ML020300371
| ML020300371 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 01/14/2002 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2001-0256 | |
| Download: ML020300371 (4) | |
Text
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Indian Point 2 Steam Generator Tube Failure Lessons-Learned Report EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Event Description Team Charter Report Task Group focused on issues directly related to the February 15, 2000 tube failure event and operation of the current SGs at IP2.
Public input was not sought as part of the Task Group effort Two additional reports were important to the Task Group effort:
1 )
RES review dated March 16, 2000.
- 2)
OIG Event Inquiry on the "NRC's Response to the February 15, 2000, Steam Generator Tube Rupture at Indian Point Unit 2 Power Plant."
Safety Significance No actual radiological consequences of the event. The event did not impact the public health and safety. [NRC Special Inspection Report]
Preliminary staff assessment appropriate for the SDP process.
The risk from the IP2 SG event and risk from the tube condition prior to the event were well within NRC measures for maintaining public health and safety.
Lessons Learned Recommendations Industry Regulatory Process Licensing Inspection 0
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&ot FeRr P 9ttC-NREL-ASfr Indian Point 2 Steam Generator Tube Failure Lessons-Learned Report Lessons-LearnedlRecommendation Con Ed Special Inspection Team findings are reasonable, corrective actions at IP2 should proceed in accordance with the ongoing inspection and enforcement process.
1997 Examinations: PWSCC; Tube denting and hour-glassing; Noise Industry / NEI / EPRI Improvements to the Generic industry guidelines (NEI, EPRI):
Plant-specific qualification of eddy current probes Probability of detection; In-situ pressure testing.
- 2)
NEI noise study
- 3)
Vendor oversight by licensees
- 4)
Plant-specific implementation of lessons-learned NRC Regulatory Processes Licensing Amendment Review and Safety Evaluation: Missed opportunity to pursue questions.
Tech. Spec. required Reports Inspection
- 1)
Additional SG inspection guidance for the baseline inspection program.
- 2)
Inspector training to support the objectives of the SG inspection program.
- 3)
NRR support of the SG inspection program - Outage phone calls are effective and should be formerly incorporated into the inspection program.
- 4)
Risk-informed thresholds to identify when increased NRC interaction is warranted in response to SG tube degradation.
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,t*FGwA ION - NOT FOR P&BLIC HEL IAS
- 5)
Risk-informed thresholds to identify when increased NRC interaction is warranted in response to an adverse primary-to-secondary trend.
PRE-DECI;G;AL ;;FC.MAT!ON NOT,-FOR PUB'I'C REI FA-F Schedule Report to Brian Sheron Septer Brain's Recommendation to Sam Collins Octob*
Who Reviews/Comments on the Report Task Group Briefing of S. Collins and Others (as decided)
"nber 29 (today)
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- Week of 10/8