ML020860174
| ML020860174 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 03/26/2002 |
| From: | Merschoff E NRC Region 4 |
| To: | Denise Wilson Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) |
| References | |
| EA-01-298 IR-01-012 | |
| Download: ML020860174 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000298/2001012
Text
March 26, 2002
David L. Wilson, Vice President of
Nuclear Energy
Nebraska Public Power District
P.O. Box 98
Brownville, Nebraska 68321
SUBJECT:
COOPER NUCLEAR STATION - FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION
FOR A WHITE FINDING AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION
(NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-298/01-12)
Dear Mr. Wilson:
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the final results of our significance
determination for the preliminary white finding identified in the subject inspection report. The
inspection revealed that you had implemented an improper validation process for your biennial
written requalification examinations conducted between June 20 and July 27, 2000, for which
you had not implemented prompt and appropriate corrective actions. The inspection report
discussed that the validation process, given the similarity of examination questions from
examination to examination, resulted in a compromise of the integrity of the written
examinations administered by your staff. This inspection finding was assessed using the
operator requalification human performance significance determination process (SDP) and was
preliminarily characterized as white, an issue with low to moderate importance to safety, which
may require additional NRC inspection.
At your request, a regulatory conference was held on February 1, 2002, to discuss your views
on this issue. During the conference, the Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) described its
assessment of the significance of the findings and corrective actions.
During the conference, NPPD did not agree with the preliminary risk significance, which was
characterized in our inspection report. Specifically, NPPD indicated that if the compromise
issue was a quality of exam issue, then the issue would not be considered a finding in
accordance with the operator requalification human performance SDP. This would be the case,
in NPPDs view, because less than 20 percent of the examination questions were unacceptable.
Additionally, your staff indicated that there was no loss of control of examination material, no
unintended exposure of examination material to students, and that examination validity was not
affected. Therefore, NPPD's position was that since less than 20 percent of the operators
failed the examination, the issue should not be considered a finding in accordance with the
operator requalification human performance SDP. Your basis for this position was that the
examination was both valid and reliable relative to the guidance in NUREG 1021, Operator
Nebraska Public Power District
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Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, Revision 8, Supplement 1. Your staff
indicated that the examinations were valid and reliable because: (1) the examinations contained
the appropriate sampling of knowledge, (2) the examinations reflected actual operational
conditions and decisions, (3) the operators were allowed exposure to examination banks,
(4) there was a high degree of confidence in the operators testing knowledge, and (5) the
examinations were consistent and repeatable.
Also, NPPD indicated that even if the examinations were compromised such that the validity
was affected, then the significance of the issue would only be green in accordance with the
operator requalification human performance SDP. Your staff argued this because it was
NPPDs position that the appropriate actions were taken immediately following the identification
of the issue and no compensatory measures were necessary.
The assessment that no compensatory measures were necessary was based on the
conclusions of your 2000 and 2001 reviews. Your initial review of the potential compromise in
August 2000, concluded that the examination was valid. The review found that no questions
were duplicated from examination to examination and that each examination question was
either new or significantly modified. The subsequent review of the potential compromise in
2001 confirmed your staff's previous conclusions and identified some additional issues, which
did not affect the overall conclusion that the biennial written requalification examinations
conducted in 2000 were valid.
Some of the additional issues identified by your staff during the review conducted in 2001
included a conclusion that the administration of the examination constituted a violation of
10 CFR 55.49. At the conference, NPPD also acknowledged that certain examination
questions were similar, but concluded that the examination results were not affected by the
validation method or timing used by your staff. The basis for NPPDs conclusion was that
licensed operator performance was typical of previous examination performance and the
examination appropriately discriminated at the proper threshold for the minimum level of
competency for operators at your facility. Your staff indicated that the procedural guidance for
the examination administration was weak because it did not prohibit a crew validating an
examination, which was constructed with the same learning objectives, approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />
prior to taking their own examination. In addition, your staff stated that not all individuals were
exposed to the same questions during the validation and not all individuals conducted the
validation.
Finally, your staff concluded that the worst-case examination analysis conducted by your staff,
which concluded that three operators would have failed the examination, was not reasonable.
After conducting an additional regrade of the examination, removing all the potentially
compromised questions from those affected examinations regardless of whether an operator
answered the question correctly or incorrectly, your staff concluded that no additional operators
would have failed the examination. Therefore, NPPD concluded no operators resumed licensed
duties without having passed a valid requalification examination.
We considered the information developed during the inspection, the additional information you
provided in your letters dated January 25 and February 15, 2002, and the information provided
at the conference. Based on the preponderance of the evidence before us, we conclude that
the examination was compromised in such a way that both the exam validity and integrity were
Nebraska Public Power District
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affected. As a result, the NRC has concluded that the inspection finding is appropriately
characterized as white, an issue with low to moderate importance to safety, which may require
additional NRC inspections. The evidence that leads us to these conclusions is summarized in
the following paragraphs.
During the conference, you agreed with NRC's final conclusion that the Cooper Nuclear
Stations biennial written requalification examination conducted in 2000 did not meet the NRC
requirements contained in 10 CFR 55.49. 10 CFR 55.49 states that the integrity of a test or
examination is considered compromised if any activity, regardless of intent, affected, or, but for
detection, would have affected the equitable and consistent administration of the test or
examination. Our independent review concluded that the process used to validate the written
requalification examinations, given the similarity of examination questions, compromised the
integrity of the examinations. The operator requalification human performance SDP was
developed partially on the basis of 10 CFR 55.49; it appropriately reflects the importance of
maintaining a high degree of examination integrity. We also concluded that the validation
process used by NPPD constituted a loss of control of examination material by exposing
operators to specific examination reference material just prior to taking their own examinations.
Therefore, we concluded that examination security was compromised as a result of the
validation process.
Your staffs reviews concluded that the similarity of the questions did not impact the results of
the examination. We do not agree with this assessment. For example, our review identified a
number of instances in which approximately 50 percent of a crew validating a question involving
a specific learning objective that was dissimilar from the one on their actual examination did not
perform as well as other crews who validated a similar question involving a specific learning
objective. This indicated that the similarity combined with the validation affected the
examination results.
Since NPPD failed to document who validated the specific examination questions, it was not
possible to determine which operators benefitted from the actual validation process. However,
your staff stated during our inspection that interviews of operators you conducted revealed that
at least one operator believed he had gained an advantage as a result of this validation
process. This validation process combined with the similarity of each examination question
provided an opportunity for operators to gain knowledge on how to answer a number of
questions prior to taking their own examinations. This learning process, which occurred just
prior to the crews examination, affected the ability of the examination to make a reliable and
valid determination that operators had the minimum level of competency at your facility.
Because of the uncertainties introduced by the validation process, the increased difficulty of the
examination from past biennial requalification examinations, and training improvements during
the subject requalification cycle, we concluded there were too many variables to make a
conclusive determination that examination validity was not affected based on examination
results alone. We did, however, conclude that the validation process conducted by NPPD
affected the examinations ability to measure operator knowledge independently and
objectively. Specifically, the validation process, given the similarity of the questions, resulted in
elevated crew scores on those specific questions operators validated which were similar to the
questions that appeared on their own examinations. Therefore, we concluded that the
examination was compromised in such a way that both the examination validity and integrity
were affected.
Nebraska Public Power District
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Also, we believe that the timing of the validation process relative to the administration of the
actual tests influenced the examination results. This validation methodology, combined with the
similarity of examination questions, becomes a more significant influence on the discrimination
capability of the examination when the examination is an open reference examination and the
reference material is reviewed by the operators just before this examination is administered.
When this occurs, the examinations' ability to test operator knowledge could become biased by
short-term knowledge gained through the examination validation.
During the regulatory conference, we requested that you provide us with the results of a
regrade of the examinations, removing only those compromised questions that operators
answered correctly. You provided the results of that regrade effort in a letter dated
February 15, 2002. According to this regrade, two additional operators would have failed the
biennial requalification examination administered between June 20 and July 27, 2000. Your
letter also reiterated your assessment of the significance of the finding, your position that the
subject biennial requalification examinations were valid, and your position that the removal of
only those compromised questions that were answered correctly is inconsistent and inequitable.
We determined that your final review, which deleted all the problematic questions from the
examination even if an operator answered the question(s) incorrectly to be unsupportable and
non-conservative because operators that answered the question incorrectly clearly
demonstrated a lack of knowledge on the topic. Conversely, if an operator answered a
question correctly, this could be attributed to the operator gaining knowledge to answer the
question correctly as a result of recent exposure to a similar question. During our regrade of
the subject examinations, we deleted only those compromised questions that operators
answered correctly. As a result, we concluded that at least two operators resumed license
duties even though, in retrospect, they did not pass the 2000 written requalification
examination.
The operator requalification human performance SDP addresses whether the licensee took the
appropriate compensatory actions immediately once the compromise was discovered.
According to your corrective action documents, the potential examination compromise was
identified by members of your training staff administering the examination some time in
July 2000. The issue was not placed into your corrective action program until several weeks
after it was identified. Meanwhile, your staff continued to validate and administer examinations
in the same manner. When the issue was examined weeks later, this review of the issue was
narrowly focused on examination results and procedure adherence. In our view, sufficient
information was available, such that, the examination compromise should have been identified
in July 2000.
We concluded that you failed to take immediate and appropriate compensatory actions when
the validation process was questioned by your staff. Therefore, as a compensatory action in
July 2000, validation and administration of the remaining examinations, in our view, should have
been suspended pending the implementation of appropriate corrective actions. The aspect of
the operator requalification human performance SDP which addresses whether the licensee
took the appropriate compensatory actions immediately is answered no. Therefore, we
concluded that the outcome of the operator requalification human performance SDP is a white
finding.
Nebraska Public Power District
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You have 10 business days from the date of this letter to appeal the staff's determination of
significance for the identified white finding. Such appeals will be considered to have merit only
if they meet the criteria given in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 2.
The NRC has also determined that a violation of 10 CFR 55.49 occurred, in that the integrity of
the 2000 requalification biennial written examination was compromised, as cited in the enclosed
Notice of Violation (Notice). The circumstances surrounding the violation were described in
detail in the subject inspection report. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy,
NUREG-1600, the Notice of Violation is considered escalated enforcement action because it is
associated with a white finding.
You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the
enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to
determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with
regulatory requirements.
Overall, plant performance has been in the Degraded Cornerstone Column of the NRC Action
Matrix, as described in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0305. This issue is the first issue
affecting the mitigating system cornerstone at the Cooper Nuclear Station. We will use the
NRC Action Matrix to determine the most appropriate NRC response for this finding. We will
notify you by separate correspondence of that determination.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter
and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public
Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs
document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Ellis W. Merschoff
Regional Administrator
Docket: 50-298
License: DPR-46
Enclosure: Notice of Violation
cc w/enclosure:
G. R. Horn, Senior Vice President
of Nuclear and Enterprise Effectiveness
Nebraska Public Power District
1414 15th Street
Columbus, Nebraska 68601
Nebraska Public Power District
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John R. McPhail, General Counsel
Nebraska Public Power District
P.O. Box 499
Columbus, Nebraska 68602-0499
D. F. Kunsemiller, Risk and
Regulatory Affairs Manager
Nebraska Public Power District
P.O. Box 98
Brownville, Nebraska 68321
Dr. William D. Leech
Manager - Nuclear
MidAmerican Energy
907 Walnut Street
P.O. Box 657
Des Moines, Iowa 50303-0657
Ron Stoddard
Lincoln Electric System
1040 O Street
P.O. Box 80869
Lincoln, Nebraska 68501-0869
Michael J. Linder, Director
Nebraska Department of Environmental
Quality
P.O. Box 98922
Lincoln, Nebraska 68509-8922
Chairman
Nemaha County Board of Commissioners
Nemaha County Courthouse
1824 N Street
Auburn, Nebraska 68305
Sue Semerena, Section Administrator
Nebraska Health and Human Services System
Division of Public Health Assurance
Consumer Services Section
301 Centennial Mall, South
P.O. Box 95007
Lincoln, Nebraska 68509-5007
Ronald A. Kucera, Deputy Director
for Public Policy
Department of Natural Resources
205 Jefferson Street
Jefferson City, Missouri 65101
Nebraska Public Power District
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Jerry Uhlmann, Director
State Emergency Management Agency
P.O. Box 116
Jefferson City, Missouri 65101
Vick L. Cooper, Chief
Radiation Control Program, RCP
Kansas Department of Health
and Environment
Bureau of Air and Radiation
1000 SW Jackson, Suite 310
Topeka, Kansas 66612-1366
Nebraska Public Power District
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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
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ENCLOSURE
Nebraska Public Power District
Docket No. 50-298
Cooper Nuclear Station
License No. DPR-46
During an NRC inspection conducted October 15 through November 29, 2001, a violation of
NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and
Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the violation is listed below:
10 CFR 55.49 states that Applicants, licensees, and facility licensees shall not engage
in any activity that compromises the integrity of any application, test, or examination
required by this part. The integrity of a test or examination is considered compromised
if any activity, regardless of intent, affected, or, but for detection, would have affected
the equitable and consistent administration of the test or examination. This includes
activities related to the preparation and certification of license applications and all
activities related to the preparation, administration, and grading of the tests and
examinations required by this part. 10 CFR 55.59 (a) requires each licensee to pass a
comprehensive requalification written examination covering a 24-month requalification
program.
Contrary to the above, between June 20 and July 27, 2000, the facility licensee
compromised the integrity of the requalification biennial written examinations required by
10 CFR 55.59. Specifically, the facility licensee developed weekly requalification
examinations that were similar to each other, then allowed some operators to validate at
least 50 percent of the next weekly examination the day before taking their own
examination. This affected the equitable and consistent administration of the
examination.
This violation is associated with a white significance determination process finding
(50-298/0112-01).
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Nebraska Public Power District is hereby required
to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555 with a copy to the Regional
Administrator, Region IV, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the
subject of this Notice of Violation (Notice), within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting
this Notice. This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should
include: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation or
severity level, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the
corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full
compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previously docketed
correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an
adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for
Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or
revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is
shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.
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If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with
the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
Because your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC
Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs
document system (ADAMS), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy,
proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the public without
redaction. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). If personal privacy or proprietary
information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed
copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted
copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such
material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have
withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the
disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the
information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential
commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an
acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
Dated this 26th day of March 2002