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Category:General FR Notice Comment Letter
MONTHYEARML16221A1652016-08-0303 August 2016
Comment (1) of Mark Leyse on Behalf of Bellefonte Efficiency and Sustainability Team/Mothers Against Tennessee River Radiation, Regarding Amendment Request for the Extended Power Uprate for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3
ML11308A0302011-11-0101 November 2011
Comment (2) of Tom Clements on Behalf of Friends of the Earth, on Draft Strategic Plan About Testing of Plutonium Fuel (MOX) Made from Weapons-Grade Plutonium Required for NRC to License MOX Use in Boiling Water Reactors
ML0719903442007-06-28028 June 2007
Comment (1) of Bertram C. Morris on Question Regarding Guidance for Electronic Submissions
ML0636204352006-12-22022 December 2006
Comment (46) of Beth A. Wetzel, on Behalf of TVA Re Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1172, Application and Testing of Safety-Related Diesel Generators in Nuclear Power Plants, Enclosed Comments Should Be Considered ESI-EMD Owners Group and Tva'S C
ML0604100502006-02-0202 February 2006
Comment (8) of Glenn W. Morris on Behalf of Tennessee Valley Authority Re Proposed Generic Communication; Post-Fire Safe-Shutdown Circuit Analysis Spurious Actuations.
ML0511602172005-04-20020 April 2005
Comment (2) on Draft Regulatory Guide (DG) 1137 - Guidance for Lightning Protection for Nuclear Power Plants
ML0507001072005-02-28028 February 2005
Comment (4) of Heinz J. Mueller Re the Draft Generic Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement
ML0430100972004-10-23023 October 2004
Comment (473) of Corey E. Olsen on Draft Criteria on Manual Actions to Achieve Post-fire Safe Shutdown
ML0416000952004-06-0303 June 2004
Comment (6) of Frances Lamberts on Renewal of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3
ML0416001012004-06-0202 June 2004
Comment (467) of M. Bowden Regarding Public Comment on Draft Criteria on Manual Actions to Achieve Post-Fire Safe Shutdown
ML0415403832004-05-28028 May 2004
Comment (3) of Mark J. Burzynski on Proposed Generic Letter (GL) 2004-XX; Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR)
ML0413402452004-05-0707 May 2004
Comment (2) of Dave Ritter on Browns Ferry EIS Scoping
ML0414100442004-04-21021 April 2004
Comment (3) of Governor Bill Anoatubby Supporting the Renewal Application of the Tennessee Valley Authority for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant License
ML0412504052004-03-31031 March 2004
Comment (1) of Zola Regarding EIS Input - Over the Life Extension Request of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
ML0408302472004-03-17017 March 2004
Comment (2) of Mark J. Burzynski, TVA, Regarding Best Practices to Establish and Maintain a Safety-Conscious Work Environment
ML0404302652004-01-21021 January 2004
Comment (222) of Stephen Knowlton Regarding Stricter Fire Standards at Nuclear Plants
ML0404305032004-01-18018 January 2004
Comment (162) of D. K. Cinquemani and F. L. Cinquemani Opposing the Processed Relaxation of Enforcement of the Current Fire Code
ML0402305892004-01-14014 January 2004
Comment (135) of Christopher Anderson Opposing Easing of Fire Protection Regulations That Affect Fire Barriers Protecting Electrical Cables in Nuclear Reactors
ML0402305282004-01-14014 January 2004
Comment (134) of Mary Mastin Opposing Easing of Fire Protection Regulations That Affect Fire Barriers Protecting Electrical Cables in Nuclear Reactors
ML0402305972004-01-13013 January 2004
Comment (138) of Claire Martineau Opposing Easing of Fire Protection Regulations That Affect Fire Barriers Protecting Electrical Cables in Nuclear Reactors
ML0402305942004-01-12012 January 2004
Comment (137) of Fawn Shillinglaw Opposing Easing of Fire Protection Regulations That Affect Fire Barriers Protecting Electrical Cables in Nuclear Reactors
ML0401307252004-01-0808 January 2004
Comment (127) of George Crocker Regarding Manual Actions to Achieve Post-Fire Safe Shutdown
ML0400807572004-01-0606 January 2004
Comment (122) of Hamilton Hudgins Regarding Draft Criteria on Manual Actions to Achieve Post-Fire Safe Shutdown
ML0400807422004-01-0505 January 2004
Comment (119) of Lisa Cohen Regarding Draft Criteria on Manual Actions to Achieve Post-Fire Safe Shutdown
ML0402305982004-01-0101 January 2004
Comment (139) of Mark K. Boughton Opposing Easing of Fire Protection Regulations That Affect Fire Barriers Protecting Electrical Cables in Nuclear Reactors
ML0400807702003-12-0404 December 2003
Comment (4) of Scott Poteet Re Shell Life of GFE
2016-08-03
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Text
1NRCREP - fire protection at nuclear power reactors 1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
_ _ Page 1 From: "George Crocker" <gwillc@mtn.org>
To: <nrcrep~nrc.gov>
Date: Thu, Jan 8, 2004 2:15 PM
Subject:
fire protection at nuclear power reactors -
TO: Chief, Rules and Directives Branch Division of Administrative Services, Office of Administration U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission '.
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 /126 e From: George Crocker, Executive Director /JJ /
North American Water Office y P.O. Box 174 Lake Elmo, MN 55042 651-770-3861 RE: Public Comment on Draft Criteria Regarding Manual Actions to Achieve Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Comment Period Open Until January 26, 2004 To Whom It May Concern:
A fire at the Browns Ferry nuclear power station in 1975 nearly caused catastrophic radiation releases. As a result, Chapter 10 Code of Federal Regulation Part 50 Appendix R Section III.G.2 was promulgated in order to ensure that public health and safety were protected by requiring automated electrical systems capable of shutting down the reactor from the control room be maintained free from fire damage in the event of a serious fire.
Many reactor operators chose to violate this rule rather than complying with it. Longstanding violations involve bogus fire barriers and other structural fire protection deficiencies that continually place the public at an elevated, unnecessary, and what should be considered an unacceptable risk. Now (The Federal Register, 11/26/2003), however, instead of finally enforcing its own rules, surprise surprise, the NRC proposes to reward the scoflaws by relaxing enforcement and allowing reactor operators to send plant workers into the reactor building during a fire to "manually operate" reactor shutdown equipment.
This substitution of non-validated and potentially suicidal manual actions for automated reactor shutdown electrical systems may save the NRC and reactor operators some money, which increasingly, seems to be what the NRC is all about. But from a public health and safety perspective, this is an absurd proposition that unacceptably increases undue risks in the event of fire.
From a regulatory oversight perspective, this relaxation is counter-productive. How does the NRC expect reactor operators to take it seriously when the consequences of longstanding and publicly acknowledged violations of rule and law is to say, "Never mind," and relax the requirement?
This proposed relaxation is typical of NRC deteriorating oversight in a time when competition in electric utility markets is pressuring the nuclear industry, including regulators, to cut costs. Unfortunately, this is also the time in which aging reactors and reactor components require increased maintenance and regulatory oversight. The trend that this proposed relaxation illustrates is therefore bound to lead to catastrophic consequences. There will, however, be survivors, and some of them are likely to find you and hold you accountable.
Sincerely, George Crocker, Executive Director North American Water Office
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