ML040790024

Draft Section C Operating

ML040790024
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	12/18/2003
From:	Roy D Florida Power & Light Group
To:	Conte R NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB
Conte R
References
50-443/04-301 50-443/04-301
Download: ML040790024 (44)

Text

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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-I

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Facility: Seabrook Scenario No.: 11-2 Op Test No.: 1 t -

Examiners: Candidates: Palmieri - US Crosby - PSO Initial Conditions: Unit at 100% power.

Turnover: Maintain 400 MVARs lagging. Load Control needs the higher MVARs for a system test.

Entered TSASs for CS-P-2B being tagged out of service for planned maintenance 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago. Return to service expected within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Critical Tasks: 1. MANUALLY trip the reactor from the control room when SSPS fails to automatically trip the reactor. [E-0, A]

2. MANUALLY trip the main turbine before a severe (Orange Path) challenge develops to either the Subcriticality or the Integrity CSF, or before transition to ECA-2.1, whichever happens first. [E Q]

3. MANUALLY start at least one ESW pump (SW pump or CT pump) for an operating safeguards train before transition out of E-0. [E L]

Event Type* Event Description I (Both) Pressurizer (PZR) pressure channel fails. Transient causes

1. I9 RCS failure of one PZR spray valve resulting in abnormal PZR Pressure pressure control.

2 NIA R (RO) The Load Dispatcher contacts the control room to order a power reduction to 5 90% power due to pending grid limitations.

__ 3 bkED1UAT

___cI Y

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are required to manually trip the reactor (CT) and turbine (CT).

Combination of abnormal PZR pressure control and failure of the main turbine to automatically trip will cause a Safety lniection to occur.

L C (Both) When SI occurs SW-P41A trips and the standby pump fails to automatically start. The crew must manually start the

• (N)ormal, (R)eac standby pump (CT).

vi6, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Page 1 of 15

Scenario Event Description Seabrook Simulator Scenario I The simulator is initialized at 100% power. The crew is instructed to maintain power. Load Control is conducting a system wide test, and needs the MVAR loading to be maintained at 400 lagging.

CS-P-2B is out of service for an oil change. T.S. 3.1.2.2, 3.1.2.4 and 3.5.2 were entered 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago. The pump is expected back in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

RC-P-455 fails high causing PZR spray valves to open and requiring operators to take action to restore RCS pressure control. Pressurizer spray valve PCV-455B fails partially open at the same time due to a valve positioner problem. This results in abnormal PZR pressure control when PZR pressure control is restored to automatic.

The Load Dispatcher contacts the control room to order a power reduction to 5 90% power due to pending grid limitations. The crew will utilize major plant evolution procedure OS1000.06, POWER DECREASE and OD1 56 to perform the power reduction.

The 13.8 kV Bus 1 UAT breaker trips and the associated RAT breaker fails to fast transfer.

Loss of power to Bus 1 results in reactor trip demand due to loss off A & B RCPs and A & C Circulating Water pumps. The crew enters E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

The reactor fails to trip automatically and the operator is required to manually trip the reactor.

On the reactor trip, the automatic Turbine Trip fails and all turbine stop and control valves will remain open. MSlVs will not automatically close and cannot be closed from the control room.

The operator is required to manually trip the main turbine.

The combination of abnormal PZR pressure control and the failure of the main turbine to trip causes Safety Injection to actuate.

In addition, SW-P41A will trip and the remaining TRAIN A SW pump will fail to auto start causing the crew to perform the RNO for E-0, Attachment A step 7.

Expected procedure transition is E-0 s ES-1.Is OS1000.1 1.

Page 2 of 15

Seabrook Simulator Scenario Setup Scenario 1 Initialize the simulator at 100% IC 300. Raise VAR loading on the Main Generator to 400MVARs LAGGING.

2. 0 I Protected train is 'A'.

3. 0 Place the control switch for CS-P-2B in PTL 0 Close CS-V-197 0 Danger tag CS-P-2B and CS-VI 97 0 Press the pushbutton control switch for CVCS TRAIN B BYP/INOP light

4. Run the following SCENARIO to rack-out the breaker for CS-P-2B, de-energize CS-VI 97, fail automatic trip of the turbine, fail closure of the MSIVs, failure of the Bus 1 RAT breaker to close and failure of SW-P-41C to AUTO start and activate Event Trigger Demo Exams/Exam 19 power loss:

0 SELECT: Scenario SELECT: Demo exams SELECT: Exam # I 9 setup SELECT:RUN mfRPS003, AUTOMATIC TURBINE TRIP FAILURE mfSWO14, SW PUMP 41C FAILS TO AUTO START svMSV86 I S 0 VALVE FAILS OPEN svMSV88 IS0 VALVE FAILS OPEN svMSV9O I S 0 VALVE FAILS OPEN svMSV92 IS0 VALVE FAILS OPEN bkEDlRAT BREAKER FAILS OPEN mvCSV197, MOV BREAKER STATUS OPEN bkCSl P2B 52, BREAKER RACKED-OUT SELECT: Event Triggers (Top Bar)

SELECT: Demo Exams/Exam I 9 power loss VERIFY: ACTIVATED (Only options are to OPEN /ABORT / CLOSE)

Page 3 of 15

Seabrook Simulator Scenario Setup Scenario 1

5. Perform the following to cause failure of the reactor to trip automatically on loss of 13.8kV Bus1:

SELECT: MF List 0 SELECT: REACTOR PROTECTION 0 SELECT: mfRPSOOl AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP FAILURE (TRAIN A) 0 SELECT: INSERT 0 SELECT: MF List 0 SELECT: REACTOR PROTECTION 0 SELECT: mfRPSOO2 AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP FAILURE (TRAIN B) 0 SELECT: INSERT Verify the following malfunctions inserted:

0 mfRPSOOl AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP FAILURE (TRAIN A) 0 mfRPS002 AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP FAILURE (TRAIN B)

6. Activate Event Trigger Demo exams\Exam 19M Delete MSlV failure:

0 SELECT: Event Triggers 0 SELECT: Demo exams 0 SELECT: Exam 19M Delete MSlV failure 0 ACTIVATE Verify the following activated:

0 SELECT: Event Triggers (Top Bar)

Demo Exams/Exam 19M Delete MSlV failure ACTIVATED (Only options are to OPEN / ABORT / CLOSE)

Page 4 of 15

Seabrook .

Simulator Scenario Turnover Information Scenario 1 Protected Train is A Mode 1: 100% RTP, ARO = 228 steps CBD, Boron Concentration = 1293 ppm. ODI-56 rev 7 on US desk, +I degrees = 88 gal RMW, -1 degree change = 19 gal BA; AFD target 0.60%,

Current AFD 0.35%

Grid system test in progress. Reactive load on the main generator is 400MVARs lagging.

Dispatch will notify us when the test is completed.

Centrifugal Charging Pump CS-P-2B is danger tagged out for oil change. Entered TSASs 3.1.2.2a, 3.1.2.4 and 3.5.2.a two hours prior to turnover. Expected return to service is 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after turnover.

Page 5 of 15

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 1 Paqe 6 of 15 SCENARIO OUTLINE EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors Shift Shift turnover informationas stated. None Turnover Provide Turnover Sheet When directed by the Lead Examiner, initiate the following event:

EVENT I PT-455 fails Perform the following to initiate RC-PT-455 fails high high and PZR and PZR Spray Valve RC-PCV-455B Fails Open:

Spray Valve Fails Open.

PSO Acknowledges alarm, notes failed PZR pressure channel, recommends manual control of PZR pressure control to return PZR pressure to normal.

us Acknowledges report, directs PSO to use manual control of PZR controller to return PZR to program.

us Refers to OS1201.06, PT 455 - 458 PZR PRESSURE INSTRUMENT FAILURE and directs operator actions.

NOTE: IF the crew does nothing, the plant will trip on OTAT. At RO Reports CONTROLLING channel (RC-P-455) failed scripted severity (0.25), the spray valve will require 3 banks RO Manually controls pressure at program of B/U heaters to return PZR pressure to program. With 3 RO Selects alternate channel for control and backup banks of heaters ON, PZR spray will eventually be required (457/456) selects Alt. channel for recording and Alt to limit PZR pressure increase. IF the PZR Pressure control channel for AT, OPAT and OTAT recording.

is returned to fully auto control, PZR pressure will cycle as the backup heaters are turned on and off.

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 1 Page 7 of 15 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors CUE: IF solicited by the crew, I&C suggests that the RO Notes status of RC-PCV-4556 when directed to check failure of RC-PT-455 could have initiated the Spray Valves - CLOSED and reports to US.

problem with RC-PCV-455B. Further US Directs RO to manually close affected spray valve per investigation will be required to confirm. RNO.

RO Reports the spray valve does not respond to controller demand.

RO As directed, controls PZR pressure using automatic or manual control.

RO Verifies no redundant channel bistables tripped.

US Refers to TS 3.3.1, table 3.3-1 item 7 , 9 & I O . TS 3.3.2 Table 3.3-3 items I d & loa. TS 3.2.5. Notifies 1&C to initiate troubleshooting of failed channel, failed spray valve US Coordinates using BTI to bypass the failed channel for troubleshooting or testing. Notifies Work Week Manager and plant management regarding failure.

NOTE: At the discretion of the lead Examiner, bypass the failed channel or trip the failed channel as directed by the US. IF the Lead Examiner chooses, the next event can be initiated without bypassing or placing the channel in trip condition. The scenario will not be affected either way.

SELECT: Panel Overview SELECT: BTI CP-1 SELECT: CP-I Door to OPEN D5628 7300 CABINET CAB CP-1 DOOR OPEN SELECT: ENABLE D4562 7300 CABINET CP-1 BYPASSED / INOP 0 SELECT: PB-455A to the UP position High Pressure Reactor trip SELECT: PB-45% to the UP position Low Pressure Reactor trip (P-7 interlocked) 0 SELECT: PB-455D to the UP position Pressurizer Low Pressure SI (P-I 1 interlocked) 0 SELECT: PB-455B to the UP position P-I I permissive 0 SELECT: TB-411C to the UP position OTAT Trip SELECT: CP-1 Door to CLOSED D5628 7300 CABINET CAB CP-1 DOOR OPEN - return

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 1 Page 8 of 15 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors NOTE: If the crew chooses NOT to use BTI, perform the following to trip the bistables:

SELECT: Panel Overview I

0 SELECT: TripCP-I D5628 7300 C, .BI IET CAB CP-1 DOOR OPEN

[7 SELECT: CP-1 Door to OPEN

[7 SELECT: PB-455A to the UP position High Pressure Reactor trip 17 SELECT: PB-455C to the UP position Low Pressure Reactor trip (P-7 interlocked)

SELECT: PB-455D t o the UP position Pressurizer Low Pressure SI (P-I 1 interlocked)

SELECT: PB-4558 t o the UP position P-I 1 permissive SELECT: TB-41IC to the UP position OTAT Trip 0 SELECT: CP-1 Door to CLOSED D5628 7300 CABINET CAB CP-1 DOOR OPEN - return After allowing the crew t o complete OS1201.06, or at the Lead Examiners discretion, continue to the next event.

NOTE: H2 pressure control will not be restored. The bearing oil will maintain 25 psig H2 pressure on loss of MSOPIESOP.

EVENT 2 Power Contact the control room as Load Dispatch. Direct a us Refers to OS1000.06, POWER DECREASE and OD1 decrease power decrease to 5 90% power within the next 15 56 for power reduction. Provides direction on rate and minutes due to pending grid limitations. Maintain control bands for operators. Conducts brief for power

-< 90% until cleared by Load Dispatch. decrease.

SUR Uses the LOAD SELECTOR load decrease push-NOTE: The power reduction allows the RO to satisfy the (R)eactivity button or LOAD LIMIT SET potentiometer to reduce control or (N)ormal control requirement and the US to satisfy load to maintain power and VAR loading.

the (N)ormal control requirement. Once met, the next event may be started.

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 1 Page 9 of 15 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors SUR If reducing load with the load selector, FOLLOW the load set with the load limit set potentiometer and the standby load set.

RO Initiates boration / inserts control rods to control RCS temperature and AFD.

Uses OD1 56 values or DETERMINES the quantity of boric acid required to make the desired reactivity change from RSI 735,Reactivity Calculations TURNS the BLENDER MODE START SWITCH to STOP PLACES the BORIC ACID BLENDER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH to BORATE.

CHECKYPLACES CS-FIC-111 in auto remote (AIR).

CHECKS/PLACES CS-FIC-110 in auto remote (AIR).

SETS CS-FIQ-111 controller to the desired flow rate.

SETS CS-FIQ-111 controller to the desired quantity.

NOTE: Operators are required t o remain at the makeup controls TURNS the BLENDER MODE START SWITCH to during the boration I dilution and makeup evolution. START. When the boric acid supply counter has added This will ensure proper system response is verified as its preset quantity, VERIFIES the boration stopped.

well as the desired amount.

RO As directed by US, RETURN the makeup controls to automatic blended makeup.

As directed by US, OPERATE pressurizer heaters to force spray to equalize boron concentration between the RCS and pressurizer.

us Provide oversight of power reduction. Notify plant management of plant status.

After the crew has dispatched NSO(s) to respond and initiated a power decrease, or at the lead examiners discretion, continue with the next event.

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 1 Paae 10 of 15 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors EVENT 3 Loss of 13.8 Initiate a loss of bus 1 as follows :

kV Bus 1 &

Rx Trip Demand 0 SELECT: MF List Crew must recognize demand for reactor trip and trip the reactor 0 SELECT: Electrical Distribution manually. Crew performs Immediate Actions (VAS).

(component) 0 SELECT: bkEDl UAT RO Trips the reactor MANUALLY (CT). Verifies reactor trip 0 SELECT: Fail Open (UAT BREAKER FAILS and bypass breakers open, neutron flux decreasing, OPEN) and rod bottom lights lit.

0 SELECT: INSERT A trip demand will occur when Bus 1 loses power SUR Trips the main turbine MANUALLY (CT). Verifies all due to loss of A & B RCPs and A & C CW pumps. turbine stop valves closed and generator breaker open.

On the plant trip, the pressure transient will cause Verifies power to AC Emergency busses, verifies all the spray valve to drift open to 30%. emergency busses energized.

NOTE: Combination of increased spray flow, abnormal PZR RO Checks if SI is actuated - IF YES, crew continues in pressure control and requirement to MANUALLY trip the E-0 after the US reads the //As. IF NO, crew will go to main turbine, automatic SI is expected. ES-0. I, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE after the US IF the crew established tripping the RCPs associated reads the //As.

with PZR spray as contingency actions after VAS to avoid depressurization to SI after a reactor trip, THEN an us Enters E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, automatic SI may not occur. In that case the crew will Step 1 and directs operator actions to verify VAS exit E-0 at step 4 to ES-0.1 Step I.Go to page 14. completed.

EVENT 4 SW-P-41A will trip and SW-P-41C will not RO Performs ATTACHMENT A. Notes the status of TRN automatically start. The crew will be required to A SW and starts SW-P-41C per ATTACHMENT A manually start SW-P-41C (CT) to provide cooling to RNO (CT).

the only available high head injection pump.

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 1 Page 11 of 15 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors SUR Performs operator actions on both sides of the MCB until RO has completed ATTACHMENT A.

US/SUR Checks if MSlVs should be closed - NO USlSUR Check CNTMT pressure has remained 18 psig - YES US/SUR Verifies total EFW > 500 gpm - YES USlSUR Monitors RCS temp stable at or trending to 557°F -

NO SUR As directed, opens EFW mini-flow and throttles EFW to reduce cooldown.

NOTE It is expected, but not required that the RO will have USlRO Checks RCS Isolated - NO completed ATTACHMENT A, briefed the US and returned to RO As directed, closes CS-VI45 to isolate the RCS performing MCB manipulations by Step 10 of E-0.

USlRO Checks PORVs closed - YES USlRO Checks PZR spray valves closed - NO NOTE: It is expected that if RCS pressure has not stabilized or RO AS directed, checks closed I closes spray valve and begun increasing, the crew will evaluate shutting down RC- shuts down RC-P-1C.

P-I C to minimize spray flow through the failed open spray valve.

RO As directed (NOTE) maintains seal injection flow to all RCPs.

US/RO Checks whether ALL RCPs should be stopped - NO, subcooling SAT US/SUR Checks for faulted SG - NO USlSUR Checks for ruptured SG - NO USlRO Checks whether RCS is intact - YES CREW Checks if ECCS flow should be reduced:

USlRO Checks RCS subcooling > 40°F - YES US/SUR Checks secondary heat sink - YES

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 1 Paae 12 of 15 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors NOTE: IF the crew did not stop RC-P-IC at RNO step 1Oc 2), then USlRO Checks RCS pressure stable or increasing - YES RCS pressure may not be stable or increasing. IF this occurs the crew will be forced to implement E-0 steps 16 -

26, returning to step 9 and then step 10 where they will have another opportunity to stop RC-P-1C to minimize spray flow.

USlRO Check PZR level > 5% - YES RO As directed, resets SI Verifies only CS-P-2A running and DOES NOT shut down CS-P-2A.

RO Checks RCS pressure stable or increasing - YES RO AS directed, opens CS-VI42 and 143, closes SI-VI38 and 139, establishes 60 gpm charging flow while maintaining 6 - 10 gpm seal injection flow.

us Exits E-0 to Step 7 of ES-1. I , SI TERMINATION.

CREW Begins monitoring CSFs for implementation.

NOTE: The scenario may be terminated at the Lead Examiners discretion or when the crew has established inventory control in ES-I . I , SI TERMINATION (step 15).

USlRO Check if SI pumps should be stopped - YES RO As directed, places SI pumps in STBY.

As directed, places RH pumps in STBY USlRO Verifies ECCS not required - YES (not required)

RO As directed, resets T signal (P signal NA)

CREW Checks Instrument Air:

USlSUR Verifies instrument air pressure normal - YES US/RO Verifies PCCW CNTMT isolations open - YES USlSUR Verifies CNTMT instrument air pressure normal - YES USlRO Checks if CBS pumps running - NO USlRO Check if Letdown can be established - YES

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 1 Pase 13 of 15 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors RO As directed, opens CC-V341, closes / checks closed letdown drag valves, opens CNTMT isolation valves, opens letdown valves, throttles a drag valve to establish letdown flow.

RO As directed, sets VCT makeup controls Expected E-Plan classification for this event: NO CLASSIFICATION RO As directed, aligns CCP suction to VCT.

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 1 Page 14 of 15 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors NOTE: This portion of the scenario is only applicable if the crew successfully took actions to prevent a Safety Injection actuation.

Transition t o us Enters ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE and ES-0.1 directs operator actions.

us Reads applicable CAUTIONS and NOTES of ES-0.1, reviews ES-0.1 OAS items with crew.

NOTE: It is expected that upon exiting E-0, the crew will CREW Takes action to restore TRN SW cooling by discover that SW-P41A has tripped and TRN A MANUALLY starting SW-P-41C (CT).

components have lost service water cooling. While SI has not actuated, restoration of TRN A SW remains a critical task as CS-P-2A is the only pump available for RCS inventory control and RCP seal injection.

US/RO Checks RCS temperature stable or trending to 557°F -

YES (trending to 557F)

US/SUR Checks RCS temperature c 557°F OR FWI actuated -

YES (FWI)

SUR Verifies FWI by status panel.

SUR Verifies total EFW > 500 gpm, verifies, main FW pumps tripped and closes FW pump discharge valves.

US/RO Verifies all control rods fully inserted - YES US/RO Check PZR level > 17% - YES US/RO Check charging in service - YES US/RO Check letdown in service - YES US/RO Check PZR level trending to 25% - YES US/RO Check VCT makeup controls set for required boron concentration and automatic - YES US/RO Checks PZR pressure > 1800 PSlG - YES UWRO Checks PZR pressure stable at or trending to 2235 PSIG - YES

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 1 Paae 15 of 15 us Reads CAUTIONS regarding overcooling of the plant and CST makeup.

US/SUR Verifies 5% NR level in at least one SG or 65% WR level in at least two SGs - YES US/SUR Verifies SUFP or MDEFW available - YES (both)

US/SUR Checks RCS temperature stable or increasing - YES SUR If not already performed per OAS, opens EFW mini-flow valves and controls SG levels 25% to 50%. I As directed by the Lead Examiner, terminate the scenario.

E-Plan classification for this scenario - NO CLASSIFICATION

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-I Facility: Seabrook Scenario No.: 2rl Op Test No.: 1 Examiners: Candidates: Palmieri - US Crosby - BOP Initial Conditions: Unit at 75% power.

Tu mover: Maintain current power level until cleared for pawer increase by system load control.

Entered TSASs for CS-P-2B being tagged out of service for planned maintenance 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago. Return to service expected within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Critical Tasks: 1. Control the EFW flow rate to not less than 25 GPM per SG in order to minimize the RCS cooldown rate before a severe (orange path) challenge develops to the integrity CSF. [ECA-2.1 A]

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Event Malf. No. Event No. Event Description 1 NA Power increase.

2 LtFWLT529 I (Both) Steam Generator narrow range level channel L529 will fail low. As it is the controlling channel, the feedwater control system will respond to increase feed flow to the B SG.

Operator action will be required to restore feed flow to normal and return B SG narrow range level to within Droqrammed band.

Manual actuation of MSI in the control room will not cause the MSlVs to close. Procedure progression will be E-0 jE-y 2 3 ECA-2.1 where the crew will be directed to reduce feed flow to all SGs to 25 gpm (CT) to avoid severe challenge to the Integrity CSF.

The motor operator overloads for EFW flow control valve FW-FV-4214A will trip as soon as the valve motion is demanded. The operator will be required to utilize FW-FV-4214B to control EFW flow to A SG.

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)n: rument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Page 1 of 12

Scenario Event Description Seabrook Simulator Scenario 2 The simulator is initialized at approximately 75% power at EOL. The plant was ordered to reduce power from 100% to current power level due to potential for grid loading limitations /

instability. After turnover the crew is cleared for power increase by system load control and expected to return to 100% at 5% / hr.

CS-P-2B is out of service for an oil change. T.S. 3.1.2.2, 3.1.2.4 and 3.5.2 were entered 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago. The pump is expected back in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

The controlling channel for SG B level control will fail low. The feedwater control system will respond to increase feed flow to SG B. Operator action will be required to restore feed flow to normal and return B SG narrow range level to within programmed band.

An inadvertent turbine trip causes a catastrophic rupture of the main steam bottle (down stream of MSIVs). The reactor fails to trip automatically. The crew will have to trip the reactor manually (CT). All four MSlVs will fail to close when the MSI signal is actuated. Manual actuation of MSI in the control room will not cause the MSIVs to close. Procedure progression will be E-0 to E-2 to ECA-2.1 where the crew will be directed to reduce feed flow to all SGs to 25 gpm (CT) to avoid severe challenge to the Integrity CSF. A component failure will occur as the operator attempts to limit EFW flow to SG A. The motor overloads for FW-FV-4214A will actuate and require the operator to utilize FW-FV-42148 to limit EFW to SG A to 25 gpm. When feed flow has been reduced, NSO(s) dispatched to the MSlVs will successfully close MSlVs in the west pipe chase (SG A and D). The crew will exit ECA-2.1 returning to E-2. With EFW limited to 25 gpm a RED condition will exist for the HEAT SINK CSF. A note at the beginning of FR-H.l states that the procedure should NOT be implemented if feed flow was reduced by operator action. The crew will continue to implement E-2 and transition to ES-1 .I, SI TERMINATION.

Page 2 of 12

Seabrook Simulator Scenario Setup Scenario 2 0 I Initialize the simulator at 75%, IC98

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1.

2. 0 I Protected train is A.

3. 0 Verify AFD is within 2 1% of target / adjust CBD as necessary 0 Place rod control in AUTOMATIC

4. 0 Place the control switch for CS-P-2B in PTL 0 Close CS-V-I 97 0 Danger tag CS-P-2B and CS-VI 97 0 Press the pushbutton control switch for CVCS TRAIN B BYP/INOP light

5. Run the following SCENARIO to fail AUTOMATIC reactor trip, fail closure of the MSIVs, and activate Event Triggers Demo ExamdExam 52M FWFV4214A Fails and Demo Exams/Exam 52M Steam Break:

0 SELECT: Scenario 0 SELECT: Demo exams 0 SELECT: Exam #52M setup 0 SELECT:RUN 0 mfRPSOOl, AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP FAILURE (TRAIN A)

MfRPS002, AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP FAILURE (TRAIN B) 0 svMSV86 IS0 VALVE FAILS OPEN

[7 svMSV88 I S 0 VALVE FAILS OPEN 0 svMSV9O IS0 VALVE FAILS OPEN 0 svMSV92 IS0 VALVE FAILS OPEN mvCSV197, MOV BREAKER STATUS OPEN 0 bkCSl P2B 52, BREAKER RACKED-OUT 0 SELECT: Event Triggers (Top Bar) 0 SELECT: Demo Exams/Exam 52M FWFV4214A Fails 0 VERIFY: ACTIVATED (Only options are to OPEN /ABORT / CLOSE)

SELECT: Demo ExamslExam 52M Steam Break 0 VERIFY: ACTIVATED (Only options are to OPEN /ABORT / CLOSE)

Page 3 of 12

Seabrook Simulator Scenario Turnover Information Scenario 2 Protected Train is A MODE 1: 75% RTP, CBD @ 165 steps (ARO = 228 steps), Boron Concentration = 149 ppm.

ODI-56 rev 7 on US desk, + I degrees = 4540 gal RMW, -1 degree change = 40 gal BA; AFD target - 0.65%, Current AFD - 0.69%

The plant was ordered to reduce power from 100% to current power level due to potential for grid loading limitations. When cleared by PSNH Load Dispatch, return to 100% power at 5%/hour. Power Aid for power increase is on US desk.

Centrifugal Charging Pump CS-P-2B is danger tagged out for oil change. Entered TSASs 3.1.2.2a, 3.1.2.4 and 3.5.2.a two hours prior to turnover. Expected return to service is 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after turnover.

Page 4 of 12

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 2 Page 5 of 12 SCENARIO OUTLINE EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors Shift Shift turnover informationas stated. us Provides operators with turnover.

Turnover Provide Turnover Sheet When directed by the Lead Examiner, call the crew as PSNH Load Dispatch. Clear the plant for load increase to 100%:

EVENT 1 Load us Briefs crew on power increase. Provides guidelines for Increase operator responsibilities and control bands. Provides Power Aid to BOP. Provides oversight on control manipulations SUR Uses RE provided estimates on RMW required for power increase or DETERMINES the quantity of RMW required to make the desired reactivity change from RS1735,Reactivity Calculations SUR As directed, aligns the controls and initiates dilution.

Uses control rods for power increase and AFD control.

BOP Selects loading rate as directed. Adjusts the LOAD LIMIT SET potentiometer 1% to 2% above current load. Uses the load selector LOAD INCREASE push-button and verifies LOAD INCREASING lamp illuminates. Verifies expected response on turbine 1st stage pressure and control valve response.

Follows the load set with the standby load set.

At Lead Examiners discretion, initiate the next event.

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 2 Page 6 of 12 INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors EVENT 2 FW-L529 Perform the following to initiate failure of the Fails Low controlling NR level channel for SG B:

0 SELECT MF List BOP Acknowledges alarms, notes failed SG B level channel, 0 SELECT Feedwater (Component) recommends manual control of SG B level control to return SG B level to program.

0 SELECT ltFWLT529 us Acknowledges report, directs BOP to use manual 0 Double Click control of SG B feed regulating valve to return SG B 0 SELECT FAIL LOW NR level to program. May direct halt of power 0 INSERT increase.

Refers to OS1235.03, SG LEVEL INSTRUMENT FAILURE.

us Directs operator actions and provides oversight of control manipulations.

BOP Identifies failed channel as controlling channel, establishes MANUAL control of SG B feed regulating valve and restores SG B NR level 50% to 70%.

Selects an alternate SG level channel for control.

Restores SG B FF/SF matched and level at program, then returns SG B level control to AUTO.

SUR Verifies no redundant SG B NR level channels tripped on UL-1 and UL-6.

CREW Verifies no redundant SG B NR level channels tripped on UL-12 us Refers to TSs. TS 3.3.1 Table 3.3-1 Item 13 and TS 3.3.2 Table 3.3-3 Items 5.b, 6.a, 7.c, 1O.c and 3.3.3.6 Table 3.3-10, Item 7 are applicable.

us Contacts Work Week Manager for support on troubleshooting and repair. Informs plant management of failure. Coordinates with I&C

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 2 Paae 7 of 12 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors USlBOP Check for ATWS mitigation channel failed - NO NOTE: At the discretion of the lead Examiner, bypass the failed channel or trip the failed channel as directed by the US. IF the Lead Examiner chooses, the next event can be initiated without bypassing or placing the channel in trip condition.

The scenario will not be affected either way.

NOTE: f the crew chooses t o use BTI. Derform the followina:

SELECT: Panel Overview SELECT: BTI CP-1 SELECT: CP-I Door to OPEN D5628 7300 CABINET CAB CP-1 DOOR OPEN SELECT: ENABLE D4562 7300 CABINET CP-1 BYPASSED / INOP SELECT: LB-529A to BYPASS SELECT: LB-5298 to BYPASS F4840 SG B LEVEL LO-LO - return SELECT: CP-1 Door to CLOSED D5628 7300 CABINET CAB CP-1 DOOR OPEN - return NOTE: If the crew chooses NOT to use BTI, perform the following to trip the bistables:

0 SELECT: Panel Overview 0 SELECT: Trip CP-1 D5628 7300 CABINET CAB CP-1 DOOR OPEN 0 SELECT: CP-1 Door to OPEN 0 SELECT: LB 529A to the UP position D4777 SG B LEVEL HI-HI CHANNEL TRIP 0 SELECT: LB 5298 to the UP position F4840 SG B LEVEL LO-LO - already in alarm SELECT: CP-1 Door to CLOSED 05628 7300 CABINET CAB CP-1 DOOR OPEN - return After allowing the crew to complete OS1235.03, or at the Lead Examiners discretion, continue to the next event.

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 2 Pane 8 of 12 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors EVENT 3 Turbine Trip Initiate an inadvertentturbine trip as follows:

Steam Break ECA-2.1 0 SELECT: Panel PFF14 I Crew must recognize demand for reactor trip and trip the reactor manually. Crew performs Immediate Actions (VAS).

0 SELECT: Insert OR 0 SELECT: Main Turbine TRIP pushbutton SUR Trips the reactor MANUALLY (CT). Verifies reactor trip 0 SET Final Value: TRIP and bypass breakers open, neutron flux decreasing, and rod bottom lights lit.

0 INSERT Verifies all turbine stop valves closed and generator breaker open.

A trip demand will occur when the main turbine trips. Verifies power to AC Emergency busses, verifies all The catastrophic steam break will be initiated when emergency busses energized.

the turbine trips. Verify that Event Trigger Demo SUR Checks if SI is actuated, Verifies both trains of SI exams\Exam 25M Steam Break has actuated: actuated.

SELECT: Malfunctions (Top Bar) us Enters E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY VERIFY: mfMSO5l MAIN STEAM BOTTLE INJECTION, Step 1 and directs operator actions to BREAK - INSERTED at 1.0 verify VAS completed.

SUR Performs ATTACHMENT A.

An automatic SVMSI is actuated but the MSlVs do BOP Performs operator actions on both sides of the MCB not close. until SUR has completed ATTACHMENT A.

US/BOP Checks if MSlVs should be closed - YES BOP As directed, attempts to close the MSlVs from the MCB USlBOP Check CNTMT pressure has remained < 18 psig - YES

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 2 Paae 9 of 12 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors NOTE: It is likely that EFW flow to one SG will be automatically US/BOP Verifies total EFW > 500 gpm - YES isolated by the HIGH FLOW isolation. IF FW-FV-4214A received an isolation signal the valve will fail nearly full open due to the component failure scripted into the scenario.

US/BOP Monitors RCS temp stable at or trending to 557°F -

NO EVENT 4 When the BOP begins to throttle EFW to SG A using BOP As directed, opens EFW mini-flow and throttles EFW to FW-FV-4214A, Event Trigger Demo ExamdExam reduce cooldown. Notes loss of FW-FV-4214A control 52M FW4214A Fails will de-energized the MOV. and uses FW-FV-42148 to throttle EFW flow.

Maintains total > 500 gpm.

NOTE It is expected, but not required that the SUR will have US/SUR Checks RCS Isolated - YES completed ATTNJ-WENT A, briefed the us and returned to SUR As directed (NOTE) maintains seal injection flow to all performing MCB manipulations by Step 10 of E-0. RCPs.

US/SUR Checks whether ALL RCPs should be stopped - NO, subcooling SAT US/BOP Checks for Faulted SG - YES us Exits E-0 to E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step 1 Crew Begins monitoring CSFs for implementation.

us Reads applicable CAUTIONS and NOTES from E-2 US/BOP Check if MSlVs and Bypasses are closed - NO US/BOP If not already dispatched, directs NSO(s) to locally close MSIVs.

US/BOP Checks if ANY SG pressure boundaries are intact - NO us Exits E-2 to ECA-2.1, UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS, Step 1.

us Reads applicable CAUTIONS and NOTE@)of ECA-2.1 US/BOP Checks if MSlVs and Bypasses are closed - NO US/BOP Checks SG ASDVs closed - YES

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 2 Paqe 10 of 12 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors US/BOP Checks FWRV and FWRV Bypasses closed - YES.

US/BOP Checks FWlVs closed - YES USlBOP Checks MDEFW or SUFP supplying SG(s) - YES US/BOP Checks MS-V393 and MS-V394 closed - NO SUR As directed, closes MS-V393 and MS-V394.

US/BOP Checks SGBD isolation valves closed - YES us Reads CAUTION requiring minimum of 25 gpm EFW to each SG with NR level c 5%.

US/BOP Checks if RCS Cold Leg cooldown rate is c 100°F/HR -

NO NOTE: Control limitations associated with EFW throttle valves may BOP Throttles EFW to establish minimum flow of 25 gpm to challenge the operator when minimizing flow and each SG (CT).

maintaining a minimum of 25 gpm.

NOTE: It is expected that the crew will pursue restoring 25 gpm to any SG isolated automatically on high flow AFTER the EFW lines are walked down.

Isolation of As soon as feed flow has been minimized to all SGs, USBUR Checks RCS Hot Leg temperatures stable or SG A and D DELETE the malfunctions blocking closure of SG A decreasing - YES and D MSIVs:

0 SELECT: Component Malfs (Top Bar) US/SUR Checks whether ALL RCPs should be stopped - NO, 0 SELECT: mfMSV86 subcooling SAT.

SELECT: Delete MF US/BOP Checks CST inventory =- 250,000 gallons - YES c] SELECT: mfMSV92 US/BOP Checks secondary radiation - NORMAL.

0 SELECT: Delete MF Acknowledges NSO report, begins monitoring SG A and D pressures and informs crew when pressure in either SG A or SG D is increasing.

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 2 Page 11 of 12 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors NOTE: The crew should exit ECA-2.1 to E-2 as soon as pressure in us Notes ECA-2.1 OAS item 2 and exits ECA-2.1 when any SG increases. any SG pressure increases.

Isolation of 0 SELECT: Component Malfs (Top Bar)

SGBandC 0 SELECT: mfMSV88 0 SELECT: Delete MF 0 SELECT: mfMSV9O 0 SELECT: Delete MF NOTE: A CAUTION prior to step Iof FR-H.1 states that the Crew Notes HEAT SINK CSF - RED procedure should not be performed if EFW flow is < 500 us Notes CAUTION in FR-H.l prior to step 1 and does gpm due to operator action. NOT perform FR-H. 1. Continues with E-2.

CUE: As an NSO, report that the MSlVs for SG A and D have BOP Acknowledges NSO report, informs crew of MSlV been closed from the west pipe chase. status.

us Reads applicable CAUTIONS and NOTES of E-2.

US/BOP Checks if MSlVs and Bypasses are closed - YES US/BOP Checks if ANY SG pressure is stable or increasing -

YES US/BOP Checks for any SG pressure decreasing in uncontrolled manner or any SG completely depressurized - IF YES, USBOP perform step 4 and isolate EFW flow to affected SGs. IF NO, go to step 5.

US/BOP Checks CST inventory > 250,000 gallons - YES US/BOP Checks secondary radiation - NORMAL I CREW: Checks id ECCS flow should be reduced:

USlSUR Check RCS subcooling > 40°F - YES USlBOP Checks secondary heat sink - NO us Exits E-2 to E-I, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, step 1 us Reads NOTES of E-I

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 2 Page 12 of 12 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors US/SUR Checks if RCPs should be stopped - NO US/BOP Checks for FAULTED SGs- NO US/BOP Checks secondary heat sink - NO BOP As directed, establishes a total EFW > 500 gpm until level is adequate.

US/BOP Checks secondary radiation - NORMAL us Reads CAUTION regarding actuation of PORVs on PZR pressure or LTOP.

US/SUR Checks PORVs available - YES CREW Checks if ECCS flow should be reduced:

US/SUR Checks RCS subcooling > 40°F - YES US/BOP Checks secondary heat sink - YES USBUR Checks RCS pressure stable or increasing - YES US/SUR Check PZR level > 5% - YES us Exits E-I to ES-1.1, SI TERMINATION.

As directed by the Lead Examiner, terminate the scenario.

E-Plan classificationfor this scenario - UE 15b (Although H-RED existed, the condition was operator induced and LOSS OF HEAT SINK was not valid).

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Seabrook Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: 1 Examiners: Candidates: Palmieri - US Crosby - PSO / BOP Initial Conditions: Unit at 100% power.

Turnover: Entered TSASs for CS-P-2B being tagged out of service for planned maintenance 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago. Return to service expected within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Critical Tasks: 1. MANUALLY trip the reactor from the control room when SSPS fails to automatically trip the reactor. [E-0, A]

2. Establish feed flow into at least one SG before RCS bleed and feed is required [FR-H.l, A]

Event Malf. No. Event No. Type* Event Description 1 ttRCTT411 I (Both) RCS Loop 1 NR cold leg RTD fails high. Loop 1 Tavg increases and Loopl AT decreases. Loopl becomes the auctioneered high channel and NSSS control systems respond. Used if the RO candidate is on the primary side of the MCB.

2 NA The Load Dispatcher contacts the control room to order a power reduction to 5 90% power due to pending grid limitations.

3 ctMSPK300 1 C (Both) Main steam pressure controller MS-PK-3001 has an internal failure causing the setpoint to fail LOW. MS-PK-3001 controls the ASDV for SG A. The ASDV is driven full open when the setpoint fails LOW. Used if the RO candidate is on the secondary side of the MCB.

4 mfED025 C (Both) Vital 120 VAC power panel I-EDE-PP-1A loses power when the inverter supplying the power panel malfunctions.

CHANNEL I RPS / SSPS is affected. Control systems using CHANNEL I inputs are affected.

Page 1 of 17

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 5 mfEDOO5 M (Both) The normal UAT feeder to 4.16kV Bus 3 inadvertently trips C (Both) open. The breaker for the alternate feeder to Bus 3 (RAT) fails to close and Bus 3 de-energizes. The immediate impact is loss of power to condensate pumps CO-P-30A and 30C (STBY) as well as heater drain pump HD-P31A. Flow to the MFPs is significantly reduced and MFP suction pressure drops rapidly. The MFPs will sequentially trip on LOW suction pressure. When the first MFP trips, a Turbine Setback will be actuated. SG levels will decrease to the SG LO-LO level reactor trip setpoint. The reactor will fail to trip automatically. The operators will be forced to trip the reactor MANUALLY (CT). When the reactor trips the Main Turbine will fail to automatically trip and will not trip manually. The operators will be required to actuate MSI. As soon as the TDEFW pump steam supply valve begins to open, the TDEFW pump will trip on overspeed. After running for a short time the shaft of the MDEFW pump will shear, resulting in loss of all feed to the SGs. If the crew attempts to restore feed using the SUFP, the Bus 5 breaker will fail to close.

The crew will be able to restore feed to the SGs by resetting the TDEFW (CT). The procedure progression will be from E-0 a FR-H. 1 3 E-0 3 ES-1.1.

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (1)n: ument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Page 2 of 17

Scenario Event Description Seabrook Simulator Scenario 3 NOTE: This scenario has been written as a spare. Events have been included to provide for evaluation of the RO candidate on either side of the MCB. It is assumed that only those events required to meet the evaluation requirements will be executed during the scenario.

The simulator is initialized at 100% power. The crew is instructed to maintain power. Load Control is conducting a system wide test, and needs the MVAR loading to be maintained at 400 lagging.

CS-P-2B is out of service for an oil change. T.S. 3.1.2.2, 3.1.2.4 and 3.5.2 were entered 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago. The pump is expected back in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

IF the RO candidate is on the primary side of the MCB, RCS Loop 1 NR cold leg RTD fails high.

Loop 1 indicated Tavg increases and Loopl indicated AT decreases. Loopl becomes the auctioneered high channel and NSSS control systems respond. The automatic rod control system drives rods IN at maximum speed until the operator places rods in MANUAL. The PZR level control system REFERENCE LEVEL fails to 100% of programmed level. As the plant is at 100% power PZR control is not adversely affected. The condenser steam dumps receive a demand signal but do not open because they not are not armed. The crew will utilize abnormal procedure OS1201.08, TAVG/DELTA T FAILURE to respond to the failure.

The Load Dispatcher contacts the control room to order a power reduction to 5 90% power due to pending grid limitations. The crew will utilize major plant evolution procedure OS1000.06, POWER DECREASE and OD1 56 to perform the power reduction.

IF the RO candidate is on the secondary side of the MCB, main steam pressure controller MS-PK-3001 will fail due to an internal fault causing the setpoint to fail LOW. MS-PK-3001 controls the ASDV for SG A. The ASDV is driven full open when the setpoint fails LOW. The crew will take action to close the ASDV using guidance from the MPCS VAS procedure.

Vital 120 VAC power panel 1-EDE-PP-1A loses power when the inverter supplying the power panel malfunctions. CHANNEL I RPS / SSPS is affected. Control systems using CHANNEL I inputs are affected. RCS letdown will be isolated when the controlling channel of PZR level fails low. The PZR pressure control system will generate a demand for all PZR heaters to be energized when the controlling channel fails low. The heaters will not energize due to the PZR level channel failing low. Automatic rod control (insertion) will occur due to the TREF signal going to NO-LOAD value when the controlling channel of main turbine 1 stage pressure fails low. SG level control for two of the SGs and MFP speed control will be affected. The crew will utilize abnormal procedure OS1247.01, LOSS OF A 120 VAC VITAL INSTRUMENT PANEL (PPIA, 1b, 1C RO 1D) to respond. Power will be restored to the power panel from its alternate source by an NSO as directed by the control room.

The normal UAT feeder to 4.16kV Bus 3 inadvertently will trip open. The breaker for the alternate feeder to Bus 3 (RAT) fails to close and Bus 3 de-energizes. The immediate impact is loss of power to condensate pumps CO-P-30A and 30C (STBY) as well as heater drain pump HD-P-31A. Flow to the MFPs is significantly reduced and MFP suction pressure drops rapidly.

The MFPs will sequentially trip on LOW suction pressure. When the first MFP trips, a Turbine Setback will be actuated. SG levels will decrease to the SG LO-LO level reactor trip setpoint.

The reactor will fail to trip automatically. The operators will be forced to trip the reactor MANUALLY (CT). When the reactor trips, the Main Turbine will fail to automatically trip and will not trip manually. The operators will be required to actuate MSI. Automatic SI will be actuated Page 3 of 17

Scenario Event Description Seabrook Simulator Scenario 3 due to the excessive cooldown caused by the failure of the main turbine to trip. As soon as the TDEFW pump steam supply valve begins to open, the TDEFW pump will trip on overspeed.

After running for a short time the shaft of the MDEFW pump will shear, resulting in loss of all feed to the SGs. If the crew attempts to restore feed using the SUFP, the Bus 5 breaker will fail to close. The crew will be able to restore feed to the SGs by resetting the TDEFW (CT).

The procedure progression will be from E-0 g FR-H.l 3 E-0 3 ES-1.I.

Page 4 of 17

Seabrook Simulator Scenario Setup Scenario 3

1. 0 I Initialize the simulator at 1OO%, IC 300 C9 BOL

2. I Protected train is A.

3. 0 Place the control switch for CS-P-2B in PTL 0 Close CS-V-197 0 Danger tag CS-P-2B and CS-VI 97 0 Press the pushbutton control switch for CVCS TRAIN B BYP/INOP light

4. 0 CHECWPLACE two SG FF/SF & level input channels from CHANNEL I and two from CHANNEL II

5. Run the following SCENARIO to rack-out the breaker for CS-P-2B, de-energize CS-V197, fail automatic trip of the reactor, fail automatic and manual trip of the turbine, fail automatic MSI, fail manual actuation of TRN B MSI, fail closure of the Bus 3 RAT breaker, and activate Event Triggers Demo exams/Exam 25M TDENV Trip and Demo exams/Exam 25M MDEFW shaft shears:

0 SELECT: Scenario SELECT: Demo exams 0 SELECT: Exam #25M setup 0 SELECT:RUN Verify the following inserted / activated:

0 mfRPSOOl, AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP FAILURE (TRAIN A) 0 mfRPSOO2, AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP FAILURE (TRAIN B) 0 mfRPS003, AUTOMATIC TURBINE TRIP FAILURE 0 mfRPSOl9, MS ISOLATION FAILS TO ACTUATE (TRAIN A) 0 mfRPS020, MS ISOLATION FAILS TO ACTUATE (TRAIN By) 0 I bkED3RAT BREAKER FAILS OPEN 0 IOOZMDIEHCUC3851TVT, MAIN TURBINE TRIP overridden to RELEASE 0 IOOZMDIMSCS30851, TRN B MSI ACTUATION overridden to RESET 0 mvCSVl97, MOV BREAKER STATUS OPEN 0 bkCSl P2B 52, BREAKER RACKED-OUT Page 5 of 17

Seabrook Simulator Scenario Setup Scenario 3 SELECT: Event Triggers (Top Bar) 0 SELECT: Demo Exams/Exam 25M TDEFW Trip 0 VERIFY: ACTIVATED (Only options are to OPEN /ABORT / CLOSE) 0 SELECT: Event Triggers (Top Bar) 0 SELECT: Demo ExamdExam 25M MDEFW shaft shears 0 VERIFY: ACTIVATED (Only options are to OPEN /ABORT / CLOSE)

I SELECT: Event Triggers (Top Bar) 0 SELECT: Demo Exams/Exam 25M SUFP AF breaker fails open 0 VERIFY: ACTIVATED (Only options are to OPEN /ABORT / CLOSE)

Page 6 of 17

Seabrook Simulator Scenario Turnover Information Scenario 3 Protected Train is A Mode 1: 100% RTP, ARO = 228 steps CBD, Boron Concentration = 1293 ppm. ODi-56 rev 7 on US desk, + I degree = 88 gal RMW, -1 degree change = 19 gal BA; AFD target - 0.65%, Current AFD - 0.69%

Centrifugal Charging Pump CS-P-2B is danger tagged out for oil change. Entered TSASs 3.1 .2.2a, 3.1.2.4 and 3.5.2.a two hours prior to turnover. Expected return to service is 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after turnover.

Page 7 of 17

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 3 Page 8 of 17 SCENARIO OUTLINE EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors Shift Shift turnover information as stated. None Turnover Provide Turnover Sheet When directed by the Lead Examiner, initiate the following event:

Loop I Tc Insert Loop I Tc Fails high as follows:

Fails high 0 SELECT: MF List RO Notes automatic rod insertion, checks for failed input to 0 SELECT REACTOR COOLANT (component) rod control.

c] DOUBLE CLICK: ttRCTT411 us Acknowledges report, directs BOP to check for Turbine Runback / Setback.

0 SELECT: Fail High BOP Verifies no Turbine Runback / Setback. Checks for 0 SELECT: Insert failed input to rod control.

RO Notes abnormal Loop1 indication The automatic rod control system drives rods IN at us Acknowledges report of RC Loop Iindication failure maximum speed until the operator places rods in and directs RO to place rod control in MANUAL.

MANUAL. Steam dumps get open demand but are RO PLACES rod control in MANUAL. Pulls up VPROs not armed and do not open. us Refers to OS1201.08, TAVGlDELTA T FAILURE and directs operator actions.

USlRO Checks for ANY Tavg Channel failed high - YES RO Verifies rod control in MANUAL.

USlBOP Checks condenser steam dump valves closed - YES RO Defeats Loop IAT inputs, defeats Loop 1 Tavg input and selects a non affected channel for recording.

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 3 Page 9 of 17 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors US/RO Checks Tavg within 2 1°F of Tref - IF YES, US will likely delay returning rod control to A UT0 until rods have been restored to ARO position. IF NO US will direct RO to restore Tavg within I F of Tret US/RO Checks PZR level trending to program - YES US/BOP Verifies steam dump interlock selector switches positioned to NA RESET or NA BYPASS INTERLOCK

- YES US/RO Verifies no redundant channel bistables tripped.

us Refers to TS 3.3.1, table 3.3-1 item 7 & 8. TR 19.

Notifies I&C to initiate troubleshooting.

us Coordinates tripping of bistables or using BTI to bypass the failed channel for troubleshooting or testing. Notifies Work Week Manager and plant management regarding failure.

NOTE: At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, bypass the failed channel or trip the failed channel as directed by the US. IF the Lead Examiner chooses, the next event can be initiated without bypassing or placing the channel in trip condition. The scenario will not be affected either way.

NOTE: If the crew chooses to use BTI, perform the following:

SELECT: Panel Overview SELECT: BTI CP-I SELECT: CP-I Door to OPEN D5628 7300 CABINET CAB CP-1 DOOR OPEN SELECT: ENABLE D4562 7300 CABINET CP-1 BYPASSED / INOP SELECT: TB-411C to the UP position OTAT Trip SELECT: TB-411G to the UP position OPAT Trip SELECT: TB-412D to the UP position Low-Low Tavg P-I 2 SELECT: TB-412G to the UP position Low Tavg FWI SELECT: CP-I Door to CLOSED D5628 7300 CABINET CAB CP-1 DOOR OPEN - return

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 3 Page 10 of 17 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors NOTE: If the crew chooses NOT to use BTI, perform the following t o trip the bistables:

SELECT: Panel Overview SELECT: Trip CP-I D5628 7300 CABINET CAB CP-1 DOOR OPEN SELECT: CP-1 Door to OPEN SELECT: TB-411C to the UP position OTAT Trip SELECT: TB-411G to the UP position OPAT Trip SELECT: TB-412D to the UP position Low-Low Tavg P-I 2 SELECT: TB-412G to the UP position Low Tavg FWI SELECT: CP-1 Door to CLOSED D5628 7300 CABINET CAB CP-1 DOOR OPEN - return After allowing the crew to complete OS1201.08, or at the Lead Examiners discretion, continue to the next event.

Power Contact the control room as Load Dispatch. Direct a us Refers to OS1000.06, POWER DECREASE and OD1 decrease power decrease to 5 90% power within the next 15 56 for power reduction. Provides direction on rate and minutes due to pending grid limitations. Maintain control bands for operators. Conducts brief for power

- 90% until cleared by Load Dispatch. decrease.

BOP Uses the LOAD SELECTOR load decrease push-NOTE: The power reduction allows the RO to satisfy the (R)eactivity button or LOAD LIMIT SET potentiometer to reduce control or (N)ormal control requirement and the US to satisfy load to maintain power and VAR loading.

the (N)ormal control requirement. Once met, the next event If reducing load with the load selector, FOLLOW the may be started. load set with the load limit set potentiometer and the standby load set.

RO Initiates boration / inserts control rods to control RCS temperature and AFD.

Uses OD1 56 values or DETERMINES the quantity of boric acid required to make the desired reactivity change from RSI735,Reactivity Calculations

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 3 Page 11 of 17 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors TURNS the BLENDER MODE START SWITCH to STOP PLACES the BORIC ACID BLENDER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH to BORATE.

CHECKWPLACES CS-FIC-111 in auto remote (AIR).

CHECKS/PLACES CS-FIC-1 10 in auto remote (AIR).

SETS CS-FIQ-1I 1 controller to the desired flow rate.

SETS CS-FIQ-I 11 controller to the desired quantity.

NOTE: Operators are required to remain at the makeup controls TURNS the BLENDER MODE START SWITCH to during the boration I dilution and makeup evolution. START. When the boric acid supply counter has added This will ensure proper system response is verified as its preset quantity, VERIFIES the boration stopped.

well as the desired amount.

As directed by US, RETURN the makeup controls to automatic blended makeup.

RO As directed by US, OPERATE pressurizer heaters to force spray to equalize boron concentration between the RCS and pressurizer.

At the lead examiners discretion, continue with the next event. us Provide oversight of power reduction. Notify plant management of load restrictions.

EVENT 3 MS-PK-3001 Initiate failure of MS-PK-3001 as follows:

FaiIu re 0 SELECT: MF list D5214 ASDV A NOT FULL CLOSED 0 SELECT: Main Steam (Component) BOP Acknowledges VAS and Hardwired alarms. Informs 0 Double Click: ctMSPK3001 crew that the ASDV for SG A is full open. Notes controller SETPOINT is pegged LOW. Pulls up VPRO.

0 SELECT: FAIL SETPOINT us Directs operator action per VPRO or HWAS for UA-53 0 SET VALUE: 0 A-7.

0 INSERT BOP Places ASDV control switch to close, places MS-PK-3001 in MANUAL - MINIMUM

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 3 Paae 12 of 17 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors us Refers to TS 3.7.1.6 and 3.6.3. ASDV remains operable as long as it can be MANUALLY operated form the MCR us Contact Work Week manager and / or I&C for support and troubleshooting. Informs station management.

EVENT 4 Loss of Initiate loss of PP-1A as follows:

PP-1A 0 SELECT: MF List CREW Diagnoses loss of power panel based on plant 0 SELECT: ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION response and indicationsfrom MCB.

SELECT: mfED025 LOSS OF UPS-MA RO Notes automatic control rod insertion, recommends placing rod control in MANUAL based on indications of INSERT failed power panel.

us Acknowledges input from RO, directs RO to place rod control in MANUAL Automatic rod control (insertion) will occur due to the RO Places rod control in MANUAL.

TREF signal going to NO-LOAD value when the controlling channel of main turbine 1st stage pressure fails low.

us Enters abnormal procedure OS1247.01, LOSS OF A 120 VAC VITAL INSTRUMENT PANEL (PPIA, I B , I C RO 1D) and directs operator actions.

SG level control for two of the SGs and MFP speed US/BOP CHECKS SG steam flow /feed flow matched - NO control will be affected.

BOP As directed, places affected SG FRV in MANUAL and controls NR level 50% to 70%.

Places MFP speed controller in MANUAL and maintains MFP speed at program.

Selects alternate control channels for affected controls.

US/BOP Checks steam dump valves closed - YES

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 3 Paqe 13 of 17 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors The PZR pressure control system will generate a USlRO Checks PZR pressure control stable or trending to demand for all PZR heaters to be energized when 2235 PSlG - YES the controlling channel fails low. The heaters will not energize due to the PZR level channel failing low.

USlRO Check for affected PZR pressure instrument - YES RO As directed, places PZR pressure control in MANUAL, selects an alternate controlling channel and recording channel.

RCS letdown will be isolated when the controlling USlRO Check PZR level stable or trending to program - NO channel of PZR level fails low. PZR level will trend up due to continued charging.

RO As directed, reduces charging flow to minimize PZR level increase.

USlRO Check for affected PZR level instrument - YES When directed as NSO to transfer PP-1A to the maintenance supply, RO As directed, places PZR level control in MANUAL, perform the following: selects an alternate controlling channel and recording channel. Resets the PZR control group heaters.

0 SELECT: D-Points USlRO Checks if letdown was isolated - YES 0 SELECT: EDE USlRO Checks if letdown can be re-established - YES 0 SELECT: svo6003EDE RO As directed, establishes 50 gpm charging, verifies PZR 0 SELECT: ALARM level > 17%, aligns cooling to letdown heat exchanger, INSERT closes letdown drag valves, opens letdown isolation valves, re-establishes letdown flow RO Unless already defeated by EVENT 1, defeats CHAN I 0 SELECT: Malfunctions (Top Bar) input to 7300 processes by selecting Loop 1 AT, Tavg 0 SELECT: mfED025 and selects non affected channel for recording.

0 SELECT: DELETE Crew Determines PP-1A affected.

us Dispatches NSO to check status of UPS and to re-energize PP-1A from its maintenance supply.

us Directs actions to restore normal system alignment.

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 3 Paae 14 of 17 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors RO As directed, resets N41 rate trips, restores defeated Loop 1 Tavg and AT channels.

RO As directed, restores PZR pressure control to preferred alignment (455/456).

RO As directed, restores AUTO control of rods, PZR level and PZR pressure control.

BOP As directed, returns SG level control and MFP speed control to AUTO.

us Evaluates TS 3.8.3.1 and 3.3.3.6. Contacts Work Week manager / Electrical maintenance for support /

troubleshooting. Informs plant management.

After allowing the crew to complete OS1247.01, or at the Lead Examiners discretion, continue to the next event.

EVENT 5 Loss of Bus Initiate loss of 4.16 kV Bus 3 as follows:

3 - Loss of Heat Sink 0 SELECT: MF List BOP Notes VAS alarms associated with loss of Bus 3.

0 SELECT: Electrical Distribution Reports Turbine Setback in progress due to loss of condensate pump CO-P-30A. Reports MFP suction 0 SELECT: mfEDOO5 BUS 3 UAT BREAKER pressure decreasing and feed flow decreasing to all TRIP (86 LOCKOUT)

SGs.

0 INSERT us Based on time available, US may enter OS1231.03, TURBINE RUNBACK / SETBACK. Directs reactor trip based on procedure guidance that the plant cannot survive setbacks due to loss of feed from greater than 85% power.

IF automatic reactor trip demand occurs, the reactor Crew must recognize demand for reactor trip and trip the reactor will not trip. manually. Crew performs Immediate Actions (VAS).

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 3 Paae 15 of 17 INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors RO Trips the reactor MANUALLY (CT). Verifies reactor trip and bypass breakers open, neutron flux decreasing, and rod bottom lights lit.

NOTE: Automatic and manual turbine trip is blocked. Automatic BOP Attempts to trip the main turbine MANUALLY. Notes MSI is blocked. Manual TRN B MSI is blocked. All included that the turbine did not trip and actuates TRB B MSI to cause automatic SI. (MCB-EF). When MSlVs fail to close, actuates TRN A MSI and verifies all MSlVs close. When generator output is zero, opens the generator breaker.

NOTE: As soon as MS-V395 starts opening, the TDEFW pump trips.

Verifies power to AC Emergency busses, verifies all emergency busses energized.

RO Checks if SI is actuated, Verifies both trains of SI actuated.

us Enters E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, Step 1 and directs operator actions to verify VAS completed.

RO Performs ATTACHMENT A.

BOP Performs operator actions on both sides of the MCB until RO has completed ATTACHMENT A.

US/BOP Checks if MSlVs should be closed - NO, but MSIVs are closed US/BOP Check CNTMT pressure has remained < 18 psig - YES NOTE: When the crew attempts to start the SUFP, the Bus 5 US/BOP Verifies total EFW > 500 gpm - NO breaker will fail to close.

BOP As directed, attempts to start the SUFP. Notes that the Bus 5 breaker fails to close.

us Exits E-0 to FR-H.1, REPSONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK, Step 1 us Reads CAUTIONS, NOTES and applicable OAS items CREW Determines whether secondary heat sink is required -

YES.

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 3 Page 16 of 17 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors US/RO Checks if at least one CCP is available - YES US/BOP Checks if SGBD is isolated - YES US/BOP Determines cause of loss of EFW - TDEFW tripped on overspeed; MD EFW pump shaft sheared. SUFP breaker failure.

US/BOP Monitors RCS temp stable at or trending to 557°F -

YES, temperature is trending to 557°F.

NOTE It is expected, but not required that the RO will have US/RO Checks RCS Isolated - NO completed ATTACHMENT A, briefed the US and returned to RO directed, closes C S - V I ~ ~to isolate the RCS performing MCB manipulations by Step 10 of E-0.

US/RO Checks PORVs closed - YES US/RO Checks PZR spray valves closed - YES RO As directed (NOTE) maintains seal injection flow to all RCPs.

US/RO Checks whether ALL RCPs should be stopped - NO, subcooling SAT When directed as NSO to restore EFW by resetting the TDEFW: US/BOP Checks for faulted SG - NO US/BOP Checks for ruptured SG - NO SELECT: RF List US/RO Checks whether RCS is intact - YES SELECT: Main Steam (Component) CREW Checks if ECCS flow should be reduced:

SELECT: rmvMSVl29 US/RO Checks RCS subcooling > 40°F - YES SELECT: RF: MANUAL US/BOP Checks secondary heat sink - NO, as MDEFW shaff SET RAMP to 30 sec; VALUE to 1.O has sheared.

US/BOP Determine whether SUFP is immediately available -

Contact control room to open FW-V346 and when NO opened: US/BOP Directs NSO to locally restore EFW flow per OS1036.03.

0 INSERT us Goes to step 4

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 3 Pane 17 of 17 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors NOTE: Step 5 of FR-H.1 is CONTINUOUS ACTION step. As RO As directed, stops all RCPs soon as EFW flow has been established, the crew US/BOP Checks power to SUFP - NO should exit to procedure and step in effect (E-0, Step 8).

US/BOP Initiate switchover of SUFP from Bus 5 to Bus 4 breaker CUE: Report as the NSO at the TDEFW pump that flow has BOP Notes EFW > 500 gpm feed flow to SGs as indicated been restored. on MCB and reported by NSO (CT).

us Determines feed and bleed is NOT in progress and exits FR-H.l to procedure and step in effect (E-0).

CREW Returns to E-0 step 8 and proceeds through procedure to step 15 where they check if ECCS flow should be reduced - YES.

NOTE: The scenario may be terminated at the Lead Examiners discretion.

US/RO Checks if RCS subcooling is > 40°F - YES US/BOP Checks if secondary heat sink is adequate - YES US/RO Checks RCS pressure stable or increasing - YES US/RO Check PZR level > 5% - YES RO As directed, resets SI Verifies only CS-P-2A running and DOES NOT shut down CS-P-2A.

RO Checks RCS pressure stable or increasing - YES RO AS directed, opens CS-VI42 and 143, closes SI-VI 38 and 139, establishes 60 gpm charging flow while maintaining 6 - I O gpm seal injection flow.

us Exits E-0 to Step 7 of ES-I .I, SI TERMINATION.

As directed by the Lead Examiner, terminate scenario.

E-Plan classification for this scenario - SAE (H-RED)