ML033420172

Addendum to License Amendment Request Submitted 05/21/03

ML033420172
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	12/01/2003
From:	Mecredy R Rochester Gas & Electric Corp
To:	Clark R Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML033420172 (22)

Text

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Robert C. Mecredy RdI1if Always at Your Service Vice President Nuclear Operations December 1, 2003 Mr. Robert L. Clark Office of Nuclear Regulatory Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject:

Addendum to License Amendment Request submitted May 21, 2003.

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244

References:

1. Letter from Robert C. Mecredy (RG&E) to Robert L. Clark (NRC) dated May 21, 2003, License Amendment Request Regarding Revision of Ginna Technical Specification Sections 1.1, 3.3.6, 3.4.16, 3.6.6, 3.7.9, 5.5.10, 5.5.16, and 5.6.7 Resulting From Modification of the Control Room Emergency Air Treatment System and Change in Dose Calculation Methodology to Alternate Source Term.

2. Letter from Robert C. Mecredy (RG&E) to Guy S. Vissing (NRC) dated May 3, 2001, Application for Amendment to Facility Operating License Control Room Emergency Air Treatment System (CREATS) Actuation Instrumentation Change (LCO 3.3.6).

Dear Mr. Clark:

On May 21, 2003, Rochester Gas and Electric (RG&E) submitted a License Amendment Request (LAR) as indicated in Reference 1. As part of that submittal, RG&E committed to "resubmit proposed changes to LCO 3.3.6 and the associated draft bases upon NRC approval of RG&E License Amendment Request dated May 3, 2001" (Ref. 2). Reference 2 has since been approved as Amendment 83 to the Ginna Technical Specifications. The attached markup and typed versions of LCO 3.3.6 satisfy the above commitment and should be docketed as an addendum to Reference 1.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that I am authorized by Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation to submit this documentation and that the foregoing is true and correct.

If you have questions regarding this submittal please contact Mr. Mike Ruby at (585) 771-3572.

Sincerely Executed on December 1, 2003 Robert C. Mecredy ItbOSC15 An equal opportunity employer 89 East Avenue I Rochester, NY 14649 MD tel (585) 546-2700 www.rge.com An Energy East Company

Attachments:

1. Tech Spec Section 3.3.6 Markup

2. Tech Spec Section 3.3.6 Typed

3. Bases Section 3.3.6 Markup Cc: Mr. Robert L. Clark (Mail Stop 0-8-C2)

Project Directorate I Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Regulatory Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Regional Administrator, Region 1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 U.S. NRC Ginna Senior Resident Inspector Mr. Peter R. Smith, Acting President New York State Energy, Research, and Development Authority Corporate Plaza West 286 Washington Avenue Extension Albany, NY 12203-6399 Mr. Paul Eddy NYS Department of Public Service 3 Empire State Plaza, 10th Floor Albany, NY 12223

Attachment I Tech Spec Section 3.3.6 Markup

CREATS Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.6 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6 Control Room Emergency Air Treatment System (CREATS) Actuation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.Ei The CREATS actuation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE.

I A'lc~ccrdlAIll. TA iIC B 2,A&4-I APPLICABILITY:

, . . ._ _ _ -g -

_ ._, .I._.

- Q' G- =A 4----- . rw__r z-VssslW ACTIONS

-NOTE-Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION lCOMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions A.1 I with one channel or train inoperable. -NOE W - j inpeabeTero roo ay be unisolate houry h eve oure in this Pition7 I Place GREATS in Mode r.7 days B. One or more FunctionsK B.14I with two channels or twc trains inoperable.  !: - NOTf-6E -- - --

The tol ro my be unisolate 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> every e in this Iours Placeion.

I HODS, Place GREA+ gimModeu ^. Immediately I C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition A or B AND I not met in MODE 1,2, 3, or 4. C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.3.6-1 Amendment4

CREATS Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.6 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and 9D.1 SupOnd CORE 4moediately associated Completion ALTERATIGOG.

I Time of Condition A or B not met during movement ALJ I of irradiated fuel /

assemblies eD D./ Suspend movement of Immediately eeORE AFT~rvATI~ti. irradiated fuel assemblies.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

-NOTE-Refer to Table 3.3.6-1 to determine which SRs apply for each CREATS Actuation Function.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SR 3.3.6.2 Perform COT. 92 days SR 3.3.6.3 ---- -NOTE-Verification of setpoint is not required.

Perform TADOT. 24 months SR 3.3.6.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 24 months SR 3.3.6.5 Perform ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. 24 months 8.1.2 Enter applicable Immediately Conditions and Required -

Actions for one-eREFS e ,R 4T\

train made inoperable by inoperable CREFS r A.6 T5 62> e actuation instrumentation.

OR B.2 Place botArains in Immediately emergency lradiater

-pfeteeofiw3mode.

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.3.6-2 Amendment43-

CREATS Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.6 Table 3.3.6-1 CREATS Actuation Instrumentation I EQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION 1 HANNELS REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Manual Initiation 2 trains SR 3.3.6.3 NA

2. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays 2 trains SR 3.3.6.5 NA l3. Control Room Radiation Intake Monitors 2 SR 3.3.6.1 5 .5 mRlhr SR 3.3.6.2 I~

-;SR

} 3.3.6.4 qq, S~i7,

• c 4 a - fsj'cr_ sRc, a ecO E.F~ 2 /

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\ c~L) ture, 1.~Je,.¶E'AJ7'el4 1 AirXo t ' 's- b 2, ,_ (_.

CCf/ 316 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.3.6-3 Amendment-ea-

Attachment 2 Tech Spec Section 3.3.6 Typed

CREATS Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.6 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6 Control Room Emergency Air Treatment System (CREATS) Actuation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6 The CREATS actuation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE.

I APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.6-1.

ACTIONS

-NOTE-Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions A.1 Place one CREATS train in 7 days I with one channel or train emergency mode.

inoperable.

B. One or more Functions B.1.1 Place one CREATS train in Immediately I with two channels or two emergency mode.

trains inoperable.

AND B.1.2 Enter applicable Conditions Immediately and Required Actions for one CREATS train made inoperable by inoperable CREATS actuation instrumentation.

OR B.2 Place both CREATS trains Immediately I in emergency mode.

C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition A or B AND not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.3.6-1 Amendment

CREATS Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.6 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l D. Required Action and D.1 Suspend movement of Immediately associated Completion irradiated fuel assemblies.

Time of Condition A or B not met during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- NOTE -

Refer to Table 3.3.6-1 to determine which SRs apply for each CREATS Actuation Function.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SR 3.3.6.2 Perform COT. 92 days SR 3.3.6.3 -NT Verification of setpoint is not required.

Perform TADOT. 24 months SR 3.3.6.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 24 months SR 3.3.6.5 Perform ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. 24 months R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant3362Amnet3.3.6-2 Amendment

CREATS Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.6 Table 3.3.6-1 CREATS Actuation Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Manual Initiation 1,2,3,4, 2 trains SR 3.3.6.3 NA (a)

2. Automatic Actuation Logic and 1,2,3,4, 2 trains SR 3.3.6.5 NA Actuation Relays (a)

3. Control Room Radiation Intake 1,2,3,4,. 2 SR 3.3.6.1 * .5 mR/hr Monitors (a) SR 3.3.6.2 SR 3.3.6.4

4. Safety Injection Referto LCO 3.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation,' Function 1, for all initiation functions and requirements.

(a) During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.3.6-3 Amendment

Attachment 3 Bases Section 3.3.6 Markup Note: These bases pages are being provided for information only to show the changes that RG&E intends to make following approval of the LAR. The bases are under RG&E control for all changes in accordance with Specification 5.5.13. RG&E requests that the NRC document acceptance of these bases changes in the SER.

CREATS Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.6 Control Room Emergency Air Treatment System (CREATS) Actuation Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The CREATS provides a protected environment from which operators C E ,q. can control the plant following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity.

This system is described in the Bases for LCO 3.7.9, "Control Room Emergency Air Treatment System (CREATS).' This LCO only addresses w~~ th actuation instrumentation 4er the high radiation state GREATS Modo 0'- O The high radiation actuation instrumentation iuJ ectfc' (sI) consists of two GM probe radiation monitors installed in the outside air I n,; ,}et /

V 8 rial Z oAb J intake for the control room ventilation system. A high radiation signal v from either of these detector ill Wtiato the CREATS filtration train and

__icolato oaoh air cuppl' path with two dampers. The control room operator can also OiiatA tha 6A PATS f fiat tFainandirolate the ek-euppky- '

AC d tk C-eg2'

-C 7t

= ehhe~l twe manual pushbuttons in the control room.

APPLICABLE cation of components and CREATS related ducting within SAFETY contro emergency zone envelope ensures an adeq supply of ANALYSES filtered air to ads requiring access. The CRE rovides airborne radiological protection econtrol room ouors in MODES 1, 2, 3, 0 and 4, as demonstrated by the tro maccident dose analyses for the most limiting design basi rflzst accident and steam generator tube rupture . 1). This analysis ws that with credit for the CREATS, or rdit for instantaneous isolation e control room coincident e accident initiator and no CREATS filtration ava the dose rates to control room personnel remain within GD

-i s.

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.3.6-1 Revision-R&!

Te control room must be kept habitable for the operators stationed there during accident recovery and post accident operations.

The CREATS acts to terminate the supply of unfiltered outside air to the control room, and to initiate filtration. These actions are necessary to ensure the control room is kept habitable for the operators stationed there during accident recovery and post accident operations by minimizing the radiation exposure of control room personnel. One train of filtration in conjunction with isolation is sufficient to maintain control room doses within established limits.

a) -e,- Control Room doses were analyzed per Regulatory Guide 1.183, Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors (Ref. 6). Per reference 7, Safety Injection is credited with initiating the CREATS emergency mode within the time assumed in the dose analysis for LOCA, SGTR and MSLB accidents. For other analyzed accidents (Rod Ejection, Locked RCP Rotor, Fuel Handling Accident, SFP Tornado Missile), the high radiation signal is the primary protection. CREATS actuation is not required for GDT Rupture, although the analysis demonstrates that actuation will occur from the radiation monitors for this event.

• resew+.. d I 6/a

/o( 7hcC ~ 4 tA e°oA reca /CcIc a14*( CREATS Actuation Instrumentation 5RF '5Cq

/e ' e T eeAgeto The Allowable Value for the Control Room Radiation Intake Monitors is (6 , ,e

3) a s ed on a correlation to the limit specified in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, t; a nd the guidance provided by the NRC in NUREG-0737 section K(QeX Lllf II.B.Z Dose Rate Criteria, and NUREG-0800 section 6.4, Control Room

-'R tHabability Prograg This is a maximum of 5 rem body dose, with a 30 ay'weighted average dose rate of less than 15 mR/hr. This allowable L e

• y value is calculated in accordance with the Ginna Station Setpoint Verification Program and will provide for isolation of the control room ventilation system which will prevent exceeding these limits., he current control rom accident dose calculations conservatively assume that the 60 cloud released during the accident enters the control room envelope for

\9second prior to ventilation system isolation. The response time of the Control Room Radiation Intake Monitors to an actual release is bounded t(34o sec',wd yebythetimeusedintheanalyses During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies or duri G r ALTEURATIONFC, the CREATS ensures control room habitability in the td rt event of a fuel handling accident. It has been demonstrated that the crctld', 9 1>Ar CREATS is not required in the event of a waste gas decay tank rupture d '

The CREATS Actuation Instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO The LCO requirements ensure that instrumentation necessary to initiate the CREATS is OPERABLE.

1. Manual Initiation The LCO requires two trains to be OPERABLE. A train consists of one pushbutton and the interconnecting wiring to the actuation em r8 C/

logic. The o eratorcan initiate the CREATS X~e- filtitin A tany Mo (E>./Ti geby usingIpushbuttontin the control room. This eotionwill r -go cut,2iGR Of 211 cOMPGROntS X2Mo _ in tht msar 9n iO of

~ ~

£~~CA ~; If t~ho awtematii aetuotieR rignole FeqUircd by this LCOG.

lSole dews gaMa<7e2. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays dl'i~t~oc %i4J tThe LCO requires two trains of Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays to be OPERABLE. Actuation logic consists of all circuitry associated with manual initiatioland Control Room Radiation

• 4a rat 7<J~rWbc Intake Monitors within the actuation system, including the initiation relay contacts responsible for actuating the CREATS.

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.3.6-2 Revision -6O

/e Au-tomatic SI Actuation Logic an cuato Relays cost of thsao r features and operate in the same manner as described for ESFAS Function I~b.,

/ ~~~~SI, in LCO 3.3.2. The applicable MODES'and specified conditions for the

/ 3i CREATS portion of these functions are different and less restrictive than those specified for their SI roles. If one or more of the SI functions becomes inoperable in such a manner that only the CREATS function is affected, the Conditions applicable to their SI function need not be entered. The less restrictive Actions specified for inoperability of the CREATS Functions specify sufficient

\q~mpnsatoy meauresfor this case./

CREATS Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.6

3. Control Room Radiation Intake Monitor The LCO specifies two channels of Control Room Radiation Intake Monitors to ensure that the radiation monitoring instrumentation necessary to initiate the CREATS filtration trai nand isolation dampers remains OPERABLE.

The Nominal Trip Setpoint used in the Control Room Radiation Intake Monitors is based on the Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.6-1. The selection of this trip setpoint is such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing time delays, calibration tolerances, instrumentation uncertainties, and instrument drift are taken into account. The Nominal Trip Setpoint specified in plant procedures is therefore conservatively adjusted with respect to the Analytical Limit. If the measured setpoint exceeds the procedural tolerances of the Nominal Trip Setpoint value, the setpoint is considered OPERABLE unless the Allowable Value as specified in Table 3.3.6-1 is exceeded. The Nominal Trip Setpoint specified in the plant procedures bounds the Allowable Value.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the CREATS actuation instrumentation must be OPERABLE to control operator exposure during and following a Design Basis Accident.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies oF durin9gCRE

- -ALTERATIONS, the CREATS actuation instrumentation must be OPERABLE to cope with the release from a fuel handling accident.

ACTIONS The most common cause of channel inoperability is failure or drift of the bistable or process module sufficient to exceed the tolerance allowed by the plant specific calibration procedures. Typically, the drift is found to be small and results in a delay of actuation rather than a total loss of function. This determination is generally made during the performance of a COT, when the process instrumentation is set up for adjustment to bring it within specification. The Was left" Nominal Trip Setpoint must be within the tolerance specified by the calibration procedure. If the 'as found" setpoint exceeds the Allowable Value limit specified in Table 3.3.6-1, the channel must be declared inoperable immediately and the appropriate Condition entered.

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.3.6-3 Revision 26

g 4. ~Safety Injectiona Refer to LCO 3.3.2, Function 1, for all initiating Functions and requirements.

i (D.< - The CREATS emergency mode is also initiated by all Functions that automatically initiate SI. The CREATS emergency mode requirements for these Functions are the same as the requirements for their SI function. Therefore, the requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.6-1. Instead, Function 1, SI, is referenced for all applicable initiating Functions and requirements.

CREATS Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 A Note has been added to the ACTIONS indicating that separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function. The Conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed in Table 3.3.6-1 in the accompanying LCO. The Completion Time(s) of the inoperable channel/train of a Function will be tracked separately for each Function starting from the time the Condition was entered for that Function.

ndition A applies to one or more Functions with one channel of tui

%CR S actuation instrumentation inoperable.

If one radia onitor channel, one manual initiation-ttain, or one automatic actuatioic train is inoperable, 7 days are permitted to restore it to OPERABL atus. In this Coriditron the remaining redundant OPERABLE cha I/train i equate to perform the control room protection function. Howe e overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in th PER E channel/train could result in a loss of function. The 7Completion is based on the low probability of a DB ccurring during this timeod, and ability of the remaining ch Iel/train to provide the required cap ity. If the channel/

train cap be restored to OPERABLE status, the CRE S must be plaedin Mode-F. This accomplishes the actuation instrume ion Function and places the system in a conservative mode of operati TIX4eq'dAction for Condition A is modified by a Note which a the control rooflaeiaLaed for S 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> eve L is allows fresh air makeup to improveronent within the control

• room and ispa a aed on the low proba b d>Xsmakeup period.

Condition B app the failure of two radiation monitor channels,>-u manual initiation trains, automatic actuation logictr i . n this Condition the CREATS actuatiois mentatio capable of performing its intended automatic fu is considered a loss of safety function. The Requi ion is to place thBEATS in -Mode-F immediately. T l pishes the actuation instrumentalo 4nction that m een lost and places the system in a conservative mo eration.

rith i aon for Condition B is modified by a Note which the control roomTd or 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> U los fresh air makeup to impr twitin the control room auu& iae based on the low probability o tM-nngthis makeup period.

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.3.6-4 Revision i;&

A.1 a Condition A applies to the actuation logic train Function of the CREATS, the radiation monitor channel Functions, the manual channel Functions and the SI logic Functions. If one train is inoperable, or one radiation monitor channel is inoperable, 7 days are permitted to restore it to OPERABLE status. The 7 day 0-- Completion Time is the same as is allowed if one train of the mechanical portion of the system is inoperable. The basis for this Completion Time is the same as provided in LCO 3.7.9. If the channel/train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, one CREATS train must be placed in the emergency radiation protection mode of operation. This accomplishes the actuation instrumentation Function and places the plant in a conservative mode of operation.

B.l.l, B.1.2. and B.2 Condition B applies to the failure of two CREATS actuation trains, two radiation

( monitor channels, two manual channels, or two SI actuation trains. The first Required Action is to place one CREATS train in the emergency mode of operation immediately. This accomplishes the actuation instrumentation Function that may have been lost and places the plant in a conservative mode of operation.

DJ <~] The applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.7.9 must also be entered for the CREATS train made inoperable by the inoperable actuation instrumentation. This ensures appropriate limits are placed upon train inoperability as discussed in the Bases for LCO 3.7.9.

Alternatively, both trains may be placed in the emergency mode. This ensures the CREATS function is performed even in the presence of a single failure.

CREATS Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 C.1 and C.2 Condition C applies when the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B has not been met and the plant is in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. The plant must be brought to a MODE that minimizes accident risk. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

D.1 and D.2 Condition D applies when the Required Action and associate Completion Time of Condition A or B has not been met durin movement of irradiated fuel assemblies e duing A6TS Movement

.ORE of irradiated fuel assemblies and CORE ALTEFRATIONFC must be suspended immediately to reduce the risk of accidents that would require CREATS actuation. This places the plant in a condition that minimizes risk. This does not preclude movement of fuel or other components to a safe position.

SURVEILLANCE A Note has been added to the SR Table to clarify that Table 3.3.6-1 REQUIREMENTS determines which SRs apply to which CREATS Actuation Functions.

SR 3.3.6.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of more serious instrument conditions. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is a verification that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

CHANNEL CHECK acceptance criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit.

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.3.6-5 Revision-2

CREATS Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 The Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is based on operating experience that deinonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels.

SR 3.3.6.2 This SR is the performance of a COT once every 92 days on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended function. This test verifies the capability of the instrumentation to provide the automatic CREATS actuation. The setpoints shall be left consistent with the plant specific calibration procedure tolerance. The Frequency of 92 days is based on the known reliability of the monitoring equipment and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

SR 3.3.6.3 This SR is the performance of aTADOT of the Manual Initiation Function every 24 months. The Manual Initiation Function is tested up to, and including, the master relay coils.

The Frequency of 24 months is based on the known reliability of the Function and the redundancy available, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints because the Manual Initiation Function has no setpoints.

SR 3.3.6.4 This SR is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION every 24 months, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.

The Frequency of 24 months is based on operating experience and is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle.

SR 3.3.6.5 This SR is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. All possible logic combinations are tested for the CREATS actuation instrumentation. Inaddition, the master relay is tested for continuity. This verifies that the logic modules are OPERABLE and there is an intact voltage signal path to the master relay coils. This test is acceptable based on instrument reliability and operating experience.

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.3.6-6 Revision-26

CREATS Actuation Instrumentation B 3.

3.6 REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.4.

e g ~  ;+-

~ 2. Robert C. Mecredy, RG&E, to Guy S. Vissi

Subject:

App ncen t to F erating License Control Room Emergenm CREATS 7Zs..'k Rup~*Ar~c Q{f~i6 \Applicabili 3.3.6 and LCO 3.7.)

3, /OCrFe &O,-o, AApex- / RDC q C5 t&-o737, 5cfboiV :LC.B.2 osRotCre7.

• f & .*E&6-°O&'OSdo.~cs6 y Cap.&to/ IZOC~b aCo.L e 6t i/ ey Pro,a ra 01" 6.* ehdty# #t G 6v , e. /.& zve pc, '4cc0t eb tr-rA97rt' Ct so~trce 7e',^,. fcr E Dvertepu Baf s r

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-? Q6E , -" tUF5,4 Chyzk /.r Tr,7,o;W 7, a/aa /claim :,Ae-ezl vo. PP U Q COA 15PJZ / Z:Sole-2ec-, eo.

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.3.6-7 RevislonQ&