ML020280075

LER 01-S01-00 for R E Ginna Nuclear Plant Re Safeguards Event

ML020280075
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	01/22/2002
From:	Mecredy R Rochester Gas & Electric Corp
To:	Clark R Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LER 01-S01-00
Download: ML020280075 (4)

Text

R ffA A Subsidiaryof RGS Energy Group, Inc.

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION @ 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y 14649-0001

• 716 546-2700 www.rge.com ROBERT C. MECREDY Vice President Nuclear Operations January 22, 2002 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Attn: Robert L. Clark Project Directorate I Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Safeguards LER 2001-SO1, Safeguards Event R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244

Dear Mr. Clark:

The attached Safeguards Licensee Event Report LER 2001-SO 1 is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71 and Section I(a)(3) of Appendix G, Reportable Safeguards Events.

Ve I urs Robert C. Mecredy xc: Mr. Robert L. Clark (Mail Stop O-8-E9)

Project Directorate I Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 U.S. NRC Ginna Senior Resident Inspector

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 7-31-2004

'7-2001) COMMISSION Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) bjsl @nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-1 0202 (See reverse tor required number of (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D0 20503. Ifa means used to digits/characters for each block) impose information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRC

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244T 1 OF 3

4. TITLE Safeguards Event

5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED REV MO FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MO DAYYEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL I NUMBER NO 05000 2FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER

Ž2 24 2001 122001001 I24 - S0S01 - 00 0 01 0 22 00205000

9. OPERATING 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITRED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)

MODE 1 20.2201 (b) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10. POWER LEVEL 20.2203(a)(1) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) X 73.71(a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71 (a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) OTHER in Abstract below or in Specify 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) NRC Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) 20.22031a()v 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 20.2203(a(1(i 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) If  :**  :¢ I 120.2203(a)(3)(i) I 50.73(a)()ii)A 50.73(a)(2)(iii() I ,* . 3! i£* i~

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

Ronald C. Teed - Manager, Nuclear Security i (585) 771-3232

13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT MANU- REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT ANU- REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIX

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH I DAY YEAR SUBMISSION YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X DATE

16. ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On December 24, 2001, at approximately 0722 EST, a plant employee reported to the on-duty Security Shift Supervisor (SSS) that he had observed what appeared to be an unattended security weapon or training aid in a plant restroom. The SSS immediately dispatched an Assistant Security Shift Supervisor to the area of that restroom. The assistant supervisor discovered a loaded security weapon leaning against the wall between the sinks in that restroom. The assistant supervisor immediately inspected and secured the weapon. The discovery of an unattended security weapon within the Protected Area (PA) was determined to be reportable to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71 and 10 CFR 73 Appendix G.

NRC FORM 366 (7-2001)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE YEAR SEQUENTIAL I REVISION Y NUMBER NUMBER R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 2 OF 3 2001 -- S01 -- 00

17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required,use additionalcopies of NRC Form 366A)

1. PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS The plant was in Mode 1, at approximately 100% steady state reactor power.

II. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On December 24, 2001, at approximately 0722 hours0.00836 days <br />0.201 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.74721e-4 months <br />, a plant employee reported to the on-duty Security Shift Supervisor (SSS) that he had observed what appeared to be an unattended security weapon or training aid in a plant restroom. The SSS immediately dispatched an Assistant Security Shift Supervisor to the area of that restroom. The assistant supervisor discovered a loaded security weapon leaning against the wall between the sinks in that restroom. The assistant supervisor immediately inspected and secured the weapon. The weapon had all ammunition accounted for, the "chamber checker" (a device used to readily identify if the chamber is empty) was in place, and it appeared that nothing had been done to or with the weapon during the time it was unattended in that restroom. All other weapons and ammunition were immediately inventoried and all were accounted for. The SSS began making proper notifications, started a preliminary investigation, and took immediate corrective actions.

Upon notification by the SSS, security management personnel responded to the plant to direct the investigation and identify and implement additional preliminary corrective actions. The initial security investigation consisted of interviews with all personnel that may have been involved, including all plant personnel that may have been a witness (i.e., noticed someone using that plant restroom).

December 24th was Christmas Eve and was a company holiday. Since the event occurred on a holiday, the number of personnel on site was limited to security personnel and the on-duty operations and operations support personnel. Thus, the number of individuals that may have had information to contribute to the investigation was limited. Access reports were run on all on-duty security personnel, and post assignment logs were reviewed to ascertain activities and look for opportunities for security personnel to have left the weapon unattended in that restroom.

Upon conclusion of this initial investigation, which spanned two days, the security officer who inadvertently left the weapon unattended was identified. In reconstructing the officer's activities, the following sequence of events occurred. At approximately 0110 EST on December 24, 2001, the officer was transitioning from a response post inside a plant building to the Access Control Facility (ACF). The officer was feeling ill and partially vomited into his hand. He proceeded into a plant restroom and leaned the weapon between the sinks while he washed his hands. He then wiped his hands and proceeded to his next station in the ACF, forgetting to retrieve the weapon. Since the next station (the ACF) did not require the officer to carry a weapon, he did not realize what he had done and the weapon remained where he had left it in that restroom until the weapon was observed by the plant employee.

NRC FORM 366A 11-2001)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE REVISION YEAR INUMBER SEQUENTIAL NUMBER R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 N 3 OF 3 2001 -- S01 -- 00

17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required,use additionalcopies of NRC Form 366A)

III. EVENT

SUMMARY

The weapon was inadvertently left unattended by the security officer at approximately 0110 EST on December 24, 2001, and the weapon was observed, unattended, in the plant restroom at approximately 0722 EST. The time the weapon was unattended in the restroom was determined to be approximately six hours and ten minutes. During the time that the weapon was unattended (midnight shift on a holiday), the staffing levels at the plant consisted of security personnel and on-duty operations and operations support personnel (for a total of nine "non-security" personnel on site). The unattended weapon had no impact on the effectiveness of the security force to respond to a contingency event, since other weapons were readily available should the need arise. Immediate corrective actions and investigations were initiated upon discovery of the event.

NRC Regulatory Guide 5.62 ("Reporting of Safeguards Events", Revision 1, November 1987) was reviewed, and it was determined that this event was reportable to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, based on the examples listed in Section 2.2 of the regulatory guide. The SSS and the Operations Shift Supervisor notified the NRC Operations Center, per 10 CFR 73.71 and 10 CFR 73 Appendix G, at approximately 0939 EST on December 24, 2001.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTION The event was entered into the plant corrective action program. This event is being evaluated in detail as part of a plant event evaluation by the Nuclear Assessment group and security management.

Concurrent with this ongoing evaluation, corrective actions were immediately taken to prevent recurrence. Shift meetings were conducted on December 24th with all security personnel on duty at the time of the event, and also with the relief shift on the same date, to raise awareness of the issue and the seriousness of the event. A detailed report on the event was prepared, and all other security personnel (those not on site on December 24th) received a thorough briefing prior to commencing their next work shift. The evaluation team looked for other areas and opportunities where there was an increased risk of leaving a weapon unattended. Administrative controls were enhanced and additional administrative and physical barriers were established to reduce the potential for leaving a weapon unattended. The details of these administrative controls have been shared with NRC Region I staff and the NRC Resident Inspector.

Additional corrective actions continue to be evaluated as a part of the ongoing event evaluation.