ML030100026
| ML030100026 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 01/09/2003 |
| From: | Ernstes M Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch |
| To: | Sumner H Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| 50-321/02-301, 50-366/02-301 50-321/02-301, 50-366/02-301 | |
| Download: ML030100026 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000321/2002301
Text
January 9, 2003
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
ATTN: Mr. H. L. Sumner, Jr.
Vice President
P. O. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201-1295
SUBJECT:
EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC EXAMINATION REPORT
50-321/02-301 AND 50-366/02-301
Dear: Sumner:
During the period October 16-24, 2002, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
administered operating examinations to employees of your company who had applied for
licenses to operate the Edwin I. Hatch Point Nuclear Plant. At the conclusion of the
examination, the examiners discussed the examination questions and preliminary findings with
those members of your staff identified in the enclosed report. The written examination was
administered by your staff on October 30, 2002.
All eleven applicants passed the operating examination, all but one SRO passed the written
examination. There were six post examination written comments and one post examination
operating examination comment which are identified in Enclosure 2.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its
enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room
or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS).
ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the
Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Michael E. Ernstes, Chief
Operator Licensing and
Human Performance Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos. 50-321, 50-366
Enclosures: (See page 2)
2
Enclosures:
1. Report Details
2. Post Examination Comment Resolution
cc w/encls:
J. D. Woodard
Executive Vice President
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution
P. H. Wells
General Manager, Plant Hatch
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution
Raymond D. Baker
Manager Licensing - Hatch
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution
Ernest L. Blake, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts and
Trowbridge
2300 N Street, NW
Washington, D. C. 20037
Office of Planning and Budget
Room 610
270 Washington Street, SW
Atlanta, GA 30334
Director
Department of Natural Resources
205 Butler Street, SE, Suite 1252
Atlanta, GA 30334
Manager, Radioactive Materials Program
Department of Natural Resources
Electronic Mail Distribution
Chairman
Appling County Commissioners
County Courthouse
Baxley, GA 31513
Resident Manager
Oglethorpe Power Corporation
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution
Charles A. Patrizia, Esq.
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker
10th Floor
1299 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D. C. 20004-9500
Senior Engineer - Power Supply
Municipal Electric Authority
of Georgia
Electronic Mail Distribution
John C. Lewis
Training Manager
E. I. Hatch Nuclear Plant
U. S. Highway 1 North
P. O. Box 2010
Baxley, GA 31513
3
Distribution w/encls:
L. Olshan, NRR
J. Munday, SRI
RIDSNRRDIPMLIPB
PUBLIC
OFFICE
RII:DRS
RII:DRS
RII:DRS
RII:DRS
RII:DRP
SIGNATURE
/RA/
/RA By Rbaldwin For/
/RA/
/RA By RBaldwin For/ /RA/
/RA/
NAME
RBaldwin:pmd
TKolb
GLaska
LVick
MErnstes
BBoser
DATE
1/9/03
1/9/03
1/9/03
1/9/03
1/9/03
1/9/03
E-MAIL COPY?
YES
NO YES
NO YES NO YES
NO YES
NO YES
NO
PUBLIC DOCUMENT
YES
NO
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: C:\\ORPCheckout\\FileNET\\ML030100026.WPD
Enclosure 1
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos.:
50-321, 50-366
License Nos.:
Report Nos.:
50-321/02-301, 50-366/02-301
Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)
Facility:
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant
Location:
P.O. Box 2010
Baxley, Georgia 31515
Dates:
Operating Tests - October 16-24, 2002
Written Examination - October 30 , 2002
Examiners:
R. Baldwin, Chief Examiner
G. Laska, Operations Engineer
L. Vick, Senior Reactor Engineer
T. Kolb, Operations Engineer (Under Instruction)
Approved by:
M. Ernstes, Chief
Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
ER 05000321-2002-301, ER 05000366-2002-301, on 10/16-24/2002, Southern Nuclear
Operating Company, Inc., Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, licensed operator
examinations.
The NRC examiners conducted operator licensing initial examinations in accordance with the
guidance of Examiner Standards, NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1. This examination
implemented the operator licensing requirements of 10 CFR §55.41, §55.43, and §55.45.
The NRC administered the operating tests during the period October 16- 24, 2002. Members of
the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant training staff administered the written examination on
October 30, 2002. The operator licensing initial written examinations were developed by the
NRC. The operating tests were developed by the Edwin I. Hatch staff from an outline submitted
by the NRC. All applicants, one Reactor Operator (RO) and ten Senior Reactor Operators
(SRO) passed the operating examination. All applicants except one SRO passed the written
examination. Those applicants that passed both examinations were issued operator licenses
commensurate with the level of examination administered.
No significant issues were identified.
Report Details
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA5 Operator Licensing Initial Examinations
a.
Inspection Scope
The examiners developed the written and operating examinations in accordance with
the guidelines specified in NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1.
The examiners reviewed the licensees examination security measures while preparing
and administering the examinations to ensure examination security and integrity
complied with 10 CFR 55.49, Integrity of examinations and tests.
The examiners evaluated one RO and ten SRO applicants who were being assessed
under the guidelines specified in NUREG-1021. They administered the operating tests
during the period October 16-24, 2002. Members of the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant
training staff administered the written examination on October 30, 2002. The
evaluations of the applicants and review of documentation were performed to determine
if the applicants, who applied for licensees to operate the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant,
met requirements specified in 10 CFR Part 55.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
The licensee submitted six post examination comments concerning the written
examination and one post examination operating examination comment (ADAMS
Accession Number ML 023290002). The RO and SRO written examinations and
answer keys may be accessed in the ADAMS system (ADAMS Accession Number
ML02329003 and ML02329006).
4OA6 Meetings
Exit Meeting Summary
On October 25, 2002, the Chief Examiner discussed generic applicant performance and
examination development issues with members of licensee management.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the
inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
J. Betsill, Assistant, General Manager-Support
R. Diedrickson, Manager, Operations
S. Grantham, Supervisor, Operations Training
G. Johnson, Supervisor, Safety Audit & Engineering Review
J. Lewis, Manager, Training & EP
S. Tipps, Manager, Nuclear Safety & Compliance
P. Wells, General Manager
NRC
J. Munday, Senior Resident Inspector
N. Garrett, Resident Inspector
Enclosure 2
Hatch Exam 2002-301
Facility Comments and NRC Resolutions
Question:
- 7, SRO Exam
Comment:
The licensee recommends accepting answer B as a correct answer in addition to
the key answer D. Supporting documentation was submitted, Hatch Licensee
Event Report (LER) 2002-001, in which the E. I. Hatch Nuclear Safety and
Compliance department determined that HPCI was declared INOPERABLE with
the vacuum breakers isolated.
Resolution: Recommendation partially accepted. The licensee provided LER stated that the
HPCI System is rendered INOPERABLE with the HPCI Exhaust Line Vacuum
Breaker isolated. This LER is considered to represent the licensees official
determination of the systems OPERABILITY concerning the isolation of these
valves. Therefore, answer D which declared the HPCI system to OPERABLE
under these conditions will not be considered as a correct response.
The answer key will be changed to reflect that B is the only correct answer.
Question:
- 15, SRO Exam
- 21, RO Exam
Comment:
The licensee recommends deleting this question due to not having a correct
answer. The APRM UPSC TRIP/INOP SYS B alarm was replaced with
APRM/OPRM TRIP and only a ROD OUT BLOCK will be initiated.
Resolution: Recommendation accepted. The alarm identified in the answer no longer exists.
The answer should have identified that the ROD OUT BLOCK annunciator is in
alarm. The reference material provided to develop the examination was not
updated in this area.
The answer key will be changed to reflect the deletion of this question.
Question:
- 57, SRO Exam
- 66, RO Exam
Comment:
The licensee recommends deleting this question in that it does not meet the intent
of the K/A. The licensee contends that the question does not test the knowledge
of the reasons for a scram but it tests the reason for two steps in a procedure to
provide a Reactor scram.
Resolution: Recommendation not accepted.
The question was developed from K/A 295016 AK 3.01 which is:
2
Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to
control room abandonment: Reactor scram.
The question asks why the procedure also provides additional methods for
scramming the reactor (provided in the stem) when the control room is being
abandoned. The distractors provide the governing document where this
requirement is identified. In this situation the FSAR requires that the ability for
prompt hot shutdown of the reactor from locations outside the control room must
be maintained.
The answer key will remain unchanged.
Question:
- 66, SRO Exam
- 74, RO Exam
Comment:
The facility recommends this question be deleted since it exceeds the learning
objective and the bounds of the K/A by testing the number of valid inputs for
SPDS indication.
Resolution: Recommendation not accepted.
The question was developed from K/A 295026 EK 2.04 which is:
Knowledge of the interrelationship between suppression pool high water
temperature and the following: SPDS.
The question stem states the average Suppression Pool temperature is 102 F.
and identifies how many signals are operable for each group. An SPDS display
will turn Yellow if there are less than two inputs from any group. The number of
operable readings per group would allow the operator to determine this condition
was not met. The stem indicates that each group has at least four operable
signals. Since there was only one inoperable signal in two of the groups, the
question did not test the specific logic required for an operable signal (2/5) but the
applicant only needed to recognize that you can have one invalid signal and still
have a valid SPDS indication. The question was a valid test of the K/A.
The answer key will remain unchanged.
Question:
- 72, SRO Exam
- 78 RO Exam
Comment:
The facility recommended accepting distractor D as an additional correct answer.
Since a primary system discharging into secondary containment would be
considered a substantial degradation. Also, performing an Emergency
Depressurization places the plant in the safest possible condition as quickly as
possible since the 100 F cooldown rate can be exceeded. Additionally, the
3
licensee contends that the question is not within the bounds of the K/A, but does
not request it be deleted as in previous contested questions.
Resolution: Recommendation accepted. The fact that the primary system is causing two
areas within Secondary Containment to exceed maximum safe operating
temperatures implies the leak is substantial. While distractor D is a true
statement it is not the reason for emergency depressurization based on lesson
plan material. Since the stem of the question did not clearly identify where the
basis for this question came from an additional answer D will be also allowed.
The K/A states Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they
apply to high secondary containment area temperature: Isolating affected
systems. The NRC maintains the question meets the K/A due to the fact that it
addresses the reason for emergency depressurization if the affected system
cannot be isolated. If the system could be isolated this would not be an issue.
The answer key will be changed to reflect that answer D will be allowed as an
additional correct answer.
Question:
- 98, SRO Exam
- 99, RO Exam
Comment:
The question requires the applicant to determine how the Shift Supervisor
maintains communications with the Fire Brigade from the main control room. The
facility recommends this question be deleted since the radio system has been
upgraded per DCR 01-004 and therefore has no correct answer.
Resolution: Recommendation accepted. Since a new system has been installed there is no
correct answer. The reference material provided for examination development
was not updated in this area.
The answer key will be changed to reflect the deletion of this question.
Question:
- 53, SRO Exam
- 54, SRO Exam
Comment:
The licensee contends that an applicant while transposing answers for the above
two questions the applicant marked E for the answers. The licensee contends
that the applicant intended to answer D for the above questions. The licensee
provided a copy of the applicants examination where the applicant circled D for
these two questions. The licensee recommends amending the applicants answer
sheet to reflect D for both questions.
Resolution: Recommendation not accepted. Since the applicant elected to place his answers
on the examination in stead of the answer sheet directly, the applicant is
responsible for ensuring accuracy when transcribing answers from the
4
examination to the answer sheet. NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1,
Appendix E, Part B, Step 6 provides guidance for marking the answer sheets.
Once an applicants answer sheet is handed in to the proctor, the examination
responses are considered final, no changes can be made to the answer sheet
after that event. Handing in the examination signifies the completion of the
examination.
Comment:
The JPM required the individual to review a surveillance for the Scram Discharge
Volume Isolation Valves in which 3 of the valves had stroke times outside the
Acceptance Criteria times. Two of the valves exceeded the Tech Spec maximum
stroke time of 60 seconds and one of the valves only exceeded the surveillance
Acceptance Criteria of 56 seconds but was within the Technical Specifications
time of 60 seconds. The facility recommends accepting the actions for all 3
valves being inoperable by Tech Specs and also accepting the Tech Spec actions
for only 2 of the valves being Tech Spec inoperable.
Resolution: Recommendation not accepted. The facility states that Tested components
which do NOT meet the criteria specified in the surveillance procedure are
considered inoperable. A discussion with the Operations Manager and Licensing
Manager at the time the JPM was administered resulted in the same conclusion.
The NRC will grade the JPM as it was originally intended. The 3 valves that did
not meet the acceptance criteria of the surveillance are considered inoperable.
No change to the answer key will be made.