ML021690648
| ML021690648 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom, Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 05/24/2002 |
| From: | Wasong A Exelon Nuclear |
| To: | Conte R NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB |
| References | |
| 50-277/02301, 50-278/02301, 50-353/02301, 50-353/02301 50-277/02301, 50-278/02301, 50-353/02301, 50-353/02301 | |
| Download: ML021690648 (17) | |
Text
Appendix D SCENARIO OUTLINE Form ES-D-1 Facility: LGS l and 2 Scenario No. 1 Op-Test Number:
Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: Shuffle Part 1 is in progress on Unit 1 Turnover: A fuel bundle is in transit from the core to the spent fuel pool Event Malf Event Event No. No. Type* Description Minor leakage reported from drywell upper seal plate into the
- 1. N/A C drywell requires temporary suspension of fuel movement to allow access to upper drywell area for inspection.
- 2. N/A M A fuel bundle is dropped onto spent fuel pool with significant fuel damage.
kIN )ormal, t R' )eactIVity, k I )nstrument, k %,)omponent, t M )ajor Page 1 of 4
Appendix D OPERATOR ACTIONS Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No. LG IPO Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Minor leakage reported from drywell upper seal plate into the drywell requires temporary suspension of fuel movement to allow access to upper drywell area for inspection.
Examiner Cue:
With a fuel bundle in transit from the core to the spent fuel pool, the drywell controlpoint contacts you and informs you that a water leak in the vicinity of the drywell upper seal plate has been detected. Access to the drywell is needed to the 313' elevation for inspection and repairin the next 5 minutes.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior FHD
- Direct the completion of the current CCTAS step (the bundle is currently in the cattle chute and needs to be moved, as this is one of the least desirable locations to leave the bundle if drywell access is a concern).
FHD *E Suspend core alterations (The requirement for access controls to the upper elevations of the drywell appears in several places: NOM-L-4.1, FHD Turnover Checklist, FH-105, and HP-300. The candidate may reference any or direct the suspension of core alterations from memory)
FHD Post a sign in front of the controls of the grapple controls to remind personnel to verify access controls re-established prior to resuming irradiated core component handling FHD Contact the Health Physics Drywell Control Point and report:
"* irradiated core component transfers have been halted
"* access to the drywell upper elevations may be unrestricted
"* the fuel grapple controls have been posted to re-verify access controls prior to resuming [irradiated core]
component handling Ref: FH-105 Step 9.1.2 Examiner Cue:
After about 30 minutes, the Drywell ControlPointcontacts you and informs you that the waterleak was from a demin water hose. Access restrictionsto the upperelevation of the drywell have been put back in-place and the area is clear. The control room has made the announcement in the drywell, and irradiatedcomponent movements may resume.
You have commenced the next CCTAS step, and have grappleda bundle over the core and are transportingit to the spent fuel pool.
Appendix D OPERATOR ACTIONS Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No. LG IPO Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of I Event
Description:
A fuel bundle is dropped onto spent fuel pool with significant fuel damage Examiner Cue:
A bundle is hanging from the main hoist, and the bridge is moving toward the target cell location in front of the North Fuel Prep Machine. Sudden stoppage of the bridge causes the bundle to swing into the prep machine. The bundle caught on the fuel prep machine and as the mast swung away, the bail handle failed and the bundle fell onto the spent fuel below.
The bundle is now lying partly on spent fuel and partly on the fuel pool floor. Bubbles and cloudy water can be seen rising toward the surface.
(Wait about 30 seconds then provide the cue) "The PRO has contacted the bridge and reported that the refuel floor has automaticallyisolated due to high exhaust rad level" The refuel bridge arearad monitoris now alarming.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior FHD Enter ON-120, FUEL HANDLING PROBLEMS per Symptom 1.3 (Fuel Bundle Dropped or Damaged)
FHD Evacuate the refuel floor per ON-120 FHD Contact SSV and request disposition of damaged bundle CUE: The SSV directs you to leave the bundle in the current location, ensure the refuel floor is evacuated, and come to the main control room FHD Verify normal refuel floor HVAC is isolated and SGTS is started CUE: The PRO reports that the refuel floor has automatically isolatedand standby gas treatmentis running CUE: You have reachedthe terminationpoint for the scenario Page 3 of 4
LSRO INTEGRATED PLANT SCENARIO TURNOVER CONDITIONS LGS Scenario 1 Fuel Handling Director Unit 1 OPCON 5 Core Shuffle Part 1 in progress All prerequisites for core alterations are met and a bundle is in-transit from the core to the spent fuel pool. The mast is mid-way through the cattle chute.
CANDIDATE Page 4 of 4
Appendix D SCENARIO OUTLINE Form ES-D-1 Facility: LGS l and 2 Scenario No. 2 Op-Test Number:
Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: In-vessel maintenance is in progress on Unit 2 Turnover: The bridge is over the core and moving toward the fuel pool with a double blade guide hanging from the main hoist and a control rod/fuel support piece on the combined grapple hanging from the monorail aux hoist.
Event Malf Event Event No. No. Type* Description
- 1. N/A I Receipt of unexpected rod block over core due to load cell failure
- 2. N/A M Significant leakage from CRD Mechanism Housing requires I I installation of the Emergency Guide Tube Seal
( N )ormal, ( R )eactivity, ( I )nstrument, ( C.)omponent, (M )ajor Page 1 of 4
Appendix D OPERATOR ACTIONS Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No. LG IPO Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Receipt of unexpected rod block over core due to load cell failure Examiner Cue:
The NES combined grapple, the fuel support, and the control rod blade are clear of the top guide and coming up per Step 5. 8.19 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior FHD Raise NES combined grapple until it stops when the jam block actuates the whisker switch CUE: The aux hoist is full up CUE: The ReactorOperatorhasjust received a ROD OUT BLOCK alarm.
The Refuel Platform Operatorhas received ROD BLOCK #1 and ROD BLOCK #2 lamps and has 908 lb indicated on the main hoist Note: The candidateshould recognize this as erroneous enforcement of a refueling interlock (hoist loaded over core). A failure of the load cell on the main hoist in the hi direction would cause this (See S97.0.M Attachment 1).
The RPO would also see weight indicationjump.
FHD
- Place the components in a safe location due to equipment exhibiting unexpected behavior Ref: S97.0.M Step 3.1 NOTE: The candidatemust address placing the loads in a safe location, keeping in mind that the main grapple will not attempt to releaseif the load is 908 lb. Examples of ways to meet this step could include (1) CRB in blade rack with FSP seated on rack, (2) hanging from the hoist as low as possible in the fuel pool, or (3) in a location specified by reactorengineers.
The load should not normally be left hanging over the core.
FHD Suspend core alterations and CRB exchanges due to inoperable refueling interlocks Ref: LCO 3.9.6 FH-105 Step 4.27 Note: CRB exchanges are done in de-fueled cell. This is not a core alteration;however, the failed load cell will still prevent performing CRB exchanges because the blade guides will not release.
FHD Initiate notifications to troubleshoot and repair the main hoist load cell.
Page 2 of 4
Appendix D OPERATOR ACTIONS Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No. LG IPO Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Significant leakage from CRD Mechanism Housing requires installation of the emergency guide tube seal Examiner Cue:
While waiting for the system managerto come to the refueling bridge, you heara reportfrom undervessel that a severe leak occurrred when CRD mechanism 30-39 was lowered using the NES machine. The lift cylinderhasjammed and the CRD cannot be raisedback into position. All undervessel crews are evacuating the drywell The controlroom supervisorhas directedyou to install the emergency guide tube seal to 30-39 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior FHD Attach CRB grapple or jet pump grapple as required to frame mounted or monorail aux hoist CUE: The grapple cabinet is currently obstructed by a piece of heavy equipment Ref: M-C-741-301 Section 5.7 FHD Use a rope to handle the guide tube seal as an emergency measure CUE: A 100 foot piece of nylon rope is now attachedto the guide tube seal. The seal has been cariedto the bridge NOTE: The guide tube seal is stored on a horizontalrack on the Southwest comer of the Refuel Floor. The rope is already staged and attached.
FHD Position the bridge and trolley over 30-39 CUE: The cab is over 30-39 FHD Direct the guide tube seal lowered over the rail into the guide tube for 30-39 CUE: The rope is wrappedaroundthe railingand the seal is in the water. The seal has been lowered through the top guide and has seated in 30-39. Leakage is stopped as verified by undervessel inspection.
CUE: You have reached the termination point for the scenario.
Page 3 of 4
LSRO INTEGRATED PLANT SCENARIO TURNOVER CONDITIONS LGS Scenario 2 Fuel Handling Director Unit 2 Mode 5 In-vessel maintenance is in progress on Unit 2 per M-C-741-301 All prerequisites for core alterations are met and all rods indicate full in (dummy PIPs are installed on uncoupled rods)
Control rod blade exchange in cell 30-39 is in progress. The double blade guide is hanging from the main hoist with weight indicating 385 lb.
The FSP and CRB are being raised through the top guide on the NES combined grapple on the monorail aux hoist with weight indicating 460 lb and all flags in full-down position (this value agrees with Attachment 12 expected value)
CANDIDATE Page 4 of 4
Appendix D SCENARIO OUTLINE Form ES-D-1 Facility: PBAPS 2 and 3 Scenario No. 1 Op-Test Number:
Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: Core alterations are in progress on Unit 3 Turnover: A bundle is being raised from the core.
Event Malf Event Event No. No. Type* Description
- 1. N/A C Hoist jam condition while moving fuel
- 2. N/A M Unexpected fuel floor area radiation monitor alarm
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Appendix D OPERATOR ACTIONS Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No. PB IPO Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Hoist jam condition while moving fuel Examiner Cue:
Bundle 17-30 is grappledand being raised.The hoist is at 530 inches and is coming up with the bundle oriented Northwest.
The Refuel Platform Operatorhas just called out a hoistjam condition with about half the bundle above the top guide Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior FHD Direct the RPO to stop hoist operation Ref: S018.1 .A-3 FHD Direct the bundle to be lowered until the hoist jam goes out CUE: The RPO has lowered the bundle several inches. The HOIST JAM lamp is out and the grapple controls are released The RPO reports that the bundle channel appearsbowed by visual observation.
FHD The FHD may at this point direct the RPO to attempt to raise the bundle again.
CUE: The RPO has attempted to raise the bundle again using gentle rotation of the mast. The bundle is now clearof the core and is over the spent fuel pool on the way to X-54 Page 2 of 4
Appendix D OPERATOR ACTIONS Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No. PB IPO Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Unexpected Fuel Floor Area Radiation Alarm Examiner Cue:
The bundle from 17-30 is now about to be lowered into the spent fuel pool. The location and orientationof the bundle has been double-verified and the mast encoder indicates 12 inches Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior FHD Direct the RPO to lower the bundle until a slack cable warning is received CUE: The bundle is going down Wait 20 seconds CUE: The fuel storage pool ARM is now alarming FHD Enter ON-124, FUEL FLOOR AND FUEL HANDLING PROBLEMS -PROCEDURE FHD Recognize that the alarm is not due simply to a bundle positioned near a monitor because the alarm would have been received prior to lowering the bundle Ref: ON-124 Section 2.2 FHD Direct the bundle to be raised until it clears the fuel racks CUE: The RPO has begun to raise the bundle, then reports that the hoist has stopped and a FAULT DETECTED alarm is received for unknown reasons. The bundle is still about halfway into the fuel rack FHD Recognize the bundle will not raise or lower FHD Inform Health Physics of the condition FHD Notify the Main Control Room crew CUE: You can now hear the Fuel FloorArea Rad Monitor alarming FHD Direct the crew to evacuate to the Turbine Building elevation 165' CUE: You have reached the termination point for the scenario.
You may stop here Page 3 of 4
LSRO INTEGRATED PLANT SCENARIO TURNOVER CONDITIONS PBAPS Scenario 1 Fuel Handling Director Unit 3 Mode 5 Core Shuffle Part 2 in progress All prerequisites for core alterations are met and a bundle is being raised form the core CANDIDATE Page 4 of 4
Appendix D SCENARIO OUTLINE Form ES-D-1 Facility: PBAPS 2 and 3 Scenario No. 2 Op-Test Number:
Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: Core shuffle part 2 is in progress.
Turnover: A bundle is in transit from the fuel pool to the core.
Event Malf Event Event No. No. Type* Description
- 1. N/A I Wide Range Nuclear Monitoring (WRNM) Instrument failure requires suspension of core alterations
- 2. N/A M Loss of cavity level and emergency makeup "I" I l - - - I / I \ -- -.. .L ./ I \ _ L.. . . ' . . . . .+/- * *
- k IN )ormal, k, R )ea ~iviy, )nstrum ent, t C, )om ponenl, )aJor Page 1 of 5
Appendix D OPERATOR ACTIONS Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No. PB IPO Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Wide Range Nuclear Monitoring instrument failure requires suspension of core alterations Examiner Cue:
With the refuel platform entering the refuel slot, the Reactor Operatorcontacts the bridge crew and reports the "2B" Wide Range NI just failed because the cable was accidentally un-plugged from underthe vessel.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior FHD Direct the RPO to stop auto motion due to failure to meet required operable nuclear instruments Ref: T.S. Surv. Req. 3.3.1.2.2 NOM-L-4.1 FH-6C Step 5.6 Examiner Note: The candidate need only simulate that the bundle is not inserted into the core. He or she may elect to complete the transit of the refuel slot to minimize dose rate in the drywell The candidate may either direct the RPO to stop the bridge, or he or she may simulate supervisory action from the FHD console by stopping the move. The move may be terminated by performing any of the following:
- Touching AUTO STOP 0 Deflecting a manual motion joystick 0 Depressing STOP pushbutton
- Depressing TRAVEL OVERRIDE CUE: The RPO has stopped the bridge (You have stopped the bridge)
FHD Notify Reactor Engineering that core alterations have been suspended Ref: FH-6C Step 10.2.4 CUE: Reactorengineeringdirects you to return the bundle to the "safe setdown" location until the WRNM is restored FHD Return the bundle to the safe setdown location in the fuel pool in semi-auto or manual mode CUE: The bundle is in-transitto the location you selected Page 2 of 5
Appendix D OPERATOR ACTIONS Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No. PB IPO Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
Loss of reactor cavity level and emergency makeup CUE:
While waiting in a low dose area for the WRNM to be restored,you hear the drywell control point reportingthat everyone just came running out of the drywell because there is a huge leak coming from some big pipe. You can also see cavity level dropping rapidly, and the fuel pool cooling weirs just became uncovered. You have been directed to respond to the cavity level drop from the fuel floor because the only available ECCS has failed to inject from the control room.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior FHD Enter ON-124, FUEL FLOOR AND FUEL HANDLING PROBLEMS - PROCEDURE FHD - Ensure all irradiated components are lowered to a safe location
- Complete the fuel move in progress, either to the original location or to the nearest fuel pool location (the rapidlevel drop given in the cue may cause the candidate to abandon the move to the originallocation and simply get the bundle down immediately. This is also an acceptable response per the procedure)
- Ensure the fuel prep machines are fully lowered if fuel loaded
- All other irradiated components hanging from any hoist or cable is lowered CUE: All fuel and irradiatedmaterials are fully lowered Ref: ON-124 Section 2.6 FHD Notify Health Physics to continue to evaluate fuel floor conditions CUE: HP is on the fuel floor and providing continuous coverage FHD Evaluate whether the fuel is uncovered in the fuel pool for the purpose of EP classification CUE: The fuel is still covered by approximately20 feet of water FHD Evacuate non-essential personnel to the Turbine Building CUE: The Shift managerhas directedyou to remain on the fuel floor and direct the response until Health Physics directs you to evacuate.
Page 3 of 5
Appendix D OPERATOR ACTIONS Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No. PB IPO Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 2 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
Loss of reactor cavity level and emergency makeup CUE:
While waiting in a low dose area for the WRNM to be restored,you hear the drywell controlpoint reportingthat everyone just came running out of the drywell because there is a huge leak coming from some big pipe. You can also see cavity level droppingrapidly, and the fuel pool cooling weirsjust became uncovered. You have been directed to respond to the cavity level drop from the fuel floor because the only available ECCS has failed to inject from the control room.
FHD Enter FH-74, "Actions in Response to an Unexpected Loss of Fuel Pool, Reactor Cavity, or Equipment Storage Pool Water Inventory" FHD Inspect the fuel pool rails, racks, fuel prep machines, and cask laydown area for any irradiated material above the top of the fuel storage racks CUE: All materials are below the top of the racks Ref: FH-74 Step 8.4.2 (Note- There are several steps in FH-74 that have already been taken in ON-1 24. The candidate may spend a few moments locating the next step that needs to be performed)
FHD Turn off power to the refueling platform FHD Exit the area using proper HP procedures CUE: While exiting, the control room supervisorcalls and directs you to add waterto the cavity per FH-74. Health Physics is present and states that radiologicalconditions permit the performance of the steps on the refuel floor FHD Attach hoses to any condensate and demin water connections and route to the cavity and add water FHD Roll out any fire hose attached to a water supply and route to the cavity and add water CUE: You have reachedthe terminationpoint for the scenario Page 4 of 5
LSRO INTEGRATED PLANT SCENARIO TURNOVER CONDITIONS PBAPS Scenario 2 Fuel Handling Director Unit 2 Mode 5 Core Shuffle Part 2 in progress Unit 2 Refuel Platform is in full automatic X, Y, Z mode "A", "B", "G", and "H"WRNMs are the only operable Nuclear Instruments The CCTAS step in progress is bundle PYN463 from P2SPENT CC-18 (NW) to 51-34 (SW)
The CCTAS lists P2SPENT YY39 as the safe setdown location All prerequisites for core alterations are met and the bridge is in motion toward the refueling slot CANDIDATE Page 5 of 5