ML033381118
| ML033381118 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 12/03/2003 |
| From: | Troy Pruett Division of Reactor Safety IV |
| To: | Ridenoure R Omaha Public Power District |
| References | |
| Download: ML033381118 (7) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 61 1 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400 ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4005 December 3,2003 R. T. Ridenoure Division Manager - Nuclear Operations Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm.
P.O. Box 550 Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0550
SUBJECT:
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY DEFICIENCY IDENTIFIED DURING THE NOVEMBER 18,2003, EXERCISE
Dear Mr. Ridenoure:
Enclosed is a copy of the Federal Emergency Management Agencys (FEMA) Region Vlls letter to the Nebraska Emergency Management Agency, dated November 25,2003. This letter discusses two deficiencies identified during evaluation of the November 18, 2003, emergency preparedness exercise of state and local response plans for the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station.
Both of the deficiencies were assessed against the Washington County Emergency Operations Center. FEMA defines a deficiency as, an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant. The first deficiency related to the effectiveness of direction and control provided by the Emergency Management Director at the Washington County Emergency Operations Center. The second deficiency related to decision-making and communication of protective action decisions for special population groups in Washington County.
The purpose of this letter is to communicate FEMAs official notification of the deficiency in accordance with the NRC-FEMA Memorandum of Understanding. No response to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is required.
b The NRC encourages Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station to work with the appropriate off-site governmental agencies to ensure a timely resolution of this issue. The NRC will continue to monitor the status of this issue. In accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding, the NRC and FEMA Region VI will assess the progress made towards resolution of this issue by approximately February 2, 2004, and will decide at that time if additional measures are necessary.
If this issue is not resolved by March 25, 2004, the Federal Emergency Management Agency may withdraw the finding of reasonable assurance according to the requirements of 44 CFR 350.1 3(a). At that time the NRC would take appropriate action according to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(~)(2) and 50.54(~)(3).
Omaha Public Power District If you have any further questions, please contact Ryan E. Lantz at (817) 860-8158, or Paul J.
Elkmann at (81 7) 276-6539.
Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket: 50-285 License: DPR-40 Attach men t :
FEMA Region VI1 Letter to Nebraska Emergency Management Agency, dated November 25,2003 cc w/attachment:
John 9. Herman, Manager Nuclear Licensing Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm.
P.O. Box550 Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0550 Richard P. Clemens, Division Manager Nuclear Assessments Fort Calhoun Station P.O. Box 550 Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0550 David J. Bannister, Manager - Fort Calhoun Station Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station FC-1-1 Plant P.O. Box 550 Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0550 James R. Curtiss Winston & Strawn 1400 L. Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005-3502 Chairman Washington County Board of Supervisors P.O. Box 466 Blair, NE 68008
Omaha Public Power District Sue Semerena, Section Administrator Nebraska Health and Human Services System Division of Public Health Assurance Consumer Services Section 301 Centennial Mall, South P.O. Box 95007 Lincoln, NE 68509-5007 Daniel K. McGhee Bureau of Radiological Health Iowa Department of Public Health 401 SW 7th Street, Suite D Des Moines, IA 50309 Technical Services Branch Chief FEMA Region VI1 2323 Grand Blvd., Suite 900 Kansas City, Missouri 641 08-2670
Omaha Public Power District 121 103 Electronic distribution bv RIV w/o enclosure:
Regional Administrator (BSM1)
DRP Director (ATH)
DRS Director (DDC)
Senior Resident Inspector (JGK)
Branch Chief, DRPIC (KMK)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/C (WCW)
Staff Chief, DRPITSS (PHH)
RlTS Coordinator (NBH)
Jim Isom, Pilot Plant Program (JAI)
Regional State Liaison Officer (WAM)
NRWDIPM/EPB/EPHP (EWW)
N R R/DI PMIEPBIE PH P (REMS)
IRA 121 3 /03 ADAMS: HYes 13 No Initials: nlh H Publicly Available 0 Non-Publicly Available 0 Sensitive H Non-Sensitive
N0.049 P.2/4 U.S. Department of Nomefgnd Security PBM&@onVII 2323 G w d Boulevard, Suite 900 Kansas City, AI0 64108-2654 Wovember 25,2003 Al Berndt, Assistant Director Nebraska Emergency Management Agenoy 1300 Military Road Lincoln, Wi 66508-1090
Dear Mi. Benlclt:
n e purpose of this letter is to offiolally Worn yow office of #he two Deficiencies identified during the November IS, 2003, I11-scalehelocation, re-entry, and return exercise of the state and local radiological emergemy response plans for the Fort QJhoun Nuclear Station. These issues were discussed at the post exercise participants briefing on November 20,2003. The Deficiencies were assessed against the Washington County Emergency Operations Center.
,Washimton Cowntv B?memancv 0perntions.Centor CEOQ 1, Criterion lcl, activities associated with direction and wmtrol, was not adeauat& demonstrated, resulting in a Deficiency. The following specific concern was identified:
Direction and control was never fully established wiw the WasbingEon County 13oc. The Bmergm Management Director never fully asBumed his leadmsbip and coordina~oa role with;a the EOC -lure.
The BOC s&ff worked independently without cm-their activities or informing other staff of their actions, Regvlar briefings by all EOC M, by firnctional area, did not occur untiI evslurrtors indicated to the Emergemy Mapagement Duector (at appmxim#ely 10:15 am,) that tl6s should be clone in order to effectively coordinate activities and inape that no necessary actions were missed, @en after receivirlg this advice h m the evduators, this process was n e w fully engaged and infma~on exchanged witbin the EOC about aotivitiee was incomplete. Examples of problem related to this direction and control failure include:
Accurate information concerning protective ac~otu for echools was never provided to the public. The Blair and Fort cafboun School8 were notified at the Alert (7: 15 a.m.) in accordance with an automatic procedure that is implemented by the Sheriffs Oflice dispatch cenw, When asked what action was taken for the schools, the Emergency Management Director was inifially ync-in about this. Afkx consultation with the State Liaison and others, the Emergency Management Director stated t b t the schools would use their normal evacuation procedures. Later in @e exerclw, i n f o r n t h was circulafed that the schools Piad been notified and closed prYi~r to their n o m 1 start time and h t buses enroute to ~ c k o d would have been turned around. However, no measage went out to the public to www.ba.gov
N0.049 P.34 address ~chool closures and to notify pprenb that their children were being returned home, infomqtion was provided to the piblidcoacerning sc)loO~S or dayoare facilities until an Emergency Public Information PPl) message wa6 mlewed following the Gterieral Bmergency (10:14 a,m,). vlnt mesaage incorrectly indioated that the '~hmls bad been relocated to Fremont High School, Tbge was a peat deal of uncertttinty about the wlian t&m for the sahoals and the @taws of the school children.
It is possible that school children couldlhave bmn *mr;d to their homeg wirhoyt paren&l superyision. This could have posed a skriow threat to their health and safety dwing the evacuaiian of sub areas 1,2, and 3.
I I
0 The Sheriffs Office momel condwt~d back-up route alerting for areas affected by a men outgge (sirens 41 and 42) folloWing the Site *a
&mgeacy at 8:59 4,m. A controller message @out the siren failure at 8:43 a.m. led to muoh 4i' ayasion by the Sheriff P OESice on tbis isaua. However, informatbn about the aotual initiation d oompletion of routs al&g vas dot commwicated to anyone else wjtbin tbe EQC, The Emd CY Msnagment Mctos never directed his staff to initiate this action asd was not aware that they d clone this, There was also confisioa mang Shenff s Office personnel about whether this a i bad been Stiated aad completed, The Sheriffs Office made a decision to vacua@ me yillage of Waehingtq which lies outside &e 10 mile BPZ and thc sub arm evacuated ( 2, aad 31, other BOC sW aad the State were unaware of this action until it wrw mentioned a? the k ghnbg of the post-plumt phase of tbe ekercige. No public informalion QT BAs/E3PI rneseqge was #eased that ad&swd this action.
The Ihnergency Management D k t m fded to 1 ake on a Icadmbip and coordinatiqn mlc with the EOC s t a,
In addition, the EOC staff did not bow what o&cr fuacticqul aseas of the BOC vere aooomplisbing mtil the evaluators asked them to provide EOC briefings; A failurs to establish direction apd GO&-01 resulted in misoonmunicarion within the Wasbingtm Cow EOC and betweeq the EOC and tbe State on impomt bmes concerning +lit sqfety and public infonpation. Comunication ap4 coordinabion in g e n d was insufticient to insure that dl necessary Wtiyities m W c Q P p ~ i ~ d,
Vesed, and aommunicated to qffected I
parties in a timely mawer. (NURW-0654, GI.$, 2.h b.)
I Remedial Actions R q M : A mneditd e x m ~
m t Opemtions Center. Tbis should occur s -$
to f4e Emergency Mauagement Director receiving traintng in Boc direction aad control. In addition, the Weapcl btliqc and faK machine Shoy14 be cpovd to a location Within the EOC to elhahate the Bmerghcy &lawgmmt r>irectar from ha*
m leave the BOC freqrlentlY.
I 0
P I
mnhcted by the Washingtan Camp EmgmGy
'terion 2121, activities associated with protc tive aotion decisim-m&ing for special population groups,
- 2. cn I
was not adeqiatelv demmstmtwl, resulting identified The Washington County plan states that nurs~n~
hames Bnd haspitalc will Fc q c u a 1 4, Dyring the rxercise, then-wrw ~ n n f l k t i n ~
d ~ v n ~ ~ ; ~ - c pWjr: fh" !?E qbmf \\2,+,?t as$;,ons should be taken fpr the nursing home6 and the hospiw located withq the sub areas to be evacuated. n e Health md Human Services rgceaentative stated,?hat these facilities would shelter-hplaoe. Howe~er, fie deparberat peraomel were smmding by to arssipt with evaqutgicm ofmese facilities md there was discussiog vithin the a Deficiency, The folloving specific concern was I
tfalasportatio~ resources to =$;st vvla the eyacuatim of the nyssing homes and the
I hoapita1. There is no evidence that either of tbese protective acfion decisions w-a~
made for the special populations or that these facilities were ever notified (either actually or simulated) about any protective actions to take, The plam and prwedurea for wkng decisions regarding the protection of special pc)pu]ations and faoilitiea were not followed. here was a lack of effective cornmication wi$hin the EOC and beween the EOC and the s@te of Nebraskas faailities. The ineffdve GommaUncation and coordination of the countyy)~
aotions resulted in critical actionis pot being accomplished. As the result of the failwe to nlake and o o m d c a t e deoisioss COnCer?Ib& special feciljtic?s, &eEe popdations were not adequately protected an4 the health and safety of these perS0116 vas oomproomised, (WRW-0654, Jag., lO.cd.e,g.)
Remedid Actions Req#ired: A rmedial exercise must be conducted by the Wpsbingtor, County Emergency Operatiom Center. AU EOC sWshoulcj review plans and procedures and additional b-aioing must be provided concerning the plans and pmcedqrees for the protec~on of special populatj~ns. The Emergency Management Coordinator needs to mswe that plans and procedures ate followed and must closely monitor staff activities within the EQC M ensure that critical aOtion5 are p)ccomplisbed, In &lition, careful logging of BOC activities and regular cosnmdcaiim, both internally and emally, are requjred to effitively coordinate activities and pmvide quality controI.
In accordance with 44 CDR 350,9(d) and the FUIMA Wol~gical
- Emergency Preparedness &mise MqquI
@l3MAW-14)), September 1991, we have thoroughlyreviewed and disoussed these issuss with F E U Headqwtem, the U.S, Nuclear Regulatory Cmqnimion, md approp$& FEMA Region VII Regional Assisfame Chamnittee members. SW-REP-14, page (2.16-1, derines a Dcficienoy as,.
identified inadequacy of 0rgaaiZatifma.l perfonmnw in an exercise tbat could cawe a finding that offsite emergency maredness i s not adequate to provide wswble qs8uranoe fhat appropriate protective measurea can be taken in the event ofa radiological emergewy to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant. Becaupe of sdew, they me reqwed to be corrected Witbin t20 days a 4 a tbe exercise through appropriate remedial actions, including remedial exercises, driIla, plan changes or other actions, Please provide a response to tbe pmpased remedial aotim listed above by Deoembq 5,2003. My Radiological Emergsncy preparedness staff i s available t6 provide assistaoce in acbieving resolution to this issue. Should you have any questionS, please contact MT.
Joe ScMte at (SI 6) 283-70 16, observed or pom~al impact of a Ihfiqieqcy on the public health and Sincerely,
,7 Richard W j e Regional Director