ML033140463
| ML033140463 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 07/08/2003 |
| From: | Nease R Division of Reactor Safety IV |
| To: | Alexion T NRC/NRR/DLPM |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2003-0358 | |
| Download: ML033140463 (6) | |
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- Minor changes to the ANO briefing book ;ThrmaS A~exi Re: Minor change to the ANO briefing bookPage 1 From:
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Date:
Subject:
Rebecca Nease I
Alexion, Thomas tJh (I 7/8/03 11:08AM Re: Minor changes to the ANO briefing book Hi Tom, You are right - I forgot the attachments. They are now attached. By distribution I meant anyone to whom you made/gave a copy of the briefing book. I made copies for all NRC folks sitting at the table here in RIV.
In addition, See-Meng developed some slides that I have attached. Please remember that they are DRAFT, and he may not even use them. We'll discuss this in the pre-briefing today.
>>> Thomas Alexion 07/08/03 08:06AM >>>
- Rebecca, 0__ U.,./. '.. _
I think you forgot the attachments in your e-mail.
Tom
>>> Rebecca Nease 07/07/03 04:45PM >>>
- Tom,
\\I.
I Attached is one additional page (Table of Contents - place up front before Tab A) and a corrected page that replaces the last page behind Tab B. Please distribute to the folks that have copies.
Are we all set for tomorrow's pre-briefing at 2 - 3:30 pm CDT? I understand See-Meng Wong and Phil Qualls will be here. I have briefing books for each of them.
Thanks for helping out.
Rebecca CC:
Hannon, John; Qualls, Phil In1format~iOn in this reCOrd was doleted
,1 3acI'dribce wlhjJ~e Fresadomt of Information
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TABLE OF CONTENTS TAB DESCRIPTION A
Agenda Notice of Licensee Meeting B
ANO Fire Protection Finding Summary ANO Fire Protection Issue Time Line C
NRC Inspection Report dated August 20, 2001 D
Memorandum dated September 10, 2001 from Region IV to NRR - TIA Request for Risk Determination of Fire Protection Findings at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (01 TIA1 1)
E Letter dated September 28, 2001, to NRC from ANO - Backfit Claim F
Letter dated April 15, 2002, to ANO from Region IV - Response to Backfit Claim G
Letter dated January 11, 2002, to John Hannon, NRC, from NEI - Use of Manual Actions to Achieve Safe Shutdown for Fire Events H
Letter dated May 16, 2002, to NEI from John Hannon, NRC - Response to NEI's letter Regarding the Use of Manual Actions to Achieve Safe Shutdown for Fire Events I
Memorandum dated September 25, 2002, to Region IV from NRR - Response to TIA Request for Risk Determination of Fire Protection Findings at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (01 TIA1)
J Draft SERP Worksheet for SDP-Related Findings K
Letter dated February 3, 2003, from ANO to NRC - Request for Additional SDP Technical Information L
Letter dated March 25, 2003, to ANO from Region IV - Choice letter M
Letter dated April 2, 2003, to NRC from ANO - Request for Additional SDP Information N
Letter dated April 11, 2003, to ANO from Region IV - Response to ANO's April 2, 2003, Request for Additional Information 0
Miscellaneous Information
ANO FP ISSUE TIME LINE June 11 - 22, 2001 August 3, 2001 August 20, 2001 August 31, 2001 September 7, 2001 September 10, 2001 September 28, 2001 October 26, 2001 January11, 2002 January 17, 2002 April 15, 2002 May 16, 2002 August 20, 2002 September 25, 2002 December10, 2002 January 24, 2003 March 21, 2003 March 25, 2003 April 2, 2003 Inspection Exit - issue was characterized as a URI for compliance review and risk significance Report - Issue was a URI for compliance review and risk significance Re-Exit - compliance review determined that the use of manual actions for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions was a non-compliance with llI.G.2 Phase 2 - resulted irn v
TIA - to HO requesting a Phase 3 Backfit - ANO claimed the violation was a backfit generic to all plants Backfit Panel NEI letter to NRR - generic aspect of using manual actions for complying with Appendix R, III.G.2 Backfit Panel - panel denied the backfit, and upheld the violation Backfit Response to ANO - backfit was denied - delayed due to coordination with NRR's response to NEI on the generic portion of the backfit claim NRR letter to NEI - addressing the generic position concerning the use of manual actions for complying with Appendix R, lIl.G.2.
Draft TIA response -_
Fi TIA pone SERP Re-SERP - agreed on GREATER-THAN GREENLY
- Choice letter to ANO informing them the finding was GREATER-THAN-GREEN Additional Information requested-by ANO to be provided by April 11, 2003 Additional Information provided - to ANO via overnight mail April 11, 2003
Phase 3 SDP Analysis Performance Deficiency ANO Unit 1 fire zone 99-M (North Electrical Switchgear Room) did not meet regulatory requirements for separation of electric cables and equipment of redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve post-fire safe shutdown, and there was lack of adequate procedures for manual actions to achieve post-fire safe shutdown following a fire in fire zone 99-M (or other identified fire zones equivalent to 99-M)
Assumptions Red train cables are not protected with one-hour rated barrier, and are not separated from the Green train cables by a minimum of 20 feet distance free of intervening combustibles No automatic fixed fire suppression system Ionization detection system provides alarm in Main Control Room Credit for fire brigade response and arrival at fire zone 1 00-N, which is adjacent to fire zone 99-M Heat release rates of 200-500 kW in fire modeling of duration and severity
Integrated Assessment of Fire-induced CDF Fire Risk Equation:
FCDF=Fi*Sf*Pl *P2*P3 where:
Fj = Fire ignition frequency of ignition source Sf = Severity factor for a challenging fire P1 =
Probability of automatic fire suppression system being unavailable P2 =
Failure probability of manual suppression by fire brigade P3 =
Conditional core damage probability (CCDP), with or without recovery actions Identified Ignition Source Scenarios Electrical Switchgear Cabinets Transformers Ventilation Subsystems
4.
Human Reliability Screening Analysis Categories of Important Operator Recovery Actions Manual alignment of emergency feedwater to the steam generators Restoration of service water to affected diesel generators Isolation of letdown flow and inventory control Local start of a diesel generator without dc control power Human error probability (HEP) estimates determined using NRC ASP methodology, INEEUEXT-99-0041, "Revision of the 1994 ASP HRA Methodology (Draft)," January 1999.