ML033160076

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
VR-CORR-03-0026 - Commissioner Nils Diaz'S Vote on Letter to Rep. Sue Kelly, Responds to Request for Review of Recent Draft Report Prepared by James Lee Witt Associates, LLC Regarding Emergency Preparedness at Indian Point and Millstone Fac
ML033160076
Person / Time
Site: Millstone, Indian Point  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 02/11/2003
From: Diaz N
NRC/Chairman
To:
References
Corr-03-0026, FOIA/PA-2003-0372, FOIA/PA-2003-0379, FOIA/PA-2003-0388, FOIA/PA-2003-0398 VR-CORR-03-0026
Download: ML033160076 (2)


Text

CT CORR: 03-0026 CORR: 03-0026 COMMISSION CORRESPONDENCE Correspondence Response Sheet I agree with the rewrite provided by the Chairrnan's office on 2/11/03.

Date: February4, 2003 To: Chairman Meserve Nilis J. Didt\ l 02\/k /03 Commissioner Dicus /

Commissioner Diaz CommissionerMcGaffigan CommissionerMerrifield From: Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary

Subject:

Letter to Representative Sue W. Kelly responds to request for review of recent draft reportpreparedby James Lee Witt Associates, LLC, regardingemergency preparedness at Indian Pointand Millstone facilities ACTION: Please comment/concur and respond to the Office of the Secretaryby:

Time: NOON Day: Wednesday Date: February12, 2003 Comment:

Contact:

PatriciaMilligan, NRRIEDO

c'D l CNJD-/

415-2223 Entered In STARS Tracking System Ves flyO FEB 0 II: 4,

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION a x / WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 CHAIRMAN The Honorable Hi la Rodham Clinton United State enate WashingtP, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Clinton:

I am responding on behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to your letter of January 22, 2003, in which you requested that the NRC review the recent draft report prepared by James Lee Witt Associates, LLC, for the Governor of the State of New York, regarding emergency preparedness at the Indian Point and Millstone facilities. You also requested that the NRC begin making changes to Federal regulations, as recommended in the draft report. 1-9t The NRC has received a copy of the draft Witt report. The4atters addressed in the draft report in large measure relate to offsite planning and prepajedness, which, at least in the first instance, are matters within the purview of the Federal Em rgency Management Agency (FEMA). While any judgment as to the overall state of emerg ncy, planning and preparedness is for the NRC to reach, in keeping with the longstanding Me orandum of Understanding (MOU) between FEMA and the NRC, we look initially to FE A for its views on the draft report relating to offsite preparedness. One important issue whic ails under our purview relates to plant security and the effect of potential terrorism. We confider it appropriate to comment on this issue as it figures prorpinently in the.conclusions of the V!itt renQrt 4 r

>/>2;4 ~gS>CC~e7S Se/rd~ynyve Vioe'ira 79f~zo;,;66fy7t W&cks<b,'trport appears to give undue weight to the impact of potential acts of terrorism on emergency planning and preparedness. Emergency preparedness programs are designed to I

cope with a spectrum of accidents, including those involving rapid, large releases of radioactivity. Emergency preparedness exercises have invariably included large releases of radioactivity that occur shortly after the initiation of events. Necessary protective actions and offsite response are not predicated on the cause of events. Whether releases from the plant occur as a result of terrorist acts or equipment malfunctions, emergency plans guide decision makers and responders in the same way. Preliminary results from our vulnerability studies do not indicate an increased source term or quicker release from terrorist-initiated events than is already addressed by the emergency planning basis required by NRC regulations and in place at Indian Point.

As FEMA assesses the implications of the'itt report and other relevant information on the state of emergency planning and preparedness, it is important to consider that significant steps have been taken to strengthen security of Indian Point and other nuclear plants since the I

September 2001 terrorist attacks. While all nuclear power plants have been required for many years to have security programs to defend against violent assaults by well-armed attackers, numerous additional steps have been taken since September 2001 to thwart terrorist acts. The NRC issued orders in February 2002 to all operating nuclear power plant licensees to implement compensatory security measures for the current threat environment and also