ML032940065

Fire Protection Issue at River Bend

ML032940065
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	10/07/2003
From:	- No Known Affiliation
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
FOIA/PA-2003-0358
Download: ML032940065 (1)

Text

Fire Protection Issue At River Bend

1. What did the NRC approve Inthe license or SER regarding the protection or lack of protection for the SSW in Fire Area PT-1 ?

The operating license refers to Attachment 4 of the license as designating the requirements of the Fire Protection Program at River Bend. Attachment 4 refers to the FSAR as well as the SER dated May 1984 and Supplement 3 dated August 1985.

• The SER dated May 1984 Identified that the Safe Shutdown Capability review was in progress and would be addressed in a supplement to the SER.

• Supplement 3 to the SER dated August 1985 addresses Safe Shutdown Capability Inone of Its sections. This section identifies the fire area Inquestion (PT-1) as an area where no areawide automatic fire suppression equipment was provided. Both divisions of SSW cabling run through this area. The fourth paragraph of this section states that there is,

...a 1-hour fire rated barrier around one shutdown division". This paragraph also states, "Also, because one shutdown divsion Isprotected by a fire barrier, there Is reasonable assurance that safe shutdown could still be achieved and maintained. Therefore, area wide automatic fire suppression is not necessary". This condition has not been true for River Bend for fire area PT-1 since the thermo-lag Issue In 1991.

2. What does the licensee have to do to use the NSW as a backup to SSW If a fire disables both trains of SSW? If using NSW is a simple turning of a switch then the licensee Is probably OK and would not need an exemption.

• The question may require more In-depth research than simply addressing the ease with which NSW can be used. NSW Istheir normal cooling water method. SSW is their uonsite powered" safe shutdown system dedicated to cooling necessary plant loads following an accident where offste power is not available. If you don't lose offsite power, then NSW would be utilized. The whole premise of their position Is that a fire In PT-1 could take out both divisions of SSW but would not affect NSW and would not cause a loss of offsite power. Therefore, they want to consider NSW as the 'redundant safe shutdown system to SSW (a function for which It was not designed). This was not an approach previously

• The resident writeup you already have is more detailed and explicit in the situation here' and the types of questions we have regarding the River Bend Safe Shutdown Capability.

Iforrmsllen jn tis J r; . C -

inaccordar.ce Vitl te; eedom;j onfolmatiol IAct, eierpions e