Text

October 2003 Exam 50-369 & 50-370/2003-302 Draft Written Exam
	ML033421062
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	10/21/2003
From:	; Duke Energy Corp
To:	; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	50-369/03-302, 50-370/03-302
	Download: ML033421062 (397)
	v • d • e

MCGUIRE OCTOBER 2003 EXAM 50-369& 50-37012003-302 OCTOBER 21,2003

B u ~ kQimtion: 121.1 Answer: B 1 Pt(s) An operator lras been working as listed below:

10/15/2003 1900 Starts Shift Turnover in control room Assumes shift duties 1%

Relieved of duties in c.ontro1 room Stcuts hRC rec1:qualificationexam Completes NRC requalification exam Demts site for home and@

arts shift turnover unies relief shift duties ieved ofdoties in control room Departs site

%%at action (if any) must the operator take to comply with Tech Spec 5.2.2 regarding limits on oiutime hours?

Reference Provided Tech Spec 5.2.2 A. Yo action required by the operator B. Notify the OSM aud obtain approval prior to assuming the watch at 1900 on 10/16.

e. Submit Request for Work Hours Extension Form to be approved by the Station Manager/Bbesigneeprior to 1900 on Ques-121. LDOC

ID. Incorrect:

Plausible:

Level: SRO 10CFR55.43(b)2 KA: 2.1.5 (2.313.4)

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-ADM-DIR, Obj 9 Source: BANK l m e l of knowledge: Memory

References:

1. Tech Spec 5.2.2, Unit Slaff

2. NSD-200, Appendix A, Request for Work Hours Extension Ques 121.1.DOC

1 Pt(s) An operator lras been working as listed below:

IO/15!2QO3 1900 Starts Shift Turnover in control room 1330 Assumes shift duties 10!'16:2OO3 0730 Relieved of duties in control room 0800 Starts NRC requalification exan1 1130 Completes NRC requalification exam Departs site for home and r e s 1900 Starts shiii turnover 19.10 Assunies relief shift duties 0730 Relieved of duties in control room Departs site

%%at action (if my) must the operator take to comply with Tech Spec 5.2.2 regarding limits 011 overtime hours?

Reference Provided A. No action required by the operator B. Notify the OSM and obtain approval prior to assuming the watch at 8900 on 10/16.

C. §abmit Request for Work Hours Extension Form to bc approved by the §,tation ManagerlDesignee prior to I900 on 1O/I6.

D. This work schedule exceeds Tech Spec 5.2.2 and is not altoviable

Organization 5.2 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 5.2.1 Onsite and Offsite Orqaninations Onsite and offsite organizations shall be established for unit operation and corporate management, respectively. The onsite and offsite organizations shall include the positions for activities affecting safety of the nuclear power plant.

a. Lines of authority, responsibility, and communication shall be defined and established throughout highest management levels, intermediate levels, and all operating organization positions. These relationships shall be documented and updated, as appropriate, in organization charts, functional descriptions of departmental responsibilitiesand relationships, and job descriptions for key personnel positions, OF iil equivalent forms of documentation. These requirements shall be documented in the UFSAW;

b. The Station Manager shall be responsible for overall safe operation of the plant and shall have control over those onsite activities necessary for safe operation and maintenance of the plant;

c. The Vice President of McGuire Nuclear Site shall have corporate responsibility for overall plant nuclear safety and shall take any measures needed to ensure acceptable performance of the staff in operating, maintaining, and providing technical support to the plant to ensure nuclear safety;

d. The Executive Vice President Nuclear Generation Department will be the Senior Nuclear Executive and have corporate responsibility for overall nuclear safety; and

e. The individuals who train the operating staff, carry out radiation protection, or perform quality assurance functions may report to the appropriate onsite manager; however, these individuals shall have sufficient organizational freedom to ensure their independence from operating pressures.

(continued)

McGuire Units 1 and 2 5.2-7 Amendment Nos. 1841466

Organization 5.2

-=% 5.2 Organization (continued) 5.2.2 Unit Staff The unit staff organization shall include the following:

a. A non-licensed operator shall be assigned to each reactor containing fuel and afl additional non-licensed operator shall be assigned tor each control room from which a reactor is operating in MODES S , 2 , 3, or 4.

A total of three non-licensed operators are required for the two units.

b. At least one licensed Reactor Operator (RO)shall be present in the control room when fuel is in the reactor. In addition, while the unit is in MODE 1, 2,3,or 4, at least one licensed Senior Reactor Operator (SFIO) shall be present in the coritrol room.

c. Shift crew composition may be less than the minimum requirement of I Q CFR 50.54(m)(2)(i) and 5.2.2.a and 5.2.2.9for a period of time not bo exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months in order to accommodate unexpected abseflce of on-duty shift crew members provided immediate action is taken to restore the shift crew composition to within the minimum requirements.

d. A Radiation Protection Technician shall be on site when fuel is in the reactor. The position may be vacant for not mare than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , in order to provide for unexpected absence, provided immediate action is taken to fill the required position.

e. Administrative procedures shall be developed and implemented to limit the working hours of station staff who perform safety related functions (e.&, licensed SROs, licensed WQs,radiation protection technicians, auxiliary operators, and key maintenance personnel).

Adequate shift coverage shall be maintained without routine heavy use of overtime. The objective shall be to have operating personnel work a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months day with alternating 48 hour5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months md 36 hour4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months weeks while the unit is operating. However, in the event that unforeseen problems require substantial amounts of overtime to be used, or during extended periods of shutdown for refueling, major maintenance, or plant modification, OR a temporary basis the following guidelines shall be followed:

1. An individual should not be permitted to work more than 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months straight, excluding shift turnover time; Icontinuedl McGuire Units 1 and 2 5.2-2 Amendment Nos. 4841166

Organization 5.2 5.2 Qrganization __

5.2.2 Unit Staff (continued)

2. An individual should not be permitted to work more than 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period, nor more than 28 hours3.240741e-4 days 0.00778 hours 4.62963e-5 weeks 1.0654e-5 months in any 48 hour5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months period, nor more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months in any 7 day period, all excluding shift turnover time;

3. A break of at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months should be allowed between work periods, including shift turnover time;

4. Except during extended shutdown periods, the use of overthe should be considered on an individual basis and not for the entire staff an a shift.

Any deviation from the above guidelines shall be authcrized advance by the Station Manager or his designee, in accorda with approved administrative procedures, or by higher levels management, in accordance with established procedures an humentation of the basis for granting the deviation.

Controls shall be Included in the procedures such that individual overtime shail be reviewed rnonthiy by the Station Manager or his designee to ensure that excessive hours have not been assigned.

Routine deviation from the above guidelines is not authorized.

f. The Operations Manages shal hoId or have held an SRO license.

g. The Shift Technical Advisor (STA)shall provide advisory technical support to the Control Room Senior Reactor Operator (CRsRO)in the areas of thermal hydraulics, reactor engineering, and plant analysis I

with regard to the safe operation of the unit.

I

_-- I..

- -~ (continued)

McGuire Units I and 2 5.2-3 213 and 194

1 Pt(s) An operator has been working as listed IO11 512003 1900 1930 Assumes shift duties ,/

L Starts Shift Turnover in ontrol room i

/

2011 6/2003 ,/

0730 Relieved of d u t i d in control room 0800 Starts NRC regdalification exam 1130 Completes P$RC requalification exam Departs sitdfor home and rest 1900 Starts sh,$ turnover 1930 Assume$ relief shift duties 0730 Reliey6d of duties in control room DepArts site i

What action (if,bny) must the operator take to comply with Tech Spec 5.2.2 regarding iit$s on overtime hours?

/

A. N9action required by the operator i

1 B. ,/Notifythe OSM and obtain approval prior to assuming the watch

/

1 at 2900 on 1Ql16.

i y Submit Request for Work Houw Extension Form to be approved by the Station ManagerlDesignee prior to 1900 on 10116.

/ i Thiswork schedule exceeds Tech Spec 5.2.2 and is not f D.

allowable 1

Bank Question: 721.1 Answer: C 1 Pt(s) An operator has been working as listed below:

IO11512003 1900 Starts Shift Turnover in control room I930 Assumes shift duties 1Oil 612003 0730 Relieved of duties in control room 0800 Starts NRC requalification exam 1190 Completes NRC requalification exam Departs site for home and rest 1goo Starts shift turnover 1930 ASSUMeS relief shift duties 0730 Relieved of duties in control room Departs site What action (if any) must the operator take to comply with Tech Spec 5.2.2 regarding limits on overtime hours?

A. No action required by the operator B. Notify the OSM and obtain approval prior to assuming the watch at 1900 on 10116.

C. Submit Request for Work Hours Extension Form to be approved by the Station ManageriDesignee prior to 1900 on 10116.

D. This work schedule exceeds Tech Spec 5.2.2 and is not allowable Distracter Analysis:

A. Incorrect:

B. Incorrect: .

C. Correct:

Plausible:

D. Incorrect:

Plausible:

Level: SRO 10CFR55.43(b)2 U: 2.1.5 (2.33.4) 1

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-ADM-DR, Obj 9 Source: BANK Level of knowledge: Menioqr

References:

1. Tech Spec 5.2.2, Unit Staff

2. NSD-200, Appendix A, Request for Work Hours Extension 2

-) 2.0 GENE IC KNOWLEDGES ANB ABILITIES 2.1 Conduct of Operations 2.1.1 Knowiedge of conduct of operations requirements.

(CFR: 41.10 145.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.7 SRO 3.8 2.1.2 Knowledge of operator responsibililks during all modes of plant operation.

(CFR. 41.10 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.0 SRO 4.0 2.1.3 Knowledge of shift turnover practices.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.0 SRO 3.4 2.1.4 Knowledge of shift staffing requirements.

(CFR: 41.10 1 43.2)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.3 SRO 3.4 2.1.5 Ability to locate and use procedures and directives related to shift staffng and activities.

(CFR: 41.10 143.5 145.12)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.3 SRO 3.4 2.1.6 Ability to supervise and aswme a management role during pEant transients and upset conditions.

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.12 1 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.1 sa0 4.3 2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

(CFR: 43.5 145.12 i 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 4.4

2. I .8 Ability to coordinate personnell activities outside the control room.

(CFR: 45.5 145.12 1 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.8 SKO 3.6 2-1 NUREG-1122,Rev. 2 I

OBJECTIVES QBJECTlVE Concerning NSD 109, Confined Space Entry:

0 Discuss the Authorized Entrants (person entering confined space) responsibility.

Discuss the Authorized Attendants (Hatchwatch) responsibility.

ADMDlROl1 Concerning NSB 200 Overtime Control:

0 State the maximum hours a worker at McGuire can work without an approved Request For Work Hours Extension form.

ADMDIR012 Concerning NSB 202 Reportability:

Given a description of a plant occurrence, determine reportability using NSB 202.

ADMDIR013 Concerning NSB 203, Operability:

State who is responsible for operability determinations, taking any appropriate action(s) required by Tech Specs and ensuring all compensatory actions are assigned.

0 Define the term as it applies to chemistry sampling analysis exceeding Tech Spec limits and Reactor Coolant Leakage calculation exceeding Tech Spec limits.

0 Provided with a copy of NSD 203, determine if a proposed change, test or temporary modification requires an unreviewed safety question (USQ).

ADMDIRO14 Concerning NSD 304 Reactivity Management:

e State the purpose of this NSD.

ARMDIROIS OP-MC-ADM-DIR FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 07 Page 9 of 19

Organization I

5 5.2

. 5.2 Organization (continued) 5.2.2 Unit Staff The unit staff organization shall include the foliowing:

a. A non-licensed operator shall be assigned to each reactor cont@ningfuel

&nd an additional non-licensed operator shall be assigned for each contra(

room from which a reactor is operating in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4.

A tot4 of three non-licensed operators are required tor the two units.

b. At least one licensed Reactor Operator (RQ) shail be present in the control room when fuel is in the reactor. In addition, while the unit is in MODE 1, 2.9,or 4, at least one licensed Senior Reactor Operator (§as) shall be present in the contrd room.

c. Shift crew composition may be less than the minimum requirement of 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(i) and 5.2.2.a and 5.2.24 for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months in order to accommodate unexpected absence of on-duty shift crew members provided immediate action is taken to restore the shift crew composition to within the minimum requirements.

d. A Radiation Protection Technician shall be on site when fuel is in the reactor. The position may be vacant for not more than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , in order to provide for unexpected absence, provided immediate action is taken to fill the required position.

e. Administrative procedures shall be developed and implemented to limit the working hours of station staff who perform safety related functions (e.g., licensed SRQs, licensed RQs, radiation protection technicians, auxiliary operators, and key maintenance personnel).

Adequate shift coverage shall be maintained without routine heavy use of overtime. The objective shall be to have operating personnel work a 62 hour7.175926e-4 days 0.0172 hours 1.025132e-4 weeks 2.3591e-5 months day with alternating 48 hour5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months and 36 hour4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months weeks while the unit is operating. However, in the event that unforeseen problems require substantial amounts of overtime to be used, or during extended periods of shutdown for refueling, rnajo: maintenance, or plant modification, on a temporary basis the foliowing guidelines shall be followed:

1. An individual should not be permitted to work more than 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months straight, excluding shift turnover time; (continued)

McGuire Units 1 and 2 5.2-2 Amendment Nos. 684/166

P I

5.2 Organization 5.2.2 Unit Staff (continued)

2. An individual should not be permitted to work more than 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period, nor more than 28 hours3.240741e-4 days 0.00778 hours 4.62963e-5 weeks 1.0654e-5 months in any 48 hour5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months period, nor more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months in any 7 day period, all excluding shift turnover time;

3. A break of at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ShoUld be allowed between work periods, including shift turnover time:

4. wept during extended shutdown perids, the use of overtime should be considered on an individual basis and not for the entire staff on a shift.

Any deviation from the above guidelines shall be authorized in advance by the Station Manager or his designee, in accordance with approved administrative procedures, or by higher levels of management, in accordance with established procedures and with documentation of the basis for granting the deviation.

Controls shall be included in the procedures such that individual overtime shall be reviewed monthly by the Station Manager or his designee to ensure that excessive hours have not been assigned.

Routine deviation from the above guidelines is not authorized.

f. The Operations Manager shal! hold or have held an SRQ license.

g. The ShiR Technical Advisor (STA) shall provide advisory technical supporp to the Control Room Senior Reactor Operator (CR§RO)in the areas of thermal hydraulics, reactor engineering, and plant analysis I

with regard to the safe operation of the unit.

I (continued)

McGuire Units 1 and 2 5.2-3 213 and 194

VERIFY HARD COPY AGAINST WEB SITE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO EACII USE Nurlear Policy Manual Volume 2 NSD 200 APPENDIX A.200. REQUEST FOR WORK HOURS EXTENSION

1. Permission is requested for the individuals listed below to exceed the guidelines of Tech Spec 5.2.2 for hours that will be worked on the date shown. (Fill out ALL columns including: Full name, actual date work hour extension will occur, the Ictter(s) of the limit(s) that will be exceeded, estimated hours that will be worked beyond guidelines, Emp. ID, department or vendor name and assigned supervisor's name.j

a. Uiorking more. than 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months straight (excluding shift turnover time)

b. Working more than 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period (excluding shift turnover time)

C. Working more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (28 hours3.240741e-4 days 0.00778 hours 4.62963e-5 weeks 1.0654e-5 months for MNS and ONS) in any 48 hour5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months period (excluding shift turnover time)

d. Working more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months in any 7 day period (excluding shift turnover timej

e. Less than 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months break between scheduled work periods (excluding cailouts, but inshiding shift turnover time).

Note: Call-outs are not considered scheduled work periods and do not require an Appendix A form unless limit(s) a, b, c, d is exceeded due to the call-out. FFD and Management Procedmes provisions apply to call-outs).

a. Specific reasons describing the need for exceeding the work hour guidelines. (Brief description of work to be performed and why specific individuals are needed to complete task.

3. I have assessed the fitness for continued duty of the above named individual(s). The assessmcnt included an evaluation of the working conditions, and the individual(s) mental and physical ability to complete the task safely. I find the individualhj fitness satisfactory to safely complete the assignment. 1will

! periodically re-assess their status as appropriate to determine their ability to continue. NOTE: The 1'1T) assessme.nt must be done within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months prior to the beginning of the. task date/time the work hour extension begins.

Signed: supv. ID: Date: Time:

SupervisorITernp. Supervisor/Designee of employec(s)/vend[)r(s)*

22 MAR 2001 5 VERIFY HARD COPY AGAINST WEB SITE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO EACH USE

VERIFY HARD COPY AGAINST WEB SITE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO EACH USE NSD 200 Nuclear Policy Manual - Volume 2

4. Authoriiation is herehy granted for the individual(s) listed above to exceed the work hour guidelines of Tech Spec 5.2.2.

Signed: .~ Station Mgr./Designee ID:.

Date: Time: hhl PM Station Manager/Designee** (See Section 200.5 for approved list of designees)

Authorization obtained via phone From: ~ date: Time:

BY: Date: 'Time:..

5. If approval is not obtained prior to overtime being exceeded, dwument reasons below and initiate a PIP PIP#- ,. ..~Comments: . . .. .~. .-

6. Route the completed form to the Human Resource Manager.

Supervisor shall not assess himself/herself for FFD concerns.

- Supervisor of employee(s)/vendor(s) and Station ManagerDesignee shall not he the same person.

6 22 MAR 2001 VERIFY H A K JCOPY AGAINST wm SITE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO EACH USE

Bunk Questiorr: 181.6 Answrr: A 1 Pt(s) Unit 1 was operating at 100% when a loss of offsite power and L.OCA occurred concurrently. Both Diesel Generators fail to start. The operators implemented EPllltV5000lE-0 (Recictor Trip or SujkQ Injection) and then d to EPIII.~5OOC~~CA-O.O (LossofiiiNACIowe~

OOITCA-0.0(Loss of All .4C Power) the crew \vas Given the following critical safety function statu indicxtians:

Coiitaiilment ORAXGE 0 Inventory YEILOW

~~

e Integrity - ORANGE E Subcriticality - ORANGE 0 Heat Sink - RET) 0 Core Cooling - KED Which ONE (1) of the following actions is required by EOPs?

A.

.--=

transition to adequate Core Coding)

R.

c.

D. Immediately transition to F,P/

Ques-186. ldoc

&/W k ' Once E-O has been exited it is appropriate to implement CSFST's.

However, in the case of ECA 0.0 there is no power. and C§F§lks are not ym impiemeaate&until power is restored. Once power is restored then the crew wsl then return to E-0 atad implement the status trees.

A. Correet B. Incorrect: Lower priority CSPST C. Incorrect: Lower priority CSFST D. Incorrect: Lower priority @SF§T IXVEL: SRO 10CFR55.43@)5 SOURCE: Modified LESSON: OP-MC-EP-HNTRB OBJECTIVE: OP-MC-EP-INTRQ Bbj. 3 , 6

REFERENCES:

OP-Me-EP-INTRO pages 29 & 29 8 M P 4-3 Use of Abnormal and Emergency Procedures pages 15 to 18 KA: EAPE WE06 EA 2.1 (3.4'42)

1 Pt(s) Unit 1 was operating at 100% when a loss of offsite power and LOCA occurred concurrently. Both Diesel Generators fair to stat. The operators implemented EP/1/.4/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Sufefy Zrrjection) and then trmsitioned to EI'/1/A!5000j%CA-0.0 (I,oss cfA11AC Power). In EPiI!it/5000,'ECA-0.O (Loss ofz4NACPoww)the CRW was able to start and load one Diesel Generator. The crew then transitioned back to EP/l/h~5000/E-0(Reactor Trip or S&y Injection).

Given the following critic.al safety function status indications:

e Ckx:aim,en! -- OP-~>JC;I;:

e Inventory - YEI.I,OW e Integity - ORAhZE e Subcriticality - OKMYGE e Heat Sink - RED 0 Core Cooling - . ICED Which ONE (1) of the following actions is required by EOPs?

A. Immediately transition to EP/I/M5000iFR-C.l (Response to hadequate Core Cooling)

B. Inmediately transition to EP/liA/5000/FR-H.1 (R~sponscto Loss of Secorrduiy Heut Sink)

C. Immediately transition to EP/liiW5OB)O/FR-%.1(Response to High Contuisrment Ppessure)

D. Immediately transition tar EP/l/A/5O00/FR-S.l (Response to Nucbeur Power GenerutiodA TWY)

IPt(s) Unit f was operating at 100 LOCA occurred concurrently.

The operators implemented E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety and then transitioned to ECA 0.0 (bossof All AC Po the crew was able to start and then transitioned back to E-0.

Given the following critical sa Containment ORANGE Inventory YELLOW Integrity - ORANGE Subcriticality - ORANGE 0 Heat Sink - RED Core Cooling - RED Which ONE (1) of the actions is required by EOPs?

to FR-C.I (Response io lnadeqrrafe transition to FR-H.1 (Response to Loss of ediately transition to FR-2.4 (Response to High Power GeneraPion/ATWS)

Bank Question: 181.6 Answer: A 1 Pt(s) Unit 1 was operating at 100% when a loss of offsite power and LOCA occurred concurrently. Both Diesel Generators fail to start.

The operators implemented E 0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) and then transitioned to ECA 0.0 (boss ofAIIAG Power). In ECA 0.0 the crew was able to start and load one Diesel Generator. The crew then transitioned back to E-0.

Given the following critical safety function status indications:

Containment ORANGE Inventory - YELLOW

Integrity - ORANGE Subcriticality - ORANGE

Heat Sink - RED Core Coaling - RED Which ONE (I) of the following actions is required by EOPs?

A. Immediately transition to FR-C.l (Response to Inadequate Core Cooling)

B. Immediately transition to FR-#.I (Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)

C. Immediately transition to FR-Z.1 (Response to High Containmenf Pressure)

D. Immediately transition to FR-S.1 (Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ANVS)

Distracter Analysis: 0 nce E -0 has b e m exited i t i s appropriate t o implement CSFSTs. However, in the case of ECA 0.0 there is no power and CSFSTs are not implemented until power is restored. Once power is restored then the crew will then return to E O and impiement the status trees.

A. Correct B. Incorrect: bower priority CSFST Ques-106.l.doc

C. Incorrect: Lower priority CSFST D. Incorrect: bower priority CSFST LEVEL: SRO IBCFR55.43(b)5 SOURCE: Modified LESSON: OF'-MC-EP-INTRO OBJECTIVE: OP-MC-EQ-INTWO Obj. 3, 6

REFERENCES:

OP-MC-EP-INTRO pages 29 & 29 OMP 4-3 Use of Abnormal and Emergency Procedures pages 15to18 KA: APE WE06 EA 2.1 (3.414.2)

Ques_-

186.l.doc

EPE: Degraded Core Cooling (Continued)

KIA NO. KNOWLEDGE EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Degraded Core Cooling).

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 SRO 4.0 EK3.3 Manipulation of controls requiredl to obtain desired operating results during abnonnal, and emergency situations.

IMPORTANCE RO 4.0 SRO 3.9 I EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 sa0 3.7 ABILITY EA1. Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to the @graded Core Cooling)

(CFR:41.7 I 45.5 I 45.6)

EA1.l Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.8 SRO 3.8 E A 1 2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

IMPORTANCE RQ 3.5 SRO 3.8 EAl.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.7 SRO 4.0 EM. Ability to determine and intermet the followina _ _ - to

- as they- apply the @egradeed Core Cooling)

(CFR: 43.5 145.13)

EM. 1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRQ 4.2 NUREG-1122. Rev. 2 4.5-16

DUKE POWER MCGUIRE OPERATIONS TRAINING CLASSROOM TIME (Hours)

OBJECTIVES OBJECTIVE List the six Critical Safety Functions in order of importance.

EPINTROCO!

List the two EP's which provide the entry points into the EP set.

EPINTR0002 Explain when and how the CSF Status Trees are evaluated.

EPlNTR0003 Apply the EP Rules of Usage to determine required actions for a step in an EP that is not satisfied when no contingency action (no RNO column) is provided.

EPINTR0004 Apply the EP Kules of Usage to determine required actions while performing an P contingency action when the action cannot be performed or is not successful.

EPINTR0035 State when Foldout Page actions or trmsitions are applicable.

EPINTROOOS Describe how to determine if sequence is important when performing subtasks within a step of an EP.

EPINTR0007 Discuss the purpose and applicability of Notes and Cautions.

EPINTR0008 Define the 'Constrained Language" terms listed in OMP 4-3, Use of Abnormal and Emergency Procedures.

EPINTR0009 OP-MC-EP-INTRRO FOR TRAMNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 02 Page 5 of 63

DUKE POWER MCGUIRE OPERATIONS TRAINING 2.3.3. Function Restoration Procedures

\

Objective # 3 Challenges to the Critical Safety Functions (CSF's) are addressed by the Function Restoration Procedures. Each CSF is monitored b y Status Tree in order of priority. Monitoring of Status Trees begins either when directed b y E-O, or upon any trarlsition from E-0.

The six Status 'I'recs, one for each ( X F , are found in procedute F-0.

?. F-0.1, SI!BCHITICALI'IY (Procedun?series "S")

2. F-0.2, CCRE COOL.ING (Procediire series "CY)

3. F-0.3, HEAT SINK (Procedure series "H")

4. F-3.4, INTEGRITY (Procedure series "P")

5. F-0.5, CONTAINMENT (Procedure series "Z")

6. F-C.6, INVENTORY (Procedurc series "I")

I Objective # 3 I Each Status Tree includes four color-coded challenges to the CSF being monitored. The color coding represents the severity of the challenge, and thus the priority of the required response. The t a b k llsts the colors in their order of priority, defines the challenge, and shows the symbols that are used in the CSF Status Trees.

Color prioritization is important. W red path is addressed before any orange path.

Any orange path is addressed before any yellow path. If more than one Status Tree indicates the same color, then priority is addressed by the monitoring order of s %: H B - z - I.

~

OP-MC-EP-IMTRO FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 02 Page 27 of 63

SI%TUS TREE PRIORITY lDENPlFlCATlON Line Code Immediate operator action is required.

I The CSF is under Orange severe challenge.

Prompt. operator action is required. mmmmmm Yellow is off-normal or not satisfied. eaa eaea Operator action may I betaken.

There is only one entry point to each Status Tree in F-0.However, there are multiple exit points, but oniy one exit point is possible. The path depends on the plant parameters which are symptomatic of the particular CSF. The exit is always to one of the several procedures associated with the specific CSF Status Tree, or, if the path is green, to remain in the E series procedure being executed. If the exit is to an FR procedure, then the E series procedure is suspended. The FRP's are designed to restore the condition of the CSF and not the plant. When the FWP is exited, the operator is directed back to the appropriate OWP to continue plant recovery.

OP-h4C-B'-INTRO FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 02 Page 29 of 63

OMP 4-3 Page 15 of 28 7.14.3 The configuration control cards filled out in Steps 7.14.1 and 7.14.2 shall be handled per the following two sitwations:

Without operational support center activation The configuration control card wi11 be handled by Ops shift per OMP 7-1 (Removal and Restoration (RSrR) Requirements).

With operational support center activation WHEN the OSC is activated. Operations will report to the OSC and shall bring with them all confiyration c.ontro1cards that have been filled out.

The cards taken to the OSC shall be given to the OPS SRO in the C)SC:.

For handling cards in the OSC, refer to W~O/PjS700~020 (Activation ofthe Operations Support Center).

4.15 Usage of Status Trees There are six different trees, each one evaluating a separate Critic.aI Safety Function of the plant. Color-coding of the status tree end points will be either red, orange, yellow, or green, with green representing a "satisfied" safety status. Each nongreen color represents an action level that should be addressed according to the Rules of I'riority as discussed below.

The six Status Trees are always evaluated in the sequence:

Subcriticality C o x Cooling

Heat Sink Integrity 0 Containment 0 Inventory E identical color priorities are found on different trees during monitoring, the required actiori priority is de.tennined by this sequence.

Initial monitoring of the status trees should begin on either of the following conditions:

As directed by an action step in EP/1,2iN5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

a transfer is made out of the Safety Injection procedure to another EP.

OM' 3-3 Page 16 of 28 An exception to this is that no status tree monitoring is required during the L.oss of All AC: Power EP since none of the electrically powered safeguards equipment can be used. N= power is subsequently restored, EP/l,2/hi'5000/ECA-O. I or 0.2 (Loss of All AC Power Recoveqr procedures) will direct the operator when monitoring of status trees is required.

7.15.1 Implementing CSF Path Procedures 7.15.1.1 CSI' procedures are to be implcrnented prior to transition from EPi1,2/A5000/E-O (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection). a CSF path is red or orange while the operating crew is in EP/i,2/Ai5OOOIE-O, but has turned to green upon transition from E.-O, the CSF procedure which was in aiarm shall NOT be irriplemented. the CSP path is yellow, it shall be handled as any other yellow path procedure per Section 7.15.1.7. E there are any valid red or orange path CSF's on transition from E-0 (unless transition is to EP/1,2/iVSOOOIECA-O(1,oss of All AC Power), the associated CSF procedure shall be implemented.

7.15.1.2 -

IF a valid red or orange path flickers into alarm on SPDS but r e m s to green prior to the crew validating the condition and implementing the procedure (implementation of procedure being that the SKO either hands out fold-out pages or starts reading from the procedure), the C.SF procedure shall he implemented. the CSF path is yellow, it shall be handled as any ot1ie.r yellow path procedure per Section ?.15.1.7. Iikewise, if a valid red path or orange path goes into alarm during performance of a higher priority CSF procedure, but returns to green prior to transition fkom the higher priority CSF path procedure to the lower priority CSF procedure, the associated CSF promdure shall NOT be implemented. the CSF path is yellow, it shall be handIed as any other yellow path procedure per Section 7.15.17.

7.15.1.3 -

IF a CSF procedure directs the operator to return to the procedure and step in effect, AND the corresponding status tree continues to display the offnormal conditions, the corresponding CSI; procedure doesn't have to be implemented again, sinw all recovery actions have been completed. However, if the same status tree subsequently changes to a valid higher priority condition, (OK if it changes to lower condition and returns to higher priority condition again), the corresponding CSF procedure shall be implemented as required by its priority.

OMP4-3 Page 17 of 28 7.15.1.4 RedPath

-IF any valid red p t h is encountered during monitoring, the operator is required to inmediatery implement the corresponding EP. Any recovery EP previously in progress shall be discontinued. E during the performance of any red path procedure, a valid red condition of higher priority arises, the higher priority condition should be addressed first, and the lower priority red path procedure suspended.

7.15.1.5 Orange Path IF any valid orange path is encountered, the operator is expected to scan all of the remaining trees, and then, if no valid red is encountered, promptly implement the coxresponding EP. I_F during the performance of an orange path procedure, any valid red condition or higher priority valid orange condition arises, the red or higher priority orange condition is to be addressed first, and the original orange path procedure suspended.

7.15.1.6 Completion of red or orange path procedure Once procedure is entered due to a red or orange condition, that procedure should be performed to completion, unless preempted by some higher priority condition. It is expec.ted that the actions in the proc.edure will clear the red or orange condition before a11 the operator actions are con~plete.However, these procedures should be perfomied to the point of the defined transition to a specific procedure or to the "procedure and step in effect" to ensure the c.onditionremains clear. At this point any lower priority red or omngc paths cumntly indicating or previously started but completed shall be addressed.

FK-S. 1, P. I and Z. 1 can be entered from either an orange or red path status. E the color changes from orange to red while you are in one of these EPs, the crew should continue and complete the EP from where they are. Crew does NOT have to backup and restart the EP. you exit the orange path, and it subsequently turns red, the EP must be reentered at Step 1.

OMP 4-3 Page 18 of28 Upon continuation of recovery actions in Optimal Recovery procedure. some judgment may be required by the operator to avoid inadvertent reinstatement of a Red or Orange condition by undoing some critical step in the Function Recovery procedure.

The Optimal Recovery procedures are optimal assuming that safety equipment is available. The appearance of a Ked or O r a g e condition in most cases implies that some equipment or function required for safety is NOT avaihble, and by implication some adjustment may be required in the Optimal Recovery procedure.

Bank Questiorr: 2IO.I Answer: B 1 Pt(s) Unit 1 expencnced a LOCA with a breach of containment at 0200. The OSM assumed the duties of the Emergency Coordinator and declared a General Emergency at 0210. The initial recommended protective actions at 0215 were a5 follows:

e Shelter zones E, F, 6 , I I , I, J, K, P, Q, S

Evacuate zones L, B; M, C, N, A, D, (9, R At 0225. the initial dose projection information was presented to the OShil.

Projected dose at the site boundary 0 TEDE 250 mrem

CDE thyroid = 400 mreni Given the following conditions at 0225:

Wind dirsction 130' 7

e Wind speed = 8 MPH e Containment radiation levels a lEMF-51A=SlOR/hr 0 1EMF-5IB = 815 R h Which one of thc following protective action reconmendations are correct in accordance with RP/0/.415700!04 (GeneralFmergmey) on the 0230 ENS update message?

References Provzded A. No change to protective action recommendations is required.

B. Chncel evacuation of Zone D, and shelter Zone D.

/C. Extend the evacuation to I, K, P, Q, and S.

D. Cancel protective action recommendations based upon dose projection information.

Ques..ZlO.l.doc

Distracter Analysis: Initial PARS were based on a wind speed of less than 5 mph. the subsequent message at 0225 has a wind speed of greater than 5 mph and thus a change of PARS is needed.

.4. Incorrect:

Plausible:

Eo. Correct:

C. Incorrect:

Plausible:

D. Incorrect answer Biausible:

Level: SRO 10CFR55.43@)5 IM: CJ 2.444 ( 2.1XOj Source: Rank Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-EP-EM Obj. 1 1

References:

Ippi0iA5700iO04 Enclosure 4.2 Ques._210.1.doe

1 Pt(s) tinit 1 experienced a LOCA with a breach of containment at 0200. The OSM assumed the duties of the Emergency Coordinator and declared a General Emergency at 0210. The initial recomrnended protective actions at 0215 were as follows:

e Shelter zones E;F, G, H, I, J, K, P, Q, S o Evacuate zones I., 3, M,C, N,4,Il, 0,R At 0225, the initial dose projection information was presented to the OSM.

o Projected dose at the site boundary 0 TEDE = 250 nirem e CDE thyroid = 400 mrem Given the following conditions at 0225:

e Wind direction = 130" e Wind speed - 8 MPM e Containment radiation levels Q 1EMF-51A = 810 Rh lEMF-51B = 815 Rh Which one of the following protective action recommendations are correct in accordance with W/0/A'5700i04 ((;e?wai Emergency) on the 0230 ENS update message?

References Provided A. No change to protective action recommendations is required.

B. Cancel evacuation of Zone D, and shelter Zone D.

c'. Extend the evacuation to I, K, P, Q, and S.

D. Cancel protective action recommendations based upon dose projectbn information.

Que-Z1 0.l.doc

1 Pt(s) Unit 1 experienced a LOCA with a breach The OSM assumed the duties of the Eme declared a General Emergency at 0210.

protective actions at 0215 were as follows:

a Shelter zones E, F, G, H, I s J, K, P, Q, Evacuate zones L, B, M, C , N, A, D, 0 ,

At 0225, the initial dose projection inforifation was presented to the OSM.

/

Projected dose at the site bound&

TEDE = 250 mrem a CBE thyroid = 400 mrem,,

Given the following condition,dat 0225:

/

a Wind direction = 1300./

Wind speed = 8 Mf$

a Containment radiahon levels IEMF-51A 7810 Rlhr IEMF-51YL 815 Whr Which one of-rhe following protective action recommendations are correct in akordance with RP/O/A/5700/04 (General Emergency) on the 0230 EhS update message?

References Provided:

A. ,/ No change to protective action recommendations is

i required.

,/

,/El. Cancel evacuation of Zone D, and shelter Zone D.

/

i C. Extend the evacuation to I, K, P, Q, and S.

D~ Cancel protective action recommendations based upon dose projection information.

Ques-2lO.l.doc

Bank Question: 210.f Answer: B 1 Pt(s) Unit 1 experienced a LOCA with a breach of containment at 0200.

The OSM assumed the duties of the Emergency Coordinator and declared a General Emergency at 0210. The initial recommended protective actions at 0215 were as follows:

Shelternones E, F, G, H,I, J, K,P, Q, S 0 Evacuate zones L, 3, M, C, N,A, B, 0 , R At 0225, the initial dose projection information was presented to the OSM.

Projected dose at the site boundary TED = 250 mrem CBE thyroid = 400 mrem Given the following conditions at 0225:

Wind direction = 130" Wind speed = 8 MPH 0 Containment radiation Levels

= 1 E M F d l A = 810 Whr I E M F d l B = 815 Whr Which one of the following protective action recommendations are correct in accordance with RP/O/N5700/04 (General Emergency) on the 0230 ENS update message?

References Provided:

RP/Q/N5700/04 A. No change to protective action recornmendations is required.

B. Cancel evacuation of Zone D, and shelter Zone D.

C. Extend the evacuation to I, K, P, Q, and S.

B. Cancel protective action recommendations based upon dose projection information.

Bistracter Analysis: Initial PARSwere based on a wind speed of less than 5 mph. The subsequent message at 0225 has a wind speed of greater than 5 rnph and thus a change of PARS is needed.

A. IRcQITeCt:

Plausible:

B. Correct:

C. Incorrect:

Plausible:

D. incorrect answer Plausible:

Level: SRO IOCFR55,43(b)5 KA: 6 2.4.44(2.U4.0)

Source: Bank Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-EP-EMP Obj. 11

References:

RP/O/A/5700/004 Enclosure 4.2 Ques-210.1 .doc

2.4 Emergency Procedures /Plan (Continued) 2.4.44 Knowledge of emergency plan protective action recommendations.

(CFR: 43.5 145.11)

IMPORTANCE RQ 2.1 sa0 4.0 2.4.45 Ability to prioritbe and interpret the significance OP each annunciator or alarm.

(CFW: 43.5 145.3 145.12)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.3 SRO 3.6 2.4.46 Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions.

(CFR: 43.5 t 45.3 i 45.12)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 SWO 3.6 2.4.47 Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in a n accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate conh-01 room reference materid.

(CFR: 41.10,43.5 I45.12)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 3.7 2.4.48 Ability to imterpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.12)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 SRO 3.8 2.4.49 Ability to perform without reference to procedures those actions that require imediate operation of system components and controls.

(CFR: 41.10 143.2 1 45.6)

IMPORTANCE WO 4.0 SRO 4.0 2.4.50 Ability Bo verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manuai.

(CFR: 45.3)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.3 SKO 3.3 NUREG-1122. Rev. 2 2-16

Recommend evacuation of 2 mile radius & 5 miles downwind. Reconmend in-place sheher for a11 zones not evacuated out to 10 miles (See Enclos re 4.2. page 3 of 4)

Evacuate zones L,

.:I 4

Large fission product Contninment?

(See Enclosure 4.2. page 2 projected by RP to exceed Protective 10 miles downwind. Recommend in-place shelter for all zones nof evacuated out to Recornmend protective actions in accordance with the Protective Action Guides.

(See t;nclosuie 4.2, page 2 of 4)

(See Enclosure 4.2. page 3 of4)

S9Z OSP t.29 W8 OPEZ

Duke Power Company (1) ID No RPIO/Ai5700/004 PROCEDURE PROCESS RECORD Revision No 017 h

(12) Procedure Completion Verification Yes 0N/A Check lists and/or blanks initialed. signed. dated or filled in NA. as appropriale?

Yes 0N/A Required enclosures attached?

63 Yes N/A Data sheets attached. completed. dated and signed?

&I Yes NIA Charis. graphs. etc. attached. dated. identified, and marked?

Yes CIN/A Procedure requirernenls met?

Verified By ~~

~~ Bate ~~

Procedure Cornpleticn Approved Date ~~

.- J (14) flemarks (anach additional pages. if fiecessaryj

General Emergency Reference Use

RPIQ)lN5700/004 Page 2 of S General Emergency

1. symgtow Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantiai core degradation or meking with potential for loss of containment integrity.

2. Inmedilate Actions 2.1 The following Enclosures should he given to the appropriate personnel:

e The OSM should execute Enclosure 4.9 (OSN Immediate and Subsequent Actions) in ;1 timely manner.

e The WCC SRO, or another SRO designated by the OSM should execute Enclosure 4.10 (WCC SKO Immediate and Subsequent Actions) in a timely manner.

e The STA should execute Enclosure 4.1 1 (STA Immediate and Subsequent .4ctions) in 3 timely manner.

RP//O/A/5700/004 Page 3 of 5

3. Sarbsequeat Actions 3.1 Follow-up Notifications IS minutes. (PP-LM-00-02i38j

_ I 3.1.1 Assess protective action recommendations made to the State and Coonties in the previous notification. Refer to Enclosure 4.2, page 1 of 4.

_ I 3. I .2 Ihe Emergency Coordinator shall make follow-up notifications to State and County authorities utilizing Enclosure 4.1 (Emergency Notification Form):

- Every hour until the emergency is terminated OM

- If there is any significant change to the situation OR

~ As agreed upon with & individual agency. Documentation shall he maintained for any agreed upon schedule change and the interval shall no! be greater than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to any agency.

3.1.3 Complete Enclosure 4.1 (Emergency Notification Form) in accordance with Enclosure 4.5, Section 1.

-. 3.1.4 Make follow-up notification to State and County authorities using the Emergency Notification Form i n accordance with Enclosure 4.5, Section 2.

RP//Q/NV5700/004 Page 4 of 5 3.2 Ensure completion of Enclosure 4.7 (Emergency Coordinator / Emergency Operations Facility Director Turnover Checklist) prior to turnover of Emergency Coordinator responsibilities.

NOTE: A TSC preprogrammed fax button is available on the Control Room fax machine.

IF changes to the initial Protective Action Recommendations are recognized during the turnover, the turnover should not be. completed until the Control Room transmits this notification to the offsite agencies. ( PIP-IM-0-00541) 3.3 WHEN TSC Emergency Chrdinatcr is ready to receive tiirnover 'FII@N perform one of the following to facilitate turnover:

0 IEmd deliver turnover sheet to the TSC Emergency Coordinator.

OR

____I Fax turnover sheet to the TSC

- 3.4 In the event that a worker's hehavior or actions contributed to an actual or potential substantial degradation ofthe level of safety of the plant (incidents resulting in an Alert or higher emergency declaration), the supervisor must consider and establish whether or n o t a k.

for cause drug,/alcohol screen is required. The I3-D Progam Administrator or designee is available to discusslassist with the incident.

3.5 Protective Actions Onsite

- ..~. . 3 3 . 6 Evacuate non-essential personnel from the site after all personnel have been accounted for via Site Assembly. Refer 10 RP/O/A/5700/0I I (Conducting a Site Assembly, Site Evacuation or Chntainment Evacuation).

~ 3.5.2 E a situation which is immediately hazardous to life or valuable property exists, evaluate potential dose rates by one of the following methods:

a. Contact RP Shift at Ext. 4282

b. Assess area monitors

~ 3.5.3 Compiete Enclosure 4.8 (Request for Emergency Exposure), prior to dispatch of emergency workers if emergency situation precludes documentation.

3.6 Using Section B of the Emergency Plan (EAL Basis), assess the emergency condition:

_ I 3.6.1 Remain in a General Emergency, OR

__p 3.6.2 Terminate the emergency. REFER TO RPi0/8/5700/012 (Activation of the Technical Support Center (TSC]), Enclosure 4. I!? for termination criteeia.

3.7 Termination Notifications NOTE: Enclosure 4.6 has instructions for completion and transmission of termination notifications.

3.4.1 Complete Enclosure 4.1 (Emergency Notification Form) in accordance with Enclosure 4.6, Section 1.

- 3.4.2 Make termination notification to State and County authorities using the Emergency Notification Form in accordance with Enclosure 4.6, Section 2.

4. Enclosures 4.8 Emergency Notification Form.

4.2 Guidance for Offsite Protective Actions 4.3 Initial Notificxtion Completion~ransmission 4.4 NRC Event Notification Worksheet 43 Follow-up Notification ComplctioniTransmission 4.6 Termination Notification Completior~rnnsmissiora 4.7 Emergency Coordinator / Emergency Operations Facility Director Turnover Checklist 4.8 Request for Emergency Exposure 4.9 OSM Iinmetiinte and Subsequent Actions {PIP0-M97-4638) 4.LQ WCC SRO Immediate and Subsequent Actions {PIP0-MY7-4638) 4.1 B STA Immediate and Subsequent Actions {PIP0.M97.4638)

4. AUlHERTICATIQP8 (If Required): -- WT- v

5. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION: 1 L.5 A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL NEMT @ALERT EWE AnEa EMERGENCY @GENERAL EM ERG^

I_

6. @mergency Declaration At: @Termination 81: TIM&DATE: (G-4 .- -Im a2-T (IfB, WIfa item 16.)

7. EMERGENCY DESCRIWION/REMARKS:- -- . --__

15.

. If items 8-14 have not changed, only items 1-7 and 15-16 are required lo be completed

.I Inlormalion may not be auailabie on initial notifisations

EncIosure 4.2 RP/O/Al5700/004 Guidance for Off--siteProtective Actions Page 1 of 4 Recommend evacuation of 2 mile radius & 5 miles downwind. Recommend in-place shelter for all zones not evacuated out to 10 miles (See Enclcs re 4.2, page 3 of4)

Evacuate zones L, Containment?

(See Enclosure 4.2, page 2 Off-site doses projected by RP t o exceed Protective ction Guides'?

Reconmend evacuation of 5 mile radius &

10 miles downwind. Recommend in-place shelter for all zones not evacuated uiit to 10 miles. actions in accordance with the Protective Action Guides.

(See Enclosure 1.2.page 2 of 1)

(See Enclosure 4.2.page 3 of 4)

Enclosure 4.2 RPlO/AJ.5700/004 Guidiewre for Off-site Protective Actions Page 2 of 4 GCJlDANCE FOR DETERMXA'FION OF GAP ACTIVITY rddiation leve1 exceeds the leveis in the table bebw.

If the OAC is available, call up the followi~gcomputer points based on need:

__.I_

Unit 4 OAC Unit 2 OAC MIA0829 IE,WSl A MZA0829 2EMF.51A MIA0835 IEiWSlB M2.40835 2 E W 5 IB TIME AITER CONTAINMENT MONITOR READPIG (RO-IR)

SHLrnOWPJ (HOIJRS) EMF S i A ~ o ~ ( l 0 0 GAP 7 c Activity Reiea&

0 2,340 0-2 864 2-4 624 4-8 450

>8 26.5

I i

4 1

EncEo5ure 4.2

,-\, RP/OIAJ57W/,,

Guidance for OE-5ite Protective Actians Page 3 of 4

.i GLXDAN'CE FOR OFFSITE PROTECTIVE A m o i v s PAGs

-.-. (ProJected Dose) ~

Total Effective Committed Dose - 1 Dose Equivalent Equivalent (CDE)

Recommendation I

< 5 rem

> 5 rem No Protective Action is required hased on Evacuate affected zones and shelter the 1- .- .

- remainder ofthe 10 mile EFZ not-. evacuated.

Protective Action Guides (PA&) are levels of radiation dose at which prompt protective actions should be initiated and are based on EPA-400-R-92-001 1- of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Kuciear Incidents.

Enclosure 4.3

-- RPIolN57mlm Page 1 of 9 I. Completion OF the Emergency Notification Form NOTE: m lItems 1 - IO, 15 and 16 are required.

1.1 Complete Enclosure 4.1 (Emergency Notification Form) as follows:

NOTE: Message # s shouid he sequentially numbered throughout the dnll/eniergency.

Item 1 Check A for Drill OIp B for Actual Emergency Check INITIAL=

Write i n rtiessage number.

NOTE: Certain events could occur at the plant site such that both units are affected. These may include:

Enclosure 4.3 (Ahnonnai Rad IixWRadiological Effluent), Enclosure 4.6 (FiresExplosions and Security Events) and Enclosure 4.7 (Natural Disasters, Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety) from RP/O/A/5700/W, (Classification of Emergency). Consider this when completing the unit designation on line 2 of the Emergency Notification Form. (PIPO-M97-4638)

I.

i REPORED BY: is the Communicators name.

.- ftem 2 Write i n the unit(s) Cbmmunicators name.

NOTE: Information for Items 3 and 4 will be completed during transmission of the Emergency Notification I Form.

- Item 3 Write in the transmittal time & NJ date.

Item 4 Write, in appropriate numher codeword.

- Item 5 Check D for GENERAL EMERGEKCY.

.- Item 6 Check A for Emergency Declaration At: ANB)

Wnte the time date the classification was declared

RP/O//A/570Q/)/004 Page 2 of 9 Item 7 Enter EAL Number and Emergency Description of the reason for declaring the emergency classification (in layman's terms, if possible). Lpo NOT use system abbreviations, acronyms or jargon which may cause confusion. h t e a d , write out the description i n long hand. Be sensitive to the fact that certain descriptive technical terms may elicit unanticipated reactions from others. (PIP 0-MY$-2065)

Item 8 Check the appropriate piant condition. [PIP 0-MY7-4210 KRC-I) 0 A Improving: Emergency conditions are improving in the direction of a lower classification or termination of the event.

.R Stable: The emergency situation is under control. Emergency core cooling systems, equipment, plans, etc., are operating as designed.

C Degrading: Given current and projected plant conditions/equipment status, recovery efforts are not cxpected to prevent entry into a higher emergency classification or the need to upgrade offsite Protective Action Recommendations.

~. Item 9 Check A SHLTDOWN write the time arid date of Reactor Shutdown OR Check H t$NIP write in the Reactor Power level

NOTE: 1. An emergency release is any unplanned, quantifiable discharge h the environment associated with a declared emergency event. (This definition is based on an NRC commitment made on 11/30/90 following McGuire's Steam Generator Tube Rupture.) (PIP 0-M.197-4256) 1

2. Notify the OSM if box C or box D is checked.

3 . Base the determination of emergency release on:

EMF readings, e containment pressure and other indications, 0 field rnonitoiing results, e knowledge of the event and its impact on systems operation and resultant release paths

4. An emergency refease is occurring if any one or more of the f d 0 W i I I g btilleted conditions an niet associated with a declared emergency:

containment particulate, gaseous, iodine monitor ( E m s 38, 39 andor 40) readings indicate an increase in activity.

OR Containment monitor (Em+51A and/or 51B) readings indicate greater than I . S W r ,

AND I Either containment pressure is greater than 0.3 psig, OR An actual containment breach is known to exist.

IJnit vent particulate, gaseous, iodine monitor (EMF3 35, 36. andor 37) readings indicate an increase in activity.

8 Condenser air ejector eshausF monitor (EMF 33) or other alternate means indicate Steam Generator tube leakage.

Confirmed activity in the environment reported by Field Monitoring Team(s) e Knowledge of the event and its impdct on systems operation and resultant release paths

-.....- Item 10 Check the appropriate box for emergency release.

e ti NONE: clearly n o emergency d e % e is occuning or has occurred m La POTENTIAL: discretionaq option for the EC or EOFD.

m C IS OCCURRING: meets the specified conditions.

e D HAS OCCURREIB: previously met the specified conditions.

Enclosure 4.3 RPl(BlA157001004 Initial Notification Page -1of 9 C~mpleBio~rranssnissiola

___ Item 15 Check B write affected zones for evacuation AND Check C AND write the letter designation for all other zones not evacuated.

I

_ Item 16 Have the Emergency Coordinator approve the niessage i%NI)

Write in the time I$ND date the message was approved.

2. TRANSMISSION OF %HEEMERGENCY NOTZFHCATHON FORM I NOTE: i. All initial notifications are verbal. Avoid using abbreviations orjargon likely to be unfamiliar to the Stafe and Counties. i f any information is not available or nut applicable, write out "Not Available" or "Not Applicable" in the margin or other space as appropriate. Do not abbreviate "N.A.".

2. The backup means of communications are the Bell line or County Emergency Response Radio KPIOlrW57001014, Enclosure 4. I is available for needed backup numbers.

I. 3. Refer to page 6 of9 ofthis Enclosure for instructions on how to use the County Emergency Response Radio if selective signaling or Bell line i s not available.

- 2.1 ~ ! S Gthe Selective Signaling teiephone by dialing " I and depressing the push to talk button.

__ 2.2 a%; Selective Signaling Group Call fails, THEN go to RPiOINS700/014, Enclosiire 4.1for manual selective signaling numbers.

1 NOTE: The time when the first patty is contacted should be recorded on Line 3.

2.3 4s the State arid Counties answer, check them off on the back of the notification form. At least one attempt using the individual selective signaling code must be made for any missing agencies. Proceed with the notification promptly following an attempt to get missing agencies on the line.

2.4 Check the State and Counties are on the line, document this ti-ne in item #3 on the form. This time should not exceed L5 minutes from the time of declaration (Item # 6).

~ ~ .. 2.5 Tell them you have an emergency notification From the McGuire Control Room and to get out the Emergency Notification Form.

2.6 Read the complete message slowly, line by line, beginning with Item it I , allowing ample tinre to copy.

Enclosure 4.3 R P/@AJS 1OQlO)/oo4 Initial Notification Page 5 of 9

@omlPletio~ransmissiosl When you reach item #4, ask the State or a County to authenticate the message. The agency should give you a number and you should provide the appropriate codeword. Write the number and codeword on the form.

After communicating the initial message. ask if there are any questions. Record individuals names and times on the back of the form. This time is the Sam6 time as Item #3.

After verbally transmitting the message, FAX a copy (front page only) to :he agencies. Refer i o pages 8 of 9 and 9 of 9 of this Enclosure for F.4X operation.

Continuous attempts to contact missing agencies must be nxide if unable to complete the notification per step 2.3. Document the time these agencies were contacted on the back of the notification form.

RPi&Af5700/004 Page 6 of 9 COUNTY EMERGENCY RESPONSE RADIO NOTE: This radio will onlycontact the County warning points. The State Have one of the Counties relay the message to the State.

Group Call:

1 be contacted on this radio.

_ _ ~ 1. Press 46 to activate all County radio units.

2. When the ready light comes o n , press the bar on the transmitter microphone and say:

"'l'his is McGuire Control Room to ail Counties, do you copy?"

Once a11 Counties respond, begin transmitting the message using step 2.3 through 2.10 of this enclosure.

Proceed with the mttification promptly fobwing an attempt to get missing agencies on the air.

' 'UTE: RP/O/A/5700/014, Enclosure 1.1 is available for needed individuai radio codes.

.__ - 2

3. If a County fails to respond on the group call, press their individual code on the cncoder arid say:

"This is McCuire Control Room to (Agency you are calling), do you copy?"

Once the County responds, begin transnritting the message using step 2.3 through 2.10 of this enclosure.

-4 After you have finished transmitting the message, conclude by saying:

"'l'his is WQC700 base clear."

5 Continuous attempts to sontact missing agencies must be made i f unable to complete the notification per step 2. Efocurnent the time these agencies were contacted on the bac.k of the notification form.

Enclosure 4.3 RP/&N5700/003 Initial Notification Page 7 of 9 Conaplelio~ransmissian This page is left intentionally blank.

Enclosure 4.3 RP/O/N5700/004 Initial Notification Page 8 of 9 ComlP1e.tio~r;nnsmissioPl OPER4TION OF THE FAX A. G R O W F A X the other calls.

2. This sends a FAX fo a11 County Warning Points, State EOC, TSC, EOF, News Group and JIC.

1 . Insert the Emergency Notification Form face down into the FAX.

2 . Press GROUP FAX button.

-~ 3 . Press "SENDIRECEIVE" button.

R . 1NL)FVDUAL FAX

1. Insert the Emergency Notification Form face down into the FAX.

~ 2. Select location(s) to receive the fax:

- . ... e Press Kews Group.

~. .. e PressTSC.

- e Press State of North Carolina EOC

~. o Press Mecklenburg County Warning Point.

.-.. e Press Gaston County Warning Point.

e Press Lincoln County Warning Point.

D Press Iredrll County Warning Point

~ e Press Catawha County Warning Point.

m Press Cahams County Warning Point.

. e PressEOF.

e Press JIC.

-. 3. WHEN the appropriate individual location is selcctcd. press the "SENDRECEIVE" button.

I NOTE:

I

~

RP/O/)/a/57OO/C14, Enclosure 3.1 is available for needed manuai FAX numbers. I I

C. To send a FAX to a location dialing manually:

1. Insert the document face down into the FAX.

... -2. Using the keypad, dial the number that you wish to call.

- 3. Press "SEND/RECEIVE" button.

EnCbSUrt! 9.4 RP/O/A/5700/004 Event Notification Worksheet Page 1 of 2

Enclosure 4.4 RPIOIN~MIO~~

NRC Event Notification Worksheet Page 2 of 2

-IF the naifiralion is due and Ihe infomntim is nol available

~THEN rmrt "Not Available" and complete I k notification.

EAK RATE gpdgpd S LIMITS EXCEEDED 'IIDVEN OR LONG TERM DEVEUWMENT EAK START VAT TIME 'WlANTA(TTVTTY: PRMARY SECONDARY L.lSC Sample) Xe Pq-~ rnCiIml Xe rq--.~mCliml lcdineeq. ~ mwmi ldlncrq mCk'ml IST OF SAFETY RE.LAIFV EQUIPMENT NOTOPERATlOhAL;

Enclosure 4 5 R P/(B/tk/5700/004 F Q B ~ Q WNotification

-~J~ Pdge B ot 6 Campletia~nnsmissiion

1. Completion of the Emergency Notification Form NOTE: If items 8 - 14 have not changed froin the previous message, only i t e m 1 - 7.15 and 16 are required to be completed. Avoid using abbreviations or jargon iikely to be unfamiliar to the State and Counties. I f any information is not available or not applicable, write out "Not Available" or "Not Applicable" in the margin or other space as appropriate. Do not abbreviate "N.A.".

1. I Complete Enclosure 4.1 (Emergency Notification Form as follows):

NhITE: Message # s should be sequentially numbered throughout the drill/emergency.

- J

.-- Item i Check A for Drill U for Aclual Emergency AND Check FOI.I.OW-C'P Write in message numher.

NOTE: Certain events could occur at the plant site such that both units are affected. These may include:

Enclosure 4.3 (Abnormal Rad I~zvels/RadiologicalEffluent). Enclosure 4.6 (Fires/Explosions and Security Events) and Enclosure 4.7 (Natuml Disasters, Hazards and Other ('onditions Affecting Plant Safety) from RP/O/A/5700/000. (Classification of Emergency). Consikr this when completing the "unit designation" on line 2 of the Emergcncy Notification Form. (PIP O - M W 4638 REPORTED BY: is the Communicator's name

~ Itern 2 Write i n the unit(sj Communicator's name NOTE: Transinittai time is the time you FAX the form to the agencies.

- Iterr 3 Write in the transmittal time B")date.

- Item 4 Authentication is not required when faxing.

hein 5 Check D for GENERAL EMERGENCY.

~ -Item

.__. . 6 Check A for Emergency Declaration At:

Write the time AND date the classification was declared

Item 7 Enter EAL Number and Emergency Description of the reason for declnring the emergency classification (in layman's terms, if possible). DO NOT use system abbreviations, acronyms or jargon which may cause confusion. Instead, write out the description in long hand. Be sensifive to the fact that certain descriptive technical terms may elicit unanticipated reactions from others. (PIP 0-M98-2065 j In addition, provide a description of changes i n plant conditions since the last notification. Items to be considered for iriirlusion arc a~ follows: {PIP 0-M98-7065)

Other unrelated classifiable events (for example, during an Alert. an event which, by itself would meef the conditions for an Unusual Event)

Major/Key Equipnient O u t of Service Emergency response actions underway Fire(s) onsite Flooding related to the emergency Explosions Loss of Offsite Power Core Uncovery Core Damage Medical Emergency Response Team activation related to the emergency Personnel injuly related to the emergency or death Transport of injured individuals offsite specify whether contaminated or not

~

Site Evacuation/relocation of site personnel Saboteurs/Intruders/Suspiciousde.vicesflhreats Chemical or Ha7,ardous Material Spills or Releases Extraordinq noises audible offsite Any event causing/requiring offsite agency response Any event causing increased medii attention Remember to "close the loop" on Items from previous notifications.

I Item 8 Check the appropriate plant condition. {PIP M-097-4210 NRC-I }

- A . Improving: Emergency conditions are improving in the direction of a lower classification or termination of the event.

= B .Stable: The emergency situation is under control. Emergency core cooling systems, equipment, plans, etc., are operating as designed.

.C. Degrading: Given current and projected plant conditionslequipment status, recovery efforts are not expected to prevent entry into a higher emergent).

classification or the need to upgrade offsite Prctte.ctive Action Recommendations.

___ Item 9 Check A SHCTDOWN AND write the time and date of Reactor Shutdown OR Check B AND write in the Reactor Power level.

~ 9 7 - 4 2 5J4

2. Notify the h.)SM if box C or box D is checked.

3 . Rase the determination of emergency release on:

e EMF readings, e containment pressure and other indications, e field monitoring results, e knowledge of the event and its impact on systems operation and resultant release paths.

4. Am emergency release is occurring if any one or more of the FoBBowirag b ~ k t e dcondition!

are met associated with a declared emergency:

m Either Containment particulate, gaseous, iodine monitor ( E m s 38, 39 andor 40) readings indicate an increase in activity, OR Containment monitor (EMF'S51And/or 5 1B)readings indicate greater than t .SRIhr, AND Either containment pressure is greater than 0.3 psig, OR An actual containment breach is known to exist.

Unit vent particulate, gaseous, iodine monitor (EMFs 35, 36, andor 37) readings indicate an increase in activity.

Condenser air ejector exhaust monitor (EMF 33) or other alternate means indicate Steam Generator tuhe leakage.

Confirmed activity in the environment reported by Field Monitoring Team(s).

Knowledge of the event and its impact on systems operation and resultant release paths Item 10 Check the appropriate box for emergency release.

e A NONE: clearly no emergency release is occumng o r has occuned.

e B POTENTIAL: discretionary option for the EC or ECFD.

m C IS OCCURRING: meets the specified conditions.

e D HAS OCCURRED: previously met the specified conditions.

Enclosure 4 5 RPl@/lA/5700/W4 Follow-Up Notification Page 5 of 6

~~~pletio~ransmissiorP 1.2 follow-up notification is due and information for Items 11 through 14 cannot be obtained from RP shift, glIEN mark each item "Not Available" and go to Item 15.

Item 11 Check G W O LEVEL ~ I$ND Check A for AIRBORNE E3 for LIQUJD I$wB)

Write in the time AlrbH) date the release staeted AIpiD stopped if available.

Item 12 Check CIlRIES PER SECOND AWD Check BELOW ABOVE normal operating limits AI\ID Check the appropriate blocks A, U,C, D AND write in the value(s).

I KOTE: If unchanged from the previous notification, the information does not have to b e 7 1 Item 13 Check NEW UNCIIANGED I$")

Write in the projection time Write in the estimated duration A")

Write in the TEDE and Thyroid CDE values.

~

item 14 Check A, B, C, D m provide values for each

-~ item 15 Check E3 write affected zones For evacuation AND Check C write the letter designation for all other zones not evacuated Ftem 16 Have the Emergency Coordinator approve the message Write in the time A")date the message was approved.

Enclosure 4.6 WP/6blN570OlQW

./- -~.,

Termination Notification Page 1 of 6 C~~nl~leBio~ra~~smissiors

1. Completion of the Emergency Notific:atisn Form NOTE: A tenmnation message shouid be marked as FOLLOW-UP on the Emergency Notification Form.

1.1 Complete Enclosure 4.1 (Emergency Notification Form) as follows:

- Item 1 Check A for I>rill B for Actual Emergency Check FOLI,OW-1.P Write in message number.

NOTE: Certain events could occur at the plant site such that both units are affected. These may include:

Enclosure 4.3 (Abnormal Rad Lvels/Radiological Eftluent), Enclosure 4.6(FiresExplosions and Security Events) and Enclosure 4.4 (Natural Disasters, Hazards a d Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety) from RP/0/.4/5700/000, (Classification of Emergency). Consider this when completing the unit designation 011 line 2 of the Emergency Notification Forni. (PIP (ILM97-REPORTED BY: is the Communicators name

~- hem 2 Write in the unit(s) Communicators name.

NOTE: information for Items 3 arid 4 will he completed during transmission of the Emergency Notification I____

~ Item 3 Write i n the transmittal time date

~. Item 4 Write in appropriate number codeword.

~~ Item 5 Check D for GENERAL EMERGENCY.

Item 6 Check B for Termination At:

Write the time date the classification was terminated item 16 I h e the Emergency Coordinator approve the message AND Write in the time date the message was approved.

/--

RFl@blN5700/004 Page 2 of 6 NOTE: 1. AI1 termination notifications are verbal. Avoid using abbreviations or jargon likely to be unfamiliar to the State and Counties. If any information is not available or not applicable, write out "Not Available" or "Not Applicable" in the margin or other space as appropriate. Do not abbreviate "N.A.".

2. The backup means of communications are the Bell h e or County Emergency Response Radio.

RP/O//N57001014, Enclosure 4. I is available for needed backup numbers.

3. Refer to page 3 of 6 of this enclosure for instructions on how to use the County Emergency Response Radio if selective signaling or Bell line is not available.

2. I Use the Selective Signal telephone by dialing

I and depressing the push to talk button.

-. 2.2 -

IF Selective Signaling Group Call fails, go to RP/O/A/570@/014,Enclosure 4.1 for manual selective signaling numbers.

,: 2.3 As the State and Counties answer, check them off on the back of the notification form. At least one attempt using the individual selective signaling code must be made for any missing agencies.

i Pmeed with the notification promptly foBIowing an attempt ta get missing agencies on the he.

2.4 Check the State and Counties are on the line, document this time in item #3 on the form

~ 2.5 Tell them you have an emergency notification from the McGuire Control Room and to get out the Emergency ldotification Fonn.

~ 2.6 Read the complete message w,line by line, beginning w i t h Item # I , allowing ample time to copy.

I NOTE: Refer to page 4 of 6 of this Enclosure for the aufhentication codeword list

-~ . 2.4 When you reach item #4, ask the State or a County to authenticate the message. The agency should give you a number and you should provide the appropriate codeword. Write the number and codeword on the form.

2.8 After communicating the message, ask if there are any questions. Record individuals' names and times on the back of the form. 'this time is the same time as Item #3.

2.9 After verbally transmitting the message, FAX ;L copy (front page only) to the agencies. Refer to page 5 of 6 and 6 of 6 of this enclosure for FAX operation.

\.-

Enclosure 4.6 RP/O/Ai5700/004 Termination Notification Page 3 of 6 CompBeaio~rarssrssission

- 2.10 C:ontinuous attempts to contact missing agencies must he made if unable to complete the notification per step 2.3. Dwument the time these agencies were confacted on the back of the notification form.

NOTE: This radio will only contact the County warning points. The State radio. flaw one of the Counties relay the message to the State.

be contacted on this I

Group Cdl;.

1. Press 20 to activate all County radio units

- 2. When the ready light comes on, press the bar on the transmitter microphone and say:

"This is McCiuire Control Room to all Chunties, do you copy?"

Once a11 Counties respond, begin transmitting the message using step 2.3 through 2.10 ofthis enclosure.

Proceed with the riotification promptly f d l ~ w i t an~ g attempt to get missing agencies the air.

NOTE: KPIO/A/5400/014. Enclosure 4.1 is available for needed individual radio codes.

- 3. If a County fails to respond o n the group call, press their individual code on the encoder and say:

"This is McGuire Control Room to (Agency you 31%calling), do you copy'!"

Once the County responds. kgiti transmitting the message using step 2.3 through step 2. 10 of this enclosure.

~ ~ 4. After you have finished transmitting the message, concluae by saying:

"This is WQCSM hase clear."

5. Continuous attempts to contact missing agencies must be made if unable to complete the notification per Step 2. Document the time these agencies were contacted OR the back of the notification form.

RPlQIP1/5700/OM Page 4 of 6 This page is left intentionally blank.

i

Enclosure 4.6 K PIQIA/S100MK)4 Termination Notification Page 5 of 6

&'om~leBicP~ranssnissiura omrumolr6 OF THE FAX A. GROUPFAX completing the other calls.

2. This sends a FAX to all County Warning Points. State EOC, TSC,EOF, News Group and jIC.

~ .. !~Insert the Emergency Notification Form face down into the FAX.

2. Press "GKOIIP FAX" button.

-3. Press "SEND/REC:EIVE"button.

R. 1NL)IVDUAL FAX I. Insert the Emergency Napifisation Form face down into the FAX.

l_ll_ 2. Select location(s) to receive the fax:

~ e Press NewsGroup.

e Press TSC.

m Press State of North Carolina ROC.

~. Press Mecklenburg County Warning Point.

~ 0 Press Gaston County Warning Point.

-..... e Press Lincoln County Warning Point.

~ 0 Press Iredell County Waniing Point.

~ 0 Press Catawba County Warning Point.

~ 0 Press Cabarms County W m i n g Point.

e Press EOF.

e Press JIC.

3. WHEN the appropriate individual location is selected, press the "SENPYRECEIVE" burton.

Page 6 of 6 OPERATIOM OF THE FAX C. To send a FAX to as&& location dialing manually:

1. Insert the document face down in the FAX.

.- 2 . Using fhe keypad, dial the nilinher that you wish to call.

.- - 3. Press "SENDRECEIVE" button

EncBosiare 4.7 Emergency Coordinator / Emergency Operations Facility Director Turnover Checkkst UNITIS) AFFECTED: UB UL ir1~-~-99-38r.q DATE POWER LEVEL Ncs TEMP NCS PRESS 1

N O W DECLARED AT: TSC AClTVATED A T ALERT DECLARED AT EOF ACTIVATED A R SAE DECLARED AT:

G.E. DECLARED AT:

RFASON FOR EhlER CLASS:

SITE ASSEMBLY --

SITE W A C . (NOKESSEN.)

SITE W A C . (ESSEmIAL)

OTHER OFFSITE AGENCY INVOLVEMENT MEDICAL

Enclosure 4.8 RP/~/Al5~oO/004 Heqslst for Emergency Exposure (a) Page 1 of 1 (a) Excludes declared pregnant women (b) Includes skin and hody rxtremities (c) Only on a volunteer basis to persons fully aware of the risks invoived. ALI factors being equal, select wlunteers above the age of45 and those who normally encounter little exposure.

.i i.

My signature indicates niy acknowledgernent that I have k e n informed that I may be exposed to the levels of radiation indicated above. I have k e n Fully hriefeed on the task 60 De ascomplished and on the risks of this exposure.

I. .. ... ... . .. - acknowledge this planned Emergency Ixposure (KPM or designee, signature or note of verbal authorization Date/Timr I, .. ... .

... - ..approve this planned Emergency Exposure at (Emergency Coordinator or EOF Director, signature o r note of verbal authorization Da telTi nie Subsequent Radiation Protection Action:

- Determine need for medical evaluation

. . - Initiate reporting requirements per IKFR2O

-Copy to Individual's Esposure History File

Encsosure 4.9 RPf ~fA!5~oO/oO4 osha Immediate and $hibseqrsant Actions Page I of 4

1. Immediate Actions Initial

-~ 1.1 The Operations Shift Manager or designee SHALL ANN69WCE the event over the plant P A . system by performing the following:

1.1.1 Turn on the outside page speakers I

v d r i i l purposes, state "This is a drill. This is a drill."

I o Any plant phone in the Control Room horse shoe area or extension 4021 is ororrammed

.___ 1.I.2 Dial 710; pause, dial 80. Following the beep, wnounce "a General h e r -

has been declared". Provide a brief description of the event (may be wri~teii below) and announce "Activate the TSC/OSC_-andEOF".

1.1.3 Repeat the preceding announcement one time I . I.4 Turn off the outside page speakers.

~

Initial notification to the State and Counties &be event dedardtion, using hcbSUre 4.1.

Enclosure 4.3 has instructions for compleaicnltransmission of the Emergency Notification Form . _I_.____

-. . ....... 1.2 The Emergency Coordinator shall recommend to offsite authorities in the initial notification the following:

Wind Speed).

2. To obtain the wind .direction, use chart recorder 1EEHCK9100. point d8 (Average Upper Wind Direction).

3. If either point on IEEBCR9100 is unavailable, obtain needed data from one of the following sources in order of sequence:

A. DPC Meteorological Lab (8-594-0341)

B. Natiooai Weather Service in Greer, S.C. (864-879-1085 or 1-800-268-7785)

C. Catawba Nuclear Station Control Room (8-83 1-5345).

I NOTE: E changes to the initial Protective Action Recommendations are recognized and approved by the Emergency Coordinator, these shall be transmitted to the offsite agencies within 15 minutes. { PD%hI-OO--O1238)

.- 1.2.1 -

IF containment radiation levels exceed the Isvels on Enclosure 4.2, page 2 of 4, Guidance for Determination of Gap Activity, m:

~ e Evacuate the 5-mile radius 10 miles downwind as shown on Enclosure 4.2, page 2 of 4, Prctective Action Zones Determination, using wind direction e Shelter remaining zones as shown on Enclosure 4.2, page 2 of 4, Protective Action Zones Ueterniination, using wind direction.

E I R C ~ O4.9SM~~ RP/0/'4J57W/c04 OSM Immediate and Subsequent Astions Page 3 of 4 1.2.2 Econtainnient radiation levels DO NOT exceed the levels on Enclosure 4.2, page 2 of 4, Guidance for Deteimination of Gap Activity. THEN perform one of the following:

HF wind speed less than or equal to 5 MPN, m:

~ e Evacuate zones I,, 3, M, C, N, 4.D. 0, R

~AND e Shelter zones E, F, Ci, H, I, J, K, P, Q, S.

OR IF wind speed greate.r than 5 MPH, m:

~- e Evacuate the 2-mile radius ANF)5 miles downwind as shown on Enclosure 4.2, page 3 of 4, Protective Action Zones Determination, using wind direction

~

AND

-. . e Shelter remaining zones as shown on Enclosurc: 4.2, page 3 of 4. Protective Action Zones Determination, using wind direction.

-~ ~~~ 1.3 E valid trip I1 alarm occurs on any one o f the following:

1 OIp 2 EMF36(L)

I EMF24,25,26,27 2EhIF10, 11, 12. 13 immediately contact RP shift at 4282 to perform HP/Q/R/1009/029 (Initial Response On-Shift Dose Assessment).

~. 1.4 E box C (IS OC'CURKING) or box D (HAS OCCURRED) from Item 10 (EMERGENCY RELEASE) on Enclosure 4.1, (Emergency Notification Forin) is checked, THEN immediately contact KF shift at 4282 to perform HP/OIB/1009/029 (Initial Response On-Shift Dose Assessment).

Enclosure 4.9

' 1 OSM Immediate and §ubseqPaent Actions Page 4 of 4

2. Subsequent Actions

-. I NOTE:

- 7 Site Assernhly is a required on-site protective action in response to an Alerl or higher declaration. ~_ 1 I _ 21 -

IF a site assembly has not already k n initiated, refer to WP/O/A/5700/01 I (Conducting a Site Assembly, Site Evacuation or Containment Evacuation) to evaluate and initiate a site assembly.

- . .- 2.2 Augment shift resources to assess and respond to the emergency situation as needed.

. 2.3 GO TO Step 3.1 in the body of this procedure and continue with the prescribed subsequent aciions.

Enclosure 4.10 RP10/A/5700/004 WCC SWO Immediate and Subsequent Page 1 of 2 Actions

1. Immediate Astions Initial NOTE: 1. Initial notification to the State and Counties be made within 15 minutes of the event declaration. using Enclosure 4.1.

2. Enclosure 4.3 has instructions for completion/transmission of the Emergency Notification Fonn.

I ,I The Emergency Cloordinator shzll wornmend to offsitc authoriiies i n the initiai norification the following:

r I__ .

_--I NOTE: 1. To obtain the wind speed, use chart recorder lEEBC29100. point #5 (Average Lower Wind Speed).

2. To obtain the wind direction, use chart recorder IEEBCR(,iM, point #R (Average LJpper Wind Directionj.

3. If either point on lEERCR9100 is unavailahle, obtain needed data from one of the foilowing sources in order of sequence:

I A. DPC: Meteorological Lab (8-594-0341)

B. National Weather Service in Greer, S.C. (864-870-108.5or 1 -S00-268-7785).

t C. Catawba Nuclrar Station Control Room (8-831-5345)

R18'rE: -

IF changes to the initial Protective Action Recoinmendations ai-e recognized and approved hy the Emergency Coordinator, these shall he transmitted to the offsite agencies within 1.5 minutes. (PIP-hZ-00-01238) i.l.1 Econtainrnent radiation levels exceed the levels on Enclosure 4.2. page 2 of 4, Guidance for Dete.rmination of Gap Activity, ' I":

Evac.cuate the 5-mile radius 10 miles downwind as shown on Enclosure 4.2, page 2 of 4, Protective Action Zones Delaminationl using wind direction.

- . e Shelter rrmaining zones ;ISshown on Enclosure 4 2 . page 2 of4, Protective w'

Action Zones Determination, using wind direction.

Enclosure 4.1 B STA Immediate and Subsequent Actions

1. Immediate Actions Initial NOTE: For a Drill, the Community

.___I Alert Network (CAM) is not activated.

1 I. 1 For a security event, go to steps 1.4, 1.5,and 1.6.

1.2 Activate the Emergency Response Organization by contacting Security via the ringdown phone to the CAS/SAS, or at extension 2688 or 4900 and issue the following message:

~ 1.2.1 For a Dril! Activate thc TS<I/CSC/EBF pagers, McGuire Delta, General Emergency declared at - (time).

~ 1.2.2 For an Emergency Activate the IXYOSCEOF pagers, McGuire Echo, General Emergency declared at ,. I (time).

-AND Activate the CAN system.

l lll _ _ __ _l_ll~_ ~

For a Drill, the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) is not activated.

ERDS can only be activated I deactivated from designated computer terminals with SIIS access. These are located in the Shift Work Managers office, the Data Coordinators Control Room

. . . .. . ~.~..

horsesho, area. .~

~ 1.3 For an Emergency, activate the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) as soon as possible, but not later than one hour after the emergency declaration per the following:

1.3.1 Ensure SDS is running on the selected terminal

.~ ~

1.3.2 Click on MMALV.

~ I .3.3 <Clickon GENERAL.

-- 1 .?.4 Click on ERDS.

1.3.5 Click on ACTIVATE 1.3.6 Record the time and date E R I E was activated. ?IbF?ATE Easrern mm dd j y 1.3.7 Inform the O W that ERDS was activated

.. .... 1.3.8 -

EF ERDS failed to activate after five ( 5 ) attempts, TI%EN have an Offsite Agency Communicator notify the NRC via ENS or other available means.

Eardosure 4.11 STA Immediate and Subsequent Actions Page 2 of 2

-- 1.4 E For a drill, a security event exists and offsite ERQ staging is desired before giving instructions to report to the TSC and OSC, contact Security via the ringdown phone to the CASISAS, or at extension 2688 or 4900, and give instructions to activate the TSCBSC, according to the Emergency Response Pager Instructions for a security event driK

__ 8.5 For an actual emergency, a security event exists and offsite ERQ staging is desired before giving instructions to report to the TSCiOSC, THEN contact Security via the ringdown phone to the CASISAS, or at extension 2688 or 4900, and give instructions to activate the

'TSC/OSC, according to the Emergency Response Pager Instructions for a security event emergency.

I .6 When the security event is stabilized to the point that ERO members can come on site, go to step 1.2.

2 Subsequent Actions 2.1 Notify one of the NRC Resident Inspectors using RP/O/A/5700i014, Enclosure 4.2.

- 2.2 Contact Duke Management using RPiQ/A/5700/014, Enclosure 4.3 as soon as possible following event declaration.

2.3 Inform the OSM when this enclosure has been completed, reporting any deficiencies or problems.

1 Pt(s) Chit 2 was operating at 60% power when an ATWS ewnt occurs. Two (2) of the three (3) pressurizer safety relief valves fail to actuate. Reactor Coolant pressure transient peaks at 2740 psig.

Which one of the following describes the safeti, limit value, and allowable action timc applicable to this transient?

A. 2485 p i g / 5 minutes B. 2735 psig / I minutes C. 2485 psig / 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 1). 2735 LpSig / 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Distracter Analysis:

A. Incorrect: safety limit is 2935 psig, allowable action time is 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Plausible: psychometric balance B. Incorrect: allowable action time is 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Plaaasible: the safety limit is correct and the allowable action time is corrcct for modes 3-6 C. Paacorrect: safety limit is 2735 psig Plausible: allowable action time is correct D. Correct Answer:

Level: SRC) 10CFR55,43(b)2 Source: BAhK Author: BCR Objective: OP-MC-IC-PE Obj. 14

Reference:

Tech Spec 2.2 OF-RIC-IC-IPE page19 KA: 2.2.22 (3N4.1)

Qwes-264.l.doc

1 Pt(s) Unit 2 was operating at 60% power when an A?'WS event occurs. Two (2) of the three (3) pressurizer safety relief valves fail to actuate. Reactor Coolant pressure transient peaks at 2740 p i g .

Which one of the following describes the safety limit value, and allowable action time applicable to this transient?

A. 2485 p i g / 5 minutes B. 2735 p i g / 5 minutes C. 2485 psig / ii hour D. 2735 psig I 1 h o ~ r Qiies-264.1 .doc

1 Pt(sj xi Unit 2 was operating at 6046 power ,hen an ATWS event occurred that

/ .

lifted all three (3) pressurizer safety relief valves. T-ave peaked at 680 F and the NC pressure transient rdched 2675 psig.

i which one of the followinghescribes the safety limit value, and allowable action time applicable tophis transient?

/,

A. 2635 p i g I sminutes

,/

B. 2735 pig?5 minutes C. 2639,fkig I 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months D. 2435 p i g / 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months i

Ques-264.l.dsc

1 Pt(s) Unit 2 was operating at 60% power when an ATWS event occurred that lifted all three (3) pressurizer safety relief valves. T-ave peaked at 680 "F and the NC pressure transient reached 2635 psig.

Which one of the following describes the safety iimit value, and allowable action time applicable to this transient?

A. 2635 psig IS minutes B. 2735 psig I5 minutes C. 2635 psig / 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months D. 2735 psig / 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months

___________l___s__s_________I___________---------------------------------------~~----~~-

Distracter Analysis:

A. Incorrect: safety limit is 2735 psig, allowable action time is 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Plausible: psychometric balance B. Incorrect: allowable action time is 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Plausible: the safety limit is correct and the allowable action time is correct for modes 3-6 C. Incorrect: safety limit is 2735 psig Plausible: allowable action time is correct D. Correct Answer:

Level: SRO 10CFRSS.43(b)2 Source: BANK Author: BCH Objective: OP-MC-IC-IPE Obj. 14 Rcference: Tech Spec 2.2 OP-MC-IC-IPE page19 Kh: 2.2.22 (3.414.1)

I 2.2 Equipment Control (Continued)

/

2.2.18 Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during shutdown operations.

(CFR: 43.5 I45.13) a IMPORTANCE RO 2.3 SRO 3.6 2.2.19 Knowledge of maintenance work order requirements.

(CFR: 43.5 145.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.1 SRO 3.1 2.2.20 Knowledge of the process for managing troubleshooting activities.

(CFR: 43.5 145.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.2 SRO 3.3 2.2.21 Knowledge of pre- and post-maintenance operability requirements.

(CFR: 43.2)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.3 SRO 3.5 2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limit$.

(CFR: 43.2 145.2)

I IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 4.1 2.2.23 Ability to track Limiting conditions for operations.

(CFR: 43.2 145.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.6 SRO 3.8 2.2.24 Ability to analyze the affect of maintenance activities on LCO Statu%

(CFR: 43.2 145.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.6 SRO 3.8 2.2.25 Knowledge of bases in technical specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

(CFR: 43.2)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.5 SRO 3.1 2.2.26 Knowledge of refueling administrative requirements.

(CPR: 43.5 145.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.5 SRO 3.1 2.2.21 Knowledge of the refueling process.

(CFR: 43.6 145.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.6 SRO 3.5 2-7 NUREG-1122,Rev. 2 I

__ - I L L b s P P 0 E OBJECTlVE a S R Q

0 0 14 Concerning the Technical Specifications related to the Reactor Protection System; Given the LCQ title, state the LCO (including any COLR X X X values) and applicability.

For any LCQ's that have action required within one hour, X X X state the action.

0 Given a set of parameter values or system conditions, X X X determine if any Tech Spec LCO's is (are) not met and any action(s) required within one hour.

0 Given a set of plant parameters or system conditions and X X X the appropriate Tech Specs, determine required action(s).

Discuss the basis for a given Tech Spec LCO or Safety X

Limit.

SRQ Only ICIPEOI4 OP-MC-ICIPE FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 22 Page 13 of 147

DUKE

.... POWER . - ...,. .... MCGLNRE OPERATIONS......

THAININE

..... ... . . . ..... .....A ,..-. ....-

What if the input instrumentation is also used for control systems? It is assumed that a controlling channel failure produces a transient requiring protective action and at the same time prevents this channel from initiating protective action. Further, it is assumed that the single failure criteria must be met for a fault in a non-controlling channel to generate a protective signal. This then requires two other non-faulted channels to initiate the protective action, or a total of four channels for instrumentation used for both protection and control systems. Therefore a two-out-of-four (214) logic circuit is used.

Due to the redundancy requirements, there are two separate trains of protection, two reactor trig breakers in series, and physical separation between the process and nuclear channels (I, 11, 111, and IV).

1.2.2 System Design Basis Qbiective # 2 I The Reactor Protection System provides Reactor Trip signals and other protective actions to: prevent core damage and protect system integrity. This is accomplished by preventing the DNBR from dropping below the design limit of 1.3, preventing the maximum NC System pressure from exceeding 2735 psig, and preventing the fuel rod maximurn linear power from exceeding 18 kWFT to prevent fuel centerline melt (CIL fuel temperature < 4700 OF).

In addition to reactor trips, the system actuates alarms, provides rod withdrawal stops, initiates turbine runbacks, and allows for testing and bypass of trip signals. The Reactor Protection System consists of several subsystems including the Process Instrumentation, Nuclear Instrumentation, Soiid State Protection, Keactor Trip Switchgear, and Reactor Coolant Pump Monitor Panel.

2.0 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION 2.1 Process instrumentation and Control Cabinets There are four redundant protection cabinets or channels. Each receives and processes signals from dedicated detectors. Each cabinet contains the following:

primary and backup power supplies, signal processing circuits, protection bistables and test circuitry. Cabinet outputs go to the SSPS cabinets.

2.2 Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS)

A four bay cabinet in the control room contains the NIS drawers. Eight independent channels cover the Nuclear Instrumentation operating range. The system consists of two Source Ranges, two Intermediate Ranges, and four Power Ranges. The detectors are located around the periphery of the reactor vessel, adjacent to the reactor vessel wall. The Nuclear Instruments monitor neutron flux to provide indication and generate trips signals if needed. When a channel trips, the output goes to the SSPS cabinets.

OP-Me-IC-iPE FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 42 Page 19 of 147

I SLS 2.0 2.1 SLS 2.1.l Reactor Core SLs In MODES 1 and 2, the combhation of THERMAL POWER, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) highest loop average temperature, and pressurizer pressure shall not exceed the SLs specified in figure 21.1-1 for four loop operation.

2.1.2 RCS Pressure Sb In MODES 1 , 2, 3, 4, and 5, the RCS pressure shall be maintained 5 2735 psig.

2.2 SL Violations 2.2.1 If SL 2.1 .I is violated, restore compliance and be in MODE 3 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

2.2.2 If SL 2.1.2 is violated:

2.2.2.1 In MODE 1 or 2, restore compliance and be in MODE 3 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

2.2.2.2 in MODE 3, 4, or 5, restore compliance within 5 minutes.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 2.0-1 Amendment Nos. 1841166

66(

I DO NOT OPERATE IN THIS AREA 65C 640 c

L.. 630 t3-J e

620 0

E 6jO 600 590 ACCEPTABLE OPERATION 580 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 i.2 Fraction of Rated Thermal Power Figure 2.1 3 - 1 Reactor Core Safety Limits -

Four Loops in Operation McGuire Units 1 and 2 2.0-2 Amendment Nos. 191 Unit 1 172 [ U n i t 21

Bank Question: 495.1 Answer: B 1 Pt(s) Unit 1 is in Mode 6. Given the following a l m s :

e lE.MI'-I7 (Spent Fuel Building Bridge) Trip 2 a IEMF-36 (rJnit Vent High Gas Radiation) Trip 1 Which one of the following describes the c0rrec.t operator response?

A. Implement AP/1/N5500/41(Case IILoss ofSpent Fuel LeveP).

B. Implement AWl/N5500/25 (Spent FuePDamage].

C. Implement APll/N5500/4%(Case P Loss oJSpe~ntFuel Cooling).

D. Direct Radiation Protection to survey the Spent Fuel Pool area to verify the alarm.

A. Incorrect:

Plausible%.,

B. Correct: ian&ver D. Incorrect I evel: SRO IOCFR55.43(b)5 KA, EAPE 061 A.Q.01 (3.513.7)

Ixsson Plan Objective: OP-MC-AP-25 Obj 1 ~

Source: BANK Level of Knowledge: Memory

References:

AP!I /12!5500!025

1 Pt(s) Unit 1 is in Mode 6 . Given the following alamis:

0 1EMF-17 (Spent Fuel Building Bridge) Trip 2 e IEMF-36 (Unit Vent High Gas Radiation) Trip I Which one of the following describes the correct operator response?

A. Implement AP/1/8/556)0/41 (Case ZILQSS~J~Yppea~t F1ie1Level).

B. Ittiple~ie~tAP/l/AI5500125(Speizt FudUamage).

@. Implement AP/1IA/5500/41 (Case PLQSSof Spent Fuel Cooling).

D. Direct Radiation Protection to survey the Spent Fuel Pool area to verify the alarms.

1 Pt(s) Unit Iis in mode 6. Given the following alarms:

1EMF-17 (Spent Fuel Building Bridge) tri IEMF-36 (Unit Vent High Gas Radiatio i

Which one of the following describes thfiorrect operator response?

/

A. Implement AP/l/A/5500141(Case i I/ Loss of Spenf Fuel Lev@.

//'

/'

B. Implement AP/114/5500/25 (Spent Fuel Damage)).

i i

6. implement qPfI/A/5500/41 (Case !Loss of Spent Fuel Cooling).i

/,'

D. Dir@kidiation Protection to survey the Spent Fuel Pool ap'a to verify the alarms.

/'

Ques-495. Ldoc

Bank Question: 495.1 Answer: B IPt(s) Unit 1 is in mode 6. Given the following alarms:

e IEMF-I7 (Spent Fuel Building Bridge) trip 2 E IEMF-36 (Unit Vent High Gas Radiation) trip 1 Which one of the following describes the correct operator response?

A. Implement APIZIN5500141 (Case 11 Loss of Spent Fuel Level).

B. Implement APillN5500125 (Spent Fuel Damage).

C. Implement AP/l/N5500/41 (Case l Loss of Spent Fuel Cooling).

D. Direct Radiation Protection to survey the Spent Fuel Pool area to verify the alarms.

Distracter Analysis:

A. Incorrect:

Plausible:

B. Correct: answer Piauslble:

C. Incorrect:

PIausible:

D. Incorrect PIausible:

Level: SRO IOCFR55.43(b)5 KA; EAPE 061 M . 0 1 (3.513.7)

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-AP-25 Obj. 1 Source: BANK Level of Knowledge: Memory

References:

APlZIN55001025

I APE: 061 Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System Alarms AKI. Knowledge orthe operational implications of the following concepts 8s they apply to Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System Alarms:

CFR 41.8 141.10 145.3)

AK1.O1 Detector limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. ...

I 2.5* 2.9?

AK2. Knowledge of the irnterrelirtions between the Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM)

System Alarms and the following:

(CFR411.7 145.7)

AK2.01 Detectors at each ARM system location . .... ......... . ....... 2 3 2.6*

AK3. Knowledge of the reasom for the fullowing responses as they apply to the Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System Allarms:

(CFR41.5,41.10 145.6 145.13) m.01 Effect of temperature inversion on ARM system channel indications . . . . 2.3 2.6 AK3.02 Guidance contained in alarm response for ARM system . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 3.6 AluLrX AA1. Ability tu operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to the Area Radiation Monitoring (AIWSystem Alarms:

(CFR 41.7 145.5 145.6)

AAI.01 .

Automatic actuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ... ~ ..... ..... . 3.6 3.6 AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Area Radiation Monitoring (e System Alarms:

(CFR:43.5 I45.13)

AA2.01 ~ . . .. .

ARM panel displays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 3.7 AA2.02 Normal radiation intensity for each ARM system channel . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 3.2 AA2.03 Setpoints for alert and high alarms . . . , , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 3.3 AA2.04 Whether an alarm channel is functioning properly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. i 3.5 AA2.05 Need for area evacuation; check against existing limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 4.2 AA2.06 Required actions if alarm channel is out of service . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I 3.2 4.1

.P NUREG-1122, Rev. 2 4.248

DUKE POWER --_ I . _

MCGUIRE OPERATK3NS TRAIIWNG B _

CLASSROOM TiME (Hours)

OBJECTIVES OBJECTWE Concerning AP/l/N5500/025 (Spent Fuel Damage):

State the purpose of the AQ 0 Recognize the symptoms that would require implementation of the AP.

AP025001 Given scenarios describing accident events and plant conditions, evaluate the basis for any caution, note, or step.

APO25002 OP-MC-AP-25 FOR TRAlMING PURPOSES ONLY

~ .

REV. 00 Page5oflI

A. PurpoSe The purpose of this procedure is to ensure proper response in the event of spent fuel damage.

Y EMF-36 UNKT VENT GAS HI RAD" alarm "I EMF-38 CONTAINMENT PART HI RAD" alarm "1 EMF-39 CQNTABNMENT GAS HI RAD" alarm "IEMF-40 CONTAINMENT IODINE HI RAD" alarm "1 EMF42 FUEL BLDG VENT HE RAD" alarm "1 EMF-16 CONTAINMENT REFUELING BRIDGE" a r m "1EMF-17' SPENT FUEL BLBG REFUEL BRDG" alarm Gas bubbles originating from the damaged assemblies Visible evidence of damage with the potential of radioactive releases.

- 1. Check location of spent fuel damage IN - --- GO TO Step 1I.

CONTAINMENT.

CAUTION Damage to the rubber Reactor Vessel Cavity Seal may occur if an assembly is dropped on or near it.

2. Evacuate containment as follows:

- a. Ensure Containment Evacuation alarm has sounded

- b. Announce occurrence on page and instruct evacuated personnel to assemble in contaminated change room.

- c. REFER LO^ RP/OIN5700/011 (Conducting a Site Assembly, Site Evacuation. or Containment Evacuation).

BPI1/N5500/25 RESPONSE NO1 OBTAINED

- a. Place UNIT 1 VP SUP R EXH FAN li MODE SELECT" to "OFF".

b. Check the following valve position b. Perform the following:

indications:

- 1) {.E key switches in next step must be

On "UNIT 1 VP CONT OTSD ISOL": moved, use key #I 78 from black box in control room.

- "UPPER CLSD" - LIT

2) Ensure the following key switches

- "LOWER CLSD" - LIT. are selected to "CLOSE":

On '1VP-18&20 INCORE INST RM - "16 VP LOWER CONT PURGE PURGE OTSD ISOL": ISOb" I

"CLOSED" - LIT, - "1A VP LOWER CONT PURGE ISOL".

On "UNIT 1 VP CONT INSD [SOL":

- 3) E any VP valves open, TgtEN

- "UPPER CLSDn - LIT initiate Containment Ventilation isolation by actuating Tn'p 2 on

- 'LOWER CLSD" - LIT. 1EMF-38L.

9 On '1VP-17R19 lMCORE lNST RM PURGE iNSD ISOL":

- "CLOSED" - LIT

- 4. Stop any VQ release in progress. _I initiate Containment Ventilation Isolation by actuating Trip 2 on 1EMF-38L.

- 5. Ensure Equipment Hatch closed.

6. Ensure at least one door on each of the folbting CLOSED:

- Upper Personnel Airlock

- Lower Personnel Airlock.

APII IN5500125

7. Isolate Refueling Cavity from Spent Fuel Pool a5 follows:

- a. S t o p H FWPump.

- b. Notify Fuel Handling Crew to move the fuel transfer car to the Spent Fuel Pool Building

c. Dispatch two operators to perform the following:

- 1) fuel transfer car is in the Spent Fuel Pool Building, MEN closc 4 KF-122 (Fuel Transfer Tube Block) (Spent fuel bldg, 780. PP-51, top of fuel pool at south east comer) .

Place Containment Aux Carbon Filter Units in service, ~ O P 1 1 1 N 6 4 5 Q I Q 1 5 (Containment Purge System), Enclosure 4.1 (Containment Aux Carbon Filter System Operation).

Place Refueling Cavity in purification PER OPlfIAi62.001043(Purification of the Refueling Cavity), Enclosure 4.1 (Purification of The Refueling CavityEpent Fuel Pool).

GO TO Step 14, Announce over paging system to evacuate the Spent Fuel Poo! area and assemble evacuated personnei in contaminated change room.

APIlIN5500f25

12. Isolate Spent Fuel Po01 area as follows:

- ' a. Check 'UNIT 1 VF EXHAUST BYPASS - a. Place VF in filter mode by placing 'UNIT DAMPER" "CLOSED" light - LIT. 1 VF EXH BYP BMPR CNTRL" switch to the "CLOSE" position.

- b. Stop # I FW pump

- c. Notify Fuel Handling Crew to move the fuel transfer car to the Spent Fuel Pool Building.

d. Dispatch two operators to perform the following:

- 1) Ensure all doors closed in Spent Fuel Pool area.

- 2) WHEN fuel transfer car is in the Spent Fuel Pool Building, close 1KF-122 (Fuel Transfer Tube Block) (spent flier bldg, 780, PP-51, top of fuel pool at south east comer).

- 13. Ensure KF purification loop in service PEW OQ/f/8/6200/005(Spent Fuel Cooling System), Enclosure 4.2 (Spent Fuel Pool Purification Loop Operation).

I

14. REFER TO RP/OfAf5700/000

_ I _ _

(Classification of Emergency).

1 Pt(s) Unit 1 has implemented EP/liN5000mS-0.3 (Akrturul Circulation Coulduwsn with Steam Void ~ F ZVessel! when a YEILQW path occurs on Reactor Coolant Inventory due to RVHS LJppper Range level indication 400%.

Whic.h one of the following statements correctly describes the proper procedure flomtpath?

A. Transition to EP/l/A/5000/FR-I.3 (Response to Voids in &e Reactor Vesser)because EOP usage requires traansitioning from an ES procedure for a EEH,I,OW path if there are no other higher priority critical safety fu~~ctions.

B. Transition into EP//1/A/5000/FW-H.3 (Response lo Voids irr the Reuctoa Vessel) in order to vent the reactor vessel void tbrough the head vent and collapse the void to allow the cooldown to SOlltinUe.

c. Do not implement EP/l/tV500(BIPR-I.3(Resposase to Voids irr the Reuctos Vesseg because this procedure requires starting one NCP,whicb cannot he done with a void in the reactor vessel due to the potential for gas binding.

D. Do not itrmpiement EP/1/A/500O/FR-I.3 (Respoarse to Voids in the Reuctoa Vesser)because this WOMMcause a loss of WCS inventory, as the reactor cootant would flash to steam when the reactor vessel head vent was opened.

Distracter Analysis:

A. Incorrect: EOP usage allows but does not require transitioning to FR procdures.

Plausible: If candidate is unfamiliar with the EQP usage rules B. Incorrect: Although this is a true statement for FK-1.3, it does not apply to the case above when conducting a cooldown in ES-0.3.

Plausible: This is the purpose of FR-1.3.

C. Incorrect: An NCP can be started with a void in the reactor vesscl and will be started in FR-1.3 if the attempt to collapse the void by repressurizing the system fails.

Plausible: If the candidate is concerned that starting the NCI will destroy the pump.

D. Correct: ES-0.3 maintains a void under controlled conditions. FR-1.3 is prohibited in ES-0.3. If the head were vented, the steam void

would not be eliminated. A5 pressure is decreased, water would flash to steam to replace the steam being vented. Void size would remain essentially the same and the net is a loss of system inventory.

Level: SRO 10CFR55.43(@)(5)

KA: W E 10 EA21 (3.213.9)

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-EP-FRI Obj. 4 Source: BAVK Level of knowledge: memory

References:

1. QP-MC-EP-EO page 195

2. OP-MC-EP-FRI pages 13 & 53

3. EP/l!N5000,FR-I.3 page 2

1 Pt(s) IJnit 1 has implemented E.P;l iAi5000/ES-0.3 (Niturul Circulntiorz Cooooidow~with Steam Void in Vase()when a YELLOW path OCCUKS on Reactor Coolant Inventory due to RV1.K LJpper Range level indication i 1000/0.

Which one of the following statements correctly describes the proper procedure flowpath?

A. Transition to EP/B/.W§UOO/FR-Ii.3 ( R c s p ~ i s to e Voids irt the Reactor Vessel) because EOP usage requires transitioning from an ES procedure for a YEI~.H,OWpatan if there are no oll~er higher priority critical safety functions.

B. Transition into EP/l/M500O/FR-I.3 (Response to Voids in the Reustor Vrssel) in order to vent the reactor vessel void through the head vent and collapse the void to aliaw the cooEdown to eonthe.

C. Da not implenient EP/l/M5000/FR-Ie3(Response to Voids i16 the Rrustor Vessel)because this procedure requires starting one NCP, which cannot be dona with a void in the reactor vessel due to the potential for gas binding.

D. Do not implement EP/l/A/50OO/FR-I.3 (t.sponse to Voids ifz the Reactor Vessel) because this would cause a loss of RCS inventory, as the reactor coolant would flash to steam when the reactar vessel bead vent wras opened.

_ _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ ~ ~ ~ _ _ _ _ ~ _ _ - . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Ques-871.2.doc

1 Pt(s) Unit 1 has inipleniented ES-0.3 (Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Vesseg when a YELLOW path occurs on Revtor C.oolantInventory due to UR level indication c; 100 %.

Which one of the following statements come procedure flomyath?

because EQP usage re ansitioning from au ES procedure igher priority critical the Reactor l/essel) ne with a void in the reactor vessel due to the coolant would flash to steam when the reactor vessel Ques-871.2.doc

Bank Question: 871.2 Answer: D 1 Pt(s) Unit 1 has implemented E§-0.3 (Nrrturcrl Circulcition Cooldown with S t e m Void in Vesselj when a YF.LLOW path occurs on Reactor Cooianl Inventory due to U R level indication 100 %.

R(lis.h one ofthe following statements c.orrectlydescribes the proper procedure flowpath?

A. Transition to FR-1.3 (Response to Voids irn the Reuctor Vessel) because EOP usage requires transitioning from an ES procedure for a YELLOW path if there arc no other higher priority critical safety functions.

B. Transition into FR-1.3 (Response to Voids in the Reactor Vessel) in order to vent the reactor vessel void through the head vent and collapse the void to allow the cooldown to continue.

C. Do not implement FR-1.3 (Response fo Voids in tlfeReactor Vessel)because this procedure requires starting one NCP, which cannot be done with a void in the reactor vessel due to the potential for gas binding.

D. Do not implcmcnt FR-1.3 (Response to Voids in tlze Reactor Vessel)because this would cause a loss of RCS inventory, as the reactor coolant would flash to steam when the reactor vessel head vent was opened.

Distracter Analysis:

A. Incorrect: EOP usage allows but does not require transitioning to FR procedures.

Plausible: If candidate is unfamiliar with the EOP usage rules B. Incorrect: Although this is a true statement for FK-1.3, it does not apply io the case above xhen conducting a cooldown in ES-0.3.

Plausible: This is the purpose of FR-1.3.

C. Incorrect: An NCP can be started with a void in the reactor vessel and will be started in FR-1.3 if the attempt to collapse the void by repressurizing the system fils.

Plausible: Ifthe candidate is concerned that starting the NCP will destroy the pump.

B. Correct: CS-0.3 maintains a void under controlled conditions. FR-1.3 is prohibited in ES-0.3. If ihc head were vented, the steam void would not be eliminated. As pressure is decreased, water would

flash to steam to replace the steam being vented. Void size would remain essentially the same and the net is a loss of system inventov.

Level: SRO 10CFRS5.43@)(5)

KA: WE 10 EA2.1 (3.213.9)

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-EP-FN Obj. 4 Source: B m K Level of knowledge: menioiy

References:

1. OP-MC-EP-EO page 195

2. OP-MC-EP-FKI pages 13 & 53

3. EP/l/A/500O/FR-I.3 page 2 Ques-871.2.doc

- EPE: Natural Circulation with Steam Void In Vest4 withh&hoUt R W s CQllthUed)

KIA NO. KNOWLEDGE EM. Ability to determine and interpret the fdowing as they apply tQ the (Natural Cmdation with Steam Void in Vessel withlwithout RVLIS)

(CFB: 43.5 I45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abmal and emergency operations.

IMPORTANCE KO 3.2 SRO 3.9 EA22 adherence to appropriate procedures and OpeKithII within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RQ 3.4 SRO 3.4 4.5-27

CLASSROOM TIME (Hours)

NLO II NLOR I I

LPRO I I

LPSO I I

LOR II II II 1.0 II 1.0 I I

1.0

_J I

OBJECTIVES L

P OBJECTIVE s Explain the purpose of each procedure in the FR-I series.

EPFRlOOl Discuss the entry and exit guidance fer each procedure in the FR-I series.

EPFR1002 Discuss the mitigating strategy (major actions) of each procedure in the FR-I series.

EPFR1003 Discuss the basis for any note, caution or step for each procedure in the FR-I series.

EPFR1004 Given the Foldout page, discuss the actions included and the basis for these actions.

EPFR1005 Given the appropriate procedure, evaluate a given scenario describing accident events and plant conditions to determine any required action and its basis.

EPFR1006 Discuss the time critical task(s) associated with the FR-I series procedures including the time requirements and the basis for these requirements.

EPFR!(M7 OP-MC-EP-FRI FOR TRAINING PlJRRPOSES ONLY REV. 03 Page 5 of 91

-5UKE POWER . . ~ MCGUtRE OPERATIONS TRAINING 2.3. FR-1.3, Response to Voids In Reactor Vessel A rapid NC system cooldown1depressurination may result in steam voids being formed in the upper head. If this occurs and NC system depressurization must continue, this procedure should not be implemented. Non-condensible voids can be introduced into the NC system from a complete SA accumulator tank discharge (nitrogen) or may result from an inadequate core cooling condition (hydrogen).

If voids in the vessel are indicated and there is a need to eliminate them, FR-1.3 is used to restore a full reactor vessel. RVLlS indicating less than 100% Upper Range level with no NC pumps running is the primary means of determining if voids exist.

In addition to the primary indication, other indirect indications of voids are listed below (these voids are not necessarily located in the reactor vessel head):

1) Pzr level response to NC system pressure changes may not be normal if voids exist in the NC system. The Pzr level may go down during a NC system pressurization due to void compression or condensation. Also, the level may rise rapidly during a spraying operation due to void expansion or generation.

2) Indications of reactor vessel head temperatures equal to or greater than saturation temperature warrants the assumption that a steam bubble has been generated in the reactor vessel head.

3) The operator may suspect non-condensible voids in the NC system after either a complete CLA discharge or an inadequate core cooling condition.

The first actions in FR-1.3 attempt to condense the voids by pressurizing the NC system, which will be successful if the voids are composed of steam that can be condensed. However, if this fails to eliminate all the voids, then an attempt is made to start a NC pump. This action is also intended to eliminate the condensible voids. After these actions, if the void has been eliminated, the procedure is exited. If the void remains, actions are then taken to vent the reactor vessel. Venting will continue until either the voids have been eliminated or the venting termination criteria have been exceeded. When the voids have been eliminated, FR-1.3 is exited and a return to the procedure and step in effect is made.

OP-MC-EP-FRI FQR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 03 Page 13 of 91

DUKE POWER MCGU!RE OPERATIONS TRAINlNG 5.4. Detailed Description of Procedural Steps STEP 1 IF ES-0.3 (Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Vessel) in progress, THEN RETURN procedure and step in effect.

PURPOSE: To inform the operator that this procedure is not intended to be used while performing the recovery actions included in 3-0.3, Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Vessel.

BASIS: A rapid NC system cooldown/depressurization may result in the vessel head fluid reaching saturation which may result in steam voids being formed in the upper head. If this occurs and NC system depressurization must continue this procedure should not be implemented.

STP 2 Check if SA has been terminated:

PURPOSE: To determine whether the §/I system is operating.

BASIS: if S/I is still operating, there exist other, more critical plant conditions that should be addressed before implementation of this procedure.

OP-MC-E-FRI FOR TRAfNING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 03 Page 53 of 91

~DUKE POWER MCGUlRE OPERATlONS TRAjNING

~ - j.

7.6. Final Plant Status Upon entry to ES-0.3, natural circulation of the NC system has been confirmed and a cooldown/depressurization has been initiated.

The purpose of this procedure is to continue plant cooldown and depressurization to cold shutdown under conditions that allow for the potential formation of a void in the upper head region. There should be no accident in progress and an available reactor vessel level system.

At no time is it appropriate to make a transition to FR-1.3, Response to Voids in Reactor Vessel, and perform a head venting operation. This is contrary to the intent of ES-0.3 where a vessel void is allowed to exist under controlled conditions while the plant is cooled down and depressurized to cold shutdown. If FR-1.3 were used to vent the vessel head at this time, the steam void would not be eliminated.

As pressure goes down (from venting), more water will flash to steam in the head region, replacing the steam that was vented. The void size will remain essentially constant and the net result will be a loss of system inventory. Therefore, FR-1.3 should not be used when cooling down and depressurizing the system with ES-0.3.

Note: Although 3-0.3 is the approved procedure for natural circulation cooldownldepressurination with a vessel void, E§-0.2 presents the preferred mode of operation (Le., no void formation) and should be used whenever possible.

The following table summarizes the exit guidance from ES-0.3. The left culumn lists each step that provides a potential exit point from 3-0.3. The right column lists the transition procedure(s). If an exit transition is necessary, the operator should transition to Step 'l of the appropriate procedure.

OP-MC-EP-EO FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 09 Page 195of 217

6. Ooerator Actions

- 1. E EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.3 (Natural Circulation Cooldown With Steam Void In Vessel) in progress, m E 4 RETURN TO procedure and step in

- I effect.

2. Check if S/l has been terminated: - .___.I RETURN - TO procedure and step in effect.

- Both NI pumps'- OFF

- e 1NI-9A (NC Cold Leg lnj From NV) -

CLOSED

- 1NI-1013(NC Cold Leg lnj From NV) -

CLOSED.

3. Check if charging flow has been established:

- a. At least one NV pump - ON. a. Perform the following:

1) E KC flow to NC pump thermal barriers is lost, dispatch operator to close the following prior to starting an NV pump:

- 1NV-28 (A NC Pump Seal Water Manual Cuntro!) (aux bldg, 733, VCT hallway at reactor bldg wall)

I 1NV-44 (B NC Pump Seal Water Manual Control) (aux bldg.

733+2, " - 5 2 , VCT hallway at reactor bldg wall)

- 1NV-60 (C NC Pump Seal Water Manual Control) (aux bldg, 733+2, JJ-51, VCT hallway 15 ft southwest of BIT)

- 1 NV-76 (D NC Pump Seal Water Manual Control) (aux bldg.

716-c-44,JJ-51,room 603,4 ft from reactor building wall).

(RNO continued on next page)

B u d Question: 881.1 Aassavrr: B 1 Pt(sj Unit one was operating at LOO% power when a total loss of orisite and offsite power occurred. Given the following events and conditions:

e lEVDA is supplying normal M l power loads e No battery charger is available e Systems operate normally e BATI EVCA UNDERVOLTAGE alarm is ISf Which one of the following statements correctly describes the SROs response to the de Fled voltage?

9$ l j hour, eusure via the OAC the vital battery output opeued autoinaticalIg when bus voltage decreased to 105 volt?.

anually opeu the vital battery output bus voltage falls to 105 volts.

via the OAC the vital battery output utornatically when bus voltage decreased

11. Dispatch an N I B to manually opeu the vital battery output breaker when bus voltage falls to BO7 volts.

Distracder A~idysis:

A. Incorrect: the vital battery breaker does not automatic.allyopen Plausible: partially correct - the design time for sustaining loads is 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months B. Correct: below this value the battery could be damaged or coniponents wiil begin t o fai1.

4. Incorrect: the battery is expected to last for I hour and there is no automatic trip associated with low voltage Plausible: the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months requirement for battery performance is typical of the atix batteries - voltage limit is 107 volts.

D. Incorrect: the vital batteries we not designed to sustain Loads fur 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Plausihk: partially c.orrec,t DC bus protection is achieved by

~~

manually opening the breaker - voltage limit is 104 volts.

Level: SKO lOCYK55.43(b)G Ques-881. Ldoc

I<A:APE OSX AA2.02(3.3*/3.6)

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-AP-15 Obj. 2 Source: Modified Level of hiowledge: Comprehensivc

References:

1. "-15 Background Document pages 4,40

2. ~ / l / A l S 5 0 0 / 0 1 5page 57

1 Pt(s) Unit one was operating at 100% power when a total loss of onsite and offsite power occurred. Given the following events and conditions:

e 1EVDA is supplying normal full power loads e No battery charger is available e Systems operate normally e "BATT EVCA LNDERVOLThGE alarm is ]..IT Which one of the following statements correctIy describes the SRO's response to the degraded voltage?

A. After 1 hoar, ensure via the 0.4C the vital battery output breaker opened aototraatically when bus voltage decremed to 105 volts.

B. Dispatch an NLO to manually open the vi&albattery output breaker when bus voltage falls to 105 volts.

C. After 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , ensure via the OAC the vital battery output breaker wilk opened automatically when bus voltage decreased to 107 volts.

D. Dispatch NLQ to manually open the vital battery o~tptit breaker when bus voltage Falls to 1027 volts.

1 Pt(s) IJnit one was operating at 100 a total loss of onsite ami offsite power occurred. Given the fo md conditions:

lEVDA is supplying no No battery charger is avai1 Systems operate normally 0 RAT7 EVCA UNDEKV GE alarm is LIT

/

Wliieh one ofthe following,datements correctly describes the SKOs response to the degraded #&age?

A. After 1 bour,&nsurevia the QAC the vital battery output breaker op,&cd automatically when bus voltage decreased to 105 volts,,,

B. Dispnt9 a11 NI,O to manually open the vital battery output breaker wheu bus voltage falls to 105 volts.

C. After 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , ensure via the OAC the vital battery output Pieaker mill opened automatically when bus voltage decreased i

,,,to 107 volts.

D/ Dispatch an NLO to manually open the vital battery output

,/

breaker when bus voltage falls to 107 volts.

Ques-88l.l.doc

Bank Question: 887.1 Answer: B 1 Pt(s) Unit one was operating at 100% power when a total loss of onsite and offsite power occurred. Given the following events and conditions:

1EWA is supplying normal full power loads No battery charger is available Systems operate normally BATT EVCA UNDERVOLTAGF alarm is LIT Which one of the following staterncnts correc.tlydescribes the SROs response to the degraded voltage?

A. After 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , ensure via the OAC the vital battery output breaker opened automatically when bus voltage decreased to 105 volts.

R. Dispatch an NLO to manually open the vital battery output breaker when bus voltage falls to 105 volts.

C. After 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , ensure via the OAC the vital battery output breaker will opened automatically when bus voltage deereased to 107 volts.

D. Dispatch an NLQ to manually open the vital battery output breaker when bus voltage falls to 107 volts.

______________________________I_________-~---~-~~--------------------------------~

Distracter Analysis:

A. Incorrect: the vital battery breaker does not automatically open Plausible: partially correct - the design time for sustaining loads is I hour B. Correct: below this value the battery could be daniaged or coniponents will begin to fail.

C. Incorrect: the battery is expected to last for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and there is no automatic trip associated with low voltage Plausible: the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months requirement for battery performance is typical of the aux batteries .--voltagelimit is 104 vults.

D. Incorrect: the vital batteries are not designed to sustain loads for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Plausible: partialiy c0rrec.t- DC bus protection is achieved by manually opening the breaker - voltage limit is 107 volts.

Level: SRO IOCFR55.4?@)6

K A APE 058 AA2..02(3.3*/3.6)

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-AF-I5 Obj. 2 Source: Modified Level of knowledge: Comprehensive

References:

I. AP-15 Background Document pages 4,40

2. AP/i/A/5500!015 page 57

I APE:

KLUa AK1.

.. 058 Lass of DC kower Knowledge of the operational implications of the following eoncepts as they apply to Lcss of DC Power:

(CFR 41.8 I41.10 145.3) i IMPORTANCE AK1.01 Battcry charger equipment and instrumentation . . . . . . .. . . ... . . . . 2.8 3.%*

~

61.02 Electrical units: volts, amps, and dc . . 2.0 2.3 AK2. KnowEedge of the interrelations between the Loss of DC Power and the following:

(CFR41.7 I45.7)

AK2.01 Motors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 2.2 AK2.02 Breakers. relays, and disconnects . . . . . . . . . . .... . . ..... . . .. . 2.2' 2.4*

AK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the lo& of DC POWW:

(CFR41.5,41.10 145.6 / 45.1)

AK3.01 Use of dc control power by DIGS ... . .. . . . . . ........... .... 3.4' 3.7 AK3.02 Actions contained in EOP for loss of dc power . . . . .... ...... ... . 4.0 4.2 l5BLlaX AAI. Ability to operate and I or monitor the following a3 they apply t Q the Loss d DC Power:

(CFR 41.7 145.5 145.6)

AAI.01 Cross-tie of the affected dc bus with the aitcmate supply ..... . ... ... 3.4* 3.5 AAl.02 Static inverter dc input breaker, frequency meter, ac output breaker. and ground fault detector . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .

... I 3.1* 3.1 AAI .03 Vital and battery bus compnents . . . . . . . .. ~ ... . .... . . . . . . .. 3.1 3.3 AM. Ability to determine and interpret the following BS they apply to the Loss of DC Power:

(CER 43.5 I45.13)

AA2.01 That a loss of dc power has oscurred; verification that substitute power sources have come on line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 4.1 AA2.02 125V dc bus voltage. low/critical low, alarm . . . . . . . . . . . I . . ... 3.3* 3.6

~

AA2.03 DC loads lost; impast on ability to operate and monitor plant systems . 3.5 3.9 4.2-43 NUREG-1122, Rev. 2 I

CLASSROOM T i M g . i k i i

, I 3 3 2 OBJECTIVES OBJECTIVE 1 I the procedure. [ I l l rc. 4 Given scenarios describing aw-islentevents and plant conditions, evaluate conditions which require application of continusus action steps.

APll and 21N55001015 (Loss Q f Vital or Aux Control Power) 6 VCT level control will be affected by a loss of several control power busses (EVDA, E W A , KXA, KXB).

Increased operator monitoring of VCT level will be necessary in these instances. On a loss of one of these buses, normal VCT make-up is unavailable, and VCT level I S maintained by periodically swapping NV pump suction to the FWST. ( E A R sections consulted: 9.3.4.2, 6.3.2.2, 15 4.6.1) (Tech Specs consulted: 3.5.2) e On a loss of a vital AC bus, the associated P-avg and power range channel will fail. which inputs the Reactor Control System These malfunctioning instruments need to be removed from service in order to restore the reactor control system to operation, and to eliminate possible invalid alarms such as QPTR due to the malfunctioning power range detector. Steps to remove these instruments are in accordance with AP-16 (Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation). Removal of these instruments ensures proper operation of the Reactor Control System and various reactor power alarms such as QPTR and Power mismatch. (FSAR sections consulted: 7.7.1) (Tech Specs consulted: 3.2.4, 3.2.5) e On a loss of KXA for Unit 1 (KXB for Unit 2), it is probable that a loss of letdown will occur due to NV-26 and NV-459 faiiing closed. No procedural method exists at this time to restore letdown without the use of one of these valves. Contingency actions to deal with Pressurizer level increasing are to minimize charging and for station management to evaluate performing a unit cooldown to shrink the Pressurizer water inventory until power is restored. Emergency boration will occur concurrently to ensure adequate shutdown margin exists during the cooldown. With charging at a minimum, only a small cooldown rate will be needed to accomplish this shrinkage. After verifying adequate shutdown margin, existing Operating Procedures will be used for initiating the cooldown. Credit for Xenon can be used in the SBM calculation for cooldowns to 500 Deg. (FSAR sections consulted: 4.3.2.4, 4.3.1.5, 15.4) (Tech Specsconsulted: 3.1.1.1) 6 One possible scenario that leads to a loss of a DC bus begins with the associated battery charger tripping. The battery will assume the loads immediately; but over time, battery voltage wiil decrease. At 115 volts an undervoltage annunciator will alarm in the control room, which is a symptom of this AP. Enclosure 2 will aid the operator in responding to this type of failure. Existing operating procedures wiil be utiiized to restore a battery charger to service. However, if a charger cannot be started and battery voltage decreases to a set value (109 volts for aux control power battery), an operator will be dispatched to open the battery output breaker?thus fully deenergizing the QC bus. At 105 volts, station management will evaluate whether or not to open a vital DC battery output breaker. This is required fer two reasons. First, DC components will begin to fail at a battery voltage less than that value. Secondly, the battery could be badly damaged if required to supply loads at a significantly low voltage. Below this voltage value, the battery has met its duty cycle requirements. Calc File #

MGC-1381.0640-0062 and MCC-1381.05-00-0200 substantiate these values. (FSAR sections consulted:

8.3.2, Table 8-13) (Tech Specs consulted: 3.8.2.1) 6 The NF containment isolation valves fail closed on a loss of control power. If NF-233B (RB Glycol Return Cont Inside Isol) fails closed, it is imperative that the operator ensure that the supply side of the Reactor building header is also isolated to prevent a glycol spill from occurring inside containment. Guidance is given to perform this action as well as shutting down NF pumps, which would be running in a reduced flow condition. ESF alignment is unaffected by these actions. ( FSAR sections consulted: 7.6.5.2.2, 6.2.2.15.7) (Tech Specs consulted: 3.6.3) e For each control power bus, there is an enclosure identifying significant loads affected by the loss of that bus These enclosures are for information only, and serve as a guide for the operator to use in determining Tech Spec concerns and additional operational impacts.

Page 4 of 46 Rev 0

AP/f and 2/N5500/045 (Loss of Vital or Aux Control Power)

ENCLOSURES: Bus Status Indications The bus status indications for the instrument and control power buses covered by this AP have been gathered in this one enclosure. This is more efficient than listing them throughout the AP. Especially considering that the information is used for some buses numerous times, spread over the length of the AP. In some cases pattern recognition is used, like a row of status lights lit for 12OVac Vital. In other cases individual components for a bus are listed.

Even though this is not a foldout page, it should be kept available for use during the AP, because the AQ continually asks for information off this enclosure. One of the best indications to use is the OAC graphics, EPGESSIC for Vital and EPK for Aux control power. The status of most of the buses can be determined from these (except for W K X B and KRNKRB). Response to

Dearaded DC Bus Voltacre:

For the situation where a charger has tripped, and the DC Battery is still carrying the bus, the bus voltage will degrade over time. Step 13 of this AP refers the Operator to this enciosure for compensatory actions. The Operator is reminded that under worst case situations, the Vital Batteries will last at least 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , and the Aux Batteries will last at least 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . Depending on which channel is lost and plant conditions?the batteries may last considerably longer. The point at which they're considered lost is when the voltage degrades to the point where the output breaker is opened (107VDC for Aux.. IOSVDC for Vital), as directed later in this enclosure. An overview of the enclosure is as follows:

The first step checks if the problem is the result of the loss of a charger power source. If the problem is the loss of ETA and/or ETB, the enclosure refers the Operator to the applicable procedure. These procedures should restore power to the chargers. The 2"' and 3" steps attempt to restore EVCS, if it was supplying a bus, by trying to power up it's MCC (IEMXH or 2EMXH) and ensuring proper breaker alignment from the MCC to the charger. The qLhstep attempts to restore the normal chargers, if any of them had been lost. by aligning it to be fed from an energized MCC.

and ensuring proper breaker alignment from the MCC to the charger.

Steps 5 & 6 attempt to restore a charger to DCA and/or DCB. This is done by verifying breaker alignment from MCC to applicable charger (CXA, CXB.?or CXS), and swapping to an energized MCC, if necessary.

Step 7 gives direction when a charger can't be aligned to a bus. The compensatory actions include swapping the affected bus inverter to alternate source (extends the battery life and prevents the loss of the associated AC bus), reviewing the applicable load list enclosure(s) for the upcoming components out of service, and specifies the battery voltages where opening the battery output breaker is appropriate, and sends the Operator back into the body of the AP to deal with the now deenergized bus. Restorinq Power to EVDA. 1EVDA. 2EVBA: The cautions in front of the enclosure deals with the issue of a tripped breaker. Depending on plant conditions, etc.?reclosing a breaker may be justified prior to visual inspection and troubleshooting. Getting the bus energized quickly to avoid major operational problems versus waiting until its certain there is no fault on the bus can be worth it from a risWreward standpoint. If plant conditions are such that not much is to be gained by quickly reenergizing the bus, then it would not be worth it from a riskheward standpoint. Be advised that justification for your action(s) will be required because reclosing a breaker without inspection andies testing is clearly a safety concern due to the high potential for explosion upon closure of a degraded circuit breaker onto a faulted condition (PIP 1-M46-3674). A breaker that is visibly damaged shall not be operated without IAE approval. The 3" caution emphasizes the point of not standing in front of the breaker when re-closing. Although this is a good precaution at any time in case of a fire ball, it's especially pertinent when there may be a fault on the bus with the increased current flow on the closing of the breaker.

The first five steps of the enclosure attempt to reclose a tripped open breaker, assuming that's the cause of the loss of power. If this works, the enclosure is exited. If it don't work, step 6 opens the Page 40 of 46 Rev 0

21. E AT ANY T m EVDA Distribution Gentes reaches 105 volts, mEE evaluate performing the fotlowing:

- a. Dispatch operator to open Distribution Center EVBA Compartment 2A (Battery EVCA Switch)

b. IF AT ANY TIME control power is needed to operate 'A' Train breakers, THEN contact station managrnent to evaluate aligning battery to breaker control power circuits only.

c. Notify Unit 2 to perform the following:

- I)WHEN EVDA deenergized, THEN REFER TO APl2lA/550Qf15 (Loss

___-_I of Vital or Aux Control Power) as time allows.

- 2) Trip Unit 2 reactor.

- 3) m,_T_s EP/2/8/5000/E-Q (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

- d. WHEN EVDA deenergized, T#EN

.RETURN

~~

-.. - --Step 1 in body of TO procedure as time allows.

- e. Trip Unit i reactor.

- f. GO TO EP/1/A/500O/E-O (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

22. E AT ANY TIME EVDB Di~tflbutiofl Center reaches I 0 5 volts, m e v a l u a t e performing the following:

- a. Dispatch operator to open Distribution Center EVDB Cornpartrnent 2A (Battery EVCB Switch).

- b. Notify Unit 2 to GO_ API2lA/5500/15 (Loss of Vital or Aux Control Power).

- c. RETURN TO Step 1 in the body of the procedure.

Answer: D 1 Pt(s) The following conditions exist otr Unit 1:

t$&d (ex,-

e d16m p m -

The valve positioner for condenser dump valve ISB-I2 fails.

Control room indication shows the valve OPEN.

Whish one of the following actions in AP!llN5500/01 (Stem Le@j correctly describes the 1; condenser dump valve?

A. Dispatch a88 NL isolation valve.

B. Instruct RO to depress the CLQSE pushbutton o condenser dump valve control room switch.

C. Instruct IAJi to energize t condenser dump valve.

D. Instruct the RO to select W F INTLK BYPASS switches.

Distrscter Analysis:

A. Incorrect:. This is only done i f the OFF RESET does not work B. Incorrect:. llrere are no pushbuttons for these valves C. Incorrect:

Plausible:

D. Correct:. This is the first action ofthe KNO of the AI..

Level: SRO 10CFK55,43(h)S KA: SYS 039 M.04 (3.413.7)

Lesson Plan Ohjectivc: OP-MC-STM-ISE Obj, 4 Source: MOUEIED ---- 6d &M(QB I

I .eve1 of knowledge: Comprehension

References:

1. OP-MC-STM-IDE page 55 Ques ..979. Ldoc

1 Pt(s) The following conditions exist on Unit I:

100% power at 1180 MWe e The valve positioner for condenser dump vdve 1SB-12 fails.

e Control room indication 5hOwS the valve OPEN.

Which one of the following actions in rZP!liA!5500!01 (Sreurn Leak) correctly describes the FIRST direction from the SRO to CLOSE the open condenser dump valve?

A. Dispatch an NI,O to macnaliy close the ccndenser dump isolation valve.

B. Instruct RQ to depress the C1,OSE pushbotton on the sondenser dump valve control room switch.

6. Instruct HAL to energize the P-12 solenoids to close the condenser dump valve.

1). Instruct the RB to selcct OFP =SET on the STEAM DUMP HNTLK BYPASS switches.

Ques..979.1 .doc

1 Pt(s) The following conditions exist on Unit 1:

e 100% power at 1180 MWe

The valve positioner for condenser dump v Control room indication shows the vah Which one of the following actions in AP/1 A. Dispatch an NLO to isolation valve.

B. InstruetR ss the CL.OSEpnshbutton on the

/IIVTL BYPASS switches.

Ques-979.l.doc

Bank Question: 979.1 Answer: D 1 Pt(s) The following conditions exist on Unit 1:

100% power at 1180 MWe m The valve positioncr for condenser dump valve 1SB-12 fails.

m Control room indication shows the valve OPEN.

Which one of the following actions in AP!ILW5500/01 (Steam Leak) correctly describes the FIRST direction from thc SRO to CLOSE thc open condenser durnp valve?

A. Dispatch an N I B to manually close the condenser dump isolation valve.

B. Instruct RO to depress the CLOSE pushbutton on the condenser dump valve control room switch.

c. Instruct IAE to energize the P-12 solenoids to close the condenser dump valve.

D. Instruct the RO to select OFF RESET on the STEAM DUMP INTL BYPASS switches.

Distracter Analysis:

A. Incorrect. This is only done if the OFF RESET does not work B. Incorrect:. There are no pushbuttons for these valves C. Incorrect:

Plausible:

D. Correct:. Tlis is the first action ofthe l7NO of the AP..

Level: SKO 10CFR55.43@)5 KtZ: SYS 039 A2.04 (3.4!3.7)

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-S?M-ISEOb;. 3 source: MODIFIED Level of knowledge: Comprehension

References:

I. OP-MC-STM-DE page 55

2. AP/l/Ai5500/01 Steam Leak page 5 Ques-979.l.doc

SYSTEM: 039 Main and Reheat S t e m System (MRS)

.I d3NLr.E A1 Ability to predict andlor monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) a s d a t e d with operating the MRSS controls including:

(CFR: 41.5 145.5)

A1.O1 Moisture separator reheater, from its temperature and pressure . . . . . . . 1.7 1.7 A1.02 Temperature heatup rate limit for main steam piping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 2.3 81.03 Primary system temperature indications, and required values, during main steam system warm-up . . . I .. . . . . . . .. . . .

~ .

. ... . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 2.7 Al.04 Low pressure turbine nietal inlet temperature indications relative to the opening and shutting of steam vents for moisture separator reheater . . . . . 1.8 1.9 A1.05 RCST-ave . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2* 3.3 81.06 I .

Main steam pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 3.0 3.1 A1.07 . . .

Main stqam temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 2.6 A I .on Reheater steam pressure . . . .. . .

.. ...... ....... ....... . 1.8 1.9

~

A1.09

'41.10 Main steam line radiation monitors . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Air ejector PBM . . . . . . . . . . . .

~ ... .

2.P 2.9*

2.7*

3.0* 1 A2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following mal-functions or operations on the IvlRSS; and (b) based on predictions, w e procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or opera-tions:

(CER: 41.5 143.5 145.3 145.13)

A2.01 Flow paths of steam during a LOCA .. I . .

... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 3.2 A2.02 Decrease in turbiue load as it relates to steam escaping from relief Valves . 2.4 2.7* I A2.03 Indications and alarms for main steam and area radiation monitors (during SGTR) . . . ... ..

I 3.4 3.1 A2.04 . . .

Mahnctioning steam dump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 3.7 A2.05 Increasing steam demand, its relationship to increases in reactor power . . 3.3 3.6 A3 Ability to nionitor automatic operation of the MKSS, including:

(CFK: 41.5 145.5)

A3.01 Moisture separator reheater steam supply . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . 1.9* 1.1 A3.02 Isolation of the MRSS . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 3.5* 1 3.4-21 NCTREG-1122, Rev. 2 I

DUKE POWR MCGUIRE OPERATIONS TRAINlNG OBJECTIVES ystem resulting from a failure OB-MC-STWIDE FOR TRAINING USE ONLY REV. 23 Page 5 of 71

DUKE POWER MCGUlRE OPERA WQNS TRAINING Main Steam Header Pressure It is generated from pressure transmitter SMPT5200. If it fails high, condenser dump valves will open if in Steam Pressure mode. If pressure fails low, steam dump will not respond automatically in Steam Pressure mode.

Steam Dump Valve Failure 1 Qbjective #4 I When a Steam Bump Valve fails OF sticks open, it has symptoms similar to a steam IeaWbreak. Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure will drop, along with Pressurizer level, as long as reactor power is less than secondary power. If operating in the power range, reactor power will tend to increase to accommodate the increased steam flow. If the reactor is shut down, cooldown should continue until the low TEvgP-12 interlock closes the dump valve. Going to "QFF" on the STEAM BUMP INTLK BYP CH switches is the most effective way to attempt to close a failed open dump valve from the control room. This should be effective for steam dump control system failures and for the condenser dump valves, valve positioner failures. For some failure modes on the valve positioner for the atmospheric dump valves (Unit a), going to "OFF" will not necessarily close the valve, since the P-I2 solenoids are upstream of their valve positioners. Since all steam dump valves are spring loaded to close on loss of air, locally isolating air and bleeding it off should cause the valve to fail closed. Steam dump valves that are stuck open can be isolated; the condenser dumps locally with their manual isolations, and the atmospherics (Unit 2) manually from the control room using their motor operated isolations, or locally.

SAFETY NOTE: Accessing the area of the atmospheric dump valves while a valve was open could present a dangerous situation which should be evaluated before proceeding (Unit 2).

4.0 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Non-Safety Related System. No Tech Specs on Steam Dumps OP-MC-STM-jDDE FOR TRAlNlNG USE ONLY REV. 23 Page 55 of 71

.a i;

j 3

6. identify and isolate Beak o n Unit 1:

a. Check S/G PORVs - CLOSED. a. E SiG pressure is less than 1092 PSIG, THEN

_ _ perform the following:

I 1) Close affected SIG P O W manual loader.

2) IF S/G PORV is still open, =:

- a) Close S/G PORV isolation valve.

-- b) E SIG PORV isolation valve still open, THEN dispatch operator to closk SiG PORV isolation

b. Check CQnd!nSer dump valves - b. Perform the following:

1) Select "OFF RESET ofl the following switches:

- "STEAM DUMP INTLK BYPASS CHANNEL A"

- "STEAM DUMP INTLK BYPASS CHANNEL B".

- 2) valve will not close, acN dispatch operator to close condenser dump valve isolation valve.

3) leaking condenser dump valve is isolated Q R repaired, return the following switches to

- "STEAM DUMP INTLK BYPASS CHANNEL A"

- "STEAM DUMP INTLK BYPASS CHANNEL B .

B m k Question: 999 .I Answer: B 1 Pt(s) Which one of the following must the Control Room SRO ensure prior to authorizing a Liquid Waste Release from the Waster Monitor Tank (LVMlJ?

A. A source check has been performed on EiMF-44.

B. The required naamber of RC pumps is in operation.

C. The Recommended Release Rate is equal to the A1Bowabk Release Rate.

D. The Expected CPRI of EMF 44 and the EMF 44 Trip I Setpoint are less than the EMF 44 Trip 2 Setpoint

__________s___________ss_ss_____s__s__s_----_---------~-----~--~~~~----~~~---~~-----~

Distracter Analysis:

A. Incorrect:. EMF 49 is used for WMT releases Plausible:

B. Correct:

C. Incorrect: Recommended release rate must be less than allowable release rate D. Ineorrect:.EMF 49 is utilized Plausible:

1,evel: Sa0 10CFR55.43@)

K4: APE 000059 AA 2.0.2 (2.9L3.9)

Lesson PIan Objective: OP-RIC-WE-RLR Obj. 3 Source: Bank, 2002 NRC Retake Exani Level oflac\~ledge:Memory

References:

1. OP-MC-WE-RI,K pages 11 & 13 Ques-999.l.doc

1 Pt(s) Which one of the following must the Control Room SKO ensure prior to authorizing a Liquid Waste Release from the Waster Monitor Tank (WMT)?

A. A source check has been performed on EMF-44.

B. The required number ob RC pumps is in operation.

C. The Recommenc%edRelease Rate is equal to the Allowable Release Rate.

D. The Expected CPM of EMF 44 and the EMF 44 Trip 1 Setpoint are less than the &EMIF44 Trip 2 Setpoint Ques. 999.l.doc

1 Pt(s) Which one of the following must the Control Room itor Tank (WMT)?

A. A source check B. The required u te is equal to the A l l o ~ a h l ~

Release Rate.

D. The Expecte MF 44 and the EMF 44 Trip 1

/

.I i

Ques-999.l.doc

Bank Question: 999 T . Answer: B 1 Pt(s) Which one of the following must the Control Room SRO ensure prior to authorizing a Liquid Waste Release from the Waster Monitor Tank ( W M W A. A source check has hecn performed on EIIIF-44.

B. The required number of RC pumps is in operation.

C. The uRecommended Release Rate is equal to the Allowable Release Rate.

D. The Expected CPM of EMF 44 and the EMF 44 Trip 1 Setpoint are less than the EMF 44 Trip 2 Setpoint Distracter Analysis:

A. Incorrect:.EMF 49 is used for WMT releases Plrusible:

B. Correct:

C. Incorrect: Reconmended release rate must be less than allowable release rate D. Incorrect:.EMF49 is utilimd Plausible:

Level: SRO 10CFR55.43(b)

KA: APE 000059 hA 2.0.2 (2.9/3.9)

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-WE-RLR Obj. 3 Source: Bank, 2002 NRC Retake Exam Level of knowledge: Memory

References:

1, OP-MC-WE-RLR pages I 1 & 13

APE: 059 Accidental Liquid Radioactive-Waste Relwe . ! :.... I I

L liu.Lu

\

AAI. Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to the Accidental Liquid h d w a s t e Release: I (CFR41.7 145.5 145.6)

AA1.01 Radioactive-Liquid monitor ............................... 3.5 3.5 AA1.02 ARMsystem ........................................ 3.3 3.4 AAl.03 Flow rate controller ................................... 3.0* 2.9 AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release:

(CFR: 43.5 I45.13)

A.42.01 The failure-indication light arrangement for a radioactive-liquid monitor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 3.5 AA2.02 The permit for liquid radioactive-waste release . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 3.9 AA2.03 Failure modes, their symptoms, and the causes of misleading indications on a radioactive-liquid monitor . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 3.6 AA2.04 The valve lineup for a release of radioactive liquid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2' 3.5' I AA2.05 The occurrence of automatic safety actions as a result of a high PRM system signal ............................. 3.6 3.9 AA2.Q6 That the flow rate of the liquid beimg released is less than or equal to that specified on the release permit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5' 3.8 4.245 NUREG-i122. Rev. 2 I

CLASSROOM TIME (Hours)

. . . ~.

State the purpose of the Radiological Liquid Releases.

Given a completed LWR, state the recommended release rate.

Y x x State what responsibility the Shift Supervisor is accepting when he signs to authorize a release.

Given a completed LWR, state the proper EMF to be used for the release.

Evaluate plant parameters to determine any abnormal system conditions that may exist.

Concerning the Selected Licensee Commitments (SLCJ related to Liquid Waste Releases; e Given the SLC Manual, discuss any commitments and their applicability.

e For any commitments that have action required within one hour, state the action.

e Given a set of parameter values or system conditions, determine if any commitment is (are) not met and any action@)required within one hour.

e Given the SLC Manual, discuss the basis for a given commitment.

SRO only

2.2 Wekasing sa WMT Refer to Drawing 7.2, WMT Subsystem. Radwaste initiates the procedure. They select the tank to be discharged, recirculate it for mixing, and obtain a sample. Next, the sample is analyzed. Radwaste delivers the sample to RP for isotopic analysis.

WP then generates a Release Discharge Document using the Wadwaste Computer Program. RP assigns the next sequential LWR number. Based on the isotopic analysis ~eport,RP calculates instantaneous release rates.

objective #2 1 The Recommended Release Rate is the lesser of:

e Maximum System Release Rate (MSRR) for WMT = 120 gpm, or 0 Allowable Release Rate The Allowable Release Rate is determined by the amount of activity present in the tank.

RP indicates the EMF Utilized, which is EMF49L for WMT releases. RP next indicates the EMF background cpm, expected cpm, , trip 1, and trip 2 setpoints.

W B then takes the release procedure and the discharge document to the control room.

The SRO authorizes the release by signing the release document. The SRO authorizing the release ensures the following:

e EMF 49 and 1WP-35 & 37 (Liquid Radwaste lo RC control valves) are operable (WM-46, the old release path, is not used).

- 6f any of these are inoperable, then the appropriate documentation / procedure enclosure must be in the retease package e A source check has been performed on EMF-49.

s Select EMF 49 to record on the chart recorder if desired.

NOPE: The abowe checks are required by procedure prior to release.

Prior to signing the LWR document, the SWO should review the following:

e Any special instructions e Ensures the LWR document agrees with the Radwaste OQ (Le., same tank) e The required number of RC pumps are in operation MOPE: The wc minimum flow Eateriock is set a0 the minimum #

of pumps required for the release. If the tote[ # RG pumps running is less then the selected number, IWP-35 and IWP-37 will close.

The Recommended Release Rate is less than the Allowable Release Rate.

e The proper EMF is utilized (for a WMT release, this is EMF 49)

B The Expected CPM of the EMF and the EMFTrip B Setpoint are less than the EMF Trip SI Setpoint The RO logs the LWW number in autolog. The purpose of the log is to maintain an account, in the control room, of all LWWGWR releases. The information contained in the log is:

e Release#

e Start Time & Bate e Stop Time & Date e Volume Released e Any unusual events encountered during the release Now the release is ready to be started. Radwaste notifies the Shift Supervisor the discharge is initiated. The Radwaste technician aligns the WMT to be discharged to BC and commences the release. When the release is terminated, the Shift Supervisor is notified. Autolog is updated. and the Release document is closed out, with the Shift Supervisor signing the Release document acknowledging the completion.

2.3 Releasing a VUCDT Refer to Drawing 7.3, VUCBT Reiease Flowpath. A lot of the elements in the release process for a VUCBT are similar to the release of a WMT. The following are the highlights of a VUCBT release.

Bank Question: 1006.1 Answer: Q 1 Pt(s) An NLO has been dispatched to discharge the Ventilation Unit Condcnsate Drain Tank (VUCUT) to the Floor Dmin Tak (I-DT). As the discharge is being established, the 1EMF-44 flow meter ruptures and 1EMF-44 LOSS OF SAMPLE FLOW annunciator alarms.

Which one of the following describes the reason for this incident?

A. Both Unit 1 VUCDT pumps were simultaneously started.

B. 1WL-359( W C D T P ~Recirc I ~ ~ Tlzrottle) was opened too far and too much flow was initiated.

C. Radwaste Chemistry failed to open lWM-222 (VUCDT to KC Disch Hdr).

D. 1WI.-359 was not throttled prior to VUCDT pump start.

________ss_____s____-----------------~~----~--~~--~-------------------~~--~---~~--~~

Distracter Analysis:

A. Incorrect:.

Plausible:

I/

B. Incarrect:

Correct:.

Level: SRO 1.) l3 r~

KA: G 2.1.32 (3.4B.8)

I \ ,

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-WE-RLR&y L-Source: BANK L,evel of knowledge: Memory

References:

1. OP-MC-WE-RLR p

2. OPU4/6500/01A p Ques-1006.l.doc

1 Pt(s) An NLO has been dispatched to disc.harge the Ventilation Unit Condensate Drain Tank (VUCIYI) to the Floor Drain Tank (FDT). As the clisc.harge is being established, the 1EMP-44 flow meter ruptures and 1EMF-44 LOSS OF SAMPLE FLOW ammiator alarms.

Which one of the foIlowing describes the reason for this incident?

A. Both Unit 1 VUCDT pumps were simultaneously started.

B. 1WL-359 (WCDTPcrmp Recirc Tltroffkjwas opened too far and too mueh flow was initiated.

C. Radwaste Chemistry failed to open 1WM-222 (VUCDT to RC Disch Hdr).

D. 1WL-359 was not throttled prior to VUCDT pump start.

Ques-1006.I.doc

1 Pt(s) An NLO has been dispatched to recirculate the Condensate Drain Tank (VUCDT) in preparatio As recirculation is being established, the IE alarms.

/

7 ruptures and 1EMF-44 LOSS OF SAMPL FLOW annunciator Which one of the following describpa possible reason for this incident?

/

i

/

A. Both Unit 2 VU@T pumps were simultaneously started.

B. IWL-359 (WCDT Pump Recirc Throttle) was opened too far and$o much flow was initiated.

ste Chemistry failed to open 1WM-222 (VUCDT to ot throttled prior to VUCDT pump start.

Ques-1006.1 .doc

Bank Question: 1006.1 Answer: D 1 Pt(s) An NLO has been dispatched to recirculate the Ventilation Unit Condensate Drain Tank (VUCDT) in preparation for doing a release.

As recirculation is being established, the 1EMF44 flow meter ruptures and 1EMF-44 LOSS OF SAMPLE FLOW annunciator alarms.

Which one of the following describes a possible reason for this incident?

A. Both Unit IVUCDT pumps were simultaneously started.

B. tWh-359 (VUCDT Pump Recirc Throttle) was opened too far and too much flow was initiated.

C. Radwaste Chemistry failed to open IWM-222 (VUCDT to RC Disch Hdr).

D. IWL-359 was not throttled prior to VUCDT pump start.

Distracter Analysis:

A. Incorrect:.

Plausible:

B. Incorrect:

Plausible:

C. Incorrect:

Plausible D. Correct:.

Level: SRO 106FR55.43(b)6 KA: SYS 073 G2.1.32 (3.413.8)

Lesson Plan Objective: QP-MC-WE-WL Obj. 7 Source: BANK Level of knowledge: Memory

References:

1. OP-MC-WE-WL page 29

2. OP/1/A/650Q/01Apage 16

2.1 Conduct of Operations (continued) 2.1.27 Knowledge of system purpose and or function.

(CFR: 41.7)

IMPQRTANCE RO 2.8 SRO 2.9 2.1.28 Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components m d controls.

(CFR: 41.7)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.2 SRO 3.3 2.1.29 Knowledge of how bo conduct and verify valve lineups.

(CFR: 41.10 I45.1 I45.12)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 3.3 2.1.30 Ability to iocate and operate components, including local controls.

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.9 SRO 3.4 2.1.31 Ability to locate control room switches, controls and indications and to determine that they are correctly reflecting the desired plant lineup.

(CFR: 45.12)

IMPORTANCE RO 4.2 SRO 3.9 2.1.32 Ability to explain and apply all system limits and precautions.

(CFR 41.10 / 43.2 I45.12)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 3.8 2.1.33 Ability to recognize indications for system operating parameters which are entry-level conditions fur technical specifications.

(CFR: 43.2 143.3 / 45.3)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 4.0

2. I .34 Ability to maintain primary and secondary plant chemistry within allowable limits.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.3 SRO 2.9 NUREG-I 122, Rev. 2 2-4

DVKE POWER MCGUIRE OPERATIONS TRAINING e --

CLASSROOM TIME (Hours)

OBJECTIVES OBJECTIVE

~~~

Stale the purpose of the Liquid Waste (WL) System WEWiOOl Discuss the purposeioperation of the following:

VUCDT VUCDTPump VUCDT Pump Discharge Pressure Gage o WL-320 (VUCDT EMF Outlet)

Wh-324 (VUCDT EMF Bypass)

WL-359 (VUCBT Pump Recirc.) WEWL002 Describe the two possible VUCDT discharge flow paths.

WEWL003 List the control room indication available to indicate a high level in the VUCDT. WEWLOO4 Describe the Containment Floor and Equipment Sump operations. WEWL005 Describe the purpose/operation of the NCDT WEWLOOS Given a Limit and/or Precaution associated with an operating procedure , that Operations personnel are responsible for; discuss its basis and applicability. WEWL007 Evaluate plant parameters to determine any abnormal system conditions that may exist. WEVJLOOB Describe the purpose and contents of the NPDES Permit.

WEWLOOS OP-MC-WE-WL FOR TRAlNiNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 14 Page 5 of 73

DUKE POWER MCGUIRE OPERATIONS TRAINING 3.0 SYSTEM OPERATION 3.1 Normal Operation 3.1 .I Limits and Precautions Before transferring any tank contents to another tank, ensure sufficient volume is available for transfer. (This will prevent equipment damage due to overpressurization and an inadvertent spill due to overfilling.)

The transfer and handling of all waste shall be coordinated with Radwaste Chemistry.

(This ensures waste is routed to the proper treatment subsystem.)

WHEN starting any Chemical Pump, start pump with discharge path closed and throttle open after pump reaches speed (5 seconds). Do not start more than 10 times in one hour. (To prevent burning up the pump.)

The VUCDT Pumps shall only be operated manually. (This will prevent equipment damage due to overpressurination and an inadvertent spill due to overfilling.)

Ensure that IWL-359 (VUCDT Pump Recirc.) is open prior to starting a VUCDT Pump to prevent rupture of 1EMF-44 flow meter.

3.1.2 Operating Procedures NCDT Operation The NCDT normally has a cover gas of 112 or N2. During plant operation it is usually H2, and when the plant is shutdownlNC system opened it is usually N2. Storage cylinders with isolations and pressure regulators are provided for H2 and Nz. They are cut in only as necessary to raise the NCBT pressure, and then isolated back. When the cover gas is changed from Nz to HZor Ha to Nz, the new gas supply is aligned and the tank level is raised and lowered as necessary to burp the undesired gas out. The gas space is vented to the WG System.

When starting a NCDT pump on an idle system, the discharge flow path is isolated (recirc. and discharge) until the pump is running. Then recirc. is aligned, followed by placing Wb-23 (NCDT Pumps level control) in automatic. When swapping NCBT pumps, the idle pump is started and the previously running pump is stopped, without having to isolate the discharge. If the NCDT Pump flowrate is < 55 gpm or > 120 gpm, the flowrate is adjusted by throttling the pump discharge isolation and the recirc.

OP-MC-WE-W6 FOR TRAfNiNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 14 Page 29 of 73

Bank Questiori: 1075 Answer: A 1 Pt(S) tinit 2 has just completed a refueling outage. Two hundred (200) ice baskets were reloaded dunng the outage. Chemistry has detemiind that the pH of the ice in the baskets that were reloaded have an av &k

%O@ a' 1 <'&JC*M*

N'hich one of the folkwing statements correctly describes the concern with A. Reduced iodine removal in the event of a LOC4 B. Reduced boron solubility following a LOCA C. Increased caustic stress corrosion following a LOCA D.

bd,,, a L-4 a.4-I_-______-_________-_s__s___ls__________---------------~~-~~--~~--~~---~------------

DiStrdCter Analysis: The key to this question is realizing that the basis for maintaining limits on basic pH is to enhance iodine removal (retention in sump water). A more neutral pH wrould retain less than the assumed amount ofiodine. The other distractors are either incorrect chemical responses to a drop in pH or a response not of concern.

A. Correct:

B. Incorrect:

C. Incorrect:

Plausible.

Level: SRO I(A: SYS 024 G 2.1.32 (3.4B.8)

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-CNT-PdF Obj. 18 Source: NEW Level of know1ccige:miory

/--

18 Author: JIiZ Ques-1075 .doc

References:

1. Lesson Pian OF-MC-CNT-NF page 67

2. Tech Spec Basis page B3.6.12-8 Ques-1075.doc

1 Pt(s) IJnit 2 haas just coniplcted a reheling outagc Two hundred (200) ice basket!:

were reloaded during the outage. Chemistry has determined that the pII of the ice in the baskets that were reloaded have an average pH of 4.5. verses the 9.0 to 9.5 that is required.

Which one ofthe following statements correctly describes the concern with the pH sample?

A. Reduced iodine removal in the event of a LOCA B. Reduced boron solubility following a LOC.4 C. Increased caustic stress corrosion following a LOCIA D. Increased CRUD solubility following a LOCA

________s____l- _________s_s________~------------------~----~--~~-------

Ques-1075.doc

the ice in the baskets that were reloaded have e $1 of7.5, verses the 9.0 to 9.5 that is required.

Which one of the following stateme eetly describes the concern \vith the pH sample?

R. Reducedbo ubility following a I L K 4 C. Increas tic stress corrosion following a LOCA RUD solubility following a LQCA

Bank Question: 1075 Answer: A 1 Pt(s) Unit 2 has just completed a reheling outage. ?fvo hundred (200) ice baskets were reloaded during the outage. Chemistry has determined that the pH of the ice in the baskets that werc reloaded have an average pII of 4.5, verses the 9.0 to 9.5 that is rcquired.

Which one of the following statements correctly describes the concern with the pI sample?

A. Reduced iodine removal in the event of a LOCA B. Reduced boron solubility following a LOCA C. Increased caustic stress corrosion following a LOCA D. Increased CRUD solubility following a LOCA Distracter Analysis: The key to this question is realizing that the basis for maintaining limits on basic pH is to enhance iodine removal (retention in sump water). A more neutral pN would retain less than the assumed amount of iodine. The other distractors are either incorrect chemical responses to a drop in pII or a response not of concern.

A. Incorrect:

Plausible:

B. Incorrect:

C. Correct:

Plausible:

D. Incorrect:

Plausible:

Level: SRO K4: SYS 027 G2.1.32 (3.4/3.8)

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-CNT-NP Obj. 18 source: NEW Level of knowledge: Memory Author: JHZ Ques-1075.doc

References:

I. Lesson Plan OP-MC-CNT-NF page 67

2. Tech Spec Basis page B3.6.12-8

2.1 Conduct of Operations (continued) 2.1.27 Knowledge of system purpose and or function.

(Crn: 41.7)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.8 SRQ 2.9 2.1.28 Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls.

(CFR: 41.7)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.2 SRQ 3.3 2.1.29 Knowledge of how to conduct and verify vaive lineups.

(CFR: 41.10 I 45.1 I 45.12)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 3.3

2. I .30 Ability to locate and operate components, including local controk.

(CFR: 41.7 145.7)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.9 SRO 3.4 2.1.31 Ability to locate control room switches, controls and indications and bo determine that they are correctly reflecting the desired plant lineup.

(CFR: 45.12)

IMPORTANCE RO 4.2 SRQ 3.9 2.1.32 Ability to explain and apply all system limits and precautions.

(CFR: 41.10 143.2 I 45.12)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRQ 3.8

2. B 3 3 Ability to recognize indications for system operating parameters which are entry-level conditions for technical specifications.

(CFR: 43.2 143.3 145.3)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 4.0 2.1.34 Ability to maintain primary and secondary plant chemistry within dlowabte limits.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 145.12)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.3 SRO 2.9 NUREG-1122, Rev. 2 2-4

Describe how the ice condenser temperature is maintained during normal operation.

State the purpose of the following NF Ice Making System components:

0 Glycol Recirc Pumps 0 Run-Off-Fill switches 0 Ice Making Solution Mixing Tank.

Discuss the basic flewpath of ice from the ice storage bin to the ice baskets in the ice condenser.

Concerning the ice condenser chart W C O F ~ W :

e State the purpose e List the information that can be accessed B Describe the modes of operation.

Given a limit andor precaution associated with an NE System Operating Procedure, discuss its basis and applicability.

State the problems which will occur as a result of operating with elevated Ice condenser temperature.

State the purpose of iodine removal from containment following a LOCA..

Explain how iodine removal from containment atmosphere is accomplished and the effect of (sodium tetraborate) Na25407 on the removal groeess.

Describe how a failure of the ice condenser doors to open on a LBCA will effect containment sump level.

Describe how a failure of the ice condenser doors to open on a HEb5lC will effect peak containment pressure.

-3DUKE POWER _..... I

.2 Abnormal and Emergency Operation MCGUIRE OPERA TIDNS TRAINING

... At the boginniug of a LOCA, Lower co;itainrnefit pressure wili be greater ihan upper containnient pressure. When differer;;ial pros:;ure is greaier tha? 1.G Ibs/ft2the lower doors wiil open. The stean: /air flow thru tho ice condenser will open the interrnediate and top deck doors. The ice will absorb large aniounts 3f energy from :he steam/hot ai:

mix:i:re as it passes through the ice concknser. This wid reduce the peak pressure in containment.

Hydrogen accumulaticn inside containnient diiring a LOCA presents an expiosion hazard. Emergency procedure EP/l o,9JA50CO/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Irijectio?)

directs tho operator to place tho I-iydrogen Igniters in oFera!ion arid dispatch an oFerator to tur? 03 the NF AHUs once a LCCA has beeri determined. The ccntainvent responss to hydrogen combustion as a re;jul! of tha deliberate igriitior; of hydrogen (Hydrogen Igniters) following core damsso has been analyzed. This analysis has not been pedcrrneci with tho NF A W s ip. sewico. Since the coctainment resporiije analysis does not covsider the impact of the opera?ioriof the NF AHUs, they should be stopped pricr tc the release CF hydrogon in a ccrc! damage accident and prior to the operatior; of the Igniters.

L Objective #17,18 1 Iodine presents a radiological problem (internal dose and dose at the site boundary in the event of containment [eakage) in containment 6oIbwlng a LOCA.

By removing iodine, the radiological airborne hazard ran be reduced. Some Iodine (about 80%) wilf be trapped in the containment sump water by hydrolysis:

312 9 3H2Q -3 51 + 1 6 3 -. .t 6H+

The efficiency of this interaction can be increased to almost 100% by increasing the pH of the solution. This is accomplished by adding sodium tetraborate to the ice making solution mixing tank.

Operation of the ice condenser is critical to the containment response following a HELBIC. The ice condenser and containment spray work together to maintain eontainrnent pressure below 15 psig. lb for some reason the ice eondenser doors faikd to open, containment pressure would exceed the design basis pressure.

Excessive containment leakage or in worst case scenario, a breach of containment, could result in excessive dose to plant personnel and the general population near the plant. In addition, the ice melt provides borated water for the containment sump. Following a LOCA, the melted ice provides 2000 ppm borated water (Tech Spec minimum of 1800 ppm.) to aid in the containment sump hwemtory a w b b l e for recirculation through the core.

Ice Bed I

E B 3.6.12 BASES

) SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Frequency of 40 months for a visual inspection of the structural soundness of the ice baskets is based on engineering judgment and considers such factors as the thickness of the basket walls relative to corrosion rates expected in their service environment and the results of the long term ice storage testing.

SR 3.6.12.7 Verifying the chemical composition of the stored ice ensures that the stored ice has a boron concentration 2 1800 ppm and 5 2330 ppm as sodium tetraborate and a high pH, 2 9.0 and 5 9.5 at 20"C, in order to meet the requirement for borated water when the melted ice is used in the ECCS recirculation mode of operation. Additionally, the minimum boron concentration setpoint is used to assure reactor subcriticality in a post LBCA environment, while the maximum boron concentration is used as a bounding value in the hot leg switchover timing calculation (Ref. 4). This is accomplished by obtaining at least 24 ice samples. Each sample is taken approximately one foot from the top of the ice of each randomly selected ice basket in each ice condenser bay. The SR is modified by a NOTE that allows the boron concentration and pH value obtained from averaging the individual samples analysis results to satisfy the requirements of the SR. if either the average boron concentration or average pH value is outside their prescribed limit, then entry into ACTION Condition A is required. Sodium tetraborate has been proven effective in maintaining the boron content for long storage periods, and it also enhances the ability of the solution to remove and retain fission product iodine. The high pH is required to enhance the effectivefless of the ice and the melted ice in removing iodine from the containment atmosphere.

This pH range also minimizes the occurrence of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components exposed to ECCS and Containment Spray System fluids in the recirculation mode of operation. The Frequency of 54 months is intended to be consistent with the expected length of three fuel cycles, and was developed considering these facts:

a. Long term ice storage tests have determined that the chemical composition of the stored ice is extremely stable;

b. There are no normal operating mechanisms that significantly change the boron concentration of the stored ice, and pH remains within a 9.0 - 9.5 range when boron concentrations are above approximately 1200 pm; and

c. Operating experience has demonstrated that meeting the boron Concentration and pH requirements has not been a problem.

McGuire Unit I and 2 B 3.6.12-8 Revision No. 25

Bunk Question: 10'76 Answer: B 1 rys) Given the following events and conditions on IJnit 1:

0 F\VST Channel 4 level transmitter was discovered frozen at C1000.

a Technical Specification ac.tions for FWST Channel 4 have not been initiated.

e At 0630 a LOCA oecurs e At 0630 a loss of instrument buss lEKVA occur Channel 1 low level bistdble fails to the Which one of the following statements correctly desc.ribes the required operator response concerning the ND System swap over to the containment simp?

A. Verify auto swap aver oecurs as designed when WSI' Cliannal 2 level gets to 180 inches.

B. Manually swap ND pump suction to the containment sump per ES 1.3 (Tramfir CQ CbIdLug Recirc) when the FWSr Channel 2 gets to 180 inches.

C. Immediately (after I minute) reset SI and Sequelaeers and stop ND pumps.

I). Select "SS Latched" and then verify auto swap over of ND pump suction per ES 1.3 (Transjiir to CoIdLrgRecirrc) when FWST

%eve1 Channel 2 gets to 18.0 inches.

Distracter Analysis: The key to this question is realizing that F W S T Channels 1,2 and 4 provide inputs to the aotoswap feature of the ND sump valves. This feature is a 2/3 logic. With channel 4 frozen it will not perform its desired function. However, with channel 1 faiIed low (auto swapover Bowrlevel bistable picked up), when channel 2 gets to the auto swapover setpoint, the swapover s l i o ~ l doccur automatically. Note: because of mads over the years, there is no Channel 3.

A. Bsscorrect:

W. Correct.

Piausible C.'. Incorrect:

PBausible, if channel 4 bistable was picked-up

13. Incorrect:

Ques.. 1076.doc

Plausible, if channel 1 bistabk was not p i ~ k e d - ~and p Operator thought SS Latched would help Level: SRO 10CFR55.43@)5 $ 4\,

&,\< (ci.- i K4: SYS 013 .42.04 (3.6142)

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-FH-FW Obj. 3 OP-MC-PS-hTl Obj. 7 Source: NEW Level of knowledge: Comprehensive Author: CWS

References:

I. OP-MC-PS-ND pages 29,3 1 and 65

2. OP-MC-FH-EWpages 35 and 65

I Pt(s) Given the following events and conditions on Unit 1:

e FWST Chmiel4 level transmitter was discovered frozen at 0600.

e Technical Specification actions for FWST Chamel4 have not been initiated.

e At 0630 a LOC.4 occurs e At 0630 a loss of instrument buss IEKVA occurs and results in FWST Channcl 1 low level bistable fails to the non tripped condition.

Which one of the following statements correctly describes the required operatur response concerning the NU System swap over to the containment sump?

A. Verify auto swap over oceors as designed when PWST Channel 2 level gets to 880 inches.

B. ?vlanoally swap ND paimp suction t5 the containment sump per ES 1.3 (Tmnsfer CokfLtgRecirc) w-hen the FWST Channel 2 gets to 180 inches.

C. ImmediateIy (after B minute) reset SI and Sequencers and stop hD pumps.

D. Select SS Latched and then verify auto swap 0ver of ND pump snrtion per ES 1.3 ( T a s f e r to CoIdLeg Recirc) when EWST Bevel Channel 2 gets to 180 inches.

Ques-1076.doc

I Pt(S) Given the following events and conditions on Unit 1:

FWST Channel 4 level transmitter was disccve

At 0630 a LOCA occurs accompmk ngle failure of FWST Channel 1 failing low.

System swap over to the containment A. Verify auto s ver occurs as designed when FWST Channel ap ND pump suction to the containment sump per iately (after 1 minute) reset SI and Sequencers and stop per ES 1.3 (Trmsfer to Cold Leg Recivc) when W S T level Channel 2 gets to 180 inches.

Bank Question: 1076 Answer: A 1 Pt(s! Given the following events and conditions on Unit 1:

FWST Chamel 4 level transmitter was discovered frozen at 0600.

Technical Specification actions for FWST Channel 4 have not been initiated.

e At 0630 a LOCA occurs accompanied by a single failure ofFWST Channei 1 failing low.

Which one of the following statements correctly describes the required operator response concerning the ND System s w p over to the containment sump?

A. Verify auto swap over occurs as designed when IWST Channel 2 level gets to 180 inches.

B. Manually swap ND pump suction to the containment sump per ES 1.3 (Trurrsferto Cold Leg R ~ c i r cwhen

) the FWST Channel 2 gets to 180 inches.

C. Immediately (after 1 nlinute) reset SI and Sequencers and stop ND pumps.

D. Select SS Latched and then manually swap ND pump suction per ES 1.3 (Transfer to ColdLeg Recirc) when FWST level Channel 2 gets to 180 inches.

Distracter Analysis: The key to this question is realizing that M S T Channels 1,2 and 4 provide inputs to the autoswap feature o f the ND sump valves. Thk feature is a 2/3 logic. With channel 4 frozen it will not perform its desired function. However, with channel 1 failed low (auto swapover low level bistable picked up). when channel 2 gets to the auto swapover setpoint, the swapcver should occur automatically. Note: because of mods over the years, there is no Channel 3.

A. Correct:

B. Incorrect:.

Plausible, if channel I bistable was not picked-up C Incorrect:

Plausible, if channel 4 bistable was picked-up D. Incorrect:

Plausible, if channel 1 bistable was not picked-up and Operator thought SS Latched would help Ques-lO76.doc

Level: SRO 10CFR55.43@)5 KA: S Y S 013 A2.04 (3.6!4.2)

Lesson Plan Objective: Of-MC-FH-FW Obj. 3 OP-MC-PS-ND Obj. 7 Source: NEW Level of knowledge: Comprehensive

.4uthor: CWS

References:

1. OP-MC-PS-ND pages 29,31 and 65

2. OP-MC-FH-EW pages 35 and 65

I SYrnM: 013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)

K6 Knowledge of the e f f e d of a loss or malfunction on the following will have onthe ESFAS:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

K6.01 Sensors and detectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7* 3.1*

K6.QZ ' Controllers and positioners .............................. 2.2 2.6 K6.03 Breakers, relays. and disconnects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 2.9 K6.84 Trip s e t p h t calculators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4* 2.7f fAFJLKK A1 Ability to predict andlor monitor changes in parameters (to Prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ESFAS controk including:

(CFR 41.5 145.5)

A1.O1 RCS pressure and temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.0 4.2 A1.02 Containment pressure, temperature, and humidity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9 4.2 A1.03 Feedwater header differential ............................. 2.6f 2.6*

A1.04 SIGlevel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 3.6 81.05 Main steam pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 3.6 A1.06 RWSTlevel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 3.9 A1.07 Containment radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 3.9 AI.08 Containment sump level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 3.8 A1.09 T-hot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A1.10 T-cold.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ESFAS; and (b) based Ability on these predictions, we procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations; (CFB: 41.5 143.5 145.3 145.13)

AZO1 LOCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 4.8 A2.02 Excess steam demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 4.5 A2.03 Rapid depressurization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 4.1 AZO4 Loss of instrument bus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 4.2 A2.05 Loss of dc control power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 4.2 A2.06 Inadvertent ESFAS actuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7" 4.0 A3 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the FSFAS including:

(CFIP: 41.7 145.5)

A3.01 Input channels and logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.v 3.9 A3.02 Operation of actuated equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 4.2 A3.03 Continuous testing feature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4f 2.7*

NUREG-1122, Rev. 2 3.2-26

2 2 2 2 1.5 OBJECTIVES OBJECTIVE State the purpose of the Refueling Water System.

Provided with the FW training drawing and QP/1 or 2/PJ6200/14 and OP/l or 2/A/6200/13, discuss the various lineups that can be utilized to transfer water, provide makeup, or purify the refueling water.

Identify the valves/purnps/instrumentation that can be operated or monitored from the Control Room.

Given a Limit and Precaution associated with the FW System, discuss its basis and when it applies.

Concerning the Technical Specifications related to the Refueling Water System; Given the LCO title, state the LCQ (including any COLR values) and applicability.

For any LCQs that have action required within one hour, state the action.

Given a set of parameter values or system conditions, determine if any Tech Spec LCQs is(are) not met and any action(s) required within one hour.

Given a set of plant parameters or system conditions and the appropriate Tech Specs, determine required action(@.

0 Discuss the basis for a given Tech Spec CCQ or Safety Limit.

SRQ Onlv OP-MC-FH-FW FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 32 Page 7 of 109

2.12 FWST Level Instrumentation

/

levels which are important to proper FWST operation:

L0w;Low 33"

.bow 180" 0 Makeup 462" High 470" 0 Overflow 484" The Low and Low-Low levels are used for post accident monitoring. Redundant annunciators alarm at each point. Valves NI-184 and 185 automatically open at the how level setpoint.

Computer alarms actuate at the overflow, low and low-low also.

Annunciator alarms actuate at the overflow, High, makeup, low, and low-low levels.

Of the four level transmitters monitoring FWST level, three are powered from Essential Power (Channels 1, 2, 4), and one is powered from non-essential range).

eve&channels have receiver gauges in the Control floorn:

o Channel 4 FWST Level MC-9 e Channel 7 FWST Level MC-9 o Channel 2 FWST Level MC-9 o FWST Level (Narrow Range) MC-9 Channel 2 FWST level has an input to the PAMS Chart Recorder located on MC-5.

BP-MC-FH-FW FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 32 Page 35 of 1Q9

therefore are not susceptible to reference leg problems like losinn Ievel due to small leaks or evaporation. Problem over t h i i e a r s with FWST level

) instrumentation has initiated design studies and level instrumentation redesign to make the level indication more reliable. Site Plan MG-97-0035addresses the FWST bevel Instrumentation Improvement Project. It addresses potential common mode failures such as submergence, impulse line freezing and reference line blockage. As a result, modifications are in progress under NSM-12496 and 22496. {If a transmitter problem occurs, the operators would b h t notice it on cross-channel comparison, performed periodicaNy (SBER 97-07 Review), unless it were a gross problem which would cause a Ievel alarm from one ob the fransmHfers.)

FWST Pressure Atmospheric pressure exists in the FWST since it is normally vented to atmosphere, and therefore pressure is not monitored in the FWST.

FWST Level Five channels provide Control Room level indication alarms and protection logic utilized in Normal Operation and ECCS/NS pumps switch-over from the FWST to the Containment Sump following a LQCA. There are three Safety Related Level Channels required by Tech Specs under ESFAS Instrumentation and two Non-Safety Related level instruments used to monitor FWST Level during normal operations.

NOTE: Unit 1 McGuire FWST Instrumentation is slated to be upgraded during the 1EOCl2 Outage. The 0 500 Non-Safety Related H20bevel Instrument will be eliminated. The Channels 1,2, and 4 Lower Narrow Range Safety Related bevel Instruments (0 -

160 HzO) will be expanded to indicate 0 500 Hz8. The setpoints at which the Low bevel Auto-Switch-over to Cold Leg Recirculation will change from 150 H2Q to 180 H20. The setpoint at which the Control Room Crew will manually swap Containment Spray Pump Suction to the Containment Sump will change from 97H2Q to 33 HzO. The Non-Safety Related Upper Narrow Range Level Instrument (405 530 HzO) wili remain.

This modification has already been completed on McGuire Unit 2.

Each of the three Safety Related level instruments (FWP5000 Channel 4, FWP5070 Channel 1, and FWP5020 Channel 2) has a completely separate reference and variable leg tap, and are located 120 degrees in circumference from each other. Therefore a single failure will not affect more than one channel.

Their range is from 0 - 160 H20(Unit 1 only).

OP-MC-FH-FW FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 32 Page 65 of I 0 9

-.DUKE POWER _ _

MCGUIRE OPERATKlN.5 TRA!NING I I__

CLASSROOM TIME (Hours)

OBJECTIVES L

P OBJECTIVE S

0 Explain the purpose of the ND System. X PSNDOOI Sketch the ND System reflecting all major components and X interconnections to associated systems ( NC, NI, NS ) per Drawing 7.1.

PSND002 I

Describe the instrumentation and alarms associated with the X ND System.

PSND003 List the power supplies for the ND pumps. X PSNDOO4 I

Describe the operation of the following ND valves: X NDlB(2AC) - C LOOPto ND Pump e ND4B (I9A) - B(A) NB Pump Suction from FWST or NC e ND67B (688) - B(A) ND Pump and B(A) ND HX Mini-Flow 0 NDISB (308) - Train B(AJ NB to Hot beg Isolation e ND35 ND System to FWST Isolation.

~

PSNDOOS I

Explain overpressure protection for the ND System. X PSNDOOG Explain the interlocks associated with the emergency auto- X swap of ND pump suctions to the containment sump during an accident.

PSNDOO7 OP-MC-PS-AID FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 29 Page 5 of 77

DUKE POWR MCGUIRE OPERATdONS TRAINING

____LI NB-35 shall not be opened during Modes I- 4. Opening this valve during Modes 1 - 3 would allow both trains of ND to recirculate to the FWST, since ND-258 and NB90A are required to remain open. With the NKI to FWST recirculation path open, both trains of ND would be inoperable due to the insufficient ECCS injection flowrate to the NC loops. Opening this valve while in Mode 4 with the NB System in service could cause a rapid loss of reactor coolant inventory and void the 24" FW header with steam, making all ECCS trains inoperable. Therefore, ND-35 shall remain locked closed during Modes 1 4. -

2.3.10 NI-l84B ( RB Sumu to Train E3 ND & NS ) and NI-'l85A f RE3 Surnr, to Train A ND&NS)

I Obiective # 7 B NI-184B and NI-185A have openlclose pushbuttons on the ND section of M C l l .

These valves are designed to automatically open on FWST low level ( 188 inches),

following a safety injection signal, to swap the MD pump suction from the FWST to the containment sump. Each valve has an S-latch control circuit which ensures that the valves will not swap to the containment sump unless certain conditions exist ( Refer to drawing 7.3 ). The S latch is activated by the train related safety injection signal and has two train related indicationlswitches on M C l l . When the Ss signal is actuated, the S LATCHED indication will illuminate and remain lit until the SS RESET pushbutton is depressed. The S LATCH seals in the Ss SIGNAL, therefore the automatic swap will be enabled even if the SS signal is reset. The S-latch allows the automatic opening of NI-1848 andlor NI-185A on 2 of 3 FWST LO level bistables provided the FWST level instruments are not in test.

The S-latch switch also has a BYPASS pushbutton which has a mechanical latch which allows the operator to open the valves with their open pushbuttons in the event that:

the Ss signal did not actuate the S Latch

the S-latch had been prematurely reset it is desired to transfer to the containment sump prior to the FWST LO Level setpoint, or testing of the circuit is required The BYPASS pushbutton allows opening of the containment sump valves with ND-1SA (A ND Pump Suction from FWST or NC) and N D 4 B (B ND Pump Suction from FWST or NC) open however, NS-1 B (B NS Pump from Cont Sump) and NS-18A (A NS Pump from Cant Sump) must be closed. This accomplishes the auto transfer of ND Suction from FWST to the containment sump since ND-?SA and ND4B will automatically close once its train related Containment sump isolation valve reaches the fully open position. The REL aushbutton removes the mechanical latch on the BYPASS pushbutton. This pushbutton is used when the BYPASS function is no longer needed.

OP-MC-PS-ND FOR TRAlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 49 Page 29 of 77

DUKE PQWiZR MCGUIRE OPERATIONS TRAINING The SS Reset pushbutton will restore the NI-I84B(185A) open interlock and disables the 213 FWST LO level auto open signal. When depressed, the S latch light will go out.

NI-284B(185A) can be manually opened using their Control Room pushbuttons if NS-l(18) are closed and one of the following conditions are met:

the S LATCH contacts are closed or the S LATCH BYPASS is depressed or NB4B(ISA) is closed.

Minor Modification MM-7161 and MM-7220 added equalization lines from the bonnet of valves NI-184B and NI-l85A to the downstream side of the valve. These valves are flex-wedge gate valves and have the potential to trap high pressure water and air between the disks. The trapped water and air are postulated under certain conditions to cause the disks to seat so tightly that the valve operator would be unable to open the valve when necessary. The equalization line consists of a 212 inch tubing line tapped and welded into the valve body and welded to a 'l/2 inch class 3 packless valve ( NI-856 for valve Nl-184B and valve Nl-857 for NI-185A )which is fully qualified for the service conditions of this application. Equalization valves NI-856 and Nl-857 will be normally open. The downstream side of the equalization valve is 1/2 inch tubing which is routed back to the NI valve on the down stream side (toward the pump). The equalization line is thus configured to maintain the pressure in the bonnet at a pressure no more than the operating pressure in the NB pump suction piping. The equalization valves act as check valves to prevent pressurization of the bonnet in normal operating alignments.

2.3.1 1 NV-840 (ND to Pzr Aux Spray Control )

NV-848 is an air operated valve which provides Auxiliary Prr spray capability when the NCPs are not operating. The valve has a manual loader, openlclosed indicating lights, and a two position Power Disconnect key switch ( ISOL/NORM all located on the NV section of MC5. The Power Disconnect switch is used to connect/disconnect power to the solenoid supplying air to the manual loader for NV-840. On Unit 2 only, Minor Modification MGMM-7220 installed a 2-inch valve (2NV-1053) upstream of valve 2NV-840. 2NV-1053 is a normally closed manual globe valve.

Valve 2NV-840 is a fail-closed, air operated containment isolation valve which is not subject to Type C leak-rate testing due to its being in a beak Class 1 penetration.

OP-MC-PS-ND FOR TRAlNlNG PURPQSES ONbY REV. 29 Page 31 of 77

DUKE POWER __ -

MCGUIIIE OPERA WONS TRAINING 7.3, Nl-l84B(185A) Control (05127i97 NI-184 and NI- 185 Controls

( each valve has it's own controls )

S - LATCHED LIGHT LIT A. Activited by Safety Injection Sibma1 R. Allows auto opening ofNI-184 ( 1x5 ) on 213 FWST Iow level unless FWST level is in test.

C. Allows NI-184 ( 185 ) to be manually opened with ND-4 ( 19 )

open as long as NS-I ( 18 ) is closed.

D. Once NI-184 ( 185 ) is fully open, ND-4 ( 19 ) will close.

SS RESET PUSHBUTTON

-4.When depressed after SI reset, rcstorcs the NI-184 ( 185 ) open interlock. To manually open NI-1x4 ( 185 ).

1. hD-4 ( 19 )must he closed and

2. KS-1 ( 18 ) must be closed B. Disables the Auto Swap on low FWS1' level.

C. S-Latched light should go out.

BYPASS PUSHBUTTON A. Allows manual opening of NI-I 84 ( 185 ) with ND-4 ( 19 ) open as long as NS-1 ( 18 ) arc closed.

13. Used to initiate transfer of ND suction prior to FWST low level or if S-Latch is reset prior to transfer or for testing

@U?L.BUTTON - Releases the BYPASS Button when function not ionger needed OPEX PR DEPRESSED NS-I ( I 8 CLOSED S-1.ATCIIF.D RYPASSED OPEKNI-184 ( 185)

ND-4 ( 19 1 CLOSED K O 1 IN 'TEST 2 2 FWST LO LEVEL OP-MC-PS-ND FOR TRAlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REW. 29 Page 65 of 77

Bank Question: fO77 Alasw@r: B 1 Pt(s) Unit One was operating at 100% power when a LOCA occurred. Given the following events and conditions:

e STA determines RED Path for FR-P.1 (Response to Imminc?nt Pressurized T/icrninlShock Condition) is valid e FR-P.1 is entered fiom FR-Z..1 (Rcsponse lo Iigh C.wiriiinment Pressure) e Reactor Cuoiant (NC) pressure is 350 psig a i d slowly decreasing.

Which one of the following statements correctly describes the procedural guidance for perfomling an WC system soak:,

A. Do not cooldown NC System until temperature has been stable for 60 minutes and raise NC pressure to within the limits of the

$ost-Sodk Limit Curve.

B. Do not cooldown NC System until temperature has been stable for 60 minnutes and do not raise NC pressure C. Cooldawn to within the limits of the Post-Soak Cooldown Limit Curve within 30 minotes and do not raise pressure.

D. Cooldown to within the limits of the Post-Soak Cooldowsl Limit curve within 3.0 minutes and raise pressure to within the limits of the Post-Soak Cooldown Limit Curve.

___________ss_ss_____s--s__s____________-~~-~~-------~-~--~-----~-~~--~---------~-~------

Distracter Analysis: The key to this question is to realize the basis for the soak step is tu miniinhe additional stresses (no cooidown for 60 min and no pressure increases).

A. Incorrect:

Plausible:

W. Correct: .

C. Incorrect:

Plausibie:

11. Incorrect:

Plausible:

K.evcl: SRO IOCFR55.43(b)5 KA: LAPE 000011 ES 2.14 (3.6*!4.0)

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-M(:-IP-IXP Obj. 4 Ques-1077.doc

Source: NEW

References:

1, OP-MC-EP-FRP p3ge 43

2. EP/l/A!S000#'K-P.1 page 28 Quts- 1 0 7 7 . d ~

1 Pt(s) Unit One was operating at 100% power when a LOCA occurred. Given the following events and conditions:

e STA determines RED Path for FR-P. 1 (Response to Imminent Pressurized Thertnal Sliock Condition) is valid e IR-P. I is entered from FR-%.1 (Response to High C'ontuinrnefit Pressure)

Reactor Coolant (NC) pressure is 350 psig and slowly decreasing Which one of the following statements correctly desc.ribes the procedural guidance for performing an NC system soak?

A. Do not cooldown NC System until temperature bas been stable for 60 minutes and raise NC pressure to within the limits of the Post-Soak Limit Curve.

B. Do not ~ooldownNC System until temperature has been stable for 60 minutes and do not raise NC pressure C. Cooldown to within the limits of the Post-Soak Cooldowm Limit Curve within 30 minutes and do not raise pressure.

I9. Cooidomn to within the limits of the Post-Soak &'ooBdownLimit curve within 30 minutes and raise pressure to within the limits of the Post-So&kCooEdown Limit Curve.

Ques 1037.doc

1 Pt(s) Unit One was operating at 1OW6 power when a LOCA occurred. the following events and conditions:

0 STA deternines RED Path for FR-P.I (Response Pressurized Thermal Shock Cotiditionj is valid FR-P. 1 is enrered from FR-Z. 1 (Response Pressure) o Reactor Coolant (NC) pressure is 350 p k a n d slowly decreasing.

/

/'

Which one of the following statcmepd'correctly describes the proczdural guidance for performing an NC suSfem soak?

A. Do not cooldown $'System until temperature has been stable for 60 minutespnd raise NC pressure to within the limits of the Post-Soak &&it Curve.

B. J Do not c oldolvn NC System until temperature has been stable for 6d)nhinutes and do not raise XC pressure

/

C. Co6idown to within the limits of the Post-Soak Cooldown Limit

,durve writhin 30 minutes and do not raise pressure.

/

D. ,,/ Cooldown to within the limits of the Post-Soak Cooldown Limit curve within 30 minutes and raise pressure to within the limits of the Post-Soak Cooldown Limit Curve.

Ques-lO77.doc

Bank Question: 7077 Answer: B 1 PtjS) Unit One was operating at 100% power when a L O U occurred. Given the following events and conditions:

m STA determines RED Path for FR-P. 1 (Response to Zi~imiitent Pre,murized l%ermal Shock Condition) is valid FK-P.l is entered from FR-Z.1 (Response to High Containment Pressure)

Reactor Coolant (NC) pressure is 350 psig and slowly decreasing.

Which one of the following statements correctly describes the procedural guidance for performing an NC system soak?

A. Do not cooldown NC System until temperature has been stable for 65 minutes and raise NC pressure to within the limits of the Post-Soak Limit Curve.

R. Do not coolldown NC System until temperature has been stable for 60 minutes and do not raise NC pressure C. Cooldown to within the limits of the Postsoak Cooldown Limit Curve within 30 minutes and do not raise pressure.

D. Cooldown to within the limits of the Post-Soak CouldowrnLimit curve within 30 minutes and raise pressure to writhin the Limits of the Post-Soak Cooldown Limit Curve.

Distracter Analysis: The key to this question is to realize the basis for the %oak step is to minimize additional stresses (no cooldown for 65 min and no pressure inereases).

A. Incorrect:

Plausible:

B. Correct: .

C. Incorrect:

Plausible:

D. Incorrect:

Plausible:

I.eve1: SRO 10CFRSS.43fb)S K A E.4PE 000011 ES 2.14 (3.6*/4.0)

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-EP-FRP Obj. 4 Ques-1077.doc

Source: hTW Author: CWS Level of knowledge: Comprehension

References:

1. OP-MC-EP-FRP page 43

2. EI'illA/tOOO;FR-P.l page 28

EPE: 011 Large B r d LOCA ..

,.is EA1.13 Safety injection components ............................. ' 4.1* 4.2 Subcooling margin monitors ......................... :.....

~

EA1.14~ 3.9 4.1 EA1.15 RCS temperahre and pressure ............................ 4.2 4.2 EAI.16 Balancing of HPI loop flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................ 3.5* 3.5' EA1.17 Safety parameter display system ............................ 3.5* 4.1' EA2 Ability to determine or interpret the following 5s they apply to m

Large Break LOCA:

(CFR 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.01 Actions to be taken. based on RCS temperamre and pressure .Saturated and superheated ......................... 4.2 4.7 EA'2.02 Consequences to RHR of not resetting safety injection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3* 2.7' EA2.03 Consequences of managing LOCA with loss of CCW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 4.2 EA2.04 Signifisance of PZR readings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 3.9 EA2.05 Significance cf charging pump operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 3.7' EA2.06 That fan is in slow speed and dampers are in accident mode during LOCA 3.7* 4.0' EA2.07 That equipment necessary for functioning of critical pump water seals is operable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2? 3.4*

EA2.08 Conditions necessary for recovery when accident reaches stable phase . . . 3.41 3.9*

EA2.09 Existence of adequate natural circulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 4.3 EA2.10 Verification of adequate core cooling ........................ 4.5 4.7 EA2.11 Conditions for throttling or stopping HPI ..................... 3.9 4.3 EA2.12 Conditions for throttling or stopping reflux boiling spray . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6' 3.8*

EA2.13 Difference between overcoding and LOCA indications . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7* 3.7*

EA2.14 Actions to be taken if limirs for PTS are violated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6* 4.0 NUREG-1 122 Rev . 2 4.1-8

DUKE BOWER MMCGUIRE OPERATIONS TRAINING CLASSROOM TIME (Hours)

I I I I I I OBJECTIVES

- I QBJECTlVE Explain the purpose of each procedure in the FR-P series.

EPFRPOOI Discuss the entry and exit guidance for each procedure in the FR-P series.

EPFRP002 Discuss the mitigating strategy (major actions) of each procedure in the FR-P series.

EPFRC003 Discuss the basis for any note, caution or step for each procedure in the FR-P series.

EPFRP004 Given the Foldout page, discuss the actions included and the basis for these actions.

EPFRPOOS Given the appropriate procedure, evaluate a given scenario describing accident events and plant conditions to determine any required action and its basis.

EPFKPOOG Discuss the time critical task(s) associated with the FR-P series procedures including the time requirements and the basis for these requirements.

EPFRP007 OP-MC-EP*FRSP FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 05 Page 5 of 69

DUKE POWER MCOUIRE OPERATIONS TRAINING STEP 26 Check adequate NC System depressurization as follows:

PURPOSE: To determine if subcooling has been reduced to a minimum in order to minimize NC system pressure.

BASIS: Establishing NC system pressure as low as possible minimizes the pressure stress on the reactor pressure vessel. If minimum subcooling is not already established, this step instructs the operator to return to the depressurization in Step 16. Since letdown has been established, the operator should use auxiliary spray for further depressurization if normal Pzr spray is not available. The specified subcooling value does not represent a minimum limit since an operating margin of 10' F above the minimum is provided to allow sufficient time for stopping the depressurization. Should the minimurn subcooling value be reached, the SI1 pumps should be operated to maintain the minimum subcooling (as directed by the actions of Step 13.

STEP 27 Determine if NC System soak is required.

PURPOSE: To see if a "soak" period is required prior to further cooldown.

BASIS: If cold leg temperature has gone down more than 100" F in any one hour period, then a "soak" period is required to allow the thermal stresses imposed on the reactor vessel wall to decrease before further cooldown is allowed. The "soak" is a period of steady state operation during which any temperature drop or pressure rise are to be avoided. This time period allows thermal gradients in the reactor vessel wall to be reduced, thus reducing corresponding stresses. Any actions that will not cause either a Cooldown or a pressure rise and are specified by any other procedure in effect are permitted during this "soak" period.

Following the "soak", a cooldown may be implemented with the following additional cooldown restrictions required in order to not challenge vessel integrity.

1. Maintain NC system pressure and T-Colds within the limits of Enclosure 3 (Post-Soak Cooldown Limit).

2. Maintain cooldown rate in cold legs less than 50' F in any 68 minute period STEP 28 Return to procedure and step in effect.

PURPOSE: To direct the operator to the proper procedure foliowing successful completion of the steps in this procedure.

BASIS: Now that the pressureltemperature stabilization guidance presented in FR-P.l has been completed, the operator should continue plant recovery operations by returning to the procedure and step that was in effect at the time FR-P.1 was entered.

OP-MC-EP-FRP FOR TRAINlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 05 Page 43 cf 69

26. Check adequate NC System RETURN TO Step 17.

depressurization as foilows:

-* NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs LESS THAN IO" F OR

-- NC System pressure - LESS THAN 112 PSIG.

27. Determine if NC System soak is required:

- a. Cooldown rate in NC System cold legs - - a. GO TO Step 28.

GREATER THAN 100" F IN ANY 60 MINUTE PERIOD.

b. Perform all of the following:

I 1) Do not cool down NC System until temperature has been stable for 60 minutes.

- 2) Do not raise NC pressure during that time.

- 3) Perform actions of other procedures in effect which do not cooldown or raise NC System pressure until the NC System temperature soak has been completed.

4) W H M NC System 60 minutes soak is complete. TN

-. cooldown may be initiated with the following limits:

- Maintain NC pressure and T-Colds within the "ACCEPTABLE OPERATING REGION" of Enclosure 3 (Post-Soak Cooldown Limit).

- Maintain cooldown rate in NC cold legs less than 50" F in any 60 minute period.

Bar& Question: 1078 Answer: C 1 It(s) Given the following events and conditions on Unit 1:

e 9o%R1P

1A RC pimp is tagged for motor repair 1R RC pump motor breaker tripped due to overcurrent 2 minutes ago

While responding to the 6.3 KV switchgear room an NLO accidentally trips open the IC RC pump breaker Which one of the following statements describes the correct plant rcsponse and sequence of procedure implementation?

Condenser vacuum will go up due to less flow resistance. No Abnormal or Emergency procedures will he implemented.

B. C-9 permissive will be lost and the unit will runhack due to OTDT. AP/l/N§500/03(Loud Rejection) and AP/1/.4/5500/23 (LOSSoJCondmser Vacrsum)will be implemented.

@. Condenser V ~ C U M W will I g5 down until the turbine trips.

A?/1/N5500/23 (Loss of Condenser Vaciium) and EHP/1/1$/5000/E-0 (Reactor Tr@ or Safety Injection) will be implemented.

D. Coaadenser vacuum will go down until the turbine trips.

APIUA/5500/23 (LQSSof Cmdenser Vacuum) and AP/I/N5500/02 (Turbine Generator Tr@)will be implemented.

_______________l__s_----~~----~---~~~---------------------------------~~-----~--------

Distraetcr Analysis: In this event vacuum will decrease until a turbine trip is warranted. This is 20 V ~ C M by U ~the AOP. Before 20 is reached a turhine trip sho~laloccur automatically. The reactor trip if greater than ?-8. If the turbine does not trip the reactor will be tripped. In either instance the crew will enter E-o.

A. Incorrect:

B. Incorrect:

C. Correct:

Level: SRO 10CFR55.43@)5

KA: SYS 078 A2.02 ( 2 3 2 . 4 )

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-rW-23 Obj. 2 Source: NE Author: RDR Level of knowledge: Comprehensive

References:

1. hp/l/k/5500;23 page 1

2. AP!23 Background Document page 4 Ques-1078.doc

1 ft(s) Given the following events and conditions on Unit 1:

0 9096RTP e IA RC pump is tagged for motor repair 0 1B RC pump motor breaker tripped clue to overcurrent 2 minutes ago 0 While responding to the 6.9 KV switchgear room an NL.0 accidentally trips open the IC RC pump bre&er Which one of the following statements describes the correct plant response and sequence of prosedure implementation?

A. Condenser V B C B B M PwiH ~ go UP due to less flow resistance. ?do Abnormal or Emergency procedures will be implemented.

B. C-9 pernessive will be lost and the unit will runback due to OTDT. AWI/A/5500/03 (LoadRejecfiosa)and APllltU5500123 (Loss of Comfemer V U C U Kwill ~ ) be imp%emented.

C. Condenser vacuum will go down until the turbiiie trips.

AP/8/AW5500R3(Loss of Condenser Varcuurn) and EP/l/A/5UOO/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety bnjectiua) will be implemented.

D. Condenser vacuum will go down until the turbine trips.

APlBlA5500123 (Loss of Corarbratser Vacuuni) and A P / l / ~ ~ 5 5 0 0 / 0(Turbine 2 Gerierator Tr&) will be implemented.

1 Pt(sj Given the following events aid conditions on Unit I:

90%RTI 1A RC pump is tagged for motor repair /

1R KC punip motor breaker trips due to ovdrcurrcnt 2 minutes ago While responding to the 6.9 KV switch ar room an NLO accidentally trips open the 1C RC pump breaker

/

Which one of the following statemenfdeseribes the corrcct plant responsc and sequence of procedure implernqibtion?

A.

/

Condenser vacuum wjB go up due to less flow resistance. No Abnormal or Emerp&cy procedures will be implemented.

/

B. C-9 permissive be lost and the unit willi runback on QTDT.

C.

f Apll/it/5500/0 (Load Rej,ction) andAP/l/A/5500/2.3 (LOSSof Condenser curtm) will be implemented.

Coudens#vacuum will go dowrn until the turbine trips. AP/23 and E-p(Reuctor Trip or Safety Injection) will be implemented.

D. Coqgenser vacuum will go down until the turbine trips. AP/23 aqd AP/02 (Turbine Generator Trip) will be implemented.

--- /

i Ques-1078.doc

Bank QMCSfiofl: 7078 Answer: C 1 Pt(s) Given the following cvents and conditions on Unit 1:

YOXRTP lh RC punip is tagged for motor repair 1B RC pump motor breaker trips due to overcurrcnt 2 minutcs ago

Whiic responding to the 6.9 KV switc.hgearroom an NLO accidentally trips open the IC RC pump breaker nhich one of the following statements describes the correct plant response and sequence of procedure implementation?

A. Condenser vacuum will go up due to less flow resistance. No Abnormal or Emergency procedures will be implemented.

B. (2-9 permissive mill be lost and the unit will runback on OTDT.

APllliV5500103 (Load Rejecfion)andAP/1/:115500/23 (Lossof Condenser Vacuum)will be implemented.

C. Condenser vacuum wrill go down until the turbine trips. APl23 and E-0 (Reactor Trip or Sa@y Injection) will be implemented.

D. Condenser vacuum will go down until the turbine trips. AP123 and APl02 (Turbine Generator Trip) will be implemented.

Distracter Analysis: In this event vacuum will decrease until a turbine trip is warranted. This is 20 vacuum by the AOP. Once 20 is reached a turbine trip should occur automatically. The reactor trip if greater than P-8. If the turbine does not trip the reactor will be tripped. In either instance the crew will enter E-0.

A. Incorrect:

Plausible:

B. Incorrect:

C. Correct:

Plausible.

D. Incorrect:

Plausible:

Level: SRQ 10CFR55.43@)5 KA: SYS 078 M.02 (2.5/2.7)

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-AP-23 Qbj. 2

Source: NEW Author: KDB Level of knowledge: Comprehensivc

References:

1. N/l/Ai'5500/23 page 1

2. N / 2 3 Background Docunient page 4 Ques-lO78.doc

SYSTEN 075 Circulating Water System _, . .

K6 Knowlecke of the effect of a loss or mdfundfon of the following wilt have I

on the circulating water system: . . ... . .

(CFR. 41.7 I45.7)

K6.01 K6.02

. Valves ...........................................

Sensors and detectors ...................................

1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5 K6.03 Controllers and positioners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 1.5 K6.04 Pumps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 1.6 K6.05 Motors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 1.5 K6.06 Breakers, relays, and disconnects .......................... 1.5 1.5 dBIkIw AB Ability to predict andlor monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the circulating water system controls including:

(CFR: 41.5 I45.5)

A1.O1 Cooling water temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 2.0 A1.02 Intake levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.P 2.5 A1.03 Pump amperage (ncrmal range and limitations) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 1.7 Pump oil levels and seal flows (normal range and limitations) . . . . . . . . 1.7 1.6 A1.05 Lube oil temperature and pressure .......................... 1.5 1.6 A1.06 Circulating water temperature (inlet and outlet) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 1.7 A1.07 Circulating water pump motor current and pump discharge pressure . . . . 1.5 1.5 Al.08 Circulating water makeup pump motor current (within limits) . . . . . . . . 1.6* 1.6*

A1.09 Normal condition? for pump oil levels and seal water pressure . . . . . . . . 1.4 1.5 A2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts OC the fotlowlng malfunctions or operation$ QIP the circulating water system; and @) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR 41.5 I43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

A2.01 Loss of intake structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0* 3.2 A2.02 Loss of circulating water pumps ........................... 2.5 2.1 A2.03 Safety features and relationship between condenser vacuum, turbine trip, and steam dump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 2.7*

A2.04 Effects of extremes in ambient temperature on cooling tower operation .. 1.8* 2.I*

A2.05 Potential damage to condenser from high discharge pressures of circulating water pump ................................. 1.6 1.6 NUREG-1122, Rev. 2 3.8-16

DUKE POWER MCGUIRE OPERATIONS TRAINING CLASSROOM TIME (Hours)

OBJECTIVES OBJECTIVE

~

Concerning A W I (2)/5500/23 (boss of Condenser Vacuum):

e State the purpose of the AP e Recognize the symptoms that would require implementation of the AP.

AP23001 Given scenarios describing accident events and plant conditions, evaluate the basis for m y caution, note, or step.

AP23002 09-MC-AP-23 FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 00 Page 5 of 11

APll and 2/A/5500/023(Loss of Condenser Vacuum)

STEP 3:

PURPOSE:

Protect the turbine from damage due to loss of condenser vacuum. The turbine manual states condenser vacuum less than approx. 24" with high steam flow (90%) or less than approx. 26" with low steam flow (<30%)can cause turbine blade damage.

DISCUSSION:

This step is reached if condenser low vacuum trip is reached. If this is the case, the turbine should have tripped automatically (the auto trip comes in between 20-29" Hg). This step can also be reached if condenser vacuum is lower than normal coincident with HI-HI exhaust hood temperature (indicates the increasing windage is not being cooled sufficiently by the steam flow). If the turbine is not tripped, the RNQ gives direction to trip the reactor. This is consistent with the philosophy of tripping the reactor to prevent challenging an auto reactor trig. An auto reactor trip that is likely with no steam dumps is High Pzr Press, since condenser dumps are likely not available. Without condenser dumps, steam pressure and temperature have to increase until the reactor powers' worth of steam flow is passing through the SIG PORVs and Safeties. This results in a rapid rise in NC pressure.

REFERENCES:

STEP 4:

PURPOSE:

For scenarios where the turbine automatically tripped while at a reactor power of less than P-8, the reactor may not have tripped. This step ensures the reactor gets tripped for these type scenarios.

DISCUSSION:

It's a conservative action to trig the reactor on a loss of condenser vacuum that causes a loss of turbine. A loss of steam dumps to the condenser is likely, causing elevated T-ave and loss of secondary inventory (through S i 6 PORVs and Safeties).

Page 4 of 9 Rev 0

5. Symptoms Condenser vacuum going down e Hotwell temperature going up "CONDENSER LO VACUUM (PRETRIP)" alarm

Main generator load going down Loss of condensate flow

. Loss of RC pymps.

C. Qperator Actions

- 1. Announce occurrence on page.

2. Check if turbine trip required: P e r f o m the foilowing:

- Main condenser vacuth - LESS THAN - a. !F AI, ANY TIME condenser vacuum 2 0 t+G. goes below 2 0 Hg QB "CONDENSER LO VACUUM TURB TWP" (IAD-I, A-7) alarms, THEN GO TO. Step 3.

-b IF AT ANY TIME a 'TURB EXH HOOD HI-HI TEMP" (IAD-1, F-8) alarms AND condenser vacuum is degraded, r t N

_GO _ PO Step 3.

I 3. Check turbine - TRIPPED. Perform the following:

a. Trip reactor.

- ._b. G.Q. TQ EP/I/A/5000/E-O (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) while continuing with this AP as time allows.

10/02/03 TH'NC 13:39 FAX 7 0 4 87.5 5094 HLP PXAM DEY El001 I Pt(s) Given the follow@ events and conditions on Unit 2:

Unit 2 is at 100% power.

The followin:: evcnts all occur Octobm 1,2003 At 0800, Power Range DetcctorN41 was removed from service to replace a relay hssociated with the High Flux lrip hiction. The cliannel was IZlUrrtcd te service at: 0900.

At 0915, Power Range Detector H42 was removed from service to rcplace a relay associated with the High Flux aip function. The chanoel was roturned to service at 1015.

At 1500, an &E Supmvkoruotifies the Control Room SRo that thc relays installed earlier in N41 and N42 were the iucarrect relays and thc Sigk Flu trip function associated \eththose channels will not hmcttion as designed.

Which one of thc dowing statements comctly describes required Technical Specification actions based on the abovc condilronsf Refmeme Provided A. Place JNOPERABLE channels iu tripped c ~ n d i l hAND ~ reduce THERMAL POWXR to 5 75% RTl' by 0300 BctQbcr2,2003.

B.

I C. Be in MODE 3 by 0300 on October 2,2003.

D. Return at least one channel to service by 1600 hours0.0185 days 0.444 hours 0.00265 weeks 6.088e-4 months or commence a shutdown tu place the unit in Mode 3 by 2200 hoarm,

1 Pt(s) Given the following events and conditions on tinit 2:

P""

e Unit 2 is at 100% power.

e The following events all occw toclay.

e At 0800, Power Range Detector N41 was removed fmm service to replace a relay associated with the High Flux trip fmction. The channel was returned to service at 0900.

e At 0915, Power Range Detector N42 was removed fiorn servic.e to replace a d a y associated with the High Flux trip function. The channel was returned to service at 1015.

e At 1500, an I&E Supervisor notifies the Control Room SRO that the relays installed earlier in N31 and N42 were the incorrect relays and the IIigh Flux trip fuiiction associated with those channels will not function as designed.

Which one ofthe following statements correctly describes required Technical Specification actions based on the above conditions'!

Rejerence Provided Tech Spec 3.3.1 m d Tuhle 3.3.1-1

@ Return both channels B o service hy 1900 hours0.022 days 0.528 hours 0.00314 weeks 7.2295e-4 months or shutdown the unit to Mode 3 by 0300 on October 2.

Reduce unit load to 5 75% RFI' by 2115 hours0.0245 days 0.588 hours 0.0035 weeks 8.047575e-4 months .

C. Hmmediateiy commence a shutdown to place the unit iu Mode 3 hy 1685 hours0.0195 days 0.468 hours 0.00279 weeks 6.411425e-4 months .

D. Return at Beast one channel to service by 1600 hours0.0185 days 0.444 hours 0.00265 weeks 6.088e-4 months or commence a shutdown to piace the unit in Mode 3 by 2200 hours0.0255 days 0.611 hours 0.00364 weeks 8.371e-4 months .

Distracter Analysis:

A. Incorrect:

Plausible:

R. Incorrect.

C. Incorrect:

Plausible:

D. Correct:

Plausible:

Ques. 1079.doc

Level: SRO 10CFR55.43(b)2 KA: GZ.l.12 Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-ADM-TS Objs. 5 & 6 Source: RANK I ~ v eof l knowledge: Analysis

References:

1. Tech Spec 3.3.1

2. Tech Spec Table 3.3.1-1 Ques-lOi9.doc

1 Pt(s) Given the following events and conditions on Unit 2:

0 Unit 2 is at 100%)power.

o The following events all occur today.

e At 0800, Power Range Detector N.11 was removed from scrvice to replace a relay associated with the High Flux trip function. The channei was returned to service at 0900.

e At 0915, Power Range L?etector N42 was removed from servic.c to replace a relay associated with the High Flux trip hic.tion. The channel was returned to service at 1015.

e At 1500, an I&E Supervisor notifies the Control Room SRO tlmt the relays installed earlier in N41 aid N42 were the incorrect relays and the High Flux trip function associated with those channels will not function as designed.

Which one of the following statements correctly describes required Technical Specification actions based on the above conditions'?

Reference Provided A. Return both channels to service by 1900 hours0.022 days 0.528 hours 0.00314 weeks 7.2295e-4 months or shutdown the unit to Mode 3 by 0300 on October 2.

B. Reduce unit load to 5 75% RPT by 2115 hoors.

C. Immediately commence a shtdoavn to place the unit in Mode 3 by 1615 hours0.0187 days 0.449 hours 0.00267 weeks 6.145075e-4 months .

D. Return at least one channel to service by 1600 laours or commence r shutdowaa to piace the unit in Mode 3 by 22QO hours.

_____s___s__________~~-----~~~~-----~~-------~~---------------------~~~~-----~-~------~----

Ques-1079.doc

1 Pt(s) Given the following events and conditions on Unit 2:

,/

Unit 2 is at 100% power. I'

The following events all occur today!

At 0800, Power Range Detector @1 was removed from semice to replace a relay assoc.iated with th(e High Flux trip func.tion. The channel was returned to service at 090Q.'

A?' 0915, Power Range Detqetor M42 was removed fmrn senTice to replace a relay associated with the High Flux trip function. The channel was returned to service atlOl5.

At 1500, an I&E Supeqkor notifies the Control Room SRO that the relays installed earlierh N41 and N42 were the incorrect relays and the High Flux trip functih associated with those channeis will not function as designed.

Which one of the foyowing statements correctly describes required Technical Specificqion actions based on the above conditions?

Reference Provided 1

A. Returq'both channels to service by 1900 hours0.022 days 0.528 hours 0.00314 weeks 7.2295e-4 months or shutdown the unit tp'klode 3 by 0300 on October 2.

3. Rcddce unit load to 5 75% RPT by 2115 hours0.0245 days 0.588 hours 0.0035 weeks 8.047575e-4 months .

1 C. Iynediately commence a shutdown to place the unit in Mode 3 l

b 1615 hours0.0187 days 0.449 hours 0.00267 weeks 6.145075e-4 months .

D. eturn at Least one channel to service by 1600 hours0.0185 days 0.444 hours 0.00265 weeks 6.088e-4 months or commence a shutdown to place the unit in Mode 3 by 2200 hours0.0255 days 0.611 hours 0.00364 weeks 8.371e-4 months .

i Ques-1079.cIoc

Bank Question: 1079 Answer: B 1 Ws) Given the following events aid conditions on Unit 2:

Lnit 2 is at 100% power.

The following events all occur today.

At 0800, Power Range Detector K41 was rcmoved kom service to replace a re1a-y associated with the High F l w trip fimction. lhe channel was returned to service at 0900.

AT 0915, Power Range Detector N42 was rcmoved kom service to replace a relay associated with the High Flux trip function. The channel was returned to service at 1015.

At 1500, an I&E Supervisor notifies the Control Room SRO that the relays installed earlier in N41 and N42 were the incorrect relays and the High Flux trip function associated with those channels will not hnction as designed.

Which one of the following statements correctly describes required Technical Specification actions based on the above conditions?

Referetice Provided Tech Spec 3.3.1 and Table 3.3.1-1 A. Return both channels to service by 1900 hours0.022 days 0.528 hours 0.00314 weeks 7.2295e-4 months or shutdown the unit to Mode 3 by 0300 on October 2.

B. Reduce unit load to 5 75% W T by 2115 hours0.0245 days 0.588 hours 0.0035 weeks 8.047575e-4 months .

C. Immediately commence a shutdolvn to place the unit in Mode 3 by 1615 hours0.0187 days 0.449 hours 0.00267 weeks 6.145075e-4 months .

1). Return at least one channel to service by 1600 hours0.0185 days 0.444 hours 0.00265 weeks 6.088e-4 months or commence a shutdown to place the unit in Mode 3 by 2200 hours0.0255 days 0.611 hours 0.00364 weeks 8.371e-4 months .

Distracter Analysis:

A. Incorrect:

Plausible:

B. Incorrect.

C. Incorrect:

Plausible:

D. Correct:

Plausible:

Ques-1079.doc

Level: SRO 10CFR55.43(b)2 KA: G2.1.12 Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-tWM-TS Objs. 5 & 6 Source: BANK Level of knowledge: Analysis

References:

I. Tech Spec 3.3.1

2. Tech Spec Table 3.3.1-1 Ques-1079.dos

2.1 Conduct of Opepatioms (continued) 2.1.9 Ability to direct personnel activities inside the control room.

(CFR: 45.5 145.12 145.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.5 SRO 4.0 2.1. IO Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license.

(CFR: 43.1 145.13)

IMPQRTANCE RO 2.7 SRO 3.9 2.1.11 Knowledge of less than one hour technical specification action statements for systems.

(CFR: 43.2 I45.13)

IMPORTANCE It0 3.0 SR0 3.8 2.1.12 Ability to apply technical specifications or a system.

(CFR: 43.2 I 43.5 145.3)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.9 SRO 4.0 2.1.13 Knowledge of facikity requirements for controlling vital I controlled access.

(CFR: 41.10/43.5 /45.9/45.10)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.0 SRO 2.9 2.1.14 Knowledge of system status criteria which require the notification of plant personnel.

(CFR: 43.5 I 45.12)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.5 SRO 3.3 2.1.15 Ability to manage short-term information such as night and standing orders.

(CFR: 45.12)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.3 SRO 3.0 2.1.16 Ability to operate plant phone, paging system, and two-way radio.

(CFR: 41.10 I45.12)

IMPORTANCE WO 2.9 SRO 2.8

2. I. 17 Ability to make accurate, clear and concise verbal reports.

(CFR: 45.12 145.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 SRO 3.6 NUREG-1122,Rev. 2 2-2

DUKE-POWER

=,

MCGUlRE OPERATIONS TRAINING OBJECTlVE Given a set of plant conditions, determine the plant MODE.

ADMTS004 Explain the use of logical connectors and apply these rules to any given Technical Specification.

ADMTSOOS Explain the rules for Completion Times and apply these rules to determine the time allowed for completing the Required Action(s).

Explain the Frequency rules for periodic actions (both Required Actions and Surveillance Requirements) and apply these rules to determine when a periodic action must be performed.

RJMTSOO?

Given a Technical Specification and associated Bases, determine the system components that are required to be OPERABLE to meet the LCO (Limiting Condition for Operation).

ADMTSOOB I

OP-MC-ADM-TS FOR TRAiNiNG PURPOSES ONLY REW. 15 Page 7 of 73

RTS Bnstrumentation 3.3.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

- \,, 3.3.f Reactor Trip System (RTS) instrumentation LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentationfor each Function in BaMe 3.3.6 --6shall be OPERABLE.

APPUCABIbiTY: According to Table 3.3.1-1 ~

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions A.1 Enter the Condition -. Immediately with one or more referenced in Table 3.3.1-1 required channels for the chanRel(s).

inoperable.

8. One Manual Reactor B.l Restore channel to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months Trip channel inoperable. OPERABLE status OR 8.2 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours6.25e-4 days 0.015 hours 8.928571e-5 weeks 2.0547e-5 months C. One channel or train C.1 Restore channel or train to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months inoperable. OPERABLE status.

OR C.2 Open reactor trip breakers 49 hours5.671296e-4 days 0.0136 hours 8.101852e-5 weeks 1.86445e-5 months (RTBs).

(continued)

-.J*

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.6-1 Amendment Nos. 184A 66

~ ..

.. - .. . / . ,

, ,.,,! ,~ . ,

, - f. ,;

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

8. One channel inoperable One channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing and setpoint adjustment.

_ _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ s _ _ _ ~ _ - s - - s ~ - ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ - - ~ ~ - ~ - - - - - ~

D.l.l Place channel in trip. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months

-AND 8.1.2 Reduce THERMAL 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months POWER to 5 75% RTP.

OW 8.2.1 Place channel in trip. 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months

~AND

-s---S___e--s---S-- NOTE----------------

Only required to be perfofmed when the Power Range Neutron Flux input to QPTW is inoperabie.

D.2.2 Perform S W 3.2.4.2. 3nce per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months OR D.3 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months (continued) i McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-2 Amendment Nos. 184/166

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.6 ACTIONS (continued)

CQNDIT!ON COMPLETION TBME E. One channel inoperable.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 12 hours F. THERMAL POWER F.1 Reduce THERMAL 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months

> P-6 and <: B-10, one POWER t0 6 P-6.

Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channel -

OR inoperable.

F.2 Increase THERMAL POWER tQ > P-10.

G. THERMAL POWER G.1 Suspend operations Immediately

> P-6 and < P-d 5, two invofving positive reactivity Intermedia&eRange additions.

Neutron Flux channels inoperable. -

AND (3.2 Reduce THERMAL 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months POWER to < P-6.

W. THERMAL POWER H.1 Restore channel@)to Phor to increasing

< P-6, one or two Q P E R A B E status. THERMAE POWER Intermediate Range to > P-6 Neutron Flux channels inoperable.

(continued)

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-3 Amendment Nos. 1841166

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)

\

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETIQN TIME I. One Source Range 1.4 Suspend operations Immediately Neutron Flux channei involving positive reactivity inoperable. additions.

4. Two Source Range J.1 Open RTBs. lmmediately Neutron Flux channels inoperable.

K. One Source Range K.1 Restore channel to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months Neutron Flux chsnne! @PERAELEstatus.

inoperable.

- OR K.2 Open RTBs. 49 hours5.671296e-4 days 0.0136 hours 8.101852e-5 weeks 1.86445e-5 months

b. Required Source Range L.1 Suspend operations Immediately Neutron Flux channel involving positive reactiiity inoperabfe. additions.

~AND L.2 Close unborated water 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months source isolation valves.

~AND L.3 Perform SR 3.6.1.1. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter (continued) lilcGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-4 Amendment Nos. 184/166

ff TS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)

-\

CONDITDN COMPLETION TlME M. One channel inoperable M.4 Place channei in trip. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months OR M.2 Reduce THERMAL 42 hours4.861111e-4 days 0.0117 hours 6.944444e-5 weeks 1.5981e-5 months POWEff to c P-7.

N. One Reactor Codant Flows Low (Single Loop) channel inoperable.

M.1 Place channel in trip. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months SR N.2 Reduce THEffMAL 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months POWER to < P-8.

(continued)

I McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-5 Amendment Nos. 184/166

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)

--\

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION

0. One Turbine Trip - Low Fluid Oil Pressure channel inoperable.

0.1 Place channel in trip. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months oa 0.2 Reduce THERMAL IO hours POflER to < P-8.

P. One or more Turbine P.1 Place channel in trip. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Trip -Turbine Stop Valve Closure channels 3R inoperable.

P.2 Reduce THERMAL 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months POWER to e P-8.

Q. One train inoperable.

One train may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months far surveilfance testing provided the other train is BPEWABLE.

6.1 Restore train to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months OPERABLE status.

OR 3.2 Be in MODE 3. 42 hours4.861111e-4 days 0.0117 hours 6.944444e-5 weeks 1.5981e-5 months (continued)

. I McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-6 Amendment Nos. 184/166

RTTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME W. One RTB train NQTES.-----------------

-______-___-__--s_

inoperabie. j. One train may be bypased far up to 2 Rows for surveillance testing, provided the other train is OPERABLE.

2. One R f B may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for maintenance on undervoltage or shunt trip mechanisms, provided the other train is OPERABLE.

8.1 Restore train to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months OPERABLE st&Js.

OR R.2 Be in MODE 3. 1 h0UE S. One or more channel(?.) S.1 Verify interiock is in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months inoperable. required state for existing unit conditions.

OR S.2 Be in MODE 3. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months (continued)

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-7 Amendment Nos. 184/166

RTS Bnstrumentation 3.3.6 ACTfOMS [Continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME T. One or more channe!(s) T.1 Verify interlock is in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months inoperabie. required state for existing unit conditions.

OR T.2 Be in MODE 2. 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months U. One trip mechanism U.1 Restore inoperable trip 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months inoperable for one WPB. mechanism to OPERABLE st3t!!s.

BR u.2 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours6.25e-4 days 0.015 hours 8.928571e-5 weeks 2.0547e-5 months V. Two RTS trains V.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-8 Amendment Nos. 1841166

RTS instrumentation 3.3.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FREQUENCY 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Compare results of calorimetric heat balance dculation 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months t5 Nuclear Instrumentation System (NE) channel 5utput.

Compare results of the incore detector measurements to 3 effective III NIS AFD. power days (EFPD)

(continued)

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-9 Amendment Nos. 1841166

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1 SURVEILUNCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

FREQUENCY Pefioorrn TAQOT. 31 dayson .

STAGGERED TEST BASIS 31 days on a STABGEflED TEST BASIS Calibrate excore channels to agree with incore detector 92 EFPD measurements.

92 days (continued)

McGuire Units 4 and 2 3.3.1-10 Amendment Nos. 184/166

WTS Bnstrumentation 3.3.i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

I Only required when not performed within previeLis 52 days

--~_____-________~_s___

Prior to reactor stattup AND

~

Four hours after reducing power below P-IO for power and intermediate range instrumentation AND Four hours after reducing power below P-6 for source range instrumentation AND Eve9 92 days thereafter (continued)

MsGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-11 Amendment Nos. 184/f66

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

-. SURVElLbBNCE FREQUENCY Perform TABQT. 92 days 4 8 months 18 months SR 3.3.1.I2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months SFl 3.3.1. I 3 Perform COT 1 8 months (continued)

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-12 Amendment Nos. 184/1EE

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 SI4WVEILUNCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) 1 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY sw 331.14 ____s___~ ~ __

Verification of setpoint is not required.

Perform TWDOP 18 months

~_______NOTE--------

Only required when not performed within previous 31 days Perform TADOT. Prior to reactor startup 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SI? 3.3.1.I? Verify RTS RESPONSE TlME for RTDs is within limits. 18 months McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-13 Amendment Nos. 184Jl66

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 4

APPUCAELE MOCES OR BMEfl SPECiFIED REQUIRED SUflVEIUNCE MLCWABLE TalP FUNCTION CONDtTIBNS CHANNELS CONDIllONS RECUIREMENTS VALUE SETWlKT 2 6 SR 3.3.1.14 NA 2 c SR 3.3.1.14 NA

8. High 1.2 4 D Sfl 3.5.1.1 ~1104aarS SR 3.3.1.2 SR 3.3 1.7 SR 3.3.1 . I 1 SR 3.3.1.16

b. Low 4 E Sfl 3.3.t.l SA 3.3.t.e

- 2696 RTP E

SR 3.3.1.1I SR3.3.t.16

3. Power Range NE(;*

flux -le H Q PmNve

~ Rats 1.2 4 D Sa 3.3.1.7 5 5.5% RTP SR3.3.1.11 Mu?tin8 mMant

,2e 2 F.G SR 931.1 53046rnP SA a51.a SR3.31.11 2 H sR3.3.1.1 --=3o%m sR3.3.18 SR 331.11

5. smJK=aF(engs 2 IJ

- Nammflua 2 J.K 1 L ~~33.1.1 NIA SR33.t.1:

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 APPLICABLE M O E S 08 amm NC441PML SPECIFIED REWIRED 8URVEIl.lAE ACbOWAeLE TalS mNcnm CONmNS CHANNELS CONDITIONS FIEQLilRUIlEPrrS VALUE SEFOMf

6. OvertempemurnA T 1.2 4 f SR 3.3.1.1 Refer m SA 3.5.1.3 Note 1 (Snw SR3.3.1.6 3.3.1-18)

SR 3.3.1.7 SR3.3.1.12 SR 3.3.l.t6 SR3.3.1.17

7. C m n x w r A T 1.2 4 E SB 3.3.1.1 RelHr to SR 3.3.1.3 MH 2 (Page SR 31.s.5 3.3.1-19)

Sfl33.<.9 SR 3.3.1. 12 ER3.3.1.X SR33.1.17 A M sFt3.3.1.t SR 1.3.1.7 SK 3.3.1.10 SR3.3.1.16

b. High 12 E sRaai.1 SR3.3.1.7 SR3.3.1.10 SR3.Sl.16 hi sR3A.1.1 SR33.1.7 SR 331.10 N SRU1.1 sR3121.7 sR312t.tO SR33.1.16 M SR.S.3.1.1 SR33.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR33.1.16 M SR 33.1.e 2 5015 V SR 36.1.10 SR3.3.1 16

RTS in~trumenfation 3.3.1 Tab:? 3 3 1 1 (page 3 i l 7)

Reaclcr T o p Sysem ' n ~ ~ ~ u r n e n l d i ~ ~ n I

I APPLICAELE FUNCTION MODES OR ORER SPECJFIED CONDlT1ORl.S RMVIRED CHANNELS CONDITIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ALLOWABLE VALUE NOMINAL TRIP SETFUlhT 1

1 per boi M S A 3.3.1.9 -, 5 5 9 Kz SR 3.3.t.10 SR3.3.1.16

13. Slem Geneator 4 per SG E (SG)Water Level.

LO* LOW 14 TinbineTnp 3 0 SR3.3.l.70 2 42 pslg SR3.3.1.15 4 B SR 3.3.1.13 >IY.ow' SR 3.3.1.15 2 trains Q SR3.31.5 NA SR 3.3.1.14 2 5 SR 3,3.1.:1 -> 4511 Jmp SR 3.3.1.13 1 per wn T SR 3.3.1.5 M/t 4 - SR 3.3.1.11 -< 49% RTP SR 3.3.1.15 4 S SR3.3.1.11 L7%RTF SR 3.3.1.13 &~ll%

RTP 2 T sR3.3.1.12 -c 1 1 2 m e SR 5.3.1.13 iT*lse psssrw equmlent McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-16

RTS Instwrnentaticm 3.3.1 APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIER REWIRED SURVUWNCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONOlTlQNS ChANNELS CONLXTIWS REQUIREMENTS VALUE smam NA NA NA NA NA PIA NA &A MA HA MA NA McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-17

RTS Instrunenlalion 3.3.i Table 3.3 1-1 (page 5 of ij Reactor Trip Systen t~strumefitation Note 1: Bverternoerature aP The Overtemperature AT Function Allowable Value shall net exceed the following NOMINAL TRIP SETPQINP by more than 4.4% of RTP.

Where: AT is measured RCS AT by loop narrow range RTDs, O F .

ATo is the indicated AT at RTP, OF.

s is the Laplace transform operator, sec-I.

T is the measured RCS average temperature, O F .

r' is the nomina! Tavg at W?P, < 5 S . j P is the measured presurber pressure. psig P' is the nominal RCS operating pressure, = 2235 psig K1 = Overtemperature AT reactor trip NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT, as presented in the CBLR, I

& = Q v e r t e m p a t ~ ~ATe reactor trip heatup setpoint pnaity coefficient, as presented in me COLR, K3 = Overtemperature AT reactor trip depressurization setpcmt penalty cc&iciesr?, as presented in the COLR.

?,,q = ?ime c~nstantsiltilied in the Lead-lag antroller for AT, as presented in the mLR.

T~ = Tk-iw canstants utili& in the hg compensator for AT, as presented in the COLR,

t. = Time mmtants uWed in the IeacMag controller for 'T-, as presented in We COLR.

= Time exstants u h T ~ d in the measured Tw b g mpensater, as presxited in the Corn, md,

!,(AI) = B fblwi~cwraf the irtdicated diffwenoe between top m d W~? I deteGtoss Qf the pcmer-range nudear i m chambers; with @m to be selected ta& ca measur& i m m e n t reqmose dunng phnt s t a m tests such that (i) for q - q, betwean the "pos&ve*and 'negabve' fl(as)breakpoints as presented in the COLfl; f,(el)= 0, where q,and q,are percent RATED THERMAL BQWER in the top md bottom halves of the a r e raspf&vely, and q1a qoIS total 'TF1ERRAAL POWER in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER, (eontmued)

McGuire Urns 1 and 2 3.3.1- 1 a

RPS 1ndrumentat:on 3.3.1 T m l e 3.3.1-1 (page 6 of 7)

Reactor Trip System instrwner,tatior:

(ii) far each percent imbalance that the magnitude of qs- qb is more negative than the f,(Al) "negative' breakpoint presented in the COLR, the A T Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by the f,jAl) 'negative' slope presented in the CQhfl; and (iii) for each percent imbalance that the magnitude of q, - qbis more positive than the f,(Al) 'positive' breakpoint presented in the COLf3, the AT Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by the f;(Al)

'positive" slope presented in the CQLR.

Note 2: Overpower AT The Overpower AT Function Ailuwable Value shall nat exceed ttie following NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT by more than 3.0% of RTP.

Wnere: AT is measured WCS AT by loop narrow range RTDs, "F.

AT0 is the indicated BT at RTP. O F .

s is the Laplace transform operator, set.'.

T is the tTIei3SUFed R 6 S average terRpewWre. "F.

8' is the nominial Twpat RTP,5 5885.1 OF.

& = Overpower AT reactor NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT 85 presented in me coif?. I

s = 0 . W F for increasing average temperature and 0 for decreasing average temperature, s<, = Overpower AT rwctof heatup &point penalty ~ ~ eas presented n t Hn the a R for T > T' ard #s = 0 for p, 7 , . 72 = Tim mnstmts utilized in BRa W l a g cmtroller for AT. as presmted h the CQLW.

-r3 = Time constants utibsd in the lag compensator foc AT, 8s presented in t?~e COkR.

+6 = Tme C X J R S ~ ~ Wutili&

I~~ in the measured,U lag compensator, as presented in me corn.

7, = Time constant lrtilized in the ratelag controller for, ,T as presented in the COLR, and f&l) = a function cf the indicated diierence between top end bottom detectors of the power-range nuclear ion cnambers; with gains to be selected based on rneasurd instmment response during plant startup tests such that:

(mntinued)

MGuire Units T and 2 3.3.1-19 Cncr:n?-,t PWS. 1"/175

RTS Instrumentation 4.9.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 7 of 7)

Reactor Trip System Instrumentation (i) for qt - q b between the "positive" and "negative" f*(AI) breakpoints as presented in the CBLR; f@) = 0, where q, and qb are percent RATED THERMAL POWER in the Bop end boottom halves of the core respectivdy, and q, + q b is total THERMAL POWER in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER; (ii) for each percent imbalance that the magnitude of 9,- q b is more negative than the f2(Al) "negative" breakpoint pfesented in the COLR, the AT Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by the f,(Al] "negative" slope presented in the COLR; and (iii) for each percent imbalance that the magnitude of q, - qb is more psitive than the fa(Al) "positive" breakpoint presented in the CObR, the AT Trip Setpoint shall be automatiilly reduced by the f2(Al)

"positive" slope presented in the COLR.

I McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-20 Amendment Nos. 184/166

Bank Qnestion: IO80 Aiiswer: C 1 Pt(s) Given the following events and conditions on IJnit 1:

Mode 3 in preparation for a reactor startup e Reactor trip breakers arc closed and shutdown banks withdrawn

I&E is replacing a failed Containment Pressure Channel I1 transmitter, The associated bistables are in their Technical Specification required position.

A loss of lEKVA occws.

Which one of the following sratements correctly describes a concern requiring prompt operator attention?

A. PBacing control rods in manual B. Placing CF Regulating Valves in manual.

C. Terminating inadvertent Safety Irajection.

$ -D. Terminating inadvertent Containment Spray.

Distracter Analysis: The key is realizing the failed instrument channel would have one SI bistable tripped by Tech Specs and the redundant channel tri,y on the loss of the instrument bus, resulting in an inadvertent SI.

A. Incorrect: The reactor is already tripped.

Plausible: This is an immediate action per the Abnormal Procedure for loss of instnunent bus, but the SRO is expected to prioritize concurrent procedures, and apply the appropriate one (reactor trip procedure)

W. Incorrect: Already have FW Isolation Plausible: , Immediate action per the AP (see above)

C. Correct:

D. Incorrect: Containnierit Spray would not initiate Plausible. If the Operator thought the Tec,h Spec required position was tripped and thought the failed position of the bistable was tripped.

Level: SKO 10CFR55.43(b)5 KA: 000057AA2.19 Ixsson Plan CX7jcctive: OP-MC-IC-IPE Obj 6 Ques.. 1080.doc

Source: BANK Author: John Zelm Level of knowledge:

References:

1. Lesson Plan 0P-MC-IC-IPE page 34

2. Tech Spec 3.3.2, page 3.3.2-10 & 3.3.2-3 Ques. 1080.doc

1 Ptjs) Given the foliowing events and conditions on Unit 1:

e Mode 3 in preparation for a reactor startup 0 Reactor trip breakers are closed and shutdown banks withdrawn e I&E is replacing a failed Containment Pressure Channel II transniilter The associated bisrables are in their Technical Specification required position.

e A loss of IEKVA occurs.

Which one ofthc following statements correctly describes a concern requiring prompt operator attention?

A. Placing control rads in manual R. Placing CP Regdating Valves in mannai.

C. Terminating inadvertent Safety Injection.

D. Terminating inadvertent Containment Spray.

I Et@) Given the following events and conditions on Unit 1:

Mode 3 in preparation for a reactor startup

Reactor trip breakers are closed and slutd anks withdrawn I&E is replacing a failed Containment Pry ~hannclII transmitter.

The associated bistahles are in their T&uical Specification required position.

4 loss of lEKVA occurs.

Which one of the following statements correctly describes a concern requiring prompt operatorxttention?

A. Placing con$roIrods in manual B. Placing~GFRegulating Valves in manual.

C. Terfinating inadvertent Safety Injection.

D. Terminating inadvertent Containment Spray.

,/

Bank Question: 1080 Answer: C 1 Pt(s) Given thc following events 'and conditions on Unit 1:

Mode 3 in preparation for a reactor startup Reactor Uip breakers are closed and shutdown banks withdrawn I&E is replacing a failed Containmcnt Pressure Channel 11 transmitter.

The associated bistables are in their Technical Specification required position.

A loss of lEKVA occu~s.

Which one of the following statements correctly describes a concern requiring prompt operator attention'?

A. Placing control rods in manual B. Placing CP Regulating Valves in manual.

C. Terminating inadvertent Safety Injection.

D. Terminating inadvertent Containment Spray.

___~____________I_________I_____________------------------------------~~~--~~----~-

Distracter Analysis: The key is realiziug the failed instrument channel would have one SI bistable tripped by Tech Spec's and the redundant channel trips on the loss of the instrument bus, resulting in an inadvertent SI.

A. Incorrect: The reactor is already lrippcd.

Plausible: This is an immediate action per the Abnomlal Procedure for loss of instrument bus, but the SRO is expected to prioritize concurrent procedures, and apply the appropriate one (reactor trip procedure)

B. Incorrect: Already have PW Isolation Plausible: . Immediate action per the AP (sce above)

C. Correct:

D. Incorrect Containment Spray would not initiate Plausible. If the Operator thought the Tech Spec required position was tripped and thought the failed position of the bistable was tripped.

Level: SRO 10CFR55.43@)5 KA: 000053 AA2.19 Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MCXC-PE Obj h Ques-1080.doc

Source: BANK Author: John Zelin Level of knowledge: Anaylsis

References:

1. Lesson Plan OP-MC-IC-IIE page 37

2. Tech Spec 3.3.2, page 3.3.2-10 & 3.3.2-3

APE 057 Loss o l Vital AC Electpled Instrument Bus AA2 . Ablltty to determine and interpret the following as they apply to ' r the Less of Vltd AC Instrument Bus:

(CFR: 43.5 145.13)

AM.OT Safety injection tan& pressure and level indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 3.8 AA2.02 Core flood tank pressure and level indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7" 3.8*

AA2.03 RPS panel alarm annunciators and trip indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 .T 3.9 AA2.04 ESF system panel alm annunciators and channel status indicators . . . . . 3.7 4.0 AA2.05 ' S/Gpressure and level meters ............................ 3.5 3.8 AA2.06 AC instrument bus alarms for the inverter and alternate power source . . . 3.2 3.7 AAz.07 Valve indicator of charging pump suction valve from RWST ......... 3.3 3.5 I AA2.08 Reactor power digital display and remote flux meter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4" 3.5*

AAz.09 .

T.ave and T.ref . chart recorder ........................... 3.l* 3.4*

AA2.10 Turbine load limiter control .............................. 2.3 2.5 Main feed pump running indicator and controller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A'42.11 AAz.12 AA2.13 PZR level controller. instrumentation and heater indications . . . . . . . . .

VCT level and pressure indicators and recorders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.91 3.5 3.0 3.P 3.7 3.4 AA2.14 That substitute power sources have come on line on a loss of initial ac . . . 3.2 3.6 AA2.15 That a loss of ac has occurred ............................. 3.8 4.1 AM.16 Normal and abnormal PZR level for various modes of plant operation . . . 3.0 3.1 AA2.14 AAz.18 System and component status using local or remote controls . . . . . . . . .

The indicator. valve. breaker or damper psition which 3.1 3.4 will occur on a loss of power ............................. 3.1 3.1 AA2.13 The piant automatic actions that will occur on the loss of a vital ac electrical instrument bus ........................ 4.0 4.3 AA2.20 Interlocks in effect on loss of ac vital electrical instrument bus that must be bypassed to restore normal equipment operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 3.9 P

NUREG.1122. Rev 2 4.2-42

c!....-". ... ......__

NLO MLOR

...........&Q FPsa"[.'TQT OBJECTIVES M

b OBJECTIVE D State the purpose of the Reactor Protection System. X X ICIPEOQI I-Describe the reactor core parameters and values the system X X is designed to prevent exceeding.

ICIPE002 Explain how the following Reactor Trip signals will cause the X X Weactor Trip Breakers and Bypass.. Breakers to Open (include coils affectck):

e Automatic signal from SSPS.

e Manual Reactor Trip signal.

0 Manual Safety Injection signal.

ICIPE003 Explain the significance of the SSPS General Warning Alarm X X and the conditions which will initiate it.

lClPEOo4 State the power sou~ce(s)to each Reactor Protection X X Channel and Train.

lClPEOo.5 Describe the effect on the RQS due to loss of a power source X X including bistable status, trip logic and any alarms which would indicate the loss of power.

ICIPE006 Describe how the operator knows when more than one X X Protection Cabinet Door is Open.

ICIPE007

2.6.3 Effects of Loss of Power to Reactor Protection

'?'Z Upon less of a Vital 126) WAC Bus, with the Unit at full power, all bistabks on the akected channel will de-energke giving Trip signal in&s while the control board bistable lights for %heaffected channel will k lit. The Trip Logic will change with one Trip signal P P S Ssuch ~ ~ ~that the a4 logic now becomes 113 and the a3 logic nem becomes 112. The power Boss should net cause sa reactor trip since the redundant power supplies will maintain the UW coils energized.

Alarms associated with the Reactor Protection System include:

SSPS Train A or B Generai Warning due to the loss of power supply EKVA OB EKVB for Train A, EKVC OF EKVD for Train 3~

SSPS Train A & 5 loss of powef.

PCS Protection Channel loss of power for the cabinet which hac! the loss.

All the trip alert annunciators for the one channel tripped.

Upon loss of a Vital 120 VAC input to an SSPS input channel, only the $istables powered from the input cabinet will de-energize. The NC Bump undervoltage and under frequency bistables from the PIC Bump Monitor Panel will de-energize. The turbine trip (Auto Stop Oil pressure sand Turbine Stop valve Closed) bistablee will also de-ensrgke. Only the trip toggle far the above trips will be affected. The Me

, pump under voltage and under frequency will go to 183 while the turbine trip logic witl go to 112 for Auto Stop Oil and a3 for the Stop Valves Closed.

AhFmS associated with the Reactor Protection System include:

SSPS Train A & B loss of power.

SSPS Train W or 5 General Warning due to the IOSS to channel 1 or 2 for Train A, or loss to channel 3 or 4 for Train E.

Trip alert annunciators far the affected channel.

Refer to 8 E item 5.5 in Section 5.0 Industry Events

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.5 OTHER NOWNAL SPECIRED flEOUlRED SURVEIWCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION COND!TlQNS CflANNELS CONBiTlOhS REWIAEMENTS VALUE SEPOINT 1.2.3.4 2 E SR 332.7 NA PIA 1.2.3.4 2 vatns C SR 3.3.22 NA RIA SR 3.32.6 5R 3.32.6 1.2.3 3 D SR 3.3.2.1 c 1.2 psip SR 3.32.5 SR 3.326 SR 3.32.9 I .2.3(8) 4 D SR 2.3.2.1 -> 1835 prig SR 3.5.2.5 SFI.3.32.8 SR 3.32.9 12.38 1 $artail. E SR 3.3.2.1 NA 2mim 123.4 2baun c SR 3.322 tu SR 3.324 SR 3.32.6 123 4 E SR 3.325 53.0pzg SR 3 3 2 5 SR %a28 SFI 3328 12x4 2 E SR 33.27 NA 123.6 2 vam C SP 23.22 NA SR 3.3.24 SR 3.326 McGuire Units 1 a r c 2 3.3.2-1C:

. <J*'

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2

\ ACTIONS (cerntinued)

CBNDITIBN E. One Containment Pressure channel inoperable.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 42 hours F. One channel M train F.1 Restore channel or train to

% inoperable. OPERABLE status.

i OR F.2.4 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours6.25e-4 days 0.015 hours 8.928571e-5 weeks 2.0547e-5 months

~AND F.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 60 hours6.944444e-4 days 0.0167 hours 9.920635e-5 weeks 2.283e-5 months G. One Steam Line G.1 Restore channei to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months lsolation Manual OPERABLE status.

initiation - individual channel inoperable. OR G.2 Declare associated steam 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months line isolation valve inoperable.

(continued)

McGuire Units I and 2 3.3.2-3 Amendment Nos. 184/166

Level of knowledge: Memory

References:

1. m ! 2 2 Basis Document, page 13 Ques-1081 .doc

1 Pt(s) Unit 1 is operating at 100 56 power when a loss of VI event occurs.

AP/l!A:5500:22 (Loss of ll) has been implemented.

VI header pressure is 55 psig and going down.

Which of the following conditions would require the SRO to direct tripping the IJnit 1 Reactor per xP/1/.4/5500/22 (Loss ofV7)?

A. 1N\-238 (Charging B h e Plow Control) Fails closed.

B. 1CF-23AB (B S i 6 CP Control Vlv) fails closed.

67. 1HaW-252B (RB Non Ess Sup Cant Batside 1501) f2il.p-closed.

D. 1NV-34A (A NC Pump Return Isolation) fails dosed.

/

Unit 1 is operating at 100 Oio power when a loss of VI event o@rs.

1 Pqs)

AP/I/A/5500!22 (Loss of VI)has been irnplerneritcd. VI,k&er pressure is

,J 55 psig. ,*,'

i Which of the foliowing condition would requ,keIhe SRO to direct tripping of the Unit 1 Reactor per hp/22?

A. 1 ~ ~ - 2 (Charging 38 kine PIOW control) fails cs~sed.

B. 1CF-23AB (s S/G CF CQIltrOlVk) fails Closed.

C. IRY-252B@BNon Ess Sup COR^ Outside Isdl fails dosed.

D. lh'\7-348 (,,A9, NC Pump Return Isolation) fails closed.

Bank Question: 7081 Answer: B 1 Pt(s) Unit 1 is operating at 100 O h power when a loss of VI event occurs.

AP/l/N5500/22 (Loss ofV1) has been iniplemented. VI header pressure is 55 psig.

\nlicli of the following condition would require the SRO to direct tripping of the [hit 1 Reactor per AP/22?

A. IN\.'-238 (Charging Line Flow Control) fails closed.

B. 1CF-23AB (I3 SIG CF Control Vlv) fails closed.

C. lR"252B (RB Nun Ess Sup Cont Outside Isol) fails closed.

D. 1NV-34A ("A', NC Pump Return Isolation) fails closed.

A. Incorrect:..lNV-238fails open.

Plausible: If loss of all charging and seal injection was criteria for Rx trip and operator thought valve failed closed.

B. Correct: Step 12 of APi22 checks S!G levels stable, if not and level is going down in uncontrollcd manner, then trip Kx. With 1CF-23 closed, S/G level would he rapidly decreasing.

C. Incorrect: Eventually M!2Z fold out page would direct tripping the Rx if NC Pump temperatures got high enough.

Plausible 1RN-252B does fail closed and could eventually lead to a Rx trip (see above)

D. Incorrect:. 1W-34A fails open on loss ofVI.

Plausible Level: SRQ KA: 065 A U . 0 6 3.6A.2 Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-A-22Ohj 3 Source: New Author: Rob Billings Level of knowledge: Memory

References:

1. APi22 Basis Document, page 13 Ques-lO8l.doc

APE: .M5 Eosr ~f Iwstrument Air .;::\2:. :;,,,-. ics ' . dr ".

.: 2 <.

AWnY Abiliay to opeeke and I or monitor the following BS they apply to tRe Lass of Hmtmment AEr:

(Crn41.7 145.5 145.6) , .

AAI.01 Remote manual Ioaders . .. . . . . . . . . . . ..

~ ... . ~ . . . ... .

~ 2.F 2.5 M1.02 Components served by instrument air to minimize drain on system, . . . .. 2.6 2.8 AAI .03 Restoration of systems served by instrument air when pressure is regained 2.9 2.1 AA1.04 Emergency air compressor .... .. . . .. . . . ... ..

I . . ... . .. . 3.Y 3.4*

Rps ........._....~... ............................

~ ~

AA1.05 3.Y 3.Y AAZ. Ability to determine and hterpret the following as they apply to the Loss OP Iwstrument Air:

(CFIP: 43.5 145.13)

AA2.01 Cause and effect of Low-pressure instrument air alarm . . .. . .. . ..

. . . 2.9 3.2 AA2.02 Relationship of flow readings 60 system operation .. ..

. . . . . . .. . . . . 2.4" 2.6*

A.42.03 Location and holation of leaks . . . ... ..

. . ... . . . . . . . ~ . ..

~ . 2.5 2.9 AA2.04 Typical conditions which could cause a compressor trip (e.g.. high temperature) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

... . . . . . . . 2.2 2.7 AA2.05 When to commence plant shutdown if instrument air pressure is decreasing 3.44 4.1 m .

0 6 When IO trip reactor if instrument air pressure is &-creasing . . . . .. .

. 3.6' 4.2

~

AA2.07 Whether backup nitrogen supply is controihg vdve position . . . . . . . . 2.P 3.2" AA2.08 . . . .. .. .

Failure modes of air-operated equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . .

~

2.9* 3.3 4.2-51 NUREG-1122. Rev. 2 1

DUKE POWER MCGUIRE OPERATIONS TRAINING CLASSROOM TIME (Hours)

OBJECTIVES N N L L L P OBJECTIVE 0 0 R R

Explain the purpose for AP/22 (Loss of VI).

OP-MC-AP-22 FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 00 Page 5 of 11

AP/I and YAt5500/022(Loss of VI)

The step also reestablishes NC temperature control, first by controlling ND bypass flow around the ND HXs via ND-18 or 33. Temperature is also adjusted by throttling KC to control ND discharge temperature. If NC temperature is greater than 200*F,the potential exists to boil KC if it is throttled to a low flow rate, so direction is given to maintain KC flow to the ND Hx greater than 2000 GPM in this case.

REFERENCES:

Engineering letter attached to 50.59 for rev 17 of APIl/A/5500122 and rev 15 of APkiA/5560122.

STEP 12:

PURPOSE:

Prompt the operators to watch SIG ievels because the CF control valves fail closed on a loss of VI. If S/G levels cant be controlled, the Operator is directed to trip the reactor.

DISCUSSION:

The CF control valves use 0 - 60# valve operating air. Depending on the nature of the problem with VI and considering line losses, etc., these valves could start failing at 70# or more VI pressure as indicated in the control room. The operating philosophy regarding loss of Main Feedwater at power is to trip the reactor. This will prevent challenging the Lo-Lo S/G automatic reactor trip and will result in better initial conditions at the time of the manual trip. Refer to PIP 2-M-87-0208 where a automatic reactor trip occurred 5 min after loss of offsite power due to loss of VI to the CF valves. If the CF valves were to get to less than 25% open (for 30 sec or more) on 3 out of 4 S/Gs?an AMSAC could also be generated. For most scenarios, its likely the operator will have manually tripped the reactor prior to this occurring.

REFERENCES:

PIP 2-M-87-0208 Page 13 of 42 Uev 6

1 Pt(6) Given the folloniG events and conditions on Unit 1 :

Large break LOCA h i d e contsinment with fuel damage

Cwrently the crew is implcmmtmg E-2 (Loss of Reactor or SecondUry Coolant)

- Hydrogen Analym concmtration rmding IS 1% and increasing

%readings F are as follows.

= IEW-SlA (Reactor Buildkg Activity) 2 5 W 1EMIFdlB (Resctor Building Acthily) 37 Rhr Which one ofth foiloWiIgstatements describes the correct inSirmcnt used to det.=nn&edurc, and the correct nZiigztmg strategy lo address the abovc condlbons'?

R8ereence Provided A. Hydrogen Analyzer EPl1/M§QOO.~R-Z.4 (Response lo Place Hydrogen recombiners in semi

Bank Question: 1082 Answe~:D I PC(S) Given the following events arid conditions on LJnrdt 1:

e Large break LOCA inside containment with fuel damage e Currently the crew is implementing E- 1 @uss qf Ktuctor or Smvzdmy

CooIut1t) & &ww;+sV5l pp&wNhp I @,A e

EMF readings are as follows:

1EMF-38 (Containment Particulate) 35Rihr IEMF-39 (Containment Gas) 36 Rkr m IEMF-5 1A (Reactor Building .4elivity)3$4t/hr lEMF-51B(Reactor Building Activity) 37 Iik

-',w &d&@&

ements describes the correct eti to the correct mitigating strategy to address the above E.Pil/A/5000/FR-Z.4 (Response to Containment Hydrogen)

Distracter Analysis:

A. Incorrect:

Ptausible:

B. Incorrect:

C. Incorrect:

Plausible:

D. Correct Piausible:

Level: SRQ 10CFR55.43@)4 KtZ: AEPE U'16 G 2.4.6 (3.1i4.0)

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-T:I'-FW ObJ. 3 Source: hTW Author: CWS Ixvel of knowledge: Memory

References:

1.OP-MC-EP-PRZ pages 53 & 55

2. EPiliA5000lF-0 page 9

3. EP/liAi5000/I'R-Z.3 Ques-lO82.doc

1 Pt(s) Given the following events and conditions on IJnit 1:

e Large break LOCA inside containment with fuel damage e Currently the crew is implementing E-1 (Loss rlfReactnl.or Secondmy Cuoiant) e FMF readings are as follows:

1EMF-38 (Containment Particurate) 35Kihr 1EMF-39 (Containment Gas) 46 Rflr lEMF-51A (Reactor Buiiding Activity) 3 6 R h 1EIvF-SlB (Reactor Building Activity) 37 Rhr Which one of the following statements describes the correct EMF used to determine procedure, and the correct mitigating strategy to address the above conditions?

A. IEMF-38 (Containment ParticuIate)

EPIlIN50QO/IFR-Z.4(Response $0High ContainnmenfHydrogem)

Ensure cQllt3illlwtntiSOhtiOn Place VE in service B. IEMF-39 (Containment Gas)

EPiPlt1/5000/FR-Z.3 (Response to High Coiitainivient Radiation Levels)

Ensiire containment isolation Ensure Hydrogen recombiners are in service C. IEMF-S-SBAmeactor Building Activity)

EP/-SBlA/5000/FR-Z.4(Response to High Coi~trmi~rrittent IIydrogcn)

Ensure containment isolation Ensure Hydrogen recombiners are in service D. IEMF-S1B (Reactor Building Activity)

EPltlN5Q0WHR-Z.3(Response do High Contaiiznrenb Radiation Levels)

Ensure containment isolation Place VE in service

____________s__s____---------------~--~-----~--~----------~--~-~--~~-~---~-----

Ques-lB82.doc

c I Et@)

/

/

Given the following events and conditions n [.hit 1:

Large break LOCX inside containni, t uith fuel damage Currently the crew is implementi?g E-1 (Loss ofReucfor or Seconduqj Cookunt)

EMF readings are as follows:

/'"

1. 1EMF-38 (Containment articulate) 3 5 R h

2. EMF-39 (Containme Gas) 36 Rihr

3. 1EMF-5iA (Reactor $uilding Activity) 3 6 R h

4. 1EMP-51B (Reactor%uilding Activity) 37 R l r i

Which one of the follohng statements correctly describes the correct E m s used to determine pr$edure and mitigating strategy to address the above conditions? [

/

A. 1EMF-38 FK-Z.+@?espurtse to High Containment Hydrogen)

~ n s u i kcontainment isolation P l a VE~ in service B.

i IEMF-39

!FR-Z.3 (Response to High Containment Radiation Levels) i I

.f Ensure containment isolation

/

/ Ensure Hydrogen recombiners are in service

!C. 1ERIF-SIA EX-Z.4 (Response to EZigh Cowtaiitment ffvdrogeii) i Ensure containment isolation i

Ensure Hydrogen recombiners are in service D. IEMF-SIB i I--Z.3 (Response to Hig?t Containment Radiation tevejs)

Ensure containment isolation Place VE in service

_____s____l_____________I_______________-~-~-------------~~-~--~--~-----------~--

Bank Question: 1082 Answer: D 1 Pt(s? Given the following events and conditions on Unit I :

Large break LOCA inside Containment with fuel damagc Currently the crew is implementing E-1 (Loss ofReuctor or Secondat?

Coolunt)

E h S readings are as follows:

1. IEMF-38 (Containment Parliculate) 3 5 W r

2. EMF-39 (Containment Gas) 36 Rhr

3. 1EhfF-51A (Reactor Building Activity) 36R;hr

4. IEhF-51R (Reactor Building Activity? 37 W h Wlicli one of the following statcments correctly describes the correct EMFs used to determine procedure and mitigating strategy to address the above conditions?

A. 1EiVF-38 FR-Z.4 (Response to High Containment Hydrogen)

Ensure containment isolation Place VE in service B. 1EMF-39 FR-ZJ (Response to High Containment Radiation LeveJs)

Ensure containment isolation Ensure Hydrogen recombiners arc in service C. IEbfF-51A FR-Z.4 (Response to Hi$ Coritainment Ifydrogen)

Ensure containment isolation Ensure Hydrogen recombiners are in service D. bEMF-51B FH-Z.3 (Responseto High Containment Radiation Levels)

Ensure containment isolation Piace VE in service Distraeter Analysis:

A. Incorrect Plausible:

B. Incorrect:

C. Incorrect:

Ques-1082.doc

Plausible:

D. Correct Plausible:

Le~el:SRO 10CFR55.43(b)4 KA: AEPE W16 G 2.4.6 (3.1!4.0)

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-EP-FRZ Obj. 3 Source: hZU Author: CUS Level of knowledge: Memory

References:

1. OP-MC-EP-FRZ pages 53 & 55

2. EP!liAi5000/F-O page 9

3. EP/l/NA/SOOO/FR-Z.3

6 2.4 Emergency Procdures RIm' 2.4.1 Knowledge of EOP entry conditions and immediate action steps.

(CFR: 41.10 143.5 145.13)

IMPORTANCE RQ 4.3 SWO 4.6 2.4.2 Knowledge of system set points, interlocks and automatic actions associated with EOP entry conditions.

(CFR 41.7 145.7145.8)

Note: The issue of setpoints and automatic safety features is not specificalIy covered in the systems sections).

IMPORTANCE RQ 3.9 SRO 4.1 2.4.3 Ability to identify post-accident instrumentation.

(CFR: 41.6145.4)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 SRO 3.8 2.4.4 Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters which are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operathg procedures.

(CFR 41.10 I 43.2 145.6)

IMPORTANCE RO 4.0 SRO 4.3 2.4.5 Knowledge of the organization of the operating procedures network for normal, abnormal, and emergency evolutions.

(CFR: 41.10143.5 145.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.9 SRO 3.6 IMPORTANCE RO 3.1' SRQ 4.0 2.4.7 Knowledge of event based EOP mitigation strategies.

(CFR: 41.10143.5/45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.1 SRO 3.8 2.4.8 Knowledge of how the event-based emergency/abnqrmal operating procedures are used in conjunction with the symptombased EOPs.

(CFR: 41.10 I 43.5 I45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.0 SRO 3.7 2-11 NUREG-1122. Rev. 2 1

_,__POWER DUKE -. ;:-. .. . _ s--.-_...=.-...MCG'UIHE

......- ..- --- ^ I -

i, .: TRAlNiNG OPERATIONS CLASSROOM TIME (Hours)

OBJECTIVES OBJECTIVE EPFRZOOI FPFRZOOJ any required action and its basi EPFRZOOB Discuss the time critical task(s) associated with the FR-Z series procedures including the time requirements and the basis for these requirements.

EPFRZO07 OP-MC-EP-FRZ FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 13 Page 5 of 81

DUKE POWER MCGUIRE OPERAT[ONS TRAINING i

FR-Z3 Response to High Containment Radiafion Level 5.0 FR-Z.3. WESPbNSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT RADIATION LEVEL 5.1. Purpose This propedure provides actions to respond to high containment radiation level.

5.2. SymptsmdEntry Conditions This procedure is entered, based on operator judgement, from EP/1/8/50001F-O (Critical Safety Function Status Trees) (Containment), on a Yellow condition.

This condition is:

1~ Containment radiation greater than 35 Whr (1 EMF 5dA or B)

OP-MC-EP-FRZ FOR TRAlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 13 Page 53 of 81

........ ~.~

~~ I__ - -

5.3. lmmediatehlafor Actions There are no immediate operator actions in FR-Z.3. The recovery/restoration technique includes the following three major action categories:

1. 6 Check containment ventilation isohtion

2. Place Annulus Ventilation system in service

3. Notify Station Management of containment radiation level The following subsections provide a more detailed discussion of each major action category.

5.3.1 Check Containment Ventilation isolation The isolation of the non-essential ventilation penetrations are verified to prevent the potential release of radioactivity from containment.

5.3.2 Place Annulus Ventilation System in Operation The VE system is placed in service to provide filtration of leakage from the containment structure.

5.3.3 Notify Station Management of Containment Radiation Level The operator is instructed to notify management of the Containment radiation level in order to obtain their recommended action. This information may be needed to determine potential offsite releases.

OB-MC-EP-FRZ FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 13 Page 55 of 81

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS EPIZlAJ5000lF-0 Containment Page Iof 1

~

(3) Procedure Title Response to High Containment Radiation Level ._I_.__I_

(4) Prepared By -- Date May 9,2001

+

(5) Requires 10CFR50.59 evaluation?

17 Yes (Mew procedure or revision with major changes)

No (Revision with minor changes)

&I No (To (6) Reviewed By (QR) Date .... 9 '1 Cross-Disciplinary Review By - (QR) NA- Jsl$- Date 2 ?t- .of-Reactivity Mgmt. Review By .._ . (QR) FdA.$&. Date_.-&$?_

(7) Additional Reviews Reviewed By - Date Reviewed By". . Date ~

(8) Temporary Approval (ifnecessary)

Ry .. ~

~~ (SRO/QR) Date.

By .... ~. (QR) Date ~ -

(9) Approved By - .. . . ___~~___ ate __ CIOL PERFORMANCE (Compare with Control Copy every 14 calendar days while work is being performed.)

(10) Compared with Control copy^ ..., _I .___ .__ . Date ~

Compared with Control copy-^.^. ...... ' ~~

Date -~

Compared with Control Copy .. . . Date -

(TI) Date@)Performed .. - ~ -

Work Order Number (WO#) ... . .. ~~

COMPLETION (12) Procedure Completion Verification 17 Yes MA Check lists andlor blanks initialed, signed, dated, or filled in NA. as appropriato?

U Yes n NA Listed enclostires attached?

Yes n NA Data sheets attached, completed. dated and signed?

u Yes 0 MA Charts. graphs. otc. attached. dated, identified, and marked?

C:l Yes NA Procedure requirements met?

Verified ~. . .~. ~~ .D a!e-~~~~_-~~~-

(13) Procedure Completion Approved .~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ --- DRte~~~- ~ ~-

(14) Remarks (a!t.?ch aduif;onalpaycs, ifnecessary.)

C. 0perator.Actions I. Check Containment ventilation isolation:

a. Check the following isolation valves - _I

a. Close valve(s)

CLOSED:

- IVQ-1A (Cant Air Bel lnside Isol)

-_ 1VQ-6A (Cont Air Add Inside Isol) 1VQ-2B (Cont Air Ret Outside Isol)

- IVQ-5B (Cont Air Add Outside Isol).

b. Check the following valve position b. Perform the following:

indications:

- 1) Place "UNIT 1 VP SUP R EXH On "UNIT I VP CONT O E D ISOL": FANS MODE SELECT" to "OFF" I "UPPER CLSD" - LIT -. 2) LE key switches in next step must be moved, _THEN use key #I78 from

-. - "LOWER CLSD" - LIT. black box in control room.

e On "IVP 18&20 INCORE INST RM 3) Ensure the following key switches PURGE OTSD ISOL": are selected to "CLOSED":

- "CLOSED" - LIT. - 0 "I 6 VP LOWER C O W PURGE ISOL" On "UNIT 1 VP GONT INSD ISOL":

- " i A VP LOWER CONT PURGE

- _ * "UPPER CLSD" LIT ~ ISOL".

__ 'LOWER GLSD" - LIT

- On "IVP 17&19 INCORE INST RM PURGE INSD ISOL":

- "CLOSED" - LIT

RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT RADIATION LEVEL I

a. VE Fans - ON. a. Start fans as follows:

1) Select "ON".

I 2) Return switch to "AUTO".

- b. AnnLllus pressure being maintained - b. Ensure damper mode select switches in NEGATIVE. "AUTO". -

I IAVS-Q-7 Mode Select

- 0 1AVS-D-8 Mode Select

- IAVS-0-2 Mode Select

- . 4AVS-D-3 Mode Select.

3. Check if aux carbon filter fans can be placed in service as follows:

- a. Check containment sump level - LESS - a. GO TO Step 4 THAN OR EQUAL TO 1 FT.

~-b. Start aux carbon filter fans.

4. Notify station management of containment radiation level to obtain recommended action.

- 5. RETURN_TO_procedure and step in effect.

I Pt(s) Given the following events and conditions on CJnit 1:

e LJnit 1 is 35% KTP.

e Pressurizer Pressure Control Selector switch is in the 12 position 0 lNC-31B (Pressurizer PORV Isolation Valve) is closed due to 1NC-32R (Ircssurizer PORV) leakage.

0 Channel 2 Pressurizer Pressure f d s HIGH.

e Pressurizer Pressure Control Selector switch is placed in the 113 position per procedure.

0 1NC-36B fails to close when the Operator places the switch in the closed i

position.

Which one of the following statements correctly describes the SRO directions to the KO to isolate lWC:-36B?

A. Place the Pressurizer Master to MANUAL and adjust the output to 50%.

B. Place the c o n t r ~switch l for lNC-35B (Pressurizer PORV Isolation Valve) to CLOSED.

s. Place the control A switcj for lNC-36B (Pressurizer PORV) tw-tc\=.

D. Place the control switch for lNC-35B (Pressurizer PORV Isolatioii Valve) to OVERRIDE.

1)istraeter Analysis: The key to this question is to realize the A f guidance is written assuming closing the one failed POR\s9 block valve. Since owe block valve is already closed, the procedure guidance is incomplete, and the SRB should cue the RO to utilize the over-ride feature to get the second bbck valve closed.

A. Incorrect:

Plausible B. Incorrect:

C. Incorrect:

Plausible:

D. Correct:

Plausibk:

Level: SRO 10CFR55.43(b)5 Ques-1083.doc

KA: EAFE 000027 AA2.15 (3.4/4.0)

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-PS-NC Obj. 13 Source: NEW Author: RDB Level of knowledge: Comprehensive

References:

1. OP-MC-PS-NC page 37

2. AF/1~.4/5500/11page 2 Ques-1083.doc

1 Pt(s) Given the following events md conditions on Unit 1:

e Unit 1 is 35% RTP.

e Pressurizer Pressure Control Selector switch is in the 1!2 position e i h C 3 1 R (Pressurizer PORV isolation Valvej is closed due to 1NC-32B (Pressuiizer PORVj leakage.

o Channel 2 Pressurizer Pressure fails HIGH.

a Pressurizer Pressure Control SeIector switch is placed in the U3 position per procedure.

e 1NC-36B fails to close when the Operator places the switch in the closed position.

Which one of the following statements correctly describes the SRO directions to the RO to isolate 1NC-3GB?

A. Place the Pressurizer Master to MANUAL and adjust the output tQ50%.

B. Place the control switch for 1NC35B (Pressurizer PORV Isolation Valve) to CLOSED.

@. Place the control switch for 1NC36B (Pressurizer PORV) to CLOSED.

D. Place the control switch for lNC-35R (Pressurizer POW\

Isolation Valve) to OVERRIDE.

Ques-1083.doc

APE: 027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System @ZR PCS)Malfunction ~

1%. I

\. AA2. Ability to determine and interpret &e following BS they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfusactions:

(CFR: 43.5 145.13)

AA2.01 Conditions which will cause an increase in PZR level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 3.8 Normal values for RCS pressure ........................... 3.8 3.9 AA2.02 AA2.03 AA2.04

. Effects of RCS pressure changes on key components in plant . . . . . . . .

Tech-Spec limits for RCS pressure .........................

3.3 3.7 3.4 4.3 AA2.05 PZR heater setpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 3.3 AA2.06 Conditions requiring plant shutdown ........................ . 3.5 3.9 AA2.09 Makeup flow indication. ................................ 3.1 3.1 AA2.08 Letdown flow indication ................................ 3.2 3.2 AA2.09 Reactor power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 3.6 AA2. %O PZR heater energizcdlde-energizedcondition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 3.6 AA2.11 RCSpressurc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.0 4.1 AA2.12 PZRieveI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 3.8 AA2.13 Seal return flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 2.9 AA2.14 RCP injection flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 2.9 AA2.15 Actions to be taken if PZR pressure instrument fails high . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 4.0 AA2.16 Actions to be taken if PZR pressure instrument fails low . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 3.9 AA2.17 Aiiowable RCS temperature difference vs. reactor power . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 3.3 AA2.18 Operable control channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 3.5 4.2-21 NUREG-1 122, Rev. 2 I

DUKE POWER MCGUIRE OPERATIONS TRAINING OBJECTIVES OBJECTIVE Zoncerning the Pzr cold and hot calibrated level indication:

state the purpose of this indication describe how the operator corrects the indicated level for temperature state the problems which can occur if the level is not corrected for temperature State the purpose of the pressurizer power operated relief ialves.

A t the parameters and setpoints associated with the NCS

-elief valves.

3escribe the indications which would be used to identify a eaking Pnr PORV or safety.

Zoncerning the Pzr PORV loop seals:

what was their original purpose e why are they continuously drained during operation e describe the operational concern of leaving the drain valve open while its associsted PORV is leaking state from where the loop seal drain valves are operated.

State the purpose of the Pnr Code safety valve.

Soncerning the Pnr Code safety valves loop seals:

what was their original purpose 0 why are they continuously drained during operation State the purpose of the pressurizer relief tank and the design Features which accomplish the purpose.

OP-MC-BS-NC FOR TRAINING PURPOSE5 ONLY REV. 26 Page 9 of 153

B. SvrnptLms e Pzr pressure channel failed 0 Pzr pressure going down in an wncontsolled manner 0 Pzr pressure going up in an uncontrolled manner e Any Pzr PORV or spray valve failed open o "PZR PORV DISCH HI TEMP" alarm e "PRT HI TEMP" alarm.

C. Qperator Actkns Check actual Pzr pressure - HAS GONE -- _- Step 15.

GO TO DOWN.

Check all Pzr pressure channels - ..- IF either controlling channel is INDICATING THE SAME. malfunctioning, THEN piace "PZR PRESS CNTRL SELECT" switch to backup channel.

Check Pzr PQRVs CLOSED.

~

Perform the following:

a. Close PORVs

b. PORV will not close, THE& close

- a. Close Pzr spray valve(s)

- b. E ANY T(MEa reactor trip occurs

@ spray valve still open. THEN stop 1A and 1 B NC pumps.

-DUKE POWER I__f_

MCGUIRE

.. OPERATIONS TRAINING There are four Pmr pressure channels which have meter indication on l(2)MClO.

These channels provide 2 out of 4 logic for the high pressure (2385 psig) and low pressure (1945 psig) reactor trips. These channels provide the 2 out of 4 logic for the low pressure Safety Injection (1845 psig). Channels 1,2 and 3 provide the 2 out of 3 logic for P I 1 (1955 psig). One of the channels can be selected for recording.

Channels 1 or 3 can be selected for Pzr Pressure Control.

The Pressurizer Pressure Control and Level Control are covered in more detail in lesson plans OP-MC-PS-IPE and OP-MC-PS-ILE.

2.7 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves I Obiecliive#l3 I Each unit has three pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs): NC32B, 34A and 368. The purpose of these valves is to limit pressure for large power mismatches, prevent high pressure reactor trip and minimize undesirable opening of code safety valves. Each PORV has its own block valve which can be operated from the main control board section 1(2)MClO. Each PORV block valve is equipped with a 3-position control switch: "Override - CLSD OPEN". The block valves switches are interlocked

~

such that only the first valve placed in the "CLSD" position will close. In order io close the other block valves, their switches must be place in the "Override"' position.

I Objective#14 I In automatic, the pressurizer PORVs are controlled by the pressure master. The pressure master has compensating circuitry which can compensate for rapid pressure increases or longer intervals where pressure remains above or below setpoint for longer periods of time. This compensating ability can modify the PORV lift setpoint however, 2335 psig is the generally accepted lift setpoint for the PORVs. These valves are pneumatically operated and receive their normal motive force from the Instrument Air System. A backup source comes from A and f3 Cold Leg Accumulators (CLA) in the form of N2 gas through N1430A or N1431B respectively. These valves can be manually opened by their control switches on main control board section 1(2)MCll or they will be automatically opened when "low temperature overpressure protection" (LTOP) is in effect. LTOP provides a 380 psig lift setpoint to NC34A and NC32B when NCS temperature is less than 320' F and "low press" is selected on the key switch. The NC NR pressure transmitters must also be manually placed in service when NC pressure is less than 600 psig for this protection circuit to be operational. NC32B and NC36B are supplied from CLA "B" via N1431B and NC34A is supplied from CLA " A via N1430A.

Annunciator alarms on 1(2)AD6 alert the operator that the N2 from the CL.4 to NC32B and 34A has been enabled. During normal operation the N2 backup from the CLA is not normally selected. The CLAs have a minimum pressure required by Tech Specs therefore possible leakage or operation of the PORVs could allow the N2 pressure to fall below the Tech Spec requirement. Thus the N2 is only enabled when the operating mode does not have a CLA Tech Spec pressure requirement.

OP-MC-PS-NC FOR TRAMNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 26 Page 37 of 153

AP/l and 2/A/5500/011 (Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies)

STEP 3:

PURPOSE:

To close or isolate a failed open P O W DISCUSSION:

One cause for pressure decreasing could be a PORV open when it shouldnt be. NC-32 and 36 should automatically close with pressure decreasing at 2315 psig. NC-34 should automatically close when the demand output on the master controller decreases to less than approximately 80%. This would be equivalent 2315 psig with no integral built up on the master controller circuitry. With the PORV inappropriately in the OPEN position or if it has failed open in AUTO, going to CLOSE in the RNO should close the PORV. In the event it doesnt, or the POWV is mechanically stuck open, the Operator is directed to close the PORV Isolation Valve.

If other PORV isolations are already closed, it is expected Operator knowledge to have to use the OVERRIDE position to close the remaining POWV block valve(s).

The situation of the PORV remaining open and the PORV isolation valve not closing is addressed in a subsequent step. The required actions for this situation are not included in this step because this is an immediate action step, and subsequent contingency steps are beyond what can be memorized. If a reactor trip setpoint is being approached, OMP 4-3 provides adequate guidance to ensure a reactor trip occurs.

For a failed open PORV, the operator must act quickly. Simulator validations have shown that the operator has about 10 seconds to isolate the flowpath to avoid a reactor trip and about 25 seconds to avoid a safety injection.

REFERENCES:

P.S.3.4.11(Pnr PORVs) and T.S. 3.4.12 (LTOP).

PIPS0-M97-3253 & 0-M98-0717 (PIPS that address automatic opening capability operability requirements of T.S.s). Basically, only in the LTOP mode is automatic opening capability a requirement for operability.

Page 5 of 18 Rev 4

1 Pt(s! Given the following events and conditions on Unit 1:

Unit 1 is 35% RTP.

Pressurizer Pressure Control Selector switch is in the 112 position lNC31R (Pressuriz.erPORV Isolations Valve) is closed due to lrJC-32B (Pressurizer PORV) leakage.

Channel 2 Pressurizer Pressure fairs HIGH.

Pressurizer Pressure Control Selector switch is placed in the 113 position.

1NC-36R fails to dose when the Operator places the switch in the closed position.

Which one of the following statements correctly describes the SRO directions to the RQ to isolate 1NC-36B?

A. Place the Pressurizer Master to MANUM, and adjust the output to 50%.

B. Place the control switch for 1NC35B (Pressurizer POKV Isolation Valve) to CLOSED.

C. Place the control switch for 1NC-36B (Pressurizer PORV) to CLOSED.

D. Place the control switch for 1NC-35B (Pressurizer PORV Isolation Valve) to OVERRIDE.

Bank Question: 1083 Answer: D 1 Pt(s) Given the following evmts and conditions on Cnit 1:

Unit 1 is 35% KTP.

e Pressurizer Pressure Control Selcctor switch is in the 1i2 position

1NC-31B (Pressurizer PORV Isolations Vdlve) is closed due to 1NC-32B (Pressurizer PORV) leakage.

e Channel 2 Pressurizer Pressure fai.liHIGI1.

P r e s s t i ~ ~Pressure er Control SeIector switch is placed in the 1/3 position.

lNC-36R fails to close when the Opcrdtor places the switc.h in the closed position.

Which one of the following statements correctly describes the SRO directions to the R 9 to isolate 1NC-36R?

A. Place we Pressurizer Master to I\IANUAL and adjust the output to 50%.

B. Plack the control switch for 1NC-35B (Pressurizer PORV Isdlation Valve) to CLOSED.

G. Place the control switch for 1NC-36B (Pressurizer PORV) to CLOSED.

D. , Place the control switch for lNC-35B (Pressurizer PORV Isolation Valve) to OVERRIDE.

/

istracter Analysis: The key to this question is to realize the AP guidance is written assuming closing the one failed PORVs block valve. Since one block valve is already closed, the procedure guidance is incomplete, and the SKO should cue the RO to utilize the over-ride feature to get the second block valve closed.

A. Incorrect:

Plausible B. Incorrect:

C. Incorrect:

Plausible:

D. Correct:

Plausible:

Level: SRO 10CFR55.43(b)5 Ques 1083.doc

KA: EAPE 000023 AA2.15 (3.7j4.0)

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-PS-WC Obj. 13 Source: NEW Author: RDB Level of knowledge: Comprehensive

References:

1. OP-MC-PS-NC page 37

2. AP/1/N5500/11 page 2 Ques-1083.doc

Bank Questioia: log4 Answer: B Given the following events and conditions on [Unit 1:

Vnit 1 has experienced a large brenk LOCA.

IF3 ND pump trips 10 minutes into the event and will not restart.

FWST level is 178and desreasing.

REACTOR VESSEL 1.R LEVEL is 61%.

Subcooling is -5 degrees.

EP/l/A;5000!I:S-1.3 (Transfer to ColdLeg Recirc) is implemented.

1NI-185A (RD Surnp Io Train A NII & NS) can not he opened.

EP/l!N5000iE.CA-I. I (Loss ofEmergenq Coolant Recirc) is entered when cold !eg rcc.irculatioucan not he established in EPiliA;5000!ES-1.3 e -

Time after event oc.currenceis now T 45 minutes.

Which one ofthe following statements in orrectly describes the required actions and bases for the above conditions?

Reference Provided EC.4 1.1und Enclosurcs I & 4 A. Cross tie Unit 2 and Unit 1 F\%SF to extend injectiou time.

4. Stop one NV and one NI pump to extend ETVST inventory.

C. Attempt to start an NCpump to provide forced cooling.

D. Start the lip ND pump and reduce SI flow to 390 gpm ~ C match I SI flow to decay heat load.

Distractcr Analysis:

A. Incorrect:

Plausible B. Correct.

C. Incorrect:

Plausible:

D. Incorrect:

PkduSibk:

Level: SKO IOCFR55.33(b)5 Ques-lO84.doc , , a -

KA: W E 11 EA2.2(3.4/4.2)

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-EP-E-1 Obj. 3 Source: RANK Level of knowledge: Analysis

References:

1.

2.

Ques-lQ84.doc

1 Pt(s) Given the following events and conditions on IJnit 1:

e LJnit 1 has experienced a large break LOCA, m IB ND pump trips 10 minutes into the event and will not restart.

e FWST level is 148and decreasing.

E REACTOR VESSEL LR LEVEL is 61%.

e Subcooling is -5 degees.

e E,Plllk~500O~ES-1.3 (Trumfer to CbldLcg Hecirc) is implemented.

B 1NI-185A (RBSump To Train A N D & NS)can not be opened.

e EF/lAi5000;ECA-l. 1 (LossofEniergeiicy Coolant Recirc:)is entered when cold Ieg recirculation can not be established in EP/liA,~5000/ES-1,3 (Transfer to CMl Lcg Reciri).

e Time afier event occurrence is now T -t 45 minutes.

Which one of the following statements in EP/l/A~5000/F?C:A-1.1 (Lossof Emergency Coolaiit Recirc) correctly describes the required actions and bases for the above conditions?

kfirencr Provided A. Cross tie Unit 2 and Unit 1 FWST Bo extend injecaion time.

B. Stop one WV and one NH pump to extend FWST inventory.

@. Attempt to start an NC pump to provide forced cooling.

D. Start the BA ND p ~ m p and reduce SI flow to 390 gprn to match SI flow to decay heat load.

Ques-1084.doc

1 Pt(s) Given the following events and conditions on Unit I :

Unit I has experienced a large break LO

1B ND pump trips 10 minutes into the nd will not restart

FWST level is 178"and decreasing/

REACTOR VESSELLR LEV&' is 61%.

Subcooling is -5 degrees. ,. .

ES I .3 (~ran.@rto Cordieg Reeirc) is implemented.

lNI-185A (f5 Simp To Train A NB 6i NS) can not be opened.

ECA 1.I (LOSS of Emergency Coolant Recive) is entered when cold k g recirculation cai not be established in ES 1.3.

Time aAcr event occurrence is now T -+ 45 minutes.

Which one ofthe following statements ia&G#A+ . correctly describes the required actions and bases for the above conditions?

Reference Provided:

A. Cross tie Unit 2 and IJnit 1 FWST to extend injection time.

B. Stop one NV and one NI pump to extend FWST inventory.

/' C:. Attempt to start an NC pump to provide forced cooling.

D. Start the IA ND pump and reduee SI flow to 390 gpm tu match SI flow to decay heat load.

Bank Question: 1084 Answer: B 1 Pt(s) Given the following events arid conditions on Unit 1:

Unit 1 has experienced a large break 1,OCA.

1B NT,pump trips 10 minutes into the event and will not restart.

Fb7STlevel is 178"and decreasing.

REACTORVESSEL 1.R LEVEL" is 61%.

Subcooling is -5 degrees.

DS 1.3 (Transfir to ColdLeg Recirc) is implemented.

1NI-185A (RE3 Sump To Train A N D &: NS) can not be opened.

ECA 1.1 (Loss ofEmergency C'ooluirt Recirc) is entered w41en cold leg recirculation can not be established in E§ 1.3.

e -

Time after event occurrence is now T 45 minutes.

Which one of the following statements in ECA 1.1 correctly dcscribes the required actions and bases for the above conditions?

Refereme Provided:

EC,4 1 I and Enclosures 1 & 4 A. Cross tie Unit 2 and Unit 1 IWST to extend injection time.

B. Stop one NV and one NI pump to extend FWST inventory.

C. Attempt to start an NC pump to provide forced cooling.

D. Start the 1A ND pump and reduce SI flow to 390 gpm to match SI flow to decay heat load.

A. Incorrect:

Plausible B. Correct.

C. Incorrect:

Piausible:

D. Incorrect:

Plausible:

Level: SKO 10CFR55.43(b)5 KA: W E 11 E M . 2 (3.4/4.2 )

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-EP-5-1 Ob;. 3 Source: BANK Level of knowledge: Analysis

References:

1.

L

EPE: Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation (Continued)

KIA NO. KNOWLEDGE EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operanion withim the limitations in the facilitys license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 4.2 NUREG-1 122, Rev. 2 4.5-30

-_ 11_----__--_

DUKE POWER MCGUIRE OPERATKWS TRAINING CLASSROOM TIME (Hours)

OBJECTIVES OBJECTIVE

~ ~~~

Explain the purpose for each procedure in the E-7 series.

EPElOOl Discuss the entry and exit guidance for each procedure in the E-l series.

EPE1002 Discuss the mitigating strategy (major actions) of each procedure in the E-1 series.

EPE100R

~ ~ ~

Discuss the basis for anv note. caution or s t e ~for each procedure in the E-I series.

EPE1004 Given the Foldout page discuss the actions included and the basis for these actions.

EPE1005 Given the appropriate procedure, evaluate a given scenario describing accident events and plant conditions to determine any required action and its basis.

EPE1006 Discuss the time critical task(s) associated with the E - I series procedures including the time requirements and the basis for these requirements.

EPE1007 OP-MC-EP-El FOR TRAlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. f 2 Page 5 of 267

DUKE POWER MCGUIRE OPERATIONS TRAINING ECA-I. 1 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation STEP 14 Check if SI in service PURPOSE: Determine if SI is still aligned as indicated by any NI pump running or the NV Injection Path open (NI 9 or 10 open) or any ND pump running with suction aligned to the FWST or Containment Sump.

BASIS: If SI is in service, the next series of steps must be performed to minimize flow and/or realign for normal charging. If SI is not in service the steps are skipped.

STEP 15 Establish one train of SA flow:

PURPOSE: To establish one train of S/B flow.

BASIS: This step instructs the operator to establish only one train of S/I flow (one NV, one NI, and possibly one ND pump) to delay FWST depletion.

The quantified benefit of reducing SA flow is illustrated below in terms of time available before depleting 200,000 gallons of FWST water. These times are typical and are based on NS flow of 5,600 gpm and SA pumps injecting at zero pressure:

12 minutes - based on maximum safeguards flow

17 minutes - based on minimum safeguards flow

150 minutes based on decay heat flow and NS off NI and NV Pumps are only started if suction is aligned to the FWST. ND pumps are only started if NC pressure is less than 286 psig and a suction source has been verified.

The ND pumps are only started if the suction is aligned either to the containment sump or the FWST. Since the ND suction from the containment sump is shared by NS and may be in use to control containment pressure, the ND pumps is not blindly realigned to the FWST source.

STEP 16 Check flowpath from FWST back to containment sump isolated:

PURPOSE: To ensure that FWST fluid is not being lost to the sump.

BASIS: This step instructs the operator to verify proper valve positions to ensure no backflow exists. With FWST at the low level switchover setpoint, coincident with a "S"signal, the sump recirculation valves open automatically. Since the valves from the FWST to the ND pumps and the sump recirculation valves are open simultaneously at this time, backflow from the FWST to the sump may exist.

OP-MC-EP-E1 FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 12 Page 199 of 267

1 (R0401)

Duke Power Company (1) IDNe. E P / l / N $ W ECA-1.d PBQ6EsS RECORD Revision No. OQB (3) Procedure Title Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc _ I -

I Date June 3,2003 (5) Requires NSD 228 Applicability Determination? IfApplicability Determination is required, attach NSD 228 documentation.

Yes (New procedure or revision with major changes)

(QR) Date Cross-DiscipiinafyReview By (QR) NA+ Date Reactivity Mgmt. Review By (QR) N& Date RIgn:. lnvolvemant R e v l w By (OPSSL;~:.)N A d Date (7) Additional Reviews (8) Temporary Approval (if necessary)

BY (QSM/QW) Bate Bate Date PERFORMANCE (Cornpaw with ControlCopy every 14 calendar days while work is being pedomed)

(10) Compared with Control Copy Bate Compared with Ccntrel C ~ p y Bate Compared with Control Copy --____ Date (11) Date(s) Performed Work Order Number (WO#)

COMPLnTION (12) Procedure CBmpletion Verification 0 Yes 0 NA Check lists and/or blanks initialed, signed, dated, or filled in NA, as appropriate?

0 Yes 0 NA Required enclosures attached?

0 Yes NA Data sheets attached, completed, dated and signed?

0 Yes 0 NA Charts, graphs, etc. attached, dated. identiified, and marked?

Yes NA Procedure requirements met?

Verified By Date (13) Procedure CompletionApproved Date (14) Remarks (Attach additioflalpags, ifnecesary)

Form based cn NSD 703 App D (Rocedure Rocesr Raon

MNS LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRC PAGE NO.

EQ/l/A/5000/ECA-1.I 1 of 6?

Rev. 8

,-- UNIT 1 A. Purpose Thk procedure provides actions to restore emergency coolant recirc capability, to delay depletion ofthe FWST by adding makeup and reducing outflow, and to depressurize the NC System to minimize break Wow.

83. m t . o m s or E.~tw Conditions This procedure is entered from:

a EP/7/A/SOOO/E-l (Loss Of Reactor Or Secondary Coolant), Step 13, and P/I/A/5000/ES-1.2 (Post LQCA Cooldown And Depressurization), Step 4, when Cold Leg Recirc capability can not be verified.

e EP/I/A/5000/%-1.3 (Transfer To Cold Leg Recirc), Foldout Page, if recirc flaw cannot be aligned or maintained.

e EP/~/N5000/ES-1.3(Transfer BC Cold beg Recirc), Step 3, if containment sump level less than setpoint.

e EP/l/A/5000/E.5-1.3 (Transfef To Cold Leg Recirc), Step 6, when at least one flow path from the sump can not be established or maintained.

o EP/1/A/550Q/ES-1.3 (Transfer To Cold Leg Recirc), Step 11, if Cold Leg Recirc fiow can not be verified.

e EP/l/A/5000/ECA-4.2 (LOCA Outside Containment), Step 3, when a LOCA outside containment cannot be isolated.

I, I

.- J MNS EP/I/A/500O/ECA-I. 1 LJNIT B LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECBRC PAGE NO.

2 of61 Rev. 8

6. pperator Actions.

I 1. Monitor Foldout page.

2. Try to restore Cold beg Recirc capability:

__ a. Check any ND pump - ON. a. Perform the following:

- 1) E containment sump level is less than 3 ft, THEM GO TO Step 2.b.

2) Close the following:

I e IND-13A (A ND Pump Svct From FWST of NCl NOTE Closing IND-ISA and INB-48 meets one of the permissives to ailow manual opening of associated sump valve.

3) W N IND-jSA is closed, jTI.RI attempt to open 'INI-2858 (RB Sump To Train A NB & NS) as follows:

- e Place control permissive switch in "BYPASS" and open 1NI-485A.

4) WHEN 1ND-4B is closed, E attempt to open INI-1843 (RE3 Sump To Train B ND & NS) as fcllews:

- e Place control permissive switch in "BYPASS" and open 1NI-1846.

I 5) E sump valve opens, m-E:_start N_

ND pump on same train.

LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRC EPII/A/~00Q/ECA-1.1 2 (Continued)

b. Check the followings pumps - - b. Dispatch operator to determine problem AVAILABLE TO BE OPERATED FROM with pump(s) as necessary.

THE CONTROL ROOM:

c. Check the following valves - OPEN: c. Perform the following:

_ I e 1NI-185A (RE3 Sump To Train A NB & _ I 1) LE vafve(s) is deenergized, KHEa NS) dispatch operator to restore power.

- e ZNI-184B (FIB Sump To Train B NB & 2) !%:valve@)not capable of opening NS). from the control room, E&:

- a) E 114 ND Pump available, dispatch operator to standby 4NI-185A (RB Sump Bo Brain A ND 8 NS) (aux bldg, 7 1 6 4 FF-53, room 602, midget hole just outside CP D door 212).

- b) E ?B ND Pump available, a dispatch operator to standby 41\11-4848 (RB Sump To Train B NB & NS) (aux bldg, 716+3, FF-53, room 602.midget hole just inside CAB door 212).

- c) containment sump level greater than 3 ft. j74Ji.N notify dispatched operator to open valve on train(s) with available ND pump.

~ d. Check containment sump level - - d. E NC inventory loss occurring outside GREATER THAN 3 FT. containment, THEN GO TQ Step 3.

...-. ... ....._. ................. .. ....__I.__... ..

I

~

LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIKC EPl1/A/!i000lECA- 1 1 ACT I ON i F. X P t CT ED R C SPONS E I RESPONSE NO1 O k I A I N F D

2. (Continued)

I e. Check Cold Leg Recirc capability - e. Perform the following:

RESTORED.

7 ) Continue attempts to restore Cold Leg Recirc capability as follows:

- e Power restoration

-0 Local valve operation

- 0 Other actions as specified by station management.

- 2) E loss of Cold Leg Recirc capability is due to air binding of NV and NI pumps, THEN vent pumps W Enclosure 2 (Venting NV and NI Suction for Cold Leg Recirc), prior to stalrting pumps.

- 3) & !Cold Leg Recirc capability is restored, THEN GO TQ Step 2.f.

- 4) GO TO Step 3.

__ f . Check FWST level - LESS THAN f. RETURN TO procedure and step in 180 inches ("FWST LEVEL LO" alarm) effect.

g. Check the following pumps - ON: - g. WHEM NB discharge is aligned to NI and NV pump suction in

- o At least one NI pump EQ/1/A/5000/ES-1.3 (Transfer To Cold Leg Recirc). restart NI and

- e At least one NV pump. NV pumps as required by SA Reinitiation Criteria on ES-4.3 foldout page.

- h. IQ EP/I/A/5000/ES-?.3 (Transfer To Cold Leg Recirc).

1 MNS EP/~/AI!XJOO/ECA-I UNIT 1

.I I LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRC Rev. 8 3 Re5et the following:

l - a. §/I. a. !E any reactor tn'p breaker is closed, THEM:

1) Dispatch operator to open Unit 1 reactor trip breakers.

- 2) WHEM trip breakers open, MEA reset S/I.

.- b. Sequencers. b. Dispatch operator to open breaker for affected sequencer DC control power:

I 4 A Train 1EVBA Breaker 6

-e B Train - 1EVBD Breaker 8.

- c. AT ANY TIME a BiO signal occurs, restart SI1 equipment previously on.

I 4. Depress "SS RESET" for the following valves:

- o ZNI-1848 (RB Sump To Train B ND &

NS)

- e I N t 4 8 5 A (RB Sump To Train A NB &

NS).

I 5. Cheek if FWST Bevel adequate:

a. FWST level - GREATER THAN l - - b.

20 INCHES.

AT ANY TIME while in this procedure

- a. GO TO Step 31.

FWST level goes below 20 inches,

@8 Step 31.

1 "

1 MNS EPl1/A~SOOO/ECA-l .I I LOSS OF EMERGENCY COQLaNT RECIRC I PAGE NO.

6of61

6. Determine NS requirements:

- a. Check NS pump suction -ALIGNED TO - a. GO PO Step 9.

FWST.

- b. Determine number of NS pumps required from the following table:

C 0M l A I Nhl F NT P R C 5 5 U RE N9 PUMPS R E O I J I K E O I

GRLATER I H A N 15 P S I G 2 2REATER THAN 33 i n c h e s

("FNST L O - L O BETWEER 10 P S I G A N D 15 F S I G 1 I EVEL" a l a r m )

I L E S S T H A N 10 P S I G I 0 LESS THAN NIA 0 33 inches

(" FWST IO-t.0 LEVEL" alarni)

- c. Check NS pumps running - EQUAL TO c. Perform the following:

NUMBER REQUIRED.

- 1) Reset Containment Spray

- 2) Operate NS pumps as required by table above.

7. Check criteria to atign MS System for recirc:

- a. Any NS pump - ON. - a. GO TO Step 8.

- b. Check containment sump level b. Perform the following:

GREATER THAN 3 FT.

- 1) WHEN containment sump level greater than 3 ft. eperform Step 7.c.

2) GO TO Step 8.

- 6. Align NS for recirc PER Enclosure 3 (NS Alignment To Containment Sump).

MNS LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRC PAGE NO.

EP/4/A/S000/ECA-I.f 7 of 61 t.!NIT I Rev. 8 ACIIONIEXPECIFD RE5PONSt K t S P O N S E NO1 OBTAINFD 1

8. Operate NS discharge isolation valves as follows:

a. Ciose NS spray valves on pumps that are off:

e IANSPump:

__ e 4NS-32A (A NS Pump Qisch Cont Outside Isol)

I e INS-29A (A NS Pump Disch Con!

Outside Isol).

1B NS Pump:

- e INS-42B (B NS Pump Bisch Cont Outside Isol)

-

1NS-15B (I3 NS Pump D i s h Cent Outside Isol).

b. IF AT AMY TIME NS pumps are stopped or started, -:

-o Cbse associated NS pump discharge isolation valves aRer securing a pump.

- e Open associated NS pump discharge isolation valves prior to starting a Pump.

9. Makeup to WST 0P~21N62001014 (Wefuelins Water System), Enclosure 4.2 (FWST Makeup Using Reactor Makeup Blender During M5des 1-5 or While Befuelad).

LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRC EP/1/A~5OOO/EC/4-1.I 10 Control intact S/G levels:

- a. Check N/R level in any intact S/Gs - - a. Maintain total feed flow greater than GREATER THAN 11% (3% ,466). 450 GPM until at least one intact S/G N/R level greater than 11% (32% ACC).

- b. Check VI header pressure - GREATER - b. E CA flow can not be throttled with CA THAN 60 PSIG. control valves in subsequent steps, THEN control flow PEB EP/l/A/5000/G-T (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 16 (CA Flow Control With Less of VI).

6. Throttle feed flow to maintain all intact - c. E NIB level in any intact S/G continues S/Gs N/R levels between 11% to go up, Estop feed flow to that (32% ACC) and 50%. SIG.

LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRC P/1/A/55QQ/ECh-I.a

11. Monitor shutdown margin during

~ ~ ~ l d l oasw foIIows:

n

a. N% the TSC is staffed, THEN_

request TSC to evaluate obtaining samples as follows:

I)Consider available cooling of sample HXs as follows:

- e KC will remain isolated to normal ssmple HXs for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months . until KC is realigned to normal ssnlple HXs and KF per AQ/I/A/555Q/41 (boss Of Spent Fuel Cooling or Level).

o sample is desired prior to aligning KC to KC aux bldg non-essential header, & NJ fuel damage is not expected, THEN evaluate obtaining sample PEW OQ/4/8/62QQ/011 (Unit 1 N M Sampling) Endosure 4.6 (1NC Hot beg with KC Non-essential Header Isolated).

- 2) Evaluate obtaining periodic NC System boron sample to check shutdown margin during cooldown.

NOTE

-. - Sample results are not required prior to initiating cooldown in subsequent steps.

b. \M#t!N each NC boron sample obtained, Bipd:

- I)Perform shutdown margin calculation for Cold Shutdown 6P/O/A/61Q0/056(Reactivity Balance Calculation).

- 2) Check shutdown margin - - 2) Notify station management.

ADEQUATE.

LOSS OF EMERGENCY COObAblT RECIRC EPi1IAl~BOBIECA-I1 ACT I 0k / b X P F C r t D RE S PO 11S E RESPONSE NO? O B T A I N E D t

- 12. y&ErU_ "P-ll PWESSUW!ZER SI1 BLOCK PERMISSIVE" status fight (19-18) Sit, Edepress on LQW Pressure Stearnline [solation block switches.

NOTE After the Low Pressure Steamline Isolation signal is blocked, maintaining steam pressure negative rate less than 2 PSIG per second will prevent a Main Steam isolation.

13. Initiate NC System cooldown to Cold Shutdown as follows:

a. Check condenser available: - a. IQ RNO for Step 73.d

- 6 "C-9 CONB AVAILABLE FOR STEAM DUMP" status light (-lSl-l8) -

LIT

- e MSlV C I ~intact S/G(s) OPEN.

__ b. Check'STEAM DUMP SELECT" - IN b. Perform the following to place steam STEAM PRESSURE MODE. dumps in steam pressure mode:

- I)Place "STM PRESS CONTROLLER" in manual.

- 2) Adjust " S W PRESS CONTROLLER output to equal "STEAM DUMP DEMANQ signal.

I 3) Place "STEAM DUMP SELECT' in steam pressure mode.

- c. W N " P I 2 LO-LO T A G " status light

('!SI-78) lit, place steam dumps in bypass interiock.

LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRC PAGE NO.

I Ifof61 Rev. 8

13. (Continued)

.- d. Dump steam to condenser from intact d. Perform the following:

SiGs while maintaining cooldown rate in NC T-Colds as close as possible - 1) Ensure Main Steam Isolation reset.

without exceeding 100" F in an hcur.

__ 2) Ensure SM POWVs reset.

- 3) Dump steam using all intact S/G(s)

SM PORVs while maintaining cooldown rate in NC P-Colds as ciose as possioie without exceeding 100" F in an hour.

4) E any intact S W SM PBRV closed,

'T dump steam using any of the fallowing while maintaining cooldown rate in NC T-Cohds less than 100" F in an hour:

- a) Dispatch operator to operate intact S/G(s) SM POW.

b) E any intact SIG SM PBRV is unavailable, 1.Hb-I evaluate using the following to dump steam:

- o Run TD CA Pump, I e Use steam drains PER EPillA/5000/G-I (Generic Enclosures). Enclosure 19 (SIG Depressurization Using Steam Drains).

5) no intact S/G available, I

use faulted §/e.

LOSS OF EMERGENCY CQQLANT RECIRC EP/l/A/5000/ECA-Z .I

14. Check if SA in sewice using m y of the following:

- e Any NI pump - ON OR

- o INI-9A (Ne Cold Leg Inj From NV) -

OPEN OR

- m INI-dOB (NC Ccld Leg Inj Frsm NV) -

OPEN OR

- e Any NB pump - ON WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO FWST OR CONTAINMENT SUMP.

1) both NV pumps on,THE&

perform the following:

- a) all NC pumps off: AND REACTOR V E S S E L T LEVEL is less than 60%,

GO TO Step 15.b.

- b) Stop one NV pump.

2) !E both NV pumps off, ensure suction aligned to FWST as follows:

a) Ensure the following valves dosed:

-e 1ND-58A (Train A NB To NV

& NI Pumps)

~ e IN[-I365 (B NI Pump Suction From ND)

- 0 INI-332A (NV & NI Pumps Suction X-Over)

-e 1NI-3335 (NV & NI Pumps Suction X-over).

b) Ensure the following valves open:

- 1NV-22lA (NV Pumps Suct Fmm FWST)

- e 1NV-222B (NV Pumps Suct From FWST).

- c) Start one NV pump

LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRC EF'/1/A/50OOiECA-1. I

15. (Continued)

_ I b. Check only one NI pump - ON. b. Perform the following:

1) E both Idl pumps on. 1." perfom the following:

2) E both NI pumps off, ensure suction aligned to FWST as follows:

a) Ensure the fotlswing valves closed:

- e 1ND-588 ( h i n A ND %aNV 8, NI Pumps)

-e INI-332A (NV 8, NI Pumps Suction X-Over)

-e 11\11-3338 (NV & NI Pumps Suction X-over).

- b) Ensure 4NI-lOBB (FWSTTo NI Pumps, open.

- c) W B NC pressure less than 1600 PSIG, m& start one NI Pump

- c. Check NC pressure - LESS THAN c. Perform the following:

286 PSIG.

__ I ) Stop ND pumps.

- 2) GO IQ Step 16.

LOSS OF EMERGENCY CBOLANT RECRC EP/l/AEOOO/ECA-1.I

15. (Continued)

I d. Check only one ND pump ON~

d. Perform the following:

- 1) both ND pumps on, jl-lEbJ stop one pump.

- 2) E both ND pumps off ANB available suction source is currently aligned, BHEM start one ND pump.

36. Check flowpath fmm WSV back to containment sump isolated:

a. A Train:

I 1) Check 1Nl-185A (RE Sump To Train - I)GO TO Step 16.b A ND Xt NS)-OPEN.

- 2) Check 1ND19A (A ND Pump Suct - 2) CBose 4NB-?9A.

From FWST or NC) CLOSED.

b. B Train:

- 1) Check 1NI-I848 (RB Sump To Train - 4 ) Observe Note prior to Step 17 and B ND & NS) - OPEN. 68 -TO Step 17.

- 2) Check 1ND-48 (B NB Pump SUCt - 2) Close 1ND-46.

From FWST NC) - CLOSED.

MOTE

- Preference should be given to running 18 NC Pump first. then 1A NC Pump to provide Pzr spray capability.

17. Cheek if an NC pump should be started:

-- a. All NC pumps - OFF. a. Perform the following:

- I ) Stop all but one NC pump

- 2) Place Pzr spray valve in manual and dose for stopped NC pump.

I 3) G.Q Step 18

b. NC subcooling based on core exit TICS - b. WT-tQStep 18.

- GRWTER THAN 0"F.

c. Check if NC pump seal cooling has c. Perform the following:

been maintained:

- 1) Notify station management to

- e Seal injection flow perform a status evaluation prior to stariing an NC pump.

of?

- 2) GO TO Step 18.

I o KC flow to thermal barrier.

- d. Try to start one NC pump PER EQll/A/5000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures). Enclosure 6 (NCPump Startup).

MNS LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT WECIRC PAGE NO.

EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.1 17 of 62 811811'r I Rev. 8 1 RESPONSE I t O i OBTAINED

18. Check if S/l can be terminated:

a. Check RVLIS indication: I a. GO 80 Step 24.

-e E all NC pumps off, check "REACTOR VESSEL LR LEVEL" -

GREATER THAN 60%.

OR R e q u i r w " E E A C I O R 'VESSEL D I P "

- b. NC subcooling based on core exit T C s b. Perform the following:

- GREATER THAN 50" F.

- 1) Determine minimum S/B flow required P-EBEndosure 4 (Flow Required to Match Decay Heat).

- 2) Minimize S/I Row by stopping one or more §/I pumps while maintaining greater than or equal to flow required by Enclosure 4 (Flow Required to Match Decay Heat).

- 3) GO TO Step 24.

29. Reset the following:

- e Phase A Isolation

- 0 Phase B Isolation

LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRC EP/l/A/5QOO/ECA-l.l

20. Establish VI to containment:

a. Open the following:

-o 1VL129B (A Ess Hdr Cont Outside Isol)

-m IVI-16OB (B Ess Hdr Cont Outside Isol)

- e 1VI-ZSOB (Lwr Cont Non Ess Cont Outside Iscl).

- b. Check VI header pressure - GREATER b. Perform the following:

THAN 85 PSIG.

1) Align N2 to all PORVs by opening:

- a INI-43OA (Emerg N2 From CLA TO INC-34A)

- m 1NI-431B (Emerg N2 From CkA T O INC-32B 8 36B).

- 2) LE VI not available for CA flow control in subsequent steps, control flow PEW EP/7/N5OQOlG-l (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 16 (CA Flow Control With Loss of VI).

- 3) Restore V1 pE3R AP/l/A/5500/22 (Loss Of VI).

21. Stop the following SA pumps:

- o NDpurnps I

e NI pumps

- m All but one NV pump.

LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT REClR6 EPIlIAI500QIECA-1.I

22. Isolate NV SI1 ftewpath:

a. Check MV pumps miniflow valves - a. Perform the following:

OPEN:

__1) Open valves.

-e 1NV-150B (NV Pumps Recirculation)

- 2) E both valves open. THEN GO TO e jNV-151A (NV Pumps Recirculation). Step 22.b.

I

3) E either valve closed, I&N.:

a) Dispatch operator to open viriveis):

- e INV-150B (aux bldg. 716+8, HH-55, room 627, NV pump room 1A. west of pump motor)

- o fNV-151A (aux bldg, 716+9,

"-55, room 627, NV pump room $A, west of pump motor).

- b) Realign charging PER, EPl/Z;Q\/50001G-I(Generic Enclosures). Enclosure 48 (Aligning Noma! Charging With NV Recirc Path Iso[ated).

- c) =both ZNV-4508 and 1NV-151A open, K ! a charging flow may be throttled to less than 6 G GPM.

- el) GO IQStep 24.

b. Close the following valves: b. Dispatch operator to close vative(s):

I e INi-gA (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV) -o 4NI-9A (aux bldg, 733+12. JJ-52, room 930, VCT hallway 1 ft south of E 4NI-1QB (NC Coici Leg Inj From NV) JJ-52)

B 1NI-IGB ( ~ U Xbldg, 733+4,JJ-51, room 730, VCT hallway 1 M south of JJ-51).

['e I __.......

I ..............._.................-

1 EF'/l/A/~OOO/ECA-1.1 MNS BJNI'I' E LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRC PAGE NO.

20 of 61 Rev. 8

23. Establish charging:

- a. Check VI header pressure - GREATER a. Perform the following:

THAN 60 PSIG.

1) Dispatch operators to perform the following and standby:

- Loosen lock nut and throttle handwheel on 1NV-238 (Charging Line Flow Control) (aux bldg, 726+3, HH-54, room 629, PD Flimp room) to maintain 6-10 GPM seal injection flow to each NC pump.

___ e Loosen lock nut and close handwheel on INV-241 (Seal Inj Flow Control) (aux bldg, 716+9, HW-52, room 603, above BW pumps).

2) 1NV-241 is locally closed, 1NV-238 is locally throttled, B":

a) Open the following:

- e 1NV-244A (Charging Line Cont Outside Isol)

- e 1NV-245B (Charging Line COR^ Outside Isol).

b) E 4 NV-244A Or 1NV-245B closed, BHEM dispatch operator to open valve(s):

- e 1NV-244A (aux bldg, 718+10,

"-52, room 603, above BW Pumps)

__ e lNV-245B ( ~ u Xbldg, 716+11,

"-52, room 603, west of BW Pumps).

__ c) Place 1NV-238 (Charging bine Flow Control) controller in manual and fully open.

-. d) Place 1NV-241 (Seal Inj Flow Control) manual loader fully open.

I I MNS LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT REClRC PAG%NO.

EP/l/A/500Q/ECA-I 1 21 of61 Rev. 8 UNIT B AC.1 I 0N / t X P EC T I: D RE C P 0N SE RESPONSE MOT O W A I N E D

23. (Continued)

3) IF BY ANY TIME charging flow is required to be controlled in subsequent steps, have dispatched opefators locally adjust flow rate as follows:

-e Slowly throttle handwheel on 1NV-241.

-e Throttle Rand:vheel cn 1NV-238 while msintainirty NC pump sesi injection flcw.

- e Maintain charging fbw less than 175 GPM.

- 4) GO TO Step 24.

- b. Throttle 1NV-238 (Charging Line Flow Control) to maintain 8-10 GPM seal injection flow to each NC pump.

- c. Close -IN\/-244 (Seal Inj Flow Control).

d. Open the foliowing valves: d. Dispatch operator to open valve(s):

- a INV-244A (Charging Line Cont - e INV-2448 ( ~ u Xbldg, 716910, HH-52, Outside lsol) room 603. above BW pumps)

I_ e - 1NV-2458 (Charging bine Cont - e 1NV-245B (aux bldg, 766911, "-52, Outside Isol). room 603.west cf BW pumps).

e. A,"( TIME charging flow is required to be controlled in subsequent steps, m:

-e Slcwly throttle I NV-241.

I e Throttle 1NV-238 while maintaining NC pump seal injection flow.

- e Maintain charging flow less than 175 GPM.

LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRC EQ/I/A/500Q/ECA-1.1

24. Check if NC System makeup flow is adequate:

a. Check RVLIS indication: __ a. Raise NC System makeup flow as required to maintain RVLIS indication

-o E all NC pumps off, m N check "REACTOR VESSEL LR LEVEL" -

GREATER THAN 60%.

OR

-- 9 one NC pump on, THEN check "REACTOR VESSEL D I P -

GREATER THAN REQUIRED D/P FROM TABLE BELOW:

R e q u i r e d "RFACTOR VESSEL D / P "

,.... ~ ~

^

O P E R A T I N G NC PUMP RVLIS TRAIN A 35% 15%

B 15% 15%

- b. Core exit T/Cs STABLE OR GOING

~ - b. Raise NC System makeup flow as DOWN. required to maintain core exit T/Cs stable or going down.

c. E AT &@Y T e RVLIS indication goes below setpoint in Step 24.~1, core exit P/Cs start going up, raise NC System makeup flow as required to maintain:

- m RVhlS indication

- o Core exit TlCs stable or going down.

i-::::.----- .....-. ',..........- ................................. . ............ 7 LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRC EPll/A/5000/ECA-1 1 I a. Stop affected NC pump(s)

- b. Place Pzr spray valve in manual and close for stopped NC pump.

MOTE If all F;C pumps are off, itie upper head region rnay void during NC System depressurization. This will cause Pzr level to rise rapidly.

26. Depressurize NC System to lower NC subcooling as foll~ws:

- a. Check NC subcooling based on core - a. GO TO Step 27.

exit T i c s - GRWTER THAN 10" F.

b. WHEN following criteria met, ~I-3-E~

stop depressurization started in next step.

-e NC subcooling based on core exit Tics - BETWEEN 8" F AND I O " F OR

- m Pzr level - GRL4TER THAN 96%

(58% ACC).

I EP/I/N5000/ECA-? 1 LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRC I AC: IONiEXPECTFD RtSPORSC RCSPONSC NOT OGTAINCU

26. (Continued)

- c. Depressurize NC System using normal c. Depressurize NC System as follows Pzr spray until criteria above met. until criteria met:

1) 1.F a Pzr PORV is available, THEN:

- a) Depressurize NC System using one Pzr PORV.

b) IF AT ANY TIME during depressurization, NC subcoolifig based on core exit T/Cs goes below 0"F,E:

__ (I) Ensure PORV is closed or isolated.

- (2) E subcooling based on core exit WCs is stiil less than 0"F, raise makeup flow as necessary to restore subcoo!ing.

2) E no Pzr PORV will operate, m:

a) Align N2 to all PBRVs by opening:

I 1NI-430.4 (Ernerg N2 From C I A TO 'I NC-34A) e 1NI-43-lB (Ernerg N2 From CLA To INC-32B & 368).

b) Use one Pzr PORV until criteria met.

4) !E Pzr P O W available, TI-fE-hj m Step 27.

(WNOcontinued OR next page)

LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOUNT RECIRC EP/l/A/505O/ECA-1 1 26 (Continued)

4) LF_no Pnr PORV available, 1 H t - l use NV aux spray as follows a) Close Pzr spray valves:

- 1NC-27 (A Loop PZW Spray Control)

-D 4NC-29 (El hoop PZR Spray Control).

b) Open INV-218 (NV Spray Bo PZR Isol).

c) Close:

- 0 1NV-13B (NV Supply TOA NC Loop Issl)

- 1NV-16A (NV Supply TO B NC Loop Isol).

- d) Raise charging Blow up to 175 GPM as desired to raise depressurization rate.

e) w.Hf!K criteria to stop depressurization in Step 26.b is met, THEM isolate NV aux spray as fellows:

- (1) Open 1NV-l3B (NV SuppSy To A NC Loop Isol).

- (2) Close 'lNV-21A (NV Spray To PZR Isol).

- (3) Ensure charging flow is less than 175 GPM.

27 Check if NB can be placed in WHR mode:

a Check the following. -a @3I§tep28.

._ NC T-Hots - LESS THAN 350" F (347" F ACC)

-o NC pressure - LESS THAN 385 PSIG.

- b. Consult station management to determine if ND should be placed in RHR mode.

- c. E station management decides to place NB in RHR mode, =EN. E F E B 10

- ND in RHR Enclosure 5 (Placing Mode).

LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRC EPll/A/5000/ECA-1 .I

28. Isoiate CUas as follows:

- a. Check at least two NC T-Hots - LESS a. Perform the following:

THAN 354" F.

I 1) WMEJ at least two NC T-Hots less than 354" F, U E N perform Steps 28.b and 28.c.

- 2) m T Q S t e p 2 9

b. Place the power disconnect switches to b. Vent any unisolated CLB, as follows:

"ENP.BLE" and close the following:

1) Open isolation valve on atfected I e 1NI-54A (A CL Accurn Disch Isol) CIA:

.- e 'lNI-65B (ECb Accum Disch Isol) D 1NI-50 (A CL Accum N2 Supply Isol)

-e I NI-76A ( 6 CL Accum Disch Isol)

INI-61 (B CL Accum N2 Supply

- o 1NI-88B (D CL Accum Disch Isol). Isof)

- e 4 NI-72 (C Cb AWUITI N2 Supply

!sol)

- 0 INI-84 (D CL Accurn N2 Supply Isol).

- 2) Open 1Nl-83 (Cb Accurn N2 Hdr Atmos Vent Isol).

_ I 3) Do not depressurize NC System below CLA pressure in subsequent steps until CLAs are isolated or vented.

__ 4) E CLA cannot be isolated or vented, b#EN contact TSC for guidance.

- e. WHEN valves indicate closed for at least 5 seconds, THEN_ return power disconnect switches to disconnect.

- 29. Check NC temperature GREAT%:RTHAN

~

- step 39.

200" F.

30. Check FWSf B@V@l- LESS THAN - RETURN TQ Step 4.

29 INCHES.

I I MNS LOSS OF EMERG1ENCY COOLANT RECIRC PAGE NO.

EP11/A15000/CA-l.I 28 of 61 UNIT B Rev. 8

31. stop pumps as foilews:

a. Stop S/I pumps that are taking suction from FWST:

- 0 NDpumps

__ e NI pumps

-e NVpumps

b. E either NS pump suction a!igned to FWST, Il-i-ilj perform the following on train aligned to FWST:

- 1) Reset Containment Spray I 2) stop RIS purnp(s).

- 3) Dispateh operator to remove control power fuses for NS purnp(s) (IETA, 1ETB swgr room).

c. Dispatch operator to open breakers to sequencer DC control power:

-e A Train - 1EVBA Breaker 6

- o B Train - 1EVBB Breaker 8

32. Try to raise makeup to NC System from any avaiBata!e alternate source:

a. VCT:

1) Dispatch operator to realign makeup back to VCT:

- a) Close 1NV-172 (Boric Acid Blender Disch to NV & FW) (aux bldg, 733+6,KK-51, VCT hallway).

- b) Close INV-174 (Boric Acid Blender Disch to NV 8, FW) (aux bldg, 7336.KK-51, VCT hallway).

1 MNS EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.I I LOSS OF EMERGENCY coomN-rRECIRC 1 PAGE NO.

290f61

32. (Continued)

2) Check VCT makeup controi system:

- a) Set boric acid flow control pot at 6.5.

- b) Ensure NC System makeup controller in "AUTO".

- c) Place NC System makeup switch to "START'.

- d) Ensure VCT level is maintained.

- 3) Check VCT - AVAILABLE AS NV 3) Perform the following:

SuC-riON SOURCE.

- a) W A N VCT availabb, THEN evaluate performing Step 32.a.

- b) Step 32.b.

4) Open:

-e 4NV-1418 (VCT Outlet IsoI)

I o 1NV-142B (VCT Outlet Iso~).

5) Close:

m 4NV-221A (NV Pumps Suct From FWST)

__ o INV-222B (NV Pumps Suct From FWST}.

- 6) Close INV-241 (Seal Inj Flow Control).

7) Open:

-e 1NV-244A (Charging Line Cont Outside Isol)

- 1NV-245B (Charging Line Cont Outside Isol).

--- .. .... . -~ ~

MNS I LOSS QF EMF3 COOLANT RECIRC PAGE NO.

30 of 61 Rev. 8

32. (Continued)

8) Close:

- o INI-98 (NC Cold Leg In] From w

- e 1NI-10B (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV).

- 9) Check if LBCA or steam break 9) Perform the following:

inside containment - HAS OCCURRED. a) Open:

-0 1NV-150B (NV Pumps Recirculation) 0 I N V - ? ~ ? A(NV Pumps Recirculation).

- b) Place controller in manual and close i biV-238 (Charging Line Flow Control).

- c) Start one NV pump.

d) Control charging as fellows:

- o Slowly throttle open 4 NV-244.

- e Throttle 1NV-238 while maintaining NC pump seal injection flow 6-10 GPM.

- a Maintain charging flow less than 475 GPM.

I e) GO TO Step 32.b

__ 10) Place controller in manual and fully open INV-238 (Charging Line Flow Control).

- 11) Start one NV pump

1. MNS EP/l/AI5000/ECA-1.I LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOiANT RECIRG 1 PAGE NO.

31 of61 ACT I O Y i LXFELTED RF SFONSE i

32. (Continued)

C A \ u ~ ~ O Failure

~ to maintain charging flow above 60 6 P M will resuM in inadequate NM pump miniflow protection. This limit appiies to all subsequent EPs.

12) Throttle 1NV-238 (Charging Line Flow Control) and 1NV-241 (Seal Inj Flow Control) to:

-e Establish and control charging flow between 60 GPM and 775 GPM.

-e Gontrol NC pump seal injection flow between 6-10 GPM.

- b. Check any NV pump - ON. b. E NC System depressurized, ml=KN evaluate aligning BATIUMWST to NC System (through NV suction), using any of the follobving:

- Q Emergency boration te NV suction.

OR e Use VCT overpressure:

- Maintain VCT ievel.

e Align NV suction to VCT.

-o flowrate is too high for VCT makeup, realign NV S/I flswpath to normal charging.

I_ c. Start standby Makeup pump pfER Enclosure 6 (Standby Makeup Pump Startup).

d. Consult with station management staff to evaluate pumping sump to FWST using the following flowpaths:

I _

m NB pump recirc

-e NS pump recirc.

33. Depressurize intact S G s to 660 PSI6 as BOBBOWS:

- a. Check all intact S/G pressures - I_ a. GO TO Step 34.

GREATER THAN 660 PSIG.

b. Check condenser available: - b. _CQ L Q RNO for Step 33.e I 0 "C-9 COND AVAIIABLE FOR STEAM DUMP status light (?SI-48)-

LIT I e MSlV on intact S/G(s) - OPEN.

- c. Check "STEAM DUMP SELECT" - IN c. Perform the following to place steam STEAM PRESSURE MODE. dumps in steam pressure mode:

- 4 ) Place "STM PRESS CONTROLLER" in manual

- I

2) Adiust "STM PRESS ~- -

C ~ N T R ~ L L E Boutput

" to equal "STEAM DUMP DEMAND" signa!.

- 3) Place "STEAM DUMP SELECT" in steam pressure mode.

- d. m " P - 1 2 LO-LO TAVG" status light (151-18) lit, M E N .place steam dumps in bypass interlock.

11 WINS LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRC PAGE NO.

EPlllA/50QOiECA-1.I 330f61 Rev. 8 tJMT B

33. (Continued)

- e. Bump steam from intact S/G(s) to e. Bump steam using intact SiG SM condenser at maximum rate while PORVs as follows:

attempting to avoid a Main Steam Isolation. - I)Ensure Main Steam Isolation reset.

- 2) Ensure SM PORVs reset.

- 3) Bump steam using all intact S/G(s)

SPA PORVs at maximum rate.

4) If any irrtad S/G 3rd PORV closed,

=dump steam at maximum rate:

- a) Dispatch operator to operate intact SiG(s) SM PORV.

b) LF.any intact SiG SPA P O W is unavailable, EI\B evaluate using the foliowing to dump steam:

- Run T B CA Pump I e Use steam drains PER EQ/l/A/SOOOW-I (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 39 (SIG Depressurization Using Steam Brains).

- f. Check SIG pressures - LESS THAN - f. RE:TURM TO Step 33.b.

660 PSIG.

- g. Stop SiG depressurization.

MNS LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRC PAGE NO.

EP/l/A/500O/ECA-l .I 34 of 64 UNIT B Rev. 8 I I

34. Depressurize intact SIG(s) to inject CLAs as ~QIIQWS:

a. Bump steam to condenser to maintain a. Perform the following:

appropriate RVblS indication:

4 ) Reset Main Steam Isolation signals:

-0 !E all NC pumps off, dump steam to condenser to maintain - a) Main Steam Isolation.

"REACT88 VESSEL bR LEVEL" s GREATER THAN 60%. - b) SM PORVs.

OR I 2) Bump steam using intact SiG(s) SM PORVs to maintain RVLIS

- 0 !E one NC pump on, THEN dump indication.

steam to condenser to maintain "REACTOR VESSEL DIP" - 3) E any intact S/G SM POWV closed, GREATER THAN REQUIRED D/P THEN dump steam as folluws tu FROM TABLE BELOW: maintain RVLIS indication:

- a) Dispatch operator to operate intact S/G(s)S M POW.

b) E,any intact SIG SM PORV is unavailable. BHEM evaluate using the following to dump steam:

- e Run TD CA Pump

- e Use steam drains P B EP/l/A/5000/G-4 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 49 (SIG Depressurization Using Steam Drains).

~.~

I I I I

?%

,I

! 15%

I 15% 15%

e 15% 15% 35% 15%

. - b. Check SIG pressures - LESS THAN - b. WEBU-Rj IQ.Step 3 4 3 .

110 PSIG.

- c. Stop SIG depressurization.

LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRC

35. Isolate Cbws as BOIIOWS:

- a. Check at least two NC T-#oh LESS a. Perform the foilowing:

THAN 354F.

I ? j XIat least two NC T-Hots less than 354 F, W E N perform Steps 35.b and 35.c.

- 2j 1-Q Step 36.

b. Place the power disconnect switches to b. Vent any misdated CLA as follows:

ENABLE and close the fo!lowing:

1) Open isolation vaive on affected

__ e lNI-54A (A Ch Accum Disch Isol) CIA:

__ e lNl-65B (B CL Accum Disch Isol) -o INI-50 (A Cb Accum N2 Supply Isol)

__e 1NI-76A (C CL Accurn Disch Isol)

- m 1NI-61 (E? Cb Accum 8\12 Supply

- a 1NI-88B (BCL ACCUM Disch Isol). Isol)

- e 1NI-72 (CCL A ~ ~ u tN2 m Supply Isol)

-0 1Ni-84 (BCb Aceurn N2 Supply Isol).

- 2) Open 1NI-83 (Cb Accum N2 Hdr Atmos Vent Isol).

__ 3) Bo not depressurize NC System below C-hA pressure in subsequent steps until CLas are isolated or vented.

- 4) E CLA cannot be isolated or vented, contact TSC for guidance.

- c. valves indicate closed for at least 5 seconds, return power disconnect switches to disconnect.

1I MNS EP/l/A/5000/ECA-1.2 I LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRC I PAGE NO.

360F61 f '

I AC I I O N / k XFLCTED RESPONSE RCSFONSE NO1 O R T A I N C O

36. E 61A.NY T&4g. NC pump number i seal DIP goes below 200 PSlD QB number I seal leakoff Blow goes below 0.2 GPM,

- a. Stop affected NC pump(sj.

- b. Place Pzr spray valve in manual and close for stopped NC pump.

37. Depressurize intact SIGs to atmospheric pfessure as foifows:

- a. Check "C-9 COND AVAILABLE FOR a. Perform the following:

STEAM DUMP" status light (13-18) -

LIT. - 1) Ensure Main Steam Isolation reset.

2) Ensure SM PORVs reset.

3) Bump steam using all intact SG(s)

SM PORVs while maintaining cooldown rate in NC T-Colds as dose as possibfe without exceeding 108"F in an hour.

4) L! any intact S/G SM PORV closed, dump steam using any of the following while maintaining cocldown rate in NC T-Colds less than 10Q"F in an hour:

- a) Dispatch operator to operate intact S/G(s)SM PORV.

b) LE any intact SIG SM PORV is unavailable, THEN evaluate using the following to dump steam:

e Run T B CA Pump

- m Use steam drains E R EP/4/N5000/6-2 (Genetic Enclosures), Enclosure 19 (S/G Depressurization Using Steam Drains).

- 5) GO TO Step 38.

LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRC EP/l/A/!5000/EGA-1.1

37. (Continued)

b. Check MSlVs on intact S/Gs - OPEN. b. Perform the following:

I)Reset Main Steam isolation signals:

- a) Main Steam Isolation.

- b) SMPORVs.

- c) MSIV Bypass Valves.

2) IF intact S i 6 MSWs required ciosea to isolate leak, E E N .G.Q RNO for Step 37.e.

- 3) Place "STEAM BUMP SELECT in steam pressure mode.

- 4) Place "STWI PRESS CONTROLLER" in manual and close.

- 5) Open MSlV bypass valves on intact S/Gs to equalize pres-Jure across MShk

6) pressure equalized, THE;N:

- a) Open all MSIVs on intact S/Gs

- b) Close ell MSIV bypass valves

- c) Perform Steps 37.d and 37.e.

- 7) GO TQ step 38.

~ C. Check "STEAM DUMP SELECT - IN c Perform the following to place steam STEAM PRESSURE MODE. dumps in steam pressure mode:

- 1) Place "STM PRESS CONTROLLER" in manual

- 2) Adjust "STM PRESS COkTROCLER" output to equal "STEAM BUMP DEMAND" signal.

I

3) Place "STEAM DUMP SELECT" in steam pressure mode.

LOS§ OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRC EF'/IiA,6000/ECA-'l. 7

37. (Continued)

- d. MI- "P-12 LO-LO TAVG" status light (ISI-18)lit, jMI4N. place steam dumps in bypass interlock.

- e. Bump steam to condenser from intact e. Perform the following:

S/Gs while maintaining cooldown rate in NC T-Colds as dose as possible - 1) Bump steam using all intact S/G(s) without exceeding 100" F in an hour. SM PORVs while maintaining cooldown rate in NC T-Colds as close 3s possible witholit exceeding 400" F in an hour.

2) IE any intact S/G SM PORV closed, W dump steam using any of the following while maintaining cooldown rate in NC T-Colds less than 100"F in an hour:

__ a) Dispatch operator to operate intact SIG(s) SM PBRV.

b) E any intact S/G SM PBRV is unavailable, mu. evaluate using the following to dump steam:

-e Run TD CA Pump.

Use steam drains EP/Z/Al5005/6-1 (Generic Enclosures). Enclosure 19 (36Depressurization Using Steam Brains).

LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRC EP/1/AEQOQ/ECA-'i.1

38. Check if MD can be placed in RHR mode:

a. Check the following: _I_a. RETURN Tcp Step 37

__ e All NC T-Hots - LESS THAN 350" F (343" F ACC)

- e NC System pressure - LESS THAN 385 PSlG.

- b. Consult station management to determine if NP, should be placed in R t m mode.

- c. E station management decides to place ND in RHR mode, REFER Enclosure 5 (Placing ND in RHR Mode).

LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRC P/l/A/5000/ECA-l 1

39. Maintain NC System heat removal:

_- a. !F ND in RHR mode, jWEN initiate cooldown with ND System

- b. Check "C-9 COND AVAllABbE FOR b. Perform the following:

STEAM DUMP" status light (1SI-18) -

LIT. - 1) Ensure Main Steam Isolation reset.

- 2) Ensure SM PORVs reset

- 3) Dump steam using intact S/G(s) SM PORVS.

4) E any intact S/G Stwl PQRV closed,

_THEN

_ dump steam as follows:

- a) Dispatch operator to operate intact S/G(s) SM P O W .

b) E any intact S/GSM PORV is unavailable, THEN evaluate usiflg the following to dump steam:

- e Use steam drains PEW EP/I/AA000/6-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 19 (SIG Depressurization Using Steam Brains).

- 5) E no intact S/G available ARID NB not in RHR mode, B "use faulted SIG.

- 6) GO TO Step 40

11 MNS EP/I/A/5QOO/ECA-l.I LOSS QF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRC 1 PAGE NO.

420f6$

I I 39 (Continued)

- e. W V M "P-72LO-LO TAVG" status light (I§l-l$) lit, WEB place steam dumps in bypass interlock.

-f. Dump steam to condenser from intact f. Perform the following:

S/G5 .

- 1) Dump steam using intact S/G(s)SM PORVs.

2) F!. any intact SiG SM PUHV closed, THEN dump steam as follows:

I a) Dispatch operator to operate intact S/G(s) SM POW.

b) E any intact S/G SM PBRV is unavailable, evaluate using the following to dump steam:

- 0 Run TD CA Pump.

- 0 Use steam drains PER EF'/l/A/5000/G-I (Genetic Enclosures), Enclosure 19 (SiG Depressurization Using Steam Brains).

3) E no intact S/G available AMB) ND not in RHR mode, =f$ use faulted SW.

LQSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT REClRC EQ/I/N.500B/ECA-1 Z RCSPONSE NOT GB1A:NCG

40. Check containment Hz concentration:

- a. Ensure Qperator dispatched to stop Unit 1 NF AHUs.

- b. Check H2 analyzers - IN SERVICE. b. Perform the following:

- 1) Dispatch operator to place H2 analyzers in service EP!lIA/5COO!G-1 (Generic Enclosures). Enclosure 5 (Placing H2 Analyzers in Service).

- 2) W.kM H2 analyzers in service, W complete Steps 4B.c through 40.e.

- 3) GO TO Step 42.

- c. Check H2 concentration - LESS c. Perform the following:

THAN 6%.

- 1) Obtain recommendation from station management to reduce H2 concentration.

- 2) GO TO Step 41

- d. Check H2 igniters ON

~

d. the following conditions met, place H2 igniters in service:

e NFAHUsoff

- a H2 concentration less than 6%

- e. Check H2 concentration - LESS - e. Dispatch operator to place H2 THAN 0.5%. recombiners in service PEW EP/l/NSOOO/G-2 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 4 (Placing H2 Recombiners In Service).

- 41, Consult station management staff for further actions.

t EP/4/N5000/ECA-1.I LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRC Enclosure 'l- Page 1 of 1 Foldout

1. E y r g e n c y Coolant Recirc Capability Restoration:

WHEN Cold Leg Recirc capability is restored, THEN GO TO Step 2.f in body of this procedure.

2. ECCS Suction Monitoring Criteria:

E FWST level goes below "FVVST LEVEL LO-LO" alarm setpoint (33 inches). AND NS pumps are taking suction from the FWST, I T E N :

a. Reset Containment Spray.

b. Stop both NS pumps.

FWST level goes below 20 inches, Tt.SEN stop all pumps taking suction from the FWST.

suction source is lost to any NV, Idl, ND, or NS pump, THEN stop pump.

3. CA Suction Sources:

E CA Storage Tank (water tower) goes below 4.5 R, HEN_ perform EP/UN5000/G-? (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 20 (CA Suction Source Realignment).

MNS LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRC PAGE NO.

EP/l/Al5000lECA-1.4 51 O f 6 1 Enclosure 4 - Page 1 of 1 Flow Reauired to Match Decav Heat Rev. 8 M 5GO I

N I

M u

M 400 330 A 209 T

E G

P M 100 0

10 100 1000 1c1000 T I M E A F T E R RCACTFR T R I P ( M I N U T E S )

Bank Qrrestiorr: 1085 Answer: B I ft(s) You are the Control Room SRO. At 0200 you arc notified by RP that Criticality Radiation Monitor IEMI-I 7 (Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor) is inoperable.

Which onc of the following correctly describes uireci per SLC 16.7.6 (Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operati J

I

/-:.

Immediately ensure Unit 1 VF system is inn the Filtration mode.

Notify RP to immediately provide a portable continuous monitor-with the same Alarm Setpoint in the Unit 1 SFP area. /

L. Ensure Unit 1 VF system is in the Filtration mode before 0300. p'

\$

D. Notify RE' to provide a portable continuous monitor with the same Alarm Setpoint in the Unit 1 SFP area before 0300.

Distracter Analysis:

A. Incorrect:

Plausible:.

B. Correct:

C. Hraearreet:.

Plausible:

D. Incorrect:.

Plausible:

Level: SRO 10CFK55.43(b)4 KA: 2.3.3 (1.829)

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-hfC-WE-EMF Obj 10 Source: New Level of knowledge: memery

References:

I . SLC 16.9.7Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operation.

2.

1 Pt(s) You are the Control Room SRQ. At 0200 you are notified by KP that Criticality Radiation Monitor 1EMF-I7 (Unit 1 Spent Fuel 1'001 Radiation Monitor) is inoperable.

Which one ofthe f o h v i n g corrcctly describes the actions required per S I C 16.7.6 (Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operation)?

A. Immedhtely ensure Unit 1 VF system is in the Filtrationn mode.

B. Notify RP to immediately provide a portable continuous monitor writh the same Alarm Setpoirat in the Unit 1 SPP area.

C. Ensure Unit 1 \'F system is in the Filtration mode before 0300.

D. Notify RIP to provide a portable continuous monitor with the same Maran Setpoint in the Unit 1 SFP area before 0300.

1 Pt(s) You are the Control Room SRO. At 0200 you are notified by RP t Criticality Radiation Monitor 1EMF-I7 (Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pqotl&diation f

Monitor) is inoperable.

Which one of the following correctly describes the,,acfions required per SLC 16.7.6 (Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operatior$

A. Immediately ensure Unit 1 yfiystem is in the Filtration mode.

B. Notify RP to immediat4ly provide a portable continuous monitor with the same Al..f;; Setpoint in the Unit 1 SFP area.

C. Ensure Unifl VF system is in the Filtration mode before 0300.

D. Notify RP tu provide a portable continuous monitor with the

.Same Alarm Setpoint in the Unit 1 SFP area before 0300.

Bank Question: 1085 Answer: B 1 Ptjs) You are the Control Room SRO. At 02.00 you are notified by RP that Criticality Radiation Monitor 1EMF-17 (Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor) is inoperable Which one of the following correctly describes the actions required per SLC 16.4.6 (Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operation)?

A. Immediately ensure Unit 1 VF system is in the Filtration mode.

B. Notify RP to immediately provide a portable continuous monitor with the same Alarm Setpoint in the Unit 1 SFP area.

C. Ensure Unit 1 VP system is in the Filtration mode hefore 0300.

D. Notify RP to provide a portable continuous monitor with the same Alarm Setpoint in the Unit I SFP area before 0300.

Distracter Analysis:

A. Incorrect:

Plausible:.

B. Correct:

C. Incorrect:.

Plausible:

D. Incorrect:.

Plausible:,

Level: SRO I@CFR55.43(b)4 KA: 2.3.3 (1.829)

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-WE-EMF Obj 10 Source: New Level of knowledge: memory

References:

1. SIC 16.9.7 Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operation.

2.3 Radiation Control 2.3.1 Knowledge of 10 CFR: 20 and related facility radiation control requirements.

(CFR: 41.12 143.4. 45.9 145.10)

' IMPORTANCE RO 2.6 SRO 3.0 2.3.2 Knowledge of facility AJAR.4 program.

(CFR: 41.12 143.4 145.9 145.10)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.5 SRO 2.9 2.3.3 Knowledge of SRB) responsibilities for auxiliary systems that are outside the controI (e.g., waste disposal and handling systems).

(CFR:43.4 145.10)

IMPORTANCE RO 1.8 SRQ 2.9 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits and contamination control, including permissible levels in excess of those authorized.

(CFR: 43.4 145.10)

IMPORTANCE RQ 2.5 SRO 3.1 2.3.5 Knowledge of use and function of personnel monitoring equipment.

,i (CFR: 41.11 I 45.9)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.3 SRQ 2.5 2.3.6 Knowledge of the requirements for reviewing and approving release permits.

(CFR: 43.4 145.10)

IMPQRTANCE RO 2.1 SRO 3.1 2.3.7 Knowledge of the process for preparing a radiation work permit.

(CFR: 41.10 I 45.12)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.0 SRO 3.3 2.3.8 Knowledge of the process for performing a planned gaseous radioactive release.

(CFR: 43.4 145.10)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.4 SRQ 3.2 2.3.9 Knowledge of the process for performing a containment purge.

(CFR: 43.4 145.10)

IMPORTANCE RQ 2.5 sa0 3.4 2-9 NUREG-1122. Rev. 2 . I

DUKE POWER MCGUIRE OPERATIONS TRAINING L

0 OBJECTIVE R Soncerning the Technical Specifications related to the EMFs:

Given the LCO title, state the LCQ ( including any COLR values ) and applicability. X e For any LCO's that have action required within one hour, state the action. X Given a set of parameter values or system conditions, determine if any Tech Spec LCO's is(are) not met and X any action(s) required within one hour.

Given a set of parameter values or system conditions and the appropriate Tech Spec, determine required X action(s).

0 Discuss the bases for a given Tech. Spec. LCO or Safety Limit. *

SRO ONLY WEEMFOlO OP-MC-WE-EMF FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ON6 Y REV. 19 Page 11 of 125

Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operations I

16.7.6 16.7 INSTRUMENTATION I

i 16.7.6 Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operations COMMITMENT The radiation monitoring instrumentaticn channels shown in Table 16.7.6-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY As shown in Table 16.7.6-1 REMEDIAL

--- ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more radiation A.l Adjust setpoint to wi!hin the 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months monitoring channels limit.

Alarmnrip setpoint exceeding value shown OR

-.I in Table 16.9.6-1.

A.2 Declare the channel 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months inoperable.

- _ I - - _ _ ~ _ _

B. One Containment B.1 Verify containment purge Immediately Atmosphere Gaseous system (VP) valves are Radioactivity monitoring maintained closed.

channel inoperable.

c. One Control Rcom Air C.1 isolate tke associated 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Intake Radioactivity Control Room Ventilation monitoring channel System (VC) outside air inoperable intake.

-. I _ _ _..I_

(continued)

Yi McGuire Units I and 2 16.7.6-1 Revision 0

9

., !\*$

Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operations f 16.7.6

, .. .;t:,.

REMEDIAL ACTIONS (continue .:$

3 k

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME .i

.?

D. One Criticality Radiation D.l Provide a portable Immediately Level channel continuous monitor with inoperable. same Alarm Setpoint in the fuel pool area.

D.2.1 Restore inoperable 30 days monitors to OPERABLE status.

OR 3.2.2 Suspend all fuel movement 30 days operations in the fuel building.

__I____

E. One Spent Fuel Pool i.1 Verify the Fuel Handling mrnediately Radioactivity monitoring Ventilation System (VF) channel inoperable. requirements in Technical Specification 3.7.12 are met.

TE§TING REQUIREMENTS Refer to Table 16.7.6-1 to determine which TRs app!y for each Radiation Monitoring channel.

I I _..

....~..

FREQUENCY TR 16.7.6.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months TR 16.7.6.2 Perform CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST 92 days TR 16.7.6 3 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION 48 months.

~ -

McGuire Units 1 and 2 16.7.6-2 Revision 0

e.

Radiation Monitoring for Plan: Operations

,: I 16.7.6

.: :: .fz TABLE 16.9.6-1 I

RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION FOR PLANT OPERATION E

APPLICABLE REQUIRED ALARMnRlP TESTING MONITOR MODES CHANNELS SETPOINT REQUIREMENTS I . Chnlainment Atmosphete 1.2.3.4 1 Must rneel SLC TR 16.7.6.1 Gaseous Radioactivity- 16.11-6 TR 16.7.6.2 High (Low Range EMF- limi!s TR 16.7.6.2 39) 2 . Spent Fuel Po01 With irradiated 1 -c;.7x10-4 TR 16.7.6.1 Radioactivity-High (EMF- fuel in fuel ;,Cllml TR 16.7.6.2

42) storage TR 16.7.6.3 areas or fuel building

- - ~ I _ _

3. Critica!ity Radiation Level Wrth fuel in firel 1 -c 15 mR/hr TR 16.7.6.1 (1EMF-17. E M F - 4 ) storage TR 16.9.6.2 areas M fuel TR 16.7.6.3

__._I_. -

I building 4 . Control Room Air intake 1,2.3.4.5.6 2 per station. < 3.4 x 10.4

- TR 16.7.6.1 Radioactivity-Hiyh (EMF- pCi!rn TR 16.7.6.2 43a and 43b) TR 16.7.6.3

,.~--_;__=.--__~ ~ - p . ~ c - > ~ T - - . . <._.-

McGuire Units 1 and 2 16.7.6-3 Revision 0

B Q NQuestion:

~ 1086 Answer: A 1 Ptjs) Unit 2 is at 100% power when 2A KC Pump ii1 seal leakoff rapidly increases to 6 b p i . Unit 2 has entered AF!2iN5500!OS (kfalficiwrianOfXC Pump).

Which one of the following correc.tlydescribes the concern with this condition and basis for Enclosure 1 (NCP Z I ~Poost J J 7+ z4ctior2s)astions?

A. High #B seal leak-off could lead to a seal LQCA, closing the individual seal return within 5 minutes of seeuring the NC Pomp will control the transient prior to overheating the seals.

B. High #I seal leak-off could Bead to a seal &OCA,yi@t~g&n~er ~.

3 to close the seal return after securing the NC Pump allows the NC Pump to coast to a stop.

c. High #I seal leak-off could lead to excessive #2 scal DP, closing the individual sea! retnrn within 5 aiiinutes of securing the NC:

Pump will control transient prior to overheating the wds.

D. High #I seal leak-off could Bead to excessive #2 seal DP, waiting longer than five minutes to close the seal return after securing the NC Pump allows the NC Pump to coast to a stop Level: SKO KA: SYS 003 .U.O1 (3.5i3.9)

Lesson Plan Objective: OF-MC-PS-NCP Obj 12 Source: New Level of knowledge: memory Ques .1086.doc

References:

1. Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-NCP page 27.

2. AP/08, Malfunction ofNC Pump, Enclosure 1.

3. APK% Basis Document, Page 27.

1 Pt(s) llnir 2 is at 100% power w J m 2 h N C Pump ii 1 seal leak-off rapidly increases to 6 ~ r n Unit

. 2 has entered APi2iN5500i08 (ikfa@zction qf:VC Pump).

Which one of the following correctly describes the c.onccrn with this condition and basis for IhcIosure I (iWPitnzp Post Tr@Actions) d o n s ?

A. High #1 seal leak-off couald Bead to a seal LOCA, dosing the individual seal return within § minutes of securing the NC Pump wit1 control the transient prior to overheating the seals.

W, High #1 seal leak-off could Bead to a seal E,OCA: waiting longer than five minutes to close the seal return after securing the KC Pump allows the NC Pomp to coast to a stop.

C. High #1 seal leak-off could lead to excessive #2 seal P)P, dosing the individual seal return within 5 minutes of securing the NC Pump nilk control transient prior to overheating the seals.

D. High #I seal Beakoff could lead to excessive #2 seal DP, waiting longer than five minutes to @losethe seal return a f t e ~securing the NC Pump allows the NC Pomp to coast tu a stop

__ss_ss__~____s_ss___------_-------------~~--~-~---~~-~~~----~--~-----------~-------~---

Ques-lO86.dcc

1 Ws) LJnit 2 is at 100% power when 2A NC Pump 8 1 seal dly increases to 6 a m . Unit 2 has entered .Q/2/Ai5500/ tion of NC P1tnzp).

Which one of the following correctly describes the cod&n with this condition and basis for Enclosure 1 (;VCP u r y PodTrip Actions) actions?

A. High #I seal leak-off could lead to a seal LOGA, closing the individual seal return within 5,,minutesof securing the NC Pump will control the transient prior to overheating the seals.

B. High #I seal leak-off codd lead to a seal I,OCA, waiting longer than fire minutes to plbse the seal return after securing the NC Pump allows the 3d Pump to coast to a stop.

C. High #I seal Kak-off could lead to excessive #2 seal flow, closing the ioldividtih seal return within 5 minutes of securing the IVC Pump vdl control transient prior to overheating the seals.

D. Hig6 #I seal leak-off could lead to excessive #2 seal flow, waiting

,longer than five minutes to close the seal return after securing

. the NC Pump allows the NC Pump to coast to a stop

___~____________I____l_l________________-~-----~~-~~----~~~~---

Bank Question: 1088 Answer: A 1 Pt(s) Unit 2 is at 100% power when 2A NC Pump # 1 seal leak-off rapidly increases to 6 gpm. Unit 2 has entered hp/2/AS500/08 (MnIfunction ofNC Pump).

Which one of the following correctly describes the concein with this condition and basis for Enclosure 1 (XC Pump Post Trip ,4ctions) actions?

A. High #1 seal leak-off could lead to a seal LOCA, closing the individual seal return within 5 minutes of securing the KG Pump wrill control the transient prior to Overheating tlie seals.

B. High #1 seal leak-off could lead to a seal LOCA, waiting longer than five minutes to close the seal return after securing tlie NC Pump allows the NC Pump to coast to a stop.

C. High #1 seal leak-off could lead to excessive #2 seal flow, closing the individual seal return within 5 minutes of securing the NC Pump will control transient prior to overheating the Sedh.

D. High #1 seal leak-off could lead to excessive #2 seal flow, waiting longer than five minutes to close the seal return after securing the NC Pump allows the NC Pump to coast to a stop Distrxter Analysis:

A. Correct:

B. Incorrect:

Plausible:

C. Incorrect:.

Plausible:

D. Incorrect:.

Plausible:

Levei: SRO KA: SYS 003 A201 (3.513.9)

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-PS-NCP Obj 12 Source: New Level of knowledge: inemory Ques-1086.doc

References:

1. Lesson PIan OP-MC-PS-NCP page 27.

2. APw!'O8,Malfunction ofNC Punip, Enclosure 1

3. AP!'08 Basis Document, Page 27.

I SYSTEM: W3 Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS)

K6.06 Thermalbarrier .....................................

K6.07 Thrust and radial bcaring ................................ 1.8 2.1 K6.08 Anti-reverse rotation device .............................. 2.1 2.4 K6.09 RCP electric motor ................................... 1.9 2.1 K6.10 plvnps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 2.1 K6.11 Motors ............................................ 1.6 1.9

~ 6 . i ~ Sensors and detectors .................................. 1.7 2.1 K6.13 Breakers, relays, and disconnects .......................... 1.6 1.8 K6.14 Starting requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 2.9 LiEaUri AI Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parametem (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RCPS controls induding:

(CFR: 41.5 I45.5)

A1.O1 RCPvibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 2.9 81.02 RCP pump and motor bearing temperatures .................... 2.9 2.9 A 1.03 RCP motor stator winding temperamres ...................... 2.6 2.6 A1.04 RCP oil reservoir levels ................................ 2.6 2.5 A1.05 RCSflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 3.5 A1.06 PZRsprayflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 3.1 A1.07 RCS temperature and pressure ............................ 3.4* 3.4 AI.08 Seal water temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 2.6 A1.09 SealflowandD;P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 8 2 2.8 A1.10 RCP standpipe levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 2.7 A2 Abirity to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RCPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequeraces of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFIP: 41.5 143.51 45.3 145113)

A2.01 Problem with RCP seals. especially rates of seal leak-off . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 3.9 A2.02 Conditions which exist for an abnormal shutdown of an RCP in comparison to a normal shutdawn of an RCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 3.9 A2.03 Problems associated with RCP motors, including faulty motors and current. and winding and bearing temperature problems . . . . 2.4 3.1 A2.W Effects of fluctuation of YCT pressure on RCP seal injection flow . . . . . 2.4 2.8 A2.05 Effects of YCT pressure on RCP seal leakoff flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 2.8 NUREG.1122. Rev . 2 3.0-8

DUKE POWER MCGWRE OBERATlONS TRAINING m__

OBJECTIVES OBJECTIVE Describe the controls and any interlocks associated with the Reactor Coolant Pump and Motor.

Given a parameter associated with the Reactor Coolant Pumps or Motors describe the indications for that parameter.

Given a limit andlor precaution associated with an operating pFOCedure, discuss its basis and applicability.

Explain the reason for closing the NC Pump Seal Return valves when NCS Dressure is beiow 100 Dsi.

Concerning the NC Pump seals:

e Describe the general design of the NC Pump Seals.

e Discuss the purpose of seal injection.

Discuss the flowpaths, flowrates and differential pressures associated with each seal.

Discuss the purpose of the seal injection throttle valves.

Discuss the purpose of the standpipes and the operation of the standpipe (draining and filling).

Describe the operation for adjusting NC Pump seal controlled leakage.

Concerning NC Pump Vibration Monitoring System:

State the purpose of the system.

e Discuss the operation of the system.

State the parameters and setpoints which would require an NC Pump to be stopped.

OP-MC-PS-NCP FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 21 Page 7 of 85

DUKE POWER MCGUIRE OPERATjOMS TRAINING -

Objective #11,12 Each of the NC Pump No. 1 seal leakoff lines have seal return isolation valves. These valves are closed when NC System pressure is less than 100 psig in order to prevent any backflow from the NV System through the seal return filter to the NC Pump seals.

Backflow would flush any contaminants/particuiates out of the filter and into the seal.

These isolation valves are also used in the event of a failure (excessive leakage) of the No. 1 seal. When No. 1 seal leakoff flow is high, some of this flow comes from the NC System up through the thermal barrier. There may be insufficient heat removal by the thermal barrier heat exchanger to adequately cool the leakoff flow. This hotter water could cause damage to the No. 2 and 3 seals. When the seal return valve is closed, the No. 2 seal becomes the primary seal and maintains the iarge AP. The No. 2 seal is designed to withstand this high AP for a short period and the pump must be stopped within 30 minutes and the plant must be cooled down and depressurized so that repairs can be made.

The NC Pumps are equipped with a common No. 1 seal bypass valve. Phis valve is only opened, at low system pressures (i00-1000 psig) when there is insufficient flow to adequately cool the seal (leakoff temperature 2200°F).

The leakoff from each pump is piped to a common manifold and then via a seal water filter through a seal water heat exchanger where the temperature is reduced to about that of the VCT. Leakage past the No. 1 seal provides a constant pressure on the No.

2 seal and constant pressure on the No. 3 seal. A standpipe is provided to assure a backpressure of at least 7 feet of water on the No. 3 seal. In addition, the standpipe is used to warn of excessive No. 2 seal leakage flow to the reactor coolant drain tank (NCDT). Excessive No. 2 seal leakage results in a rise in the standpipe level and eventual overflow to the NCDT via a second overflow connection.

A total of 8 gpm is supplied to each NC pump for seal injection water. 5 gpm is directed down through the thermal barrier labyrinth seal and into the NC System. 3 gpm flows up through the lower radial bearing.

A minimum differential pressure of 200 psid is required across the No. 1 seal surfaces to ensure proper water film during pump operation. The inlet pressure is approximately 2250 psig (NC System pressure) and the outlet pressure is 15-50 psig (VCT pressure) during normal operation. Approximately 3 gpm leaks off from the No. 1 seal of which 3 gph flows to the No. 2 seal. Proper VCT pressure is required to ensure adequate backpressure for proper flow through the No. 2 seal.

Approximately 3 gph is directed through the No. 2 seal. The pressure drops from 50 psig to 3 psig across this seal. Ali the No. 2 seal leakoff, except for 100 ec/hr, is directed to a standpipe. The water level in the standpipe is maintained to provide sufficient backpressure on the No. 2 seal to ensure flow through the No. 3 seal. All excess water from the standpipe is discharged to the NCDT through an orifice.

Improper standpipe level can adversely affect seal operation, therefore there is a high and low level aiarm provided for the standpipe to warn of potential seal problems. A high level alarm could indicate excessive No. 2 seal leak-off flow.

QP-MC-PS-MCP FOR TRAlMING PURPOSES QML Y REV. 21 Page 27 of 85

DUKE POWER MCGUIRE OPERATIONS TRAINING CLASSROOM TIME (Hours)

I I 1.0 I 1.0 I 1.0 1 OBJECTIVES 0

OBJECTIVE State the purpose of the AP N

L 0

?

x x continuous action steps.

OP-MC-AP-08 FOR TRAlNl" PURPOSES ONLY REV. 00 Page 5 Of 11

CAUTION Failure of Number 2 and 3 seals may occur unless the affected NC pump seal return valve is closed between 3 miflutes and 5 minutes after stopping pump. This enclosure must be completed even after transition to EPS.

I 1. Record time of NC pump shutdown:

2. Check if seal coaling available to Perform the following:

affected pump:

a. C!ose the following:

I Seal injection established (Normal or S S f Supply) -

1 NV-94AC (NC Pumps Seal f k t Cont Inside Isol)

OR -- 1 NV-95B (NCPumps $mi Ret Cont Outside isol).

KC to thermal barrier established.

_- b. Exit this enclosure.

- 3. Check any NC pump number 'I seal __G 4 TO Step 5.

leakoff flow - GREATER THAN QR EQUAL TO 6 CPM.

_I4. Maintain seal injection flow greater than 9 GPM to affected purnp(s).

Enclosure 1 - Page 2 of 2

5. WHEN- affected NC pump has been off 3 m i p t e s , THEN immediately perform the following:

a. Close affected N 6 pump Seal return valve:

-0 1 NV-34A (A NC Pump Seal Return Isol)

-

1NV-SOB (ti NC Pump Seal Return Isol)

- 1NV-GGA'(C NC Pump Seal Return lsolj

- 1 NV-82B (0NC Purnp Seal Return ISOl).

ti. Open all of t:rc follo>winyvalves:

I _ 1 KC-394A (A NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt)

- 1 KC-345A (C NC Pump Therm tiar Otlt)

- I KC-3648 ( 5 NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt) 1 KC-4130 (D NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt).

AP/l and 2/N5500/008(Malfunction of NC Pump)

ENCLOSURE 1 STEP 4 PURPOSE:

Attempt to maintain clean filtered seal injection water going the pump seals instead of water from the NC system.

BBSCUSSIQN:

When seal leak-off flow exceeds seal injection flow, the rest of the flow comes from the NC system up through the thermal barrier. This water is unfiltered. Therefor, direction is given in this step to ensure seal injection flow greater than 9 gpm in an attempt to keep the water going to the seals filtered, while maintaining less than the T.S. Limit of lOgpm/pump.

REFERENCES:

T.S. 3.5.5, Seal Injection Flow ENCLOSURE 1 STEP 5 PURPOSE:

Isolate the excessive leakage of the failed #1 seal, transfer the primary pressure drop function to the #2 seal while attempting to minimize the damage to the #2 seal.

DISCUSSION:

Isolating #I seal leakoff of a failed seal will limit the inventory loss and help limit further damage to the seal. The #2 seal will assume the role as the primary pressure drop across the s e d package. Waiting 3 minutes ensures the NC Pump has stopped rotating, which should help reduce the wear on the soft seated #2 seal face. Closing the valve immediately after 3 minutes (prior to an additional 2 minutes) should get the flow to the seal package reduced prior to hot water reaching the #2 seal, causing it to degrade prematurely.

The thermal barrier isolations are re-opened if necessary to establish KC as the backup seal package cooling method. This step is last to ensure any of the previous steps transients are completed so no remaining perturbations will reclose the valves after they are opened.

Page 27 of 28 Rev 1

Bsirk Qtsestiorr: 1087 Answer: 63 I Pt(i) Unit 1 is in Mode 3. In preparation for unit start up, mairiteriance tests the lift settings of 20% of the MSSV's as required by Tech Specs. In each case, maintenance adjusts the lift setting as close to the desired lift setpoint as possible. The following are the test results:

e ISV-20 lifts at 1203 psig initially, maintenance adjusts Iifi setting to I172 p i g .

e l S V i 5 lifts at 1215 psig initially, maintenance adjusts lift sctting to 1190 psig.

o ISV-10 lifts at 1190 psig initially, maintenance adjusts lift setting to 1190 psig.

B iSV-5 lifts at 1225 psig initially: maintenance adjusts lift setting to 1215 p i g .

Based on the test results. which one of the following statements is corrcct?

Reference Provided Tech Spec 3.4.1 A. Unit start up can continue provided Rated Thermal Power is mainpained below 58%.

B. Unit start up can continue provided Power Range set points arc reduced to < 58 % wlithin 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and KTP can not exceed 58%.

G. Unit start up into MODE 2 is not allowed and Power Range set points must be reduced to <: 58 % within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

D. Unit start up into MODE 2 is not allowed and Power Range set points must be reduced to .:39 %.within4 hours.

Distracter Anaiysis:

A. Incorrect: - .

Plausible:

B. Correct Ques-1087.doc

C. Incorreca: -.

Plausibk: -

D. Incorreek -

PBausibIe: -

MA: 2.2.21 (233.5) 1,esscn Pian Objective: OP-MC-ADLM-T§Obj 8 OP-&IC-SThl-&ISObj 13 Level of knowiecige: Analysis

References:

1. Tech Spec 3.7.1, Main Steam Safety Valves (Yl§§Vs)

2. IechSpec 3.0.4, page 3.0-1

1 Pt(s) Unit 1 is in Mode 3. In preparation for unit start up>maintenance tests the lifi settings of20% of the MSSVs as required by Tech Specs. In each case, maintenance adjusts the lift setting as close to the desired lift setpoint as possible. The following are the test results:

e 1SV-20 lifts at 1203 psig initially, maintenance adjusts Iifi setting to I172 psig.

e 1%-15 lifts at 1215 psig initially, maintenance adjusts lifi setting to 1190 p i g .

e 1SV-I0 lifts at 1170 psig initially, maintenance adjusts lift setting lo 1190 ps1g.

o 1SV-5 lifts at 1225 psig initially. maintenance adjusts lift setting to 1215 psig.

Based on the test results, which one of the following statements is correct?

Reference Pravided A. Unit start up can continue provided Rated Thermal Power is maintained below 58%.

B. IJnit start up can continue provided Power Range set points are reduced to < 58 % within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and RTP can not exceed 58%.

C Unit start up into MODE 2 is not allowed and Power Range set points must be reduced to < 58 % within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

D. Unit start up into MODE 2 is not allowed and Power Range set points must be reduced to < 39 %.withinn 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Ques-1087.doc

LCO Applicability 3.5 LCO 3.0.4 LCOs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability, except as provided in LCO 3.0.2and 3.0.7.

LCO 3.0.2 Upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the Required Actions of the associated Conditions shall be met, except as provided in LCO 3.5.5and LCO 3.0.6.

If the LCO is rnet or is no longer applicable prior to expiration of the specified Completion Pime(s), completion of the Required Action@) is not required unless otherwise stated.

LCO 3.0.3 when an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associated ACTIONS, the unit shall be placed in a MOQE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. Action shall be initiated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to place the unit, as applicable, in:

a. MODE 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months ;

b. MODE 4 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days 0.00361 hours 2.149471e-5 weeks 4.9465e-6 months ; and

c. MODE 5 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days 0.0103 hours 6.117725e-5 weeks 1.40785e-5 months .

Exceptions to this §pecification are stated in the individual Specifications.

Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation in accordance with the LCO or ACTIONS, completion of the actions required by LCO 3.0.3 is not required.

bC0 3.0.3 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2!3, and 4.

bC8 3.Q.4 When an LCO is not rnet, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall not be made except when the associated ACTlONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time.

This Specification shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS.

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

(continued)

..1 McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.0-1 Amendment Nos. 184//466

LCO Applicability 3.0 3.0 LCO APPLICABILITY (continued)

LCQ 3.0.5 Equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS may be returned to sewice under administrative control solely to perform testing required to demonstrate its OPERABILITY or the OPERABILITY of other equipment. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the system returned to service under administrative control to perform the required testing to demonstrate OPERABILITY.

LCO 3.0.6 When a supported system LCO is not met solely due to a support system LCQ not being met, the Conditions and Required Actions associated with this supported system are not required to be entered. Only the support system LCQ ACTIONS are required to be entered. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2for the supported system. In this event, additional evaluations and limitations may be required in amordarrce wilh Specification 5.5.1 5, "Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)."

If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCQ in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.

When a support system's Required Action directs a supported system to be dedared inoperable or directs entry into Conditions and Required Actions for a supported system, the applicable Conditions and Required Actions shall be entered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2.

LCO 3.0.7 Test Exception LCOs 3.1.8and 3.4.17 allow specified Technical Specification (TS) requirements to be changed to permit performance of special tests and operations. Unless otherwise specified, all other TS requirements remain unchanged. Compliance with Test Exception LCOs is optional. When a Test Exception LCO is desired to be met but is not met, the ACTIONS of the Test Exception LCO shall be met. When a Test Exception LCO is not desired to be met, entry into a MO5E or other specified condition in the Applicability shall be made in accordance with the other applicable Specifications.

(continued)

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.Q-2 Amendment Nos. 184/166

LCO Applicability 3.0 3.5 LCO APPLICABILITY (continued)

LCO 3.0.8 LCQs including the associated ACTIONS shall apply to each unit individually unless otherwse indicated as follows:

a. Whenever the LCO refers to systems or components which are shared by both units, the ACTIONS will apply to both units simultaneously;

b. Whenever the LCO applies to only one unit, this will be identified in the Applicability section of the Specification; and

c. Whenever certain portions of a Specification contain operating parameters, setpoints etc., which are different for each unit, this will be identified in parentheses or footnotes. (For example, "...flow rate of 54,909 cfm (Unit 1) or 43,009 d m (Unit 2)~~~').

McGuire Units I and 2 3.0-3 Amendment Nos. 184/166

IVEILCANCE K ..~ .. -. .

~

~~

~

~ ~

.- ~ ~ =

SK 3.0.7 SKs shall be me! during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for individual LCOs. unless otherwise stated in the SK.

Failure to mee: a Surveillance, whether such failure is experienced during the perforrriarice of the Surveillance or between performances of the Surveillance. shall be failure to riieet the LCO. Failure to perform a Surveillance within the specified Frequency shall be failure to meet the LCO except as provided in SR 3.0.3. Surveillances do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment or variables outside specified limits.

SR 3.0.2 The specified Frequency for each SR is met if the Surveillance is performed wittiin 7.25 times the interval specified in the Frequency, as measured from the previous performance or as measured from the time a specified condition of the Frequency is met.

For Frequencies specified as "once," the above interval extension does not apply.

if a Completion Time requires periodic performance on a "once per. . ."

basis, the above Frequency extension applies to each performance after the initial performance.

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications SR 3.0.3 If it is discovered that a Surveillance was not performed within its specified Frequency. then compliance with the requirement to declare the LCO not rnet rnay be delayed, frcni the ti:iie of discovery. up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (x up to the limit of the specified Frequency. whichever IS greater. This delay period is permitted to allow perforniance of the Surveillance. A risk evaluation shal; be performed for any S!meillmce delayed greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . and the risk impact shall be managed.

If the Surveiilanco is not performe.d within the delay period. Ibe LGO must iriiniedia!ely be declareu nul rnet. ax3 the applioable Conditionis) must be enleled When the Surveillance is porformd wi!titn ::?e delay Lxricd and~the Survc,iilar.ice is not met. I t i e LCO nwct iirirncdiatelf be declared not met, arid !he ;qq5cable C:oriditiori(s) m!s: be en!e:ed.

i i i - 4

SR Applicability 3.0 3.0 SR APPLICABILITY (continued)

SR 3.0.4 Entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of an LC0 shall not be made unless the LCO's Surveillances have been met within their specified Frequency. This provision shall not prevent entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS.

SR 3.0.5 Surveillance Requirements shall apply to each unit individually unless otherwise indicated as stated in LCO 3.0.8 for individual Specifications or whenever certain portions of a Specification contain sutveillance parameters different for each unit, which will be identified in parentheses or footnotes.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 4.0-5 Amendment Nos. 18U1166

1 Pt(s) Unit 1 is in MODE 3. In preparation for unit start up, ma lift settings of 20% of the MSSVs as required by Tech S case, maintenance adjusts the lift setting as close to the Setpoint as possible. The following are the test results: /

/

ISV-20 lifts at 1203 psig initially, maintenance ac!&ts lift setting to 1172 psig.

ISV-15 lifts at 1215 psig initially, maintenansdadjusts lift setting to 1190 psig.

e ISV-IO lifts at 1190 psig initially, maintepknce adjusts lift setting to 1190 psig.

ISV-05 lifts at I225 psig initially, maintenance adjusts lift setting to 1215 psig.

Based on the test results, which one of the fallowing statements is correct?

Reference Provided A. Unit start up can ,Sontinue provided Rated Thermal Power is maintained below 58%.

B. Unit start up can continue provided Power Range set points are reduced to < 58 %within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and RTP can not exceed 58%.

C. Unitstart up into MODE 2 is not allowed and Power Range set pohts must be reduced to < 58 %within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ..

B. ,.-.&it start up into MODE 2 is not allowed and Power Range set

., points must be reduced to < 39 %.within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

.~-----------------~~-~~~----~~------

/:

Ques.. 1087.d~

Bank Question: 1087 Answer: B 1 Pt(s) Unit 1 is in MODE 3. In preparation for unit start up, maintenance tests the lift settings of 20% of the MSSV's as required by Tech Specs. In each case, maintenance adjusts the lift setting as close to the desired lift Setpoint as possible. The following are the test results:

ISV-20 lifts at 1203 psig initially, maintenance adjusts lift setting to 1172 psig.

ISV-15 lifts at 1215 psig initially, maintenance adjusts lift setting to 1190 psig.

ISV-10 lifts at 1170 psig initially, maintenance adjusts lift setting to 1190 psig.

ISV-05 lifts at 1225 psig initially, maintenance adjusts lift setting to 1215 psig.

Based on the test results, which one of the following statements is correct?

Reference Provided Tech Spec 3.7.1 A. Unit start up can continue provided Rated Thermal Power is maintained below 58%.

B. Unit start up can continue provided Power Range set points are seduced to c 58 %within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and RTP can not exceed 58%.

C. Unit start up into MODE 2 is not allowed and Power Range set points must be reduced to e 58 %within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

D. Unit start up into MODE 2 is not allowed and Power Range set points must be reduced to c 39 %.within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Distracter Analysis:

A. Incorrect: - .

Plausible:

B. Correct C. Incorrect: -.

Plausible: -

D. Incorrect: -

Plausible:

Level: SRO KA: 2.2.21 (233.5)

Ques-1087.doc

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-ADM-TS Obj 8 OQ-MC-STM-MSObj 13 Source: New-Level of knowledge: Analysis

References:

1. Tech Spec 3.7.1, Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs)

2. Tech Spec 3.0.4,page 3.0-1

, )1 2.2 Equipment Control (Continued) 2.2.18 Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during shutdown operations.

(CFR: 43.5 145.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.3 SRO 3.6 2.2.19 Knowledge of maintenance work order requirements.

(CFR: 43.5 I 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.1 SRO 3.1 2.2.20 Knowledge of the process for managing troubleshooting activities.

(CFR: 43.5 145.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.2 SRO 3.3 2.2.21 Knowledge of pre- and postmaintenance operability requirements.

(CFR: 43.2)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.3 SRO 3.5 2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

(CFB: 43.2 I 45.2)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 4.1 2.2.23 Ability to track limiting conditions for operations.

(CFR: 43.2 145.13)

IMPORTANCE 80 2.6 SRO 3.8 2.2.24 Ability to analyze the affect of maintenance activities on LCO status.

(CFR: 43.2 145.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.6 SRO 3.8 2.2.25 Knowledge Qf bases in technical specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

(CFR: 43.2)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.5 SRO 3.7 2.2.26 Knowledge of refueling administrative requirements.

(CFR: 43.5 I 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.5 SRO 3.7 2.2.27 Knowledge of the refueling process.

(CFR: 43.6 I45.13)

IMPORTANCE KO 2.6 SRO 3.5 2-7 NUREGlL22, Rev. 2 I

DUKE POWER MCGUIRE OPERATIONS TRAIN!NG OBJECTIVES - - - -

N L L L OBJECTIVE L P P 0 0 a s a R -

- 0 Concerning the S/G PQRV's; List the open and close setpoints. X X X X Discuss local operation of the valves. X X X X

Describe the operation and control of the valves. X X X X

_I - I_

Concerning the Steamline Isolation signals;

List the Stearnline Isolation signals. X X X X List the components affected by a MSI signal X X X X State the setpoints and logic requirements for initiation. X X X X

Describe any operator actions required to reset the signal. X X X X Concerning the Main Steamline Isolation Valves; State the purpose of the Main Steamline Isolation Valves. X X X Describe the operation and control during opening, closing X X X X and testing.

Explain the importance of establishing less than 50 psid X X X X across the MSIV's prior to opening.

Evaluate plant parameters to determine any abnormal sys em X X X X conditions that may exist.

Concerning the Tech Specs related to the Main Steam System;

Given the LCO title, state the LCO (including any CObR X X X values) and applicability For any LCO's that have action within one hour, state the X X X action.

Given a set of parameter values or system conditions, X X X determine if any Tech Spec LCQ(s) is(are) not met and any action(s) required within one hour.

Given a set of plant parameters or system conditions and X X X the appropriate Tech Specs, determine the required action.

D Discuss the basis for a given Tech Spec LCO or Safety X

Limit.

SRQ Qnlv - - -

OF-MC-STM-SM FOR TRAlNlNG USE ONLY REV. 20 Page7of 53

Given a set of plant conditions, determine the plant MODE..

ADMTS034 Explain the use of logicel connectors and apply these rules to any given Technical Specification.

ADNISSWS Explain the rules for Cornpietion Times and apply these rules to determine the time allowed for completing the Required Action@).

Explain the Frequency rules for periodic actions (both Required Actions and Suweillance Requirements) and apply these rules to determine when a periodic action must be petformed.

ADMTSOOS Given a Technical Specification and associated Bases, determine the system components that are required to be OPERABLE to meet the LC8 (Limiting Condition for Operation).

ADMTSOO8

r LCO Applicability I . 8 3.0 3.0 LlMlTfNG CONBlTl

-1 bC0 3.9.1 LCOs shali be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability, except as provided in LCO 3.0.2 and 3.0.7.

LCO 3.0.2 Upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the Rewired Actions of the associated Conditions shall be met, except as provided in LCO 3.0.5 and LCO 3.0.6.

If the LCO is met or is no longer applicable prior to expiration of the specified Completion Pirne(s), completion of the Required Action(s) is not required unless otherwise stated.

LCO 33.3 *When an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIQNS are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associated ACTIONS, the unit shall be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. Action shall be initiated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to place the unit, as applicable, in:

a. MODE 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months ;

b. MODE 4 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days 0.00361 hours 2.149471e-5 weeks 4.9465e-6 months ; and

c. MODE 5 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days 0.0103 hours 6.117725e-5 weeks 1.40785e-5 months .

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation in accordance with the bC0 or ACTIONS, completion of the actions required by LCO 3.0.3 is not required.

LCO 3.0.3 is only applicable in MODES 1 , 2, 3. and 4 LCO 3.0.4 When an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall not be made except when the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited perlod of time.

This Specification shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS.

Exceptions to this Specification are stated In the individual Specifications.

(continued)

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.0-1 Amendment Nos. 184/166

MSSVs 3.7.1

- -... 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs)

LCB 3.7.6 The MSSVs shall be OPERABLE as specified in Table 3.7.1-1 and fable 3.7.1-2.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 'I, 2, and 3.

A. One QF more required A.1 Reduce power to less than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months MSSVs inoperable. or equal to the applicable

% RTP listed in Table 3.7.1-1.

A.2 Reduce the Power Range 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Neutron Flux High Trip Setpoints to the % RTP value listed in Table 3.7.1-1.

I I (continued)

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.1-1 Amendment Nos. 184/166

MSSVs 3.7.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION 1 COMPLETION TIME B. Required Action and B.f Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met. -

AND OW B2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months One or more steam generators with less than two MSSVs OPERABLE.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVE1LLANCE FREQUENCY Only required to be performed prior to entry into MODE 2.

In accordance with Verify each required MSSV lift setpsint per Table 3.7.1 -2 the Insetvice in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. Testing Program Following testing, lift setting shall be within +I %.

_I McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.1-2 Amendment Nos. 184/166

MSSVS 3.7.1 Table 3.7.1-1 (page 1 Of 1)

OPERABLE Main Steam Safety Valves versus Maximum Allowable Power Range Neutron FLUXHigh Setpoints in Percent of RATED THERMAL. POWER GENERATQR REQUlWEB OPERABLE 4 I58 3 5 39 2

I s 19 Table 3.7.1-2 (page 1 of 4 )

Main Steam Safety Valve Lift Settings sv-22 SV-46 sv-10 sv-4 1205 sv-23 sv-97 sv-11 SV-5 1220 SV-24 §\I-18 SV-I 2 SV-6 I I225

=

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.1-3 Amendment Nos. 184/166

Bank Question: 1088 Answer: C I Pt(s) Given the following events m d conditions on Unit 1:

e Unit 1 is at 1W %power.

e IW-244A (Charging Line Cont Outside Isol) fails closed.

e Immediate Actions ofAPiliN5500~12(1,oss ofletdowrz or Charging) are perfomied.

Assume no further Operator actions are taken.

Which one (I) of the following describes when the Pressurizer would become IiXOPEIL4BLE per Technical Sptrc.ific,ations?

Rqferetzce Provided Data Book A. Approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months due to low level.

B. Approximately 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months due to low level.

C. Approximitely 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months due to high level.

_~_________s_s_ssss_--~------------~--~--~--~---~---------~--~---~--~~~-~-----------

Andysis: WhenlNV-244 closes and letdown is isolated, IN"-238 will throttle down to its minimism flow limit of 32 gpm. A$suming 12 gpm seal return flow that leaves a net positive flow 0%20 gpm into the WC System.

Per DATA Rook curve 7.38,55% Bevel = 8000 gats. 92% kvel = 82700 gal§.

12700-8000 = 4708 gals.

4700 gals/?O gpm = 235 minutes (approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) until Reactor trip 4700 gals/12 gpm = 392 minutes (arpprcaxinrately 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months ) until Reactor trip

If the examinee incorrectly assumes Bevel will dccrease to 13 % (30Q0 gals per the curve), 8000-3000 = 5000 gals, 506)0gals/2Ogpm= 250 minutes (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) 5000gals/l2gpm = 411 minutes (7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months Distraetcr Analysis:

A. Incorrect:. Level will increase not dccresase.

Plausible: If examinee thinks there is a net negative charging flow imbalance of20 gpan.

B. IncorrecB:. 1,evel wiSS increase not decrease.

PBausibBc: If examinee thinks there is a net negative charging flow imbalance of 12 gpm.

@. Correct:

D. Hncorreek. Level will increase at a rate of 20 gpm.

PEaosible: If examinee thinks charging flow i m b a h c e of 12 gpm.

Level: SRO K4: 000022 M . 0 4 (2.9i3.8)

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-PS-IkE Obj I & 12 Source: N E W Level of knowledge: Analysis

References:

1. Lcsson Pian OY-MQ:-PS-H%,E page 11

2. Tech Spec 3.4.9, Pressurizer Qua1088.doc

1 Ii(s) Given the following events and conditions on [init 1:

e Unit 1 is at 100 %power.

e l N - 2 4 4 A (Charging Line Cont Outside Isol) fails closed.

e Inmediate Actions of AP/l\A5500/12(LOSSofLetdowri or Charging) are perfomied.

Assume no further Operator actions are taken.

Which one (1) of the following describes when the Pressurizer would become LVOPERABLE per Technical Specifications?

Refprence Provided A. Approximitely 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months due to ROW level.

B. Approximately 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months due to Bow level.

C. Approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months due to high level.

D. Approximately 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months due to high level.

Ques-lOR8.doc

e Unit 1 is at 100 % power.

Charging) are performed.

Assume n8 further Operator &ions are taken.

/

Refeh'cce Provided:

Which one (1) of the fa lowing describes when t h e Pressurizer would become INOPERAjXE per Technical Specifications?

A. Approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months due to [ow level.

B. Approximately 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months due to low level.

/

6. ,,'Approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months due to high level.

I i

Q' Approximately 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months due to high level.

I Ques-1088.doc

Bank Question: 1088 Answer; C 1 Pt(s) Given the following events and conditions on Unit 1:

e Unit 1 is at 100 % power.

1NV-244A (Charging Line Cont Outside Isol) fails closed.

Immediate Actions of AP/I/A/5500/12 (Loss of Letdown or Cbarging) are performed.

Assume no further Qperator actions are taken.

Reference Provided:

Data Book Which one (1) of the following describes when the Pressurizer would become INOPERABLE per Technical Specifications?

A. Approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months due to low level.

B. Approximately 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months due to low level.

C. Approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months due to high level.

D. Approximately 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months due to high level.

Analysis: When1NV-244 closes and letdown is isolated, 'INV-238 will throttle down to its minimum flow limit of 32 gpm. Assuming 12 gprn seal return flow that leaves a net positive flow of 20 gpm into the NC System.

Per DATA book curve 7.38,55% level = 8000 gals. 92% level = 12700 gals.

12900-8000 = 4700 gals.

4700 gals/20 gpm = 235 minutes (approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) until Reactor trip 4700 galdl2 gpm = 392 minutes (approximately 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months ) until Reactor trip If the examinee incorrectly assumes level will decrease to 17 % (3000 gals per the curve), 8000-3000 = 5000 gals, 5000gaIs120gpm = 250 minutes (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months )

Ques-1088.doc

5000galsll2gpm = 419 minutes (7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months Blstracter Analysis:

A. Incorrect:. Level will increase not decrease.

Plausible: If examinee thinks there is a net negative charging flow imbalance of 20 gprn.

B. Incorrect:. Level will increase not decrease.

Plausible: If examinee thinks there is a net negative charging flow imbalance of 12 gpm.

C. Correct:

D. Inccarrect:. Level will increase at a rate of 20 gprn.

Plausible: If examinee thinks charging flow imbalance of 12 gpm.

Levei: SRO KA: 000022 AA2.04 (2.913.8)

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-PS-ILE Qbj 7 & 12 Source: NEW Level of knowledge: Analysis

References:

1. Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-ILE page 17

2. Tech Spec 3.4.9, Pressurizer

' 8 APE 022 Loss of Reaftor Coolant Makeup

/

AAI. Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant plllnrp Makeup:

(CFR 41.7 145.5 145.6)

AA1.O1 CVCS letdown and charging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 3.3 A A I .02 CVCS charging low flow alarm, sensor, and indicator . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 2.9 AA.l.03 PZR level trend ...................................... 3.2 3.2 AA1.04 S p e d demand controller and m i n g indicators (positive displacementpump) ................................... 3.3 3.2' I AA1.05 RCP seal back pressure regulator valves and flow indicators . . . . . . . . . 2.9' 2.8' AA1.06 CVCS charging pump ammeters and running indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 2.7 AA1.07 Excess letdown containment isolation vaive switches and indicators ..... 2.8" 2.7' AA1.08 VCTlevel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 3.3 AA1.09 RCP seal flows, temperatures, pressures, and vibrations . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 3.3 AM. Ability to determine and interpret the following BS they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Makeup:

(CFR: 43.5 145.13)

AA2.01 Whether charging line leak exists .......................... 3.2 3.8 AA2.02 Chrgingpumpproblems ............................... 3.2 3.7 AA2.03 Failures of flow control valve or controller .................... 3.1 3.6 AA2.04 How long PZR levei can be maintained within limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 3.8 4.2-13 NUREG-1122, Rev. 2 I

DUKE POWER MCGUIRE OPERATIONS TRAINING OBJECTIVES

- I L e P P QBJECTlVE w S 0 - 0 Describe the protection (signals, setpoints, permissives) X X associated with Pressurizer level (logic not required).

Describe the actions the operator must take to restore X X Pressurizer heater operation following a low level heater cutoff.

For any Pressurizer Level Control System input signal failure, X X determine the effect and evaluate operator action to be taken.

Determine program Pressurizer level for interim power levels X x between 0% and 100%.

Concerning the Technical Specifications related to the Pressurizer Level Control System:

0 Given the LCO title, state the LCO (including any COLR X X values) and applicability.

a For any LCO's that have action required within one hour X X state the action.

0 Given a set of parameter values or system conditions, X X determine if any Tech Spec LCO's is (are) not met and any action(s) required within one hour.

a Given a set of parameters or system conditions and the X X appropriate Tech Specs, determine required action(s).

8 Discuss the bases for a given Tech Spec LC8 or Safety X Limit

SRO ONLY OP-MC-PS-ILE M R TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 17 Page ? O f 45

Pressurizer I

3.4.9 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYS%%M(RCS) 3.4.9 Pressurizer LCO 3.4.9 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with:

a. Pressurizer water level 5 92% (1 600 ft3); and

b. Two groups of pressurizer heaters OPERABLE with the capacity of each group 2 150 kW.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETTsON TIME A. Pressurizer water level A.1 Be in MODE 3 with reactor 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months not within limit. trip breakers open.

AND e _

A.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months B. One required group of B.1 Restore required group of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months pressurizer heaters pressurizer heaters to inoperable. OPERABLE status.

C. Required Action and C.4 Be in MODE 3.

associated Completion Time of Condition B not -AND met.

6.2 Be in MODE 4.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.4.9-1 Amendment Nos. 184/166

ff UKE POWER MCGUIRE OPERATIONS TRAINING CLASSROOM TIME (Hours)

OBJECTIVES OBJECTIVE State the purpose of the Pressurizer Level Control System.

Draw the Pressurizer Level Control System per training drawing 9.2.

Describe the Pressurizer Level Control System Program (include values and source signal for program development).

Describe how the level in the Pressurizer is raised or lowered to match the Program Level by the Pressurizer Level Control System.

Describe the controls and indications associated with the Pressurizer Level Control System.

Bescribe the effect that the integral function has on the output of the Pressurizer Level Master Controller.

Describe the effect on the Pressurizer Level Control System when the setting on the potentiometer on the Pressurizer Level Master Controller is changed.

Bescribe the effect on the Pressurizer Level Control system when the Level Master output is increased or decreased while the controller is in manual.

Describe all automatic control functions (alarms and protection) that occur when Pressurizer level deviates from programmed level (include setpoint).

OP-MC-PS-!LE FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 17 Page 5 of 45

--- DUKE POWER MCGUIRE OPERATIONS TRAINING I Objective #6 I Integral means that the longer the input error signal exists, the larger the demand for control response. If actual level deviates from program level for a substantial amount of time, a significant demand for control response will develop. Once level has returned to program, this demand will slowly decrease causing level to overshoot or undershoot program setpoint depending on the direction of the initial level deviation.

To clear this integral signal, the controller must be placed in manual, positioned to the desired output for actual conditions and then placed back in auto.

2.4.1. PZR Level Master MAN-AUTO Station This station allows the input error signal to vary the controller output in the automatic mode, or allows manual control of controller output. The output is sent to the NV-238 and Positive Displacement (PD) Pump MAN-AUTO stations.

A potentiometer is provided on the controller to set a minimum limit on charging flow to ensure seal injection flow is maintained. The setting of 0 -10 turns corresponds to 0 -

200 gpm. The normal setting is 1.75 turns or 35 gpm. This function is bypassed when the controller for NV-238 is placed in manual. This pot is set up per OW1 (2)/8/6200/001A (Chemical and Volume Control System Letdown) Enc. 4.1.

When in MANUAL, the output of the controller sets a fixed position for NV-238 or a fixed speed for the PD Pump. Increasing the output causes NV-238 to open or PD Pump speed to increase. Decreasing the output causes NV-238 to close or PD Pump speed to decrease. (NV238 and/or PD Pump speed in Auto)

I Objective #4 I 2.4.2. NV-238 MAN-AUTO Station This station is used to control the position of NV-238. In AUTO, it compares the output of the Level Master to actual charging flow to position valve for needed charging flow. In MAN, open/close push-buttons are used to position the valve.

I Obiective #4 I 2.4.3. PD Pump MAN-AUTO Station This station is used to control the speed of the PD Pump. in AUTO, the output of the controller controls PD Pump speed. In MAN, raise/lower push-buttons are used to adlust speed. The automatic feature of this controller is not currently used here at McGuire. IAE does not maintain AUTO, never place the PD Pum-p Controller in AUTO.

OP-MC-PS-ILE FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 17 Page 17 of 45

OMP 4-3 Page 4 of 29 4.3 All Personnel who use procedures.

4.3.1 Must follow procedures in compliance with NSD-703 (Administrative Instructions for Station Procedures) and this OMP.

4.3.2 Contac.t the EWAP procedure staff to correct procedural inadequacies as they x e discovered.

4.4 All licensed operators shall memorize immediate actions of erne.rgency and abnonnal procedures.

4.5 Shift Support Assistant 4.5.1 Replenishes Working Copy file.

4.5.2 Ensures completed APs and EP's arc routed to the Operations Work Process Manager (or designee) for routing to Master File.

4.5.3 Makes new Control copies if a Control Copy has been used.

5. Reporting Requirements None

ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RSSiUTSE NOT OBTAINED C. QDerator Actions 0 IF a loss of charging through the Tiegenerative HX has occurred, ensure the following are closed:

- 0 1NV-458A (75 GPM UB Orifice Outlet coflt Isol)

-

1NV-457A (45 GPM UD Orifice Outlet Cont Isol)

- e 1NV-35A (Variable UD Orifice Outlet Cent Isol).

VOLUME (GALLONS)

Bank Qztesstiost: 1089 ,4nswev: A 1 Pt(S) 1Jnit 2 was operating at 10Oo/o power when OCA occurred.

Given the following events and conditions:

e The crew has entered EPlliA/OO!E-O (Reactor Trip or S&v d

Injection) z.. 3 a Containment pressure reached has %$psi e The inadequate core cooling inonitor indicates -10 degrees subcooling.

e All NI and NV pumps have malfunctioned and will not start.

What action (if any) should the crew take regarding the KCPs?

A. Secure all NCPs.

B.

C.

Secure 3 NCPs and ~ A W1 running.

No action, the XCPs must continue t

\.-- /;b I1 */,-.rzc D. NCPs must continue to run, unless H vibration is reached.

-i

____s__s_______s__s_ss-- _-_____-----

i!~---&E--.&L --------

Distracter Analysis:

A. C h ~ e c tThe NC pumps should be tripped when Phase B occurs per Oh4P 4-3 guidance due to the loss of RU and KC to the N C Pumps B. Incorrect: .

C. Incorrect:

Plausible:

D. Inrorrect:

Plausible:

1-evel:SRO 10CFR55.43(b)5 KA: 2.4.49 (4.0i4.0)

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-EP-INTRO Obj 18 OP-RIC-ADM-OMP Obj 8 Source: BANK Catawba 2003 NRC exam Level of knowledge: Memory

References:

1. Lesson R a n OP-MC-EP-KTRO page 59

2. OMP 4-3>Use of Abnornul arid Emergency Procedures, page 4 Ques-lO89.doc

1 Pt(sj LJnit 2 was operating at 100% power when a large I,OCA occurred.

Given the following events and conditions:

e The crew has entered EI3!I:A~5000!E-0(Reactor Trip or Saj6ty In;ectzonj e Containment pressure reached has 3.5 p i g and incrcaring.

B The inadequate core cooling monitor indicates -I0 degrees suhcooling.

e A11 NI and NV pumps have malfunctioned and will not start.

What action (if any) should the c.rew take regarding the NCFs'!

A. Secure ail NCPs.

B. Secure 3 NCPs and leave I running.

C. NQaction, the X C Y s must coiiti~ueto run.

H). NCPs must continue to r ~ nunless

, HI-HI vibration is reached.

Ques-1089.doe

1 Pt(s) Unit 2 was operating at 100% power when a large LQSA occurred Given the following events and conditions:

The crew has entered E-0 (Reucfor Containment pressure reached 0 The inadequate core coolin es -10 degrees subcooling.

All NI and NV pumps h ctioned and will not start.

What action (if any) s ie crew take regarding the NCPsY NCPs and leave 1 running.

tion, the NCPs must continue to run.

Ps must continue to run, unless HI-HI vibration is reached.

Ques-lOS9.doc

Bank Question: 1089 Answer: A 1 Pt(s) Unit 2 was operating at 100% power when a large LOCA occurred.

Given the following events and conditions:

e The crew has entered E-0 (Reactor Trip or Sufeq Injection)

Containment pressure reached lias 3.5 psig and increasing.

The inadequate core cooling monitor indicates -10 degrees subcooling.

All M and NV pumps have malfunctioned and will not start.

What action (if any) should the crew take regarding the N C R ?

A. Secure all NCPs.

B. Secure 3 NCPs and leave 1 running.

C. No action, the NGPs must continue to run.

D. NCPs must continue to run, unless HI-HI vibration is reached.

Distracter Analysis:

A. Correct: The KC pumps should be tripped when Phase B occurs per OMF' 4-3 guid'ance due to the loss of F W and KC to the KC Pumps B. Incorrect: .

C. Incorrect:

Plausible:

D. Incorrect:

Plausible:

Level: SKO lWFK55.43@)5 KA: 2.4.49 (4.0/4.0)

Lesson Plan Objective: OP-MC-EP-WTKO Obj 18 OP-MC-ADM-OMP Obj 8 Source: RANK Catawba 2003 NRC exan Level of knowledge: Mcniory

References:

I. Lesson Plan 01'-MC-EP-INTKO page 59

2. OMP 4-3, IJse of Abnormal and Emergency Procedures, page 7 Ques-1089.doc

2.4 Emergency Procedures /Plan (Continued) 2.4.M Knowiedge of emergency plan protective adion mcomwewdatiom.

(CFR: 43.5 145.11)

IMPORTANCE R4) 2.1 SRO 4.0 2.4.45 AbiEty to prioritize and interpret the significance of each a n n ~ ~ 5 & 0orr alarm.

(CFW: 43.5 145.3 145.12)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.3 sa0 3.6 2.4.46 AbiIity to verify that the d m s are consistent with the plant C O ~ & ~ ~ O I B .

(CFR: 43.5 I 45.3 145.12)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 sa0 3.6 2.4.47 Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely m w e r utilizing the appropriate c ~ n t r drwm reference material.

(CFR: 41.10.43.5 145.12)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SWO 3.7 2.4.48 Ability to interpret contrd i-wm indications to verify the status and operation of system, and mdwstawd h ~ w operator actions and directives p h t md SYSteEll CQIldithS.

(CFR: 43.5 145.12)

MPORTANCE RO 3.5 SRQ 3.8 2.4.49 Ability to perform without reference to procedures those actions that require immediate operation OP system compneaats md controls.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.6)

IMPORTANCE WO 4.0 SRO 4.0 2.4.50 Ability t~ verify system d m setpin$ md operate controls identifled in the dam respnse manual.

(CFR: 45.3)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.3 SRQ 3.3 NUREG-1122,Rev. 2 2-16

DUKE PO WEff MCGUIRE OPERATIONS TffAINIMG OBJECTlVE Apply the EP Rules of Usage to determine required actions once a procedural action step has been initiated, but is not yet completed.

EPINTROOIO

~

Describe the action to be taken when a RED, O R A N G ,

and/or YELLOW condition@)i s h e identified.

EPINTROOII Discuss the roles of the Control Room Personnel with respect to Emergency Procedure implementation as described in OMF 4-3, Use of Abnormal and Emergency Procedures EPINTR0012 Explain when and why procedure ES-0.0, Rediagnosis, is used.

EPlNTROOl3 State the conditions which define Adverse Containment Conditions and discuss the impact on Emergency Procedure implementation.

EPINTR0014 State the sources of subcooling indication which are to be used when using the EP's, and state why subcooling is an important parameter to monitor.

EPINTRO015 Discuss the basis for SA termination, and list the parameters s e d to justify S/I termination.

EPINTRQOIG Discuss the S/l reinitiation criteria in terms of the parameters monitored and typical action if criteria is reached.

EPINTR0017 Discuss the csnsiderations for NC pump operation including trip criteria and its applicability.

EPINTR0018 OP-MC-EP-INTRQ FOR TRAlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 02 Page 7 of 63

DUKE PO WEB P MCGUIRE OPERATIONS TRAlNlNG On a Phase B isolation signal, cooling water (RN and KC) for the NC pumps is isolated. If the pumps remained in operation the motors would rapidly overheat and severe damage could occur. Unless the procedure has directed otherwise, such as in Response to Degraded Core Cooling, the pumps should be tripped on a Phase B signal. This Is one of the few subsequent actions that can be performed prior to the step being read.

The same philosophy is true regarding Abnormal Procedure trip criteria. Unless the procedure has directed otherwise, a pump should be tripped whenever an operating limit is exceeded.

At several places in the EPs, It is an advantage to restart a NC pump. This enhances heat removal andor provides better NC system temperature, pressure, and Pzr level control.

Under post-accident conditions, the pump parameters of the operating procedure may not be within the limits of pump operation. In these cases, the Ps recommend that a minimum set of conditions be established to allow pump start.

When they are met, the pumps can the be started.

5.5. Cooldown Rate When an Emergency Procedure specifies to maintain cooldown in NC T-Colds less than 100°F in an hour, the amount of cooldown performed over the last 60 minutes must be considered.

6.0

SUMMARY

The Westinghouse Owners Group issued the ERGS based on two complementary and interrelated guideline subsets, one of which is event based, and the other of which is symptom based. The EPs provide prioritized guidance for the operating crew to maintain the Critical Safety Functions and prepare for plant recovery.

To ensure smooth transitions, the E F s have been written in a human factored two-column format. This format provides for only two entry points and a minimum of Immediate Operator Actions.

Enclosures are used for advising the crew on conditions that must be continuously monitored, and to provide detailed direction for complex evolutions.

The rules of use are provided to assure consistent application of the procedures by all operating crews.

Several concepts are generic to all the EPs, including Adverse Containment Conditions, maintenance of subcooling margin, termination and reinitiation of Sil, and operation of the NC pumps.

OP-MC-EP-INTRO FOR TRAlNiNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 02 Page 59 of 63

DUKE POWER MCGUIRE OPERA TlONS TRAINING OBJECTIVES OBJECTlVE Concerning QMP 4-3, Use of Abnormal and Emergency Procedures:

Describe the responsibility of licensed operators for maintaining knowledge of and implementation of immediate actions.

State management's expectations for manual initiation of Safequards Actions.

State the expected action BO'S and SWO's are to take if an automatic action, which should have occurred, failed.

Describe the Operations policy on when Non-procedural blocking of Automatic Safety Actuations could be done.

Given a set of plant conditions, determine if an A.T.W.S.

(Anticipated Transient Without Scram) which would require a manual Reactor Trip has occurred or if a failure of the reactor trip breakers or the automatic trip feature of the reactor protection system had occurred which would require a plant shutdown.

State three subsequent actions that can be taken prior to procedure direction (include conditions that allow these actions to be taken).

State when Adverse Containment Setpoints are used.

Describe the Control Room Team Responsibilities During the use of EP/APs.

Define the following items:

Check, ensure, faulted, ruptured, implement, intact, go to, refer to. per, stable, evaluate.

Describe the "rules of use" of the Two Column Format Procedure.

ADMOMP004 OP-MC-ADM-OW FOR TRAiNiNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 18 Page 9 of 33

OMP 4-3 Page 7 of 29 9.3 Abnormal Procedure Usage:

Entry into an abnormal procedure is based on an evaluation of symptoms referenced in the respective procedure. There are times when symptoms exist that are at the Level that the applicable ahnomid procedure would be implemented. Those situations would be addressed by existing operating and/or almn response procedures. WHEN more than one 4P is applicable at the same time, the Control Room SKO will determine how many procedures can be implemented at a time and their priority based upon manpower available and ability to maintain control of the situation running more than one procedure at a time.

9.4 Immediate and Subsequent Actions Immediate actions are to be performed immediately upon the recognition of the event.

Immediate ac.tions should be. performed prior to the SRO reading them. WHEN the SKO does read the immediate action, the RO will ensure that all the requirements of the step have bee.n fully implemented.

Subsequent action steps should be performed as the SRO reads the steps. ROs should NOT perform steps prior to the SRO reading the step. This practice can mask "root cause" symptoms of the event in progress, especially when performing EP/l(2)/r2/5000E-O (Keactor Trip or Safety Injection).

The only subsequent actions that can be taken prior to procedure direction are the following:

1. CA may be reset and controlled to a S / G when that S/G reaches its normal level setpoint.

2. Known leaks may be isolated. Note that if procedure covers isolation of leak, it is usually preferable to wait until procedure step is reached. License.d operator may isolate leak prior to reaching step only if plant conditions reauire it to be done..

3. NC Pumps may he tripped on an Sp signal due to the loss of support functions unless the procedure has directed otherwise.

EP/l/N5000/E-O

- 12. -

Check all SIG pressures GREATER Perform the following:

M A N 775 PSG.

a. Check the following closed:

- All MSVs All MSIV bypass valves

- All SM PORVs

b. E any valve open, THEN:

- I ) Initiate Main Steam Isolation signal.

- 2) E any valve still open, THEN close valve.

- 13. Check Containment Pressure HAS

~ Perform the following:

REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG.

NOTE The time of reactor trip may be used in subsequent procedures to determine when ND aux containment spray should be aligned.

- a. Record approximate time of reactor trip.

- b. Check Monitor Light Group 4, Row (3, lit.

(RNOcontinued on next page)

13. (Continued)

c. any Row G window is dark on energized train@), perform the following:

- 1) Initiate Phase Band Containment Spray signal.

2) E Row G window is still dark, m:

Check OAC Monitor Light Program ("MQNL") for Phase B, and align valves.

- CIA6 is cut of service, T u ensure Phase B valves closed EP/1/N5000/6-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 12 (Phase E Valve Checklist),

while continuing in this EP.

d. Stop all NC pumps while maintaining seal injection flow.

- e. Ensure all RV pumps are in manual and off.

- f. Energize HZ Igniters by depressing "ON" and "OVERRIDE".

g. Dispatch operator to stop all NF AMUs (control panels located in 750 and 733 electrical penetration rooms).

- h. time allows, THEN cheek Phase E3 HVAC equipment PER Enclosure 2 (Phase B HVAC Equipment).

ML033421062

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SUMMARY

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