Text

Draft Section C Operating
	ML040790024
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	12/18/2003
From:	Roy D; Florida Power & Light Group
To:	Conte R; NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB
	Conte R
References
	50-443/04-301 50-443/04-301
	Download: ML040790024 (44)
	v • d • e

t Event Type*

I (Both)

R (RO)

Scenario Outline Form ES-D-I Appendix D Event Description Pressurizer (PZR) pressure channel fails. Transient causes failure of one PZR spray valve resulting in abnormal PZR pressure control.

The Load Dispatcher contacts the control room to order a

~

Facility:

Seabrook Scenario No.:

11-2 Op Test No.:

1 Examiners:

Candidates:

Palmieri - US Crosby - PSO 2

Initial Conditions:

Turnover:

NIA Critical Tasks:

C (Both)

I9 RCS Pressure When SI occurs SW-P41A trips and the standby pump fails to automatically start. The crew must manually start the standby pump (CT).

Unit at 100% power.

Maintain 400 MVARs lagging. Load Control needs the higher MVARs for a system test.

Entered TSASs for CS-P-2B being tagged out of service for planned maintenance 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ago. Return to service expected within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

1. MANUALLY trip the reactor from the control room when SSPS fails to automatically trip the reactor. [E-0, A]

2. MANUALLY trip the main turbine before a severe (Orange Path) challenge develops to either the Subcriticality or the Integrity CSF, or before transition to ECA-2.1, whichever happens first. [E Q]

3. MANUALLY start at least one ESW pump (SW pump or CT pump) for an operating safeguards train before transition out of E-0. [E L]

3 bkED1 UAT

___cI -

Y L

(N)ormal, (R)eac power reduction to 5 90% power due to pending grid limitations.

are required to manually trip the reactor (CT) and turbine

- I (CT).

~~

Combination of abnormal PZR pressure control and failure of the main turbine to automatically trip will cause a Safety lniection to occur.

vi6, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Page 1 of 15

Scenario Event Description Seabrook Simulator Scenario I The simulator is initialized at 100% power. The crew is instructed to maintain power. Load Control is conducting a system wide test, and needs the MVAR loading to be maintained at 400 lagging.

CS-P-2B is out of service for an oil change. T.S. 3.1.2.2, 3.1.2.4 and 3.5.2 were entered 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ago. The pump is expected back in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

RC-P-455 fails high causing PZR spray valves to open and requiring operators to take action to restore RCS pressure control. Pressurizer spray valve PCV-455B fails partially open at the same time due to a valve positioner problem. This results in abnormal PZR pressure control when PZR pressure control is restored to automatic.

The Load Dispatcher contacts the control room to order a power reduction to 5 90% power due to pending grid limitations. The crew will utilize major plant evolution procedure OS1 000.06, POWER DECREASE and OD1 56 to perform the power reduction.

The 13.8 kV Bus 1 UAT breaker trips and the associated RAT breaker fails to fast transfer.

Loss of power to Bus 1 results in reactor trip demand due to loss off A & B RCPs and A & C Circulating Water pumps. The crew enters E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

The reactor fails to trip automatically and the operator is required to manually trip the reactor.

On the reactor trip, the automatic Turbine Trip fails and all turbine stop and control valves will remain open. MSlVs will not automatically close and cannot be closed from the control room.

The operator is required to manually trip the main turbine.

The combination of abnormal PZR pressure control and the failure of the main turbine to trip causes Safety Injection to actuate.

In addition, SW-P41A will trip and the remaining TRAIN A SW pump will fail to auto start causing the crew to perform the RNO for E-0, Attachment A step 7.

Expected procedure transition is E-0 s ES-1.I s OS1 000.1 1.

Page 2 of 15

Seabrook Simulator Scenario Setup Scenario 1 0

2.

0 SELECT: Scenario SELECT: Demo exams SELECT: Exam #I9 setup SELECT:RUN

3.

0 0

Initialize the simulator at 100% IC 300. Raise VAR loading on the Main Generator to 400MVARs LAGGING.

I Protected train is 'A'.

Place the control switch for CS-P-2B in PTL Close CS-V-197 Danger tag CS-P-2B and CS-VI 97 Press the pushbutton control switch for CVCS TRAIN B BYP/INOP light

4.

Run the following SCENARIO to rack-out the breaker for CS-P-2B, de-energize CS-VI 97, fail automatic trip of the turbine, fail closure of the MSIVs, failure of the Bus 1 RAT breaker to close and failure of SW-P-41 C to AUTO start and activate Event Trigger Demo Exams/Exam 19 power loss:

mfRPS003, AUTOMATIC TURBINE TRIP FAILURE mfSWO14, SW PUMP 41C FAILS TO AUTO START svMSV86 IS0 VALVE FAILS OPEN svMSV88 IS0 VALVE FAILS OPEN svMSV9O IS0 VALVE FAILS OPEN svMSV92 IS0 VALVE FAILS OPEN bkEDlRAT BREAKER FAILS OPEN mvCSV197, MOV BREAKER STATUS OPEN bkCSl P2B 52, BREAKER RACKED-OUT SELECT: Event Triggers (Top Bar)

SELECT: Demo Exams/Exam I 9 power loss VERIFY: ACTIVATED (Only options are to OPEN /ABORT / CLOSE)

Page 3 of 15

Seabrook Simulator Scenario Setup Scenario 1

5.

Perform the following to cause failure of the reactor to trip automatically on loss of 13.8kV Bus1 :

0 0

0 mfRPSOOl AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP FAILURE (TRAIN A) mfRPS002 AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP FAILURE (TRAIN B)

SELECT: MF List SELECT: REACTOR PROTECTION SELECT: mfRPSOOl AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP FAILURE (TRAIN A)

SELECT: INSERT SELECT: MF List SELECT: REACTOR PROTECTION SELECT: mfRPSOO2 AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP FAILURE (TRAIN B)

SELECT: INSERT 0

Verify the following malfunctions inserted:

SELECT: Event Triggers (Top Bar)

Demo Exams/Exam 19M Delete MSlV failure ACTIVATED (Only options are to OPEN / ABORT / CLOSE)

6.

Activate Event Trigger Demo exams\\Exam 19M Delete MSlV failure:

0 0

SELECT: Event Triggers SELECT: Demo exams SELECT: Exam 19M Delete MSlV failure ACTIVATE Verify the following activated:

Page 4 of 15

Seabrook.

Simulator Scenario Turnover Information Scenario 1 Protected Train is A Mode 1 : 100% RTP, ARO = 228 steps CBD, Boron Concentration = 1293 ppm. ODI-56 rev 7 on US desk, +I degrees = 88 gal RMW, -1 degree change = 19 gal BA; AFD target 0.60%,

Current AFD 0.35%

Grid system test in progress. Reactive load on the main generator is 400MVARs lagging.

Dispatch will notify us when the test is completed.

Centrifugal Charging Pump CS-P-2B is danger tagged out for oil change. Entered TSASs 3.1.2.2a, 3.1.2.4 and 3.5.2.a two hours prior to turnover. Expected return to service is 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months after turnover.

Page 5 of 15

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 1 Paqe 6 of 15 SCENARIO OUTLINE EVENT INSTRUCTION Shift Turnover Provide Turnover Sheet Shift turnover information as stated.

When directed by the Lead Examiner, initiate the following event:

EVENT I PT-455 fails Perform the following to initiate RC-PT-455 fails high high and PZR and PZR Spray Valve RC-PCV-455B Fails Open:

Spray Valve Fails Open.

NOTE: IF the crew does nothing, the plant will trip on OTAT. At scripted severity (0.25), the spray valve will require 3 banks of B/U heaters to return PZR pressure to program. With 3 banks of heaters ON, PZR spray will eventually be required to limit PZR pressure increase. IF the PZR Pressure control is returned to fully auto control, PZR pressure will cycle as the backup heaters are turned on and off.

Actions or Behaviors None PSO us us RO RO RO Acknowledges alarm, notes failed PZR pressure channel, recommends manual control of PZR pressure control to return PZR pressure to normal.

Acknowledges report, directs PSO to use manual control of PZR controller to return PZR to program.

Refers to OS1201.06, PT 455 - 458 PZR PRESSURE INSTRUMENT FAILURE and directs operator actions.

Reports CONTROLLING channel (RC-P-455) failed Manually controls pressure at program Selects alternate channel for control and backup (457/456) selects Alt. channel for recording and Alt channel for AT, OPAT and OTAT recording.

Page 7 of 15 Seabrook Simulator Scenario 1 0

0 0

0 EVENT SELECT: Panel Overview SELECT: CP-I Door to OPEN SELECT: ENABLE SELECT: PB-455A to the UP position SELECT: PB-45% to the UP position SELECT: PB-455D to the UP position SELECT: PB-455B to the UP position SELECT: TB-411 C to the UP position SELECT: CP-1 Door to CLOSED SELECT: BTI CP-1 INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors CUE:

IF solicited by the crew, I&C suggests that the failure of RC-PT-455 could have initiated the problem with RC-PCV-455B. Further investigation will be required to confirm.

RO US RO RO RO US Notes status of RC-PCV-4556 when directed to check Spray Valves - CLOSED and reports to US.

Directs RO to manually close affected spray valve per RNO.

Reports the spray valve does not respond to controller demand.

As directed, controls PZR pressure using automatic or manual control.

Verifies no redundant channel bistables tripped.

Refers to TS 3.3.1, table 3.3-1 item 7, 9 & I O. TS 3.3.2 Table 3.3-3 items I d & loa. TS 3.2.5. Notifies 1&C to initiate troubleshooting of failed channel, failed spray valve Coordinates using BTI to bypass the failed channel for troubleshooting or testing. Notifies Work Week Manager and plant management regarding failure.

US NOTE: At the discretion of the lead Examiner, bypass the failed channel or trip the failed channel as directed by the US. IF the Lead Examiner chooses, the next event can be initiated without bypassing or placing the channel in trip condition. The scenario will not be affected either way.

D5628 7300 CABINET CAB CP-1 DOOR OPEN D4562 7300 CABINET CP-1 BYPASSED / INOP High Pressure Reactor trip Low Pressure Reactor trip (P-7 interlocked)

Pressurizer Low Pressure SI (P-I 1 interlocked)

P-I I permissive OTAT Trip D5628 7300 CABINET CAB CP-1 DOOR OPEN - return

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 1 Page 8 of 15 0

[7

[7 17 0

EVENT INSTRUCTION SELECT: Panel Overview SELECT: TripCP-I SELECT: CP-1 Door to OPEN SELECT: PB-455A to the UP position SELECT: PB-455C to the UP position SELECT: PB-455D to the UP position SELECT: PB-4558 to the UP position SELECT: TB-41IC to the UP position SELECT: CP-1 Door to CLOSED NOTE: If the crew chooses NOT to use BTI, perform the following to trip the bistables:

Actions or Behaviors D5628 7300 C,.BI I

IET CAB CP-1 DOOR OPEN High Pressure Reactor trip Low Pressure Reactor trip (P-7 interlocked)

Pressurizer Low Pressure SI (P-I 1 interlocked)

P-I 1 permissive OTAT Trip D5628 7300 CABINET CAB CP-1 DOOR OPEN - return After allowing the crew to complete OS1201.06, or at the Lead Examiners discretion, continue to the next event.

NOTE: H2 pressure control will not be restored. The bearing oil will maintain 25 psig H2 pressure on loss of MSOPIESOP.

EVENT 2 Power decrease Contact the control room as Load Dispatch. Direct a power decrease to 5 90% power within the next 15 minutes due to pending grid limitations. Maintain

< 90% until cleared by Load Dispatch.

us Refers to OS1 000.06, POWER DECREASE and OD1 56 for power reduction. Provides direction on rate and control bands for operators. Conducts brief for power decrease.

Uses the LOAD SELECTOR load decrease push-button or LOAD LIMIT SET potentiometer to reduce load to maintain power and VAR loading.

SUR NOTE: The power reduction allows the RO to satisfy the (R)eactivity control or (N)ormal control requirement and the US to satisfy the (N)ormal control requirement. Once met, the next event may be started.

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 1 Page 9 of 15 EVENT INSTRUCTION NOTE: Operators are required to remain at the makeup controls during the boration I dilution and makeup evolution.

This will ensure proper system response is verified as well as the desired amount.

Actions or Behaviors SUR If reducing load with the load selector, FOLLOW the load set with the load limit set potentiometer and the standby load set.

Initiates boration / inserts control rods to control RCS temperature and AFD.

Uses OD1 56 values or DETERMINES the quantity of boric acid required to make the desired reactivity change from RSI 735,Reactivity Calculations TURNS the BLENDER MODE START SWITCH to STOP PLACES the BORIC ACID BLENDER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH to BORATE.

CHECKYPLACES CS-FIC-111 in auto remote (AIR).

CHECKS/PLACES CS-FIC-110 in auto remote (AIR).

SETS CS-FIQ-111 controller to the desired flow rate.

SETS CS-FIQ-111 controller to the desired quantity.

TURNS the BLENDER MODE START SWITCH to START. When the boric acid supply counter has added its preset quantity, VERIFIES the boration stopped.

RO RO As directed by US, RETURN the makeup controls to automatic blended makeup.

As directed by US, OPERATE pressurizer heaters to force spray to equalize boron concentration between the RCS and pressurizer.

Provide oversight of power reduction. Notify plant management of plant status.

us After the crew has dispatched NSO(s) to respond and initiated a power decrease, or at the lead examiners discretion, continue with the next event.

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 1 Paae 10 of 15 SELECT: MF List SELECT: Electrical Distribution EVENT INSTRUCTION Crew must recognize demand for reactor trip and trip the reactor manually. Crew performs Immediate Actions (VAS).

EVENT 3 Loss of 13.8 Initiate a loss of bus 1 as follows :

(component)

SELECT: bkEDl UAT SELECT: Fail Open (UAT BREAKER FAILS OPEN)

SELECT: INSERT kV Bus 1 &

Rx Trip Demand 0

0 RO 0

0 0

Actions or Behaviors A trip demand will occur when Bus 1 loses power due to loss of A & B RCPs and A & C CW pumps.

On the plant trip, the pressure transient will cause the spray valve to drift open to 30%.

SUR NOTE: Combination of increased spray flow, abnormal PZR RO pressure control and requirement to MANUALLY trip the main turbine, automatic SI is expected.

IF the crew established tripping the RCPs associated with PZR spray as contingency actions after VAS to avoid depressurization to SI after a reactor trip, THEN an us automatic SI may not occur. In that case the crew will exit E-0 at step 4 to ES-0.1 Step I.

Go to page 14.

EVENT 4 SW-P-41A will trip and SW-P-41 C will not automatically start. The crew will be required to manually start SW-P-41 C (CT) to provide cooling to the only available high head injection pump.

RO Trips the reactor MANUALLY (CT). Verifies reactor trip and bypass breakers open, neutron flux decreasing, and rod bottom lights lit.

Trips the main turbine MANUALLY (CT). Verifies all turbine stop valves closed and generator breaker open.

Verifies power to AC Emergency busses, verifies all emergency busses energized.

Checks if SI is actuated - IF YES, crew continues in E-0 after the US reads the //As. IF NO, crew will go to ES-0. I, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE after the US reads the //As.

Enters E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, Step 1 and directs operator actions to verify VAS completed.

Performs ATTACHMENT A. Notes the status of TRN A SW and starts SW-P-41 C per ATTACHMENT A RNO (CT).

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 1 Page 11 of 15 EVENT NOTE NOTE:

INSTRUCTION It is expected, but not required that the RO will have completed ATTACHMENT A, briefed the US and returned to performing MCB manipulations by Step 10 of E-0.

It is expected that if RCS pressure has not stabilized or begun increasing, the crew will evaluate shutting down RC-P-I C to minimize spray flow through the failed open spray valve.

Actions or Behaviors SUR Performs operator actions on both sides of the MCB until RO has completed ATTACHMENT A.

US/SUR Checks if MSlVs should be closed - NO USlSUR Check CNTMT pressure has remained 18 psig - YES US/SUR Verifies total EFW > 500 gpm - YES USlSUR Monitors RCS temp stable at or trending to 557°F -

NO SUR As directed, opens EFW mini-flow and throttles EFW to reduce cooldown.

USlRO Checks RCS Isolated - NO RO As directed, closes CS-VI45 to isolate the RCS USlRO USlRO RO RO U S/RO US/SUR USlSUR U SlRO CREW U SlRO US/SUR Checks PORVs closed - YES Checks PZR spray valves closed - NO AS directed, checks closed I closes spray valve and shuts down RC-P-1 C.

As directed (NOTE) maintains seal injection flow to all RCPs.

Checks whether ALL RCPs should be stopped - NO, subcooling SAT Checks for faulted SG - NO Checks for ruptured SG - NO Checks whether RCS is intact - YES Checks if ECCS flow should be reduced:

Checks RCS subcooling > 40°F - YES Checks secondary heat sink - YES

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 1 Paae 12 of 15 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors NOTE: IF the crew did not stop RC-P-IC at RNO step 1Oc 2), then RCS pressure may not be stable or increasing. IF this occurs the crew will be forced to implement E-0 steps 16 -

26, returning to step 9 and then step 10 where they will have another opportunity to stop RC-P-1 C to minimize spray flow.

USlRO USlRO RO RO RO us CREW Checks RCS pressure stable or increasing - YES Check PZR level > 5% - YES As directed, resets SI Verifies only CS-P-2A running and DOES NOT shut down CS-P-2A.

Checks RCS pressure stable or increasing - YES AS directed, opens CS-VI42 and 143, closes SI-VI38 and 139, establishes 60 gpm charging flow while maintaining 6 - 10 gpm seal injection flow.

Exits E-0 to Step 7 of ES-1.I, SI TERMINATION.

Begins monitoring CSFs for implementation.

NOTE: The scenario may be terminated at the Lead Examiners discretion or when the crew has established inventory control in ES-I.I, SI TERMINATION (step 15).

USlRO RO USlRO RO CREW USlSUR US/RO USlSUR U SlRO USlRO Check if SI pumps should be stopped - YES As directed, places SI pumps in STBY.

As directed, places RH pumps in STBY Verifies ECCS not required - YES (not required)

As directed, resets T signal (P signal NA)

Checks Instrument Air:

Verifies instrument air pressure normal - YES Verifies PCCW CNTMT isolations open - YES Verifies CNTMT instrument air pressure normal - YES Checks if CBS pumps running - NO Check if Letdown can be established - YES

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 1 Pase 13 of 15 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors RO As directed, opens CC-V341, closes / checks closed letdown drag valves, opens CNTMT isolation valves, opens letdown valves, throttles a drag valve to establish letdown flow.

As directed, sets VCT makeup controls As directed, aligns CCP suction to VCT.

RO RO Expected E-Plan classification for this event: NO CLASSIFICATION

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 1 Page 14 of 15 EVENT INSTRUCTION NOTE: This portion of the scenario is only applicable if the crew successfully took actions to prevent a Safety Injection actuation.

Transition to ES-0.1 NOTE: It is expected that upon exiting E-0, the crew will discover that SW-P41A has tripped and TRN A components have lost service water cooling. While SI has not actuated, restoration of TRN A SW remains a critical task as CS-P-2A is the only pump available for RCS inventory control and RCP seal injection.

Actions or Behaviors us us CREW US/RO US/SUR SUR SUR U S/RO U S/RO US/RO US/RO U S/RO US/RO US/RO UWRO Enters ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE and directs operator actions.

Reads applicable CAUTIONS and NOTES of ES-0.1, reviews ES-0.1 OAS items with crew.

Takes action to restore TRN SW cooling by MANUALLY starting SW-P-41 C (CT).

Checks RCS temperature stable or trending to 557°F -

YES (trending to 557F)

Checks RCS temperature c 557°F OR FWI actuated -

YES (FWI)

Verifies FWI by status panel.

Verifies total EFW > 500 gpm, verifies, main FW pumps tripped and closes FW pump discharge valves.

Verifies all control rods fully inserted - YES Check PZR level > 17% - YES Check charging in service - YES Check letdown in service - YES Check PZR level trending to 25% - YES Check VCT makeup controls set for required boron concentration and automatic - YES Checks PZR pressure > 1800 PSlG - YES Checks PZR pressure stable at or trending to 2235 PSIG - YES

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 1 Paae 15 of 15 us Reads CAUTIONS regarding overcooling of the plant and CST makeup.

US/SUR Verifies 5% NR level in at least one SG or 65% WR level in at least two SGs - YES US/SUR Verifies SUFP or MDEFW available - YES (both)

US/SUR Checks RCS temperature stable or increasing - YES SUR If not already performed per OAS, opens EFW mini-flow valves and controls SG levels 25% to 50%.

I As directed by the Lead Examiner, terminate the scenario.

E-Plan classification for this scenario - NO CLASSIFICATION

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-I Event I Malf. No.

Facility:

Seabrook Scenario No.:

2rl Op Test No.:

1 Examiners:

Candidates:

Palmieri - US Crosby - BOP Event Initial Conditions:

Tu mover:

Unit at 75% power.

Maintain current power level until cleared for pawer increase by system load control.

Entered TSASs for CS-P-2B being tagged out of service for planned maintenance 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ago. Return to service expected within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

1. Control the EFW flow rate to not less than 25 GPM per SG in order to minimize the RCS cooldown rate before a severe (orange path) challenge develops to the integrity CSF. [ECA-2.1 A]

Critical Tasks:

No.

1 NA 2

LtFWLT529 I (Both) y

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)n:

~~

Event Description Power increase.

Steam Generator narrow range level channel L529 will fail low. As it is the controlling channel, the feedwater control system will respond to increase feed flow to the B SG.

Operator action will be required to restore feed flow to normal and return B SG narrow range level to within Droqrammed band.

Manual actuation of MSI in the control room will not cause the MSlVs to close. Procedure progression will be E-0 j E-2 3 ECA-2.1 where the crew will be directed to reduce feed flow to all SGs to 25 gpm (CT) to avoid severe challenge to the Integrity CSF.

The motor operator overloads for EFW flow control valve FW-FV-4214A will trip as soon as the valve motion is demanded. The operator will be required to utilize FW-FV-4214B to control EFW flow to A SG.

rument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Page 1 of 12

Scenario Event Description Seabrook Simulator Scenario 2 The simulator is initialized at approximately 75% power at EOL. The plant was ordered to reduce power from 100% to current power level due to potential for grid loading limitations /

instability. After turnover the crew is cleared for power increase by system load control and expected to return to 100% at 5% / hr.

CS-P-2B is out of service for an oil change. T.S. 3.1.2.2, 3.1.2.4 and 3.5.2 were entered 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ago. The pump is expected back in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

The controlling channel for SG B level control will fail low. The feedwater control system will respond to increase feed flow to SG B. Operator action will be required to restore feed flow to normal and return B SG narrow range level to within programmed band.

An inadvertent turbine trip causes a catastrophic rupture of the main steam bottle (down stream of MSIVs). The reactor fails to trip automatically. The crew will have to trip the reactor manually (CT). All four MSlVs will fail to close when the MSI signal is actuated. Manual actuation of MSI in the control room will not cause the MSIVs to close. Procedure progression will be E-0 to E-2 to ECA-2.1 where the crew will be directed to reduce feed flow to all SGs to 25 gpm (CT) to avoid severe challenge to the Integrity CSF. A component failure will occur as the operator attempts to limit EFW flow to SG A. The motor overloads for FW-FV-4214A will actuate and require the operator to utilize FW-FV-42148 to limit EFW to SG A to 25 gpm. When feed flow has been reduced, NSO(s) dispatched to the MSlVs will successfully close MSlVs in the west pipe chase (SG A and D). The crew will exit ECA-2.1 returning to E-2. With EFW limited to 25 gpm a RED condition will exist for the HEAT SINK CSF. A note at the beginning of FR-H.l states that the procedure should NOT be implemented if feed flow was reduced by operator action. The crew will continue to implement E-2 and transition to ES-1.I, SI TERMINATION.

Page 2 of 12

Seabrook Simulator Scenario Setup Scenario 2 0

0 0

0

~~

1.

0 I Initialize the simulator at 75%, IC98 SELECT: Scenario SELECT: Demo exams SELECT: Exam #52M setup SELECT:RUN

2.

0 I Protected train is A.

0

[7 0 0

3. 0 0

svMSV86 IS0 VALVE FAILS OPEN svMSV88 IS0 VALVE FAILS OPEN svMSV9O IS0 VALVE FAILS OPEN svMSV92 IS0 VALVE FAILS OPEN

4. 0 0

0 0

0 Verify AFD is within 2 1 % of target / adjust CBD as necessary Place rod control in AUTOMATIC mvCSV197, MOV BREAKER STATUS OPEN bkCSl P2B 52, BREAKER RACKED-OUT Place the control switch for CS-P-2B in PTL Close CS-V-I 97 Danger tag CS-P-2B and CS-VI 97 Press the pushbutton control switch for CVCS TRAIN B BYP/INOP light

5.

Run the following SCENARIO to fail AUTOMATIC reactor trip, fail closure of the MSIVs, and activate Event Triggers Demo ExamdExam 52M FWFV4214A Fails and Demo Exams/Exam 52M Steam Break:

0 mfRPSOOl, AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP FAILURE (TRAIN A)

MfRPS002, AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP FAILURE (TRAIN B) 0 0

0 0

SELECT: Event Triggers (Top Bar)

SELECT: Demo Exams/Exam 52M FWFV4214A Fails VERIFY: ACTIVATED (Only options are to OPEN /ABORT / CLOSE)

SELECT: Demo ExamslExam 52M Steam Break VERIFY: ACTIVATED (Only options are to OPEN /ABORT / CLOSE)

Page 3 of 12

Seabrook Simulator Scenario Turnover Information Scenario 2 Protected Train is A MODE 1: 75% RTP, CBD @ 165 steps (ARO = 228 steps), Boron Concentration = 149 ppm.

ODI-56 rev 7 on US desk, + I degrees = 4540 gal RMW, -1 degree change = 40 gal BA; AFD target - 0.65%, Current AFD - 0.69%

The plant was ordered to reduce power from 100% to current power level due to potential for grid loading limitations. When cleared by PSNH Load Dispatch, return to 100% power at 5%/hour. Power Aid for power increase is on US desk.

Centrifugal Charging Pump CS-P-2B is danger tagged out for oil change. Entered TSASs 3.1.2.2a, 3.1.2.4 and 3.5.2.a two hours prior to turnover. Expected return to service is 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months after turnover.

Page 4 of 12

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 2 Page 5 of 12 SCENARIO OUTLINE EVENT INSTRUCTION Shift Turnover Provide Turnover Sheet Shift turnover information as stated.

Actions or Behaviors us Provides operators with turnover.

When directed by the Lead Examiner, call the crew as PSNH Load Dispatch. Clear the plant for load increase to 100%:

EVENT 1 Load Increase us Briefs crew on power increase. Provides guidelines for operator responsibilities and control bands. Provides Power Aid to BOP. Provides oversight on control manipulations Uses RE provided estimates on RMW required for power increase or DETERMINES the quantity of RMW required to make the desired reactivity change from RS 1735,Reactivity Calculations As directed, aligns the controls and initiates dilution.

Uses control rods for power increase and AFD control.

Selects loading rate as directed. Adjusts the LOAD LIMIT SET potentiometer 1% to 2% above current load. Uses the load selector LOAD INCREASE push-button and verifies LOAD INCREASING lamp illuminates. Verifies expected response on turbine 1 st stage pressure and control valve response.

Follows the load set with the standby load set.

SUR SUR BOP At Lead Examiners discretion, initiate the next event.

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 2 Page 6 of 12 INSTRUCTION EVENT 2 FW-L529 Fails Low Perform the following to initiate failure of the controlling NR level channel for SG B:

0 0

SELECT MF List SELECT Feedwater (Component)

SELECT ltFWLT529 Double Click SELECT FAIL LOW INSERT Actions or Behaviors BOP us us BOP SUR CREW us us Acknowledges alarms, notes failed SG B level channel, recommends manual control of SG B level control to return SG B level to program.

Acknowledges report, directs BOP to use manual control of SG B feed regulating valve to return SG B NR level to program. May direct halt of power increase.

Refers to OS1235.03, SG LEVEL INSTRUMENT FAILURE.

Directs operator actions and provides oversight of control manipulations.

Identifies failed channel as controlling channel, establishes MANUAL control of SG B feed regulating valve and restores SG B NR level 50% to 70%.

Selects an alternate SG level channel for control.

Restores SG B FF/SF matched and level at program, then returns SG B level control to AUTO.

Verifies no redundant SG B NR level channels tripped on UL-1 and UL-6.

Verifies no redundant SG B NR level channels tripped on UL-12 Refers to TSs. TS 3.3.1 Table 3.3-1 Item 13 and TS 3.3.2 Table 3.3-3 Items 5.b, 6.a, 7.c, 1O.c and 3.3.3.6 Table 3.3-1 0, Item 7 are applicable.

Contacts Work Week Manager for support on troubleshooting and repair. Informs plant management of failure. Coordinates with I&C

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 2 Paae 7 of 12 EVENT NOTE:

NOTE:

INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors USlBOP Check for ATWS mitigation channel failed - NO At the discretion of the lead Examiner, bypass the failed channel or trip the failed channel as directed by the US. IF the Lead Examiner chooses, the next event can be initiated without bypassing or placing the channel in trip condition.

The scenario will not be affected either way.

f the crew chooses to use BTI. Derform the followina:

SELECT: Panel Overview SELECT: CP-I Door to OPEN SELECT: ENABLE SELECT: BTI CP-1 SELECT: LB-529A to BYPASS SELECT: LB-5298 to BYPASS SELECT: CP-1 Door to CLOSED NOTE: If the crew chooses NOT to use BTI, perform the following to trip the bistables:

0 0

0 SELECT: Panel Overview SELECT: Trip CP-1 SELECT: CP-1 Door to OPEN SELECT: LB 529A to the UP position SELECT: LB 5298 to the UP position SELECT: CP-1 Door to CLOSED D5628 7300 CABINET CAB CP-1 DOOR OPEN D4562 7300 CABINET CP-1 BYPASSED / INOP F4840 SG B LEVEL LO-LO - return D5628 7300 CABINET CAB CP-1 DOOR OPEN - return D5628 7300 CABINET CAB CP-1 DOOR OPEN D4777 SG B LEVEL HI-HI CHANNEL TRIP F4840 SG B LEVEL LO-LO - already in alarm 05628 7300 CABINET CAB CP-1 DOOR OPEN - return After allowing the crew to complete OS1 235.03, or at the Lead Examiners discretion, continue to the next event.

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 2 Pane 8 of 12 SELECT: Insert OR SELECT: Main Turbine TRIP pushbutton SET Final Value: TRIP INSERT EVENT manually.

SUR INSTRUCTION SELECT: Malfunctions (Top Bar)

VERIFY: mfMSO5l MAIN STEAM BOTTLE BREAK - INSERTED at 1.0 EVENT 3 Turbine Trip Initiate an inadvertent turbine trip as follows:

us Steam Break ECA-2.1 0

0 0

Act ions or Behaviors SELECT: Panel PFF14 I Crew must recognize demand for reactor trip and trip the reactor A trip demand will occur when the main turbine trips.

The catastrophic steam break will be initiated when the turbine trips. Verify that Event Trigger Demo exams\\Exam 25M Steam Break has actuated:

SUR SUR BOP US/BOP BOP USlBOP An automatic SVMSI is actuated but the MSlVs do not close.

Crew performs Immediate Actions (VAS).

Trips the reactor MANUALLY (CT). Verifies reactor trip and bypass breakers open, neutron flux decreasing, and rod bottom lights lit.

Verifies all turbine stop valves closed and generator breaker open.

Verifies power to AC Emergency busses, verifies all emergency busses energized.

Checks if SI is actuated, Verifies both trains of SI actuated.

Enters E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, Step 1 and directs operator actions to verify VAS completed.

Performs ATTACHMENT A.

Performs operator actions on both sides of the MCB until SUR has completed ATTACHMENT A.

Checks if MSlVs should be closed - YES As directed, attempts to close the MSlVs from the MCB Check CNTMT pressure has remained < 18 psig - YES

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 2 Paae 9 of 12 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors NOTE: It is likely that EFW flow to one SG will be automatically isolated by the HIGH FLOW isolation. IF FW-FV-4214A received an isolation signal the valve will fail nearly full open due to the component failure scripted into the scenario.

US/BOP Verifies total EFW > 500 gpm - YES US/BOP Monitors RCS temp stable at or trending to 557°F -

NO BOP As directed, opens EFW mini-flow and throttles EFW to reduce cooldown. Notes loss of FW-FV-4214A control and uses FW-FV-42148 to throttle EFW flow.

Maintains total > 500 gpm.

EVENT 4 When the BOP begins to throttle EFW to SG A using FW-FV-4214A, Event Trigger Demo ExamdExam 52M FW4214A Fails will de-energized the MOV.

NOTE It is expected, but not required that the SUR will have completed ATTNJ-WENT A, briefed the us and returned to performing MCB manipulations by Step 10 of E-0.

US/SUR Checks RCS Isolated - YES SUR As directed (NOTE) maintains seal injection flow to all RCPs.

US/SUR U S/BO P us Crew us US/BOP US/BOP US/BOP us us US/BOP US/BOP Checks whether ALL RCPs should be stopped - NO, subcooling SAT Checks for Faulted SG - YES Exits E-0 to E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step 1 Begins monitoring CSFs for implementation.

Reads applicable CAUTIONS and NOTES from E-2 Check if MSlVs and Bypasses are closed - NO If not already dispatched, directs NSO(s) to locally close MSIVs.

Checks if ANY SG pressure boundaries are intact - NO Exits E-2 to ECA-2.1, UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS, Step 1.

Reads applicable CAUTIONS and NOTE@) of ECA-2.1 Checks if MSlVs and Bypasses are closed - NO Checks SG ASDVs closed - YES

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 2 Paqe 10 of 12 0

0 c]

0 EVENT INSTRUCTION SELECT: Component Malfs (Top Bar)

US/SUR SELECT: mfMSV86 SELECT: Delete MF US/BOP SELECT: mfMSV92 US/BOP SELECT: Delete MF Actions or Behaviors US/BOP US/BOP USlBOP US/BOP SUR US/BOP us US/BOP NOTE: Control limitations associated with EFW throttle valves may BOP challenge the operator when minimizing flow and maintaining a minimum of 25 gpm.

NOTE: It is expected that the crew will pursue restoring 25 gpm to any SG isolated automatically on high flow AFTER the EFW lines are walked down.

Isolation of SG A and D As soon as feed flow has been minimized to all SGs, DELETE the malfunctions blocking closure of SG A and D MSIVs:

USBUR Checks FWRV and FWRV Bypasses closed - YES.

Checks FWlVs closed - YES Checks MDEFW or SUFP supplying SG(s) - YES Checks MS-V393 and MS-V394 closed - NO As directed, closes MS-V393 and MS-V394.

Checks SGBD isolation valves closed - YES Reads CAUTION requiring minimum of 25 gpm EFW to each SG with NR level c 5%.

Checks if RCS Cold Leg cooldown rate is c 100°F/HR -

NO Throttles EFW to establish minimum flow of 25 gpm to each SG (CT).

Checks RCS Hot Leg temperatures stable or decreasing - YES Checks whether ALL RCPs should be stopped - NO, subcooling SAT.

Checks CST inventory =- 250,000 gallons - YES Checks secondary radiation - NORMAL.

Acknowledges NSO report, begins monitoring SG A and D pressures and informs crew when pressure in either SG A or SG D is increasing.

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 2 Page 11 of 12 EVENT INSTRUCTION NOTE: The crew should exit ECA-2.1 to E-2 as soon as pressure in any SG increases.

Isolation of 0

SGBandC 0 0

0 0

SELECT: Component Malfs (Top Bar)

SELECT: mfMSV88 SELECT: Delete MF SELECT: mfMSV9O SELECT: Delete MF NOTE: A CAUTION prior to step I of FR-H.1 states that the procedure should not be performed if EFW flow is < 500 gpm due to operator action.

CUE:

As an NSO, report that the MSlVs for SG A and D have been closed from the west pipe chase.

Actions or Behaviors us Notes ECA-2.1 OAS item 2 and exits ECA-2.1 when any SG pressure increases.

Crew us Notes HEAT SINK CSF - RED Notes CAUTION in FR-H.l prior to step 1 and does NOT perform FR-H. 1. Continues with E-2.

BOP Acknowledges NSO report, informs crew of MSlV status.

us Reads applicable CAUTIONS and NOTES of E-2.

US/BOP Checks if MSlVs and Bypasses are closed - YES US/BOP Checks if ANY SG pressure is stable or increasing -

YES US/BOP Checks for any SG pressure decreasing in uncontrolled manner or any SG completely depressurized - IF YES, USBOP perform step 4 and isolate EFW flow to affected SGs. IF NO, go to step 5.

US/BOP Checks CST inventory > 250,000 gallons - YES US/BOP Checks secondary radiation - NORMAL I

CREW:

Checks id ECCS flow should be reduced:

USlSUR Check RCS subcooling > 40°F - YES USlBOP Checks secondary heat sink - NO us Exits E-2 to E-I, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, step 1 us Reads NOTES of E-I

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 2 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors Page 12 of 12 US/SUR U S/BO P US/BOP BOP US/BOP us US/SUR CREW US/SUR US/BOP USBUR US/SUR us As directed by the Lead Examiner, terminate the scenario.

E-Plan classification for this scenario - UE 15b (Although H-RED existed, the condition was operator induced and LOSS OF HEAT SINK was not valid).

Checks if RCPs should be stopped - NO Checks for FAULTED SGs-NO Checks secondary heat sink - NO As directed, establishes a total EFW > 500 gpm until level is adequate.

Checks secondary radiation - NORMAL Reads CAUTION regarding actuation of PORVs on PZR pressure or LTOP.

Checks PORVs available - YES Checks if ECCS flow should be reduced:

Checks RCS subcooling > 40°F - YES Checks secondary heat sink - YES Checks RCS pressure stable or increasing - YES Check PZR level > 5% - YES Exits E-I to ES-1.1, SI TERMINATION.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:

Sea brook Scenario No.:

3 Op Test No.:

1 Examiners:

Candidates:

Palmieri - US Crosby - PSO / BOP Initial Conditions:

Unit at 100% power.

Turnover:

Entered TSASs for CS-P-2B being tagged out of service for planned maintenance 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ago. Return to service expected within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

Critical Tasks:

1. MANUALLY trip the reactor from the control room when SSPS fails to automatically trip the reactor. [E-0, A]

2. Establish feed flow into at least one SG before RCS bleed and feed is required [FR-H.l, A]

Event No.

1 2

3 4

Malf. No.

ttRCTT411 NA ctMSPK300 1 mfED025 Event Type*

I (Both)

C (Both)

Event Description RCS Loop 1 NR cold leg RTD fails high. Loop 1 Tavg increases and Loopl AT decreases. Loopl becomes the auctioneered high channel and NSSS control systems respond. Used if the RO candidate is on the primary side of the MCB.

The Load Dispatcher contacts the control room to order a power reduction to 5 90% power due to pending grid limitations.

Main steam pressure controller MS-PK-3001 has an internal failure causing the setpoint to fail LOW. MS-PK-3001 controls the ASDV for SG A. The ASDV is driven full open when the setpoint fails LOW. Used if the RO candidate is on the secondary side of the MCB.

Vital 120 VAC power panel I

-EDE-PP-1 A loses power when the inverter supplying the power panel malfunctions.

CHANNEL I RPS / SSPS is affected. Control systems using CHANNEL I inputs are affected.

Page 1 of 17

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 5

mfEDOO5 M (Both)

C (Both)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (1)n:

The normal UAT feeder to 4.16kV Bus 3 inadvertently trips open. The breaker for the alternate feeder to Bus 3 (RAT) fails to close and Bus 3 de-energizes. The immediate impact is loss of power to condensate pumps CO-P-30A and 30C (STBY) as well as heater drain pump HD-P31A. Flow to the MFPs is significantly reduced and MFP suction pressure drops rapidly. The MFPs will sequentially trip on LOW suction pressure. When the first MFP trips, a Turbine Setback will be actuated. SG levels will decrease to the SG LO-LO level reactor trip setpoint. The reactor will fail to trip automatically. The operators will be forced to trip the reactor MANUALLY (CT). When the reactor trips the Main Turbine will fail to automatically trip and will not trip manually. The operators will be required to actuate MSI. As soon as the TDEFW pump steam supply valve begins to open, the TDEFW pump will trip on overspeed. After running for a short time the shaft of the MDEFW pump will shear, resulting in loss of all feed to the SGs. If the crew attempts to restore feed using the SUFP, the Bus 5 breaker will fail to close.

The crew will be able to restore feed to the SGs by resetting the TDEFW (CT). The procedure progression will be from ument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor E-0 a FR-H. 1 3 E-0 3 ES-1.1.

Page 2 of 17

Scenario Event Description Seabrook Simulator Scenario 3 NOTE: This scenario has been written as a spare. Events have been included to provide for evaluation of the RO candidate on either side of the MCB. It is assumed that only those events required to meet the evaluation requirements will be executed during the scenario.

The simulator is initialized at 100% power. The crew is instructed to maintain power. Load Control is conducting a system wide test, and needs the MVAR loading to be maintained at 400 lagging.

CS-P-2B is out of service for an oil change. T.S. 3.1.2.2, 3.1.2.4 and 3.5.2 were entered 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ago. The pump is expected back in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

IF the RO candidate is on the primary side of the MCB, RCS Loop 1 NR cold leg RTD fails high.

Loop 1 indicated Tavg increases and Loopl indicated AT decreases. Loopl becomes the auctioneered high channel and NSSS control systems respond. The automatic rod control system drives rods IN at maximum speed until the operator places rods in MANUAL. The PZR level control system REFERENCE LEVEL fails to 100% of programmed level. As the plant is at 100% power PZR control is not adversely affected. The condenser steam dumps receive a demand signal but do not open because they not are not armed. The crew will utilize abnormal procedure OS1201.08, TAVG/DELTA T FAILURE to respond to the failure.

The Load Dispatcher contacts the control room to order a power reduction to 5 90% power due to pending grid limitations. The crew will utilize major plant evolution procedure OS1 000.06, POWER DECREASE and OD1 56 to perform the power reduction.

IF the RO candidate is on the secondary side of the MCB, main steam pressure controller MS-PK-3001 will fail due to an internal fault causing the setpoint to fail LOW. MS-PK-3001 controls the ASDV for SG A. The ASDV is driven full open when the setpoint fails LOW. The crew will take action to close the ASDV using guidance from the MPCS VAS procedure.

Vital 120 VAC power panel 1-EDE-PP-1A loses power when the inverter supplying the power panel malfunctions. CHANNEL I RPS / SSPS is affected. Control systems using CHANNEL I inputs are affected. RCS letdown will be isolated when the controlling channel of PZR level fails low. The PZR pressure control system will generate a demand for all PZR heaters to be energized when the controlling channel fails low. The heaters will not energize due to the PZR level channel failing low. Automatic rod control (insertion) will occur due to the TREF signal going to NO-LOAD value when the controlling channel of main turbine 1 stage pressure fails low. SG level control for two of the SGs and MFP speed control will be affected. The crew will utilize abnormal procedure OS1247.01, LOSS OF A 120 VAC VITAL INSTRUMENT PANEL (PPIA, 1 b, 1 C RO 1 D) to respond. Power will be restored to the power panel from its alternate source by an NSO as directed by the control room.

The normal UAT feeder to 4.16kV Bus 3 inadvertently will trip open. The breaker for the alternate feeder to Bus 3 (RAT) fails to close and Bus 3 de-energizes. The immediate impact is loss of power to condensate pumps CO-P-30A and 30C (STBY) as well as heater drain pump HD-P-31A. Flow to the MFPs is significantly reduced and MFP suction pressure drops rapidly.

The MFPs will sequentially trip on LOW suction pressure. When the first MFP trips, a Turbine Setback will be actuated. SG levels will decrease to the SG LO-LO level reactor trip setpoint.

The reactor will fail to trip automatically. The operators will be forced to trip the reactor MANUALLY (CT). When the reactor trips, the Main Turbine will fail to automatically trip and will not trip manually. The operators will be required to actuate MSI. Automatic SI will be actuated Page 3 of 17

Scenario Event Description Seabrook Simulator Scenario 3 due to the excessive cooldown caused by the failure of the main turbine to trip. As soon as the TDEFW pump steam supply valve begins to open, the TDEFW pump will trip on overspeed.

After running for a short time the shaft of the MDEFW pump will shear, resulting in loss of all feed to the SGs. If the crew attempts to restore feed using the SUFP, the Bus 5 breaker will fail to close. The crew will be able to restore feed to the SGs by resetting the TDEFW (CT).

The procedure progression will be from E-0 g FR-H.l 3 E-0 3 ES-1.I.

Page 4 of 17

Sea brook Simulator Scenario Setup Scenario 3 0

1.

0 I Initialize the simulator at 1 OO%, IC 300 C9 BOL CHECWPLACE two SG FF/SF & level input channels from CHANNEL I and two from CHANNEL II

2.

I Protected train is A.

0 0

0

3.

0 0

SELECT: Scenario SELECT: Demo exams SELECT: Exam #25M setup SELECT:RUN

4.

0 0

5.

IOOZMDIEHCUC3851TVT, MAIN TURBINE TRIP overridden to RELEASE IOOZMDIMSCS30851, TRN B MSI ACTUATION overridden to RESET Place the control switch for CS-P-2B in PTL Close CS-V-197 Danger tag CS-P-2B and CS-VI 97 Press the pushbutton control switch for CVCS TRAIN B BYP/INOP light 0

0 mvCSVl97, MOV BREAKER STATUS OPEN bkCSl P2B 52, BREAKER RACKED-OUT Run the following SCENARIO to rack-out the breaker for CS-P-2B, de-energize CS-V197, fail automatic trip of the reactor, fail automatic and manual trip of the turbine, fail automatic MSI, fail manual actuation of TRN B MSI, fail closure of the Bus 3 RAT breaker, and activate Event Triggers Demo exams/Exam 25M TDENV Trip and Demo exams/Exam 25M MDEFW shaft shears:

Verify the following inserted / activated:

0 0

0 mfRPSOOl, AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP FAILURE (TRAIN A) mfRPSOO2, AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP FAILURE (TRAIN B) mfRPS003, AUTOMATIC TURBINE TRIP FAILURE mfRPSOl9, MS ISOLATION FAILS TO ACTUATE (TRAIN A) mfRPS020, MS ISOLATION FAILS TO ACTUATE (TRAIN By) 0 I bkED3RAT BREAKER FAILS OPEN Page 5 of 17

Seabrook Simulator Scenario Setup Scenario 3 0

0 SELECT: Event Triggers (Top Bar)

SELECT: Demo Exams/Exam 25M TDEFW Trip VERIFY: ACTIVATED (Only options are to OPEN /ABORT / CLOSE) 0 0

0 I SELECT: Event Triggers (Top Bar)

SELECT: Event Triggers (Top Bar)

SELECT: Demo ExamdExam 25M MDEFW shaft shears VERIFY: ACTIVATED (Only options are to OPEN /ABORT / CLOSE) 0 0

Page 6 of 17 SELECT: Demo Exams/Exam 25M SUFP AF breaker fails open VERIFY: ACTIVATED (Only options are to OPEN /ABORT / CLOSE)

Seabrook Simulator Scenario Turnover Information Scenario 3 Protected Train is A Mode 1 : 100% RTP, ARO = 228 steps CBD, Boron Concentration = 1293 ppm. ODi-56 rev 7 on US desk, + I degree = 88 gal RMW, -1 degree change = 19 gal BA; AFD target - 0.65%, Current AFD - 0.69%

Centrifugal Charging Pump CS-P-2B is danger tagged out for oil change. Entered TSASs 3.1.2.2a, 3.1.2.4 and 3.5.2.a two hours prior to turnover. Expected return to service is 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months after turnover.

Page 7 of 17

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 3 Page 8 of 17 0

0 c]

0 0

SCENARIO OUTLINE SELECT: MF List SELECT REACTOR COOLANT (component)

DOUBLE CLICK: ttRCTT411 SELECT: Fail High SELECT: Insert EVENT INSTRUCTION Shift Tu r n over Shift turnover information as stated.

Provide Turnover Sheet When directed by the Lead Examiner, initiate the following event:

Loop I Tc Fails high Insert Loop I Tc Fails high as follows:

The automatic rod control system drives rods IN at maximum speed until the operator places rods in MANUAL. Steam dumps get open demand but are not armed and do not open.

Actions or Behaviors None RO us BOP RO us RO us USlRO RO USlBOP RO Notes automatic rod insertion, checks for failed input to rod control.

Acknowledges report, directs BOP to check for Turbine Runback / Setback.

Verifies no Turbine Runback / Setback. Checks for failed input to rod control.

Notes abnormal Loop1 indication Acknowledges report of RC Loop I indication failure and directs RO to place rod control in MANUAL.

PLACES rod control in MANUAL. Pulls up VPROs Refers to OS1201.08, TAVGlDELTA T FAILURE and directs operator actions.

Checks for ANY Tavg Channel failed high - YES Verifies rod control in MANUAL.

Checks condenser steam dump valves closed - YES Defeats Loop I AT inputs, defeats Loop 1 Tavg input and selects a non affected channel for recording.

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 3 Page 9 of 17 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors US/RO Checks Tavg within 2 1°F of Tref - IF YES, US will likely delay returning rod control to A UT0 until rods have been restored to ARO position. IF NO US will direct RO to restore Tavg within I F of Tret US/RO Checks PZR level trending to program - YES US/BOP Verifies steam dump interlock selector switches positioned to NA RESET or NA BYPASS INTERLOCK Verifies no redundant channel bistables tripped.

Refers to TS 3.3.1, table 3.3-1 item 7 & 8. TR 19.

Notifies I&C to initiate troubleshooting.

Coordinates tripping of bistables or using BTI to bypass the failed channel for troubleshooting or testing. Notifies Work Week Manager and plant management regarding failure.

- YES US/RO us us NOTE: At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, bypass the failed channel or trip the failed channel as directed by the US. IF the Lead Examiner chooses, the next event can be initiated without bypassing or placing the channel in trip condition. The scenario will not be affected either way.

NOTE: If the crew chooses to use BTI, perform the following:

SELECT: Panel Overview SELECT: CP-I Door to OPEN SELECT: ENABLE SELECT: TB-411C to the UP position SELECT: TB-411G to the UP position SELECT: TB-412D to the UP position SELECT: TB-412G to the UP position SELECT: CP-I Door to CLOSED SELECT: BTI CP-I D5628 7300 CABINET CAB CP-1 DOOR OPEN D4562 7300 CABINET CP-1 BYPASSED / INOP OTAT Trip OPAT Trip Low-Low Tavg P-I 2 Low Tavg FWI D5628 7300 CABINET CAB CP-1 DOOR OPEN - return

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 3 Page 10 of 17 EVENT INSTRUCTION NOTE: If the crew chooses NOT to use BTI, perform the following to trip the bistables:

SELECT: Panel Overview SELECT: Trip CP-I SELECT: CP-1 Door to OPEN SELECT: TB-411 C to the UP position SELECT: TB-411 G to the UP position SELECT: TB-412D to the UP position SELECT: TB-412G to the UP position SELECT: CP-1 Door to CLOSED Actions or Behaviors D5628 7300 CABINET CAB CP-1 DOOR OPEN OTAT Trip OPAT Trip Low-Low Tavg P-I 2 Low Tavg FWI D5628 7300 CABINET CAB CP-1 DOOR OPEN - return After allowing the crew to complete OS1201.08, or at the Lead Examiners discretion, continue to the next event.

Power decrease Contact the control room as Load Dispatch. Direct a power decrease to 5 90% power within the next 15 minutes due to pending grid limitations. Maintain

- 90% until cleared by Load Dispatch.

NOTE: The power reduction allows the RO to satisfy the (R)eactivity control or (N)ormal control requirement and the US to satisfy the (N)ormal control requirement. Once met, the next event may be started.

us Refers to OS1000.06, POWER DECREASE and OD1 56 for power reduction. Provides direction on rate and control bands for operators. Conducts brief for power decrease.

Uses the LOAD SELECTOR load decrease push-button or LOAD LIMIT SET potentiometer to reduce load to maintain power and VAR loading.

If reducing load with the load selector, FOLLOW the load set with the load limit set potentiometer and the standby load set.

Initiates boration / inserts control rods to control RCS temperature and AFD.

Uses OD1 56 values or DETERMINES the quantity of boric acid required to make the desired reactivity change from RSI 735,Reactivity Calculations BOP RO

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 3 Page 11 of 17 EVENT INSTRUCTION NOTE: Operators are required to remain at the makeup controls during the boration I dilution and makeup evolution.

This will ensure proper system response is verified as well as the desired amount.

At the lead examiners discretion, continue with the next event.

EVENT 3 MS-PK-3001 Initiate failure of MS-PK-3001 as follows:

Fai I u re 0

0 0

0 SELECT: MF list SELECT: Main Steam (Component)

Double Click: ctMSPK3001 SELECT: FAIL SETPOINT SET VALUE: 0 INSERT Actions or Behaviors TURNS the BLENDER MODE START SWITCH to STOP PLACES the BORIC ACID BLENDER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH to BORATE.

CHECKWPLACES CS-FIC-111 in auto remote (AIR).

CHECKS/PLACES CS-FIC-1 10 in auto remote (AIR).

SETS CS-FIQ-1 I 1 controller to the desired flow rate.

SETS CS-FIQ-I 11 controller to the desired quantity.

TURNS the BLENDER MODE START SWITCH to START. When the boric acid supply counter has added its preset quantity, VERIFIES the boration stopped.

As directed by US, RETURN the makeup controls to automatic blended makeup.

As directed by US, OPERATE pressurizer heaters to force spray to equalize boron concentration between the RCS and pressurizer.

Provide oversight of power reduction. Notify plant management of load restrictions.

RO us D5214 ASDV A NOT FULL CLOSED BOP Acknowledges VAS and Hardwired alarms. Informs crew that the ASDV for SG A is full open. Notes controller SETPOINT is pegged LOW. Pulls up VPRO.

Directs operator action per VPRO or HWAS for UA-53 Places ASDV control switch to close, places MS-PK-3001 in MANUAL - MINIMUM us BOP A-7.

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 3 Paae 12 of 17 0

0 EVENT INSTRUCTION SELECT: MF List SELECT: ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SELECT: mfED025 LOSS OF UPS-MA INSERT Actions or Behaviors us Refers to TS 3.7.1.6 and 3.6.3. ASDV remains operable as long as it can be MANUALLY operated form the MCR Contact Work Week manager and / or I&C for support and troubleshooting. Informs station management.

u s EVENT 4 Loss of Initiate loss of PP-1A as follows:

PP-1 A CREW RO us Automatic rod control (insertion) will occur due to the TREF signal going to NO-LOAD value when the controlling channel of main turbine 1 st stage pressure fails low.

RO Diagnoses loss of power panel based on plant response and indications from MCB.

Notes automatic control rod insertion, recommends placing rod control in MANUAL based on indications of failed power panel.

Acknowledges input from RO, directs RO to place rod control in MANUAL Places rod control in MANUAL.

us Enters abnormal procedure OS1 247.01, LOSS OF A 120 VAC VITAL INSTRUMENT PANEL (PPIA, IB, I C RO 1 D) and directs operator actions.

US/BOP CHECKS SG steam flow /feed flow matched - NO BOP As directed, places affected SG FRV in MANUAL and controls NR level 50% to 70%.

Places MFP speed controller in MANUAL and maintains MFP speed at program.

Selects alternate control channels for affected controls.

US/BOP Checks steam dump valves closed - YES SG level control for two of the SGs and MFP speed control will be affected.

Paqe 13 of 17 Seabrook Simulator Scenario 3 EVENT INSTRUCTION The PZR pressure control system will generate a demand for all PZR heaters to be energized when the controlling channel fails low. The heaters will not energize due to the PZR level channel failing low.

RCS letdown will be isolated when the controlling channel of PZR level fails low. PZR level will trend up due to continued charging.

When directed as NSO to transfer PP-1A to the maintenance supply, perform the following:

0 0

0 SELECT: D-Points SELECT: EDE SELECT: svo6003EDE SELECT: ALARM INSERT SELECT: Malfunctions (Top Bar)

SELECT: mfED025 SELECT: DELETE Actions or Behaviors USlRO USlRO RO USlRO RO USlRO RO USlRO U SlRO RO RO Crew us us Checks PZR pressure control stable or trending to 2235 PSlG - YES Check for affected PZR pressure instrument - YES As directed, places PZR pressure control in MANUAL, selects an alternate controlling channel and recording channel.

Check PZR level stable or trending to program - NO As directed, reduces charging flow to minimize PZR level increase.

Check for affected PZR level instrument - YES As directed, places PZR level control in MANUAL, selects an alternate controlling channel and recording channel. Resets the PZR control group heaters.

Checks if letdown was isolated - YES Checks if letdown can be re-established - YES As directed, establishes 50 gpm charging, verifies PZR level > 17%, aligns cooling to letdown heat exchanger, closes letdown drag valves, opens letdown isolation valves, re-establishes letdown flow Unless already defeated by EVENT 1, defeats CHAN I input to 7300 processes by selecting Loop 1 AT, Tavg and selects non affected channel for recording.

Determines PP-1 A affected.

Dispatches NSO to check status of UPS and to re-energize PP-1 A from its maintenance supply.

Directs actions to restore normal system alignment.

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 3 Paae 14 of 17 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors RO RO RO BOP us Evaluates TS 3.8.3.1 and 3.3.3.6. Contacts Work As directed, resets N41 rate trips, restores defeated Loop 1 Tavg and AT channels.

As directed, restores PZR pressure control to preferred alignment (455/456).

As directed, restores AUTO control of rods, PZR level and PZR pressure control.

As directed, returns SG level control and MFP speed control to AUTO.

Week manager / Electrical maintenance for support /

troubleshooting. Informs plant management.

After allowing the crew to complete OS1247.01, or at the Lead Examiners discretion, continue to the next event.

EVENT 5 Loss of Bus Initiate loss of 4.16 kV Bus 3 as follows:

3 - Loss of Heat Sink 0

0 0

0 SELECT: MF List SELECT: Electrical Distribution SELECT: mfEDOO5 BUS 3 UAT BREAKER INSERT TRIP (86 LOCKOUT)

BOP Notes VAS alarms associated with loss of Bus 3.

Reports Turbine Setback in progress due to loss of condensate pump CO-P-30A. Reports MFP suction pressure decreasing and feed flow decreasing to all SGs.

IF automatic reactor trip demand occurs, the reactor will not trip.

us Based on time available, US may enter OS1 231.03, TURBINE RUNBACK / SETBACK. Directs reactor trip based on procedure guidance that the plant cannot survive setbacks due to loss of feed from greater than 85% power.

Crew must recognize demand for reactor trip and trip the reactor manually. Crew performs Immediate Actions (VAS).

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 3 Paae 15 of 17 INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors RO NOTE: Automatic and manual turbine trip is blocked. Automatic BOP MSI is blocked. Manual TRN B MSI is blocked. All included to cause automatic SI.

NOTE: As soon as MS-V395 starts opening, the TDEFW pump trips.

RO us Trips the reactor MANUALLY (CT). Verifies reactor trip and bypass breakers open, neutron flux decreasing, and rod bottom lights lit.

Attempts to trip the main turbine MANUALLY. Notes that the turbine did not trip and actuates TRB B MSI (MCB-EF). When MSlVs fail to close, actuates TRN A MSI and verifies all MSlVs close. When generator output is zero, opens the generator breaker.

RO BOP US/BOP US/BOP US/BOP BOP us us CREW NOTE: When the crew attempts to start the SUFP, the Bus 5 breaker will fail to close.

Verifies power to AC Emergency busses, verifies all emergency busses energized.

Checks if SI is actuated, Verifies both trains of SI actuated.

Enters E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, Step 1 and directs operator actions to verify VAS completed.

Performs ATTACHMENT A.

Performs operator actions on both sides of the MCB until RO has completed ATTACHMENT A.

Checks if MSlVs should be closed - NO, but MSIVs are closed Check CNTMT pressure has remained < 18 psig - YES Verifies total EFW > 500 gpm - NO As directed, attempts to start the SUFP. Notes that the Bus 5 breaker fails to close.

Exits E-0 to FR-H.1, REPSONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK, Step 1 Reads CAUTIONS, NOTES and applicable OAS items Determines whether secondary heat sink is required -

YES.

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 3 Page 16 of 17 0

EVENT INSTRUCTION INSERT Actions or Behaviors US/RO Checks if at least one CCP is available - YES US/BOP Checks if SGBD is isolated - YES US/BOP Determines cause of loss of EFW - TDEFW tripped on overspeed; MD EFW pump shaft sheared. SUFP breaker failure.

US/BOP Monitors RCS temp stable at or trending to 557°F -

YES, temperature is trending to 557°F.

US/RO Checks RCS Isolated - NO RO directed, closes CS-VI~~

to isolate the RCS NOTE It is expected, but not required that the RO will have completed ATTACHMENT A, briefed the US and returned to performing MCB manipulations by Step 10 of E-0.

When directed as NSO to restore EFW by resetting the TDEFW:

SELECT: RF List SELECT: Main Steam (Component)

SELECT: rmvMSVl29 SELECT: RF: MANUAL SET RAMP to 30 sec; VALUE to 1.O Contact control room to open FW-V346 and when opened:

US/RO US/RO RO US/RO US/BOP US/BOP US/RO CREW US/RO US/BOP US/BOP US/BOP us Checks PORVs closed - YES Checks PZR spray valves closed - YES As directed (NOTE) maintains seal injection flow to all RCPs.

Checks whether ALL RCPs should be stopped - NO, subcooling SAT Checks for faulted SG - NO Checks for ruptured SG - NO Checks whether RCS is intact - YES Checks if ECCS flow should be reduced:

Checks RCS subcooling > 40°F - YES Checks secondary heat sink - NO, as MDEFW shaff has sheared.

Determine whether SUFP is immediately available -

NO Directs NSO to locally restore EFW flow per OS1 036.03.

Goes to step 4

Pane 17 of 17 Seabrook Simulator Scenario 3 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors NOTE: Step 5 of FR-H.1 is CONTINUOUS ACTION step. As soon as EFW flow has been established, the crew should exit to procedure and step in effect (E-0, Step 8).

RO US/BOP US/BOP CUE:

Report as the NSO at the TDEFW pump that flow has been restored.

BOP us CREW NOTE:

The scenario may be terminated at the Lead Examiners discretion.

U S/RO US/BOP US/RO US/RO RO RO RO us As directed by the Lead Examiner, terminate scenario.

E-Plan classification for this scenario - SAE (H-RED)

As directed, stops all RCPs Checks power to SUFP - NO Initiate switchover of SUFP from Bus 5 to Bus 4 breaker Notes EFW > 500 gpm feed flow to SGs as indicated on MCB and reported by NSO (CT).

Determines feed and bleed is NOT in progress and exits FR-H.l to procedure and step in effect (E-0).

Returns to E-0 step 8 and proceeds through procedure to step 15 where they check if ECCS flow should be reduced - YES.

Checks if RCS subcooling is > 40°F - YES Checks if secondary heat sink is adequate - YES Checks RCS pressure stable or increasing - YES Check PZR level > 5% - YES As directed, resets SI Verifies only CS-P-2A running and DOES NOT shut down CS-P-2A.

Checks RCS pressure stable or increasing - YES AS directed, opens CS-VI42 and 143, closes SI-VI 38 and 139, establishes 60 gpm charging flow while maintaining 6 - I O gpm seal injection flow.

Exits E-0 to Step 7 of ES-I.I, SI TERMINATION.

ML040790024

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