ML021550040

Application for Amendment to Relocate Shutdown Margin Limits from TS to COLR Report & Modify Action Statements Consistent with NUREG-1431

ML021550040
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	05/23/2002
From:	Sheppard J South Texas
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NOC-AE-02001246, NUREG-1431
Download: ML021550040 (60)

Text

South Texas Proect Electric Generatn$Station.O. Box282 Wadsworth, Texas77483 May 23, 2002 NOC-AE-02001246 10CFR50.90 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 South Texas Project Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499 License Amendment Request Proposed Revision to Relocate Shutdown Margin Limits From the Technical Specifications to the Core Operating Limits Report And to Modify Action Statements Consistent with NUREG-1431

Reference:

1. Letter, S. Head to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk, "Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2001-21," dated January 17, 2002.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, STP Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) requests the following amendment of Operating Licenses NPF-76 and NPF-80 for South Texas Project Units 1 and 2.

The proposed change will modify the following Technical Specifications (TS):

3/4.1.1.1 "Shutdown Margin - Tavg Greater Than 2000 F" 3/4.1.1.2 "Shutdown Margin - Tavg Less Than Or Equal To 2000 F" 3/4.9.1 "Boron Concentration" 3/4.10.1 "Special Test Exception - Shutdown Margin" 3/4.10.6 "Special Test Exception - CET And RCS RTD Calibration Exemptions for 2RE03" 3/4.10.7 "Special Test Exception - DNB Parameters Surveillance Exemption for 2RE03" 6.9.1.6 "Core Operating Limits Report" The proposed changes will relocate the Shutdown Margin limits to Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) and consolidate TS 3/4.1.1.1 and TS 3/4.1.1.2. These changes are consistent with the NRC-approved Industry/Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) changes TSTF-9 and TSTF 136. These changes will allow the South Texas Project the flexibility to enhance plant operating margin and/or core design margins without the need for cycle-specific license amendment requests. In addition, STPNOC proposes to revise the action statement requirements of the Specifications to be consistent with the Westinghouse Improved Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-1431. Also, two administrative changes will remove TS 3/4.10.6 and TS 3/4.10.7 that are historical and no longer needed.

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NOC-AE- 02001246 Page 2 South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) has reviewed the proposed amendment pursuant to 10CFR50.92 and determined that it involves no significant hazards consideration. In addition, STPNOC has determined that the proposed amendment satisfies the criteria of 10CFR51.22(c)(9) for categorical exclusion from the requirement for an environmental assessment. The STP Plant Operations Review Committee and Nuclear Safety Review Board have reviewed and approved the proposed amendment.

In accordance with 10CFR50.91(b), STPNOC is notifying the State of Texas of this request for a license amendment by providing a copy of this letter and its attachments.

STP requests approval of the proposed change by May 31, 2003. Once approved, the amendment will be implemented within 30 days. This amendment request is one of the fourteen plant specific submittals that STPNOC planned to submit in fiscal 2002 (Reference 1). Attachment 1 to this letter provides the No Significant Hazards Determination and Attachment 2 provides the TS pages marked up with the proposed changes. Attachment 3 provides the retyped TS pages. and 5 include the proposed change to the Bases for TS 3.1.1.1 and a mark-up of the Core Operating Limits Report, provided for information.

There are no licensing commitments in this letter.

If there are any questions regarding the proposed amendment, please contact R. D. Piggott at (361) 972-7438 or me at (361) 972-8757.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on: VIO.

o JJ.

eppard Vice resident, Engineering & Technical Services RDP/

Attachments:

1. Licensee's Evaluation

2.

Proposed Technical Specification Changes (Mark-up)

3.

Proposed Technical Specification Pages (Re-Typed)

4.

Proposed Technical Specification Bases (For Information)

5.

Example of Core Operating Limits Report (Mark-up)

NOC-AE-02001246 Page 3 cc:

(paper copy)

(electronic copy)

Ellis W. Merschoff Regional Administrator, Region IV U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, Texas 76011-8064 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Richard A. Ratliff Bureau of Radiation Control Texas Department of Health 1100 West 49th Street Austin, TX 78756-3189 Cornelius F. O'Keefe U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. 0. Box 289, Mail Code: MN116 Wadsworth, TX 77483 A. H. Gutterman, Esquire Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP M. T. Hardt/W. C. Gunst City Public Service Mohan C. Thadani U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission R. L. Balcom Reliant Energy, Inc.

A. Ramirez City of Austin C. A. Johnson AEP - Central Power and Light Company Jon C. Wood Matthews & Branscomb C. M. Canady City of Austin Electric Utility Department 721 Barton Springs Road Austin, TX 78704

NOC-AE-02001246 Attachment I Page 1 of 13 ATTACHMENT 1 LICENSEE'S EVALUATION

NOC-AE-02001246 Page 2 of 13 LICENSEE'S EVALUATION

1.0 DESCRIPTION

STPNOC is proposing to amend Operating Licenses NPF-76 and NPF-80 for South Texas Project Units 1 and 2. The proposed changes will modify the following Technical Specifications:

3/4.1.1.1 "Shutdown Margin - Tavg Greater Than 2000 F" 3/4.1.1.2 "Shutdown Margin - Tavg Less Than Or Equal To 2000 F" 3/4.9.1 "Boron Concentration" 3/4.10.1 "Special Test Exception - Shutdown Margin" 3/4.10.6 "Special Test Exception - CET And RCS RTD Calibration Exemptions for 2RE03" 3/4.10.7 "Special Test Exception - DNB Parameters Surveillance Exemption for 2RE03" 6.9.1.6 "Core Operating Limits Report" The proposed changes to relocate the Shutdown Margin limits to Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) and consolidate TS 3/4.1.1.1 and TS 3/4.1.1.2 are consistent with the NRC-approved Industry/Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) changes TSTF-9 and TSTF-136. In addition, STPNOC proposes to revise the action statement requirements of the Specifications to be consistent with the Westinghouse Improved Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-1431. Two administrative changes will remove TS 3/4.10.6 and TS 3/4.10.7 that are historical and no longer needed.

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGE

STPNOC proposes to make the following changes to Technical Specification 3/4.1.1.1, 3/4.1.1.2, 3/4.9.1, 3/4.10.1, 3/4.10.6, and 6.9.1.6:

No.

Page Affected Section Description of Change Reason for Change 1

iv, ix Index Update Table of Contents as Update Table of Contents as a a result of proposed changes.

result of changes described below.

2 3/4 1-1 3.1.1.1 In accordance with TSTF-9 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) is a LCO and NUREG 1431 the cycle specific variable, similar to SHUTDOWN MARGIN will other variables, such as, Moderator be specified in the Core Temperature Coefficient, Rod Operating Limits Report Insertion Limits, Axial Flux (COLR) instead of TS Figure Difference, Heat Flux Hot Channel 3.1-1.

Factor and Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor, all of which are currently contained in the COLR.

There is an NRC approved methodology for the calculation of

NOC-AE-02001246 Page 3 of 13 No.

Page Affected Section Description of Change Reason for Change required SDM. Relocating SDM to the COLR will provide core design and operational flexibility that can be used for improved fuel management and to solve plant specific issues. If the SDM limits were contained within the COLR, the core design could be finalized after shutdown, when the actual end of cycle burnup is known. This would save redesign effort, if the actual burnup differs from the projected value. Current reload design efforts and the resolution of plant specific issues are restricted by the guidelines with any change to SDM requiring a License Amendment Request (LAR).

3 3/41-1 3.1.1.1 Added Mode 5 to The LCOs, Actions and LCO APPLICABILITY. In Surveillances are the same.

Applicability accordance with TSTF-136 This change combines the two and NUREG 143 1, TSs Specifications and their 3.1.1.1 and 3.1.1.2 are applicability to make one combined. With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN implementation of TSTF-9, Specification. This eliminates in item 1 above, the two unneeded and confusing Specifications are now the duplication. Differences in the same.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN above and below Tag of 2000 F will be addressed in the COLR.

4 3/4 1-1 3.1.1.1 Action Replace the reference to the See Item 2 above. The limits specified in Figure SHUTDOWN MARGIN limits in 3.1-1 with limits specified Figure 3.1-1 will be specified in the in the COLR.

COLR.

5 3/4 1-1 3.1.1.1 Action Change the ACTION "Immediately" in the TS Bases is statement from immediately considered to be 15 minutes for initiate boration to initiate operator action to start boration to boration within 15 minutes.

restore SDM. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431, Westinghouse Improved Standard Technical Specifications where the "immediately" is administratively changed to 15 minutes. This change is also consistent with the boron dilution accident analyses (UFSAR 15.4.6).

6 3/4 1-1 3.1.1.1 Action Delete specific values for Action 3.1.1.1 provides instructions boration flow and on restoring SDM with specific concentration in the values of boron flow rate and boron ACTION statement.

concentration. The details for restoring SDM are informative, but the requirement of the specification is to maintain SDM. Thus, these

NOC-AE-02001246 Attachment I Page 4 of 13 No.

Page Affected Section Description of Change Reason for Change procedural details are not necessary for inclusion within the TS. This type of detail is included in plant procedures where the acceptable combination of boron concentration and flow rate for borating the RCS are provided. The boron concentration of 7000 ppm at a flow rate of 30 gpm will be added to the TS Bases 3/4.1.1.1 for the purpose of offering a specific example. This change is also consistent with NUREG-1431 where the boron flow rate and boron concentration are not specified in TS.

7 3/4 1-1 SR 4.1.1.1.1 Replace "greater than or See Item I above. The equal to the limits as shown SHUTDOWN MARGIN limits in in Figure 3.1-1" to "within Figure 3.1-1 will be specified in the the limits specified in the COLR.

COLR."

8 3/4 1-2 SR 4.1.1.1.l.d Added Mode 5 to the In accordance with TSTF-136, TSs applicability for this 3.1.1.1 and 3.1.1.2 are combined.

Surveillance Requirement.

This change combines the two This requirement will account Specifications and their for SR 4.1.1.2.b that will be applicability to make one deleted with the deletion of SHUTDOWN MARGIN TS 3.1.1.2.

Specification. See Item 3 above.

9 3/4 1-3 Figure 3.1-1 Delete Figure 3.1-1, the See Item 1 above. The Required SHUTDOWN SHUTDOWN MARGIN limits in MARGIN limits will be Figure 3.1-1 will be specified in the included in the COLR.

COLR.

10 3/4 1-4 3.1.1.2 LCO Delete TS 3/4.1.1.2 LCO, The LCOs, Actions and Surveillances 3/4 1-5 3.1.1.2 Action Action and, Surveillance are the same. This change combines SR 4.1.1.2 a & b Requirements. TS 3/4.1.1.2 the two Specifications and their Figure 3.1-2 is combined with TS applicability to make one 3/4.1.1.1.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN Specification. Figure 3.1-2 will be included in the COLR. The associated Bases will be revised to reflect these changes. This change is consistent with TSTF-136 and NUREG-1431. See Item 3 and 8 above.

11 3/4 9-1 3.9.1 Action Delete specific values for The details for restoring boron boration flow and concentration are informative, but the concentration in the requirement of the specification is to ACTION statement.

maintain the specific reactivity conditions for refueling operations.

Thus, these procedural details are not necessary for inclusion within the TS.

This type of detail is included in plant procedures which provides

NOC-AE-02001246 Page 5 of 13 No.

Page Affected Section Description of Change Reason for Change acceptable methods of borating the RCS and refueling canal during refueling operations. The change is consistent with NUREG-1431 where the boron flow rate and boron concentration are not specified in TS.

See also Item 6 above for similar change.

12 3/4 10-1 3.10.1 Action Change the ACTION See Item 5 above.

statement from immediately initiate boration to initiate boration within 15 minutes.

13 3/4 10-1 3.10.1 Delete specific values for The details for restoring boron Action a boration flow and concentration are informative, but the Action b concentration in the requirement of the specification is to ACTION statement.

maintain the SHUTDOWN MARGIN. This change is also consistent with NUREG-1431 where the boron flow rate and boron concentration are not specified. See Item 6 above.

14 3/4 10-6 3.10.6 Delete TS 3.10.6 & TS These Specifications are historical, 3.10.7 3.10.7 LCOs, Actions and and no longer required.

Surveillance Requirements.

These Specifications are historical and no longer required.

15 6-21 6.9.1.6a Add an item to reflect the See Item 2 above. Relocation of 6.9.1.6b relocation of SHUTDOWN SHUTDOWN MARGIN to the MARGIN to the COLR with COLR.

reference to Specification 3.1.1.1.

In summary, the proposed changes will relocate the Shutdown Margin limits to the Core Operating Limits Report and consolidate TS 3/4.1.1.1 and TS 3/4.1.1.2. These changes are consistent with the NRC-approved Industry/Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) changes TSTF-9 and TSTF-136 and Westinghouse Improved Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-1431, Revision 2. This will allow the South Texas Project the flexibility to enhance plant operating margin and/or core design margins without the need for cycle-specific license amendment requests. In addition, STPNOC proposes to revise the action statement requirements of the Specifications to be consistent with the Westinghouse Improved Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-1431.

Administrative changes will remove TS 3/4.10.6 and TS 3/4.10.7 that are historical and no longer needed.

The Technical Specification Bases for TS 3/4.1.1.1, Shutdown Margin will be revised to include a specific boron concentration and flow rate to restore SDM for the purpose of offering a specific example. In addition, an administrative change will also be made to

NOC-AE-02001246 Page 6 of 13 reflect the relocation of Shutdown Margin to the COLR and consolidation of TS 3/4.1.1.1 and TS 3/4.1.1.2.

3.0 BACKGROUND

System Description and UFSAR

References:

The Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for Technical Specifications 3.1.1.1, 3.1.1.2, 3.9.1, and 3.10.1 assure that reactivity limits are maintained as required by the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and applicable design requirements.

When the LCOs are not satisfied, the ACTIONs require emergency boration to restore Shutdown Margin (SDM) or refueling boron concentration within required limits. A sufficient SDM ensures that (1) the reactor can be made subcritical from all operating conditions, (2) the reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and (3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently subcritical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.

SDM is a core design condition that is ensured during operation through control rod positioning and through the soluble boron concentration. The methods of boration control are provided in UFSAR 9.3.4, which describes the operation and design capabilities of the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS). The CVCS provides a number of functions for both normal plant operation purposes such as chemistry control or control of boron concentration for load follow and safe shutdown functions for boration. Methods of emergency boration are described in the USFAR 9.3.4. These methods include initiation of emergency boration by pumping from the Boric Acid Tanks (BAT) where boron concentration is maintained at 7000 ppm or from the refueling water storage tank (RWST), an independent source of borated water, containing a boron concentration of 2,800 - 3,000 ppm.

The STP Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) sections 3.1.2.1 - 3.1.2.7 identify the specific requirements for boration system water sources and boron injection flow paths for both operating and shutdown conditions. These requirements assure that the introduction of reactor coolant inventory is from either the BATs or RWST, where the boron concentration is greater than what would be required in the RCS for minimum SDM or refueling boron concentration. These parameters specified in the TRM provide acceptable margin to maintain subcritical operation.

Maintenance of the SDM ensures that postulated reactivity events will not damage the fuel. SDM requirements vary throughout core life as a function of fuel depletion, reactor coolant system (RCS) boron concentration, and RCS Tavg. In MODES 1 and 2, the most restrictive condition occurs at end-of-life, with Tavg at no load operating temperature, and is associated with a postulated steam line break accident (UFSAR 15.1.5) and resulting uncontrolled RCS cooldown. In the analysis of this accident, a minimum SDM of 1.3%

Ak/k is required to control the reactivity transient. The 1.3% Ak/k SDM is the design

NOC-AE-02001246 Attachment I Page 7 of 13 basis minimum for the 14-foot fuel using silver-indium-cadmium and/or Hafnium control rods (UFSAR Table 4.3-3).

In MODES 3, 4, and 5, the most restrictive condition occurs at beginning of life when the boron concentration is the greatest. In these modes, the required SDM is composed of a constant requirement and a variable requirement, which is a function of the RCS boron concentration. The constant SDM requirement of 1.3% Ak/k is based on an uncontrolled RCS cooldown from a steamline break accident. The variable SDM requirement is based on the results of the boron dilution accident analysis (UFSAR 15.4.6). The SDM is varied as a function of RCS boron concentration to guarantee a minimum of 15 minutes for operator action after a boron dilution alarm, prior to a loss of all SDM.

In Mode 6 (Refueling), the limitations on reactivity conditions ensure that the reactor will remain subcritical during core alterations, and a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limitations are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilution incident in the safety analyses. The value of 0.95 or less for Kff includes a 1%

Ak/k conservative allowance for uncertainties. Similarly, the boron concentration value of 2800 ppm or greater includes a conservative uncertainty allowance of at least 50 ppm boron. An uncontrolled boron dilution accident cannot occur in Mode 6. This accident is prevented by administrative controls (TS Surveillance 4.9.1.3) that require CVCS valves that could allow unborated water to reach the RCS to be locked closed.

Conditions and Circumstances for Proposing the Amendment The proposed changes to relocate the SDM to the COLR and the administrative change to consolidate TS 3/4.1.1.1 and TS 3/4.1.1.2 are consistent with the NRC-approved Industry/Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) changes TSTF-9 and TSTF-136.

Since the proposed changes are applicable to STP, STPNOC elected to make application for the changes.

STPNOC has identified a need to revise the Action Statement requirements for emergency boration. STPNOC determined that the best alternative would be to adopt the Required Actions from the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG 1431).

Additionally, administrative changes are proposed to remove Specifications TS 3/4.10.6 and TS 3/4.10.7 that are historical and no longer needed.

Since the application for revising the Action Statement requirements for emergency boration was already planned, it was logical to submit a single proposed change that would address all the changes to the Technical Specifications related to Boration Control.

NOC-AE-02001246 Page 8 of 13

4.0 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

Relocation of the Shutdown Margin to the Core Operating Limits Report The relocation of the SDM to the COLR will not change any requirements. The values for SDM will remain consistent with the UFSAR and will continue to provide their safety function through TS 3/4.1.1.1. Actions required to be taken when the SDM does not meet the limits will remain in the TS. SDM is a cycle specific variable, similar to other variables, such as, Moderator Temperature Coefficient, Rod Insertion Limits, Axial Flux Difference, all of which are currently contained in the COLR. Likewise, STPNOC uses an NRC approved methodology for the calculation of required SDM. (See Section 7.0, Reference 1)

Relocating SDM to the COLR will provide core design and operational flexibility that can be used for improved fuel management and to solve plant specific issues. If the SDM limits were contained within the COLR, the core design could be finalized after shutdown, when the actual end of cycle bumup is known. This would save redesign effort, if the actual burnup differs from the projected value. Current reload design efforts and the resolution of plant specific issues are restricted by the guidelines with any change to SDM requiring a License Amendment Request (LAR). Therefore, relocation of SDM to the COLR will conserve resources by reducing the number of LARs and associated NRC reviews.

Any changes to the COLR will be appropriately reviewed in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.59. A copy of the revised COLR will be sent to the NRC as required in Technical Specification 6.9.1.6.

Combination of Shutdown Margin Specifications The proposed change to consolidate TS 3/4.1.1.1 and TS 3/4.1.1.2 is administrative. The LCO, Action, and Surveillance requirements are the same. This change combines the two Specifications and their applicability to make one Shutdown Margin Specification. This eliminates unneeded and confusing duplication. Differences in the SDM above and below Tavg of 200' F will be addressed in the COLR.

Revise Action Statements for Emergency Boration Current STP Technical Specifications 3.1.1.1, 3.1.1.2, 3.9.1, and 3.10.1 require emergency boration at a rate of "greater than or equal to 30 gpm" with a concentration of "greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or equivalent" to meet the associated ACTION requirements. The proposed changes, which are based on Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-143 1), would remove these operational details from the Technical Specifications. It is the station's intent to include these values in Technical Specification Bases 3/4.1.1.1 for the purpose of offering a specific example.

NOC-AE-02001246 Attachment I Page 9 of 13 The requirement of these Specifications is to maintain Shutdown Margin or refueling boron concentration within appropriate reactivity limits. The proposed change is less restrictive in that the boron flow rates and boron concentration requirements to restore shutdown margin or refueling boron concentration are removed from TS. In the determination of the required combination of boration flow rate and boron concentration, there is no unique requirement that must be satisfied. Since it is necessary to raise the boron concentration of the RCS as soon as possible, the boron concentration is required to be from sources of highly concentrated solution. Consideration should be given in adjusting the flow rate based on the core life. The most limiting conditions being at the beginning of the cycle when RCS boron concentration is highest. The boration parameters of 30 gpm and 7000 ppm represent typical values when the borated water source is the boric acid tanks which contains 7000 ppm boron. However, the refueling water storage tank, an acceptable alternative, contains between 2800 and 3000 ppm boron concentration, therefore higher flow rates are needed to provide an equivalent rate. These details are more appropriate in plant procedures. The proposed change will include these values in the TS Bases 3/4.1.1.1 for the purpose of offering a specific example. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431, Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications, where the boron flow rate and boron concentration are not specified.

Currently, STP Technical Specifications 3.1.1.1 and 3.10.1 Action Statements require the "immediate" initiation of emergency boration. The proposed change revises the action statements to initiate boration within 15 minutes. As stated in the TS Bases, the boron dilution accident analyses (UFSAR 15.4.6) assume that operator actions to start boration will be within 15 minutes. This was determined to be adequate for an operator to correctly align and start the required systems and components and support the safety analysis. It is assumed that boration will be continued until the SDM requirements are met. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431, Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications.

The proposed changes to the Technical Specifications will not affect the design basis for the shutdown margin or boration control systems as described in the UFSAR. There are no changes to the UFSAR safety analyses or assumptions regarding shutdown margin or reactivity controls.

In conclusion, the proposed changes relocate the Shutdown Margin limits to the COLR and consolidate SDM Specifications consistent with the NRC-approved Technical Specification Task Force changes. The values for SDM will remain consistent with the UFSAR and will continue to provide their safety function through the revised Specification. Changes also include revision of the action statement requirements to be consistent with the Westinghouse Improved Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG 143 1. Finally, an administrative change will remove historical information.

NOC-AE-02001246 Page 10 of 13 5.0 REGULATORY SAFETY ANALYSIS 5.1 No Significant Hazards Determination Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92, it has been determined that this proposed amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. This determination was made by applying the Nuclear Regulatory Commission established standards contained in 10CFR50.92. These standards assure that operation of South Texas Project in accordance with this request consider the following:

1)

Will the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No The proposed change to relocate the Shutdown Margin limits to the Core Operating Limits Report does not change any requirements that are currently in place. No actual plant equipment or accident analyses will be affected by the proposed change. The Shutdown Margin limits in the COLR will continue to be controlled by the STP programs and procedures. The safety analysis addressed in the UFSAR will be examined with respect to changes in these limits, which are obtained using NRC-approved methodologies. Changes to the COLR will be conducted per the requirements of 10CFR50.59.

The proposed changes to modify the Specification action requirements changing the structure of the specifications to be more consistent with NUREG 1431, Westinghouse Improved Standard Technical Specifications have no technical impact. The changes clarify time requirements and remove details that remain consistent with the UFSAR safety analysis. The changes have no effect on the reactivity control systems to perform their design functions and involve no change to the accident analyses.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2)

Will the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No The proposed changes have no influence or impact on, nor do they contribute in any way to the probability or consequences of an accident. No safety-related equipment or safety function will be altered as a result of these proposed changes.

NOC-AE-02001246 Page 11 of 13 The SDM will continue to be calculated using the NRC-approved methods that will be submitted to the NRC. The Technical Specifications will continue to require operation within these reactivity limits.

The proposed change modifies the Specification action requirements but does not change the way the system is operated. When the limiting condition for operation is exceeded, the boration control system will continue to be operated in a manner consistent with the safety analyses. The details concerning boron flow rate and concentration that are removed from the Specifications will be added to the TS Bases for the purposes of providing an example.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3)

Will the change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No The relocation of the Shutdown Margin limits to the COLR will not change any requirements. The values for SDM will remain consistent with the UFSAR and will continue to provide their safety function through the Shutdown Margin Specification. Actions required to be taken to restore SDM will remain in the TS.

Therefore, the proposed change will not affect the limits on reactivity control, and will not permit operations that could result in exceeding these limits.

The proposed change modifies action requirements for restoring shutdown margin or refueling boron concentration. The combination of parameters currently in the Specification that are being removed discuss one means, where as several system lineups and boration sources have been evaluated in the safety analysis as acceptable to restore Shutdown Margin. Also, the time requirements for the action were modified to be consistent with the safety analysis assumptions. No actual accident analyses will be affected by these proposed changes. The proposed change will not affect reactivity control limits and will not permit operations that could result in exceeding these limits.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Conclusion Based upon the analysis provided herein, the proposed amendments present no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10CFR50.92(c) and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

NOC-AE-02001246 Page 12 of 13 5.2 Applicable Resiulatory Requirements/Criteria 10CFR50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 26 requires that the reactivity control systems must be redundant and capable of maintaining the reactor core subcritical when shut down under cold conditions. Maintenance of the SDM ensures that postulated reactivity events will not damage the fuel. This has been analyzed in UFSAR Chapter 15.

The reactivity control systems are designed to meet the requirements of GDC 26 where no changes to these systems are proposed therefore, these systems will continue to meet the existing regulatory requirements.

SDM satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii), an initial condition process variable periodically monitored to ensure that the unit is operating within the bounds of accident analysis assumptions. The revised Specification will continue to ensure that the SDM is maintained within acceptable limits that are bounded by the accident analyses, thus assuring conformance to 10CFR50.36. The COLR will contain the specific SDM limits resulting from NRC-approved methods. Therefore, the proposed change is in conformance with the requirements of 10CFR50.36.

In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

Pursuant to 10CFR51.22, an evaluation of this request has been performed to determine whether or not it meets the criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10CFR51.22(c)(9) and (c)(10) of the regulations.

This request will have no adverse radiation impact upon the environment. It has been determined that the proposed changes involve:

1.

No significant hazards consideration,

2.

No significant change in the types, or significant increase in the amounts, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and

3.

No significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposures.

Therefore, this request for revision of the Technical Specifications meets the criteria of 10CFR51.22 for categorical exclusion from the requirement for an environmental assessment.

NOC-AE-02001246 Attachment I Page 13 of 13

7.0 REFERENCES

1.

WCAP 9272-P-A, Westinghouse Reload Safety Evaluation Methodology, July, 1985

2.

NOC-AE-0100 1146, Proposed Amendment to South Texas Project Technical Specifications to Revise Administrative Control Requirements, dated November 5, 2001.

3.

NOC-AE-0100 1142, Proposed Amendment to South Texas Project Technical Specifications to Relocate Various Specifications to the Technical Requirements Manual, dated October 24, 2001.

8.0 PRECEDENTS As noted above, these changes are consistent with NRC-approved Industry/Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) changes and/or are consistent with NUREG 1431 which have been implemented by a number of Westinghouse Plants.

NOC-AE-02001246 Page 1 of 12 ATTACHMENT 2 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHANGES (MARK-UP)

Note to Reviewer: Pages iv, xi, and 6-21 included in the marked-up pages for this proposed amendment request, are also being proposed to be revised in accordance with separate amendment requests (See Attachment 1, References, Section 7.0).

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY 3/4 0-1 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL Shutdown Margin T--T-, Grcater Than 200-F 3/4 1-1 FIGURE 3.1 1 REQUIRED SHUTDOWN MARGIN VERSUS RCS CRITIC-AL BRONR CONCENTRATION (MAODES 1, 2, 3, AND 4) 3/41--3 Shutdown Margin T-a,, Less Than or Equal to 2000F 3/4 14 FIGURE 3.1 2 REQURE SHUTDOWNUr MARGIN VERSUS RCS CRITICAL BORON CONCENTRATION (MAODE 5)

3/4-4-5 Moderator Temperature Coefficient 3/4 1-6 FIGURE 3.1-2a BOL MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT VERSUS POWER 3/4 1-7a Minimum Temperature for Criticality 3/4 1-8 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS Flow Paths - Shutdown 3/4 1-9 Flow Paths - Operating 3/4 1-10 Charging Pumps - Shutdown 3/4 1-11 Charging Pumps - Operating 3/4 1-12 Borated Water Sources - Shutdown 3/4 1-13 Borated Water Sources - Operating 3/4 1-14 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES Group Height 3/4 1-16 TABLE 3.1-1 ACCIDENT ANALYSES REQUIRING REEVALUATION IN THE EVENT OF AN INOPERABLE FULL-LENGTH ROD 3/4 1-18 Position Indication Systems - Operating 3/4 1-19 Position Indication Systems - Shutdown 3/4 1-20 Rod Drop Time 3/4 1-21 Shutdown Rod Insertion Limit 3/4 1-22 Control Rod Insertion Limits 3/4 1-23 FIGURE 3.1-3 (Deleted)

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 iv Unit 1 - Amendment No. 9, 2-7 Unit 2 - Amendment No., 17

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL - STORAGE POOLS S pent Fuel Pool 3/4 9-12 In-Containm ent Storage Pool.........................................................................

3/4 9-13 3/4.9.12 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING EXHAUST AIR SYSTEM.................................

3/4 9-14 3/4.9.13 SPENT FUEL POOL MINIMUM BORON CONCENTRATION....................... 3/4 9-17 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 SHUTDOW N MARG IN...................................................................................

3/4 10-1 3/4.10.2 GROUP HEIGHT, INSERTION, AND POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS........ 3/4 10-2 3/4.10.3 PHYSICS TESTS...........................................................................................

3/4 10-3 3/4.10.4 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS......................................................................

3/4 10-4 3/4 10.5 POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM - SHUTDOWN................................................

3/4 10-5 3/4-10.6 CET AN-D RCS RT. CPO EX TIQNS FO 0 R 2R E 0 3 (This specification not used).....................................

34

4. 6 3/4.10.7 DNB PARAMETERS SURVEILLANCE EXEMPTION FOR 2RE03 (This, specification not used).......................................................

/4-4 -7 3/4.11 RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS 3/4.11.1 LIQUID EFFLUENTS Concentration DELETED Dose DELETED Liquid Waste Processing System DELETED Liquid H oldup Tanks......................................................................................

3/4 11-1 3/4.11.2 GASEOUS EFFLUENTS Dose Rate DELETED Dose - Noble Gases DELETED Dose - Iodine-1 31, Iodine-1 33, Tritium, and Radioactive Material in Particulate Form DELETED Gaseous Waste Processing System DELETED Explosive G as M ixture....................................................................................

3/4 11-2 G as Storage Tanks........................................................................................

3/4 11-3 3/4.11.3 SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTES DELETED 3/4.11.4 TOTAL DOSE DELETED SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 xi Unit 1 - Amendment No. 43, 4:7 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 32, 36, 48,

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL SHUTDOWN MARGIN - F GREATER THAN 200 2F=

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater thaRn r equal to the limit as

• ehwn in Fig-uwe-3.1 within the limits provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR).

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1,2*, 3, a-Rd 4, and 5.

ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN not within the limit IeE; than the limit as sehwn in Figure 3.1 1, ;mmed'ately initiate boration within 15 minutes and continue boration a4greater th or equal to 30 gpm of a 6olution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppmA boFrono

-q-ixalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater thanor cqua, to the

,imi, a sh*own in Figure 3.1 1 within the limits specified in the COLR:

a.

Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after detection of an inoperable control rod(s) and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter while the rod(s) is inoperable. If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod(s);

b.

When in MODE 2 with Keff less than 1, within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> prior to achieving reactor criticality by verifying that the predicted critical control rod position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6;

c.

Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, by consideration of the factors of Specification 4.1.1.1.1 d below, with the control banks at the maximum insertion limit of Specification 3.1.3.6; and

• See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.1.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 1-1 Unit 1 - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

d.

When in MODE 3, ei 4, or 5, at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by consideration of the following factors:

1 )

Reactor Coolant System boron concentration,

2)

Control rod position,

3)

Reactor Coolant System average temperature,

4)

Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,

5)

Xenon concentration, and

6)

Samarium concentration.

4.1.1.1.2 The overall core reactivity balance shall be compared to predicted values to demonstrate agreement within +/- 1 % Ak/k at least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD). This comparison shall consider at least those factors stated in Specification 4.1.1.1.1d. above. The predicted reactivity values shall be adjusted (normalized) to correspond to the actual core conditions prior to exceeding a fuel burnup of 60 EFPD after each fuel loading. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 1-2 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 48 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 07-,

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• THAN OPR F21 1A!

TO "20101F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.2 (This specification not used) The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to the limit as Ghown in Figure 3.1 2.

APPLCABllITY:

MODE 5.

With the SHUT÷DOWN MARGIN loss thaR the limit as shoWn Rin Figure 3.1 2, imedately initiate and continue boratio at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution conaig MARGIN is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to the limit as shoWn in Figure 3.1 2:

a.

W~ithin 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after detection of an inoperable control rod(s) and at least onc~e per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter while the rod(s) is inoperable. if the inoperable conrolI red is immovable Or UnR~ippable, the SHUTDOW..N MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth ofth immovable or untrippable control rod(s); and At leastn once per 24! nours Dy consideraii9Ron Othe TolIOwiflq Tactors:.

1 )

Reactor Cooelant System bo~ro concentration,

2)

Conrol! rod position,

3)

Reactor Coolant Systemn average temperature,

4)

Fuel bUrnUP based on gross thermal energy generation,

5)

Xenon concentration, and

6)

Samarium concentration.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 1-4 Unit 1 - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No.

9.

o

REQUIRED SHUTDOWN MARGIN FOR MODE 6 (A

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N)

LJ U,

m 0

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4 800 1200 1600 2000 2400 0

RCS CRITICAL BORON CONCENTRATION (PPM)

FIGURE 3.1-2 EQUIRED SHUTDOWN MARGIN VERSUS RCS CRITICAL BORON CONCENTRATION

)o oa 8.0 7.0 6.0 6.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 ACCEPTABLE REGION]

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3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.1 The boron concentration of all filled portions of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be maintained uniform and sufficient to ensure that the more restrictive of the following reactivity conditions is met; either:

a.

A Ke, of 0.95 or less, or

b.

A boron concentration of greater than or equal to 2800 ppm.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 6.*

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a oltion contaiRi*g gFrea*

than or equal to 7000 ppn boron or its equivalont until Keff is reduced to less than or equal to 0.95 or the boron concentration is restored to greater than or equal to 2800 ppm, whichever is the more restrictive.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.1.1 The more restrictive of the above two reactivity conditions shall be determined prior to:

a.

Removing or unbolting the reactor vessel head, and

b.

Withdrawal of any full-length control rod in excess of 3 feet from its fully inserted position within the reactor vessel.

4.9.1.2 The boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be determined by chemical analysis at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

4.9.1.3 Valves FCV-1 10B, FCV-1 11 B, CV0201A, and CV0221 shall be verified closed and secured in position by mechanical stops or by removal of air or electrical power at least once per 31 days.

• The reactor shall be maintained in MODE 6 whenever fuel is in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 9-1 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 54, 54, Unit 2 - Amendment No. 40, 43,

3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 may be suspended for measurement of control rod worth and SHUTDOWN MARGIN provided reactivity equivalent to at least the highest estimated control rod worth is available for trip insertion from OPERABLE control rod(s).

APPLICABILITY: MODE 2.

ACTION:

a.

With any full-length control rod not fully inserted and with less than the above reactivity equivalent available for trip insertion, immediatel initiate boration within 15 minutes and continue boration at greater thaRn r equal to 30 gpm of a-16olu1-tion Gontaining greater than or equal to, 7,000 ppam boron or itS4 equ Iaen until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is restored.

b. With all full-length control rods fully inserted and the reactor subcritical by less than the above reactivity equivalent, immediatel initiate boration within 15 minutes and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a.olution containingg reaterthan or equal to 7000 ppm. boron or its equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.10.1.1 The position of each full-length control rod either partially or fully withdrawn shall be determined at least once per 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

4.10.1.2 Each full-length control rod not fully inserted shall be demonstrated capable of full insertion when tripped from at least the 50% withdrawn position within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to reducing the SHUTDOWN MARGIN to less than the limits of Specification 3.1.1.1.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 10-1 Unit 1 - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No.

3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.6 GET AND RCS RTID CALIBRATION EXEMPTIONS FOR 2RElr LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.6 (This specification not used) The limitations of Specifications 3.3 2 Table 3.3 3 items 54f and 9.b, 3.3.3.5 Table 3.3 9 InStruiment items 3a, 3b and 10, &.3.3.6 Table 3.3 -10 items 2, 3, 12 and 15, 3.4.9.3 and 3.0.3 as it may apply to any of these items may be su1SPended unti! completion of the calibration procedure for the Core Ei Thermocouples and the Reactor Coolant System Resistance Temperature Detectors provided the RaS boron concentration is maintained greater than the refueling Kj- 0.95 APPLICABIL ITY:

Th-i SpecifiGatin is effective ONLY for Unit 2 refueling outage 2RE03 while in MODES 3, 4, and 5.

AGT40N initiate and continue boration at a greater than or equal to 30 gpm, of a solution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boFro or equivalent until RC:S boron SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 1.10.6.1

a. Verify the Core Exit Thermocouples and the Reactor Coolant System Resistance Temperature Detectors calibration procedure ic completed and the minimum. required inStuments are declared OPERABLE prior to entering MODE 2.

b. The boron conc~entration Of t-he IROS shall be determined by Chemical anlssat least once per 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br />.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 10-6 Unit 1 - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 48,

3/4 10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.7 DNrl PARAMETERS SURVEILLANCE EXEMPTION FOR 2R-E03 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.7 (This specification not used) The Sur.eillance Req....R

" 4.2.5.3 to perform a prhcision heat balance to determine R/S flow at least once per 18 monthsis suspended for Unit 2 until the preciSion RGS heat balance flow measujrement can be completed after entering MODE 1 after 2RE03 provded Reactor Power is mnaintained less than or equal to 760% RT-P.

APPLI CýABILITY:-

This Specification i6 effective ONLY for Unit 2 cycle 4 while in MODE 1 until the reauiremnents of 4.2.5.3 are m~et.

AQTt4---

With Reactor Power greater than 75T% RTP, restore Reator Power to less than or equal SURVEILLANCE REQUI REMENTS 4.10.7.1 Verify Reactor Power is lees than or equal to 75%,, RTP every' 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> URNti the pr;eiin heat balance RCS flow verification is complete.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 10-7 Unit 1 - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 48

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS MONTHLY OPERATING REPORTS 6.9.1.5 Routine reports of operating statistics and shutdown experience, including documentation of all challenges to the PORVs or safety valves, shall be submitted on a monthly basis to the Director, Office of Resource Management, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator of the Regional Office of the NRC, no later than the 15th of each month following the calendar month covered by the report.

CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT 6.9.1.6.a Core operating limits shall be established and documented in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT before each reload cycle, or any part of a reload cycle for the following:

1. Safety limits for thermal power, pressurizer pressure, and the highest operating loop coolant temperature (Tavg) for Specification 2.1,

2.

Limiting Safety System Settings for Reactor Coolant Flow-Low Loop design flow, Overtemperature AT, and Overpower AT setpoint parameter values for Specification 2.2,

3. SHUTDOWN MARGIN limits for Specification 3/4.1.1.1, 3.4. Moderator Temperature Coefficient BOL and EOL limits, and 300 ppm surveillance limit for Specification 3/4.1.1.3, 4.5. Shutdown Bank Insertion Limit for Specification 3/4.1.3.5, 5.6. Control Bank Insertion Limits for Specification 3/4.1.3.6, 6.7. Axial Flux Difference limits and target band for Specification 3/4.2. 1, 7.8. Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor, K(Z), Power Factor Multiplier, and (Fxy aP) for Specification 3/4.2.2, 8.9. Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor, and Power Factor Multiplier for Specification 3/4.2.3, and 9.10.DNB related parameters for Reactor Coolant System Tavg Pressurizer Pressure, and the Minimum Measured Reactor Coolant System Flow for Specification 3/4.2.5.

The CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT shall be maintained available in the Control Room.

6.9.1.6.b The analytical methods used to determine the core operating limits shall be those previously reviewed and approved by the NRC in:

1. WCAP 9272-P-A, "WESTINGHOUSE RELOAD SAFETY EVALUATION METHODOLOGY," July, 1985 (W Proprietary).

(Methodology for Specification 3.1.1.1 - Shutdown Margin, Methodology for Specification 3.1.1.3 - Moderator Temperature Coefficient, 3.1.3.5 - Shutdown Rod Insertion Limit, 3.1.3.6 - Control Bank Insertion Limits, 3.2.1 - Axial Flux Difference, 3.2.2 - Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor, 3.2.3 - Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor, and 3.2.5 - DNB Parameters.)

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 6-21 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 9,27,35,4-7,1-6 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 1,17, 26,36 4-03

NOC-AE-02001246 Page 1 of 12 ATTACHMENT 3 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES (RE-TYPED)

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY PAGE 3/4 0-1 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL Shutdown Margin Moderator Temperature Coefficient FIGURE 3.1-2a BOL MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT VERSUS POWER Minimum Temperature for Criticality 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS Flow Paths - Shutdown Flow Paths - Operating Charging Pumps - Shutdown Charging Pumps - Operating Borated Water Sources - Shutdown Borated Water Sources - Operating 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES Group Height TABLE 3.1-1 ACCIDENT ANALYSES REQUIRING REEVALUATION IN THE EVENT OF AN INOPERABLE FULL-LENGTH ROD Position Indication Systems - Operating Position Indication Systems - Shutdown Rod Drop Time Shutdown Rod Insertion Limit Control Rod Insertion Limits FIGURE 3.1-3 (Deleted)

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 iv Unit 1 - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No.

3/4 1-1 3/4 1-6 3/4 1-7a 3/4 1-8 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 1-9 1-10 1-11 1-12 1-13 1-14 3/4 1-16 3/4 1-18 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 1-19 1-20 1-21 1-22 1-23

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL - STORAGE POOLS S pent Fuel Pool 3/4 9-12 In-Containm ent Storage Pool.........................................................................

3/4 9-13 3/4.9.12 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING EXHAUST AIR SYSTEM.................................

3/4 9-14 3/4.9.13 SPENT FUEL POOL MINIMUM BORON CONCENTRATION....................... 3/4 9-17 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 SHUTDOW N MARG IN..................................................................................

3/4 10-1 3/4.10.2 GROUP HEIGHT, INSERTION, AND POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS........ 3/4 10-2 3/4.10.3 PHYSICS TESTS...........................................................................................

3/4 10-3 3/4.10.4 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS......................................................................

3/4 10-4 3/4 10.5 POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM - SHUTDOWN.........................................

3/4 10-5 3/4-10.6 (This specification not used)...........................................................................

3/4 10-6 3/4.10.7 (This specification not used)...........................................................................

3/4 10-7 3/4.11 RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS 3/4.11.1 LIQUID EFFLUENTS Concentration DELETED Dose DELETED Liquid Waste Processing System DELETED Liquid Holdup Tanks......................................................................................

3/4 11-1 3/4.11.2 GASEOUS EFFLUENTS Dose Rate DELETED Dose - Noble Gases DELETED Dose - Iodine-1 31, Iodine-1 33, Tritium, and Radioactive Material in Particulate Form DELETED Gaseous Waste Processing System DELETED Explosive G as M ixture....................................................................................

3/4 11-2 G as Storage Tanks........................................................................................

3/4 11-3 3/4.11.3 SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTES DELETED 3/4.11.4 TOTAL DOSE DELETED SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 xi Unit 1 - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No.

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL SHUTDOWN MARGIN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be within the limits provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR).

APPLICABILITY:

ACTION:

MODES 1, 2*, 3, 4, and 5.

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN not within the limit initiate boration within 15 minutes and continue boration until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be within the limits specified in the COLR:

a.

Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after detection of an inoperable control rod(s) and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter while the rod(s) is inoperable. If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod(s);

b.

When in MODE 2 with Kff less than 1, within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> prior to achieving reactor criticality by verifying that the predicted critical control rod position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6;

c.

Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, by consideration of the factors of Specification 4.1.1 1.1 d below, with the control banks at the maximum insertion limit of Specification 3.1.3.6; and

• See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.1.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 1-1 Unit 1 - Ammendment No.

Unit 2 - Ammendment No.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

d.

When in MODE 3, 4, or 5, at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by consideration of the following factors:

1 )

Reactor Coolant System boron concentration,

2)

Control rod position,

3)

Reactor Coolant System average temperature,

4)

Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,

5)

Xenon concentration, and

6)

Samarium concentration.

4.1.1.1.2 The overall core reactivity balance shall be compared to predicted values to demonstrate agreement within +/- 1 % Ak/k at least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD). This comparison shall consider at least those factors stated in Specification 4.1.1.1.1d. above. The predicted reactivity values shall be adjusted (normalized) to correspond to the actual core conditions prior to exceeding a fuel burnup of 60 EFPD after each fuel loading. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 1-2 Unit 1 - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No.

I

(This page not used)

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 1-3 Unit 1 - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3.1.1.2 (This specification not used)

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 1-4 Unit 1 - Ammendment No.

Unit 2 - Ammendment No.

(This page not used)

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 1-5 Unit 1 - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No.

3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.1 The boron concentration of all filled portions of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be maintained uniform and sufficient to ensure that the more restrictive of the following reactivity conditions is met; either:

a.

A Ke, of 0.95 or less, or

b.

A boron concentration of greater than or equal to 2800 ppm.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 6.*

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and initiate and continue boration until Ke, is reduced to less than or equal to 0.95 or the boron concentration is restored to greater than or equal to 2800 ppm, whichever is the more restrictive.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.1.1 prior to:

The more restrictive of the above two reactivity conditions shall be determined

a.

Removing or unbolting the reactor vessel head, and

b.

Withdrawal of any full-length control rod in excess of 3 feet from its fully inserted position within the reactor vessel.

4.9.1.2 The boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be determined by chemical analysis at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

4.9.1.3 Valves FCV-1 1 OB, FCV-1 11 B, CV0201A, and CV0221 shall be verified closed and secured in position by mechanical stops or by removal of air or electrical power at least once per 31 days.

• The reactor shall be maintained in MODE 6 whenever fuel is in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 9-1 Unit 1 - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No.

3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 may be suspended for measurement of control rod worth and SHUTDOWN MARGIN provided reactivity equivalent to at least the highest estimated control rod worth is available for trip insertion from OPERABLE control rod(s).

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 2.

ACTION:

a.

With any full-length control rod not fully inserted and with less than the above reactivity equivalent available for trip insertion, initiate boration within 15 minutes and continue boration until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is restored.

b. With all full-length control rods fully inserted and the reactor subcritical by less than the above reactivity equivalent, initiate boration within 15 minutes and continue boration until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.10.1.1 The position of each full-length control rod either partially or fully withdrawn shall be determined at least once per 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

4.10.1.2 Each full-length control rod not fully inserted shall be demonstrated capable of full insertion when tripped from at least the 50% withdrawn position within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to reducing the SHUTDOWN MARGIN to less than the limits of Specification 3.1.1.1.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 10-1 Unit 1 - Ammendment No.

Unit 2 - Ammendment No.

3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3.10.6 (This specification not used)

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 10-6 Unit 1 - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No.

3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3.10.7 (This specification not used)

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 10-7 Unit 1 - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS MONTHLY OPERATING REPORTS 6.9.1.5 Routine reports of operating statistics and shutdown experience, including documentation of all challenges to the PORVs or safety valves, shall be submitted on a monthly basis to the Director, Office of Resource Management, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator of the Regional Office of the NRC, no later than the 15th of each month following the calendar month covered by the report.

CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT 6.9.1.6.a Core operating limits shall be established and documented in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT before each reload cycle, or any part of a reload cycle for the following:

1. Safety limits for thermal power, pressurizer pressure, and the highest operating loop coolant temperature (Tavg) for Specification 2.1,

2.

Limiting Safety System Settings for Reactor Coolant Flow-Low Loop design flow, Overtemperature AT, and Overpower AT setpoint parameter values for Specification 2.2,

3.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN limits for Specification 3/4.1.1.1,

4.

Moderator Temperature Coefficient BOL and EOL limits, and 300 ppm surveillance limit for Specification 3/4.1.1.3,

5. Shutdown Bank Insertion Limit for Specification 3/4.1.3.5,

6.

Control Bank Insertion Limits for Specification 3/4.1.3.6,

7.

Axial Flux Difference limits and target band for Specification 3/4.2. 1,

8. Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor, K(Z), Power Factor Multiplier, and (Fy RTP) for Specification 3/4.2.2,

9.

Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor, and Power Factor Multiplier for Specification 3/4.2.3, and

10. DNB related parameters for Reactor Coolant System Tavg Pressurizer Pressure, and the Minimum Measured Reactor Coolant System Flow for Specification 3/4.2.5.

The CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT shall be maintained available in the Control Room.

6.9.1.6.b The analytical methods used to determine the core operating limits shall be those previously reviewed and approved by the NRC in:

1. WCAP 9272-P-A, "WESTINGHOUSE RELOAD SAFETY EVALUATION METHODOLOGY," July, 1985 (W Proprietary).

(Methodology for Specification 3.1.1.1 - Shutdown Margin, Methodology for Specification 3.1.1.3 - Moderator Temperature Coefficient, 3.1.3.5 - Shutdown Rod Insertion Limit, 3.1.3.6 - Control Bank Insertion Limits, 3.2.1 - Axial Flux Difference, 3.2.2 - Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor, 3.2.3 - Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor, and 3.2.5 - DNB Parameters.)

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 6-21 Unit 1 - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No.

NOC-AE-02001246 Page 1 of 2 ATTACHMENT 4 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES (For Information only)

Note to Reviewer: STPNOC will submit actual pages to the NRC under a separate submittal when the changes described in the enclosed License Amendment Request are approved by the NRC.

Proposed TS Bases 3/4.1.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that: (1) the reactor can be made subcritical from all operating conditions, (2) the reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and (3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently subcritical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout core life as a function of fuel depletion, RCS boron concentration, and RCS Tavg. In MODES 1 and 2, the most restrictive condition occurs at EOL, with Tavg at no load operating temperature, and is associated with a postulated steam line break accident and resulting uncontrolled RCS cooldown. In the analysis of this accident, a minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN OF 1.3%, Ak/k is required to control the reactivity transient. The 1.3% Ak/k SHUTDOWN MARGIN is the design basis minimum for the 14-foot fuel using silver-indium-cadmium and/or Hafnium control rods (Ref. FSAR Table 4.3-3).

Accordingly, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement for MODES 1 and 2 is based upon this limiting condition and is consistent with FSAR safety analysis assumptions. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, the most restrictive condition occurs at BOL, when the boron concentration is the greatest. In these modes, the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is composed of a constant requirement and a variable requirement, which is a function of the RCS boron concentration.

The constant SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of 1.3% Ak/k is based on an uncontrolled RCS cooldown from a steamline break accident. The variable SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement is based on the results of a boron dilution accident analysis, where the SHUTDOWN MARGIN is varied as a function of ARI N-1 Critical Boron Concentration, to guarantee a minimum of 15 minutes for operator action after a boron dilution alarm, prior to a loss of all SHUTDOWN MARGIN.

When SHUTDOWN MARGIN limits are not met the ACTION requires operators to initiate boration. In the determination of the required combination of boration flow rate and boron concentration, there is no unique requirement that must be satisfied. The boron concentration source shall be greater than the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN boron concentration. Higher source boron concentration and higher flow rates will restore SHUTDOWN MARGIN quicker.

The boration parameters of 30 gpm and 7000 ppm represent typical values when the borated water source is the boric acid tanks.

NOC-AE-02001246 Page 1 of 16 ATTACHMENT 5 PROPOSED EXAMPLE OF CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (MARK-UP)

(For Information only)

I315+~

C-6q0 Nuclear Operating Company 4

N AVAV SOUTH TEXAS UNIT 1 CYCLE 11 CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT October 2001 Edited by C. A. Olson J. E. Skutch APPROVED:

ED*

4 J.J.Akers, AG'ager Core Analysis B O Westinghouse Electric Company LLC Nuclear Fuel P.O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 Attachment to CAB-01-289, Rev. 1

South Texas Unit 1 Cycle 11 October 2001 1.0 CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT Revision 1 changes to this report are shown in bold and italic font.

This Core Operating Limits Report for STPEGS Unit I Cycle 11 has been prepared in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.1.6. The core operating limits have been developed using the NRC-approved methodologies specified in Technical Specification 6.9.1.6.

The Technical Specifications affected by this report are:

1) 2.1 SAFETY LIMITS

2) 2.2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS 4

3/4.1.1.3 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT LIMITS

(,)S' 3/4.1.3.5 SHUTDOWN ROD INSERTION LIMITS

,9)(p 3/4.1.3.6 CONTROL ROD INSERTION LIMITS

,9)-7 3/4.2.1 AFD LIMITS e) g 3/4.2.2 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR K)9I 3/4.2.3 NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR

0) [o 3/4.2.5 DNB PARAMETERS

.0 P RTING LIMITS The cycle-specific parameter limits for the specifications listed in Section 1.0 are presented below.

2.1 SAFETY LIMITS (Specification 2.1):

2.1.1 The combination of THERMAL POWER, pressurizer pressure, and the highest operating loop coolant temperature (T.,,) shall not exceed the limits shown in Figure 1.

2.2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS (Specification 2.2):

2.2.1 The Loop design flow for Reactor Coolant Flow-Low is 98,000 gpm.

2.2.2 The Over-temperature AT and Over-power AT setpoint parameter values are listed below:

1

South Texas Unit 1 Cycle 11, Over-temperature AT Setpoint Parameter Values T1 measured reactor vessel AT lead/lag time constant, -r = 8 sec

".2 measured reactor vessel AT lead/lag time constant, -c = 3 sec T

• measured reactor vessel AT lag time constant, T, = 0 sec T4 measured reactor vessel average temperature lead/lag time constant, r4 = 2 8 sec TS measured reactor vessel average temperature lead/lag time constant, r, = 4 sec T6 measured reactor vessel average temperature lag time constant, T, = 0 sec K,

Overtemperature AT reactor trip setpoint, KI = 1.14 K2 Overtemperature AT reactor trip setpoint T. coefficient, K2 = 0.028/OF 1ý.

Overtemperature AT reactor trip setpoint pressure coefficient, K. = 0.0014 3/psig Tf Nominal full power Tavg, T' < 592.0 OF P'

Nominal RCS pressure, P' = 2235 psig f,(AI) is a function of the indicated difference between top and bottom detectors of the power range neutron ion chambers; with gains to be selected based on measured instrument response during plant startup tests such that; (1) For q, - q, between -70% and +8%, f1(AI) = 0, where q, and q% are percent RATED THERMAL POWER in the top and bottom halves of the core respectively, and q, +

qb is total THERMAL POWER in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER; (2) For each percent that the magnitude of q, - q, exceeds -70%, the AT Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by 0.0% of its value at RATED THERMAL POWER.

(3) For each percent that the magnitude of q, - q, exceeds +8%, the AT Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by 2.65% of its value at RATED THERMAL POWER.

Over-power AT Setpoint Parameter Values T

• measured reactor vessel AT lead/lag time constant, -r, = 8 sec T2 measured reactor vessel AT lead/lag time constant, '

= 3 sec T3 measured reactor vessel AT lag time constant, T. = 0 sec T6

• measured reactor vessel average temperature lag time constant, ;6 = 0 sec T

Time constant utilized in the rate-lag compensator for Tag,,

T7 = 10 sec K,

Overpower AT reactor trip setpoint, K4 = 1.08 K,

Overpower AT reactor trip setpoint Tag rate/lag coefficient, K, = 0.02/°F for increasing average temperature, and K, = 0 for decreasing average temperature K6 Overpower AT reactor trip setpoint Tavg heatup coefficient K6 = 0.002/OF for T > T" and, KI = 0 for T < T" T"

Indicated full power Tv,,g T" < 592.0 OF f2(AI)

= 0 for all (AI)

October 2001

CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT INSERT "&A" 2.3 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (Specification 3.1.1.1):

The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be:

2.3.1 Greater than 1.3% Ap for MODES 1 and 2*

• See Special Test Exception 3.10.1 2.3.2 Greater than the limits in Figure 2 for MODES 3 and 4 2.3.3 Greater than the limits in Figure 3 for MODE 5.

5 i1rh Ir.'

TT,;+ -1 1

1 1 October 2001

(:

qO DERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (Specification 3.1.1.3):

2.9.1 e BOL, ARO, MTC shall be less positive than the limits shown in Figure 3

.2 bhe EOL, ARO, HFP, MTC shall be less negative than -6.12 x 10' Ak/k/°F.

P2.3.3 The 300 ppm, ARO, HFP, MTC shall be less negative than -5.36 x 10* Ak/MkoF T(300 ppm Surveillance Limit).

where:

BOL stands for Beginning-of-Cycle Life, EOL stands for End-of-Cycle Life, ARO stands for All Rods Out, HFP stands for Hot Full Power (100% RATED THERMAL POWER)

HFP vessel average temperature is 592 'F.

C§3X45ROD INSERTION LIMITS (Specification 3.1.3.5 and 3.1.3.6):

X1 All banks shall have the same Full Out Position (FOP) of at least 250 steps withdrawn but not exceeding 259 steps withdrawn.

02..2 The Control Banks shall be limited in physical insertion as specified in Figured.*

2 4A3 Individual Shutdown bank rods are fully withdrawn when the Bank Demanjd Indication is at the FOP and the Rod Group Height Limiting Condition for Operation is satisfied (T.S. 3.1.3.1).

Ci

-2I' AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (Specification 3.2.1):

201 AFD limits as required by Technical Specification 3.2.1 are determined by CAOC Operations with an AFD target band of +5, -10%.

2..2 The AFD shall be maintained within the ACCEPTABLE OPERATION portion of Figur /,

s required by Technical Specifications.

(§E AT FLUX T CHANNEL FACTOR (Specification 3.2.2):

2 2.

IK(Z) is provided in Figure.*v 2,0.3 The F limits for RATED THERMAL POWER within specific core planes shall be:,

,,*npccoepae,

.3.1 Less than or equal to 2.102 for all core planes containing Bank "D" control rods, and 2.9.j3.2 Less than or equal to the appropriate core height-dependent value from Table 1 for all unrodded core planes.

2.g.3.3 PF~y = 0.2.

These F limits were used to confirm that the heat flux hot channel factor FQ(Z) will be limited by Technical Specification 3.2.2 assuming the most-limiting axial power distributions expected to result for the insertion and removal of Control Banks C and D during operation, including the accompanying variations in the axial xenon and power distributions, as described in WCAP-8385. Therefore, these F limits provide assurance that the initial conditions assumed in the LOCA analysis are met, along with the ECCS acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50.46.

3

South Texas Unit 1 Cycle 11 For Unit 1 Cycle 11, the L(Z) penalty is not applied (i.e., L(Z) = 1.0 for all core elevations).

({2% ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR (Specification 3.2.3):

1 THOUT RCS Loop-specific Temperature Calibrations:

tandard Fuel' F4 11 RTI 1.46 VANTAGE 5H / RFA Fuel2 FAHTP = 1.53 WITH RCS Loop-specific Temperature Calibrations:

Standard Fuel FAAR TP = 1.49 VANTAGE 5H / RFA Fuel FlrTp = 1.557 P2 Standard Fuel / VANTAGE 5H / RFA Fuel PFAH = 0.3 2.$

DNB PARAMETERS (Specification 3.2.5):

2..1 The following DNB-related parameters shall be maintained within the following limits:3

a.

Reactor Coolant System T g, < 595 4V,

b.

Pressurizer Pressure, > 2200 psig5,

c.

Minimum Measured Reactor Coolant System Flow > 403,000 gpm6.

3.0 REFERENCES

3.1 Letter from R. A. Wiley (Westinghouse) to Dave Hoppes (STPNOC), "Unit 1 Cycle 11 Core Operating Limits Report," O1TG-G-085, Rev. 1 (ST-UB-NOC-01002182, Rev. 1),

October 2001.

3.2 NUREG-1346, Technical Specifications, South Texas Project Unit Nos. 1 and 2.

3.3 STPNOC Calculation ZC-7035, Rev. 1, "Loop Uncertainty Calculation for RCS Tav Instrumentation," October 19, 1998.

3.4 STPNOC Calculation ZC-7032, Rev. 3, "Loop Uncertainty Calculation for Narrow Range Pressurizer Pressure Monitoring Instrumentation," June 27, 2001.

Applies to Region 5.

SApplies to Regions 10A, 114, 11B, 124, 13A and 13B.

SA discussion of the processes to be used to take these readings is provided in the basis for Technical Specification 3.2.5.

4 Includes a 1.9 OF measurement uncertainty.

5 Limit not applicable during either a Thermal Power ramp in excess of 5% of RTP per minute or a Thermal Power step in excess of 10% RTP. Includes a 10.7 psi measurement uncertainty as read on the QDPS display per Reference 3.4.

6Includes a 2.8% flow measurement uncertainty.

4 October 2001

South Texas Unit 1 Cycle 11 October 2001 Figure 1 Reactor Core Safety Limits - Four Loops in Operation 680 660 640 0

LI o,

C) 620 600 580 560 540 0 Fraction of Rated Thermal Power 5

--Ri!QUR KE D SHTDW 1AGI FI'f IOE

'1 AN 2A REQUIRED SHUTDOWN MARGIN FOR MODES 3 AND 4 Q

C C0 C

0 z

z m

I-71 C

2,400 for ARI Minus Most Reactive Stuck Rod REQUIRED SHUTDOWN MARGIN VERSUS RCS CRITICAL BORON CONCENTRATION

0.

o 0...I........

l.

.......l

....... I i

......l i

.0.

0 0

0 0,

h.. 0.0.*........

[ACCEPTABLE REGION 1]2400 6.15)

(

O, 1.1 031 I-

.............---------------------........1.................................................................

400 800 1,200 1,600 2,000 RCS CRITICAL BORON CONCENTRATION (PPM) 8.0 7.0 8.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0

(

4

,w Co 0

REQUIRED SHUTDOWN MARGIN FOR MODE 6

': m m

Cn a 0)

V m

0 400 800 1200 1600 2000 2400 RCS CRITICAL BORON CONCENTRATION (PPM)

,EURDSUD

. MCIT-C REQUIRED SHUTDOWN MARGIN VERSUS RCS CRITICAL BORON CONCENTRATION 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0

I i i

[ACCEPTABLE REGO CJ4oC4.8o)

(01.30 )

60 30 oW m

Io) t 1!

r C

C (34

South Texas Unit 1 Cycle 11.

October 2001 Figuree MTC versus Power Level 7.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0

-1.0

-2.0

-3.0 0

20 40 60 80 100 6

I UNACCEPTABLE OPERATION T -

I -'



q -

1 I

4

4.

i i

i i

i 1-I I

4

___________ I __________ I L __________ I ________

ACCEPTABLE OPERATION 1

-t 4-1 4

4-1 1

T 1

1

4.

-1

+

4 4

1 I

I 1-4 1

I I

I I -

J. 

I -

I -

I -

South Texas Unit 1 Cycle 11 Figur4 Control Rod Insertion Limits versus Power Level

0.

0 C,,

CL M

0 a "0

0t 260 240 220 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

0 (79,259):122 Step Overlap (79,258):121 Step Overlap (78,256):119 Step Overlap (77,254):117 Step Overlap (76,252):115 Step Overlap (75,260):113 Step Overlap Relative Power (%)

7 October 2001

South Texas Unit 1 Cycle 11 Figure (o

AFD Limits versus Rated Thermal Power 120 100 o,

80

0) 60 E

I.

40 20 0

-40

-30

-20 Flux Difference (Al) 8 October 2001

South Texas Unit 1 Cycle 11 Figure Dj K(Z) - Normalized FQ(Z) versus Core Height 1.2 1.0 Core Elevation (ft) 0.0 7.0 14.0 0.0 F0 K(Z) 2.55 1.0 2.55 1.0 2.359 0.925 7.0 14.0 Core Height (ft) 9

.8

.6

.4 N

L.I 0

IL

0) a Z.N ca

-o E

L_

0 Z

.2 0

October 2001 7.0 14.0

South Texas Unit 1 Cycle 11 October 2001 Table 1 Unrodded F, for Each Core Height*

For Cycle Burnups Less Than 9000 MWD/MTU Core Height (Ft.)

14.00 13.80 13.60 13.40 13.20 13.00 12.80 12.60 12.40 12.20 12.00 11.80 11.60 11.40 11.20 11.00 10.80 10.60 10.40 10.20 10.00 9.80 9.60 9.40 9.20 9.00 8.80 8.60 8.40 8.20 8.00 7.80 7.60 7.40 7.20 7.0 Unrodded Core Height Fý,

(Ft.)

5.123 4.303 3.482 2.661 2.291 2.061 2.096 2.092 2.082 2.057 2.027 2.007 2.002 2.002 2.001 1.999 1.994 1.990 1.986 1.985 1.985 1.986 1.988 1.989 1.990 1.991 1.994 1.999 2.007 2.016 2.024 2.032 2.030 2.006 1.980 1.962 6.80 6.60 6.40 6.20 6.00 5.80 5.60 5.40 5.20 5.00 4.80 4.60 4.40 4.20 4.00 3.80 3.60 3.40 3.20 3.00 2.80 2.60 2.40 2.20 2.00 1.80 1.60 1.40 1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 0.00 For Unit 1 Cycle 11, the L(Z) penalty is not applied (i.e., L(Z) = 1.0 for all core elevations).

10 Unrodded F,,

1.948 1.932 1.920 1.909 1.898 1.894 1.895 1.894 1.896 1.900 1.907 1.916 1.924 1.929 1.933 1.933 1.926 1.922 1.915 1.901 1.886 1.854 1.816 1.774 1.755 1.744 1.740 1.735 1.744 1.780 1.933 2.351 2.901 3.451 4.001 South Texas Unit 1 Cycle 11 October 2001

South Texas Unit 1 Cycle 11.

October 2001 Table 2 Unrodded F, for Each Core Height*

For Cycle Burnups Greater Than or Equal to 9000 MWD/MTU Core Height (Ft.)

14.00 13.80 13.60 13.40 13.20 13.00 12.80 12.60 12.40 12.20 12.00 11.80 11.60 11.40 11.20 11.00 10.80 10.60 10.40 10.20 10.00 9.80 9.60 9.40 9.20 9.00 8.80 8.60 8.40 8.20 8.00 7.80 7.60 7.40 7.20 7.00 Unrodded F

5.186 4.443 3.665 2.858 2.456 2.180 2.153 2.109 2.082 2.072 2.053 2.035 2.031 2.034 2.036 2.038 2.039 2.040 2.040 2.038 2.037 2.036 2.039 2.045 2.053 2.057 2.059 2.060 2.065 2.074 2.085 2.096 2.105 2.114 2.121 2.125 Core Height (Ft.)

6.80 6.60 6.40 6.20 6.00 5.80 5.60 5.40 5.20 5.00 4.80 4.60 4.40 4.20 4.00 3.80 3.60 3.40 3.20 3.00 2.80 2.60 2.40 2.20 2.00 1.80 1.60 1.40 1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 0.00 For Unit 1 Cycle 11, the L(Z) penalty is not applied (i.e., L(Z) = 1.0 for all core elevations).

11 Unrodded F

2.125 2.122 2.112 2.101 2.088 2.075 2.063 2.051 2.041 2.031 2.023 2.016 2.006 1.995 1.982 1.970 1.958 1.947 1.936 1.924 1.911 1.879 1.852 1.841 1.831 1.820 1.813 1.827 1.815 1.822 2.066 2.542 3.117 3.656 4.121 October 2001