ML031530117

Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request 02-05

ML031530117
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	05/29/2003
From:	Warner M Florida Power & Light Energy Seabrook
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML031530117 (5)

Text

FPL Energy FPL Energy Seabrook Station Seabrook Station P.O. Box 300 Seabrook, NH 03874 (603) 773-7000 May 29, 2003 Docket No. 50-443 NYN-03044 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

References:

North Atlantic letter NYN-02094, Seabrook Station License Amendment Request 02-05 "Relocation of Technical Specifications Associated with Boration Systems and Chemistry, Revision of Certain Technical Specifications Associated with the Reactor Coolant System," dated October 11, 2002.

Seabrook Station "Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request 02-05" Enclosed is the response to a request for additional information associated with License Amendment Request (LAR) 02-05. Specifically, the NRC requested additional technical information concerning the surveillance requirements for valves 1-CS-V142 /1-CS-V143, and requested that FPLE Seabrook provide an analysis that demonstrates compliance with Standard Review Plan Chapter 15.4.6, "Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction that Results in a Decrease in Boron Concentration in the Reactor Coolant" for unisolated demineralizer beds with unborated mixed bed resin.

In addition, in Section IV of LAR 02-05, Technical Specification 3.4.7 is listed as being modified and relocated. Please note that it is not being modified.

Should you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Mr. James M. Peschel, Regulatory Programs Manager, at (603) 773-7194.

Very truly yours, FPL ENERGY SEABROOK, LLC Mark E. Warner Site Vice President kcrLI

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NYN-03044/Page 2 cc: H. J. Miller, NRC Region I Administrator V. Nerses, NRC Project Manager, Project Directorate 1-2 G. T. Dentel, NRC Senior Resident Inspector Mr. Donald Bliss, Acting Director New Hampshire Office of Emergency Management State Office Park South 107 Pleasant Street Concord, NH 03301

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NYN-03044/Page 3 Oath and Affirmation I, Mark E. Warner, Site Vice President of FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC, hereby affirm that the information and statements contained within this response to the Request for Additional Information to License Amendment Request 02-05 are based on facts and circumstances which are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Sworn and Subscribed beforerve this q dayof 10. ,2003 Mark E. Warner OSite

__________________________________ _ V ice President otary Public

Enclosure to NYN-03044 Request for Additional Information SEABROOK NUCLEAR PONER STATION UNIT NO. 1 Based on a Facsimile Request for Additional Information received May 5, 2003 NRC Request 1: In your application dated October 11, 2002, you proposed to remove Technical Specifications (TS) 3.1.2.1 through 3.1.2.6, "Boration Systems." If allowed, the surveillance requirements for the valves, pumps, boration source and flow paths will be removed from the Technical Specifications and placed in a licensee controlled document. Valves V142 and V143, which would be removed from the TS as a result of this proposed action, specifically appear to be containment isolation valves (PID 1-CS-B20722). Please clarify how the surveillance requirements will be maintained for these components.

FPLE Seabrook Response to Request 1: Valves l-CS-V142 and -CS-V143 receive a signal to close on a Safety Injection. Since they are required for safety injection, the surveillance requirements of TS 3/4.5.2, "Emergency Core Cooling Systems - ECCS Subsystems - Tavg Greater Than Or Equal To 350°F," apply to both valves. Valve l-CS-V143 is also a containment isolation valve. As a containment isolation valve, surveillance requirements found in Technical Specification 3/4.6.3, "Containment Systems - Containment Isolation Valves - Surveillance Requirements" also apply to CS-V143. Both CS-V142 and CS-V143 are classified as safety class 2 valves, and as such, are tested in accordance with the requirements of TS 4.0.5, In Service Testing program.

NRC Request 2: The modification of TS 3.1.2.7 is proposed to allow the Boron Thermal Regeneration System demineralizer beds to be used for reactor coolant system shutdown chemistry cleanup during Modes 4, 5, and 6. The current specification requires isolation of all of the Boron Thermal Regeneration System demineralizer beds during Modes 4, 5, and 6.

However, the change in the TS allows use of the demineralizer beds which have been saturated with boron and therefore no longer remove boron from the RCS. Pages 8 and 9 of Section I describe the actions taken to ensure that the potential for a dilution event from inadvertent use of the demineralizer bed during Mode is bounded by the existing limiting event described in the UFSAR, Chapter 15.4.6, "Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction that Results in a Decrease in the Boron Concentration in the Reactor Coolant." However deborating demineralizer beds could be inadvertently used during Modes 4, 5, and 6, resulting in a dilution event. A Mode 4, 5, or 6 dilution event resulting from deboration by unisolated demineralizer beds with unborated mixed bed resin has not been analyzed in your submittal. Please provide an analysis that demonstrates compliance with Standard Review Plan Chapter 15.4.6, "Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction that Results in a Decrease in Boron Concentration in the Reactor Coolant."

FPLE Seabrook Response to Request 2: The proposed change allows the option of isolating individual demineralizer beds which have the potential to initiate a dilution event. Closing the outlet valve for the individual demineralizer performs the isolation. The proposed change only allows beds that have been saturated with boron to be placed in service in Modes 4, 5, or 6.

Demineralizer beds that have not been saturated with boron will remain isolated from the RCS in Modes 4, 5, and 6.

The proposed changes to Technical Specification 3.1.2.7 do not invalidate the assumptions made for the current dilution analysis that covers Mode 4, 5, and 6. Demineralizer beds capable of deborating will still be isolated through the use of the individual bed outlet isolation valves.

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