ML021990461
| ML021990461 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | West Valley Demonstration Project, P00M-032 |
| Issue date: | 07/08/2002 |
| From: | Cain M, Kearney L, Little J, Macvean S, Mendiratta O Westinghouse West Valley Demonstration Project |
| To: | Glenn C Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards |
| References | |
| +KBR1SISP20050613, SAR:0007459.01 WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1, Rev 0 | |
| Download: ML021990461 (88) | |
Text
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TO: C. GLENN NRC HEADQUARTERS DATE: 07/08/2002 KEARNEY AOC-21 TEL: 716 942-4074 PAGE: 1 FROM: L.E.
TRANSMITTAL NUM: 000018427 CONTROLLED COPY TRANSMITTAL / RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Attached is a CONTROLLED COPY of the following document(s) and its applicable index. Add or replace your existing copy with the attached.
CONTROLLED ISSUE COPY# PROC ID REV# FC# DATE PROCEDURE TITLE 006 ADDENDUM I 06/28/2002 ADDENDUM TO THE PRELIMINARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FOR THE REMOTE-HANDLED WASTE FACILITY Copies made from a controlled document MUST be marked UNCONTROLLED before distribution. Signature below signifies all previous revisions, if applicable, have been destroyed or marked superseded.
I have complied with the above instructions:
RETURN BY: 07/22/2002 Signature (BLACK INDELIBLE INK ONLY) Date FOR YOUR CONVENIENCE, A SELF-ADDRESSED, STAMPED ENVELOPE HAS BEEN INCLUDED.
0
DATE: 07/08/2002 PSAR FOR THE REMOTE-HANDLED WASTE FACILITY PAGE: 1 TIME: 08:02 AT THE WEST VALLEY DEMONSTRATION PROJECT WVNS-SAR-023 INDEX ISSUE REVi Ff PROCEDURE TITLESTTU ATE COGNIZANT MANAGER ADDENDUM 1 0 ADDENDUM TO THE PRELIMINARY SAFETY ACTIVE 06/28/2002 SHERIDAN,M.J.
ANALYSIS REPORT FOR THE REMOTE-HANDLED WASTE FACILITY WVNS-SAR-023 0 PSAR FOR THE REMOTE-HANDLED WASTE FACILITY ACTIVE 09/20/2000 SHERIDAN,M.J.
AT THE WEST VALLEY DEMONSTRATION PROJECT
Doc. ID Number WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 West Valley 0 Revision Numbe r Demonstration Project 06/28/2002 Revision Date Engineering Release #4679 ADDENDUM TO THE PRELIMINARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FOR REMOTE-HANDLED WASTE FACILITY, WVNS-SAR-023, Rev. 0 REQUIREMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW MET BY REFERENCED DOCUMENT: WVDP-321 DATED: 6/23/98 PROPOSED HAZARD CATEGORIZATION: 2 SAR APPROVALS:
Dat Cognizant Engineer Date
- 0. P. Mendiratta, Date S Ma n, Site Closure Projects Manager Date J ttle, Chair, Radiation Safety Committee Westinghouse A Member of Washington Group International, Inc.
West Valley Nuclear Services Co.
10282 Rock Springs Road West Valley, NY 14171-9799 SAR:0007459,01 WV-1 816, Rev. 4 Q
-SAP! 00087.0 ýZ21 0Z_
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 2 of 85 WEST VALLEY DEMONSTRATION PROJECT PRELIMINARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FOR REMOTE-HANDLED WASTE FACILITY TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE LIST OF TABLES ..... . . . . .. . .... . 5 LIST OF FIGURES ............ ................................. 6 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS. ......... .. 7
1.0 INTRODUCTION
AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE REMOTE-HANDLED WASTE FAC ILITY 21 1.1.2 Access to the Remote-Handled Waste Facility 21 1.1.6 Remote-Handled Waste Facility Construction Schedule 21 1.3 General Process Description . ........ .. 21 1.6 Structure of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report . 22 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 1.0 . .......... .. 23 2.0
SUMMARY
SAFETY ANALYSIS 26 2.4 Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 2.0 27 4.0 PRINCIPAL DESIGN CRITERIA .......... ................ 28 4.1.4 RHWF Interfaces with Other WVDP Facilities ......... 28 4.3.2.5 Administrative Planning and Controls .... ........ 28 4.3.6 Fire and Explosion Protection ............ 29 4.3.7 Radioactive Waste Handling and Storage ...... ..... 29 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 4.0 . ........ ... 30 5.0 REMOTE-HANDLED WASTE FACILITY DESIGN .. . ........ 32 5.1 Location and Layout of Facilities .......... 32 5.2 Major RHWF Processing Features .......... ........... 33 5.2.1 Receivina Area .............. .................... 33 5.2.2 Buffer Cell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S.... . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 3 of 85 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 5.2.3 Work Cell.......................................... ........ ... 34 5.2.4 Contact Maintenance Area . ............................................... 35 5.2.5 Sample Packaging and Screening Room ..................................... 36 5.2.7 Waste Packaging and Survey Area ......................................... 36 5.3 RHWF Support Systems ... ....... ...................................... 37 5.3.1 Exhaust Ventilation Filter Room...................................... ... 37 5.3.2 Exhaust Ventilation Blower Room ....................... ............. . 37 5.3.3 Mechanical Equipment Area and Stack Monitor Room . ....................... 37 5.4.3 Natural Gas. ........................................................... 38 5.4.6 Potable Water Supply .............. ....... ........................ 38 5.4.7 Demineralized Water Supply . ............................................. 38 5.4.11 Fire Protection System ......... .................................... 38 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 5.0 .. ...... ........................................ 39 6.0 REMOTE-HANDLED WASTE FACILITY PROCESS SYSTEMS ............................. 46 6.1 Process Description ....................................................... 46 6.1.1 Narrative Description.......................................... ......... 46 6.1.2 Flowsheets ................................................. ...... 46 6.1.3.4 Fire ...................................................... ..... .. 47 6.3.1.3 Work Cell ................................................. ...... 47 6.3.1.10 Load Out/Truck Bay ............................. ................. 47 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 6.0 ................................. ............. 48 7.0 WASTE CONFINEMENT AND MANAGEMENT ...................... ............... 49 7.1 Waste Management Criteria ..................................... ....... 49 7.5 Radioactive Liquid Wastes ................. ..................... ...... 49 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 7.0 ............................... ................ 51 SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 4 of 85 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 8.0 HAZARDS PROTECTION ............ 52 8.1.1 Policy Considerations ........ 52 8.6 Off-Site Dose Assessment .... .......... 52 8.8 Fire Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 8.0 ........... 54 9.0 HAZARD AND ACCIDENT SAFETY ANALYSES . . 56 9.2.1.1 Initiating Event Summary ... ......... 56 9.2.3 Beyond Design Basis Accidents ...... 56 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 9.0 ...... 57 10.0 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS ...... ........... 80 10.1.1 Organizational Structure . ... . . . 80 10.4.2 Fire Protection ...... .............. 80 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 10.0 ...... ........... 81 11.0 DERIVATION OF TECHNICAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 83 11.1 Introduction ........... 83 11.2 Requirements . ........... 83 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 11.0 .............. 84 12.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE ........ ............. 85 SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 5 of 85 LIST OF TABLES Table Number Title Page TABLE 1.1-2 ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CONTAINERS BY TYPE GENERATED IN RHWF . 24 TABLE 1.6-1 LOCATION OF DOE-STD-3009-94 INFORMATION IN WVNS-SAR-023 25 TABLE 9.1-1 PROCESS HAZARDS ANALYSIS FOR THE REMOTE-HANDLED WASTE FACILITY . 59 SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 6 of 85 LIST OF FIGURES Figure Number Title Page Figure 5.2-1 General Arrangement - First Level . . 41 Figure 5.2-2 General Arrangement - Second Level . . 42 Figure 5.2-3 General Arrangement - Third Level ....... 43 Figure 5.2-4 General Arrangement - Sections A, D and E ........ 44 Figure 5.2-5 General Arrangement - Sections B and C ......... 45 Figure 5.2-6 General Arrangement - Section F ............ 46 Figure 5.2-7 (Deleted)
Figure 5.2-8 (Deleted)
Figure 5.2-9 (Deleted)
Figure 5.2-10 (Deleted)
Figure 5.2-11 (Deleted)
Figure 5.2-12 (Deleted)
Figure 5.2-13 (Deleted)
Figure 5.2-14 (Deleted)
Figure 5.2-15 (Deleted)
Figure 5.2-16 (Deleted)
Figure 5.2-17 (Deleted)
Figure 5.2-18 (Deleted)
Figure 5.2-19 (Deleted)
SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 7 of 85 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS A/E Architect/Engineer A Angstrom (10-8 centimeter)
A&PC Analytical and Process Chemistry AA Atomic Absorption AAC Assembly Area Coordinator AADT Average Annual Daily Traffic ABA Authorization Basis Addendum ACC Ashford Community Center ACFM Absolute Cubic Feet Per Minute ACGIH American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists ACI American Concrete Institute A/E Architect/Engineer AEA Atomic Energy Act AEC Atomic Energy Commission AED Assistant Emergency Director AEDE Annual Effective Dose Equivalent AEOC Alternate Emergency Operations Center AES Atomic Emission Spectrophotometer AIHA American Industrial Hygiene Association AISC American Institute of Steel Construction AISI American Iron and Steel Institute ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable ALI Annual Limit of Intake ALS Advanced Life Saving AMCA Air Movement and Control Association AMS Aerial Measurement System AMS Alarm Monitoring Station ANC Analytical Cell ANL Argonne National Laboratory ANS American Nuclear Society ANSI American National Standards Institute AOC Ashford Office Complex APOC Abnormal Pump Operating Condition AR-OG Acid Recovery - Off-Gas ARC Acid Recovery Cell ARF Airborne Release Fraction ARI Air-Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute ARM Area Radiation Monitor ARPR Acid Recovery Pump Room ARR Airborne Release Rate ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers ASER Annual Site Environmental Report ASHRAE American Society of Heating, Refrigeration, and Air-Conditioning Engineers ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials AU Alfred University AWS American Welding Society SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 8 of 85 ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS (continued)
B&P Buffalo & Pittsburgh BDAT Best Demonstrated Available Technology BDB Beyond Design Basis BDBE Beyond Design Basis Earthquake BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion BNFL British Nuclear Fuels Limited BNL Brookhaven National Laboratory Bq Becquerel BRP Big Rock Point BSW Bulk Storage Warehouse BWR Boiling Water Reactor c Centi, prefix for 10-2 C Coulomb CAM Continuous Air Monitor CAS Criticality Alarm System cc Cubic Centimeter cc Communications Coordinator CCB Cold Chemical Building CCDS Cold Chemical Delivery System CCR Chemical Crane Room CCS Chilled Water System CCSR Cold Chemical Scale Room CCSS Cold Chemical Sump Station CCTV Closed-Circuit Television CDDS Computer Data Display System CDS Criticality Detection System CEC Cation Exchange Capacity CEDE Committed Effective Dose Equivalent cfm Cubic feet per minute CFMT Concentrator Feed Make-up Tank CFR Code of Federal Regulations cfs Cubic feet per second CGA Compressed Gas Association CHT Condensate Hold Tank Ci Curie CLCW Closed-Loop Cooling Water cm Centimeter CMAA Crane Manufacturers Association of America CMP Construction Management Procedure CMR Crane Maintenance Room COA Chemical Operating Aisle CPC Chemical Process Cell CPC-WSA Chemical Process Cell Waste Storage Area cpm Counts per minute CR Control Room CRM Community Relations Manager CRT Cathode Ray Tube Cs Cesium CSDM Cognizant System Design Manager CSE Criticality Safety Engineer CSE Cognizant System Engineer CSER Confined Space Entry Rescue SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 9 of 85 ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS (continued)
CSPF Container Sorting and Packaging Facility CSR Confined Space Rescue CSRF Contact Size Reduction Facility CSS Cement Solidification System cSv centi-Sievert CTS Component Test Stand CUA Catholic University of America CUP Cask Unloading Pool Cv Column Volume CVA Chemical Viewing Aisle CW Cooling Tower Water CY Calendar Year D&D Decontamination and Decommissioning D&M Dames & Moore DAC Derived Air Concentration DAS Data Acquisition System DAW Dry Active Waste DB Dry Bulb DBA Design Basis Accident DBE Design Basis Earthquake DBT Design Basis Tornado DBW Design Basis Wind DC Drum Cell DC Design Criteria DCF Dose Conversion Factor DCG Derived Concentration Guide DCS Distributed Control System DEAR Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation DF Decontamination Factor DGR Diesel Generator Room DOE Department of Energy DOE-EM Department of Energy - Environmental Management DOE-HQ Department of Energy - Headquarters DOE-HQ-EOC Department of Energy - Headquarters - Emergency Operations Center DOE-ID Department of Energy - Idaho DOE-OCRWM Department of Energy - Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management DOE-OH Department of Energy - Ohio Field Office DOE-PD Department of Energy - Project Director DOE-WV Department of Energy - West Valley Area Office DOE-WVDP Department of Energy - West Valley Demonstration Project DOELAP Department of Energy Laboratory Accreditation Program DOSR DOE On-Site Representative DOT Department of Transportation DP Differential Pressure dpm Disintegrations per minute DR Data Recorder DR Damage Ratio DVP Developmental Procedure DWS Demineralized Water System SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 10 of 85 ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS (continued)
E-Spec Equipment Specification EA&SRP Engineering Administration & Safety Review Program EBA Evaluation Basis Accident EBE Evaluation Basis Earthquake ECN Engineering Change Notice ECO Environmental Control Officer ED Emergency Director EDE Effective Dose Equivalent EDR Equipment Decontamination Room EDRVA Equipment Decontamination Room Viewing Aisle EDS Electrical Power Distribution EG Evaluation Guideline EHS Employee Health Services EID Environmental Information Document EIP Emergency Implementing Procedure EIS Environmental Impact Statement EMC Emergency Management Coordinator EMOA East Mechanical Operating Aisle EMP Emergency Management Procedure EMRT Emergency Medical Response Team EMT Emergency Medical Technician EMT Environmental Monitoring Team EMU Emergency Medical Unit EOC Emergency Operation Center EP Engineering Procedure EPA Environmental Protection Agency EPD Elevation Plant Datum EPI Emergency Prediction Information EPIcode Emergency Protection Information Code EPRI Electric Power Research Institute EPZ Emergency Protection Zone ERO Emergency Response Organization ERPG Emergency Response Planning Guideline ES&H Environmental, Safety, and Health ESA Endangered Species Act ESH&QA Environmental, Safety, Health, and Quality Assurance ESQA&LO Environmental, Safety, Quality Assurance, and Laboratory Operations FACTS Functional and Checklist Testing of Systems FBC Fire Brigade Chief FBR Fluidized Bed Reactor FFCA Federal Facility Compliance Act FHA Fire Hazards Analysis FM Factory Mutual fpm Feet per minute fps Feet per second FRI Feed Reduction Index FRS Fuel Receiving and Storage FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report FSFCA Federal and State Facility Compliance Act FSP Fuel Storage Pool SAR: 0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 11 of 85 ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS (continued) ft Feet FWCA Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act g Gram g Gravitational Acceleration Constant G Giga, prefix for 10' GAO Granular Activated Carbon gal Gallon GO Gas Chromatograph GCR General Purpose Cell Crane Room GCS Gravelly Clayey Soils GE General Electric GET General Employee Training GEE Government Furnished Equipment gM Gravelly mud GM Geometric Mean GM GOA Geiger-Mueller GOALS General Purpose Cell Operating Aisle GOCO General Office Automated Logging System GPC Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated General Purpose Cell gpd Gallons per day GOAW GPLT General Purpose LAN Interface gpm GRS Gallons per minute GW General Record Schedule Specific gravity Gas Tungsten Arc Welding h Hour ha Hectare HAC Hot Acid Cell HAF Hot Acid Feed HAI Hughes Associates, Inc.
HAPR Hot Acid Pump Room HASP Health and Safety Plan HAZMAT Hazardous Materials HAZWOPER Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response HDC High Density Concrete HEC Head End Cells HEME High Efficiency Mist Eliminator HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air HEV Head End Ventilation HFE Human Factors Engineering HIC High Integrity Container HLDS High-Level Drainage System HLW High-Level Waste HLWIS High-Level Waste Interim Storage HLWISA High-Level Waste Interim Storage Area HLWTS High-Level Waste Transfer System hp Horsepower HPGe Hyperpure Germanium HPLC High Performance Liquid Chromatography HPS High Pressure Sodium SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 12 of 85 ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS (continued)
HRA Human Reliability Analysis HRM Human Resources Manager HV Heating and Ventilation HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning HVOS Heating, Ventilation Operating Station HWSF Hazardous Waste Storage Facility i.d. Inner Diameter I&C Instrumentation and Control IA Instrument Air IC Incident Commander ICEA Insulated Cable Engineers Association ICP Inductively Coupled Plasma ICR Instrument Calibration Recall ICRP International Commission on Radiological Protection ID Idaho IDLH Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers IES Illuminating Engineering Society IH&S Industrial Hygiene and Safety ILDS Infrared Level Detection System in Inch INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory INEEL Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory IRTS Integrated Radwaste Treatment System ISMS Integrated Safety Management System IV&V Independent Validation and Verification IWP Industrial Work Permit IWSF Interim Waste Storage Facility Ix Ion Exchange JIC Joint Information Center JTG Joint Test Group k Neutron Multiplication Factor k Kilo, prefix for 101 Kd Partition Coefficient keff Effective Neutron Multiplication Factor kg Kilogram Kh Horizontal hydraulic conductivity kN Kilo-Newton kPa Kilo-Pascal kPag Kilo-Pascal gauge kph Kilometer per hour kV Kilo-Volt Kv Vertical hydraulic conductivity kVA Kilovolt-ampere kW kilo-Watt L Liter LAH Level Alarm High LAN Local Area Network LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 13 of 85 ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS (continued)
LAP Laboratory Accreditation Program LAP Lower Annealing Point LASL Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory lb Pound LCO Limiting Condition for Operation LEL Lower Explosive Limit lfpm Linear feet per minute LFR Live Fire Range LI Level Indicate LIMS Laboratory Information Management System LITCO Lockheed Idaho Technologies Corporation LLDS Low-Level Drainage System LLL Lawrence Livermore Laboratory LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory LLRW Low-Level Radioactive Waste LLW Low-Level Waste LLW2 Low-Level Waste Treatment Replacement Facility LLWTF Low-Level Waste Treatment Facility LLWTS Low-Level Waste Treatment System LM Liaison Manager LMITCO Lockheed-Martin Idaho Technologies Corporation LOS Level of Service LOVS Loss of Voltage Signal LPF Leak Path Factor LPG Liquid Propane Gas 1pm Liters per minute LPM Liters per minute LPS Liquid Pretreatment System LR Level Record LSA Lag Storage Area LUNR Land Use and Natural Resources LWA Lower Warm Aisle LWC Liquid Waste Cell LWTS Liquid Waste Treatment System LXA Lower Extraction Aisle m Meter m/s Meters per second m Milli, prefix for 10' M Mega, prefix for 106 M&O Maintenance and Operations M&O Management and Operating M&TE Maintenance and Test Equipment MAR Material at Risk mb Earthquake Magnitude MBtu Mega-British Thermal Units MC Miniature Cell MCC Materials Characterization Center MCC Motor Control Center MCE Maximum Credible Earthquake mCi milli-Curie MEOSI Maximally Exposed Off-Site Individual MeV Mega-electron Volt SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 14 of 85 ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS (continued)
MFHT Melter Feed Hold Tank mG Muddy gravels mi Mile MMI Modified Mercalli Intensity MMI Man-Machine Interface M&O Management and Operating MOA Mechanical Operating Aisle MOI Maximally Exposed Off-Site Individual mol Mole MOU Memorandum of Understanding MPag Mega-Pascal gauge MPC Maximum Permissible Concentration MPFL Maximum Possible Fire Loss mph Miles per hour MPO Main Plant Operator MPOSS Main Plant Operations Shift Supervisor mR/hr Milli-Roentgen per hour MRC Master Records Center mrem Millirem MRR Manipulator Repair Room MSDS Material Safety Data Sheet msG Muddy Sandy Gravels MSM Master-Slave Manipulator mSv milli-Sievert MT Metric Ton MTIHM Metric Tons Initial Heavy Metal MTU Metric Tons Uranium MUF Material-Unaccounted-For MW Mega-Watt MWD Mega-Watt-Day n Nano, prefix for 10' Na Sodium NAD Nuclear Accident Dosimeter NARA National Archives and Records Administration NCSE Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation NDA NRC-Licensed Disposal Area NDA-LPS NRC-Licensed Disposal Area - Liquid Pretreatment System ne Effective porosity NEC National Electric Code NEMA National Electrical Manufacturers Association NEPA National Environmental Policy Act NESHAP National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants NFPA National Fire Protection Association NFS Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.
NGVD National Geodetic Vertical Datum NIOSH National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology NMC News Media Center NMPC Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NP North Plateau NPH Natural Phenomena Hazard SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 15 of 85 ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS (continued)
NPPS North Plateau Pump System NPPTS North Plateau Pump and Treatment System NQA Nuclear Quality Assurance NR Nonconformance Report NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRRPT National Registry of Radiation Protection Technology NWS National Weather Service NY New York NYCRR New York Code of Rules and Regulations NYS New York State NYSDEC New York State Department of Environmental Conservation NYSDOH New York State Department of Health NYSERDA New York State Energy Research and Development Authority NYSGS New York State Geological Survey o.d. Outer Diameter OAAM Operational Accident Assessment Manager OAM Operational Assessment Manager OB Office Building OBE Operating Basis Earthquake OEP On-Site Evaluation Point OGA Off-Gas Aisle OGBR Off-Gas Blower Room OGC Off-Gas Cell OGMR Off-Gas Monitoring Room OGTS Off Gas Treatment System OH DOE, Ohio Field Office OH/WVDP Ohio Field Office, West Valley Demonstration Project OJT On-the-Job Training OM Operations Manager OOS Out-of-Service ORNL Oak Ridge National Laboratory ORR Operational Readiness Review ORRB Operational Readiness Review Board ORT Operations Response Team OSC Operations Support Center OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Act OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration OSR Operational Safety Requirement oz Ounce p Pico, prefix for 10-12 P Peta, prefix for 1015 P&ID Piping and Instrument Diagram Pa Pascal PA Project Appraisals PAO Polyalphaolefin PAG Protective Action Guideline PAH Pressure Alarm High PBT Performance-Based Training PC Partition Coefficient PCB Polychlorinated Biphenyl PCDOCS Personal Computer Document Organization and Control Software SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 16 of 85 ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS (continued) pcf Pounds per cubic foot PCH Pressure Control High PCM Personal Contamination Monitor PCR Process Chemical Room PD Project Director PDAH Pressure Differential Alarm High PDAL Pressure Differential Alarm Low PDCH Pressure Differential Control High PDCL Pressure Differential Control Low PDM Powered Dextrous Manipulator PDR Pressure Differential Record PEL Permissible Exposure Limit PF Personnel Frisker PGA Peak Ground Acceleration PGSC Pasquill-Gifford Stability Class PHA Process Hazards Analysis PHA Product Handling Area PID Public Information Director PLC Programmable Logic Controller PM Preventive Maintenance PMC Process Mechanical Cell PMCR Process Mechanical Cell Crane Room PMF Probable Maximum Flood PMP Probable Maximum Precipitation PMP Project Management Plan PNL Pacific Northwest Laboratory "PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory PPB Parts Per Billion PPC Product Purification Cell PPE Personal Protective Equipment ppm Parts Per Million PPM Parts Per Million PPS Product Packaging and Shipping PRC Pressure Record Control PRM Process Radiation Monitor PRS Powered Roller System PSAR Preliminary Safety Analysis Report psf Pound per square foot psi Pound per square inch psig Pound per square inch gauge PSO Plant Systems Operations PSO Plant Systems Operator PSR Process Safety Requirement Pu Plutonium PVC Polyvinyl chloride PVS Permanent Ventilation System PVU Portable Ventilation Unit PWR Pressurized Water Reactor PWS Potable Water System SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 17 of 85 ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS (continued)
QA Quality Assurance QA/QC Quality Assurance/Quality Control QAP Quality Assurance Program QAP Quality Assurance Plan QAPD Quality Assurance Program Description QARD Quality Assurance Requirements Document QCN Qualification Change Notice QM Quality Management R Roentgen R/hr Roentgen per hour R&S Radiation and Safety R&SC Radiation and Safety Committee RAP Radiological Assistance Plan RCO Radiological Controls Operations RCOS Radiological Controls Operations Supervisor RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act RCT Radiological Control Technician RCTC Radiological Control Team Commander RCTL Radiation Control Team Leader REAAM Radiological and Environmental Accident Assessment Manager REAM Radiological and Environmental Assessment Manager REG Robert E. Ginna rem Roentgen Equivalent Man RER Ram Equipment Room RESL Radiological and Environmental Sciences Laboratory RF Respirable Fraction RH Remote-Handled RHWF Remote-Handled Waste Facility RHWP Remote-Handled Waste Project RID Records Inventory and Disposition Schedule RMW Radioactive Mixed Waste RP Radiation Protection rpm Revolutions per minute RPM Revolutions Per Minute RPM Radiation Protection Manager Rt Route RTS Radwaste Treatment System RWI Radiological Worker I RWII Radiological Worker II RWP Radiation Work Permit s Second S&EA Safety and Environmental Assessment SA&I Safety Analysis and Integration SAA Satellite Accumulation Area SAI Science Applications International SAR Safety Analysis Report SBS Submerged Bed Scrubber SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus scfm Standard cubic feet per minute SCR Selective Catalytic Reduction SCS Soil Conservation Service SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 18 of 85 ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS (continued)
SCSSCs Safety-Class Structures, Systems, and Components SDA New York State-Licensed Disposal Area SEAM Safety and Environmental Assessment Manager sec Second S FCM Slurry-Fed Ceramic Melter SFPE Society of Fire Protection Engineers SFR Secondary Filter Room SGN Society Generale pour les Techniques Nouvelles SGR Switch Gear Room SI International System of Units SIP Special Instruction Procedure slpm Standard liter per minute SM Security Manager SMACNA Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association SMS Sludge Mobilization System SMT Slurry Mix Tank SMWS Sludge Mobilization and Wash System SNF Spent Nuclear Fuel SNL Sandia National Lab SNM Special Nuclear Material SO Security Officer SOG Seismic Owner's Group SOP Standard Operating Procedure SPDES State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System SPO Security Police Officer Sr Strontium SR Surveillance Requirement SRE Search and Reentry SRL Savannah River Laboratory SRR Scrap Removal Room SRSS Square-root-of-the-sum-of-the-squares SS Stainless Steel SSC Sample Storage Cell SSCs Structures, Systems, and Components SSE Safe Shutdown Earthquake SSS Security Shift Supervisor SSS Slurry Sample System SSWMU Super Solid Waste Management Unit STC Sample Transfer Cell STD Standard STP Standard Temperature and Pressure STS Supernatant Treatment System Sv Sievert SVS Scale Vitrification System SWC Surge Withstand Capability SWMU Solid Waste Management Unit T Tera, prefix for 1012 TBP Tri-butyl phosphate TE Test Exception TEDE Total Effective Dose Equivalent TEEL Temporary Emergency Exposure Limit Ti Titanium SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 19 of 85 ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS (continued)
TID Tamper-Indicating Device TIG Tungsten Inert Gas TIP Test Implementation Plan TIP Test In-Place TIP Test Instruction Procedure TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter TLV Threshold Limit Value TN Transnuclear, Inc.
TPC Test Procedure Change TPL Test Plan TR Technical Requirement TRG Technical Review Group TRMS Training Records Management System TRR Test Results Report TRU Transuranic TSB Test and Storage Building TSC Technical Support Center TSCS Technical Support Center Staff TSD Technical Support Document TSR Technical Safety Requirement TVS Temporary Ventilation System UA Utility Air UAP Upper Annealing Point UBC Uniform Building Code UCRL University of California Research Laboratory UDF Unit Dose Factor UEL Upper Explosive Limit UL Underwriters Laboratories, Inc.
ULO Uranium Load Out UPC Uranium Product Cell UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply UR Utility Room USDOE U. S. Department of Energy USDOI U. S. Department of the Interior USDOL U. S. Department of Labor USDOT U. S. Department of Transportation USEPA U. S. Environmental Protection Agency USGS U. S. Geological Survey USNRC U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission USQ Unreviewed Safety Question USQD Unreviewed Safety Question Determination UWA Upper Warm Aisle UWS Utility Water Supply UXA Upper Extraction Aisle V Volt VA Volt-Ampere VAC Volt Alternating Current VDC Volt Direct Current V&S Ventilation and Service Building VEC Ventilation Exhaust Cell VEMP Vitrification Expended Materials Process SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 20 of 85 ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS (concluded)
VF Vitrification Facility VFFCP Vitrification Facility Fire Control Panel VIV Variable Inlet Vane VL Vitrification Liaison VOG Vessel Off-Gas VOSS Vitrification Operations Shift Supervisor VPP Voluntary Protection Program VS Vitrification System VSR Ventilation Supply Room VTF Vitrification Test Facility VWR Ventilation Wash Room W Watt WAPS Waste Acceptance Product Specifications WC Water Column WCC Warning Communications Center WCCC Warning Communications Center Communicator WCWRT Work Cell Washdown Receiving Tank WDC Waste Dispensing Cell WDV Waste Dispensing Vessel WGES Westinghouse Government Environmental Services WHC Westinghouse Hanford Company WHSE Warehouse WIPP Waste Isolation Pilot Plant WMO Waste Management Operations WMO Westinghouse Maintenance Operation WMOA West Mechanical Operating Aisle WNYNSC Western New York Nuclear Service Center WO Work Order WQR Waste Qualification Report WRPA Waste Reduction and Packaging Area wt% Weight percent WTF Waste Tank Farm WTFVS Waste Tank Farm Ventilation System WVDP West Valley Demonstration Project WVNS West Valley Nuclear Services Company WVPP West Valley Policies and Procedures WVVHC West Valley Volunteer Hose Company XC-1 Extraction Cell 1 XC-2 Extraction Cell 2 XC-3 Extraction Cell 3 XCR Extraction Chemical Room XSA Extraction Sample Aisle y Year Yd Dry density YOY Young of Year yr Year Y2K Year 2000
°C Degrees Celsius OF Degrees Fahrenheit Micro, prefix for 106 x Q S... Relative concentration SAR: 0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 21 of 85
1.0 INTRODUCTION
AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE REMOTE-HANDLED WASTE FACILITY 1.1.2 Access to the Remote-Handled Waste Facility An artist's rendering of the RHWF and nearby structures is provided in Figure 1.1-2.
The RHWF will be accessible by two driveways which will be connected to provide vehicular access around the entire building. One driveway will lead from the Site Perimeter/Security Road to the southeast side of the RHWF. From this driveway, vehicles will have access to the Load Out/Truck Bay, the Office Area, and the Receiving Area. The second driveway will lead from the CPC WSA access road to the north-east side of the RHWF and provide access directly to the Receiving Area. The existing perimeter/security road will be rebuilt and widened from the Main Plant road to the intersection with the road leading to the west side of the Fabrication Shop.
These road improvements will maintain access to the existing Fabrication Shop and will provide a suitable pathway for off-site shipping vehicles to approach the RHWF.
During construction of the RHWF, a temporary road will be constructed to allow vehicular access directly from the north end of the existing parking area through a new access gate in the site security perimeter. The road will be gravel only and will not be used after construction of the RHWF.
1.1.6 Remote-Handled Waste Facility Construction Schedule A design-build approach is being employed to construct the RHWF. Construction began in 2000. The actual completion of construction and initiation of radiological operations will depend on the availability of adequate funding and DOE approval of the RHWF Final Safety Analysis Report.
1.3 General Process Description The process flow for remote-handled waste processing in the RHWF is shown in Figure 1.3-1.
The first part of the process will involve lifting containers of RH waste from their storage area and loading them on a transfer vehicle, which may be shielded, for delivery to the RHWF Receiving Area. After the container arrives at the Receiving Area, the powered roller system (PRS) on the floor of the Buffer Cell will be aligned to match the width of the container, the outside Buffer Cell shield doors will be opened, and the container will be rolled from the transfer vehicle to the Buffer Cell's PRS. Alternatively, the overhead bridge crane in the Receiving Area can be used to offload waste containers from the transfer vehicle.
After the container is transferred to the Buffer Cell, the outside shield doors of the Buffer Cell will be closed and the shield doors between the Work Cell and the Buffer Cell will be opened. The container will then be moved into the Work Cell using the PRS. The container will then be staged in the Work Cell using either the 3-ton PDM or the 30-ton hoist on the bridge crane, as appropriate.
Using a combination of available PDMs and either heavy-duty or light-duty end effectors, the waste box will be opened and the contents handled, surveyed, sampled, segregated, size-reduced, decontaminated, and dewatered as necessary. Much of this work will be performed using work platforms that are located on the southeast wall of the Work Cell.
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WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 22 of 85 Waste items that are ready for repackaging will be placed in either drum or box liners that are staged near the box and drum liner storage drawers located in the southwest end of the Work Cell. Full box liners or drum liners will be removed from the Work Cell either by using the Waste Transfer System, which will allow the waste to pass into the waste packaging area, or by taking the package back out through the Buffer Cell and Receiving Area. The packaged waste transferred out of the Work Cell via the Waste Transfer System will be removed from the RHWF through the Load Out/Truck Bay.
1.6 Structure of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report The DOE employs safety analyses of its nuclear and non-nuclear facilities as the principal safety basis for decisions to authorize the design, construction, or operation of these facilities. 10 CFR 830 addresses the requirements for the development of safety analyses.
This PSAR has been developed in accordance with the methodology provided in DOE Standard DOE-STD-3009-94, which is an acceptable methodology to the DOE per Table 2 of Appendix A of Subpart B of 10 CFR 830. Because 10 CFR 830 does not require a specific format for nuclear safety analysis reports, the format of this PSAR corresponds to the format set forth in Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 3.26, Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Fuel Reprocessing Plants. A listing of DOE-STD-3009-94 sections, and the corresponding or equivalent sections of this PSAR, is provided in Table 1.6-1.
Figures and tables in this PSAR are located at the end of their respective chapter.
Dimensions in the PSAR are in the international system (SI) of units, followed by the English unit in parentheses. In general, conversions have been made from English to SI units and rounded to two significant figures.
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WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 23 of 85 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 1.0 Butler Team, The. May 18, 2001. SDD R02: System Design Description for the Waste Packaging System. Revision 1.
Code of Federal Regulations. 10 CFR 830: Nuclear Safety Management. U.S. Department of Energy.
U.S. Department of Energy. December 1992. Change 1 (September 1997). DOE Standard:
DOE-STD-1027-92 Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. Washington, D.C.
July 1994. Change 1 (January 2000). DOE Standard: DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports. Washington, D.C.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. February 1975. Regulatory Guide 3.26, Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Fuel Reprocessing Plants.
West Valley Nuclear Services Co., Inc.. Letter from D. K. Ploetz to B. A. Mazurowski. Submittal of the Project Management Plan for the Remote-Handled Waste Project Completing Contract Milestone C.3, RH-l. WD:1999:0520. July 26, 1999.
. Approval Request 057C(RH). J. Signorelli (Scientech) to James Hurst (WVNS). Revised Report for SOW 1.3, Preferred Path for Implementing the RHWP.
August 3, 1999.
. WVNS-SAR-001: Safety Analysis Report: Project Overview and General
-Information. (Latest Revision).
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WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 24 of 85 TABLE 1.1-2 ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CONTAINERS BY TYPE GENERATED IN RHWF TRU Overpack -25 Boxes Container Types Drums Drums Waste Streams CPC Jumper Boxes (TRU) 23 20 CPC Jumper Boxes (LLW) - 44 CPC Dissolver Boxes 18 10 CPC Vessel Boxes (TRU) 4 4 CPC Vessel Boxes (LLW) - 14 Vent Filter Boxes 27 25 Vent Filter (in cement) Boxes 10 27 Shield Boxes in CPC WSA 17 Shielded Boxes with DAW 45 Shielded Boxes (Resin) 20 Shielded Drums 13 WTF HLW Pumps 109 85 Main Plant D&D Wastes 76 23 Totals 267 13 334
[WVNS, July 26, 1999, and SDD R02, May 18, 2001]
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WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 25 of 85 TABLE 1. 6-1 LOCATION OF DOE-sTD-3009-94 INFORMATION IN WVNS-SAR-023 DOE-STD-3009-94 WVNS-SA2R-02 3 Chapter (Reg. Guide 3.26 Chapters) 1.0 Introduction and General Description of the Executive Summary Remote-Handled Waste Facility 2.0 Summary Safety Analysis 1.0 Site Characteristics 3.0 Site Characteristics 4.0 Principal Design Criteria 5.0 Remote-Handled Waste 2.0 Facility Description Facility Design 6.0 Remote-Handled Waste Facility Process Systems 3.0 Hazard and Accident Analyses 9.0 Hazard and Accident Safety Analyses 5.0 Remote-Handled Waste Facility Design 4.0 Safety Structures, Systems, and Components 6.0 Remote-Handled Waste Facility Process Systems 11.0 Derivation of Technical 5.0 Derivation of TSRs Safety Requirements 6.0 Prevention of Inadvertent Criticality 8.0 Hazards Protection 7.0 Radiation Protection 8.0 Hazards Protection 8.0 Hazardous Material Protection 8.0 Hazards Protection 7.0 Waste Confinement and 9.0 Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management Management 10.0 Initial Testing, In-Service Surveillance, and Maintenance 10.0 Conduct of Operations 11.0 Operational. Safety 10.0 Conduct of Operations 12.0 Procedures and Training 10.0 Conduct of Operations 13.0 Human Factors Each Chapter, as appropriate 14.0 Quality Assurance 12.0 Quality Assurance 15.0 Emergency Preparedness Program 10.0 Conduct of Operations 16.0 Provisions for Decontamination and Decommissioning 10.0 Conduct of Operations 17.0 Management, organization, and Institutional Safety Provisions 10.0 Conduct of Operations SAR: 0007459. 01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 26 of 85 2.0
SUMMARY
SAFETY ANALYSIS 2.4 Accidents There are three design basis accidents analyzed in Section 9.2 of this PSAR, all of which have consequences below the Evaluation Guidelines (EGs). The first of these involves simultaneous mechanical failure of the Work Cell ventilation pre-filters.
This extremely unlikely (frequency of occurrence of 1E-04 to 1E-06 per year) accident would result in an on-site dose of 0.93 rem (0.0093 Sv) and an off-site dose of 0.56 rem (0.0056 Sv). An anticipated event (frequency of occurrence of 1E-02 to 1E-01) involving the accidental drop of a remote-handled waste package en route to the RHWF would result in an on-site dose of 0.15 rem (0.0015 Sv) and an off-site dose of 0.088 rem (0.00088 Sv). Finally, a fire accident is analyzed in which it is postulated that fuel from a transfer vehicle will spill to the floor of the Load Out/Truck Bay, pool under waste packages staged on the truck and ignite, resulting in release of the waste package contents to the atmosphere. This extremely unlikely event would result in an on-site dose of 0.51 rem (0.0051 Sv) and an off-site dose of 0.31 rem (0.0031 Sv).
10 CFR 830.204 addresses the evaluation of accidents beyond the design basis to provide a perspective of the residual risk associated with the operation of the facility. These beyond design basis accidents are not required to provide assurance of public health and safety. Rather, the analysis of beyond design basis accidents (DBAs) is intended solely to provide information that can be used to identify additional facility features that could prevent or reduce severe beyond DBA consequences. As a result, no comparison to the EGs is required for beyond DBAs.
Three beyond DBAs are analyzed in this PSAR; a beyond DBE, a criticality accident, and a natural gas explosion. The beyond DBE would result in an on-site dose of "5.6 rem (0.056 Sv) and an off-site dose of 3.4 rem (0.034 Sv). The criticality accident is postulated to originate in the Work Cell Washdown Receiving Tank, which is located in a shielded vault below the Contact Maintenance Area. The dose, attributable entirely to short-lived, noble gas fission product generation and release, would result in an on-site dose of 26 rem (0.26 Sv) and an off-site dose of 16 rem (0.16 Sv). An explosion of natural gas in the Work Cell resulting from gas leakage from a supply line to an air supply unit heater would result in an on-site dose of 8.6 rem (0.086 Sv) and an off-site dose of 5.2 rem (0.052 Sv).
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WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 27 of 85 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 2.0 Dames & Moore. August 13, 1998. Approval Request 98-584. Prospective Dose Assessment for RHWF in Compliance with 40 CFR 61.
Code of Federal Regulations. 10 CFR 830: Nuclear Safety Management, Department of Energy.
10 CFR 835: Occupational Radiation Protection, Department of Energy.
U.S. Department of Energy. February 8, 1990. Change 2 (January 7, 1993). DOE Order 5400.5: Radiation Protection of the Public and Environment. Washington, D.C.
West Valley Nuclear Services, Co. Safety Analysis Report WVNS-SAR-001: Project Overview and General Information. (Latest Revision).
- Safety Analysis Report WVNS-SAR-002: Low-Level Waste Processing and Support Activities. (Latest Revision).
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WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 28 of 85 4.0 PRINCIPAL DESIGN CRITERIA 4.1.4 RHWF Interfaces with Other WVDP Facilities The RHWF will be a new, stand-alone facility. Dependence on existing WVDP facilities will be kept to a minimum to facilitate the shutdown, deactivation, and where applicable, decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of existing SSCs at the site.
Some support utility requirements (e.g., demineralized water) may need to be supplied from the Main Plant Utility Room. Connections to existing site SSCs that provide natural gas, fire water, sewer services, potable water, and communications will be made. See Section B.5.4 of WVNS-SAR-002, Safety Analysis Report for Low-Level Waste Processing and Support Activities, for a description of existing service and utility systems. Radioactive liquid wastes generated in the RHWF may be transferred to the existing HLW tank farm for processing through existing on-site systems. The ongoing final design for the RHWF will provide a final determination in this regard.
4.3.2.5 Administrative Planning and Controls Construction and operation of the RHWF will be accomplished through a clearly defined organizational structure with well defined responsibilities. The overall WVDP organizational structure is presented in Sections A.10.1 and A.10.2 of WVNS-SAR-001.
The RHWP organization is responsible for overseeing the design, construction, and pre-operational testing of the RHWF, and is described in Chapter 10 of this PSAR.
WVDP-011, WVDP Industrial Hygiene and Safety Manual, establishes the policies used to control chemical and industrial hazards for all WVDP operations. Safety is ensured through facility and equipment design, protective clothing and equipment selection, personnel training, and administrative controls. WVDP-010, WVDP Radiological Controls Manual, establishes the control organization, staffing and training requirements, performance goals, control zones and associated levels, posting and labeling requirements, and other administrative control requirements associated with work in radiation and contamination areas. Operations within radiologically contaminated areas require the use of work control practices to maintain exposure ALARA. These practices include the use of radiation work permits, pre-job briefings, personnel protective equipment and clothing, and dosimetry.
The WVDP uses Process Safety Requirements (PSRs) to reduce worker risk and focus attention on those systems under the direct control of the operator that are important to safe facility operation. These requirements define limiting conditions for operation, surveillance requirements, and actions, and provide the associated bases for systems and/or components under the direct control of the operator. PSRs are identified per the OH/WVDP-approved radiological, nonradiological, and worker risk-reduction criteria defined in WV-365, Preparation of WVDP Safety Documents, and are implemented through standard operating procedures and other documentation.
Procedure WV-365 specifies the approval authority for a PSR, which may be WVNS or OH/WVDP, depending upon the criterion that necessitated the requirement. The final determination for the need for PSRs per WV-365, or Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) as discussed in 10 CFR 830, will be made after the RHWF Final SAR has been developed.
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WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 29 of 85 4.3.6 Fire and Explosion Protection The WVDP fire protection program will be applied to the RHWF. This program has been developed to meet the requirements of the comprehensive fire protection program as delineated in WVDP-177, WVDP Fire Protection Manual, which is based on the fire protection-related requirements in DOE Order 420.1. Administrative controls, procedures, and training to prevent fires and explosions are presented in WVDP-177.
The RHWF will be designed in accordance with applicable National Fire Protection Association codes. Fire protection for the RHWF is based upon WVNS-FHA-014, Fire Hazards Analysis for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility. It is noted that WVNS-DC-071 states that lightning protection for the RHWF will comply with NFPA 780, Standard for the Installation of Lightning Protection Systems.
4.3.7 Radioactive Waste Handling and Storage Radioactive waste management at the RHWF will be in accordance with DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management. See Chapter 7 of WVNS-SAR-001 and Chapter 7 of WVNS-SAR-002 for an overview and understanding of radioactive waste storage and handling at the WVDP. Since it is not intended that the Load Out/Truck Bay Area of the RHWF will serve as an intermediate or long term storage area for repackaged wastes, it is important to understand current WVDP radioactive waste storage and handling practices and capabilities. See Chapter 7 of this PSAR for additional RHWF radioactive waste management information. Radioactive and mixed wastes at the WVDP are addressed in WVDP-019, Annual Waste Management Plan.
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WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 30 of 85 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 4.0 American National Standards Institute. ANSI A58.1: Building Code Requirements for Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures. American National Standards Institute.
ANSI N-300: Design Criteria for Decommissioning of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plants. American National Standards Institute.
Code of Federal Regulations. 10 CFR 830: Nuclear Safety Management. U.S. Department of Energy.
NFPA. 1997. NFPA 780: Standard for the Installation of Lightning Protection Systems. National Fire Protection Association.
Scientech Incorporated. September 24, 1999. Closure Report on the Deactivation and Decommissioning of the Stand-Alone Alternative to the RHWF. Gaithersburg, Maryland.
U.S. Department of Energy. October 13, 1995. Change 3 (November 22, 2000).
DOE Order 420.1: Facility Safety. Washington, D.C.
- July 9, 1999. DOE Order 435.1: Radioactive Waste Management.
Washington, D.C.
- March 27, 1998. DOE Order 440.1A: Worker Protection Management for DOE Federal and Contractor Employees. Washington D.C.
_ July 9, 1990. DOE Order 5480.19: Conduct of Operations Requirements for DOE Facilities. Washington, D.C.
_ April 1994. Change 1 (January 1996). DOE Standard DOE-STD-1020-94 Natural Phenomena Hazards Design and Evaluation Criteria for Department of Energy Facilities.
_ July 1993. Change 1 (January 1996). DOE Standard DOE-STD-1021-93 Natural Phenomena Hazards Performance Categorization Guidelines for Structures, Systems and Components.
- July 1994. Change Notice No. 1 (January 2000). DOE-STD-3009-94:
PreparationGuide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports. Washington, D.C.
West Valley Nuclear Services Co., Inc. July 29, 1999. Letter from D.K. Ploetz to B.A. Mazurowski (OH/WVDP). Submittal of the Project Management Plan for the Remote-Handled Waste Project Completing Contract Milestone C.3, RH-i.
" WV-106: Conduct of Operations. (Latest Revision).
"" WV-365: Preparation of WVDP Safety Documents. (Latest Revision).
"" WV-923: Nuclear Criticality Safety. (Latest Revision).
"" WVDP-002: Quality Management Manual. (Latest Revision).
"WVDP-010: WVDP Radiological Controls Manual. (Latest Revision).
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WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 31 of 85 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 4.0 (concluded)
. WVDP-011: Industrial Hygiene and Safety Manual. (Latest Revision).
. WVDP-019: Annual Waste Management Plan. (Latest Revision).
. WVDP-043: West Valley Demonstration Project Oil, Hazardous Substances, and Hazardous Wastes Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasures Plan, (Latest Revision).
. WVDP-106: Westinghouse Conduct of Operations Manual.
(Latest Revision).
WVDP-162: WVDP Nuclear Criticality Safety Program Manual.
(Latest Revision).
WVDP-177: WVDP Fire Protection Manual. (Latest Revision).
WVDP-204: WVDP Quality List (Q-List). (Latest Revision).
WVNS-DC-071: Design Criteria for the Remote Handled Waste Facility.
(Latest Revision).
WVNS-SAR-001: Safety Analysis Report: Project Overview and General Information. (Latest Revision).
_ WVNS-SAR-002: Safety Analysis Report for Low-Level Waste Processing and Support Activities. (Latest Revision).
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WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 32 of 85 5.0 REMOTE-HANDLED WASTE FACILITY DESIGN The purpose of this chapter is to provide descriptive information on the structure and installed features of the RHWF and its location on the WVDP site. The emphasis of this chapter is on the description and evaluation of RHWF features that provide confinement functions (WVNS-DC-071). The descriptions provided in this chapter are based on the final design of the RHWF which is ongoing. Therefore specific numerical values (e.g., ventilation system flow rates and differential pressures) may change based on ongoing final design efforts.
5.1 Location and Layout of Facilities The location of the site and orientation of the RHWF on the WVDP site are shown on Figure 1.1-1. The RHWF is currently under construction and located in the northwest corner of the WVDP site, northwest of the STS Building and southwest of the CPC WSA.
This area currently is being used as a staging area for construction materials and equipment. There is a gradual slope of 67 mm/m (0.8 in/ft) from the northeast to the southwest across the area.
The RHWF will be a free-standing structure with no structural reliance on other buildings or facilities at the WVDP site. The RHWF is approximately 57 m (188 ft) long and 28 m (91 ft) wide. The RHWF will be constructed to physically accommodate the outer dimensions and weight of containers and waste items for 13 RHWF waste streams described in Table 1.1-1.
The RHWF will have nine major processing features or areas, as follows:
- Receiving Area
- Buffer Cell
- Work Cell
- Contact Maintenance Area
- Sample Packaging and Screening Room
- Radiation Protection Operations Area
- Waste Packaging and Survey Area
- Operating Aisle
- Load Out/Truck Bay These areas are described in Section 5.2. The four support system features or areas that are listed below are described in Section 5.3.
- Exhaust Ventilation Filter Room
- Exhaust Ventilation Blower Room
- Mechanical Equipment Area and Stack Monitor Room
- Office Area General arrangements for the RHWF are depicted in Figures 5.2-1 through 5.2-6.
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WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 33 of 85 5.2 Maior RHWF Processing Features 5.2.1 Receiving Area The Receiving Area will provide weather protection for the loading and unloading of the transfer vehicles and will allow for contained movement of radioactive waste to and from the RHWF. This area will also act as a secondary barrier to ensure the confinement of radioactive contamination in the Work Cell.
The Receiving Area, 16 m (52 ft) long x 8.2 m (27 ft) wide x 14 m (45 ft) high, will be of two types of construction. The first 5 m (16.5 ft) length of the Receiving Area nearest the roll-up truck door will be constructed with steel-framed, insulated, double-walled, sheet metal walls with an insulated metal standing seam roof at elevation (EL) = 38 m (124 ft) with ground level being 30 m (98.5 ft). The next 10 m (33 ft) length of the Receiving Area that is nearest to the shield doors providing access to the Buffer Cell will be a reinforced concrete unloading bay with a roof elevation of EL = 44 m (143.5 ft). The floor of the Receiving Area will be 1.2 m (4 ft) below the level of the Work Cell floor (EL = 30.0 m [98.5 ft]) and will allow containers to be rolled off the transfer vehicles and onto a powered roller system located on the floor of the Buffer Cell (EL = 31.2 m [102.5 ft]).
At the second level of the Receiving Area (EL = 38 m [124 ft]), air supply unit no. 2 provides 2.15 m3 /s (4550 cfm) of filtered outside air through a dust filter and natural gas powered heater (Table 5.2-1). Most of this air passes to the Work Cell via the Buffer Cell and comprises the single largest contribution of makeup air for the Work Cell. A discussion of the ventilation system is provided in Section 5.4.1.
On the third level of the Receiving Area (EL = 40 m [132 ft]), a crane maintenance platform for the 20-ton bridge crane will be located at EL = 6.6 m (21.5 ft) on the side walls and EL = 9 m (29.5 ft) on the wall over the roll-up truck door.
Equipment within the Receiving Area includes a radio controlled 20-ton bridge crane with rails extending the full length of the Receiving Area, Buffer Cell, and Work Cell. As a contingency in the design, the 20-ton crane will be capable of movement into the Work Cell, if required, to support recovery operations for the 30-ton bridge crane (See Work Cell, Section 5.2.3). Shielding, contamination control, and crane access between the Receiving Area and the Buffer Cell will be provided by a shield door. Contamination control and crane access for the wall area above the shield door will be provided by a swinging lower air-control door, and an upper roll-up door with notches to clear the crane rails. The Buffer Cell shield, air flow, and roll-up door operating mechanisms will be located inside the Receiving Area for ease of accessibility and maintenance. The roof of the Receiving Area will be comprised of removable, weather-tight roof panels to allow crane replacement.
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WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 34 of 85 5.2.2 Buffer Cell The Buffer Cell will act as a ventilation confinement boundary between the normally uncontaminated Receiving Area and the highly contaminated Work Cell.
The Buffer Cell, 7 m (22 ft) long by 7 m (22 ft) wide by 11 m (37 ft) tall, will have space sufficient to accommodate the largest waste box, with the exception of the Waste Tank Farm (WTF) pumps. The Buffer Cell walls, floor, and roof will be constructed of shielded, reinforced concrete, sealed to facilitate cleanup and decontamination. The Buffer Cell is equipped with a powered roller system and shares the radio controlled, 20-ton overhead bridge crane with the Receiving Area, if required.
A shielded window, located on a concrete shield wall between the Buffer Cell and the Operating Aisle, will be included to allow the direct observation of operations within the Buffer Cell. Personnel access to the Buffer Cell is accomplished on the first level (EL = 31 m [102.5 ft]) by means of a double airlock that will be connected to a small room at the north end of the Exhaust Ventilation Filter Room.
Shielding, contamination control, and crane access between the Receiving Area, the Buffer Cell, and the Work Cell will be provided by shield doors on either end of the Buffer Cell. Contamination control and crane access for the wall area above the shield doors will be provided by swinging lower air-control doors, and upper roll-up doors with notches to clear the crane rails. There are sealed curbs on the floor between the Receiving Area and Buffer Cell and the Buffer Cell and the Work Cell to prevent the spread of contaminated liquids between the adjacent areas. The shield, air flow, and roll-up door operating mechanisms for the interface between the Buffer Cell and the Work Cell will be located inside the Buffer Cell for ease of accessibility and maintenance.
5.2.3 Work Cell The Work Cell is a shielded space, approximately 17 m (55 ft) long x 6.7 m (22 ft) wide x 7.9 m (26 ft) high to the top of the bridge crane rails, with the floor at EL = 0 m (0 ft). The Work Cell will be constructed of shielded, reinforced concrete.
The cell floors and walls will be sealed and lined with stainless steel to facilitate decontamination efforts.
On the wall opposite the Operating Aisle, two 6.1 m (20 ft) long x 7.3 m (24 ft) high "knock-out" sections that will allow the addition of expansion modules will be included as part of the outside wall of the Work Cell. This part of the exterior wall will be constructed of removable concrete planking. The interior stainless steel liner on this wall will be supported on support beams that extend from the floor to the top (EL = 7.3 m [24 ft]) of the "knock-out" sections.
Sliding shield doors and air control doors provide a means for waste transfer and bridge crane passage between the Work Cell and the Buffer Cell. A second shield door at the opposite end of the Work Cell will allow the 30-ton bridge crane to pass to the Contact Maintenance Area.
The 30-ton bridge crane will run on crane rails that extend the full length of the building. This 30-ton crane is designated for contaminated operations. A 3-ton PDM with a telescoping tube will be provided as part of the bridge crane and will operate from a dedicated trolley. A second trolley will be included on the bridge and will be equipped with a 30-ton hoist, hook, and cable.
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WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 35 of 85 The Work Cell will have a powered roller system on the floor near the sliding shield doors that provide access to the Buffer Cell. The placement of the powered roller system will allow the incoming waste containers to be staged adjacent to the adjustable work platforms. At the work platforms, space will be provided for up to three work stations, two of which will be installed during construction. The remaining space will be reserved for possible installation of a third station in the future. The work stations will be equipped with two 2.5-ton jib cranes with PDMs and telescoping tubes. These jib cranes will position and support the tools used to inspect, sample, and cut the waste items for final disposition. All three PDMs (one each on the jib cranes and one on the bridge crane) will be capable of being remotely handled by operators in the Operating Aisle using video monitors or while looking through any of three installed shield windows in the concrete shield wall between the Work Cell and the Operating Aisle.
Storage shelves and/or racks will be provided in the Work Cell for the storage of materials awaiting analysis, partially filled liners, and PDM equipment.
Filled drum and box liners will be transferred from the Work Cell to the Waste Packaging and Survey Area using a waste transfer system. This system will allow the transfer of contaminated liners to waste packages in the Waste Packaging and Survey Area in a manner that prevents surface contamination of packages as they are moved to the Load Out/Truck Bay.
The Work Cell will be equipped with a wash-down trench and drain system. The trench and drain will be designed to be critically safe. The trench will be no larger than 15.2 cm (6 in) in width. The drains will be 0.45 m (18 in) long by 0.68 m (27 in) and contain a replaceable strainer to remove particulates. Particulates will be removed from the drain by a pre-filter basket or vacuum.
For control of airborne contamination, the Work Cell will have local downdraft vacuum systems (source capture systems) at the work stations to collect radioactive particulate matter. In addition, 24 disposable in-cell pre-filters for the Work Cell HVAC are located in an array surrounding the adjustable work platforms. This design allows capture of particulate matter that is not captured by the source capture systems. Each of the disposable in-cell pre-filters is comprised of a 10.2 cm (4 in) deep pre-filter and 30.5 cm (12 in) deep HEPA filter contained in a 50.8 cm (20 in) diameter by 81.3 cm (32 in) long cylindrical filter enclosure. A hinged lifting bail on the top of each disposable pre-filter allows in-cell remote removal and replacement.
5.2.4 Contact Maintenance Area The Contact Maintenance Area, an area approximately 7 m (22 ft) wide by 4 m (15 ft) long, will provide an area adjacent to the Work Cell where personnel can perform maintenance on the crane, PDMs, and other Work Cell equipment. It will provide four levels of access to allow for maintenance of the crane's telescoping tube. The Contact Maintenance Area will be constructed entirely of shielded, reinforced concrete.
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WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 36 of 85 Access to the first level (EL = 31 m [102.5 ft]) will be provided by a double airlock between the Contact Maintenance Area and the Radiation Protection Operations area.
On the first level, a stainless-steel lined space will be provided for washdown pumps and valves, storage shelves, and a work bench. A floor drain will allow drainage of washdown water to the washdown collection tanks, which will be located below the floor of the Contact Maintenance Area in the tank vault. Access to the tank vault will be provided by a 1.2 m (4 ft) by 1.2 m (4 ft) square access hatch and a rung ladder to the floor below (EL = 28 m [93 ft]).
Two intermediate level platforms will be provided at approximately EL = 2.4 m (8 ft) and EL = 4.9 m (16 ft). Ladders extending through openings in each intermediate level platform and the third (upper) level provide worker access to all levels inside the Contact Maintenance Area without exiting the area.
At the top level (EL = 36 m [119.3 ft]), a second double airlock access is provided from a small room adjacent to the Mechanical Equipment Area. The floor at this level is stainless steel lined and has floor drains to capture bridge crane and PDM washdown water. The roof of the Contact Maintenance Area is comprised of removable, weather-tight roof panels to allow crane replacement.
5.2.5 Sample Packaging and Screening Room In support of waste characterization, the Sampling Packaging and Screening Room (Figure 5.2-2) will be on the second level (EL = 35 m [115.5 ft]) adjacent to the Operating Aisle. This room will provide the capability to remove samples from the sample shelf of the Work Cell. A shield window in this room is one of three that will be installed during construction that will allow operators to view the Work Cell. A PDM controller and work station controller will be provided in this room to
- allow remote sample transfer operations in the vicinity of the Work Cell sample shelf. Sample transfers will be accomplished using a transfer drawer that will allow passage of the sample through the shield wall to a sample transfer glove box in the Sampling Packaging and Screening Room. A shielded sample lift system in this room will allow the packaged sample to be transferred down to the Radiation Protection Operations Area on the first level (EL = 31 m [102.5 ft]), where the sample will be surveyed and released to a laboratory facility for characterization.
5.2.7 Waste Packaging and Survey Area The Waste Packaging and Survey Area, an area 5 m (18 ft) long and 7 m (23 ft) wide at EL = 31 m [102.5 ft], will provide an area for transferring filled waste drums and boxes out of the Work Cell via the Waste Transfer System. The Waste Packaging and Survey Area is isolated from the Work Cell by a combination of shield walls, Waste Transfer System port covers, and shield covers. Access to this area is provided from the Exhaust Ventilation Filter Room, the Radiation Protection Operations Room, and the Load Out/Truck Bay.
The Waste Transfer System in this area is comprised of a drum cart and box cart on rails that extend from the area directly below the Waste Transfer System shield covers to the Load Out/Truck Bay roll-up door.
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WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 37 of 85 The packaging area (4.6 m [15 ft] long x 3.0 m [10 ft] wide), in which the drums and boxes will be loaded using the Waste Transfer System, is separated from the survey area by two packaging area exit shield doors that open into the survey area. Each door is equipped with a periscope and a swipe survey reach rod that will allow operators in the survey area to remotely monitor and survey operations in the packaging area while the doors are closed. A sample transfer glove box will allow collection of swipe samples from one reach rod through the Work Cell shield wall.
Samples from the other rod will be transferred directly to the sample transfer glove box in the Radiation Protection Operations Area.
A 6-ton monorail transfer hoist will be provided in the survey area for lifting and placing the drum and box transfer shield lids.
A floor drain (which will be plugged when not in use) will allow washdown of the Waste Transfer System.
5.3 RHWF Support Systems 5.3.1 Exhaust Ventilation Filter Room The Exhaust Ventilation Filter Room (13 m [44 ft]) long by 4 m [14 ft] wide) will contain two filter assemblies, each of which will be comprised of two banks of HEPA filters in series. Each bank in an assembly will be comprised of a 1x3 array of 0.6 m (2 ft) by 0.6 m (2 ft) HEPA filters. Disposable in-cell pre-filters in the Work Cell will reduce the potential loading on the filters in the Exhaust Ventilation Filter Room filter assemblies. For change-out, each filter assembly in the Exhaust Ventilation Filter Room can be isolated by inlet and outlet dampers. Sufficient additional aisle pull space (2.1 m [7 ft]) will be provided in the Exhaust Ventilation Filter Room to allow filters to be pulled horizontally from their housings. Each filter assembly will be attached by 41 cm (16 in) ducting to individual blowers in the Exhaust Ventilation Blower Room.
The Exhaust Ventilation Filter Room will be accessed from the Waste Packaging and Survey Area or the north stairwell. A door will also be provided in this room to provide access to the Buffer Cell double airlock.
5.3.2 Exhaust Ventilation Blower Room The Exhaust Ventilation Blower Room (5 m [16 ft] long by 6 m [18 ft] wide) will be a steel-framed, insulated, sheet-metal-sided, and -roofed room, and will have no shielding. Each secondary filter assembly housed in the Exhaust Ventilation Filter Room will be tied to either of the two blowers in the Exhaust Ventilation Blower Room. The outlets for two blowers (one of which will normally be operating, with the other in standby) will be tied to a single stack that penetrates the roof of this room. The stack is anchored to the north side of the RHWF.
5.3.3 Mechanical Equipment Area and Stack Monitor Room The Mechanical Equipment Area and Stack Monitor Room (Figure 5.2-3) are on the third level (EL = 39.2 m [128.5 ft]) of the RHWF over the Operating Aisle. This area is steel-framed, insulated, and sheet-metal-sided. This area contains the plant air compressor and receiver, the breathing air compressor, receiver and dryer and the decontamination system pressurizer. An air handling unit on the roof over this area (Air Supply #1, Table 5.2-1) supplies make-up air for most of the RHWF areas. Fire protection and utility piping reach this area through the Utility Chase.
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WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 38 of 85 The stack effluent monitors and samplers are located in the Stack Monitor Room, which will be located on the north end of the Mechanical Equipment Area.
The Mechanical Equipment Area and Stack Monitor Room will be accessed from the north stairwell and the south stairwell. Access to the roof over this area and the Work Cell is provided via a door to a platform over the roof of the Load Out/Truck Bay.
From this platform a ladder provides access to the roof. A door at the top level of the north stairwell will also provide access to the stack access platform, which is located over the roof of the Exhaust Ventilation Blower Room.
5.4.3 Natural Gas Approximately 57 m3/hr (2000 ft 3/hr) of natural gas will be required to heat the RHWF.
The facility will be provided with a natural gas supply at 28 - 34 kPa (4-5 psi) and a maximum flow rate of 99 m3/h (3500 ft3/h). The natural gas header will be installed outside the RHWF. Four lines will lead from the header, one for each of the ventilation supply units described in Table 5.2-1. Section 9.2.3.3.1 provides additional information on the gas heater units and the risks associated with natural gas heating.
5.4.6 Potable Water Supply Potable water will be supplied to the RHWF at a pressure of 275 to 414 kPa (40 to 60 psi) and a maximum flow rate of 95 Lpm (25 gpm).
5.4.7 Demineralized Water Supply The RHWF will require 38 liters per minute (10 gpm) of demineralized water for the high pressure, low volume spray washdown system. The facility will be supplied with a 379 kPa (55 psi) at 114 Lpm (30 gpm). This will be supplied by an existing 10.2 cm (4 in) line outside the STS.
5.4.11 Fire Protection System Fire protection for the RHWF shall be based upon a comprehensive FHA of the facility and its process. Fire protection for the facility shall include where appropriate:
firewalls, doors, fire-rated dampers, windows, penetration seals, fire suppression systems, alarms, and fire detection system.
The RHWF will be supplied fire water from existing fire water lines at a pressure of 827 kPa (120 psi) and a maximum flow rate of 5678 Lpm (1500 gpm).
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WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 39 of 85 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 5.0 West Valley Nuclear Services, Co. July 29, 1999. Letter from D. K. Ploetz to B. A.
Mazurowski (OH/WVDP). "Submittal of the Project Management Plan for the Remote-Handled Waste Project Completing Contract Milestone C.3, RH-i."
WVNS-DC-071: Design Criteria for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility.
(Latest Revision).
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WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 46 of 85 6.0 REMOTE-HANDLED WASTE FACILITY PROCESS SYSTEMS 6.1 Process Description 6.1.1 Narrative Description The RHWF will be a new, stand-alone facility at the WVDP with remote handling capability for radioactive waste processing operations (WVNS-DC-071). The actual throughput for the facility will be based upon availability of waste streams and storage capability of repackaged wastes. It is estimated that the daily throughput will range between 0.14 and 1.9 m3 /day (5 and 67 ft 3/day), depending on the waste stream being processed. The descriptions provided in this chapter are based on the final design of the RHWF which is ongoing, and therefore specific process aspects may change based on the ongoing design efforts.
The first part of the process will involve lifting containers of remote-handled (RH) waste from their storage areas and loading them onto a transfer vehicle for delivery to the RHWF Receiving Area. (The waste boxes stored in the CPC WSA will be a major feed stream for the RHWF. The radionuclide inventory of the twenty-two boxes in the CPC WSA in the year 2003, which forms the basis for several accidents analyzed in Chapter 9, is provided in Table 6.1-1.) After the container arrives at the Receiving Area, the outside Buffer Cell shield doors will be opened, and the container will be removed from the transfer vehicle to the Buffer Cell's powered conveyor rollers.
After the container is transferred to the Buffer Cell, the outside shield doors of the Buffer Cell generally will be closed and the shield doors between the Work Cell and the Buffer Cell will be opened. Typically, the container will then be moved into the Work Cell using powered conveyor system.
Using the Work Cell cranes, powered dextrous manipulators (PDMs), and end effectors, the waste box will be opened and the contents handled, surveyed, sampled, segregated, size-reduced, decontaminated, and dewatered as required.
Waste items that are ready for repackaging will be placed in either drum or box liners that are staged near the box and drum liner storage drawers located in the southwest end of the Work Cell. Full box liners or drum liners will be removed from the Work Cell either by using the Waste Transfer System, which will allow the waste to pass into the Waste Packaging Area, or by taking the package back out through the Buffer Cell and Receiving Area. The packaged waste transferred out of the Work Cell by the Waste Transfer System will be removed from the RHWF through the Load Out/Truck Bay.
6.1.2 Flowsheets A simplified and generic flowsheet for waste processing in the RHWF design is provided in Figure 1.3-1. More detailed flowsheets for each waste stream will be developed during detailed design of the RHWF.
The CPC WSA waste stream represents the bounding inventories for the RHWF. The other waste streams to be processed in the RHWF (Table 1.1-1) are not expected to contain quantities of transuranic nuclides in excess of the total of all of the CPC WSA wastes streams.
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WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 47 of 85 6.1.3.4 Fire The inventory of combustible materials in the waste streams designated for processing in the RHWF is small. The RHWF will be constructed primarily of non-combustible materials. As a result, the most significant fire-related safety concern is the fire hazard posed by vehicle fuel in either the Receiving Area or Load Out/Truck Bay.
Both of these areas contain fire detection and suppression systems.
Sprinkler systems will be installed throughout the RHWF, except in the Buffer Cell, Work Cell, and Crane Maintenance Area. This exception is based on the low risk of fire in these areas, low combustible loading, and greater than 2-hour fire separation provided by the shield walls and doors (WVNS-FHA-014).
6.3.1.3 Work Cell The Work Cell will provide capabilities for remote handling, surveying, analytical samples, segregating, size reducing, washdown, and repackaging.
The primary means of movement of heavy waste boxes and drums into the facility will be by a powered roller system. As a backup, the Work Cell Crane, and Receiving Area 20-ton overhead bridge crane will be provided for movement of waste pieces and equipment. The Work Cell Crane and jib cranes will have the ability to use different types of end effectors (Figure 6.3-1), such as shears, hacksaws, cut-off saws, and chopsaws. All three PDMs will be capable of being remotely handled by operators in the Operating Aisle using video monitors or while looking through any of the shield windows in the concrete shield wall between the Work Cell and the Operating Aisle.
Waste containers and contents will be surveyed and sampled for characterization, both radiological and hazardous material. Sampling techniques may include smear samples, coupons, and vacuuming. In addition, an overall gamma scan and dose-rate survey will be performed. The results of this survey will be used to optimize the size-reduction plan for each individual piece. The remote handling equipment will be capable of fully remote lifting, surveying, sampling, segregating, size reducing, segmenting, shearing, cutting, decontaminating, dewatering, and repackaging of wastes.
Ultimately, the waste pieces will be loaded into a standard metal drum or box liner.
The liners help to control the spread of contamination and prevent damage to the waste disposal container during transfer out of the Work Cell. The liners pass through a Waste Transfer System mounted on top of the Waste Packaging Area that provides the physical boundaries necessary to bring material out of an area with radiological contamination levels greater than 1012 dpm/100 cm2 , while maintaining the exterior of the waste disposal containers clean.
Further contamination control is maintained through in-cell filtration. The in-cell pre-filters act as roughing filters for the HEPA filters located in the Exhaust Ventilation Filter Room.
6.3.1.10 Load Out/Truck Bay The Load Out/Truck Bay will be used for weather protection and storage for palletized liners, excess liners, shipping containers, and interim storage of repackaged wastes.
Also, this area will contain the forklift charging station.
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WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 48 of 85 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 6.0 West Valley Nuclear Services, Co. July 29, 1999. Letter from D. K. Ploetz to B. A.
Mazurowski (OH/WVDP). "Submittal of the Project Management Plan for the Remote-Handled Waste Project Completing Contract Milestone C.3, RH-l."
_ WV-900: WVDP Worker Safety Policy. (Latest Revision).
WVDP-011: WVDP Industrial Hygiene and Safety Manual. (Latest Revision).
_ WVNS-DC-071: Design Criteria for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility.
(Latest Revision).
"" WVNS-FHA-014: Fire Hazards Analysis for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility. (Latest Revision).
"" WVNS-SAR-002: Safety Analysis Report for Low-Level Waste Processing and Support Activities. (Latest Revision).
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WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 49 of 85 7.0 WASTE CONFINEMENT AND MANAGEMENT This chapter addresses the handling, treatment, storage, and disposal of radiological and hazardous materials associated with gaseous, liquid, and solid waste streams that will be generated incidental to the mission of the RHWF. The "management of radioactive wastes" is the primary mission of the RHWF, and hence information pertinent to the radioactive wastes that will be processed through the RHWF is provided in other chapters (i.e., Chapters 1, 5, and 6) of this PSAR.
7.1 Waste Management Criteria DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management, will govern radioactive waste management efforts at the RHWF. WVDP-370, WVDP Radioactive Waste Acceptance Program, serves a key role in implementing DOE Order 435.1 at the WVDP.
The RHWF shall be designed to ensure environmental effluent releases are maintained within discharge guidelines given in DOE Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, and 40 CFR 261, Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste.
The WVDP has developed comprehensive waste management plans to ensure that radioactive, hazardous, mixed, and industrial wastes are handled and stored in compliance with applicable state and federal regulations. A summary of WVDP waste management plans is given in Table B.7.1-1 of WVNS-SAR-002, Safety Analysis Report for Low-Level Waste Processing and Support Activities.
7.5 Radioactive Liquid Wastes
- s The RHWF design includes a liquid waste collection and transfer system. Water Washdowns of the Work Cell, Work Cell equipment, and waste forms will be performed periodically. The waste streams processed through the RHWF will be comprised primarily of contaminated metal objects that in many instances have already undergone substantial decontamination efforts (e.g., the contents of the 22 boxes located in the CPC WSA), or objects that by their nature do not lend themselves to washdown-type decontamination efforts (e.g., expended ventilation system filters). This will limit the extent to which the washdown water becomes contaminated. Washdown of the Buffer Cell may occur on a relatively infrequent basis. Demineralized water, at a pressure up to 1724 kPag (250 psig) and a flow rate of 0.63 liters per second (10 gpm), will be used to facilitate decontamination efforts in the Work Cell.
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WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 50 of 85 Three tanks, located inside a tank vault underneath the Contact Maintenance Area, will be provided for liquid collection and transfer purposes. A 2839 liter (750 gal) liquid waste receiving tank, vented to the Work Cell, will be provided for the drains from the Buffer Cell and the Contact Maintenance Area upper and lower levels. A 5678 liter (1500 gal) liquid waste receiving tank, vented to the Work Cell, will be provided for the Work Cell drain, and another 5678 liter (1500 gal) liquid waste tank, also vented to the Work Cell, will be provided for batch sampling prior to transfer to a "vendor-supplied system" or to the existing HLW tank farm through double-contained piping. If a "vendor-supplied system" is employed, it shall be required to handle, treat, store, and dispose of contaminated liquid effluents in accordance with all applicable federal and state laws and regulations. RHWF liquid wastes directed to the existing HLW tank farm shall be processed through a "vendor-supplied system" or through existing site systems described in WVNS-SAR-002.
Liquid wastes from the RHWF that will be processed through existing site treatment systems are expected to result in a negligible increase in dose to the maximally exposed off-site individual. Current estimates of dose from liquid effluent pathways are provided in Section B.8.6.4 of WVNS-SAR-002.
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WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 51 of 85 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 7.0 U.S. Department of Energy. July 9, 1999. DOE Order 435.1: Radioactive Waste Management. Washington, D.C.
. February 8, 1990. Change 2 (January 7, 1993). DOE Order 5400.5:
Radiation Protection of the Public and Environment. Washington, D.C.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 40 CFR 61. National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants. (Latest Revision).
- 40 CFR 261. Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste.
(Latest Revision).
West Valley Nuclear Services Co., Inc. Memo CA:99:0005. January 29, 1999.
Subject:
Process Safety Design Documentation for the Remote Handled Waste Facility.
WV-996: Hazardous Waste Management Program. (Latest Revision).
WVDP-370: WVDP Radioactive Waste Acceptance Program. (Latest Revision).
WVNS-DC-071: Design Criteria for the Remote Handled Waste Facility.
(Latest Revision).
- WVNS-SAR-001: Safety Analysis Report: Project Overview and General Information. (Latest Revision).
_ WVNS-SAR-002: Safety Analysis Report for Low-Level Waste Processing and Support Activities. (Latest Revision).
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WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 52 of 85 8.0 HAZARDS PROTECTION 8.1.1 Policy Considerations A formal documented program directed toward maintaining personnel radiation doses ALARA at the WVDP has been established in WVNS Policy and Procedure WV-984, ALARA Program. The ALARA program is based on requirements set forth in 10 CFR 835, DOE-STD-1098-99, Radiological Control, and DOE Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment. The radiation protection program and the ALARA program site-specific requirements are outlined in WVDP-010, WVDP Radiological Controls Manual, WVDP-076, Environmental Protection Implementation Plan, and WVDP-163, ALARA Program Plan. WVDP-131, Radiological Controls Procedures, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and other departmental procedures are used to provide more detailed instructions for workers and technical personnel. A discussion and summary of the ALARA program is provided in WVNS-SAR-001, Project Overview and General Information.
In addition to radiation protection programs, the WVDP has established a comprehensive industrial hygiene and safety program for the identification, assessment and monitoring of nonradiological hazards. Administration of the industrial hygiene and safety program is through WVDP-011, WVDP Industrial Hygiene and Safety Manual, which incorporates applicable DOE requirements as well as DOE-adopted Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards 29 CFR 1910 and 29 CFR 1926.
8.6 Off-Site Dose Assessment Calculations performed in accordance with 40 CFR 61, National Emissions Standards for
- Hazardous Air Pollutants, estimate a potential effective dose equivalent of 1.7E-04 mrem/yr (1.7E-06 mSv/yr) to a maximally exposed off-site individual due to routine operations at the RHWF. The subject calculations are attached to Memo CA:99:0005, dated January 29, 1999. These "preliminary" calculations are reported here for information purposes only, as they may be revised because of RHWF design changes or for other technical reasons.
Other calculations attached to Memo CA:99:0005, which were performed in accordance with applicable 40 CFR 61 requirements, demonstrate that radionuclide emissions from the RHWF ventilation system exhaust stack must be continuously monitored in accordance with 40 CFR, Section 61.93, "Emission monitoring and test procedures," and DOE/EH-0173T, Environmental Regulatory Guide for Radiological Effluent Monitoring and Environmental Surveillance.
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WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 53 of 85 A 5678 liter (1500 gal) liquid waste tank, vented to the Work Cell, will be provided for batch sampling of RHWF liquid wastes prior to transfer of the liquid wastes to a "vendor-supplied system" or to the existing high-level waste tank farm through double-contained piping. If a "vendor-supplied system," is employed, it shall be required to handle, treat, store, and dispose of contaminated liquid effluents in accordance with all applicable federal and state laws and regulations. RHWF liquid wastes directed to the existing high-level waste tank farm shall be processed through a "vendor-supplied system" or through existing site systems described in WVNS-SAR-002. Any RHWF liquid wastes processed through existing site systems are expected, based on engineering judgment, to provide a very small to negligible increase in the estimated dose to the maximally exposed off-site individual due to liquid releases from the site as reported in Section B.8.6.4 of WVNS-SAR-002.
Contaminated liquids that are generated by WVDP activities are processed through the Low Level Waste Treatment System (LLWTS) before discharge to the environment.
Effluent from this system is monitored as discussed in Section B.8.6.1.2 of WVNS-SAR-002.
8.8 Fire Protection The WVDP fire protection program, which will be applied to the RHWF, has been developed to meet the requirements of the comprehensive fire protection program as delineated in WVDP-177, WVDP Fire Protection Manual, which is based on the fire protection-related requirements in DOE Order 420.1. Administrative controls, procedures, and training to prevent fires and explosions are presented in WVDP-177.
The WVDP fire and explosion protection program is discussed in Section A.4.3.6 of WVNS-SAR-001.
A Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) for the RHWF is provided in WVNS-FHA-014, Fire Hazards Analysis for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility. A complete discussion of the FHA process and its requirements are given in WVDP-177. DOE Order 420.1 states that FHAs shall be developed for "all nuclear facilities, significant new facilities, and facilities that represent unique or significant fire safety risks." The subject Order also states that FHAs shall be developed using a graded approach. WVNS-FHA-014 provides the following conclusions if the "requirements/recommendations" of Section 9.0 of WVNS-FHA-014 are met: "The passive and active features and fire protection features of the RHWF will provide sufficient protection against the hazards associated with the facility. A fire that threatens the integrity of the building or the safety of its occupants or the environment is not credible, provided fire protection systems are properly tested and maintained, and housekeeping is strictly enforced."
SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 54 of 85 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 8.0 American Nuclear Society. 1983. ANSI/ANS-8.1: Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors. LaGrange Park, Illinois.
- 1983. ANSI/ANS-8.10: Criteria for Nuclear Criticality Safety Controls in Operations with Shielding and Confinement. LaGrange Park, Illinois.
Code of Federal Regulations. 10 CFR 835.: Occupational Radiation Protection, Department of Energy.
29 CFR 1910: Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Department of Labor.
- 29 CFR 1926: Safety and Health Regulations for Construction, Department of Labor.
- 40 CFR 61: National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, Environmental Protection Agency.
Dames & Moore. March, 1993. Estimation of Activity in the Former Nuclear Fuel Services Reprocessing Plant.
U.S. Department of Energy. October 13, 1995. Change 3 (November 22, 2000).
DOE Order 420.1: Facility Safety. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy.
February 8, 1990 Change 2 (January 7, 1993). DOE Order 5400.5:
Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Energy.
_ 1991. DOE/EH-0173T: Environmental Regulatory Guide for Radiological Effluent Monitoring and Environmental Surveillance. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Energy.
. July 1999. DOE-STD-1098-99: Radiological Control. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Department of Energy.
West Valley Nuclear Services Co., Inc. Memo CA:99:0005. January 29, 1999.
Subject:
Process Safety Design Documentation for the Remote Handled Waste Facility.
. Approval Request 010A. R. Carter Hollis (Butler Construction Co. of WNY, Inc.) to Loyd E. Donovan (WVNS). Radiation Shielding Calculations, Gamma Scatter Calculations Rev. 0. July 24, 2000.
- WV-905: Radiation Protection. (Latest Revision).
- WV-921: Hazards Identification and Analysis. (Latest Revision).
WV-923: Nuclear Criticality Safety. (Latest Revision).
WV-984: ALARA Program. (Latest Revision).
- WVDP-010: WVDP Radiological Controls Manual. (Latest Revision).
SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 55 of 85 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 8.0 (concluded)
- WVDP-011: WVDP Industrial Hygiene and Safety Manual. (Latest Revision).
- WVDP-076: WVDP Environmental Protection Implementation Plan.
(Latest Revision).
"" WVDP-131: Radiological Control Procedures. (Latest Revision).
" WVDP-162: WVDP Nuclear Criticality Safety Program Manual.
(Latest Revision).
"" WVDP-163: ALARA Program Plan. (Latest Revision).
" WVDP-177: WVDP Fire Protection Manual. (Latest P<evision).
_ WVDP-179: Respiratory Protection Program Plan. Latest Revision).
_ WVDP-218: Process Safety Requirements. (Latest Re vision).
WVDP-241: Site Health and Safety Plan (HASP). (Latest Revision).
_ WVNS-FHA-014: Fire Hazards Analysis for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility. (Latest Revision).
" WVNS-SAR-001: Safety Analysis Report: Project Ovetview and General Information. (Latest Revision).
" WVNS-SAR-002: Safety Analysis Report for Low-Level Waste Processing and Support Activities. (Latest Revision).
_ WVNS-SAR-003: Safety Analysis Report for Vitrification System Operations and High-Level Waste Interim Storage. (Latest Revision).
SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 56 of 85 9.0 HAZARD AND ACCIDENT SAFETY ANALYSES 9.2.1.1 Initiating Event Summary It is important to develop a credible accident scenario with a reasonably bounding source term, as this potentially avoids expenditures associated with the unnecessary designation of certain SSCs as safety SSCs, and the imposition of unnecessary TSR administrative controls. However, this PSAR has been developed from conceptual and preliminary design information that does not include details as to the quantities of radiological and hazardous material that can be located in a given area of the RHWF.
Additionally, final design features of the RHWF may be substantially different from certain conceptual design features. In consideration of these facts, it is deemed acceptable and appropriate to develop and present accident scenarios that incorporate substantially conservative assumptions, especially if the consequences of this conservatively-developed scenario are well within evaluation guidelines. This approach is consistent with the function of a PSAR. A PSAR should provide accident scenarios (in consideration of design and operational uncertainties at the time of PSAR development) that are considered with a high degree of confidence to be bounding, since a PSAR must anticipate ways the facility can be constructed, maintained, operated, and shut down safely in compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and document the adequacy of the safety basis for a new nuclear facility.
9.2.3 Beyond Design Basis Accidents 10 CFR 830 discusses the evaluation of accidents beyond the design basis to provide a perspective of the residual risk associated with the operation of the facility.
These beyond DBAs are not required to provide assurance of public health and safety.
Rather, the analysis of beyond DBAs is intended solely to provide information that can be used to identify additional facility features that could prevent or reduce severe beyond DBA consequences. As a result, no comparison to the evaluation guidelines is presented in this section.
SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 57 of 85 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 9.0 Code of Federal Regulations. 10 CFR 830: Nuclear Safety Management. U.S. Department of Energy.
Dames & Moore. January 1995. Evaluation of Ground Motion Hazard at the West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Site, for West Valley Nuclear Services Company, Inc.
Pacific Northwest Laboratory. November 1982. PAVAN: An Atmospheric Dispersion Program for Evaluating Design Basis Accidental Releases of Radioactive Materials from Nuclear Power Stations. NUREG/CR-2858, PNL-4413.
U.S. Department of Energy. December, 1994. DOE-HDBK-3010-94: Airborne Release Fractions/Rates and Respirable Fractions for Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy.
_ October 13, 1995. Change 3 (November 22, 2000). DOE Order 420.1:
Facility Safety. Washington, D.C.
_ December 1992. Change 1 (September 1997). DOE Standard DOE-STD-1027-92: Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis.
_ July, 1988. DOE/EH-0070: External Dose-Rate Conversion Factors for Calculation of Dose to the Public. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy.
July, 1988. DOE/EH-0071: Internal Dose Conversion Factors for Calculation of Dose to the Public. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy.
_ April 1994. Change 1 (January 1996). DOE Standard DOE-STD-1020-94 Natural Phenomena Hazards Design and Evaluation Criteria for Department of Energy Facilities.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. October, 1977. Regulatory Guide 1.109:
Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Appendix I. Revision 1.
_ November, 1982. Regulatory Guide 1.145: Atmospheric Dispersion Models for Potential Accident Consequences Assessments at Nuclear Power Plants. Revision 1.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. April, 1977. Regulatory Guide 3.33:
Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of Accidental Nuclear Criticality in a Fuel Reprocessing Plant. Draft for Comment.
West Valley Nuclear Services Co. 1992. WVDP-010: WVDP Radiological Controls Manual. (Latest Revision.)
_ WVDP-011: WVNS Industrial Hygiene and Safety Manual.
(Latest Revision.)
WVDP-043: Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasures Plan.
(Latest Revision.)
SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 58 of 85 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 9.0 (concluded)
WVDP-065: Radiological Parameters for Assessment of West Valley Demonstration Project Activities. (Latest Revision.)
- WVDP-162: WVDP Nuclear Criticality Safety Program Manual.
(Latest Revision.)
WVDP-186: Waste Form Qualification Report. WQR-1.2: Radionuclide Inventory Specification. (Latest Revision.)
" WVDP-193: WVDP Hazards Assessment. (Latest Revision.)
""July 29, 1999. Letter from D. K. Ploetz to B. A. Mazurowski (OH/WVDP).
"Submittal of the Project Management Plan for the Remote-Handled Waste Project Completing Contract Milestone C.3, RH-I."
Westinghouse Hanford Company. September 16, 1996. Rev. 0. WHC-SD-SQA-ANAL-501:
Fire Protection Guide for Waste Drum Storage Arrays.
SAR: 0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 59 of 85 Table 9.1-1 Process Hazards Analysis for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility 1HAZAR~D . EVENT INITIATOR PREVENTIVE SYSTEM (S) OR FEATURE (S) TIGATIVE SYSTEM(S) OR I CONSEQUENCES FREQUENCY I R S.I I I MFEATURE(S) S FCTORI Receiving Area Radioactive Container 1. Forklift drops e Forklift care/maintenance to
- Leak confinement Low Unlikely 2 Material rupture or container or ensure proper operation design features in (Airborne or leak forklift tines
- Administrative controls on RHWF Otherwise rupture forklift operation Uncontrolled container e Containers normally not lifted Release) (i.e., roller system is used)
- 2. Crane or lift
- Crane designed to conservative Leak confinement Low
- Unlikely 2 fixture drops criteria and are initially load design features in container tested RHWF
- Administrative control on crane o Containers normally and lift fixture operations not lifted (i.e.,
rollers are used)
- Restrict access to lift area
- 3. Tornado o Advance warning so operations e None Low Extremely breaches can be secured Unlikely facility and
- Conservatively designed building containers superstructure
- 4. Strong
- Conservatively designed building
- Leak confinement Low Extremely straight winds superstructure design features in unlikely
- Advance warning so materials can RHWF be relocated and/or secured
- 5. Seismic event o Conservatively designed building
- Leak confinement Low Unlikely 2 superstructure design features in RHWF SAR:0'17459.01
( WVNS-SAR-023, A Rev. 0 ndum 1 Page 60 of 85 Table 9.1-1 (continued)
Process Hazards Analysis for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility
[HA i Radioactive l E !
Container JI
!INITIATOR~
- Smear surveys of container to ITIGATIVE SYSTEM(S)
M Leak confinement OR CONSEQUENCES FREQUENCY I RIISKI
- Low Unlikely 2 Material rupture or rupture or detect contamination system in transfer (Airborne or leak leak from
- Except as noted in Section container Otherwise unspecified 6.1.3.7, overpressurization of o Leak confinement Uncontrolled cause (e.g., containers not considered a design features in Release) container hazard RHWF degradation, overpressuriza tion)
- 7. Container
- Structural strength of
- Leak confinement Low Unlikely 2 pinched by containers and waste components design features in closing shield
- Administrative controls on RHWF doors shield door operation Fire 8. Spilled
- Administrative controls on
- Fire detection systems Moderate Extremely 3 container amount and type of combustible
- Fire suppression unlikely contents materials systems ignite 9 Administrative controls on hazardous material spill response
- Lack of ignition source
- 9. Electrical
- Preventive maintenance on 9 Fire detection systems Low Unlikely 2 wiring electrical components
- Fire suppression e Installed electrical components systems inspected to meet code SAR: 0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 61 of 85 Table 9.1-1 (continued)
Process Hazards Analysis for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility jEAZD Radioactive
]i *EVENT I INITIATOR PREVENTIVE SYSTEM(S) OR FEATURE(S) MITIGATIVE SYSTEM(S) OR CONSEQUENCES I J IFREQUENCY RI Fire 10. Vehicle fire/
- Preventive maintenance on
- Fire detection systems Material Moderate Extremely 3 explosion in vehicles
- Fire suppression (Airborne or unlikely Receiving Area
- Administrative controls on systems Otherwise amount of combustible materials Uncontrolled
- Administrative controls and Release) procedures for truck operations, proper training, safety culture
- 11. Seismic event
- Administrative controls on Fire detection systems
- Moderate Extremely 3 amount and type of combustible
- Fire suppression unlikely materials systems Explosion 12. Explosion from
- Air supply heaters indirectly Fire detection and
- Moderate Extremely 3 natural gas heat air suppression systems unlikely leading to loss of structural integrity or ventilation system failure
- 13. From an
- Air supply heaters indirectly Fire detection and
- Moderate Extremely 3 unspecified heat air suppression systems unlikely cause leading to loss of structural integrity or ventilation system failure Radioactive Water 14. Inadvertent
- Fire water system design to NFPA
- Training to respond to Low Unlikely 2 Material inundation initiation of standards emergency and abnormal (Airborne or fire 0 Preventive maintenance situations so that Otherwise sprinklers or
- Operator training and sound water flow is promptly Uncontrolled breach in fire conduct of operations to prevent terminated Release) water system inadvertent damage to fire water piping piping or sprinkler heads High Under- 15. Dose survey
- Radiation detectors in Receiving
- Modular shielding Low Unlikely 2 Radiation estimating provides Area Exposure Rate gamma dose erroneous
- Administrative controls in rate output or is performing dose surveys misread SAR:O"n7459.01
(
( WVNS-SAR-023, Rev. 0
. ndum 1 Page 62 of 85 Table 9.1-1 (continued)
Process Hazards Analysis for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility
[MAMARI EVENT INITIATOR TPREVENTIVE SYSTEM(S) OR FEATURE(S) MITIGATIVE SYSTEM (S) OR CONSEQUENCES 1 FREQUENCY T RISK1
____ j jEATURE(S) J IFACTORI Fissionable Criticality 16. Configuration Pre-processing waste None
- Moderate Incredible I Material of fissile characterization and process materials knowledge prior to receipt at within the the RHWF waste changes,
- Criticality safety evaluations or moderating and criticality prevention materials such specifications as water
- Cover waste containers during intrude transfer to prevent water intrusion Hazardous Fire 17. Spilled e Administrative controls on
- Fire detection systems Low Extremely Metals (e.g., container amount and type of combustible
- Fire suppression unlikely Pb, Hg, and contents materials systems U) ignite
- Administrative controls on hazardous material spill response
- Lack of ignition source
- 18. Electrical
- Preventive maintenance on
- Fire detection systems Low Unlikely 2 wiring electrical components e Fire suppression
- Installed electrical components systems inspected to meet code
- 19. Vehicle fire/ 9 Preventive maintenance on
- Fire detection systems Low Extremely explosion in vehicles
- Fire suppression unlikely Receiving Area
- Administrative controls on systems amount of combustible materials
- Administrative controls and procedures for truck operations, proper training, safety culture
- 20. Seismic event
- Administrative controls on 0 Fire detection systems Low Extremely amount and type of combustible
- Fire suppression unlikely materials systems SAR: 0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 63 of 85 Table 9.1-1 (continued)
Process Hazards Analysis for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility HAZAPM 1 1 EVENT j INITIATOR PREVENTIVE SYSTEM(S) OR FEATURE(S) MITIGATIVE SYSTEM(S) OR CONSEQUENCES FREQUENCY RISK Buffer Cell Radioactive Container 1. Mishap with e System care/maintenance to Leak confinement
- Low Unlikely 2 Material rupture or powered roller ensure proper operation design features in (Airborne or leak conveyer
- Administrative controls and RHWF Otherwise system procedures for system Uncontrolled breaches operations, proper training, Release) container safety culture
- 2. Crane or lift e Crane designed to conservative
- Leak confinement Low Unlikely 2 fixture drops criteria and are initially load design features in container tested RHWF
- Administrative control on crane
- Containers normally and lift fixture operations not lifted (i.e.,
rollers are used) 0 Restrict access to lift area
- 3. Tornado
- Formidable structure
- None Low Extremely breaches
- Advance warning so operations unlikely facility and can be secured containers
- 4. Strong - Formidable structure
- Leak confinement Low Extremely straight winds
- Advance warning so materials can design features in unlikely be relocated and/or secured RHWF
- 5. Seismic event
- Formidable structure
- Leak confinement Low Unlikely 2 design features in I I__ I IRHWF SAR:0007459.01
{ {
if WVNS-SAR-023, A ndum 1 Rev. 0 Page 64 of 85 Table 9.1-1 (continued)
Process Hazards Analysis for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility JHAzA'D IEVENT INITIATOR ________j PREVENTIVE jSYSTEM(S) OR FEATURE(S)IFEAT (S) SYSTEM(S)
MITIGATIVE OR I CONSEQUENCES RQNv CY j__________ RISK FACTOR Radioactive Container 6. Container
- Smear surveys of container to
- Liquid collection Low Unlikely 2 Material rupture or rupture or detect contamination system in Buffer Cell (Airborne or leak leak from
- Except as noted in Section 9 Leak confinement Otherwise unspecified 6.1.3.7, overpressurization of design features once Uncontrolled cause (e.g., containers not considered a in RHWF Release) container hazard degradation, overpressuriza tion)
- 7. Container
- Structural strength of o Leak confinement Low Unlikely 2 pinched by containers design features in closing shield o Administrative controls on RHWF doors shield door operation Fire 8. Spilled e Administrative controls on a Fire detection systems Moderate Extremely 3 container amount and type of combustible unlikely contents materials ignite o Administrative controls on hazardous material spill response
- Lack of ignition source
- 9. Electrical
- Preventive maintenance on 0 Fire detection systems Low Unlikely 2 wiring electrical components
- Installed electrical components inspected to meet code Radioactive Fire 10. Vehicle fire/
- Preventive maintenance on
- Fire detection systems Moderate Extremely 3 Material explosion in vehicles
- Fire suppression unlikely (Airborne or Receiving Area
- Administrative controls on systems Otherwise that affects amount of combustible materials Uncontrolled Buffer Cell
- Administrative controls and Release) contents procedures for truck operations, proper training, safety culture
- 11. Seismic event 9 Administrative controls on 0 Fire detection systems Moderate Extremely 3 amount of combustible materials unlikely Explosion 12. Explosion from
- Proper training to idenfify
- Fire detection and Moderate Extremely 3 natural gas or potential situations where suppression systems unlikely an unspecified adverse chemical reactions might cause leading occur to loss of
- Vent vessels and containers to structural extent practicable prior to integrity or processing operations ventilation system failure SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 65 of 85 Table 9.1-1 (continued)
Process Hazards Analysis for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility JHAZARD IEVENT NTIATOR PREVENTIVE i{IVNIE
- ...SSMC{'QUENCY SYSTEM(S) OR ETATURE(S)
.. *iFEATURE MITIGATIVE (S)* i SYSTEM(S) OR ~~~~~~NEUNE ICONSEQUENCES ]EFRE!IIIN IRSRS IFACTOR High Under- 13. Dose survey
- Radiation detectors in Receiving
- Modular, portable Low Unlikely 2 Radiation estimating provides Area, Buffer Cell, and Operating shield walls in RHWF Exposure Rate gamma dose erroneous Aisles rate output or is
- Administrative controls in misread performing dose surveys
- In-process surveys of waste in Work Cell e Dose rate surveys in Buffer Cell before removing waste from shielded area Fissionable Criticality 14. Configuration - Pre-processing waste None
- Moderate Incredible I Material of fissile characterization and process materials knowledge prior to receipt at within the the RHWF waste changes, e Criticality safety evaluations or moderating and criticality prevention materials such specifications as water a Geometry control intrude Hazardous Fire 15. Spilled
- Administrative controls on
- Fire detection systems Low Extremely Metals (e.g., container amount and type of combustible unlikely Pb, Hg, and contents materials U) ignite - Administrative controls on hazardous material spill response
- Lack of ignition source Hazardous Fire 16. Electrical a Preventive maintenance on
- Fire detection systems Low Unlikely 2 Metals (e.g., wiring electrical components Pb, Hg, and
- Installed electrical components U) inspected to meet code
- 17. Vehicle fire/ 9 Preventive maintenance on
- Fire detection systems Low Extremely explosion in vehicles o Fire suppression unlikely Receiving Area 9 Administrative controls on systems that affects amount of combustible materials Buffer Cell e Administrative controls and contents procedures for truck operations, proper training, safety culture
- 18. Seismic event
- Administrative controls on
- Fire detection systems Low Extremely amount and type of combustible unlikely materials SAR:007459.01
( WVNS-SAR-023, A ndum 1 Rev. 0 Page 66 of 85 Table 9.1-1 (continued)
Process Hazards Analysis for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility AA 1EVENIjT ]INITIATOR PREVENTIVE SYSTEM(S) OR FEATURE (S) MITIGATIVE SYSTEM(S) OR CONSEQUENCES FREQUENCY j RISKRI Work Cell Radioactive Container 1. Bridge crane
- Cranes designed to conservative
- HEPA filtration of Low Unlikely 2 Material Rupture or or jib crane criteria and initially load airborne materials (Airborne or Leak fails during tested
- Potential wall or Otherwise lift, leading
- Administrative controls and floor impact will not Uncontrolled to spill of procedures for crane operations, violate integrity of Release) container's proper training, safety culture thick concrete walls contents or
- Pre-planning of complex lifts breach of container Radioactive Container 2. Mishap with
- System care/maintenance to
- HEPA filtration of Low Unlikely 2 Material Rupture or powered ensure proper operation airborne materials (Airborne or Leak conveyers,
- Administrative controls and 0 Potential wall or Otherwise leading to procedures for conveyor floor impact will not Uncontrolled spill of operations, proper training, violate integrity of Release) container's safety culture thick concrete walls contents or breach of container
- 3. Mishap with
- Administrative controls and
- HEPA filtration of Low Unlikely 2 powered procedures for crane/manipulator airborne materials dextrous operations, proper training,
- Potential wall or manipulator, safety culture floor impact will not cut-off saw, violate integrity of grinder, thick concrete walls shears, or other such equipment leading to spill of container' s contents or breach of container
- 4. Tornado
- Formidable structure
- None Low Extremely breaches
- Advance warning so operations unlikely facility and can be secured containers SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 67 of 85 Table 9.1-1 (continued)
Process Hazards Analysis for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility JUZAD VET INITIATOR PRVENTIVE SYSTEM(S) OR FEATURE (S) fIIGATIVE SYSTEM(S) OR JCONSEQUENCES FREQUENCY -RISK R1 I_ I II jTURE(S) ______ I FACTOR]
Radioactive Container 5. Strong
- Formidable structure
- Leak confinement Low Extremely 1 Material Rupture or straight winds
- Advance warning so materials can design features in unlikely (Airborne or Leak be relocated and/or secured RHWF Otherwise (i.e., close shield doors, close Uncontrolled containers, secure ventilation)
Release) 6. Seismic event 0 Formidable structure
- Leak confinement Low Unlikely 2 design features in RHWF
- 7. Container ° Smear surveys of container to Leak confinement
- Low Unlikely 2 rupture or detect contamination system in transfer leak from
- Except as noted in Section container unspecified 6.1.3.7, overpressurization of
- Leak confinement cause (e.g., containers not considered a design features in container hazard RHWF degradation, overpressuriza tion)
Radioactive Container 8. Loss of
- Administrative controls and
- Leak confinement Low Extremely Material Rupture or confinement procedures for operations, design features in unlikely (Airborne or Leak from Work Cell proper training, safety culture RHWF Otherwise Liner, floors,
- Periodic visual inspection of
- Leak detection Uncontrolled sumps and Work confinement structures capabilities under Release) Cell floor RHWF drains from unspecified cause (e.g.,
dropped load; corrosion; cut with saw)
- 9. Container 9 Structural strength of Leak confinement
- Low Unlikely 2 pinched by containers and waste components design features in closing shield - Administrative controls on RHWF doors shield door operation
- 10. Mishap with
- Administrative controls .and HEPA filtration of
- Low Unlikely 2 decontaminatio procedures for crane operations, airborne materials n system proper training, safety culture
- Leak confinement spreads
- Cell coverage of decontamination design features in contaminated system is limited by design RHWF material throughout Work Cell SAR:00n7459.01
( ( WVNS-SAR-023, A. ndum 1 Rev. 0 Page 68 of 85 Table 9.1-1 (continued)
Process Hazards Analysis for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility jHAZARD EVENT [INITIATOR 1PPEVENTIVE SYSTEM (S) OR FEATURE, (S) j -MITIGATIVESYSTE2M(S) OR jCONSEQUENC FREQUENCY RISK]
Radioactive Airborne 10a. Pressurized
- Inner shield window provides
- Operators are provided None Unlikely 0 Material Dispersal decontaminati sufficient barrier appropriate training (Airborne or of Radio- on water Otherwise activity stream Uncontrolled impinges on Release) shield window Chemical 11. Container lid
- Proper training to identify
- HEPA filtration of Low Extremely reaction removal potential situations where airborne materials unlikely process adverse chemical reactions might
- Potential impact will triggers occur not violate integrity chemical 9 Process knowledge prior to of thick concrete reaction that receipt at the RHWF walls, floor or has ceiling significant energetics (i.e.,
displaces waste material throughout Work Cell)
Radioactive Fire 12. Ignition of
- Proper training to identify HEPA filtration of Low Unlikely 2 Material combustible potential situations where airborne materials (Airborne or waste by size adverse chemical reactions might
- Fire detection and Otherwise reduction occur manual suppression Uncontrolled equipment
- Administrative controls on systems Release) (e.g., sparks amount of combustible materials or hot metal particles from grinding, sawing)
- 13. Flammable
- Proper training to identify ° HEPA filtration of Low Extremely gases potential situations where airborne materials unlikely contained in adverse chemical reactions might
- Fire detection and waste occur manual suppression containers or
- Process knowledge prior to the systems vessels receipt at the RHWF ignited by e Vent vessels and containers to size reduction extent practicable prior to equipment performing size reduction operations
- 14. Spilled
- Material selection during design
- HEPA filtration of Low Extremely hydraulic (i.e., use of materials with airborne materials unlikely fluid ignites minimum flammability)
- Fire detection and 9 Administrative controls on spill manual suppression response systems SAR: 0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 69 of 85 Table 9.1-1 (continued)
Process Hazards Analysis for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility IHAZARD EVENT INITIATOR PREVENTIVE SYSTEM(S) OR FEATURE(S) MITIGATIVE SYSTEM(S) OR f CONSEQUENCES FEATURE(CS)_ FREQUENCY RISK Radioactive FACTORS Fire 15. Electrical
- Preventive maintenance on
- HEPA filtration of Low Extremely 1 Material components electrical components airborne materials unlikely (Airborne or ignite e Electrical components meet
- Fire detection and Otherwise electrical wiring codes, as manual suppression Uncontrolled appropriate systems Release)
- Administrative controls on amount of combustible materials
- Electrical components inside the Work Cell are totally enclosed
- 16. Pyrophoric
- Proper training to identify o HEPA filtration of Low Extremely materials potential situations where airborne materials unlikely ignite adverse chemical reactions might
- Fire detection and occur manual suppression
- Process knowledge prior to the systems receipt at the RHWF
- Use low temperature cutting tools whenever possible
- Administrative controls on amount of combustible materials
- 17. Seismic event
- Administrative controls on
- Fire detection and Moderate Extremely 3 amount of combustible materials manual suppression unlikely systems SAR:0fn7459.01
(
( ( WVNS-SAR-023, A ndum 1 Rev. 0 Page 70 of 85 Table 9.1-1 (continued)
Process Hazards Analysis for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility rNITIATOR
[VNT PREVENTIVE SYSTEM(S) OR FEATURE(S) RTIAVESYSTEM(S) OR 1CONSEQUENCES FEEMQUENCY RISKR 1HAZARD Radioactive Explosion 18. An explosion
- Vent vessels and containers to
- Fire detection and Moderate Incredible IE Material from natural extent practicable prior to manual suppression (Airborne or gas or performing size reduction systems Otherwise unspecified operations Uncontrolled cause leading
- Use low temperature cutting Release) to loss of tools whenever possible Zone 1 e Air supply heaters indirectly integrity heat air (structural or ventilation filtration system)
- Spare HEPA filter train, with
- Design of HEPA filters Moderate Extremely 3 failure in exhaust each train having redundant HEPA facilitates retainment unlikely pathway fail filters of particulate matter (random
- HEPA filter differential failure, pressure monitored and alarmed chemical e Emissions monitoring attack, # Administrative controls of pressure operation of HVAC system transient,
- Periodic in-place leak testing overloading, of HEPA filters outside of the load dropped Work Cell on them, wetted)
Fissionable Criticality 20. Configuration e Criticality safety evaluations Moderate Incredible I Material of fissile and criticality prevention materials specifications within the
- Pre-processing characterization waste changes, surveys and process knowledge or moderating and radiation surveys after materials such receipt at the RHWF as water e In-process characterization intrude o Geometry control
- 21. Fissile e Criticality safety evaluations Moderate Incredible IE material and criticality prevention accumulates in specifications facility 9 Sumps protected with filters systems (e.g.,
- Source capture systems used HEPA filters, during cutting to minimize sumps) dispersion of contamination o Administrative controls on cleanup of cell debris
- In-cell pre-filters periodically replaced o Geometry control SAR: 0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 71 of 85 Table 9.1-1 (continued)
Process Hazards Analysis for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility I. EVENT
.. ITIATOR
....... .HAZA-D
..... PREVENTIVE SYSTEM(S)
,1.... OR FEATURE (S)
.RE(s) MITIGATIVE SYSTEM(S)
AT... OR j CONSEQUENCES f FREQUENCY
__ ___ Il_FACTORJ RISK1 Hazardous Fire 22. Ignition of 0 Proper training to identify HEPA filtration of
- Low Unlikely 2 Metals (e.g., combustible potential situations where airborne materials Pb, Hg, and waste by size adverse chemical reactions might
- Fire detection and U) reduction occur manual suppression equipment
- Administrative controls on systems (e.g., sparks amount of combustible materials or hot metal particles from grinding, sawing)
- 23. Flammable 4 Proper training to identify
- HEPA filtration of Low Extremely gases potential situations where airborne materials unlikely contained in adverse chemical reactions might 9 Fire detection and waste occur manual suppression containers or 0 Process knowledge prior to the systems vessels receipt at the RHWF ignited by
- Vent vessels and containers to size reduction extent practicable prior to equipment performing size reduction operations
- 24. Spilled 9 Material selection during design o HEPA filtration of Low Extremely hydraulic (i.e., use of materials with airborne materials unlikely fluid ignites minimum flammability) 9 Fire detection and
- Administrative controls on spill manual suppression response systems SAR: O"7459.01
(
( WVNS-SAR-023, A ndum 1 Rev. 0 Page 72 of 85 Table 9.1-1 (continued)
Process Hazards Analysis for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility LAA I I VET NIITO INIIAO PEVNIVE SYSTEM(S) OR FEATURE (S) JmiTIGATIVE SYSTEM(S) OR jFEATURE (S)
CONSEQUENCES FREQUENCY R3ISK I____ I_ I FACTORI Hazardous Fire 25. Electrical
- Preventive maintenance on e HEPA filtration of Low Extremely Metals (e.g., components electrical components airborne materials unlikely Pb, Hg, and ignite
- Electrical components meet 9 Fire detection and U) electrical wiring codes, as manual suppression appropriate systems 9 Administrative controls on amount of combustible materials e Electrical components inside the Work Cell are totally enclosed
- 26. Pyrophoric 9 Proper training to identify
- HEPA filtration of Low Extremely materials potential situations where airborne materials unlikely ignite adverse chemical reactions might
- Fire detection and occur manual suppression
- Process knowledge prior to the systems receipt at the RHWF
- Use low temperature cutting tools whenever possible o Administrative controls on amount of combustible materials
- 27. Seismic event
- Administrative controls on
- Fire detection and Low Extremely 1 amount of combustible materials manual suppression unlikely systems Contact Maintenance Area High Under- 1. Dose survey
- Radiation detectors in Contact
- Modular, portable Low Unlikely 2 Radiation estimating provides Maintenance Area shield walls in RHWF Exposure Rate gamma dose erroneous
- Administrative controls in rate output or is performing dose surveys misread e In-process surveys of waste in Work Cell
- Dose rate surveys in Contact Maintenance Area before removing waste from shielded area Fissionable Criticality 2. Fissile 9 Criticality safety evaluations High Incredible IE Material material and criticality prevention accumulates in specifications facility e Sumps protected with filters systems (e.g., e Source capture systems used liquid waste during cutting to minimize storage tanks) dispersion of contamination
- Administrative controls on cleanup of cell debris SAR: 0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 73 of 85 Table 9.1-1 (continued)
Process Hazards Analysis for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility IHRAZAR I_ __IEVENT
__ jfiNITIATOR FETUEs) SYSTEM (S) OR 1PREVENTIVE SYSTEM (S) OR FEATURE (S) IMITIGATIVE ICONSEQUENCES "J FRQUENCY FACTORI RiESY Radioactive Airborne 3. Container e Liquid waste storage tanks are
- Leak confinement Negligible Unlikely 2 Material Dispersal rupture or vented system in tank pit (Airborne or of Radio- leak from
- Tank pit is ventilated to Work 9 Leak confinement Otherwise activity unspecified Cell design features in Uncontrolled cause (e.g., RHWF Release) tank failure, overpressuriza tion)
Load Out/Truck Bay Radioactive Container 1. Forklift drops 9 Forklift care/maintenance to
- Leak confinement Low Unlikely 2 Material Rupture or container or ensure proper operation design features in (Airborne or Leak forklift tines o Administrative controls on RHWF Otherwise rupture forklift operation Uncontrolled container Release) 2. Crane or lift 9 Crane designed to conservative
- Leak confinement Low Unlikely 2 fixture drops criteria and are initially load design features in container tested RHWF (note:
- Administrative control on crane
- Restrict access to possible and lift fixture operations lift area future installation of crane)
- 3. Tornado o Advance warning so operations
- None Low Extremely breaches can be secured unlikely facility and e Formidable container designs containers SAR: P-17459.01
(
L
( WVNS-SAR-023, A, ndum 1 Rev. 0 Page 74 of 85 Table 9.1-1 (continued)
Process Hazards Analysis for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility HAZAR fEVENT 1 INITIATOR MPREVENTIVE SYSTEM(S) OR FEATURE(S) ITIGATIVESYSTEM(S) OR [CONSEQUENCES [FREQUENCY IF RI Radioactive Container 4. Strong 9 Formidable container designs
- Leak confinement Low Extremely 1 Material Rupture or straight winds 9 Advance warning so operations design features in unlikely (Airborne or Leak (e.g. can be secured RHWF Otherwise wind-generated Uncontrolled missiles)
Release) 5. Seismic event
- Formidable container designs
- Leak confinement Low Unlikely 2 design features in RHWF
- 6. Container & Smear surveys of container to
- Leak confinement Low Unlikely 2 rupture or detect contamination design features in leak from
- New containers will be used for RHWF unspecified repackaging operations cause Fire 7. Spilled 9 Administrative controls on
- Fire detection systems Moderate Extremely 3 container amount and type of combustible
- Fire suppression unlikely contents materials systems ignite 9 Administrative controls on hazardous material spill response 9 Lack of ignition source
- 8. Electrical 9 Preventive maintenance on
- Fire detection systems Low Unlikely 2 wiring electrical components
- Fire suppression
- Installed electrical components systems inspected to meet code SAR: 0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 75 of 85 Table 9.1-1 (continued)
Process Hazards Analysis for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility I[
- EVENT V*
HAZARD INITIATOR jPREVENTIVE SYSTEM(S) OR FEATURE(S)
~ MITIGATISYSTEM(S) OR
~~~~I(SYSE()O MIGATIVE ICONSEQUENC CNEUCE[FQECY QUENCY I RISK FACTOR~
Radioactive Fire 9. Vehicle fire/
- Preventive maintenance on
- Fire detection systems Moderate Extremely 3 Material explosion in vehicles
- Fire suppression unlikely (Airborne or Load Out/Truck e Administrative controls on systems Otherwise Bay amount of combustible materials Uncontrolled
- Administrative controls and Release) procedures for truck operations, proper training, safety culture
- 10. Seismic event
- Administrative controls on
- Fire detection systems Moderate Extremely 3 amount and type of combustible
- Fire suppression unlikely materials systems Container 11. Chemical
- Operator training on chemical
- None Low Extremely Over- reaction in incompatibility unlikely pressuriza- repackaged
- Vents installed on waste tion waste containers, as appropriate container Explosion 12. An explosion 0 Proper training to identify
- Fire detection and Moderate Extremely 3 from natural potential situations where suppression systems unlikely gas or adverse chemical reactions might unspecified occur cause 9 Vent vessels and containers to extent practicable after repackaging operations SAR:0-'7459.01
{
( WVNS-SAR-023, A,, ndum 1 Rev. 0 Page 76 of 85 Table 9.1-1 (continued)
Process Hazards Analysis for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility
[ZAI Radioactive i*E**VENT ii Truck or j
INITIATOR
- 13. Loss of I
PREVENTIVEw SYSTEM(CS) OR FAUES)
& Routine vehicle maintenance to MIT ATM SYSTEM(S) OR M CONSEQUENCESI FREQUNCY I RISFCO
- None Low Extremely 1 Material Forklift vehicle ensure vehicle operates properly unlikely (Airborne or Accident control 0 Administrative controls and Otherwise procedures for vehicle Uncontrolled operations within the facility Release)
- Proper training, safety culture
- 14. Waste 9 Routine vehicle maintenance to
- None Low Unlikely 2 container ensure truck and forklift falls off operates properly truck or & Administrative controls and otherwise procedures for forklift damaged while operations loading or
- Proper training, safety culture unloading
- Container tie-downs and shielded transfer container
- Formidable waste container designs Failure of 15. Mechanical
- System care/maintenance to
- HEPA filtration of Negligible Anticipated 0 waste failure ensure proper operation airborne materials transfer
- Smear surveys of container to system detect contamination (e.g.,
bagless 16. Operator error
- Administrative controls and
- HEPA filtration of Negligible Anticipated 0 transfer procedures for system airborne materials system) operations, proper training, safety culture Radioactive Water 17. Inadvertent 9 Fire water system design to NFPA
- Training to respond to Negligible Unlikely 0 Material inundation initiation of standards emergency and abnormal (Airborne or fire
- Preventive maintenance situations so that Otherwise sprinklers or
- Operator training and sound water flow is promptly Uncontrolled breach fire conduct of operators to prevent terminated Release) water system inadvertent damage to fire water piping piping or sprinkler heads Fissionable Criticality 18. Loss of
- Pre-processing characterization
- Ventilation removes Moderate Incredible I Material controls surveys and process knowledge fission product gases and radiation surveys after from occupied spaces receipt at the RHWF
- In-process surveys o Criticality safety evaluations and criticality prevention specifications o Geometry control SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 77 of 85 Table 9.1-1 (continued)
Process Hazards Analysis for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility
[AZAI High EVENT Under-IITIATOR
- 19. Dose survey JPREVENTMV SYSTEM (S) OR FEATURE (3)
- Radiation detectors in J
MITIGATIVE SYSTEM (S) OR ICONSEQUENCES FREQUENCY RITSK Load
- Shielded boxes and use Low Unlikely 2 Radiation estimating provides Out/Truck Bay Area of transfer shields Exposure Rate gamma dose erroneous e Administrative controls in rate output or is performing dose surveys misread
- In-process surveys 0 Dose surveys in Waste Packaging Area before removing waste from shielded area Hazardous Fire 20. Spilled
- Administrative controls on
- Fire detection systems Low Extremely 1 Metals (e.g., container amount and type of combustible
- Fire suppression unlikely Pb, Hg, and contents materials systems U) ignite
- Administrative controls on hazardous material spill response
, Lack of ignition source
- 21. Electrical 0 Preventive maintenance on
- Fire detection systems Low Unlikely 2 wiring electrical components
- Fire suppression
- Installed electrical components systems inspected to meet code
- 22. Vehicle fire/
- Preventive maintenance on
- Fire detection systems Low Extremely explosion in vehicles
- Fire suppression unlikely Load Out/Truck
- Administrative controls on systems Bay amount of combustible materials
- Administrative controls and procedures for truck operations, proper training, safety culture
- 23. Seismic event
- Administrative controls on 0 Fire detection systems Low Extremely amount and type of combustible
- Fire suppression unlikely materials systems SAR: 0on7459.01 r (
( WVNS-SAR-023, A, ndum 1 Rev. 0 Page 78 of 85 Table 9.1-1 (continued)
Process Hazards Analysis for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility HAZARD EIVENT INITIATOR PREVENTIVE SYSTEM(S) OR FEATURE(S) IITIGATIVE SYSTEM (S) OR jCONSEQUENCES FRQUENCY RISK 1 iIIFEATURE(S) I ATORJ External Area Radioactive Truck 1. Loss of 9 Routine vehicle maintenance to
- Barrier (e.g., jersey Moderate Extremely 3 Material accident control leads ensure truck operates properly barriers) unlikely (Airborne or to truck
- Administrative controls and Otherwise accident while procedures for truck operations Uncontrolled truck en route (e.g., speed limitations, Release) to RHWF, or inclement weather limitations, truck runs established routes, restrictions into facility on other site traffic) 9 Proper training, safety culture
- 2. Waste
- Administrative controls for
- Waste enclosed in Low Anticipated 4 container heavy lifts contamination barrier falls during e Routine vehicle maintenance to (i.e., Herculite')
loading ensure truck operates properly operation or - Administrative controls and falls off procedures for truck operations truck or (e.g., speed limitations, otherwise inclement weather limitations, damaged while established routes, restrictions in transit to on other site traffic) or from RHWF 9 Proper training, safety culture e Container tie-downs 9 Shielded transfer containers for some waste types Fire 3. Helicopter
- Air space control limits
- None High Incredible crashes into aircraft overflights facility Radioactive Fire 4. Airplane e Air space control limits
- None High Incredible Material crashes into aircraft overflights (Airborne or facility Otherwise Uncontrolled 5. Fire at nearby
- Engineered features at nearby
- Fire detection systems Low Extremely Release) facility or facilities to prevent fire and
- Fire suppression unlikely environs prevent spread of fire systems 0 Shutdown supply ventilation system to prevent drawing smoke into RHWF
- 6. Vehicle fire/ e Preventive maintenance on Moderate Extremely 3 explosion vehicles unlikely
- Administrative controls on amount of combustible materials
- Administrative controls and procedures for truck operations, proper training, safety culture SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 79 of 85 Table 9.1-1 (continued)
Process Hazards Analysis for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility
[HAZAPD EVENT J INITIATOR PREVENTIVE SYSTEM (S) OR FEATURE (5)J MITIGATIVE SYSTEM(S) OR I CONSEQUENCES FREQUENCY RISK I__MATURE __(S)__I FACTOR Hazardous Fire 7. Helicopter 9 Air space control limits
- None High Incredible I Metals crashes into aircraft overflights (e.g., Pb, facility Hg, and U)
- 8. Airplane 9 Air space control limits e None High Incredible I crashes into aircraft overflights facility Hazardous Fire 9. Fire at nearby
- Engineered features at nearby
- Fire detection systems Low Extremely 1 Metals facility or facilities to prevent fire and 9 Fire suppression unlikely (e.g., Pb, environs prevent spread of fire Hg, and U) systems
- Shutdown supply ventilation system to prevent drawing smoke into RHWF
- 10. Vehicle fire/
- Preventive maintenance on Low Extremely 1 explosion vehicles unlikely
"*Administrative controls on amount of combustible materials
"*Administrative controls and procedures for truck operations, proper training, safety culture SAR:0007459.01 I ,
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 80 of 85 10.0 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS 10.1.1 Organizational Structure The overall WVDP organizational structure is presented in Sections A.10.1 and A.10.2 of WVNS-SAR-001. As of April 2001, the WVNS RHWP Manager reports to the WVNS Site Closure Projects Manager, who reports to the President of WVNS. The organizational structure associated with the RHWF upon initiation of operations will be presented in the RHWF Final SAR. The organizational roles and responsibilities for RHWF design, construction, and pre-operational testing are presented in Table 10.1-1.
10.4.2 Fire Protection The WVDP fire protection program, which will be applied to the RHWF, has been developed to meet the requirements for a comprehensive fire protection program as delineated in WVDP-177, WVDP Fire Protection Manual, which is based on the fire protection-related requirements in DOE Order 420.1, Facility Safety. Administrative controls, procedures, and training to prevent fires and explosions are presented in WVDP-177. The WVDP fire and explosion protection program is discussed in Section A.4.3.6 of WVNS-SAR-001. A complete discussion of the FHA process and its requirements are given in WVDP-177. An FHA for the RHWF is provided in WVNS-FHA-014, Fire Hazards Analysis for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility.
SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 81 of 85 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 10.0 American National Standards Institute. 1997. ANS-6.4: Guidelines on the Nuclear Analysis and Design of Concrete Radiation Shielding for Nuclear Power Plants.
American National Standards Institute.
_ ANSI N-300: Design Criteria for Decommissioning of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plants. American National Standards Institute.
Scientech Incorporated. September 24, 1999. Closure Report on the Deactivation and Decommissioning of the Stand-Alone Alternative to the RHWF. Gaithersburg, Maryland.
U.S. Department of Energy. July 21, 1997. DOE Manual 232.1-1A, Occurrence Reporting and Processing of Operations Information. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Department of Energy.
_ July 21, 1997. DOE Order 232.1A: Occurrence Reporting and Processing of Operations Information. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy.
_ October 13, 1995. Change 3 (November 22, 2000). DOE Order 420.1:
Facility Safety. Washington, D.C.
_ May 18, 1992. DOE Order 5480.19: Conduct of Operations Requirements for DOE Facilities, Change 1 . Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy.
" October 15, 1996. DOE P 450.4: Safety Management System Policy.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy.
"" October 15, 1996. DOE P 450.5: Line Environment, Safety, and Health Oversight. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy.
West Valley Nuclear Service Co. WV-121: Self-Assessment Program. (Latest Revision).
" WV-368: Operational Readiness Determination for Startup/Restart.
(Latest Revision).
" WV-987: Occurrence Investigation and Reporting. (Latest Revision).
" WVDP-106: Westinghouse Conduct of Operations Manual.
(Latest Revision).
WVDP-177: WVDP Fire Protection Manual. (Latest Revision).
. WVDP-242: Event Investigation and Report Manual. (Latest Revision).
WVDP-310: WVDP Safety Management System Description.
(Latest Revision).
- WVDP-342: Operational Readiness Determination Manual for Startup and Restart of WVDP Facilities. (Latest Revision).
_ WVNS-DC-071: Design Criteria for the Remote Handled Waste Facility.
(Latest Revision).
SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 82 of 85 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 10.0 (concluded)
WVNS-FHA-014: Fire Hazards Analysis for the Remote-Handled Waste Facility. (Latest Revision).
_ WVNS-SAR-001: Safety Analysis Report: Project Overview and General Information. (Latest Revision).
SAR: 0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 83 of 85 11.0 DERIVATION OF TECHNICAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 11.1 Introduction The objective of this chapter is to provide information that satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR 830.204 (b) (4). This chapter is normally used to link the accident analyses, through descriptions of the safety-related SSCs, to the TSR document of a given facility. The TSR document, as stated in DOE Order 5480.22, Technical Safety Requirements, is intended to constitute an agreement or contract between the DOE and the applicable managing and operating (M&O) contractor (in this instance WVNS) regarding the safe operation of a given facility, activity, or operation.
As stated in DOE Order 5480.22, the DOE's "first safety responsibility must be the protection of the public." This is also the first safety responsibility of WVNS.
Those who work at the WVDP accept some risk of exposure to radioactive and other hazardous materials due to the nature of the materials with which the WVDP facilities operate. Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon the DOE and WVNS to ensure that WVDP facilities are operated in a manner that minimizes the risk to workers and limits exposures to hazardous materials to levels permitted by federal or state regulations and relevant DOE Orders and Notices.
11.2 Requirements This PSAR meets the requirements in 10 CFR 830.204 and 830.205 with respect to TSRs.
The guidance contained in DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports, has also been considered in this regard.
SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 84 of 85 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 11.0 Code of Federal Regulations. 10 CFR 830: Nuclear Safety Management. U.S. Department of Energy.
U. S. Department of Energy. February 25, 1992. Change 2 (January 23, 1996). DOE Order 5480.22: Technical Safety Requirements. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy.
July 1994. DOE STD-3009-94: Preparation Guide for U.S. Department Of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Department of Energy.
SAR:0007459.01
WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 Page 85 of 85 12.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE The Quality Assurance Program (QAP) at the WVDP is implemented on a site-wide basis and is applied in compliance with the QA Rule, 10 CFR 830.120, Quality Assurance Requirements. Definition and description of the WVNS QAP is provided by the DOE-approved WVNS document WVDP-111, Quality Assurance Program (WVNS), which also implements the requirements of DOE 0 414.1, "Quality Assurance."
The QA Program is used for determining the graded applicability of quality assurance standards to items, systems, and services. RHWF structures, systems, and components are covered by flow-down of requirements in the QAP and are graded and identified by quality level, which is based upon safety, environmental, health, and other programmatic considerations. The assigned list, methodology for classification, and rationale for establishment of quality levels are contained in WVDP-204, WVDP Quality List (Q-List) (WVNS). The criteria for determining quality level designations are provided WVDP-002, Quality Management Manual. These criteria are summarized in Section A.12.3 of WVNS-SAR-001.
A synopsis of the WVNS QAP defined in WVDP-111 is presented in Chapter A.12.0 of WVNS-SAR-001, Project Overview and General Information (WVNS).
SAR:0007459.01
1 WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Rev. 0 WVNS RECORD OF REVISION Revision On Rev. No. Description of Changes Page(s) Dated 0 Original Issue All 06/28/02 WVNS-SAR-023, Addendum 1 Routine annual update per 10 CFR 830. Deleted Figure 1.1-3 and revised the construction and initiation of operations information in Section 1.1.6. Revised estimated number of waste containers to be generated presented in Table 1.1-2, and revised Table 1.6-1 to relate PSAR chapters to DOE-STD-3009-94 chapters. Numbers associated with the elevations and dimensions of various structures and rooms changed or added throughout Chapter 5. Rated capacities for the Work Cell crane and associated PDM changed throughout, and added text to address remote control capabilities.
Added design parameters (e.g., flow rates and pressures) for various support systems discussed in Chapter 5. Figures updated to reflect latest revision/latest design. Figures 5.2-7 through 5.2-19 were deleted. Reference to WVDP-370 is now made in Section 7.1, as it is key in implementing DOE Order 435.1. Added information on using high pressure demineralized water for decontamination purposes to Section 7.5, and made additions to evaluate such in the PHA (Table 9.1-1) in Chapter 9. Added reference to DOE-STD-1098-99 to Section 8.1.1 since it is listed in the WVNS contract with DOE. Revised frequency of explosion in the Work Cell that leads to loss of Zone 1 integrity to incredible to be consistent with text in Chapter 9, though such an event remains evaluated for potential consequences in Section 9.2.3.3. Revised WVNS organizational structure information in Section 10.1.1.
Deleted references to the "conceptual design" throughout.
Made reference to WVNS-FHA-014 in several locations, with information and conclusions from WVNS-FHA-014 added where appropriate. All references to DOE Order 5480.23 and DOE Order 5480.22 were deleted, with reference now made to 10 CFR 830. Deleted all references to DOE Order 5820.2A, with reference now made to only DOE Order 435.1. All references to DOE Orders and Standards updated.
NOTE: This Addendum contains only the revised subsections of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report for Remote-Handled Waste Facility, WVNS-SAR-023, Rev. 0.
DOE Approval: DW:2002:0262, dated June 17, 2002 WV-1807, Rev. 8 SAR:0007459.01 1