ML040890633
| ML040890633 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 02/19/2004 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | |
| References | |
| 50-280/04-301, 50-281/04-301 | |
| Download: ML040890633 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000381/2004301
Text
Post-examination Comments
SU RRY EXAM
50-280, 50-28112004-301
FEBRUARY 24 - MARCH 2
& MARCH 4,2004 (WRITTEN)
WRGMA ELECTR~C
AND POWER
COMPANY
&CHMOND:, VIRGINIA 23261
Michael E. Ernstes, Branch Chief
U. S. Nuclear Flegulatoiy Commission
Region il
Atlanta Federal Center
61 Forsyth Street, S. W., Suite 23T8.5
Atlanta, Georgia 30303-893
March 10,2004
Serial No.
04-1 49
$SA
PI0
Docket NOS.
50-280
50-281
License Nos.
Dear Mr. Ernstes:
In accordance with NUREG-4 821, Section E§-402, the following commnts are submitted
concerning the Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor Operator written initial examinations
administered at Surry on March 4,2004.
The following Unit 1 conditions exist:
-
Two Main Feedwater Pumps are operating.
-
Reactor Power = 65%
-
Condensate Pumps 1-CN-P-IA and B are operating.
-
Condensate Pump 1 -CN-P-1 C is Tagged Out of Service.
- Condensate Pump 1 -CN-P-1 A trips and cannot be restarted.
-
Main Feedwater Pump Suction Pressure = 105 psig and slowly lowering.
- Steam Generator Levels are slowly lowering.
-
1 #-F8, fW PP SUCT HDR LO PRESS, is in alarm.
Which one of the following is the correct operator action?
A.
B.
C.
D.
Enter 1 -AP-21 .OO, Loss of Main Feedwater Flow, and reduce turbine load to match
steam flow and feedwater flow.
Manually trip the Reactor and enter E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Secure one of the operating Main Feedwater Pumps and monitor the operating Main
Feedwater Pump Suction Pressure.
Enter 1-AP-21.00, Loss of Main Feedwater Flow, and start a second HP Drain
Pump.
Reference:
ND-89.3-LP-2, Main Condensate System, Rev. 16
NB-89.3-LP-3, Main Feedwater System, Rev. 12
ND-95.1-LP-4, Loss of Feedwater, Rev. 3
1-AP-21 DO, boss of Main Feedwater Flow, Rev. 5
1 H-F8, FW PP SUCT HDR LO PRESS, Rev. 0
1 H-68,
FW PP BlSCH HDR LO PRESS, Rev. 0
1 J-G4, CN PPS DlSCH HDR LO PRESS, Rev. 0
Most trainees applied the Management standard for conservative decision making. If
reactor trip is imminent, then manually trip the reactor and perform the immediate actions of
E-Q. The definition of IMMINENT is within one to two hours and continuing deteriorating
conditions exist.
DNOS-01 01 I Nuclear Safety and Consewative Decision Making, states Operators faced
with unexpected or uncertain conditions will place the plant in a safe condition and will not
hesitate, if necessary, to reduce power or trip the reactor.
The conditions provided in this question, one condensate pump running with feed pump
suction pressure at 105 psig and decreasing, can only result if the only running condensate
pump is also significantly degraded. This places the plant in a condition not considered in
the development of AP-21 .OO, boss of Main Feedwater Flow.
The Supervisor of Shift Operations said that he would not hesitate to trip the reactor given
the conditions provided in the stem of the question.
We ran this scenario on the simulator and were unable to keep the unit online. It resdted
in a reactor trip 100% of the time.
6 of 10 trainees chose answer (13).
Based on the above information, accept (B) as an alternate correct answer.
The following Unit 1 conditions exist:
-
1 K-88, UPS SYSTEM TROUBLE, annunciates.
-
1 K-A7, B A W SYSTEM 1A TROUBLE, annunciates.
-
An operator reports that Battery Charger DC Output for UPS 1A-1 reads 0 amps.
Which one of the following correctly describes the power supply to the associated DC and
Vital A6 buses?
A.
DC Bus 18 will be supplied by only Battery 1A as indicated by DC Bus voltage
slowing trending down over time and Vital AC Buses 1 and I A will be supplied by
Bc Bus 4A will be supplied by only Battery 1A as indicated by DC Bus voltage
slowing trending down over time and Vital AC Buses 1 and 1A will be supplied by
DC Bus 1A will be supplied by UPS 18-2 as indicated by DC Bus Voltage remaining
stable at 125 VBC and Vital AC Buses 1 and 1A will be supplied by h s 1 Hl-1.
DC Bus 1A will be supplied by UPS IA-2 as indicated by DC Bus Voltage remaining
stable at 125 VDC and Vital AC Buses 1 and I A will be supplied by Bus 1 H1-2.
BUS 1H1-1.
B.
BUS 1 H1-2.
6.
D.
ANSWER:
(D)
Reference:
ND-90.3-LP-5, Vital and Semi-vital Bus Distribution, Rev. 1 1
ND-90.3-LP-6, 125 VDC Distribution, Rev. IO
1 K-A& UPS SYSTEM TROUBLE, Rev. 1
1 f448-E-f G,
Sheet 1 of 1, 125V DC One Line Diagram - Surly Power
1 K-A7, BAIT SYSTEM 1A TROUBLE, Rev. 5
Station Unit 1, Rev. 33
COMMENTS:
Question has no correct answer. If the battery charger DC output is lost, 1 HI -1 cannot be
the supply to Vital Bus 1/1 A. When the battery charger is lost, the inverter via the BC Bus,
supplies Vital Bus 1/1A not 1 H1-2 as stated in choice (D).
Based on the above information, rKornmnd dropping this question from the exam.
The following Unit 1 conditions exist:
-
The RCS temperature is 190°F.
-
Operators are performing Section 5.2 of 1-OP-VS-001, Containment Ventilation, to
place the Containment Purge System in setvice using l-VS-F-58A or f-VS-F-58B, Filter
Exhaust Fans.
-
The Containment Purge Form r@quires IO,OOO cfm purge flow.
Which one of the following correctly states selection criteria, in amdance with 1-OP-VS-
Q01,
for choosing which valve to use for obtaining the correct purge flow rate?
A.
B.
l-VS-MOV-lOOD (Ctmt Purge Exh) should be throttled instead of 1-VS-MQV-IO1
(Ctmt Purge B/P) due to the high flow rate required by the Containment Purge Form.
1-VS-MOV-IO1 (Ctmt Purge WP) should be throttled instead of 1-VS-MOV-IOOD
(Ctmt Purge Exh). This is due to the need to open the supply breaker to 1-VS-MOV-
1 OOB in order to throttle it. Opening the breaker will prevent automatic CTMT Purge
isolation.
1-VS-MOU-IO1 (Ctmt Purge WP) should be throttled instead of 1-VS-MOV-1OOD
(Ctmt Purge Exh) due to the low flew rate required by the Containment Purge Form.
1-VS-MOV-1OOD (Ctmt Purge M) should be throttled instead of I-VS-MOV-101
(Ctrnt Purge WP). This is due to the need to open the supply breaker to 1 -VS-MOV-
161 in order to throttle it. Opening the breaker will prevent automatic CTMT Purge
isolation.
6.
D.
ANSWER:
(A)
Reference:
1 -OQ-VS-004, Containment Ventilation, Rev. 20
NOTE in 1-OP-VS-001 Page 17 of 51 states If the Containment Purge Form allows greater
than 3000 CFM but less than 20,000 GFM, 1-US-MOV-1OOD wiil $e used to obtain the
desired flow. Fine tuning of purge flow using 1 -VS-MOV-lOl is allowed.
Step (m) on Page I7 states Adjust 1-VS-MOV-IOOD andor 1-VS-MOV-101 until the
desired purge flow is indicated.
Since the stern of the question asked which valve is used to obtain the correct purge flow
rate, some trainees applied the NOTE above and chose to do the final throttling with 14s-
MOD-1 01 to obtain the final flow rate instead of continuing to throttle 1 -VS-MOV-1 OOD.
4 of 10 trainees chose answer (C).
based on the above information, accept (C)
as an alternate correct answer.
Please find attached copies of reference material associated with the above comments.
If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact us.
Richard%. Blount, Site Vice President
Surry Power Station
Attachments
Commitments contained in this letter: None
copy:
Mr. Edwin Lea
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I I
Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center
61 Forsyth Street, S. W., Suite 23T85
Atlanta, Georgia 30303-8931
Document Control Desk
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
Mr. G. J. McCoy
Senior Resident Inspector
Surry Power Station
ATTACHMENT
VIBRrTTEN LICENSE EXAMINATION COMMENTS
REFERENCE MATERIAL TO SUPPORT COMMENTS
RO QUESTION: #38
Sarrry Bower Station - Units 1 & 2
VIRGINIA LECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
SPS Du. BASE
Rev. 6
I.
Complete Loss:
Loss of a system without the capability to restore it using Abnormal Procedures ( U s ) and
Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), e.g., Auxiliary Feedwater ( M I , AFW-Cross-
connect, Main Feedwater, Main Condensate, Chargingbfety Injection (SI). For example,
loss of all high pressure Reactor Coolant System (RCS) makeup and reactivity control
sources, including the affected units ChargingLEgh Head Safety Injection (PIHSI)
systems, with a loss of Charging Pump cross-connect capability, and/or a loss of all
CharginflHSH flowpaths constitutes a complete loss, but loss of the Refueling Water
Storage Tank (RWST) cross-tie capability, i.e., a loss of one RWST, would not constitute a
complete Boss.
2.
Exdosion:
A rapid, violent, u n c o h e d combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized
equip&&,
that potentially imparts energy to near-by etmct&es and materials. Report of
visible damage should not be interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment prior
to classifkation. The occurrence of tke explosion with reports of evidence of damage (e.g.,
deformation, scorching) is sdcient for declaration.
3.
Fudted Steam Generator:
A steam generator with a secondary bre& or leakage.
4.
Imminent;
Withirj 1 to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, and continuing deteriorating cFn?nditions ex&.
5.
Intrusion:
Visual verification that penetration into the Protected Area has been achieved and that the
threat has not been contained or mitigated. The intrusion may be in the form of a person
or persons, or may be a sabotage device that has not been removed or de-activateci, e.g.,
confimied. un-neutralized intrusion.
6.
Missile hazards include compressed gas cylinders, turbine rotating components, or any
object which can be thrown or projected and impacts at a distance.
7.
Most:
Judgement threshold for determining 5evetity of plant conditions. Application would be
supported by the specific judgement of the ShiR Supervisor. Generally, approximately
75%.
DNOS - Q l Q l
Revision 0
DOMINION NUCLEAR OPERATIONS STANDARD
NUCLEAR SAFETY AND 60PBSERWAlBVE DECISION MAKING
Expectation:
D Nuclear and industrial safety are the overeiding station concerns
D The reactor and its supporting systems are maintained within the bounds of analyzed equipment alignments
and approved procedures.
D Kiks and challenges asscsiated with plant operations are anticipated and a healthy respect is rnaintaiied
for the stored energy within the reactor core.
> Operators faced with unexpected or unwrIaain conditions will place the plant in a safe condition and will not
hesbte, if necessary, to reduce poww or trip the reactor.
Standards:
D Operators shall recognize when degraded conditions exist that could challenge plant safety or raliibilily.
9 Bnfomation shall be gathered and analyred from relevant sources and appmprlate persmnel in order to
clearly dedine and provide options for resolution of operafional c o r n s .
> Short- and long-term risks, consequences, and the aggregate impact associated with decision options shall
be critically and objectiveiy considered.
9 Implementation plans to resolve operational concerns shall be developed that include contingmacies and
compensatory measures to maintain or enhance safety or probabilistic nsk margins.
D Decision-makes and their roles and responsibiliies shall be clearly Identified.
9 Command and control responsibilities shall be carried out in accordance with site-specific procedures.
9 The bases for decisions shall be communicated throughout the organization.
> The effectiveness of decisions shall be perlodicaliy evaluated.
9 Human performance tools and group input shall be utilized to avoid inappropriate actions and unexpected
responses when reaching operating de@sions.
9 When faced with time-critical decisions, operatow:
+
Ba not allow production or cost to override safety.
+
Bo not challenge the safe operatii envelope.
+ Question and validate available information.
+
Utilize available alternate indications to validate information.
+ Assume Me available indications are valid until proven otherwise.
4
Use all available resources, induding people offsite, If necessary.
e
Develop contingency actions, f tlme allows.
+
Do not proceed in the face of uncertainty.
Approved By:
on File
Date: On FBe
Page 1 of 4
ATTACHMENT
WRITTEN LICENSE MAMINATlON COMMENTS
REFERENCE MATERIAL TO SUPPORT COMMENTS
RO QUESTION: #41
Surry Power Station - Units 1 & 2
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
DOMINION
Surry Power Station
(Page 4 of 1)
Attachment 1
UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY 1A-1
i25 VDC
BUS
I
I
) 1HI-2S 1oc2
&
) 1A-20
) lH1-1 4C
b
9
9
t
Source
A
Batte Charger
j Azlnput
t
Alternate Source
AC In ut to
Static gwitch
Normal
Static
Operation
I
Inverter
Alternate
Source to
Load
-I/
Manual
1
Bypass
I
Switch
I
I
Vital Buses
s w a h w s n a m
1 -MOP-EP-001
Revision 8
Page 36 sf 36
UNINTERRUP-PIBLE POWER SUPPLY (UPS)
ATTACHMENT
WRITTEN LICENSE EXAMiNATION COMMENTS
REFERENCE MATERIAL TO SUPPORT COMMENTS
RO QUESTION: #66
Swry Bower Station - Units 1 & 2
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND BOWER COMPANY
VIRGINIA POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
1-OP-VS-00 1
mwsHON 20
PAGE 17 QF 51
CAUTION:
Throttling of 1-VS-MOV-lWD, Ctmt Purge Exh, which is performed by
opening 1-EP-BKW-lB1-2WlB, will prevent automatic CTMT Purge isolation.
NOTE: If the Containment Purge Form allows greater than 3ooO CFM but less
than 20,W CFM, I-VS-MOV-IOOD will be used to obtain the desired flow.
Fine tuning ofpurge flow using I-VS-MOV-I01 is allowed.
NOTE: Throttling of l-VS-MOV-1WD is performed by opening the valve using the
MCR control switch, then having the operator open 1-EP-BKR-lBI-2WIB
to stop tbe valves movement when desired air flow is achieved, and then
reclose 1-EP-BKR-IB 1-2WIB. (Reference 2.4.5)
m. Adjust 1-VS-MOV-1OOD and/or 1-VS-MOV-101 until the desired purge
flow is indicated on F?-VS-118/218, LO RNG ix FK-VS-118-1/218-1, HI
RNG. Enter N/A for any valve
adjusted.
1. I-VS-MOV-lOOD
2. I-VS-MOV-IO1
n. Verify Purge flow rate is Iess than 39,600 cfm gE amount specified on the
Containment Purge Form.