ML031890326

Brief of Amicus Curiae R. Blumenthal Attomey General of Connecticut in Support of the Brief of Petitioner, Riverkeeper Inc. with Appendix, Dated June 23, 2003

ML031890326
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	06/23/2003
From:	Blumenthal R, Snook R Riverkeeper, State of CT, Office of the Attorney General
To:	Collins S, Travers W Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 3, Entergy Nuclear Operations, NRC/EDO, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, US Federal Judiciary, Court of Appeals
References
03-4313
Download: ML031890326 (51)

Text

03-4313 IN THE alinitcb states sZourt of sppears FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT RIVERKXEEPER, INC.,

Petitioner, SAMUEL J. COLLINS, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION, DR. WILLIAM TRAVERS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS OF THIE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ENTERGY NUCLEAR INDIAN POINT 2, LLC, ENTERGY NUCLEAR INDIAN POINT 3, LLC, AND ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULAT ORY COMMISSION BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE RICHAR BLUMhENTHA ATFORNEY GENERAL OF CONNECTICUT IN SUPPORT OF ThE BRIEF OF PETITIONERt, RIVERKEEPER, INC.

WITH A PEN RICHARD BLUMENTHAL ATT ORNEY GENERAL ROBERT D. SNOOK Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General 55 Elm Street, P.O. Box 120 Hartford, CT 06141-0120 Tel. (860) 808-5020 Fax (860) 808-5347 robert.snooklpo.state.ct us

TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS. ............................................. i STATEMENT OF TH*E ISSUES .. ...... .......... ii TABLE OF AUTORITES ........ 000* *s***............... ...... iii INTEREST OF 11HE AAHICUS CURI.AE .......... ............................. 1 SUMIy IAR'Y OF THlE ARGUMENT ....................................... . 3 ARGUMENT .............................. 4 I. NRC is Obligated to Ensure Adequate Emergency Plans .......... 4 HI. Compliance History of Indian Point ............................ 5

m. Terrorism and the REPP .................................... .7 IV. REPP Transportation Plans Inadequate ....................... 10 CONCLUSION .................................................. ...............

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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES I. Whether the Nuclear Regulatory Commission properly denied the petition of Riverkeeper, Inc. challenging the Indian Point Energy Center radiological emergency preparedness plan for failing to properly consider the threat of terrorism, inadequate transportation infrastructure, and shadow evacuation.

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases New England Coalition v. NRC., 582 F.2d 87 (1978) ............................................... 4 Pacific Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Resources Conservationand Development Commission, 461 U.S. 190, 103 S.Ct. 1713 (1983) ................................................5 Statutes and Regulations 42 U.S.C. § 2011 .................................................... 3 42 U.S.C. § 2013 .................................................... 4 42 U.S.C. § 2201 .................................................... 4 44 CFR. § 350 .................................................... 5 44 CFR § 3501.13(a) .................................................... 5 10 CFR § 2.206 .................................................... 7 10 CFR § 50.33 ................................................... 4,5 10 CFR § 50.47 ................................................... 5, 13 Other Authorities CoastalCorridorTransportationInvestment Area TWenty Year Strategic Plan For TransportationInvestment Area, Nov. 7, 2001, p. 6 ....................................... ... 10 Evacuation Plans Pose Problems, The Hartford Courant, May 12, 2003 .............. 12 Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government entitled "Safe But Annoyed" and included in the Appendix as Attachment 2 .................................. 12 NUREG 0654/FEMA REP 1, Rev. 1 at 4 4-16 ................................................ 14 iii

NISUREG 0654/FEMA REP 1, Rev. 1 at 4-8 ................................. 14 NUREG 0654/FEMA REP 1, Rev. 1 at 63 ................................. 14 NUREG/CR4831 .................................. 12 President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (January 29, 2002), New York Times, Jan. 29, 2003 ............................... 8 Study Warns Attack on Fuel Could Pose Serious Hazards, New York Times, Jan.

29, 2003 ............................... 8 TerroristCBRAT: MaterialsandEffects, June 3, 2003, ///www.odci.gov/, included in the Appendix as Attachment 1 .................................. 7,8 U.S. News & World Report, April 28, 2003, p. 47 ................................. 9 iv

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE Amicus curiae, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut,

("Attorney General"), resides in Greenwich, Connecticut and files this brief in his capacity as the chief legal officer representing the legal interests of the State of Connecticut and its residents.

The underlying appeal involves a challenge by Riverkeeper, Inc.

("Riverkeeper") to the adequacy of the existing security arrangements at the Indian Point Energy Center ("Indian Point"). Riverkeeper asserts that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") has failed to ensure that the facility can successfully protect public health and safety from a potential terrorist attack.

The Attorney General supports the Riverkeeper petition regarding the terrorism issue in all respects. The interests of the State of Connecticut are particularly acute in this matter because the emergency planning zone that would be involved in responding to either a terrorist attack, or a conventional nuclear incident, at Indian Point involves both a 10-mile radius emergency planning zone

("EPZ") and a separate 50-mile radius ingestion pathway EPZ. The 50-mile radius EPZ includes substantial portions of the State of Connecticut, including its largest city, Bridgeport, and its most populous county, Fairfield.

The emergency evacuation plan for Indian Point, which governs a response to either a terror attack or an accident at the facility, involves relocating potentially 1

in excess of 10 million people, many of whom are Connecticut residents or New York residents who will be evacuated into Connecticut, while simultaneously protecting these people from the deadly effects of escaped radiation. What is absent from the emergency planning at Indian Point, however, is not only adequate preparation for a terrorist attack, but also any discussion of the current severe transportation constraints of Interstates 95 and 84 in Connecticut, even though they are two of the critical proposed escape routes. Both of these major roads are currently inadequate to handle normal daily traffic, let alone emergency evacuation of large numbers of people. "Congestion is endemic throughout the Coastal Corridor [area]. It is acute on the primary highways, Interstate Routes 1-95 and 84, and U.S. Route 1 and CT Route 15, and particularly acute on the [Connecticut]

westerly portion of Interstate Route 95." CoastalCorridorTransportation Investment Area Twenty Year StrategicPlanFor TransportationInvestment Area, Nov. 7, 2001, p. 6, prepared for the Connecticut Transportation Strategy Board by the Coastal Corridor Transportation Investment Area Board. This report continues:

"When they can reach their destinations only by road, people are trapped in the congested conditions found there and can only contribute to that congestion when traveling." Id., p. 7.

As will be discussed in depth below, the emergency plan at Indian Point fails in several critical respects. Of particular concern to Connecticut, the assumptions 2

in the plan regarding evacuation routes are demonstrably inadequate. Therefore, because the Indian Point REPP affects major portions of the State of Connecticut, Petitioner, individually, and in his capacity as chief legal officer of the state, is affected and aggrieved by the continued operation of Indian Point without the specific security and evacuation measures identified in this appeal.

SUMMARY

OF THE ARGUMENT The NRC is obligated under the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2011, et seq. ('AEA"), to oversee and regulate the nation's commercial nuclear power stations to protect human health and safety and the environment. The NRC's own regulations require it to review the safety and security at nuclear power plants and, further, to insure the adequacy of the radiological emergency preparedness plans

('REPP") at each nuclear power facility.

The NRC has failed to meet this legal obligation at Indian Point. Indian Point Energy Center is a multi-reactor nuclear power station located in Buchanan, New York, just north of New York City and adjacent to Connecticut.

Approximately one-third of the population of Connecticut, and millions of residents of New York, are in the emergency preparedness zone surrounding this 3

plant. Despite the obvious risks to millions of citizens, the NRC has declined to require correction ofnumerous failures in the emergency planning at Indian Point.

Among other deficiencies are the facts that the plan: 1) fails to recognize and plan for the different and potentially greater impact on evacuation from a terrorist attack versus a nuclear accident; 2) underestimates the number of potential evacuees and; 3) wrongly assumes that the existing road network is capable of handling the expected number of evacuees.

The NRC's failure to reject the REPP as deficient and its failure to require the evaluation of emergency preparedness in the context of potential terrorist attacks violate the agency's own regulations.

ARGUMENT I. NRC is Obligated to Ensure Adequate Emereencv Plans Pursuant to federal law and regulations, the NRC is obligated to ensure that an adequate radiological emergency preparedness plan ('REPP") is created for each commercial nuclear power station in the nation, primarily in order to provide evacuation routes and other emergency plans in the event of a release of radioactive material from a nuclear generating facility. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2013, 2201, New England Coalition v. NRC., 582 F.2d 87, 90-91 (1978). Specifically, 10 CFR 1 Many of these failures have been documented in a recently completed independent report commissioned by the Governor of New York and prepared by James L. Witt Associates (the VWitt Report").

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§ 50.33 requires, as part of an application to construct a nuclear power station, appropriate response plans regarding the "Emergency Planning Zone," or EPZ.

Further, 10 CFR § 50.47 states that no operation license can be issued without a finding by the NRC that "adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." This same section adds 'NRC will base its finding on a review of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) findings" regarding emergency plans. 2 As will be discussed below, there are obvious and material failures in the Indian Point REPP.

I. Compliance History of Indian Point.

As described in a recent publication of the United States General Accounting Office ("GAO") submitted as testimony before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations on March 10, 2003, ("GAO Report"), to this day there are serious concerns regarding 'problems 2 The NRC has primary jurisdiction over issues of radiological health and safety. PacificGas &

Elec. v. State Energy Resources ConservationandDevelopment Commission, 461 U.S. 190, 103 S.Ct. 1713 (1983). The regulatory basis for radiological emergency preparedness plans is the "planning and preparedness standards and related criteria contained in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1." 44 CFR § 3501.13(a) citing 44 CFR § 350.

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in emergency preparedness [at Indian Point that] remain after being repeatedly identified as needing attention." (GAO Report, pp. 14-15.)3 This very sobering report documents how, beginning in 2001, a previous report by the GAO noted that "NRC had identified a number of emergency preparedness weaknesses at Indian Point 2 that had gone largely uncorrected."

(GAO Report, p. 3.) Apparently, the plant's owners made some moves to adjust matters but, "according to an April, 2001 NRC inspection report, the actions were not fully effective...." (Id.)

The GAO's testimony continued with an exhaustive discussion of the history of emergency response failures at Indian Point and concluded as follows:

In reviewing NRC's reports on its on-site inspections and evaluations of the plant's emergency preparedness exercises or drills completed since we issued our 2001 report, we found that the facility's emergency preparedness program has continued to experience problems or weaknesses.... In addition, NRC reported that several actions to correct previously identified weaknesses had not been completed.

(GAO Report, p. 12.)

The independent review by the GAO clearly establishes three things. The first is that Indian Point has a documented history of emergency preparedness I This Court may take judicial notice of this public report, prepared by a government agency, which was completed after this appeal was filed but directly addresses the issues before the Court.

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failures going back several years. The second is that NRC is aware of these problems. The last is that, in large measure, the problems have not been corrected.

Consequently, it is not surprising that the testimony of the GAO concludes that concerns remain, concerns that are particularly important in that the standard by which Indian Point was judged did not include the potential for a terrorist attack.

m. Terrorism and the REPP The essential premise of the REPP is that any radiological release from the facility would come from an accident in the reactor containment building. This assumption is based on a deliberate policy decision of the NRC that the design basis threat (DBT) for which emergency planning is required does not need to include terrorism. 4 This assumption, however, must be changed because it is obviously erroneous and fatally compromises the REPP.

After September 11, 2001, no one would claim that terrorism does not pose a threat to commercial nuclear stations. In fact, the Central Intelligence Agency has recently warned that "Usama Bin Ladin's operatives may try to launch conventional attacks against the nuclear industrial infrastructure of the United States in a bid to cause contamination, disruption, and terror." (TerroristCBRN:

4 The NRC has most recently articulated its position regarding emergency planning and terrorist threats in the Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206, Dckt Nos.50-003,50-247 and 50-286 (Nov. 18, 2002) which states: "The Petitioners are correct that the [design basis threat] did not consider a terrorist attack..."

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Materialsand Effects, June 3,2003, ///www.odci.gov/, included in the Appendix as .) Because of the population density, international profile, and economic importance of New York City and its surrounding areas, including southwestern Connecticut, Indian Point is a potentially attractive target for a terrorist attack.

This is not an idle concern. In his State of the Union Address, President Bush noted that "we have found diagrams of American nuclear power plants and water facilities, [and] detailed instructions for making chemical weapons."

President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (January 29, 2002), New York Times, Jan. 29,2003.

Such an attack might target the reactor containment building of a nuclear generating facility, but it might also target potentially more vulnerable targets, such as the spent fuel pools, that have considerably less structural protection. A recent article in the New York Times states that "A successful terrorist attack on a spent fuel storage pool at a large nuclear reactor could have consequences 'significantly worse that Chernobyl,"' citing a recent study by Princeton University. Study Warns Attack on Fuel Could Pose Serious Hazards, New York Times, Jan. 29, 2003. An attack on these non-containment building structures may result in a rapid radiation release because of the lack of even minimal radiological safety systems.

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In its decision of November 18, 2002 ("Decision") regarding the Riverkeeper petition, the NRC argued that the design basis threat is "robust and flexible." Further, NRC pointed out that it has required stepped-up security after 9/11. Decision, p. 1.

In response to the first claim, as a recent published news report states:

"Before the 9/11 attacks, plant owners were required to provide personnel capable of repulsing an attack by no more than three armed intruders." US. News & World Report, April 28, 2003, p. 47. Perhaps in acknowledgement that such a DBT is hardly robust, NRC did, in fact, order additional strengthening of security at nuclear plants. However, as the same article points out, since these new requirements went into effect, at "a plant in Nebraska, 150 rounds of ammunition passed through an X-ray machine undetected; in Alabama, a guard failed to check vital access doors and then lied about it." Id.

The conclusion is inescapable. The NRC's design basis threat does not reflect the existing threat of terrorism and, therefore, Indian Point's emergency plan is fundamentally flawed. Consequently, the NRC erred in declining to order a temporary suspension of the power station's operating license pending a full review of the REPP.

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IV. REPP Transportation Plans Inadequate.

An integral element of any disaster response plan is the requirement for proper evacuation of the affected population. The existing plan is woefully inadequate, is known by the NRC to be inadequate, and based on independent reports, is not presently capable of being corrected.

As an initial matter, the REPP never addresses the fact that the major road systems in southwestern Connecticut are, as previously noted, currently inadequate to handle normal daily traffic. "Congestion is endemic throughout the Coastal Corridor [area]. It is ... particularly acute on the [Connecticut] westerly portion of Interstate Route 95." CoastalCorridorTransportationInvestment.Area Twenty Year StrategicPlan For TransportationInvestment Area, Nov. 7, 2001, p. 6, prepared for the Connecticut Transportation Strategy Board by the Coastal Corridor Transportation Investment Area Board. The report notes: 'Poor or outdated engineering contributes to the inefficient movement of vehicles and gives rise to public safety concerns. Many of the Coastal Corridor [area] roadways were built neither to handle the volume of traffic that currently exists nor to accommodate the type of travel common today." Id. Nowhere does the REPP address the fact, known to every commuter in Connecticut, that the main arteries that the evacuation plan depends on will be unusable in an emergency.

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Further, there are serious concerns about the ability of the emergency plan to implement its existing public notice provisions. As the GAO Report previously cited states:

NRC's Office of the Inspector General also identified emergency preparedness issues, including the state's difficulties getting information about the emergency from

[the plant's then owners] and the fact that English is a second language for many who lived within 10 miles of the plant.

GAO Report, p. 8 Further, the Report noted that while NRC informed the company about various problems, "the company did not correct the weaknesses identified. For example, in 1998 and again in 1999, NRC identified problems with activating the pagers used to alert the plant's staff about an emergency, as well as other communication weaknesses. In 1999, NRC concluded that [the company] lacked the ability to detect and correct problems and determine their causes, resulting in weak oversight of the emergency preparedness program." Id. Even after this warning, problems in the communication of emergency information continued.

Regarding one incident, "NRC found that [the company] did not activate its emergency operations facilities within the required 60 minutes, primarily because of the complex process used to page the emergency response staff." It is self-evident that a communications 'plan' that has demonstrated a track record of delay 11

and confusion and that has been unable "to detect and correct problems," is fatally flawed.

NRC Guidance Document NLREG/CR-483 11, "State of the Art in Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants," sets forth a series of issues that must be addressed in the basic methodology of evacuation time estimates. The document specifically addresses "shadow evacuation," which it defines as "voluntary evacuation" of those "who decide to evacuate without being advised to evacuate." NUREG/CR-4831 at 4. These evacuees "can be individuals living within the planning zone but not within the sector(s) where evacuation has been advised, or those living outside but near, the EPZ who may be responding to an evacuation order directed at people within the EPZ." Emphasis added.

NUREG/CR-4831 at4.

Shadow evacuation is not a new concept. As was recently noted in a published news report, in Florida in 1999 "at least 1 million more [people] than authorities intended" evacuated in advance of Hurricane Floyd. (Evacuation Plans Pose Problems, The HartfordCourant,May 12, 2003, citing a study from the Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government entitled "Safe But Annoyed" and included in the Appendix as Attachment 2.) "Mammoth traffic jams clogged the freeways. Motorists were stuck on bumper-to-bumper interstates for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />...." Id.

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The REPP does not address "shadow evacuation." Accordingly, all calculations of evacuation times, road capacities, and other logistical concerns assume no additional usage or loads by those outside the zone who may decide to evacuate without either instruction or permission from authorities to do so.

This glaring omission in the REPP alone clearly violates the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR § 50.47 and has an immediate impact on the State of Connecticut. Shadow evacuation will swell the movement of evacuees into Connecticut. At the same time, even though people in western Connecticut live more than 10 miles from the plant, there will be many Connecticut citizens who will spontaneously evacuate and add their numbers to the mass of nuclear refugees.

A nuclear incident, unlike a hurricane, does not announce itself days in advance. An attack or accident will probably occur suddenly and the surprise factor, along with the pervasive public fear of radiation, will undoubtedly result in huge numbers of people outside the designated evacuation zones joining the shadow evacuation. The interstate road network in western Connecticut, operating beyond capacity even on normal working days, will fail. As dangerous as this would be in the event of a hurricane, a nuclear release would be worse, because the evacuated populace, caught immobile in the resulting traffic jams, would be completely unprotected from resulting clouds of radiation.

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V. Family Separation and Evacuation Times.

Planning Standard J(l0)(1) requires that the state and local governments' "plans to implement protective measures for the plume exposure pathway" include "time estimates for evacuation of various sectors and distances based on a dynamic analysis." NUREG 0654/FEMA REP 1, Rev. I at 63. The "dynamic analysis" must evaluate known behavioral responses of the population to be evacuated.

NUREG 0654/FEMA REP 1, Rev. I at 4 4-16. The requirements for such an analysis require that Distribution functions for notification of the various categories of the evacuee population shall be developed.

The distribution functions for the action stages after notification predict what fraction of the population will complete a particular action within the given span of time. There are separate distributions for auto-owning households, school population and transit dependent populations. These distribution fimctions can be constructed in a variety of ways, depending greatly on the kinds of data available for the actual site being studied. The previously developed conditional distributions are combined to develop the time distribution for the various population segments departing their home or other facility from which they are being evacuated.

Emphasis added. NUREG 0654/FEMA REP 1, Rev. 1 at 4-8.

The Indian Point REPP fails to provide this type of analysis. The most glaring example of this deficiency is that the REPP blithely assumes that school children and their families would evacuate separately, and at the same time 14

presumes that families would leave as one unit and utilize only one family car. In evacuation scenarios that take place during school days, these two situations contradict each other. The REPP time estimates analysis also fails to address the situation where parents may have children in multiple schools, which may have different designated reception centers for each child.

There is a larger behavioral problem, however. The evacuation plan calls for separation of school children from their parents in the event of a radiological release that requires evacuation. This will not happen. It defies explanation that plan preparers believe that parents will calmly leave their children in school or infants with daycare providers and climb into their private cars and drive to a designated disaster relocation area. 5 What will happen is that people will seek to reunite prior to evacuation despite anything that governmental authorities try to do to stop thenL The evacuation scenario upon which the REPP is based is a fallacy. This fallacy must be corrected before any realistic emergency plan can be created.

5 The Kennedy School of Government Study, referred to above, includes the following telling quotation: "It was a problem for us with the people that staff the shelters and for people that might maybe do something else. Maybe they're highway workers. They live in manufactured homes and they say "I gotta go." It turns out that you cannot expect families to split up. for one to staY and work while the rest of the family takes off somewhere. KSG Report, p. 12. Emphasis added.

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CONCLUSION The petition filed by Riverkeeper provided the NRC with a golden opportunity to review a clearly deficient design basis threat and establish a careful and comprehensive policy to upgrade the security at the nation's 100+ commercial nuclear power generating stations. The petition further identified numerous failings at a specific facility - Indian Point - and offered direct and concrete ideas that, if accepted, would have provided an immediate and material benefit to the public.

NRC, however, ignored the uncontroverted evidence that its DBT and the existing security arrangements at Indian Point are inadequate. Further, the NRC dismissed the very credible challenge to the over-optimistic evacuation scenario upon which the NRC bases its response plan. The NRC has, therefore, violated both federal law and its own regulations with respect to its oversight role at Indian Point. In the interests of public safety, it is imperative to suspend the plant's license to operate until a full review of all threats, including terrorism, is completed and needed changes to the security and evacuation plans are implemented.

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Respectfully submitted, By:

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL ATTORNEY GENERAL 55 Elm Street P.O. Box 120 Hartford, CT 06141-0120 Tel: (860) 808-5020 Fax: (860) 808-5347 17

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLUINCE Pursuant to F.RA.P. 32(a)(7)(C), I hereby certify that the foregoing brief complies with the applicable type-volume limitations of F.R.A.P. 32(a)(7)(B)(i) in that it contains 4,611 words, including headings, footnotes, table of contents, table of authorities, this certificate, the certificate of service, but excluding the corporate disclosure statement. In making this certification, I have relied on the word count function of Microsoft Word, the word-processing system used to prepare this brief.

Robert D. Snook Assistant Attorney General 18

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, I hereby certify that on this 23rd day of June, 2003, the original and 9 copies of the foregoing Brief of Amicus Curiae, Richard Blumenthal Attorney General of Connecticut, were filed in accordance with Rule 25(a)(2)(B(ii) to Roseann B..

MacKechnie, Clerk, Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 40 Foley Square, New York, New York 10007.

I further certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief, were mailed to the following counsel of record:

Karl Coplan Pace Enviommental Litigation Clinic, Inc.

78 N. Broadway White Plain, NY 10603 Tel: (914)422-4143 William A. Isaacson Boies, Schiller & Flexner 5301 Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20015 Tel: (202) 237-2727 John Fulton, Esq.

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

440 Hamilton Avenue White Plains, NY 10601 19

Jay E. Silberg Matia F. Travieso-Diaz Paul A. Gaukler Shaw Pittman, LLP 2300 N Street, NW Washington, DC 20037 Tel: (202) 663-8000 J. Michael McGarry, Im, Esq.

Katheryn M. Sutton, Esq.

Brooke D. Poole, Esq.

L. Michael Rafky, Esq.

Winston & Strawn 1400 L Street, NW Washington, DC 20005-3502 Tel: (202) 371-5700 Sara E. Brock, Esq.

Catherine L. Marco, Esq.

Office of the General Counsel Mail Stop 15 D21 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 John Ashcroft United States Attorney General United States Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-0001 Tel: (202) 353-1555 Robert D. Snook Assistant Attorney General 20

03-4313 IN THE Ott~iteb S'tateg Clourt of 9ppta1g; FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT RIVERKEEPER, INC.,

Petitioner, V.

SAMUEL J. COLLINS, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION, DR. WILLIAM TRAVERS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ENTERGY NUCLEAR INDIAN POINT 2, LLC, ENTERGY NUCLEAR INDIAN POINT 3, LLC, AND ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPENDIX

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Central Intelligence Agency Report TerroristCBRiN Materialsand Effects, June 3, 2003 ............. A-1-A-6

2. "Safe But Annoyed," a study from the Harvard University's Kennedy School of Coverllent ................. A-7-A-24

=

Background===

Spectrum of Terrorist CBRN Threats Chemical Agents Acrobat PDF Print Version witGrphcs BologalcAgents Arb__ PrnVro______

Radiological and Nuclear Devices Acrobat PDF PrintVersion wm~outGnaphics Online Resources Please note: 'This pamphlet contains a summary of typical agents and CBRN devices available to al-a'ida and other terrorist groups. It Is not intended to be a summary of the overall threat from al-Qalda's CBRN program.'

Background

Al-Qa'ida and associated extremist groups have a wide variety of potential agents and delivery means to choose from for chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) attacks. Al-Qa'ida's end goal is the use of CBRN to cause mass casualties; however, most attacks by the group-and especially by associated extremists-probably will be small scale, incorporating relatively crude delivery means and easily produced or obtained chemicals, toxins, or radiological substances. The success of any al-Qa'ida attack and the number of ensuing casualties would depend on many factors, including the technical expertise of those involved, but most scenarios could cause panic and disruption.

• Several groups of mujahidin associated with al-Qa'ida have attempted to carry out "poison plot" attacks in Europe with easily produced chemicals and toxins best suited to assassination and small-scale scenarios. These agents could cause hundreds of casualties and widespread panic if used in multiple simultaneous attacks.

• Al-Qa'ida is interested in radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) or "dirty bombs."

Construction of an RDD is well within its capabilities as radiological materials are relatively easy to acquire from industrial or medical sources. Usama Bin Ladin's operatives may try to launch conventional attacks against the nuclear industrial infrastructure of the United States in a bid to cause contamination, disruption, and terror.

• A document recovered from an al-Qa'ida facility in Afghanistan contained a sketch of a crude nuclear device.

• Spray devices disseminating biological warfare (BW) agents have the highest potential impact. Both 11 September attack leader Mohammad Atta and Zacharias Moussaoui expressed interest in crop dusters, raising our concern that al-Qa'ida has considered using aircraft to disseminate BW agents.

• Analysis of an al-Qa'ida document recovered in Afghanistan in summer 2002 indicates the group has crude procedures for making mustard agent, sarin, and VX. AAw a

This pamphlet contains a summary of typical agents and CBRN devices available to al-Qatida and other terrorist groups. It is not intended to be a summary of the overall threat from al-Qa'ida's CBRN program.

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[Table of Contents]

Chemical Agents Terrorists have considered a wide range of toxic chemicals for attacks. Typical plots focus on poisoning foods or spreading the agent on surfaces to poison via skin contact, but some also include broader dissemination techniques.

Cyanides A

• 2.

Terrorists have considered using a number of toxic cyanide compounds.

Sodium or potassium cyanides are white-to-pale yellow salts that can be easily used to poison food or drinks. Cyanide salts can be disseminated as a contact poison when mixed with chemicals that enhance skin penetration, but may be detected since most people will notice if they touch wet or greasy surfaces contaminated with the mixture.

Hydrogen cyanide (HCN) and cyanogen chloride (COIN) are colorless-to-pale yellow liquids that will turn into a gas near room temperature. HCN has a characteristic odor of bitter almonds, and CICN has an acrid choking odor and causes burning pain in the victimfs eyes. These signs may provide enough warning to enable evacuation or ventilation of the attack site before the agent reaches a lethal concentration.

• Both HCN and CICN need to be released at a high concentration-only practical in an enclosed area-to be effective, therefore, leaving the area or ventilating will significantly reduce the agent's lethality.

Exposure to cyanide may produce nausea, vomiting, palpitations, confusion, hyperventilation, anxiety, and vertigo that may progress to agitation, stupor, coma, and death. At high doses, cyanides cause immediate collapse. Medical treatments are available, but they need to be used immediately for severely exposed victims.

Mustard Agent Mustard is a blister agent that poses a contact and vapor hazard. Its color ranges from clear to dark brown depending on purity, and it has a characteristic garliclike odor. Mustard is a viscous liquid at room temperature.

• Mustard is not commercially available, but its synthesis does not require significant expertise if a step-by-step procedure with diagrams is available.

Initial skin contact with mustard causes mild skin irritation, which develops into more severe yellow fluid-filled blisters. Inhalation of mustard damages the lungs, causes difficulty breathing, and death by suffocation in severe cases due to water in the lungs. For both skin contact and inhalation, symptoms appear within six to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. There are only limited medical treatments available for victims of mustard-agent poisoning.

Nerve Agents Sarin, tabun, and VX are highly toxic military agents that disrupt a victim's nervous system by blocking the transmission of nerve signals.

• These agents are not commercially available, and their synthesis requires significant chemical expertise.

Exposure to nerve agents causes pinpoint pupils, salivation, and convulsions that can lead to death. Medical treatments are available, but they need to be used immediately for severely exposed victims.

Toxic Industrial Chemicals 4 3

There are a wide range of toxic industrial chemicals that-while not as toxic as cyanide, mustard, or nerve agents-can be used in much larger quantities to compensate for their lower toxicity.

Chlorine and phosgene are industrial chemicals that are transported in multiton shipments by road and rail. Rupturing the container can easily disseminate these gases. The effects of chlorine and phosgene are similar to those of mustard agent.

Organophosphate pesticides such as parathion are in the same chemical class as nerve agents.

Although these pesticides are much less toxic, their effects and medical treatments are the same as for military-grade nerve agents.

MTable of Contents]

Biological Agents Anthrax Bacillus anthracis,the bacterium that causes anthrax, is capable of causing mass casualties.

Symptoms usually appear within one to six days after exposure and include fever, malaise, fatigue, and shortness of breath. The disease is usually fatal unless antibiotic treatment is started within hours of inhaling anthrax spores; however, it is not contagious. Few people are vaccinated against anthrax.

• Anthrax can be disseminated in an aerosol or used to contaminate food and water.

• Cutaneous anthrax can be caused by skin contact with B. anthracis.This form of the disease, which is easily treated with antibiotics, is rarely fatal.

Botulinum toxin Botulinum toxin is produced by the bacterium Clostridium botulinum, which occurs naturally in the soil. Crude but viable methods to produce small quantities of this lethal toxin have been found in terrorist training manuals.

• Symptoms usually occur 24 to 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> after exposure, but onset of illness may take several days if the toxin is present in low doses. They include vomiting, abdominal pain, muscular weakness, and visual disturbance.

• Botulinum toxin would be effective in small-scale poisonings or aerosol attacks in enclosed spaces, such as movie theaters. The toxin molecule is likely too large to penetrate intact skin.

Ricin Ricin is a plant toxin that is 30 times more potent than the nerve agent VX by weight and is readily obtainable by extraction from common castor beans. There is no treatment for ricin poisoning after it has entered the bloodstream. Victims start to show symptoms within hours to days after exposure, depending on the dosage and route of administration.

• Terrorists have looked at delivering ricin in foods and as a contact poison, although we have no scientific data to indicate that ricin can penetrate intact skin. A .

• Ricin will remain stable in foods as long as they are not heated, and it will have few indicators because it does not have a strong taste and is off-white in color.

[Table of Contentsl Radiological and Nuclear Devices Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD)

An RDD is a conventional bomb not a yield-producing nuclear device. RDDs are designed to disperse radioactive material to cause destruction, contamination, and injury from the radiation produced by the material. An RDD can be almost any size, defined only by the amount of radioactive material and explosives.

• A passive RDD is a system in which unshielded radioactive material is dispersed or placed manually at the target.

• An explosive RDD-often called a "dirty bomb"-is any system that uses the explosive force of detonation to disperse radioactive material. A simple explosive RDD consisting of a lead-shielded container-commonly called a "pig"-and a kilogram of explosive attached could easily fit into a backpack.

• An atmospheric RDD is any system in which radioactive material is converted into a form that is easily transported by air currents.

Use of an RDD by terrorists could result in health, environmental, and economic effects as well as political and social effects. It will cause fear, injury, and possibly lead to levels of contamination requiring costly and time-consuming cleanup efforts.

A variety of radioactive materials are commonly available and could be used in an RDD, including Cesium-137, Strontium-90, and Cobalt-60. Hospitals, universities, factories, construction companies, and laboratories are possible sources for these radioactive materials.

Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)

An IND is intended to cause a yield-producing nuclear explosion. An IND could consist of diverted nuclear weapon components, a modified nuclear weapon, or indigenous-designed device.

• INDs can be categorized into two types: implosion and gun assembled. Unlike RDDs that can be made with almost any radioactive material, INDs require fissile material-highly enriched uranium or plutonium-to produce nuclear yield.

[able of Contents]

Online Resources More detailed information on the medical aspects of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons threats can be found at the following Internet sites:

AW5

The Medical NBC Information server:

www.nbc-med.org and http://lwww.nbc-med.org Medical Research and Material Command:

mrmc-www.army.mil Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense: chemdef.apgea.army.mil Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases: www.usamnriid.army.mil National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health:

www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/chemical-safety/defalt.htrnl US Department of Homeland Security: www.ready.gov Central Intelligence Agency:

CBR Incident Handbook http://www.cia.gov/cia/reportslcbr handbooklcbrbook.html

[Table of Contentsl CIA Homepage ICIA Reports A-;

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Safe But Armayad .Ca6-M-US a62-1652 SafeButAnnoy or urnm fit order to complete drives to safety the expected Would last buo to three hours. As ABC News would put 4t, makny evacuees were 'sade but armoyeV Many ¢ressed or Implied doubt that the evacuatio was really zecessary, or that It was haudled wel 'After five hurricanes in tee years, Cmaunpd aone representative rdi tal show aller, 'you think thWd have a due about Settbg people out of darger.' Soch pique stemmed fzcn the fact that In general cearance ines had proven to be far h}gher tha oficial antidpaled. For Om& part, haweve offidals wee le concered about publk amoy han te possMbity tua traff lams could have provem dadl, they were copzant of the fict tat, ha e storm tradadiland, hou ands o Floridaresidents nigh have beer exposd to isha IMpc with nothing nwore than fth Mmsy protectlai of their cmr as they crawled aorg the Itherstates.

Even befre the evacuavim was owef some loc eected offiias had beg= to respond to public oxy by calling for mbore effidiet evacuationi procedures-hiL partica, the 'revetse-Ran of Interstate h wmays such tat lnies an both sides of the road could be used by evacuating trafcr At the an tim, ergency magement offials were well aware of the fact dtha, althoh tiy had Isued orders expected to lead 15 c mn people to evanzwbe th* home, at least a millinmore had done so Officials were left to fture out what ha caed an evacuati far more extensive than the om twy had nicipat and how they should respond to calls for Emergency In Flrida hI part becase of the regular threat of hurices and thir impact on a sate surromwied an dice sides by wat, the eergeny nagemt system in Flodda was well deveoped. In ea was, It was a decntralized sysbte. Eadc of the dates 67 acmties had ha own director of emergency lanagemenL Although lrida kw gives the autkidty to issue evacuation orders oly to the state's Govenm, an executive order hd, 1988, delegatel that authority to the chief officials of Counties Mid m a (mayors and the dhais of couity com M ) But local cfidals warloed dclely with officisda In the take capl of Tlahassee-No evacuation could be ordered anywhere In ft itate absen an Excutive Order. Isued,by the Govenor, formal dedarhig the existmuc of a sate of enmrenq. Abeent such an order, no cotmty could beg* its disater espone-wehe that rsponse was to order an evatzaimx to open pubic shelts, a bto order the dosing of adcools or busieses. As a prActcal matter, the key decisions about bow to respond to disasts were made by loca dectors of emergeac mngemezL Says aoe cmty emeqgpy managemert dirwtor. 'It a mare elected leader that would go aginst that The big piture plannng for disasters, hawever-mdertaken to prepar for dissters. rot in reqonee to ane that was looming-was the responslW of the state Division of Emrency Maagemad in the Department of CoIumity Afam The Division.was set up to prepae and to 2A-S

Safe But ArMOYCd . 642-16=D cwordina resxmw to a wide range oi potntial disastms. Ib wo& was divided angst thre major dividor. Each wuld be own as correponding to a dIfferent stag ofa polential disaster.

T ahe of Nky and Mkir Elanng had the Ifg-kture -befwe" responsibtites-envldsln& Iong before any specfilc threat loome What Part of potEm watua Ir mnMade disas Florida faced and ffien developing Veneral plaIms fr acing with toe threats If pannrsn detar~m4 for butanx, that the best potential n:pxme to aevre weather was a marked inrerm hi the numIbe i public seIlters hi the stak, the office would indude proposals for the fundin f such sten in a plan It would develop a subx* to the overoes office- If auch funds we ultimately hdoded hi the state budget, counties would applyfo grants for the actud c ction or iuproverneu Nota!l4, the Bureau extensively distribted Informalton deslgped to hep households decide whether or not to evacuate in the ev=1 of a major storn and what sarts of proviskms to toc inorder to remain safe at home. rather than evacuating 'Which path should you tae the literature asked 'D you live in a vulnerae area? Have you been asked to evacuate? Every FloAdixa should develop a family prqwredness plan wel i advanoe of a storm thet. the Bureau urged. Soc a plan would not nly provide for a supply of drinklzg war and m~perniabe foods but encourage efforts to eoxmproof estig homes and mto purdase new 1boom built to witstand Igh wink The Bureau of Recovery and ltilon was te 'afte portion of the state response, the vehide duough which post-disaster relief funds were to be channeled to counties and undividual, as well as the bureau resosHe for developing new approace desgned to reduce the potential impact of future dsnat Inevitbly, some of this bureaus activities in respore to the lact storm began to take the fom of a 'beW resporwe to the next tdm= For bIstance, Recovy and Mitigation offered twchical train fir county building offidal as to how to evaluate and Improve stturm that might be pressed Into ervice as public emergency shelters, such that they could wthstand high winds or water.

But it was the Bureau of Preparednew ad Response which stood most dakly an the f&n lines of the state's reaction to an Iumd dbaxte4 hrough the coordiion of tespse to actual emergencims as they arosee through what was kwwn a the Regional Evacuation.Procedure From Its base operaions in thestate's ECC-ib Emerecy Com<nd Caner-hI the state capitaL t Bureau alerted county emergency managemt directors tat a formal state of emergesy was Inimnerd and Initiated a series of rtatewide (and even Interstate) coaference calls Inwhdic du of county of;kials would discuss the natire of the appropriate reonse- Whats more, Pretaredes .and Response would diret state agmwdes-ranging raro law enfiorment to transportation-to take actions to support the plans implemented by aounty officials. It was here that lay the heat of response to an actul gercy, particularly the pproach to evacuaimL In the cae of hurricanes, the Bureau had studied a wide ange of scenaio in order to provide advice to local officials. Specifically, te Bureau hd estimated how many househdfi 3

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would be affected by 6m of various nagiltudes -ra ng from the weakest socalled Categazy 1 storm, to the shrngest, so-called Category 5 storm (as amasured mm the Saffirfimpcm hmrrcan rating scale). Ihe estimtes uinidered potentib damage rmn severe flooding and wate damage.

knon asystorn surge anid largely cc ined to Immediate-couat area as well as wind damage, which could radci far InlaruL The potential hml ofadvarious tye of intarin bad led the Bureu to estima how many pe& would have to be ordered to evacuat depending on the strenfh of the stem Those estimates were tempered by the knowledge that, historicaly, some number of Floridians had chooen not to evacuate, despite orders ta theq do so. To tIae suah bdvor fbio ewm t in its models, the Bureau had one so far as to prepae statistical sampe based on surveys to determine what percentag of tosee asked to evacuate would actualy do so. The coabi2atiCmof esmtn g the Imqac af a Btam, and extitnaft gwmplaxc levelh with evacuatim orders, had led state officals to their estimates of 'cleane limes-the time it would take for evacuation, traffic to dear and iceldents to reach safety-and thus how much in advance of a stormg potential Impad an.ev UBh would have to utart More broadly, the Bureau divxded the respxme to majwr diasters such as lm es Into fiu paxti de_ waig (wther mat to 4xkre an eregecy, w bx to cdje an evacuation and a of the etn af the evacnat ; traffic manamemend sheltering and enlergnly public infamation. &otwidobsading the resourcs available at the stale level, it would, In the fac of an actal mergency, ahways fall to couny emnrgency managemert cifdabs-each of whm hd his owA aE A emergiency commiand cter -to makethe difclt call as to when, and to what extent, an evacuation should be Called for suignfiartly, to make sme the g htnformation got to the pubic as a hurricane approached.

Floyd Approaches Hurriaxnes have, Idatrcall, posed a threat to Ftorida. Betwe 188 and V99, the state was struck by an estImated W5 hurricanes of all tyes, as well as 26D tropical sto ls Hunicane which stie FoJda, xnareover, bdng with themn zot cdy winds ax hih as 50 niles per ho but extrem high r urge of o n water-urge of a magnitude by wme etimaesxceeded cay by the Impa of cydaoes from the Mdmi Ocean an Bangladesh Such surge threatened to inundate low4ying areas whi hd, in recert years, been heavily built up with resmrU, a and new home. Constructim bad edended even to h ly exosed coas b ier islands. The fad ta so many Florida residents (7 wmln of U11Sm ion) lived to dose to eidhi the stats east or west coast, combined with te fct that the lorida periisula was narrow mt there were a limited xwnber of shtered Wand location In the state. Ths, the National Hunicane Cener (in Mami) had cmiclzded that locida was the stae in the US most vuhiale to huzzicanes Such longstandig vulnexalty notwittanding the perception of hurcne threat in F Jorida In the 9i wa profoly reinforced b cm storm Hurlca Andrew, which struc 4

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south Floida ,in1 was, by any measure, a dbastr of awl" prpctiow -leaving in IWake 26 dead, MD.WC hales and some 525 bW n In poperty dmage. Alhogh Andrew spared the centa and nothern parts of the slate, lb tAy unrecdented devastation t affeded attitudes tward hurricaes sttwie Andrew had, in fa4, preci ed aspects of the hi-4evel son preparaticinwhIdh was In placewith the wzapcuhdo Floyd.

Som after it was being backed as a trpicl tom at The start of the second wee af September 1999, Floyd was being spalay wompared with Andrew-and judged to be lar and potendialy more dLUISeroW. As ealy as September 9, fiVe das before Poyd waS utiately prniewd to rewdi Flrida, the Miami Hadwart erized h strm as "ae and lky to grow viore potenL" By the lii, the Henad was reporting predkcti that Floyd would'tur sharply 3

toard Flcrida" y the 12A, arady daufled as a Categoy 3 burdiane, Floyd ws said to be marcing *rclnleady tward the Floida cmV Ard cc Monayoa , Stber 13, readers of the Herd throughout souhesd Fida woke to rd that ' hrecasten were pobed to post hurricane wakehes in Florida before dawn today as Hurricane Floyd developed the sinne iasophic power as Hurricane Andrew-but grew muh larer and pzrwedeVer Closer to lie state. loyd ebcpa to mstrou proportklu Sunday night-a CAt y 4 stM-Vkrhraly as big in area as the enire state of miord& with winttof 145 tiles per bo=r. Wsth nothing to hibt ik Floyd could become that rare, top4o(es1e Categery 5 hurricane trht, wind wids xeeding 155 nt A deciso was , the reported "n poSSJbe evaCaIf Mxere was e doubt, hawever, tht eracualins were in the offing when Governor jeb Bush, as be Issued an cutive order dedairing a se a£ energency on Manday, September 13, uerved pubily, "lts scay. s vay scary. Andrew hlt hanI in the mdde at the sdght and it was haunting. This is as strung and thre tme biggerb State Plannig The decision-znakdg procn on the specific fam of evacuatio to ,ecnwA was cenered n Tanahassee, at the DlnIM of Emergency MIargemads RespMie and Prepratin bureau. ere, recals the DivLdont& deputy director Robert Clmns, state fis were applyig all the techniques at their dipoal to their effixt to align me 1oabout evacuaticin with theirbest estimate of the sim track andntensy of the stkm.

WIM FloydL it was al happenl& laugh5 Caols. wmdmml to the statE's effort was Its use of the Hrine Evacuat or HRVAC comtr buig progaM which drew mm the inomatlon pro e by the National Hurrican In -Atiom Catm i Kam! Says Colins: "The program takes the four separate comporants of the advisoy paciage from the Haoional Hurricane duuc:a Plodda Kc7 as L~aoDi. l93S.klln 42. pcapk. The inn e& k yS im 111bR liUdlal 1969, iUng256.

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Safe but Annoyed C1642-16MD Center and puts fhem Into a graphle! oukput that allws you, for hudtane, tI look at the 72-hour forecast track, to look at the actual lcsatien of where the atom Is fr a spedr advisory, and every previous advisory. So you an look at the entive course of the stom up to the advisory that yo're usn the program f Based an forecasted storm uck, the Bureau could tun to its statistical mode and dedde whether and when to wuggst io county officials that evacuations should ben-ad who Should be told to evacuate. 'With a 72-hour foreast pedodf observs CRnsu,

'we can do tihW like factor in deaw tmes, how kg we'll need to get people an and off td roads aId when thed have to leave their houses Atd, he adds, state officials ca estimatewhen they have to order other stae to do teirput of make eacuaton poibe Foe Instance, construcion prwcs mid toll callection OA major Ighways must be halted and lw enforemmt peradine (eg, the FHards.}gway Pat be deployed to hlp direct traffic and dea With accidetsa wd beakdowvri with ther potentil f#%nicmn day.

Ox the mornIng of Mmday. September 13, 1999, the d oxisraking process at the Akle DivisionEof EMnrgenqr Unageahn was moming raply towd a cocusion to recoxamend evacuatnon. In ther crmenc,e caldl, stat included eAs1^ from 57 of FHodrdas 67 coanties, induding nmany more an those at ris faim Woyds direct impacL They flt it r o advise not Just offical who mgt have to order evacuations but also emergenc officials from potentil "host" axnties-ares In the centr ad wester part of the state, aid adjoinig southeatern asttes to wich evacuees would head, looking for roon at motels and public shltrs.

Such cozference alls-suh as the awe held to discuss Sod,at 9 ami., Monday, Septeme 13 -

were deigned to serve as a forum throuh which a owensus aboit th spedfics of the evacuation plan would be hammered ou Officials did not regard the respone to Foyd as a stritforward call. ObscsB Coblin "Thees a coanxnrum we fae every me we discuss evacmaiG If we ma*e a decison that'. vety Catbolic, we stand a ch of putting more people on the roads than the roads can pross and we leave hem stranded out on tbAt roadway. But, if we're very umsematlve, we run the risk of leaving people In area that migt be impacted by storm surg In the case of Floyd, the stakes in the evacuation plairfgwere raised by the she aime of the starm.

9Should officials base heir PUahig an a storm trac that portended liwited vqpact, thousands could be at risk should the sm actully follow a diffrent txac-and evacuation orders were relatively limted Cetr1 to the evacuation planning was offias bW based an 72-hour forecasting aqudty, tat the stonm would rot sike Sonda diectly Instea& they expected that it would tck northeast avoiding landfal but comin as dase as 25 moles off the stts east coast Such a trc stll posed Samve peril for coastal areas. Storm surge could affect those an the Inudiae cua while high winds threatened structures not able to withstand them-partulay kns of thoum nds of mbe homes that would be wi;hn reach of the storm' 140-plus mile per hor wins Mobile homes wee at risk of being bown off thIr foumdatios and into the alt Thus, the fac that hie sor mix t rot coum ashore did not mea there was no need for evacuations. It did, hOWe men those evacuatimns could be at least souvwhat limited. Crucially, the storm was eected to 6

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_afe ut AmWA afted southeast hoda in a Kgdficanly different way than it was expected to alfed the cadma and roortheast con W xmihX Specifly. even thoug Floyd w, by Monday the 2*3, dasafloed as a Chxeory 4 stn, its ta was epected to mem that southeast Fkida would experience it as or& Captegy I storm-with a relatively limited mdn fr efatcslo. The sieed fr evacuation, says Bob Collins appeaed iiot ba be - te'rhy m.Ive, given the agle ( appraad that we were 1Olo at for the particlr tom and Its pidty. And tMarus why we Ist made the dederminatiothat even though this sOm was alust a Caeor S event, that for thit 4so ut Ls ti*eocount, we ere dy going toevaca toaCatego 1 leveL Ibh it appeared that tie evacuations whth needed to occur firt, as Floyd affected the southern part of the tate would be Ome most limitedL Emerge offdus did, howexm ad that flod would have a more pweru effoct cn central rtheast Florida wasW areas-that winds would be highr thr, and the potential for dtrm surge greate. They blived, however that, because the first stae of evaaai-were It to begin on Monday, Setmber 13 in south Floida-wauld not put that marV cam on the road; hm would stfll be enouh caadyon the hihways to the second wave of evacuees ard enough room at znotds and shelters fir them at the end of their Journey. TI one wild card, as alwayv wi= the sulfect was hurdane..

was the poNRIblity that the piom could follow a diffent, mre inland tz& Shol it do so, the dLx were VeaL Even stndard homes built on foundations and in full coampliance with housing cod, mht n otbe able to withstand winds of more d=a12Si miles per ha Such th ts otwhhstandlr&by the end of the 57 m ycoiferenoce cal on Septbier 13, a staged evacemtion staeg had tae shape: an evacuation so a Cte y 1 Wve for costal CDWtiefn the southr qarter of the state, and eacuation to a Categozy 4 leve-including sructures withdn 2D nats of Oe coast and mobile homes firther Inand-for the norther, three-quartecs of the Flotida eat coast rouly froi nan River to the Gerga border (See Map ExhAbit 1). It was expected that the evacuation arders would mmn that 13 mnillon people would leave thir homes and head zuth ndorwest.

ThIs nass exodus wwald begin on Monday in th southeast In counties ibudmg Dade County (metro Mia and, 50 mdles farther north Pam Bea Count.

Southeadt Fordtx P9lm Beach County Loated 60 mnles north of Miami, Palm Beach Cunfs 47 mIles of bWaces and hmuy Negh-ise bedforn apartment buildings, looked to be a zik from HEuzcne Floyd. However, the danger to this sprawling couty-the sge lagest Inland are mt of the Mis ipp River-was thought to be limited to the coasline. This was a.locde in whic the storm would be an effective CAtegory I event Thus, al Cony Dkector of Emageny Maagement Wlim YOrri.

offidals believed evacuation should be limited-and that, for the most part it would mean relatively short drives. 'We needed people to get off Ihe bewfift and drive west of lnerstate 95,*

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Safe But Arnoyed CI&M-16W says O'Duiea, xeyxnig to the nmh-atih hig ay which ro through the county, ondy a few miks hnland from the coau Says O'brim The Natihm Hurricae Cener was vey confident the storm was going to trL We ordered a CAtegory I evacuati just to get people off the beacL Time was no questit their mitns It was going to tUr He had reasn to hope, too, o eat ridsk would kno who they wem Like other Flodlda coas ctauntie, Palm Beach had sought to ed-ute =Lb of the publ:c as to whethm they lIved hn a sumn surge area, which woul have to evacue, ovu for a CkteM 1 htwki Say MAn= 'We distroute bwocur which have evacuationes deary idebMaL Paopl hould be aware of whether theyre fa n evuatim raw or noV The cowity had amogt to reach evay houshold, distributing the evacuai oe brohures with utility bll4 fac instanae In addfk, Oren,, through extensve public sakIn, had Wicoraged Palm Beach rsidents not to tidnk of evacuation as a first optio Ewtad he had urged that they take steps to reinforce their homes, as the best xneez of protectio from nwat stormsLA the same tme, he hbd roo to beieve th tis education attempt bad not petrated all that deeply-at Weact In part because of the large zmier of newcomvs arrivng egulay In Palm Beach Cmunly Says O'Bdm 'We have an awful lot of new folks moving irL Were always trying to keep up pubc educatio to reach twse folklut fit's hard: you find yourelf thinking after several alis and the samr speedh that maybe youve reached readied everbody. you know you havet.

If the evacuation went as planmed-mnd If oaly those at dsk In a Category 1 storm evacuated-the event for Palm Besch County shoud hve been a relatively small one Says O'wen 'As far as nr s we weae loking at scmetlfrin the mid to low thousand With the storm schduled to begin to daect Palm Beach during the day en Tuesday the 14% e ton was officially ordered at7 p. the day befor Accrding to the officiad county pres release it was to k 'odered efective for resdent of arrier Iland&sobile hones and thse area subject to severe flooding." Odflals bievd, hower. that even that descriptin of who was in danger was hldy an liel anae~niI in pan because oftedifcf atbcueo h ifcly fn describing the eactd locations of those at risk. Says Bob Collins of the state Divison of Emergency M&a=amLt "intedof txying to say/O, eveyone eastward or seaward of tis very co cated line has to evaate,'

what we say Islook les ust generalize the evacuatin zwn and say we' just evacuate evely seaward of so major route. Because its slot easier to say evelyue east of US 1 has to evacuat, rather than duow tiem a map with a very wfl0lkted lne and say, well, If you live in this blue aea, you hbve to evacate. They go. W8! how in the hel deo lkwvr if I &ieeastor west of thids blue mw If£ficials regarded the Pam Beadc County evacuation as a. minor one, It was nAt prtrayed to the public that way, lagey because of the sheer dze of the ut=."he med say B A/

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' m-021o additio large colones of moble bom prS, althuh lying inland along the Indian River, were tMderM wandakty evac on order in the event i a storm of Foyd' magiude.

The rdk Ito Irevad was such that by Sundy. Septnlpef 22 muty =eency rnm~emen direCbor Robedt Lay was alrmady, learIng strongly toward an early evacuation order.

He lew tha the evacuation ofIennfied speda needs residenla-bduding the hadicppd and eldery-could take up to 30 how uad ivahved several thowad vulnmble wldenu and their "CaMIgives'! (peidl needs ev acuatio gplwm%ba baen. Ited statewide Infthe aftermath qEf Hur n Andrew.) And he knew ta eady warng g xeinom the serloumes of the stm ianaea wchi had bee aed t*e Impat of Harrica Andrew nd h4 in recet ye nem bee affected by any storm noe powfld thau A Category 1 nrrcam whh Wad paed me 60 miles south With the Ckaegoy 4 l bearing dow m the county, cijal dedded to issue a mnidatory evacuation order for our barre Ilands and d hme pa, effective at t0 pJm M dAy afterrvoan, S 1eteber13. 1A ordei get nformtionout as eary as posel, drctor TaY kidfed the Ps dthat day, Jta 11 in the m afrg-warng of th tO px. evacuation order.

TAy was acting on t hef tat an ea* rla _nou n t would give peole who wanted to 1t a hed start the chance to do so. And that would help pread out the tram Thus, lay was, in effect, ordering an evcuatio at rougly the sane time as that of Palm Beach County, althoug the doa prolxity of the storm to the more souedly are nwaxt that many houseods the had begim their evacuatin ealier, durg the'mocling of the 13L. (lay ordered Vrevards evacr aon a day earer thaoli cantral coast counties to the north.)

His a n in-cog in the Contet of the intese media coveage of the storm-had the desired effect. Brevard County nesponded to Floyd with the utmost seross. For the firt te in its history virhuly al c the 12.SD employef tXe edy Space at Cape CanveW were evacuated. (A skeleton crew of 109 remained behnd.) Traffic began to fl the rod well before the four o'dock deadlne for ndatory evacuati. Some evaames took more tha one ;ca others took Lager veiles, stocked with posessl=. An &cm nt fn a Tampa newPaPer told the stoy of Steve Carver of Brevads Satelte Beach who 'packed a 22-foot rent trudk with half his household goods. ' wuldt gt It at but better somehing ta nothing.,,

Oths, such as ShaMv Belhner of Mdbourne, 'bad little ne than a carton of ciarettes and a sixb-pc of Coke In hIs car. But Belinger was cncened ordy with gettig out of town. youd have to be cray to stay.'

TAY beliEves the resulting eleys of evacuatiim were, In codtrast to those o( Palm Bowlh Count, propriatg about 140,000 of th couYs 400,00 ide left their homes. No one could be sure, says Lay, that even standard hom coud wftstand winds ofi4 mph. He addx-

"JX lirvedahacte thalwwbulltinl965andthe building code sid that hone was built to withstand 90 11 /# M/

Safe But Arawyed ,C16i02.lnM 1-265.

tlle an,hour wftts and hn atchrg W ad yoCteli me tat mom b goingto hathen with 12 muleanhour wfiUda amI stying in that house? No, I ain't stairg tm that hose. That's what people sid. Ad even thoug we t*ied to,educate peop and Ithink we did a ai good job of In terms of protecting their wirdawa. protecting theirdoostheirp dooa so that they cm maintain.

the complete seale enivelope of that home, In mnyz camse I think people hPA zot actlly dame tbase Indo thhWs.

An hkporA cmplCAHMn hn B rrd OnmtY, hOWever, hIved itS dpto Of pVbl a~bedrig. Despfte the size of the evacuation a smaller-than-anlIcipated nurar of Brevard reidents chose to use area shdt Some 54 percent of those who evaczated In fa, left the county etirely, wie only 7,000 of an expeed SOO redent used county shelter This my have been the result of warnins by coimty offidala that shelters should be viewed as a last resort-and cfered few amenities. Cffcis were coin d tat, if the general population sought protectian in the Selter, thooe with To other aptions m bhave no pLea to go. Thus, thoe who had other optiomi -ftwhding relatives or aoces to mo~ta rooms-were en~murged, to choose them. Low wse of shelters was, however, also a result of the fac that the county could not ope a.U is shelter location County aemploye and voInteers expected to provide staffing coe, inimany cae, to evacuate themselve, says Bob Lar

'It was a problem fir us with the people that staff the hls and for people that ight maybe do soKething edsc- Maybe they'ke highway worc=. They lhed in manufaicured homes and they say ' gofta go! o' tursn oant hatyoucamot expec fzm es to split up, for cm to stay and workwle therest of thefaiytakeoff zomwhewe.T The effct of there being large numbers of evacuees, along with ther overwhelming pefernce to leave the county, headng noh and west, set the stage for NpclloII firte was that of long trffrc delays Whle 70 percent of those evacuating exected they'd be able to reach their deatiua in lu tn two hur, fewer than half were able to do so; residents of som 'surge zones took as long as 15 to 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> to reach their destinations Although the actal numbers of eas on the road for that long was relatively zaf such delays meant that hundreds were on the roads at a tfime wen the badi of the xsLom could possly have hit. The traffic fum were caused both by the thee number of evacuees fromNrevard and other cna Florida countis and by what was, in effeck thei colson with the first wave of evacuees, comn up frum the south along the main north-south Itertate and limedacos highways, knerstate 95 and the Florida Tumpake Bob Lay rem wishln& once ft became dear how large the south Florida 2A

Safe But Annoyed evacuation, waa ansi the fImpact it would have en areas farther :nort, that he could communicate with drivers to t them to tae altenae secondazy route. But he could not do s Says lay: We ould talk to people over TV and we could talk to them over the radio but the mnate they got in their car Guem we'd effectdiely lost theL Unless they were tuned to the dght statio at the right t}e ten tm re not 8on8 to get the right faformatveL' lay was are of the potenial of so-Called varale messaglfg tecliIoV-elercafl ulgr whose maage could be quiky updated to divert drhve to altenate routs, but the codty lacked suffident zwnm1e of whdgwsg for hemto playainuJorrole.

Had Floyd moved Idn(Ld the results of such traffic snafus could have been devastatfq&

The mmnler of driver in such peril was reavy limUd says Bob Lay, ordy because the county ordered Its evacuat zestively esdy. 'I% be best wth you, had we waited unll Tuesday mornM g to order that evacuati, we woud have waied until too late We woud have put peo~e en the toad aud they wuld not have beem able to get out wbere they needed to go and would have been an the toad at a time of potally high winds. (Actu overall dearance time for the cmunty was 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> - me foau hai more the county projeced Residents who ddayed had the koget ame an the road. Noted o newaper 'George and Madame Hamit pacled up their gcmJoey. 9. and dog, Riley, grVaed iVortant papers and left Melboum Beadh at 9;30 &M Tuesday. Their trp to Taupa, whnch ormally takes 3 &hoou, took almost 7."

Al Ihis had o even before the last. most northern swge of the planned evacuation

urred had even, gotten started. Sob Collins of Florida's DivMio of Emergency MmangemimL recalls that b>y the fim evaaaicm from Floida most norther major coastal dty, Jadkmvle, was cad to start, viritualy a11 the hotel rocams in the cm*tra and wext=r parts of the smate to whldcm evaciuees were liAeY to head, were ahready Mled.

Noth Florida: Jaconville lke their counterparts In southeat Florida, emergency manageman offidls in and around Jaconville-the major city cm the northeast Florida coast-would have ikd to limit the Huricane Floyd evacuation, focusing en ihose homes Lfa coastal itorm surge arl Moreover, as It became dear, late Tuesday lgah, that Floyd might not be the punishing stm some feazed- th, in fact the track forecasted for It by the National Huricane Centr was correct (Category 4, il&y to nove paralel with the coast)-the case for a lifited evacuation became stronger. If Floyd was to lit jacksmville at A it would be the mmediate cost that would be most affected. However, as In outhieae Florida, lintig the evacuation proved to be e said ha dae Nblc about the atorm track of the monster storm ctrhued to mi hi. Prident Dl Clintn hadby Wednesday nuarf Septmber 15, gone so far as t1 Isue a pre-emptive disaster decaradlon for the state of Florida The lo&riames-Untonu publIshed In Jackovle, described Floyd as ath strzgest storm to threatJen jackonvlle in the 2 century. The ctys mayor, John Delaney, was 13 Al

CW^ IttifArmn C1O-oC1--6

_2f_4¶- Ayimw, quoted as sayin& 'Ths caild very well be a stor that could flatten bhudreds of homes out at the beadw Clap Faftaor direcor of emergency awigent for Diva County, th meaor sioitheae aFloda County popdlat, 77.000), found be faced a specal probem The fad hat the St. Johns River Det the Atlantic at lJaksorwnle onpmlited the contours of tme storm sue zo Tbe hurr;ane, cbserved the FloPda Tins-Unilm "could push can water Into the SL JohbW, Ca the river to back piT floo. The corn says Patkmi,, had tried to cand4 Ofteusi'Verd m- educakas-induding =wwaspaj inserts designed to hep residents lam whete they lived in an area at rIsk of storm surge. Btt, he sayp,'mot peaoe tume the things out Unil the local media starts punpig the latesstorm!' Adds Pattewxu "lm constantiy amazed at how little peoe know about where they Hve eve to the poInt ofdot knowing whete thre within 1LW yards of a mnumb or a dver." Such ffoamatim Is Impmag in detectrdrrig the The time whe a, storm Is himineat says Pattermc, Is no easier fo mmiatn detlsd informatlon. 'By te time the Itorm is emnhln& we've mised our window of OPPotunity,"

he "y. 'Now we're oig in Second sound bites. And you can't =ummumte detaed fInormatn about storm surge zone under thoe Imataxim. I thik ft's reasonble to say that we did not have ways I dan'pe the hadaw evacuadon.' In otlm words, almost inevitaby, an -intcting ose at risk c strsurge to evacuate, would lead to a arger eaation than iecessary-althongh Patterson, ike otber mmny emergency uanagemt director also saw Floyds hih winds s a fac which could lead those not at risk from water to dedde to leave, as w N d he fdsere Int em ot to do o, The capaty to ssue a daningmage, to discourage evacuation, bas everying to do with how you've been dolng with mitigutin and 1reparallon If I had fet confident that horneowftw had been taking wind aly and really bad gone in and retroftted tir bnmes to withsand it, then I would have felt we had some immiitY from the starm am a canty. Mt we hadnt pushed letroflming "

energetically as we shuld have. So, altough I did feel cofidet telling advIduals that I knew-and wbose homes I was famlar with-that they didAt have to leave, as far as nuking a pul announ_~ent, that was differad. Al the sametim we knew peaple could be at fisk out cm th highway."

The risk sterned, In part from the fad thta, lMe the counterparts dsewhere, northeast Florida residents chose to deve rot unly away frm the coa t but also out of the county and out of the state. The Assoi5aed Prs reported flat the Viauskas fily took 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> to drive *Am Edgewater in northa Florida to south Georgia. a tdp tha usually takes fo hour The famiy of six traveled In a carvan of five can with two cats, four dogs, fimmly fiends and two boats' Jadwmvle evacuee Viscd rake told te Tampa Tribume her experene traveing in a four-ar caravan that ndhlded .pet bird r erained by a seat belt was 'hwane" Drale laughed when asked where she was heading. 'We're nt sure. Just west somewhere.' Bob Collins of the state Divislon 1A._2o

Safe Dut Annyed 6215.

C16-M-16W of Emegency Management was struck by h number fam i rom Inad areas-with o evident reason to v niate-who monethelm did smo Notwithstading suc shadow evacuation, the northeast Flord} dear e fine was actually 7.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> less than that which afficali had prS de& For tate and couty offida, t*

was something of a trimph refleting riot ondy ery departres by me househlds but adpt dqeloyment of a wide rag of services prvided by state Agendes Tow bucs Wae dployed to prevent tu beng blocked by hvakdowns. lakr buck filled with gasline were deployed to prent can from ring out of fuel deqpit the lmog wai In slow t1aff. Exta partable restrooms were put out at rest stops. DAt from the pont of view of evauafti hosed s, It stM book far longer than norma to reai much destinations as Tallahassee-where ev em found mo mold rooms were available.

Mate, says Chip Pattersam might have been ale to take advantage of available spew In public shelter. BUt the heavy tafac,bad had aother side dec, he says: the cut was nt We to open al its shelter. In the Jacscavlfle area, urik cenrl da, this ws riot the result of emergency personnel doosing to evacuae rather than showig up for wok ah It wz4 says Patterson, the result of a plan to open shelters ao a "as nfeded. basis eme Eiled tp, another Wodbe opened.hIn usuallynm wonderful seNbeobserve. Butit didriot erve us Wel duzing the Hurricane Floyd evaaaoreo The proble was iffoc it became dear that }more msheltes, particularly In the western part of the county, were needed tra bad readhed the point of audh grdlock that emergency persannel es l could not readi the shelters in order to operate themi (Patterson later d=aned the policy to open all pcimary alieteri-widdi are dispemsed geographtcally thrugout the couny-at the sam lim)

Plehaps because ft became dlear soon ater the Jadkowle area evacuated that Floyd would not make landfal in Florida after al, public annoya= surfaced mos notably her Maly Arm rikauskas -of the famly wbch traveled in a car caravan to rural Georgila where dthy ended up spending the night parked on farmid-told the Florida Times-Unin that any future evauation is oing to have to be real nandatoryfor as to do what we did &aa Observes Chip Patttrso, tartly, 'There ar a lot of people for whom any hunwonv ene is deemed to be olaerle.* Loa elected officials defended the evacum:io "I dodt think anyone flat lives at the beach questions the dedsin, said Jacksonve Mayor Wim Delaney. Te was no way you could have taken the dunce of tht fng rot turnf and (tn tWed to nove those people." A similar tone o implicit defenriveness about the evacuation was struck by m alo offals A Wednesday, September 15 artide in the Miami Herald was headlined, 'Dade officialusay they doret regret evacuatio.' Die ferald wentan to say, 'Upooted 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> eArlier under orders of evacuation, thofnsau ds of coasdl Miami-Dade reidents went home Tueday evenig after weatheig the storm fiat did rot con ... Top county officials odd if they had to do it &gafn, they would order similar evacuaions I'AS 2j

Safe But Annoyed, SafeButAnraoyed......... c16.02-1652.o C16IM-WIV-0 Hurricane Floyd caused only the mast minor propetty damage and Do fatalities as it skirted the atate of Florida. Nonetheless, as hundzeds of thousands of househods slowly filtered back to oeir bomes, thee was a wUepred MW in tbe state tat the evacatian, if ot a flacx aKdlhave been hAndled far mmre efficiently. Eioal wuitem troughout the US took nonce of the fact tha the loyd evacUaoton rous had been, as the CormnLaD (Ohlo) D iLtc had put ft "reduced topaxliWag lob.l Opined the DLspaIdt OFotunately the seem was- cta of despertion.

Bu~t Many are ad*&& what If the threat had promVa the hysterla ofianimmfinnt Cold War atta Wold the highway sytem have sen wort tun just jammed? Miht tt not hve becomea death trakp?-

By Septmb less adun a week afta the freny of public cun whic surrounded the approach of Floyd, Florida Gomor Jb Bush ordered a spedal study of evaeuai polcie As the Mi Herald wrote`'Gov rJeb Bush wants to know what woked and what d1dWt when more than a milo Floridian had to flee tir homes In advance oi Hurricane Floyd earier this Week' A ceral part of the study was to l exanatian of what appeared to be a simple, ommcwiaer~s Utep to cut do"m on eviacuat elated, traffic ams. S 'calle

-revse lWn would tum wpected interstate higways into oe-way toad, headed in the dixedtm of the evacuation wave. It was a step wich, on the surface, promiaed to be an easy way to fnrease highway cacity in an mgency, osrtenstly doubling road capacity, tempoary , in a state In whhoadconstructimh ad not kept up with the growth In auto or total populati T idea was buttessed, fn FloydX9 wake, by the deis Of South COl= G mwer Jun Hodges to everse laInlentestate 26 for evacuees returning to Charleson, whose Mayor Joseph Riley had been an outspoken advocate of such a paliy. (The St. Petersburg rTnes wrote tat Hodges had made hia derision only after 'Thousands of his cmntituents spont hamr stuck in traffic, usIng thidr cell phones to blister him on radio talk showc) The retum appeared to mrae smooty than the evacuaion Mayor Riley observed. In addLiion,federld ofials eaoessed the view that reverae-laInGg Cmid be sdectevdy employed to good effect. Said FedralEmergency Management Agency spkeman Mzc Wdlin. 'Well look at the hurricane routes (to detene)where it's feaside to ak major Interstate mnove all in cme di;edku.

Even as dtee was public daur for such a policy, Florida emergency manageat offirils ther ves were not lumping unreservedly on the bandwagoL Maor evk Guidry, in charge of evacuatoan isues for the Florida Hghway PrvL told the SL Petersburg Tmes, in effece that in an evacuation traffic jmns were Ievftbe. Thers just rot erough road to handle that flow. From our standpohnt ff the taffic keeps movi& ths about the best that people could epect. Guidry rnted at, in order to ensure that traffic did riot enter a reverse-aned highway and head in the prohtd directin the sate would need 'emmons shafng and a lot of equipmenL You have to have people at all the entrane ramps and you have to have backups to 16 AL

Safe But Arinoyed, SafeButAnnoyed c16o-1652-o C.L6a2-UM relieve those peoqe- Banier adtnewould nMt prevent drivens fom udng dosed atrntce ramps, said Gfidry. 'Tve mee people drive aroid wooden and cocrete burkm Cores certaitly wont t them.' He notedw too, that, at dsme point the one-way des4gnation must and T What happens then? You are sending a whde lot of peape from populated areas where tre is law enfonnuzeat to unpopulated ara Where thre is ahmost no kw .nf IamL" State hEMeey ofcial stess4 too1 the need for evaces to cokider uLing seconday routm Insed of main hIghwaysi and to be made aware, peraps trough eldronic nmeaging signs or through fes uent to gas statoDs and restaurants, of piws tbey could go-whethrseters cravld-ao tat traffic would gradually decreaeas can peeled off to destinations along the way.

But officals, in the weeks after the Hurricane Floyd evacuation and tereafter, most liked to emphaize their hope that wmehow the mardtude of future evacuations cmld be decreased.

Said Steve Suibert, Secretary of the Florida Departent of Cmmuniy Affais, 'M you live In an area tt muljectost sume. keep your fmIly safe at bone' Hurrrne Floyd had left in its wake little damage but, nonethels, a new challenge for emergency nagement oiclals: devising ways to convine resdents not to evacuate mmecessarfl. fWe've done a good job at teing people the Asy is fallln& ' says Bob Glis= of the states Divisi of En ny Management 'We have to do a litle better fenth subtegiB' EpIlogue In February 2OO, the Govenors I eurricand Evacuatm Task Force Report-meant to reomunend dchange in Floda's energency nmagement system as a result of the Hnrrane Floyd evacuatcm-was issued. It induded 22 -- - -'M' (see aht. It fcsed much of its attention on the possblimty of evx4anlig' highways in order to Inscreae their evacuation capacity. The Task Frve crmduded, however, that the saety and logistical problems posed by reverse-Inin~g dictated that It "smt arly be used as a IAt tesor when cmdificrs are dire 'The use of paved hdghway shoulders as a hird lane of traffic was deemed to be more wiMeypactcaL And, although seven specific highways were 9deOfied for po reverse4aning but, continued the report 'there are many less drastic steps which cn be taken. Most broadly, the tas force observed that 'the state must focus aure aftention on fiiding alternatives 6o evacuatim as one ou prmary memns of providig protective tons tlstzen. The report emphaszed the need for efforts to Uconge residents to revft their homes to become burlanerooC and the need for emrgency mnagemnei officials to encourage the use of neighborhood shelte-I order to

'leave room'on critil evaut outes for ose who truly need to leave and seek safety.' The task force weant o far as to call fmr the powsse use of 'military assets as shelters, In order to augment the stats limted d.elter capacity.

The report led to the use of the sWes retwork of pubic radiostos be Identified as the place to whih drivers could reliably tmn for infomation about traffic congestion and alternative 17 04--2

Safe But Arancyed a~

,Cu&M-162.

routes dudg ALlarge-scale evacution. It 1e4 as wdL to the expanded we of eltertzmc variable mes$ag unge#-Whhth ha been limited IT a atuipl lac of sudh sggw daft~ the Floyd evacuatiorL The Task Farce did no. howevmr offer a simple anwer to the-problez af sladow evacuation. Rather it placed lbs fait in the potentia for better public hifoimatln dlmf iti'm adPartiCUlarly, the MeOof The bAtMWe to 5 improve the amount and amaiabflty of ariergmy