ML040650270
| ML040650270 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 03/04/2004 |
| From: | Grobe J Division Reactor Projects III |
| To: | Gunter P Nuclear Information & Resource Service (NIRS) |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2004-0277 | |
| Download: ML040650270 (8) | |
Text
March 4, 2004 Mr. Paul Gunter, Director Nuclear Information and Resource Service 1424 16th Street NW Suite 404 Washington, D.C. 20036
Dear Mr. Gunter:
On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am responding to your letter dated December 29, 2003, concerning the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 (Davis-Besse). Your letter stated concerns with Davis-Besse being in compliance with the current fire protection requirements. You requested answers to specific questions. NRC responses to your questions are contained in Enclosure 1.
Following the discovery of the reactor pressure vessel head degradation at Davis-Besse, the NRC implemented an Oversight Panel in accordance with the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (MC) 0350, Oversight of Operating Reactor Facilities in an Extended Shutdown as a Result of Significant Performance Problems. The primary responsibility of the Oversight Panel is to provide continued agency focus at Davis-Besse to ensure that there is adequate protection of public health and safety. The NRC Davis-Besse Oversight Panel will remain in place as long as necessary to ensure that corrective actions are lasting. The NRC has not observed an inability or unwillingness on the part of Davis-Besse to achieve or demonstrate compliance with NRC requirements.
As part of the NRC oversight of Davis-Besse, an inspection of the fire protection program was performed. The inspection raised concerns with the licensees procedure for anticipated fires in the Davis-Besse control room and cable spreading room. The Oversight Panel, through a Task Interface Agreement (TIA), dated December 15, 2003, requested the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) to resolve the concerns raised by the inspection. In addition, the resolution of the issue was added to the Oversight Panels review of the 0350 Restart Checklist item 5.b, Systems Readiness for Restart. The TIA requested the resolution of many of the same issues you raised in your letter. Enclosure 2 is the NRR response to the TIA which is also publicly available in ADAMS, Accession number ML040490220.
The NRR technical staff reviewed the licensees procedure for anticipated fire in the control room and cable spreading room, calculations supporting the procedure, and the timeline for operator actions associated with the procedure. Based on the review, the NRR staff found that the licensees procedure continues to provide reasonable assurance that the plant can be safely shut down following anticipated fires in the control room or cable spreading room. The TIA response provides more specific details.
P. Gunter I expect the enclosed information adequately addresses your requests. Should you have any additional questions, please contact me.
Sincerely,
/RA/
John A. Grobe, Chairman Davis-Besse Oversight Panel
Enclosure:
- 1. Response to Questions Raised by The Nuclear Information and Resource Service
- 2. NRR Response to TIA (ML040490220)
Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 cc w/encl:
The Honorable Dennis Kucinich G. Leidich, President - FENOC Plant Manager Manager - Regulatory Affairs M. OReilly, Attorney, FirstEnergy Ohio State Liaison Officer R. Owen, Administrator, Ohio Department of Health Public Utilities Commission of Ohio President, Board of County Commissioners Of Lucas County C. Koebel, President, Ottawa County Board of Commissioners D. Lochbaum, Union Of Concerned Scientists J. Riccio, Greenpeace
March 4, 2004 Mr. Terry J. Lodge 316 N. Michigan St., Suite 520 Toledo, OH 43624
Dear Mr. Lodge:
On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am responding to your letter dated December 29, 2003, concerning the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 (Davis-Besse). Your letter stated concerns with Davis-Besse being in compliance with the current fire protection requirements. You requested answers to specific questions. NRC responses to your questions are contained in Enclosure 1.
Following the discovery of the reactor pressure vessel head degradation at Davis-Besse, the NRC implemented an Oversight Panel in accordance with the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (MC) 0350, Oversight of Operating Reactor Facilities in an Extended Shutdown as a Result of Significant Performance Problems. The primary responsibility of the Oversight Panel is to provide continued agency focus at Davis-Besse to ensure that there is adequate protection of public health and safety. The NRC Davis-Besse Oversight Panel will remain in place as long as necessary to ensure that corrective actions are lasting. The NRC has not observed an inability or unwillingness on the part of Davis-Besse to achieve or demonstrate compliance with NRC requirements.
As part of the NRC oversight of Davis-Besse, an inspection of the fire protection program was performed. The inspection raised concerns with the licensees procedure for anticipated fires in the Davis-Besse control room and cable spreading room. The Oversight Panel, through a Task Interface Agreement (TIA), dated December 15, 2003, requested the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) to resolve the concerns raised by the inspection. In addition, the resolution of the issue was added to the Oversight Panels review of the 0350 Restart Checklist item 5.b, Systems Readiness for Restart. The TIA requested the resolution of many of the same issues you raised in your letter. Enclosure 2 is the NRR response to the TIA which is also publicly available in ADAMS, Accession number ML040490220.
The NRR technical staff reviewed the licensees procedure for anticipated fire in the control room and cable spreading room, calculations supporting the procedure, and the timeline for operator actions associated with the procedure. Based on the review, the NRR staff found that the licensees procedure continues to provide reasonable assurance that the plant can be safely shut down following anticipated fires in the control room or cable spreading room. The TIA response provides more specific details.
T. Lodge I expect the enclosed information adequately addresses your requests. Should you have any additional questions, please contact me.
Sincerely,
/RA/
John A. Grobe, Chairman Davis-Besse Oversight Panel
Enclosure:
- 1. Response to Questions Raised by The Nuclear Information and Resource Service
- 2. NRR Response to TIA (ML040490220)
Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 cc w/encl:
The Honorable Dennis Kucinich G. Leidich, President - FENOC Plant Manager Manager - Regulatory Affairs M. OReilly, Attorney, FirstEnergy Ohio State Liaison Officer R. Owen, Administrator, Ohio Department of Health Public Utilities Commission of Ohio President, Board of County Commissioners Of Lucas County C. Koebel, President, Ottawa County Board of Commissioners D. Lochbaum, Union Of Concerned Scientists J. Riccio, Greenpeace P. Gunter, N.I.R.S.
P. Gunter I expect the enclosed information adequately addresses your requests. Should you have any additional questions, please contact me.
Sincerely,
/RA/
John A. Grobe, Chairman Davis-Besse Oversight Panel
Enclosure:
- 1. Response to Questions Raised by The Nuclear Information and Resource Service
- 2. NRR Response to TIA (ML040490220)
Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 cc w/encl:
The Honorable Dennis Kucinich G. Leidich, President - FENOC Plant Manager Manager - Regulatory Affairs M. OReilly, Attorney, FirstEnergy Ohio State Liaison Officer R. Owen, Administrator, Ohio Department of Health Public Utilities Commission of Ohio President, Board of County Commissioners Of Lucas County C. Koebel, President, Ottawa County Board of Commissioners D. Lochbaum, Union Of Concerned Scientists J. Riccio, Greenpeace ADAMS Distribution:
AJM DFT SPS1 RidsNrrDipmIipb JLC1 GEG HBC CST1 JFS2 JBH1 JJS WHR DRPIII DRSIII PLB1 JRK1
- Concurrence via email DOCUMENT NAME:
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy OFFICE RIII RIII PDIII/PD RIII NAME CLipa:tr JLara WRuland
- JGrobe DATE 03/04/04 03/04/04 02/18/04 03/04/04 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
T. Lodge I expect the enclosed information adequately addresses your requests. Should you have any additional questions, please contact me.
Sincerely,
/RA/
John A. Grobe, Chairman Davis-Besse Oversight Panel
Enclosure:
- 1. Response to Questions Raised by The Nuclear Information and Resource Service
- 2. NRR Response to TIA (ML040490220)
Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 cc w/encl:
The Honorable Dennis Kucinich G. Leidich, President - FENOC Plant Manager Manager - Regulatory Affairs M. OReilly, Attorney, FirstEnergy Ohio State Liaison Officer R. Owen, Administrator, Ohio Department of Health Public Utilities Commission of Ohio President, Board of County Commissioners Of Lucas County C. Koebel, President, Ottawa County Board of Commissioners D. Lochbaum, Union Of Concerned Scientists J. Riccio, Greenpeace P. Gunter, N.I.R.S.
ADAMS Distribution:
AJM DFT SPS1 RidsNrrDipmIipb JLC1 GEG HBC CST1 JFS2 JBH1 JJS WHR DRPIII DRSIII PLB1 JRK1
- Concurrence via email OFFICE RIII RIII PDIII/PD RIII NAME CLipa:tr JLara WRuland
- JGrobe DATE 03/04/04 03/04/04 02/18/04 03/04/04 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
ENCLOSURE 1 RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE NUCLEAR INFORMATION AND RESOURCE SERVICE QUESTION: Has the 0350 Panel inspection of the 1991 Safety Evaluation Report as referenced in Mr. Qualls's email established that the licensee is in non-compliance with fire protection requirements per 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Section III.G.2?
ANSWER: No. Issues concerning anticipated fires in the control room and cable spreading room at Davis-Besse as documented in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) safety evaluation (SE) on May 30, 1991, were inspected as part of the Manual Chapter (MC) 0350 oversight process. Following the inspection, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) technical staff was requested to review the licensees procedure for anticipated fires in the control room and cable spreading room in accordance with the NRC task interface agreement (TIA) process. The NRR technical staff reviewed the May 30, 1991, SE as well as the licensees procedure, and found that the procedure continues to assure that the plant can be safely shut down following anticipated fires in the control room or cable spreading room at Davis-Besse.
Further, the NRR technical staff found that the licensee continues to be within their design and licensing basis for anticipated fires in the control room and cable spread room as documented in the May 30, 1991, SE.
QUESTION: If so, what enforcement action is the agency taking to bring the licensee into compliance with current fire protection requirements?
ANSWER: Our review of this issue did not reveal a non-compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R.
QUESTION: Is the agency holding back other Safety Evaluation Reports pertaining to Davis-Besse from public access? If so, NIRS requests that the agency immediately release all SERs to the Public Document Room prior to any further consideration of the restart of Davis-Besse.
ANSWER: No. The NRC does not knowingly withhold public documents per 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice. All public documents are made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). In adding the May 30, 1991, SE to ADAMS, an error was made making the SE not publically available. That error has been corrected and the SE is now publicly available in ADAMS. The document accession number is ML040490476.
QUESTION: It would appear that to grant a restart request without any analysis addressing these fire protection issues would allow the licensee to illegally start up outside its licensing agreement. How does the 0350 Panel plan to visit these fundamental fire protection issues and the lack of analysis as identified by NRC Headquarters communications prior to any proposed restart?
ENCLOSURE 1 ANSWER: The Oversight Panel with assistance from NRR has completed a review of the Davis-Besse fire protection issues identified during the inspection of the Davis-Besse fire protection program. The inspection team raised concerns with the licensees procedure for anticipated fires in the control room or cable spreading room. The Oversight Panel requested the NRR staff to evaluate the issues raised during the inspection. The NRR staff found that the licensees procedure for anticipated control room and cable spreading room fires continues to assure that the plant can be safely shut down.
The NRC is planning to perform the routine triennial fire protection inspection at Davis-Besse in 2004 to provide continuing assurance of compliance with NRC regulations consistent with the NRCs baseline inspection program.
QUESTION: The 1991 Safety Evaluation Report is missing page 25. Did Region III in its review of the SER note the missing page? Is the agency making an effort to recover the missing page?
ANSWER: The missing page did not impact the TIA response prepared by NRR.
Subsequently we recovered page 25 of the SE, and the entire May 30, 1991, SE has been properly placed in ADAMS. The document accession number is ML040490476.
QUESTION: Has the 0350 Panel inspection process determined that the operator of Davis-Besse has fulfilled the legal obligation per its Consent Agreement dated May 04, 1998 and by NRC Order dated June 22, 1998 to come into compliance with I0 CFR 50 Appendix R III.G.2 by restoring operability to fire barrier systems?
ANSWER: The NRC has not performed a dedicated inspection to followup on Davis-Besse's conformance with the NRC's Confirmatory Order to restore operability of fire barrier systems.
Nonetheless, the NRC performs periodic, planned inspections at all licensed facilities of the fire protection program implementation and 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R compliance as part of the agency's baseline inspection program. These inspection efforts include inspection of the adequacy of established fire protection barriers. The NRC inspection program did not issue inspection program requirements specifically for Thermo-Lag. As such, the inspection program for Davis-Besse did not include a specific inspection of that Confirmatory Order.
QUESTION: If the 0350 panel has determined that in fact the licensee is not in compliance with Appendix R III.G.2 per the 1998 NRC Order, what enforcement action has NRC taken in follow-up to its Order to restore compliance with current fire protection requirements?
ANSWER: In a letter dated January 25, 1999, Davis-Besse provided confirmation to the NRC that Thermo-Lag modifications were completed pursuant to the Order. As stated in the response to the previous question, the NRC has not performed a dedicated inspection to followup on Davis-Besse's conformance with the NRC's Confirmatory Order. However, the NRC inspection program specifically includes inspection of the Davis-Besse implementation of the Fire Protection Program and conformance to 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R requirements.