ML040060065

Final Section C Operating

ML040060065
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	12/18/2003
From:	Roy D Florida Power & Light Energy Seabrook
To:	Conte R NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB
Conte R
References
50-443/04-301 50-443/04-301
Download: ML040060065 (12)

Text

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Seabrook Scenario No.: 2r2 Op Test No.: 1 Examiners: T. Fish Candidates: Palmieri - US Initial Conditions: Unit at 75% power.

Turnover: Maintain current power level until cleared for power increase by system load control.

Entered TSASs for CS-P-2B being tagged out of service for planned maintenance 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago. Return to service expected within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Critical Tasks: 1. Control the ERN flow rate to not less than 25 GPM per SG in order to minimize the RCS cooldown rate before a severe (orange path) challenge develops to the integrity CSF. [ECA-2.1 A]

Event Malf. No. Event No. Type* Event Description 1 NA N Power increase.

2 Lt FWLT529 I Steam Generator narrow range level channel L529 will fail low. As it is the controlling channel, the feedwater control system will respond to increase feed flow to the B SG.

Operator action will be required to restore feed flow to normal and return B SG narrow range level to within programmed band.

3 IOR on Turbine M An inadvertent turbine trip causes a catastrophic rupture of Trip pushbutton the main steam bottle (down stream of MSIVs).

4 svMSV86 C All four MSlVs will fail to close when the MSI signal is svMSV88 actuated. Manual actuation of MSI in the control room will svMSV9O not cause the MSlVs to close. Procedure progression will svMSV92 be E-0 3 E-2 a ECA-2.1 where the crew will be directed to reduce feed flow to all SGs to 25 gpm (CT) to avoid severe challenge to the Integrity CSF.

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5 mvFW FV4214A C The motor operator overloads for EFW flow control valve FW-FV-4214A will trip as soon as the valve motion is demanded. The operator will be required to utilize FW-FV-I 4214B to control EFW flow to A SG.

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Page 1 of 12

Scenario Event Description Seabrook Simulator Scenario 2r2 The simulator is initialized at approximately 75% power at EOL. The plant was ordered to reduce power from 100% to current power level due to potential for grid loading limitations /

instability. After turnover the crew is cleared for power increase by system load control and expected to return to 100% at 5% / hr.

CS-P-2B is out of service for an oil change. T.S. 3.1.2.2, 3.12.4 and 3.5.2 were entered 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago. The pump is expected back in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

The controlling channel for SG B level control will fail low. The feedwater control system will respond to increase feed flow to SG B. Operator action will be required to restore feed flow to normal and return B SG narrow range level to within programmed band.

An inadvertent turbine trip causes a catastrophic rupture of the main steam bottle (down stream of MSIVs). All four MSlVs will fail to close when the MSI signal is actuated. Manual actuation of MSI in the control room will not cause the MSlVs to close. Procedure progression will be E-0 to E-2 to ECA-2.1 where the crew will be directed to reduce feed flow to all SGs to 25 gpm (CT) to avoid severe challenge to the Integrity CSF. A component failure will occur as the operator attempts to limit EFW flow to SG A. The motor overloads for FW-FV-4214A will actuate and require the operator to utilize FW-FV-4214Bto limit EFW to SG A to 25 gpm. When feed flow has been reduced, NSO(s) dispatched to the MSlVs will successfully close MSlVs in the west pipe chase (SG A and D). The crew will exit ECA-2.1 returning to E-2. With EFW limited to 25 gpm a RED condition will exist for the HEAT SINK CSF. A note at the beginning of FR-H.l states that the procedure should NOT be implemented if feed flow was reduced by operator action. The crew will continue to implement E-2 and transition to ES-1.I, SI TERMINATION.

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Seabrook Simulator Scenario Setup Scenario 2r2

1. 0I Initialize the simulator at 75%, IC98 I

2. 0 I Protected train is A.

3. Verify AFD is within 5 1% of target / adjust CBD as necessary Place rod control in AUTOMATIC

4. 0 Place the control switch for CS-P-2B in PTL 0 Close CS-V-197 Danger tag CS-P-2B and CS-VI 97 0 Press the pushbutton control switch for CVCS TRAIN B BYP/INOP light

5. Run the following SCENARIO to fail AUTOMATIC reactor trip, fail closure of the MSIVs, and activate Event Triggers Demo Exams/Exam 52M FWFV4214A Fails and Demo Exams/Exam 52M Steam Break:

0 SELECT: Scenario 0 SELECT: Demo exams 0 SELECT: Exam #52M setup 0 SELECT:RUN 0 svMSV86 IS0 VALVE FAILS OPEN 0 svMSV88 IS0 VALVE FAILS OPEN 0 svMSV9O IS0 VALVE FAILS OPEN

[7 svMSV92 IS0 VALVE FAILS OPEN mvCSVl97, MOV BREAKER STATUS OPEN bkCSl P2B 52, BREAKER RACKED-OUT SELECT: Event Triggers (Top Bar) 0 SELECT: Demo ExamslExam 52M MIFV4214A Fails VERIFY: ACTIVATED (Only options are to OPEN /ABORT / CLOSE) 0 SELECT: Demo Exams/Exam 52M Steam Break 0 VERIFY: ACTIVATED (Only options are to OPEN /ABORT / CLOSE)

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Seabrook Simulator Scenario Turnover Information Scenario 2r2 Protected Train is A MODE 1: 75% RTP, CBD @ 165 steps (ARO = 228 steps), Boron Concentration = 149 ppm.

ODI-56 rev 7 on US desk, + I degrees = 4540 gal RMW, -1 degree change = 40 gal BA; AFD target - 0.65%, Current AFD - 0.69%

The plant was ordered to reduce power from 100% to current power level due to potential for grid loading limitations. When cleared by PSNH Load Dispatch, return to 100% power at 5%/hour. Power Aid for power increase is on US desk.

Centrifugal Charging Pump CS-P-2B is danger tagged out for oil change. Entered TSASs 3.1.2.2a, 3.1.2.4 and 3.5.2.a two hours prior to turnover. Expected return to service is 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after turnover.

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Seabrook Simulator Scenario 2r2 Page 5 of 12 SCENARIO OUTLINE EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors Shift Shift turnover information as stated. us Provides operators with turnover Turnover Provide Turnover Sheet When directed by the Lead Examiner, call the crew as PSNH Load Dispatch. Clear the plant for load increase to 100%:

EVENT I Load us Briefs crew on power increase. Provides guidelines for Increase operator responsibilities and control bands. Provides Power Aid to BOP. Provides oversight on control manipulations SUR Uses RE provided estimates on RMW required for power increase or DETERMINES the quantity of RMW required to make the desired reactivity change from RS1735,ReactivityCalculations SUR As directed, aligns the controls and initiates dilution.

Uses control rods for power increase and AFD control.

BOP Selects loading rate as directed. Adjusts the LOAD LIMIT SET potentiometer 1% to 2% above current load. Uses the load selector LOAD INCREASE push-button and verifies LOAD INCREASING lamp illuminates. Verifies expected response on turbine Ist stage pressure and control valve response.

Follows the load set with the standby load set.

At Lead Examiners discretion, initiate the next event.

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 2r2 Page 6 of 12 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors EVENT 2 FW-L529 Perform the following to initiate failure of the Fails Low controlling NR level channel for SG B:

0 SELECT MF List BOP Acknowledges alarms, notes failed SG B level channel, 0 SELECT Feedwater (Component) recommends manual control of SG B level control to return SG B level to program.

0 SELECT ItFWLT529 us Acknowledges report, directs BOP to use manual 0 Double Click control of SG B feed regulating valve to return SG B 0 SELECT FAIL LOW NR level to program. May direct halt of power 0 INSERT increase.

Refers to OS1235.03, SG LEVEL INSTRUMENT FAILURE.

us Directs operator actions and provides oversight of control manipulations.

BOP Identifies failed channel as controlling channel, establishes MANUAL control of SG B feed regulating valve and restores SG B NR level 50% to 70%.

Selects an alternate SG level channel for control.

Restores SG B FF/SF matched and level at program, then returns SG B level control to AUTO.

SUR Verifies no redundant SG B NR level channels tripped on UL-1 and UL-6.

CREW Verifies no redundant SG B NR level channels tripped on UL-12 us Refers to TSs. TS 3.3.1 Table 3.3-1 Item 13 and TS 3.3.2 Table 3.3-3 Items 5.b, 6.a, 7.c, 1O.c and 3.3.3.6 Table 3.3-10, Item 7 are applicable.

us Contacts Work Week Manager for support on troubleshootingand repair. Informs plant management of failure. Coordinates with I&C

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 2r2 Page 7 of 12 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors USlBOP Check for ATWS mitigation channel failed - NO NOTE: At the discretion of the lead Examiner, bypass the failed channel or trip the failed channel as directed by the US. IF the Lead Examiner chooses, the next event can be initiated without bypassing or placing the channel in trip condition.

The scenario will not be affected either way.

0 SELECT: Panel Overview 0 SELECT: BTI CP-1 0 SELECT: CP-I Door to OPEN D5628 7300 CABINET CAB CP-I DOOR OPEN 0 SELECT: ENABLE D4562 7300 CABINET CP-1 BYPASSED / INOP SELECT: LB-529A to BYPASS CJ SELECT: LB-529B to BYPASS F4840 SG B LEVEL LO-LO - return SELECT: CP-1 Door to CLOSED D5628 7300 CABINET CAB CP-1 DOOR OPEN - return NOTE: If the crew chooses NOT to use BTI, perform the following to trip the bistables:

SELECT: Panel Overview SELECT: Trip CP-1 D5628 7300 CABINET CAB CP-1 DOOR OPEN SELECT: CP-I Door to OPEN SELECT: LB 529A to the UP position D4777 SG B LEVEL HI-HI CHANNEL TRIP SELECT: LB 5298 to the UP position F4840 SG B LEVEL LO-LO - already in alarm SELECT: CP-1 Door to CLOSED D5628 7300 CABINET CAB CP-I DOOR OPEN - return After allowing the crew to complete OSI235.03, or at the Lead Examiners discretion, continue to the next event.

I Seabrook Simulator Scenario 2r2 Page 8 of 12 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors EVENT 3 Turbine Trip Initiate an inadvertent turbine trip as follows:

1 0 SELECT: Panel PFF14 I Crew performs Immediate Actions (VAS).

I 0 SELECT: Insert OR 0 SELECT: Main Turbine TRIP pushbutton Verifies reactor trip and bypass breakers open, neutron 0 SET Final Value: TRIP flux decreasing, and rod bottom lights lit.

INSERT SUR BOP Verifies all turbine stop valves closed and generator breaker open.

A trip demand will occur when the main turbine trips. Verifies power to AC Emergency busses, verifies all The catastrophic steam break will be initiated when emergency busses energized.

the turbine trips. Verify that Event Trigger Demo SUR Checks if SI is actuated, Verifies both trains of SI exams\Exam 25M Steam Break has actuated: actuated.

0 SELECT: Malfunctions (Top Bar) us Enters E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY cl VERIFY: mfMS051 MAIN STEAM BOTTLE INJECTION, Step 1 and directs operator actions to BREAK - INSERTED at 1.0 verify VAS completed.

EVENT 4 SUR Performs ATTACHMENT A.

Steam Break An automatic SI/MSI is actuated but the MSlVs do BOP Performs operator actions on both sides of the MCB ECA-2.1 not close. until SUR has completed ATTACHMENT A.

US/BOP Checks if MSlVs should be closed - YS BOP As directed, attempts to close the MSlVs from the MCB UWBOP Check CNTMT pressure has remained c 18 psig - YES NOTE: It is likely that EFW flow to one SG will be automatically US/BOP Verifies total EFW > 500 gpm - YES isolated by the HIGH FLOW isolation. IF FW-FV-4214A received an isolation signal the valve will fail nearly full open due to the component failure scripted into the scenario.

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 2r2 Page 9 of 12 EVENT INSTRUCTI0N Actions or Behaviors US/BOP Monitors RCS temp stable at or trending to 557°F -

NO EVENT 5 When the BOP begins to throttle EFW to SG A using BOP As directed, opens ERN mini-flow and throttles EFW to FW-FV-4214A, Event Trigger Demo ExamslExam reduce cooldown. Notes loss of FW-FV-4214A control 52M FW4214A Fails will de-energized the MOV. and uses FW-FV-4214B to throttle EFW flow.

Maintains total > 500 gpm.

NOTE It is expected, but not required that the SUR will have US/SUR Checks RCS Isolated - YES completed ATTACHMENT A, briefed the US and returned to SUR As directed (NOTE) maintains seal injection flow to all performing MCB manipulations by Step 10 of E-0. RCPs.

US/SUR Checks whether ALL RCPs should be stopped - NO, subcooling SAT USlBOP Checks for Faulted SG - YES us Exits E-0 to E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step I Crew Begins monitoring CSFs for implementation.

us Reads applicable CAUTIONS and NOTES from E-2 US/BOP Check if MSlVs and Bypasses are closed - NO US/BOP If not already dispatched, directs NSO(s) to locally close MSIVs.

US/BOP Checks if ANY SG pressure boundaries are intact - NO us Exits E-2 to ECA-2.1, UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS, Step 1.

us Reads applicable CAUTIONS and NOTE(s) of ECA-2.1 USlBOP Checks if MSlVs and Bypasses are closed - NO US/BOP Checks SG ASDVs closed - YES US/BOP Checks FWRV and FWRV Bypasses closed - YES.

USIBOP Checks FWlVs closed - YES US/BOP Checks MDEFW or SUFP supplying SG(s) - YES USBOP Checks MS-V393 and MS-V394 closed - NO

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 2r2 Paae 10 of 12 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors SUR As directed, closes MS-V393 and MS-V394.

US/BOP Checks SGBD isolation valves closed - YES us Reads CAUTION requiring minimum of 25 gpm EFW to each SG with NR level < 5%.

US/BOP Checks if RCS Cold Leg cooldown rate is c 100°F/HR NO NOTE: Control limitations associated with EFW throttle valves may BOP Throttles E N to establish minimum flow of 25 gpm to challenge the operator when minimizing flow and each SG (CT).

maintaining a minimum of 25 gpm.

NOTE: It is expected that the crew will pursue restoring 25 gpm to any SG isolated automatically on high flow AFTER the EFW lines are walked down.

Isolation of As soon as feed flow has been minimized to all SGs, US/SUR Checks RCS Hot Leg temperatures stable or SG A and D DELETE the malfunctions blocking closure of SG A decreasing - YES and D MSIVs:

SELECT: Component Malfs (Top Bar) US/SUR Checks whether ALL RCPs should be stopped - NO, SELECT: mfMSV86 subcooling SAT.

SELECT: Delete MF US/BOP Checks CST inventory > 250,000 gallons - YES SELECT: mfMSV92 US/BOP Checks secondary radiation - NORMAL. I I

SELECT: Delete MF I CUE: As an NSO, report that the MSlVs for SG A and D have BOP Acknowledges NSO report, begins monitoring SG A been closed from the west pipe chase. and D pressures and informs crew when pressure in either SG A or SG D is increasing.

NOTE: The crew should exit ECA-2.1 to E-2 as soon as pressure in US Notes ECA-2.1 OAS item 2 and exits ECA-2.1 when any SG increases. any SG pressure increases.

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 2r2 Page 11 of 12 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors Isolation of c] SELECT: Component Malfs (Top Bar)

SG B and C SELECT: mfMSV88 0 SELECT: Delete MF 0 SELECT: mfMSV9O 0 SELECT: Delete MF NOTE: A CAUTION prior to step 1 of FR-H.l states that the Crew Notes HEAT SINK CSF - RED procedure should not be performed if EFW flow is c 500 us Notes CAUTION in FR-H.1 prior to step 1 and does gpm due to operator action. NOT perform FR-H.1. Continues with E-2.

CUE: As an NSO, report that the MSlVs for SG A and D have BOP Acknowledges NSO report, informs crew of MSlV been closed from the west pipe chase. status.

us Reads applicable CAUTIONS and NOTES of E-2.

US/BOP Checks if MSlVs and Bypasses are closed - YES USlBOP Checks if ANY SG pressure is stable or increasing -

YES USlBOP Checks for any SG pressure decreasing in uncontrolled manner or any SG completely depressurized - IF YES, US/BOP perform step 4 and isolate EFW flow to affected SGs. IF NO, go to step 5.

US/BOP Checks CST inventory > 250,000 gallons - YES USlBOP Checks secondary radiation - NORMAL CREW: Checks id ECCS flow should be reduced:

USlSUR Check RCS subcooling > 40°F - YES US/BOP Checks secondary heat sink - NO us Exits E-2to E-I, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, step 1 us Reads NOTES of E-I US/SUR Checks if RCPs should be stopped - NO USIBOP Checks for FAULTED SGs- NO

Seabrook Simulator Scenario 2r2 Page 12 of 12 EVENT INSTRUCTION Actions or Behaviors 1 US/BOP Checks secondary heat sink - NO BOP As directed, establishes a total EFW > 500 gpm until level is adequate.

US/BOP Checks secondary radiation - NORMAL us Reads CAUTION regarding actuation of PORVs on PZR pressure or LTOP.

USlSUR Checks PORVs available - YES CREW Checks if ECCS flow should be reduced:

US/SUR Checks RCS subcooling > 40°F - YES US/BOP Checks secondary heat sink - YES US/SUR Checks RCS pressure stable or increasing - YES USlSUR Check PZR level > 5% - YES us Exits E-I to ES-1.I, SI TERMINATION.

As directed by the Lead Examiner, terminate the scenario.

E-Plan classification for this scenario - UE 15b (Although H-RED existed, the condition was operator induced and LOSS OF HEAT SINK was not valid).