ML030690191
| ML030690191 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 01/08/2003 |
| From: | Meserve R NRC/Chairman |
| To: | Bell H NRC/OIG |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2003-0143 | |
| Download: ML030690191 (6) | |
Text
Draft January 8, 2003
/ '.3 G:\RAM\Davis Besse IG report.wpd MEMORANDUM TO: Hubert T. Bell Inspector General From: Richard A. Mvleserve Chairman
Subject:
V , l.i,, ,
nP* l u Da'i:-D%-z (Case No.02-03S)
- ,~ati.
I am responding on behalf of the Commission to your report of December 30, 2002, of 1he Davis-Besse reactor regarding the staff's decision to allow a slight delay in the shutdown the Control Rod Drive Mechanism connection with the investigation of possible cracks in 6in head. The report includes five specific findings Va;?,0,J)(CRDM) nozzles in the reactor pressure vessel with regard to the staffs aclion..-.45onclude that one of these findings is correct in part, but that the others are unjustified, u-4, .and-misleading.-
most important, There are several significant failings in the report. First, and perhaps of continued operation the report incorrectly indicates that the decision to allow the brief period impact on the licensee. Prt was driven in large part by the interest in reducing the financial
--. ssurin the public health and safety is the hlehest priority of the NRC "inspections of reactor pressure vessel heads at all pressurized waer reac undertaken as a result of staff safety concerns about circumferential nozzle cracking.
And, as -h e5i/
your report has found, the NRC staff allowed the Davis-Besse reactor to continue to significant operate d expert staff reached unanimous agreement that there was no only aafter the relevant period of extended safety concern relating to nozzle cracks that would preclude the brief this fact operation. . It is a significant failing that the report does not acknowledge in its findings.,
the context for the Second, the findings are deficient by failing to represent accurately the notion that December 31 - the target staff's action. The findings seem to be premised on It is correct, as the report
,4-*date for completion of inspections -- was an inflexible deadline. Rep . But the findings fail to states, that this date was articulated in Bulletin 2001-01. plants (like Davis susceptible
- acknowledge that the BulletiI 2roviided that, if licensees at highly their should provide
- e-sse) di~d.no-,nwMirTLo pelrm inspections by that date, those licensees to in the Bulletin would continue basis for concluding that the regulatory requirements discussed licensee for Davis be met until the inspections were performed. B41 7 f.The
ý,
with the independe% analysis conducted by the Besse provided information that, in conjunction staff, was seen to justify &1e¶9tftft slightly delayed, inspection.1Fnote that your inquiry In any event, the staff's action in does not challenge the staff's assesgffnent of this information.
this case was k consistent with the Bulletin.
of the staff concerning Third, the report fails to acknowledge that the technical judgment correct. Specifically, the etent of axial and circumferential cracking of the CRDM nozzles was that were found during the plant inspections the size and type of cracking in the CRDM nozzles safety hazard. The posed an immediate were within the range predicted by the staff and none the likelihood of a CRDIM nozzle ejection inspection served to validate the staff's conclusion that operation from December 31, 2001, to due to circumferential cracking during the brief period of
February 16, 2002, was acceptably small. It is unfortunate that the report fails even to mention this significant fact.
Fourth, the report's shortcomings are particularly unfortunate because it should have been anticipated that the report could be misconstrued to suggest staff acceptance of the unexpected head corrosion at the Davis-Besse plant. Indeed, this has already happened in the case of the New York Times.4'As you know, the NRC has itselt Deen nlighly self-critical in connection with the programmatic deficiencies in connection with the head-corrosion event.
The NRC has prepaTed an extensive lessons-learned report to'examine that matter and to ensure that all issues relating to the head-corrosipn matter are forthrightly addressed and corrected.1 -ý5 iH-i* aiiv;, criticizthe staff for its decision to allow a brief period of extended operation before inspeciion of the nozzles because of the subsequently pe staff did not know about the head corrosion aT i* ,ie .or its Olt oiscovere:: head corrosio the decision in the
+OZX.,oison and, quite trank y, it is Monday-morning quarterbacking to question 01i ci*iM c-ac WJ pet Ise 'iaht of subsequent knowledge.
Finally, the report makes much of the fact that the staff prepared a draft shutdown order for Davis-Besse. At various points, the report cites the draft order as if It reflected the staff's final analysis. _ In fact, during the relevant period, the staff maint M and their staff, on afl,ýspects of continuing dialog with senior NRC officials, the Commissioners the situation in connection with the Davis-Besse plant. As stated in the November21, 2O01 in transmittal memorandum that forwarded the draft shutdown order, and as was made clear to discussions with myself and my colleagues on the Commission, the staff was continuing engage the licensee in discussions and was open to reviewing new and relevant information that might justify operation beyond December 31, just as the Bulletin 2001-01 contemplated.
the In.short, the staff was preparing an order in the event that one was required. Although licensee initially planned operation until March 31, 2002, It ultimately agreed to shut down by
- tprz.*"p]'rejbruary 16, subject t'orZ 4 compensatory meU lres. i: ,,F pL*,ce 01 tuls
.. w * ,y...... ito, ir ,j4ide the issuance of the order unnecessary.
',h t-, B~l*,111n as It is -unfair to cite the staffs prudent efforts to prepare for a situation that did not occur S; E" I evidence that the staffs actions were somehow improper. lr In sum,/rbelieve that the report is seriously inarc rial ano misleading..*
five significant disservice by your release ot such an uSn.h a*,aiSul MWresponse to the specific Tindingi is provided in the attachment. Oa Vessel 1Degradation of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Reactor Pressure 2002).
Head Lessons-Learned Report, Final Report (Sep 3D,
RESPONSE TO DIG FINDINGS EVENT INQUIRY INTO NRC'S REGULATION OF DAVIS-BESSE (CASE NO.02-03S)
OIG Findino 1.
During its review of the potential hazardous condition at Davis-Besse, the NRC staff considered the financial impact to the licensee of an unscheduled plant shutdown. 'This is in keeping with one of NRC's performance goals established to support agency strategic goals - which is the reduction of unnecessary regulatory burden on licensees. However, the goal of NRC Bulletin 2D00-01 was, in the interest of publichealth and safety, to have plants that were identified as being highly susceptible to vessel head penetration nozzle cracking perform inspections by December 31, 2DO1, to confirm the structural integrity of the nozzles with the intent to avoid a possible control rod drive mechanism nozzle ejection and possible loss-of-coolant accident. The fact that FENOC sought and staff allowed Davis-Besse to operate past December 31, 2001, without performing these inspections was driven in large part by a desire to lessen the financial impact on FENOC that would result from an early shutdown. Consequently, while the decision by the staff to allow Davis-Besse to continue to operate was in keeping with the NRC performance goal to reduce unnecessary regulatory burden, it was contrary to the goal of NRC Bulletin 2001-01 to have at-risk plants conduct timely inspections to ensure NRC regulatory requirements related to reactor coolant leakage were met.
Response to Finding 1.
This finding is incorrect. The NRC's primary obligation is to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety. Only If this goal is satisfied is there consideration of other goals, such as the goal to avoid undue regulatory burden.
The finding states that the NRC staff's decision to allow operation through February 1 6 'h was driven in large part by economic concerns. But this is not correct. The report elsewhere acknowledges that "IqRR staff reached unanimous agreement... that there was no significant safety concern that would preclude continued operation until [February 1S)." Report, 13 (emphasis added). Guided by the conclusion that safety was not compromised, the staff agreed to allow continued operation. The implication in the finding that there was a clash of conflicting goals and that safety was subordinated to economic considerations is wrong.
Moreover, the assertion that the staff's action was inconsistent with Bulletin 2001-01 is also incorrect. The Bulletin specifically contemplated that the licensee might seek to justify the postponement of the inspection past December 31. Bulletin 2001-01, 8. The licensee provided exactly that justification here. And your report does not challenge the adequacy of the staff's assessment of the licensee information.
DIG Finding_2.
NRC Bulletin 201-01, dated August 3, 2001, advised that inspections by December 31,2D01, would be an appropriate way to handle plants identified as having experienced or being highly susceptible to vessel head penetration
noz*le cracking. This date was not rooted in scientific analysis but was viewed by the staff as practical in that it would allow a 5-month window for plants to either perform the inspections during already-scheduled outages or to plan for and conduct an unscheduled outage. However, when questioned about the importance of that particular date, NRC staff were called to justify why December 31, 2001, was any more safety significant than any other date, e.g., January 1, 2002. As a result, NRR staff found themselves unsuccessfully trying to defend the December 31, 2001, date even though the NRR Director stated that adequate protection of the public health and safety could not be assured without performing the inspections at Davis Besse.
Resoonse to Findina-2.
This finding is misleading. The finding criticizes the staff for addressing the issue that was presented to it. The issue was not whether inspections would be performed at Davis Besse; by order or by agreement, the inspections were going to be performed. Rather, the issue was whether December 31 should be required as a deadline or whether some later date would be acceptable. Although the finding fails to acknowledge the fact, Bulletin 2D01 -01 contemplated that licensees might provide a safety justification for operation beyond December 31, 20D1. In this case, the licensee provided such a safety justification and the expert staff reached a unanimous agreement that there was no significant safety concern that would preclude continued operation until February 16. The staff should not be criticized for exercising reasonable judgment consistent with the Bulletin - judgment that subsequent inspection showed to be correct. A CAM JMOILIr DIG Findina 3.
NRC appears to have informally established an unreasonably high burden of requiring absolute proof of a safety problem, versus lack of reasonable assurance of maintaining public health and safety, before It will act to shut down a power plant. The staff articulated this standard to DIG as a rationale for allowing Davis Besse to operate until February 16, 2002, even in light of information that strongly indicated Davis-Besse was not in compliance with NRC regulations and plant technical specifications and may have operated with reduced safety margins.
Response lo Finding 3.
The report does not provide a basis for this finding and, in any event, the finding is incorrect.
The NRC staffs actions in issuing Bulletin 2001-01, in crafting the draft order, and in considering the licensee's safety arguments bor operation beyond December 31, 2001, were clearly and appropriately focused on maintaining reasonable assurance of public health arid safety. The issuance of an order on this basis does not require absolute proof.
The finding may be the result of OIG confusion about the basis for the order. The staff acknowledges It could not construct the shutdown 6rder based on a violation of technical specifications unless a violation were established -- here, known leakage from the primary
contemplated reactor coolant system boundary. But this was not the basis on which the staff p'roceeding.
In any event, the possibility that CRDM cracking was present should not be confused short period.
with the conclusion that Davis-Besse was unsafe to operate for an additional staff s safety evaluation considered the Although no CRDIvM cracking was known to exist, the of an accident due potential for circumferential nozzle cracking and concluded that the likelihood 31, 2001, to February to CRDM nozzle ejection during the period of operation from December of CRDM cracking. These 16, 2002, was acceptably small, assuming predicted types and sizes during the predictions were determined to be correct, as shown by the inspections conducted shutdown of Davis Besse in early 2002.
for
-On November 21, 2001, the NRR Director forwarded a draft shutdown order Davis-Besse through the EDO fo the NRC Commission for its information.
However, contrary to the strong justification presented in the order, the NRR Director told OIG he never intended fo actually issue the order because he lacked a regulatory basis. DIG learned that the order was concurred in by all cognizant NRC staff to include the EDO and the Office of General Counsel, and QIG learned of no concerns by the staff that the NRC lacked a basis to issue the order.
Response to Finding 4.
Director raised the I am informed that no senior member of the staff recalls that the NRR (as wall senior agency management doubts that are attributed to him. In fact, all of the relevant inspection date, justify an alternate as the Commission) understood that, Ifthe licensee could not I have no doubt that existed.
a regulatory foundation for ordering the plant to shutdown clearly sufficient safety justification the order would have been issued If the licensee had not provided for an alternate inspection date.
O0G Findinp 5.
to NRC staff developed a well-documented technical basis for preparing an order NRC shut down Davis-Besse, and on November 21, 2001, the EDO informed the Commission 'of the intent of the NRR Director to shut down the plant on or before December 31, 2001. However, contrary to the strong justification presented in 29, the order, the NARR Director did not force a shutdown. Instead, on November operate Davis-Sesse 2001, the NRR Director concluded that FENOC could safely until February 16, 2002, provided the licensee implemented several this compensatory measures It had developed. OIG found that, in reaching decision in November 20D1, NRR lacked a full understanding of those bases compensatory measures, and the NRR staff did not document Its analytical and conclusions that supported Its decision.
Response to Findin-' 5.
I agree with this finding, but only in part.
I agree that the staff should have documented the basis for the decision at an earlier stage and should have assured that there was mutual, detailed understanding of the compensatory measures. I have directed the Executive Director for Operations to ensure that actions are taken to ensure that these oversights do not occur again.
Nonetheless, the finding is misleading in various respects. First, as noted above, the finding fails to recognize that Bulletin 2001-01 provided that an alternate inspection schedule would be considered by the staff if an adequate safety rationale could be provided. At every stage, the order was understood to reflect an action that would be taken if an adequate rationale for an alternative date was not provided. Second, the finding is misleading because the staff did publish the details of its safety evaluation and did document tha hpsisepn which the staff 2 The finding thus conflicts with accepted an alternative inspection scheduler(albelt belatedly)*
was an the facts, as acknowledged elsewhere in the report. Report, 14-15. Third, while there the of the compensatory measures proposed by initial misunderstanding with regard to one licensee (the use of an additional dedicated control room operator), this issue was quickly resolved. I understand that this misunderstanding did not affect either the assumptions or the conclusions arising from the staff's risk assessment concerning extended operation.
mor a nd u m to J. A. Zw ol insk i fro m I.J . Ba r re tt a n d G . M. Hola h a n (Nov 5 , 2 0 0 2).
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