ML020810182
| ML020810182 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 03/20/2002 |
| From: | Gratton C NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD1 |
| To: | Kingsley O Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| TAC MB2271, TAC MB2272 | |
| Download: ML020810182 (8) | |
Text
ACTION 30 -
ACTION 31 ACTION 32 ACTION 33 ACTION 34 -
ACTION 35 ACTION 36 -
TABLE 3.3.3-1 (Continued)
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUM-ENTATION ACTION STATEMENTS With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement:
- a.
With one channel inoperable, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or declare the associated system inoperable.
- b.
With more than one channel inoperable, declare the associated system inoperable.
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, declare the associated ECCS inoperable within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or declare the associated ECCS inoperable.
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than :equired by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement:
- a.
For one channel inoperable, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or declare the HPCI system inoperable.
- b.
With more than one channel inoperable, declare the HPCI system inoperable.
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, place at least one inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or declare the HPCI system inoperable.
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Total Number of Channels, declare the associated emergency diesel generator and the associated offsite source breaker that is not supplying the bus inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.8.1.1 or 3.8.1.2, as appropriate.
Amendment
.N]o. ---, 34, 158 LIMERICK -
UN*IT 1 3/4 3-36
TABLE 3.3.2-I (3-r..
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYST=EM ACTUATI:2 ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 37 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, place the inoperable device in the bypassed condition subject to the following conditions:
InoDerable Device 127-11XOX 127Y-IIX0X 127Z-IIX0X Condition 127Y-llXOX and 127Z-lIXOX operable 127-11XOX and 127Z-llXOX operable 127-11XOX and 127Y-llXOX operable.
127Z-llYOY operable for the other 3 breakers monitoring that
- source, offsite source grid voltage for that source is maintained at or above 230kV (for the 101 Safeguard Bus Source) or 525kV (for the 201 Safeguard Bus Source),
Load Tap Changer for that source is in service and in automatic operation, and the electrical buses and breaker alignments are maintained within bounds of approved plant procedures.
or, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and take the Action required by Specification 3.8.1.1 or 3.8.1.2, as appropriate.
Operation may then continue until performance of the next required CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
LIMIERICK -
UNIT 1 3/4 3-36a Amendment No. 158
BASES 3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING ACTUATION INSTRUMENTAT.ION (Continued)
Specified surveillance intervals and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with NEDC-30936P, Parts 1 and 2, "Technical Specification Improvement Methodology (with Demonstration for BWR ECCS Actuation Instrumentation)," as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to D. N. Grace from A. C. Thadani dated December 9, 1988 (Part 1) and letter to D. N. Grace from C. E. Rossi dated December 9, 1988 (Part 2)).
Successful operation of the required safety functions of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) is dependent upon the availability of adequate power for energizing various components such as pump motors, motor operated valves, and the associated control components.
If the loss of power instrumentation detects that voltage levels are too low, the buses are disconnected from the offsite power sources and connected to the onsite diesel generator (DG) power sources.
The loss of power relays in each channel have sufficient overlapping detection characteristics and functionality to permit operation subject to the conditions in Action Statement 37.
Bases 3/4.8.1, 3/4.8.2, and 3/4.8.3 provide discussion regarding parametric bounds for determining operability of the offsite sources.
Those Bases assume that the loss of power relays are operable.
With an inoperable 127Z-IIXOX relay, the grid voltage is monitored to 230kV (for the 101 Safeguard Bus Source) or 525kV (for the 201 Safeguard Bus Source) to increase the margin for the operation of the 127Z-IIXOX relay.
Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is an allowance for instrument drift specifically allocated for each trip in the safety analyses.
3/4.3.4 RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION The anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) recirculation pump trip system provides a means of limiting the consequences of the unlikely occurrence of a failure to scram during an anticipated transient.
The response of the plant to this postulated event falls within the envelope of study events in General Electric Company Topical Report NEDO-10349, dated March 1971, NEDO 24222, dated December 1979, and Section 15.8 of the FSAR.
The end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip (EOC-RPT) system is a supplement to the reactor trip.
During turbine trip and generator load rejection events, the EOC-RPT will reduce the likelihood of reactor vessel level decreasing to level
- 2.
Each EOC-RPT system trips both recirculation pumps, reducing coolant flow in order to reduce the void collapse in the core during two of the most limiting pressurization events.
The two events for which the EOC-RPT protective feature will function are closure of the turbine stop valves and fast closure of the turbine control valves.
A fast closure sensor from each of two turbine control valves provides input to the EOC-RPT system; a fast closure sensor from each of the other two turbine control valves provides input to the second EOC-RPT system.
Similarly, a position switch for each of two turbine stop valves provides input to one EOC RPT system; a position switch from each of the other two stop valves provides input to the other EOC-RPT system.
For each EOC-PPT system, the sensor relay contacts are arranged to form a 2-out-of-2 logic for the fast closure of turbine control valves and a 2-out-of-2 logic for the turbine stop valves.
The operation of either logic will actuate the EOC-RPT system and trip both recirculation pumps.
LIMER:CK J-7T B 3 4 3-3 Aenr.ent No.
1
-ý,
158
BASES 3/4.3.4 RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)
Each EOC-RPT system may be manually bypassed by use of a keyswitch which is administratively controlled.
The manual bypasses and the automatic Operating Bypass at less than 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER are annunciated in the control room.
The EOC-RPT system response time is the time assumed in the analysis between initiation of valve motion and complete suppression of the electric arc, i.e.,
175 ms.
Included in this time are:
the response time of the sensor, the time allotted for breaker arc suppression, and the response time of the system logic.
Amendment No. 158 LIMERICK -
UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-3a
TABLE 3.3.3-1 (Ccnnue3d)
E4ERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM, ACTUATION iNSTRUYENTA:TION ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 30 -
ACTION 31 ACTION 32 ACTION 33 ACTION 34 -
ACTION 35 ACTION 36 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABPT E Channels per Trip Function requirement:
- a.
With one channel inoperable, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or declare the associated system inoperable.
- b.
With more than one channel inoperable, declare the associated system inoperable.
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, declare the associated ECCS inoperable within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or declare the associated ECCS inoperable.
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement:
- a.
For one channel inoperable, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or declare the HPCI system inoperable.
- b.
With more than one channel inoperable, declare the HPCI system inoperable.
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, place at least one inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or declare the HPCI system inoperable.
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Total Number of Channels, declare the associated emergency diesel generator and the associated offsite source breaker that is not supplying the bus inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.8.1.1 or 3.8.1.2, as appropriate.
Amendment No.
4-3/4, 120 LIMERICK -
UNIT 2 3/4 3-36
ACTION 37 -
TA.BLE 3.3.3-1 7 niud E:ERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUA= N:S-F.2C~ATI ACTION STATLMETýTS With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, place the inoperable device in the bypassed condition subject to the following conditions:
Inoperable Device 127-11XOX 127Y-IIXOX 127Z-IIXOX Condition 127Y-IIX0X and 127Z-I1XOX operable 127-11XOX and 127Z-IIXOX operable 127-11XOX and 127Y-1IX0X operable.
127Z-IIYOY operable for the other 3 breakers monitoring that source, offsite source grid voltage for that source is maintained at or above 230kV (for the 101 Safeguard Bus Source) or 525kV (for the 201 Safeguard Bus Source),
Load Tap Changer for that source is in service and in automatic operation, and the electrical buses and breaker alignments are maintained within bounds of approved plant prccedures.
or, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and take the Action required by Specification 3.8.1.1 or 3.8.1.2, as appropriate Operation may then continue until performance of the next required CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
Amendment No.
120 1
L M"ERT,-'" -
UNIT 2 3/4 3-36a
BASES 3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUYENTATION (Continued)
Specified surveillance intervals and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with NEDC-30936P, Parts 1 and 2, "Technical Specification Improvement Methodology (with Demonstration for BWR ECCS Actuation Instrumentation)," as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to D.
N. Grace from A. C. Thadani dated December 9, 1988 (Part 1) and letter to D. N.
Grace from C. E. Rossi dated December 9, 1988 (Part 2)).
Successful operation of the required safety functions of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) is dependent upon the availability of adequate power for energizing various components such as pump motors, motor operated valves, and the associated control components.
If the loss of power instrumentation detects that voltage levels are too low, the buses are disconnected from the offsite power sources and connected to the onsite diesel generator (DG) power sources.
The loss of power relays in each channel have sufficient overlapping detection characteristics and functionality to permit operation subject to the conditions in Action Statement 37.
Bases 3/4.8.1, 3/4.8.2, and 3/4.8.3 provide discussion regarding parametric bound-for determining operability of the offsite sources.
Those Bases assume that the loss of power relays are operable.
With an inoperable 127Z-llXOX relay, the grid voltage is monitored to 230kV (for the 101 Safeguard Bus Source) or 525kV (for the 201 Safeguard Bus Source) to increase the margin for the operation of the 127Z-lIXOX relay.
Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is an allowance for instrument drift specifically allocated for each trip in the safety analyses.
3/4.3.4 RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION The anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) recirculation pump trip system provides a means of limiting the consequences of the unlikely occurrence of a failure to scram during an anticipated transient.
The response of the plant to this postulated event falls within the envelope of study events in General Electric Company Topical Report NEDO-10349, dated March 1971, NEDO 24222, dated December 1979, and Section 15.8 of the FSAR.
The end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip (EOC-RPT) system is a supplement to the reactor trip.
During turbine trip and generator load rejection events, the EOC-RPT will reduce the likelihood of reactor vessel level decreasing to level
- 2.
Each EOC-RPT system trips both recirculation pumps, reducing coolant flow in order to reduce the void collapse in the core during two of the most limiting pressurization events.
The two events for which the EOC-RPT protective feature will function are closure of the turbine stop valves and fast closure of the turbine control valves.
A fast closure sensor from each of two turbine control valves provides input to the EOC-RPT system; a fast closure sensor from each of the other two turbine control valves provides input to the second EOC-RPT system.
Similarly, a position switch for each of two turbine stop valves provides input to one EOC RPT system; a position switch from each of the other two stop valves provides input to the other EOC-RPT system.
For each EOC-RPT system, the sensor relay contacts are arranged to form a 2-out-of-2 logic for the fast closure of turbine control valves and a 2-out-of-2 logic for the turbine stop valves.
The operation of either logic will actuate the EOC-RPT system and trio both recirculation pumps.
-V JTT
)
B 3/4 3-3 Amendment No.
1;, 32, 33, 120 ill llar_
I ý
BASES 3/4.3.4 RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUYE=NTATION (Continued)
Each EOC-RPT system may be manually bypassed by use of a keyswitch which is administratively controlled.
The manual bypasses and the automatic Operating Bypass at less than 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER are annunciated in the control room.
The EOC-RPT system response time is the time assumed in the analysis between initiation of valve motion and complete suppression of the electric arc, i.e.,
175 ms.
Included in this time are:
the response time of the sensor, the time allotted for breaker arc suppression, and the response time of the system logic.
Amendment No. 120 LiNE-RC--K -
u,.,i-. 2 B 3/4 3-3a