 18,2004 4.1 NARRATIVE SUMh24RY During the turnover briefing, the Operations crew is informed that (I) the 2.4 Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump is out-of-service (00s) for an oil change and (2) the Operations Supemisor has requested that the monthly surveillance run of the 2B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) begin prior to 0800. The 2B EDG faiIs to start. This condition places the Unit in a Technical Specification Action Statement.

The Unit 2 Turbine Generator Building (TGB) Gantry Crane is undergoing maintenance. As the crane operator attempts to engage the auxiliary hoist crane, the hook free falls and strikes the 3 phase of the 2B Startup Transfomer. The transformer is lost and cornbkied with the earlier loss of the 2B EDG, renders B Train of electric power out-of-service. This condition places the Unit in another Technical §pecification Action Statement.

The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) experiences a small break leak which is d e t k e d to be bn excess of 50 gallons per minute (GPM). The Shift ManagerEmergency Coordinator (EC) declares an ALERT based on the RCS leakage. The Operators initiate a downpower, but experience feedwater control problems and are forced to trip the turbine and reactor. At the ~

p the 2B EDC is unavailable and electrical loads are being maintained by the 2A S-p Transformer.

The break on the 2B Hot Leg increases such that the loss of RCS exceeds makeup capacity and the EC declares a SITE ARE.A EMERGENCY. On the Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SLAS), the 2A Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) Pump shows fluctuating amperagein the Control Room Simulator. The 2A High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) Pump is operating normally and provides safety injection to the c.ore.

A hearins prohiem develops and shuts do\\vn the 2.4 HPSI Pump. Re-entry Teams are requested to investigate the loss of the 2A HPSI and 2A LPSI Pumps. The 2A HPSI Pump is not recoverable. The ?A LPSI Pump is found to be air bound. The Re-entry T e a m Kill eventiially recover both the 2.4 LISI Iunp and the 2B EDC;, but not before the core is he3:c.d to XKFF 3nd p s zap activity is released into the RCS. The potential for release of large 3rn:)unts of radioactive mattrial prompts the EC to declare a CiF.NF.KA1. EMERGENCY and the Recovery Manager (RM) to recommend protective actions for the general public.

Radioactive material escapes the Reactor Containment Building (RCH), but is filtered and monitored by the Plant Vent prior to release to the atmosphere. Field Moni:orin$ Teams (FhITs) will monitor and track the resulting plume.

With the restoration of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and as conditions irnpwve at the plant, the Kbi will initiate discussions of recovcry and re-.entry with the off-site ofticials at the Emergency 0pera:ions Facility (EOF).

F!I PSI.

. ii

..,,: 1t.17

FLORIDA POWER ANI) LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT 2004 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATED EXERCISE FEBRUARY 18,2004 S I M U LATO I<

INSTRUCTION Initid Sefup

- Restore iC Set #i

- Start ?C CCW Pump

- Put 2A CCW Pump ill Pull to Lack position

- Place ECO Tag on i A CCW Pump Switch

- 2A LPSl Iuinp Air Round Stan Kccortler __

2B EDG ANTICIPATED RESIONSE ACTIONS I h e iiiitiai conditions establish tltat Meclmiical Maintenance replacing tllc oil ill llic 2A CCW f 1 W and the Opcratiocis Crew is about to conmence the Inolitlll!.

surveillniice of the ?U Etiicrgcncy Uiescl Gcncrntor.

I

_I---

I itartup Ttansforlticrs.

i

\\]LO checks 20 EDG failure to stall.

VWliMLO report damage to tlic buswnrk ofllic I? sick

---

I,

S-Tinic = Scenario time, which begins at zein Clock = Actual lime, all times approximate.

I

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FLORIDA IOWEII AND LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT 2004 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATED EXERCISE FEBRUARY 18,2004 CLOCK 0815 ALERT Declaration The EC completes tile Alert Declaratiort Cliecklist I:cI TI-The State and Counties are notified per EPII-08.

The NRC is notified per EPIP-08.

1. Unisuluhle RCS leakage as inrlicafed b9 Charging/Lefdown ririsrnatclr greater than 50 gpm but Health Physics (HP) implements the HP-200 Etilergency Plan implemeuting procedures and dispnlchcs llic Ikd Field Monitoring Team.

Field monitoring activities are initiated ill accorda~~ce

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY ST. EUCIE PLANT 2004 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATED EXERCISE FEBRUARY 18,2004 4.2 SCENARIO TIMELINE (continued)

S-TI M E 01/40 02/20 03/00 EVENT (if appropriate)

Flow Coritrol Valve FCV-9021 Creaks feedwater control problem Large Break Loss of Coolairt Accidciit (LOCA)

SITE AHEA EMERGENCY Declaration Due to 1.A: LOCA GREATER THAN caoacitv of eliareim oumos

1. RG5 leakage grater than auailuh[e charging pump capaciv occiarririg with RCSpressure above IIPSI shulofhead.

ANTICIPATED ItESFONSE ACTIONS No Limy.

Operntions pcrso1111cI perform Staiidard Post Trip Actions (SITAs) iii accordaim with 2-EOP-0 I.

The EC caiiiplcres the Site Arcn Elwxgency Clicchiist per EPIP-02.

The State mid Coillilies ale iwtilied per EPIP-08 rllc N<C is iiotificd per LWl-08.

411 itc-entry activitics arc coii~iolled tllrough tllc OSC ill iccordaiice with EPIP-05.

S-Tinle = Scenario time, which begins at zcro.

Chck = Actual time, all times approximate.

I 2

- SR of 107 ~

FLORIDA IOWER AND LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT 2004 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATED EXERCISE FEBRUARY 18,2004

-~

EVENT NO.

5 EVENT DESCR JPTlON i t the Safety Injection Actuation

igcial (SIAS)

2A High Pressure Safety Injection iwnn (WSI) operational i~ LOW iressure sarery mjccuun lump (LPSI) shows fluctuating ntnps.

1 Cori/irrgee,rcy Message for rhe Site 1 AWII f?tttergettcy

] :A I IPS1 Pump fails due to a bearing 6

1 problem.

1 CET tcinoeratures > 700°F. initiate 7

release of gas gap activity.

Monitored low level relea$e begins tlirough Plant Vent.

I I CONFIDENTIAL (until 2-18-04)

ANTICIPATED RESPONSE ACTIONS All non-essential personnel are evacuated.

The Assembly Area Supervisor is dispatched.

NLQs are directed to report to the OSC followit~g completion of immediate operator actioiis.

NRC Site Team is dispatched from Region 1V officc iii Atlanta, GA.

WLO to evaluate fluctuating amperage on ?A LISI

%imp.

ie-entry Team is sent to troubleshoot ?A I~IISI lnntp.

3ff-site assessment is perfonned in accordancc wit11 3PP-09.

ore damage assessment is performed in nccordmcc Kith EPIP-I I.

The Problem Solving Team (PST) begins reviewing tllc Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAb1C;s). -

Wiine = Scenario time, wliicli begins :it zero.

1 Clock = Actirnl time, all times approsimte.

- y Y IyL_

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT 2004 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATED EXEllCISE FEIBRIIAIlY 18,2003 S-TIME 05/30 coiitiiiiie(

CLOCK' 1230 SiMULATOH INSTRUCTKON lrtsert "Sinall Rad" EVENT NO.

7 8

EVENT Declaration Due to 6.A: Liicreased Awareness or mential core mdt.

Emergency Coordirtafor 's judgetnenf that plant conditions exist that make release oflurge antuuttts of radioactivity in Q short period appear possible or likeiy (any core tizell situation).

1. LOCA wifh failure ofECC.S itwditig lo severe core degrcadalion or meif.

' S-'Iiinc Sccilnrio time. which hegins at zero Clock = Actual time, all times approximate.

2

~ 60 of 107-

GONPIDENTIAL (until 2-18-04)

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT 2004 EhlERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATED EXERCISE FEBRUARY 18,2004

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