Summary of Potential Issues for First Week of Shearon Harris Fire Protection Inspection from R. Schin| ML040090299 |
| Person / Time |
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Harris  |
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| Issue date: |
10/28/2002 |
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| From: |
NRC/RGN-II |
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| To: |
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| References |
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| FOIA/PA-2003-0358 |
| Download: ML040090299 (1) |
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Category:Inspection Report Correspondence
MONTHYEARIR 05000400/20164042016-08-23023 August 2016
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ML16223A4172016-08-0808 August 2016
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ML13137A2942013-05-16016 May 2013
Notification of Inspection and Request for Information from June 10-14, 201,IP 71111.07, Heat Sink Performance, Triennial Review
IR 05000400/20122012012-04-0303 April 2012
IR 05000400-12-201, on 02/17/2012, Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant - NRC Security Inspection
ML1006210252010-03-0303 March 2010
Annual Assessment Letter - Harris 2010001
IR 05000400/20074042007-09-13013 September 2007
IR 05000400-07-404, on 08/17/2007, Shearon Harris, NRC Physical Security Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report
ML0724205112007-08-30030 August 2007
Conclusion of Nrc'S Review of Security Issues at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant
IR 05000400/20070032007-07-27027 July 2007
IR 05000400-07-003, on 04/01/2007 - 06/30/2007, Shearon Harris, Unit 1, Maintenance Effectiveness
ML0715203312007-06-0606 June 2007
Ltr. to Mr. Robert Duncan, II Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1-NRC Material Control and Accounting Program Inspection
IR 05000400/20074012007-02-23023 February 2007
NRC Physical Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000400/2007401
IR 05000400/20060032006-09-11011 September 2006
Inspection Report 05000400-06-003, Preliminary White Finding
ML0335604592003-01-22022 January 2003
Draft IR Writenup
ML0400902202002-12-23023 December 2002
Inspector Post-Inspection Debrief to Region II DRS Managers Regarding Harris Triennial Fire Protection Inspection
ML0335604282002-12-23023 December 2002
Inspection Summary - Triennial Fire Protection at Shearon Harris
ML0400903022002-11-12012 November 2002
Summary of Potential Issues After Second Week of Shearon Harris Fire Protection Inspection
ML0335604632002-11-12012 November 2002
Fire Protection Inspection, Potential Issues After Second Week of Inspection
ML0400902992002-10-28028 October 2002
Summary of Potential Issues for First Week of Shearon Harris Fire Protection Inspection from R. Schin
ML0335604612002-10-28028 October 2002
Fire Protection Inspection
IR 05000400/20020062002-05-10010 May 2002
IR 05000400/2002-006; Carolina Power and Light; 0n 04/09-12/2002, Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant; Special Inspection to Inspect and Assess the Circumstances Associated with Gas Accumulation in the Safety Injection System. Non-cited Viol
IR 05000400/20020072002-04-25025 April 2002
Letter from Loren R. Plisco Subject: Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant - NRC IR 05000400/2002-007, Preliminary White Finding
IR 05000400/20010052002-01-28028 January 2002
IR 05000400/2001-005, Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Inspection on 09/30-12/29/2001 Re Fire Protection, Maintenance Risk Assessments & Emergent Work Evaluation & Identification & Resolution of Problems. Two Noncited Violations Noted
2016-08-08
[Table view] |
Text
October 28, 2002 SHEARON HARRIS FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION POTENTIAL ISSUES FROM FIRST WEEK OF INSPECTION
- 1. For a fire at the B chiller, auxiliary building 261 ft. level (in fire zone 1-A-4-CHLR and in SSA analysis area 1-A-BAL-B2), AOP-36 directs operators to operate the B chiller. This is not consistent with the SSA. (AR 00075258)
- 2. For a fire at 480V MCC 35A, auxiliary building 261 ft. level (in fire zone 1-A-4-COM-E and in SSA analysis area 1-A4-BAL-B5), AOP-36 sends an operator to MCC 35A to open two breakers to prevent spurious operation of charging system MOVs. Reliance on operator actions in the room that is on fire is not allowed by NRC requirements.
(Similar to licensee self-assessment AR 00073540, which states that due to smoke, fumes, etc, not all sub-zones of fire area 1-A-BAL may be accessible to perform the required manual actions.)
- 3. ESR-0100087, completed around 1/02, changed charging pump min-flow to go to the VCT (and not directly to the charging pump suction). The SSA and AOP-36 were apparently not updated. Consequently, for a fire in most areas of the auxiliary building 261 ft. level (in fire area 1-A-BAL, sub-area 1-A-BAL-B and SSA analysis area 1-A-BAL-B), after AOP-36 aligns charging pump suction from the boric acid storage tank using gravity feed and isolates the VCT, the VCT will apparently overfill and approximately 60 gpm of RCS water will spill into the auxiliary building. (No AR yet, licensee is still considering this NRC question)
- 4. For a fire in the auxiliary building 261 ft. level (fire sub-area 1-A-BAL-B), the SSA and AOP-36 differed regarding actions to take if boric acid storage tank (BAT) level indication is lost (use the RWST or the BAT for charging pump suction?). (AR 00075065)
- 5. A fire in the turbine building can disable the motor-driven fire pump and also disable auto-start of the diesel-driven fire pump. Local manual start of the diesel fire pump for this fire area is not proceduralized. (AR 00075339)
- 6. For a fire in the auxiliary building 261 ft. level (fire sub-area 1-A-BAL-B), AOP-36 incorrectly sends an operator to the wrong MCC in the wrong room to open the breaker for valve 1CS-218 (charging pumps discharge header cross-connect) to prevent spurious operation of the MOV. The breaker is actually on MCC 1A35-SA, but AOP-36 incorrectly states that it is on MCC 1B35-SB. (AR 00075337)