LR-N04-0022, Technical Specification Bases Change S03-09B
| ML040780291 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 03/04/2004 |
| From: | Mannon S Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LR-N04-0022, S03-09B | |
| Download: ML040780291 (4) | |
Text
PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 MAR 0 4 2004 AO PSEG LR-N04-0022 Bases Change S03-09B NuclearLLC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES CHANGE S03-09B SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT NOS. I AND 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOs. DPR-70 AND DPR-75 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 PSEG Nuclear, LLC (PSEG) has revised the Bases for Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.8.1 for Salem Generating Station Unit Nos. 1 and 2. This change was reviewed in accordance with the requirements of our Technical Specification Bases Control Program and 10 CFR 50.59.
TS Bases 3/4.8.1 is being changed to clarify an example of system redundancy pertaining to the auxiliary feedwater pumps incorporated from the Standard Technical Specifications (STS). The Bases implies that single train systems such as turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (AFP) would not be considered redundant. At Salem, the single turbine driven AFP is redundant to the two 50% capacity electric driven pumps.
Attachments I and 2 contain revised pages for Salem Units 1 and 2, respectively. In accordance with our TS Bases Control Program, PSEG has incorporated these changes into the Bases.
Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Carl Berger at (856) 339-1432.
Sincerely, Steven Mannon Acting Manager - Nuclear Safety and Licensing Attachments
,ApOD, 95-2168 REV. 7/99
MAR 0 4 20 Document Control Desk LR-N04-0022 C
Mr. H. Miller, Administrator - Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Mr. R. Fretz, Licensing Project Manager - Salem U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North Mail Stop 0882 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 USNRC Resident Inspector Office (X24)
Mr. K. Tosch, Manager IV Bureau of Nuclear Engineering P.O. Box 415 Trenton, NJ 08625
3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.8.1 and 3/4.8.2 A.C. SOURCES AND ONSITE POWER-DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the A.C. and D.C power sources and associated distribution systems during operation ensures that sufficient power will be available to supply the safety related equipment required for 1) the safe shutdown of the facility, and 2) the mitigation and control of accident conditions within the facility.
The minimum specified independent and redundant A.C. and D.C. power sources and distribution systems satisfy the requirements of General Design Criterion 17 of Appendix "A" to 10 CFR Part 50.
The ACTION requirements specified for the levels of degradation of the power sources provide restriction upon continued facility operation commensurate with the level of degradation.
The OPERABILITY of the power sources are consistent with the initial condition assumptions of the accident analyses and are based upon maintaining at least two independent sets of onsite A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions coincident with an assumed loss of offsite power and single failure of one onsite A.C. source.
When a system or component is determined to be inoperable solely because its emergency power source is inoperable, or solely because its normal power source is inoperable, it may still be considered OPERABLE, provided the appropriate Actions of 3.8.1.1.a.2, b.2 or d.2 are satisfied.
Action 3.8.1.1.a.2, which only applies if the train cannot be powered from an offsite source, is intended to provide assurance that an event coincident with a single failure of the associated DG will not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical redundant required systems.
Failure of a single offsite circuit will generally not, by itself, cause any equipment to lose normal AC power.
Action 3.8.1.1.b.2 is intended to provide assurance that a loss of offsite power, during the period that a DG is inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems. Action 3.8.1.1.d.2, which applies when two offsite circuits are inoperable, is intended to provide assurance that an event with a coincident single failure will not result in a complete loss of redundant required safety functions.
These systems are powered from the independent AC electrical power train. However, redundant required systems or components credited by this specification are not necessarily powered from AC electrical sources. For example, the single train turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is redundant to the two motor-driven pumps. Redundant required system or component failures consist of inoperable equipment associated with a train, redundant to the train that has an inoperable DG or offsite power.
The completion time for these actions is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This completion time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time clock, starting only on discovery that both:
- a. One train has no offsite power supplying its loads, one DG is inoperable or two required offsite circuits are inoperable; and
- b. A required system or component on the other train is inoperable.
SALEM - UNIT 1 B 3/4 8-1 March 5, 2004
3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.8.1 and 3/4.8.2 A.C. SOURCES AND ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the A.C. and D.C power sources and associated distribution systems during operation ensures that sufficient power will be available to supply the safety related equipment required for 1) the safe shutdown of the facility, and 2) the mitigation and control of accident conditions within the facility.
The minimum specified independent and redundant A.C. and D.C. power sources and distribution systems satisfy the requirements of General Design Criterion 17 of Appendix "A" to 10 CFR Part 50.
The ACTION requirements specified for the levels of degradation of the power sources provide restriction upon continued facility operation commensurate with the level of degradation.
The OPERABILITY of the power sources are consistent with the initial condition assumptions of the accident analyses and are based upon maintaining at least two independent sets of onsite A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions coincident with an assumed loss of offsite power and single failure of one onsite A.C. source.
When a system or component is determined to be inoperable solely because its emergency power source is inoperable, or solely because its normal power source is inoperable, it may still be considered OPERABLE, provided the appropriate Actions of 3.8.1.1.a.2, b.2 or d.2 are satisfied.
Action 3.8.1.1.a.2, which only applies if the train cannot be powered from an offsite source, is intended to provide assurance that an event coincident with a single failure of the associated DG will not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical redundant required systems.
Failure of a single offsite circuit will generally not, by itself, cause any equipment to lose normal AC power.
Action 3.8.1.1.b.2 is intended to provide assurance that a loss of offsite power, during the period that a DG is inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems. Action 3.8.1.1.d.2, which applies when two offsite circuits are inoperable, is intended to provide assurance that an event with a coincident single failure will not result in a complete loss of redundant required safety functions.
These systems are powered from the independent AC electrical power train. However, redundant required systems or components credited by this specification are not necessarily powered from AC electrical sources. For example, the single train turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is redundant to the two motor-driven pumps. Redundant required system or component failures consist of inoperable equipment associated with a train, redundant to the train that has an inoperable DG or offsite power.
The completion time for these actions is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This completion time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time clock, starting only on discovery that both:
- a. One train has no offsite power supplying its loads, one DG is inoperable or two required offsite circuits are inoperable; and
- b. A required system or component on the other train is inoperable.
If at any time during these conditions a redundant required system or component subsequently becomes inoperable, this completion time begins to be tracked.
Discovering no offsite power to one train of the onsite Class 1E Electrical Power Distribution System, or one required DG inoperable, coincident with one or more inoperable required support or supported systems SALEM -
UNIT 2 B 3/4 8-1 March 5, 2004