ML033140534
| ML033140534 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone, Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 11/05/2003 |
| From: | Mcgaffigan E NRC/OCM |
| To: | |
| References | |
| Corr-03-0024, FOIA/PA-2003-0372, FOIA/PA-2003-0379, FOIA/PA-2003-0388, FOIA/PA-2003-0398 VR-CORR-03-0024 | |
| Download: ML033140534 (1) | |
Text
IMP, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 / .
e CHAIRMAN
.oo9 C The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Senator Clinton:
I am responding on behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to your letter of January 22, 2003, in which you requested that the NRC review the recent draft report prepared by James Lee Witt Associates, LLC, for the Governor of the State of New York, regarding emergency preparedness at the Indian Point and Millstone facilities. You also requested that the NRC begin making changes to Federal regulations, as recommended in the draft report.
The NRC has received a copy of the draft Witt report. Th <atters addressed in the draft report in large measure relate to offsite planning and preparedness, which, at least in the first instance, are matters within the purview of the Federal Em rgency Management Agency (FEMA). While any judgment as to the overall state of emerg ncy.planning and preparedness is for the NRC to reach, in keeping with the longstanding Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between FEMA and the NRC, we look initially to FE #A for its views on the draft report relating to offsite preparedness. One important issue which falls under our purview relates to plant security and the effect of potential terrorism. We confider it appropriate to comment on this issue as it figures prorpinently in the-conclusions of the Witt r7pzrt v -r Alhile A9zs , azr4<C-n)z-d
<, ISV5V fi7t7,Wrm-et <oC4 iTheStr'eport appears to give undue weight to the impact of potential acts of terrorism on
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emergency planning and preparedness. Emergency preparedness programs are designed to I cope with a spectrum of accidents, including those involving rapid, large releases of radioactivity. Emergency preparedness exercises have invariably included large releases of
. R-.),I radioactivity that occur shortly after the initiation of events. Necessary protective actions and offsite response are not predicated on the cause of events. Whether releases from the plant occur as a result of terrorist acts or equipment malfunctions, emergency plans guide decision makers and responders in the same way. Preliminary results from our vulnerability studies do not indicate an increased source term or quicker release from terrorist-initiated events than is already addressed by the emergency planning basis required by NRC regulations and in place at Indian Point.
As FEMA assesses the implications of thed"itt report and other relevant information on the state of emergency planning and preparedness, it is important to consider that significant steps have been taken to strengthen security of Indian Point and other nuclear plants since the I.
September 2001 terrorist attacks. While all nuclear power plants have been required for many years to have security programs to defend against violent assaults by well-armed attackers, numerous additional steps have been taken since September 2001 to thwart terrorist acts. The NRC issued orders in February 2002 to all operating nuclear power plant licensees to implemerili curripensatory security measures for the current threat environment and also