ML033140463

Partially Withheld E-mail Minor Changes to ANO Briefing Book

ML033140463
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	07/08/2003
From:	Nease R Division of Reactor Safety IV
To:	Alexion T NRC/NRR/DLPM
References
FOIA/PA-2003-0358
Download: ML033140463 (6)

Text

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-I . I-. book ;ThrmaSA~exi Re: Minor changeto the ANO briefing bookPage 1 From: Rebecca Nease I To:* Alexion, Thomas tJh (I Date: 7/8/03 11:08AM

Subject:

Re: Minor changes to the ANO briefing book Hi Tom, You are right - I forgot the attachments. They are now attached. By distribution I meant anyone to whom you made/gave a copy of the briefing book. I made copies for all NRC folks sitting at the table here in RIV.

In addition, See-Meng developed some slides that I have attached. Please remember that they are DRAFT, and he may not even use them. We'll discuss this in the pre-briefing today.

>>> Thomas Alexion 07/08/03 08:06AM >>> 0__ U., ./.'.. _

Rebecca, I think you forgot the attachments in your e-mail.

Tom

\I. I

>>> Rebecca Nease 07/07/03 04:45PM >>>

Tom, Attached is one additional page (Table of Contents - place up front before Tab A) and a corrected page that replaces the last page behind Tab B. Please distribute to the folks that have copies.

Are we all set for tomorrow's pre-briefing at 2 - 3:30 pm CDT? I understand See-Meng Wong and Phil Qualls will be here. I have briefing books for each of them.

Thanks for helping out.

Rebecca CC: Hannon, John; Qualls, Phil In1format~iOn in this reCOrd was doleted

,1 3acI'dribce wlhjJ~e Fresadomt of Information

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TABLE OF CONTENTS TAB DESCRIPTION A Agenda Notice of Licensee Meeting B ANO Fire Protection Finding Summary ANO Fire Protection Issue Time Line C NRC Inspection Report dated August 20, 2001 D Memorandum dated September 10, 2001 from Region IV to NRR - TIA Request for Risk Determination of Fire Protection Findings at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (01 TIA1 1)

E Letter dated September 28, 2001, to NRC from ANO - Backfit Claim F Letter dated April 15, 2002, to ANO from Region IV - Response to Backfit Claim G Letter dated January 11, 2002, to John Hannon, NRC, from NEI - Use of Manual Actions to Achieve Safe Shutdown for Fire Events H Letter dated May 16, 2002, to NEI from John Hannon, NRC - Response to NEI's letter Regarding the Use of Manual Actions to Achieve Safe Shutdown for Fire Events I Memorandum dated September 25, 2002, to Region IV from NRR - Response to TIA Request for Risk Determination of Fire Protection Findings at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (01 TIA1)

J Draft SERP Worksheet for SDP-Related Findings K Letter dated February 3, 2003, from ANO to NRC - Request for Additional SDP Technical Information L Letter dated March 25, 2003, to ANO from Region IV- Choice letter M Letter dated April 2, 2003, to NRC from ANO - Request for Additional SDP Information N Letter dated April 11, 2003, to ANO from Region IV - Response to ANO's April 2, 2003, Request for Additional Information 0 Miscellaneous Information

ANO FP ISSUE TIME LINE June 11 - 22, 2001 Inspection August 3, 2001 Exit - issue was characterized as a URI for compliance review and risk significance August 20, 2001 Report - Issue was a URI for compliance review and risk significance August 31, 2001 Re-Exit - compliance review determined that the use of manual actions for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions was a non-compliance with llI.G.2 September 7, 2001 Phase 2 - resulted irn v September 10, 2001 TIA - to HO requesting a Phase 3 September 28, 2001 Backfit - ANO claimed the violation was a backfit generic to all plants October 26, 2001 Backfit Panel January11, 2002 NEI letter to NRR - generic aspect of using manual actions for complying with Appendix R, III.G.2 January 17, 2002 Backfit Panel - panel denied the backfit, and upheld the violation April 15, 2002 Backfit Response to ANO - backfit was denied - delayed due to coordination with NRR's response to NEI on the generic portion of the backfit claim May 16, 2002 NRR letter to NEI - addressing the generic position concerning the use of manual actions for complying with Appendix R, lIl.G.2.

August 20, 2002 Draft TIA response -_

September 25, 2002 Fi TIA pone December10, 2002 SERP January 24, 2003 Re-SERP - agreed on GREATER-THAN GREENLY

• March 21, 2003 March 25, 2003 Choice letter to ANO informing them the finding was GREATER-THAN-GREEN April 2, 2003 Additional Information requested- by ANO to be provided by April 11, 2003 April 11, 2003 Additional Information provided - to ANO via overnight mail

Phase 3 SDP Analysis Performance Deficiency

- ANO Unit 1 fire zone 99-M (North Electrical Switchgear Room) did not meet regulatory requirements for separation of electric cables and equipment of redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve post-fire safe shutdown, and there was lack of adequate procedures for manual actions to achieve post-fire safe shutdown following a fire in fire zone 99-M (or other identified fire zones equivalent to 99-M)

Assumptions

- Red train cables are not protected with one-hour rated barrier, and are not separated from the Green train cables by a minimum of 20 feet distance free of intervening combustibles

- No automatic fixed fire suppression system

- Ionization detection system provides alarm in Main Control Room

- Credit for fire brigade response and arrival at fire zone 100-N, which is adjacent to fire zone 99-M

- Heat release rates of 200-500 kW in fire modeling of duration and severity

Integrated Assessment of Fire-induced CDF Fire Risk Equation:

FCDF=Fi*Sf*Pl *P2*P3 where: Fj = Fire ignition frequency of ignition source Sf = Severity factor for a challenging fire P1 = Probability of automatic fire suppression system being unavailable P2 = Failure probability of manual suppression by fire brigade P3 = Conditional core damage probability (CCDP), with or without recovery actions

• Identified Ignition Source Scenarios

- Electrical Switchgear Cabinets

- Transformers

- Ventilation Subsystems

4.

Human Reliability Screening Analysis Categories of Important Operator Recovery Actions

- Manual alignment of emergency feedwater to the steam generators

- Restoration of service water to affected diesel generators

- Isolation of letdown flow and inventory control

- Local start of a diesel generator without dc control power Human error probability (HEP) estimates determined using NRC ASP methodology, INEEUEXT-99-0041, "Revision of the 1994 ASP HRA Methodology (Draft)," January 1999.