IR 05000553/1981005
| ML20030D486 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Phipps Bend  |
| Issue date: | 06/19/1981 |
| From: | Girard E, Herdt A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20030D462 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-553-81-05, 50-553-81-5, 50-554-81-05, 50-554-81-5, NUDOCS 8109010444 | |
| Download: ML20030D486 (10) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11 3., Mk / [
g'r 101 MARIETT A ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 g,
j ATLANTA, GEORGI A 20003
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Report Nos. 50-553/81-05 and 50-554/81-05 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, TN 37401 Facility Name:
Phipps Bend Docket Nos. 50-553 and 50-554 License Nos. CPPR-162 and CPPR-163 Inspection at Phipps Bend site near Kingsport, TN Inspector:
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E. H. Girard
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Approved by:
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A. R. Herdt, Section Chief Dats Signed Technical Inspection Branch Engineering and Technical Inspection Division
SUMMARY Inspection on May 5-8, 1981 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 29 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of licensee identified items (50.55(e)) (Units 1 and 2), steel structures i
and supports - welding related activities (Unit 1), and safety relating piping -
welding related activities (Unit 1).
Results Of the two areas inspected, two violations were found in three areas (Viola-
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tion - Inadequate control of special processes, paragraphs 6.b and 7 and Violation - Failure to properly identify areas for repair, paragraph 6.c.(1));
and no deviations were found.
8109010444 810818 '
PDR ADOCK 05000553, O
PDR.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- W. P. Kelleghan, Project Manager
- G. Wadewitz, Construction Engineer
- T. V. Abbatiello, Assistant Construction Engineer, QC
- L. C. Clark, Assistant Construction Engineer
- J. C. Cofield, Assistant Construction Engineer, PE
- 0. E. Hitchcock, Supervisor, Site QA Unit
- S. D. Love, Regulatory Staff (Chattanooga)
- W. T. Lindeman, Supervisor, Welding QC Unit J. N. Odum, Project Engineer, Mechanical
- J. W. Self. Assistant Supervisor, Weldina QC Unit J. E. Rose, Project Engineer, Welding R. Hagood, Welding Engineering Group Leader W. Bailey, Welding Engineer, QC L. C. Hatmaker, Examination Group Leader, Welding QC Unit
- S. R. Stout, OEDC - Licensing
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope nad findings were summarized on May 8, 1981 with those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The inspector described tne areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below.
(0 pen) Violation 553/81-05-07: " Inadequate Control of Special Processes" -
paragraphs 6.b and 7.
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(0 pen) Violation 553/81-05-08:
" Failure to Properly Identify Areas for Repair" paragraph 6.c.(1).
Additional findings identified to the licensee as an inspector followup item (listed below) in telephone calls on May 15 and 29,1981, were discussed with the licensee prior to the exit interview but were not addressed during that meeting.
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Ite' 553/81-05-09:
" Carbon Steel Studs a.iot on Stainless Steel" paragraph 6.c.(1)
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
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Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Licensee Identified Items (50.55(e)) (Units 1 and 2)
a.
(0 pen) Item 553,554/81-05-01:
Reactor Vessel Nut and Stud Irregu-larities On December 23, 1980, TVA informed NRC Region II of deficiencies involving studs, nuts and washers furnisned by Lakeside Bridge and Iron Company.
TVA submitted a final report to Region II on this item on April 9, 1981.
The licensee stated they consider 10 CFR 21 to be applicable to the item.
The NRC inspector discussed this item with TVA persennel and reviewed the following documents relat're to the item:
(1)
Final Report to NRC Region II dated April 9,1981 (2) TVA Supplier Nonconformance Report NCR-S-15 (3) Specification 300-46, Rev. 4, "ASME III, NF Structural Steel, TVA STRIDE" (4)
Specification 300-46A, Rev. O, "RPV Anchor Bolts, ASME III NF Structural Steel, TVA STRIDE" (This is the engineering specifi-cation for~ the subject nuts and studs)
(5) Quality Control Instruction (QCI) M-410, Rev. 2, " Unique Inspec-tions" (6) Unique Inspection Record (in accordance with QCI M-410) for visual inspection of bolts, dated January 4,1981.
From the review and discussions the NRC inspector found that:
(1) The final report stated that the safety significant deficiency identified for the studs and nuts was undersized tnread on the studs. The cause was identified as a breakdown in the vendor's QA p r.og ram.
The report noted that several other deficiencies had been found in material supplied by the vendor but that these had been determined not to be safety significant. The report did not state what steps had been taken to assure that other safety significant characteristics of the studs and nuts, such as materials properties, were within specified requirements.
(2) The final report indicated that visual inspection of Unit 1 studs cnd nuts at the site resulted in rejection of 12 nuts intended for Unit 1.
The exact nature and significance of the deficiencies in these nuts was not described in the final repor I
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(3) Tb final report did not describe the visual inspection of Unit I stuas and nuts performed at the site in sufficient detail to permit any judgement as to its adequacy in detecting potential deficiencies. Further, the NRC inspector found that site documen-tation of the inspection of Unit 1 studs and nuts neither ade-
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quately recorded the inspection nor the nut deficiencies referred to in the final report.
(4) The 12 Unit 1 studs identified as rejected in the final report were not recorded as nonconforming or dispositioned in accordance with any approved procedure. The licensee stated that they were being used in a non-safety related application and that the applicable installation procedure would prevent their subsequent use in the original safety related application for which they were intended.
(5) The final report to Region II from TVA stated that the 12 rejected Unit I nuts were being returned to the vendor for replacement. As noted in (4) above, this was incorrect. TVA site personnel stated that a request for a correction to the report had been prepared.
The inspector reviewed this request, which was undated and had not been issued.
Item 553,554/81-05-01 will remain open pending receipt and review of a revised final report and examination of the item by Region II in a subsequent inspection.
The licensee agreed that the revised final report should include as a minimum:
(1)
Information justifying the adequacy of the Unit I stud and nut inspection performed at the site.
(2) An accurate description of the disposition of the rejec.ed Unit I nuts.
(3) The basis for assurance that other safety significant character-istics of the studs and nuts are acceptable.
(4)
Identification of the licensee reports of inspections, disposition of deficiencies, inspection procedures, etc., which provide a documented record of data provided in the final report, b.
(0 pen) Item 553,554/81-05-02: Pressure Drop in Essential Service Water Piping.
On December 10, 1980, TVA informed Region II of a deficiency in the design of the Essential Service Water System piping. The final pres-sure drop criteria were found to have deficiencies. A final report on this item is to be submitted by June 30, 1981.
The item will be examined further by Region II in subsequent inspection T
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c.
(0 pen) Item 553,554/81-05-03: Inadequate Support of Condensate Header On July 16, 1980, TVA informed Region II that they had determined that the design of the support for the 36 inch condensate header line was inadequate. A final report was submitted to Region II on August 15, 1980.
This report was revised with a submittal dated April 13, 1981.
This item will be examined further by Region II in subsequent inspec-tions.
d.
(0 pen) Item 553,554/81-05-04: Undersized Insert Plates On February 13, 1981, TVA informed Region II that during installation they had discovered that insert plates in stainless steel curb panels, manufactured by Stellar Manufacturing Company, were undersized.
A final report on this item was submitted to Region II on March 13,19C1.
TVA indicates that they consider 10 CFR 21 to be applicable to this deficiency.
The NRC inspector reviewed TVA's final report and their nonconformance report (NCR-PBNP-193) on the deficiency. The, inspector noted that the cause had not been identified and documented for this item.
The inspector noted that the breakdown in the manufacturer's QA system that permitted use of improper size plates must be idert *fied to determine proper corrective action.
This item will remain e ien pending TVA's identification and documentation of the cause of this discrepancy and further review by Region II in subsequent inspection.
e.
(0 pen) Item 553,554/81-05-05: Failure to Radiograph RPV Pedestal Welds and Bypassing Hold Points on Concrete Pour On December 23, 1980 and January 9,1981, TVA informed Region II of deficiencies involving failure to radiograph reactor pressure vessel (RPV) pedestal welds and bypassing hold points during concrete pours.
TVA anticipates providing a final report to Region II on this item by June 10, 1981. This item will remain open pending receipt and review of the final report and examination of the item in subsequent NRC inspections.
f.
(0 pen) Item 553,554/81-05-06:
Failure by ITT Grinnell to Use Proper Testing Methods On April 3,1981, TVA informed Region II that the material test reports for certa *n pipe fittings indicated the fittings had been examined by ultrasor ec testing, whereas the applicable code required penetrant or magnetic particle examination. TVA anticipates transmitting the final report to Region II on this item by May 29, 1981. This item will remain open pending receipt and review of the final report and exami-nation of the item in subsequent NRC inspection (
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(0 pen) Item 553/80-10-04, 554/80-09-04: Atlas Machine and Iron Works QA A final report on this item was submitted to Region II on December 18, 1980.
The NRC inspector was informed that the corrective action described in the report had been found inadequate and that other actions were being taken which included transfer of certain manufac-turing and repair responsibilities to a new vendor.
Examples of discrepant items supplied by the initial manufacturer were viewed by the NRC inspector.
This item will remain open pending receipt of a revised final report and further examination of the item by Region II in subsequent inspections.
h.
(0 pen) Item 553/80-10-06, 554/80-09-06: Design Deficient Gate Valves by Anchor Darling A revised final report on this item was transmitted to Region II on November 3, 1980.
The inspector.dentified the following documents relative to the item:
(1) TVA NCR-6 (2) TVA NCR-6 Rev. 1 (3)
C. F. Braun Design Deficiency Report NCR-12 (4)
Letter from L. H.
Larson (General Electric Company)
to H. M. Bankus (General Electric Company) dated November 3,1980; Subject - STRIDE Design Deficiency No. CFB-12; TVA identification NEB 80 11 05 513.
The above documents were generated offsite and could not be obtained for review until near the end of the inspection.
The NRC inspector determined that there was not sufficient time to perform an adequate review of the documents and the information provided in the final report, and that it would be desirable to have the information reviewed by an NRC specialist knowledgeable in valve design.
The item will remain open pending such a review in a subsequent Region II inspection.
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(0 pen) Item 553/81-01-06: Base Metal Crack in Drywell Vent Structure TVA submitted a final report to Region II on this item on February 13, 1981.
The NRC inspector discussed this item with TVA personnel, observed the area of the crack, and reviewed the following documents which were related to the item:
(1) NCR PBNP-172 R2 (2) QC Investigation Report (QCIR) 21723 (11/22/80)
(3) NCR PBNP-186 R1
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(4) QCIR 21891 (1/6/81)
(5) NCR PBNP-213 (6) QCIR 22352 (4/4/81)
(7)
Preliminary Report of check on chemical and physical properties of fractured plate, Singleton Materials Engineering Laboratory Report No. PB-810508.
From the review, observation, and discussions the NRC inspector found that:
(1) While TVA reported one base metal crack in their February 13, 1981 fin &l repcrt to the NRC. an additional second base crack Lad occurred in the same svucture on January 6,1981.
Further, a third base metal crack occurred in the structure about April 4, 1981. A revised final report noting the occurrence of additional cracks was not provided. Region II became aware of the additional cracks in Inspection 553,554/81-01.
(2)
Repairs were not completed by February 28, 1981, as stated in the final report.
(3)
In observing repairs to a weld joint replacing the originally cracked plate with a different thicker plate material, the NRC inspector noted what appeared to be an unsatisfactory taper at the welds betweca the replacement plate and remaining structure. The taper appeared to be about 1 to I whereas the licensee had specified 3 to 1 in the disposition to NCR 172 R2 for this crack.
The licensee initially confirmed the 1 to 1 taper but later stated they had made an error and the taper was 3 to 1.
The licensee assured the inspector that adequate taper would be provided. Further, they stated that the commentary to the applic-able code (AWS D1.1) indicated that a lh to 1 taper would be ade-quate.
(4) The licensee submitted a sample of the base material to their lab for physical and chemical property tests.
The NRC inspector reviewed a copy of the preliminary results of the tests performed which were not completed or available to the licensee until the last day of the NRC inspector's inspection (See Ref. 7 above).
The laboratory report on the properties of a sample of the plate indicated Charpy Notch Toughness test energies of only about 5 ft-lbs at 74 F.
The NRu ins,,ector noted that this appeareo a very low toughness and requested that the licensee verify its adequacy with their design enginee (
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(5) The findings described above indicate that the licensee's final report was inadequate and inaccurate in that the description of the deficiency was incomplete (neither the original report nor a revision thereto was provided giving information on the additional cracking or material tests) and inaccurate (repairs were not completed by the date indicated in the report).
Item 553/81-01-06 will remain open pending receipt and review of a revised final report and examination of the item by Region II in a subsequent inspection. The licensee agreed that the revised final report should clearly address the significance of the results of the tests they performed on the material.
6.
Steel Structures and Supports - Welding Related Activities (Unit 1)
The NRC inspector observed welding related activities for compliance with regulations and the licensee's applicable codes and specifications as described below:
a.
Observation of Welding Activities Within Containment The inspector observed welding in progress on containment vessel welds identified P1 T2301601 and P1 T231604. The code and design specifica-tion applicable to the welding of the containment are respectively, ASME Section III (74S74) and Specification 300-13 R9.
The welding activities were observed to verify that the work was being conducted in accordance with a process control card, weld identification and loca-tion as specified, applicable procedures and drawings available, adherence to welding procedure, proper joint preparation and assembly, proper welding position, and welding equipment in an acceptable condi-tion.
b.
Visual Examination of Welds The inspector visually examined welds IX21-019-AP211-2 and 07-2, which are safety related structural supports located outside the containment; and anchor bolt chair welds P1 T2302710 and P1 T23702714, which attach to the containment. The code and design specification for the support welds are, respectively, ASME Section III (74S74) and Specification 300-46 R4.
The anchor bolt chair code and specification are respec-tively, ASME Section III (74S74) and Specification 300-13 R5.
The welds were examined for proper location and size, surface finish, transitions, reinforcement, joint configuration, grinding and absence of unacceptable surface defects.
The anchor bolt chair weld; were found to be undersized in that 5/8 inch fillet welds were fcand not *o have adequate throat to meet size requirements specified by drawing F0109A. Final size inspection had been completed on these welds. The NRC inspector also noted that the process control (APC) cards for these
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welds specified a 0.422 inch thickness. The visual inspection proce-dure (QCI-N501 R4) requires recording of material thickness or weld size where thickness is specified on the APC cc-d N 0.422 inch given on the cards was neither of these. The inspector naed that if a choice of thickness or weld size is permitted, the card shauld identify which it is, as far many welds material thickness and weld size will differ.
The accepted undersized fillet welds are consicered an example of improper control of the fillet weld inspection process. The improper!y specified thicknesses are considered an example of providing improper data which may be used in the inspection process.
These are an mparent violation of requirements for control of special processes as described in Criterion IX of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, and are identified as item 553/81-05-07, " Inadequate Control of Special Processes".
Another example of a violation of this criterion is described in paragraph 7 below.
c.
Specia', Welding Applications - Repairs
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(1) Repairs to Reactor Building Containment Equipment Orain Sump Stainless Liner T13XX 004-1 The inspector observed the subject drain sump during penetrant examination of repairs being perf;rmed in accordance with QCIR 21617. The code for all stainless steel welding to the sump was identified in design specification 300-13 R5 as ASME Section III (77S77), subsection NE.
The work ard documentation were examined for proper welding procedures and electrodes, compliance with code repair limits and proper repair documentation.
The QCIR identified but did not dimensionally locate, four areas where base metal repairs were required. At least five areas could be identified on the sump which had been repaired. Only in one instance could a repaired area be identified to the documentation.
In that instance the identification was made through paint stick marking on the sump.
While the inspector was informed that weld repairs had been performed there was no documentation of the depth or location of the excavations for the repairs as required by TVA instruction W-116 R0.
The location of repairs exceeding 10*.' of the section thickness, which would require radiography in accordance with the code, could not be determined.
Further, the inspector noted additional discrepant conditions on the sump including a gauge and a number of excessively undercut areas which had not been identi-fied fcr disposition. TVA procedure CEP 15.03 requires identifi-cation of such disct 2 pant conditions on a QCIR.
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The violations of procedural requirements described above are considered to be a violation of Criterion V of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B and are identified as item 553/81-05-08, " Failure to Properly Identify Areas for Repair".
In observing the sump liner the NRC inspector noted that carbon steel studs had been applied by automatic stud welding.
The inspector questioned the licensee regarding this practice and was informed it had been determined acceptable for this application.
The inspector identified review of the acceptability of this practice as inspector followup item 553/81-05-09, " Carbon Steel Studs Shot on Stainless Steel".
(2) Repairs to Drywell Vent Structure Weld P1 DWVS 00537 R2 The code applicable to the subject weld is AWS 01.1-75.
The inspector observed arcavation and magnetic particle examination of excavated areas for the subject weld repair. The work and process control cards were observed for specification of proper weld procedures, preheat and electrode control.
Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified except the violations described in paragraph 6.b and 6.c.(1).
7.
Safety Related Piping - Welding Related Activities (Unit 1)
The inspector observed a fitup inspection on safety related piping and examined the process control cards and drawing for 'che piping for proper specification of materials and welding requircinents in accordance with the
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applicable code and TVA procedures. The piping was Air Positive Seal System piping described on line drawing AB-APS-2 Sht 1 R0. The code applicable to this piping is ASME Section III Class 2 (74S74). The NRC inspector observed that the process control cards for welds P1 P6100038 and 39 specified thicknesses of 0.133 inch, whereas the drawing specified 1 inch Sch 80 piping would have a 0.179 wall thickness ar ' would require an even larger weld size. This is considered another examp'.s of the violation described in paragraph 6.b.
Within the areas examined no violations or deviations were identified except an additional example of the violation originally identified in pragraph 6.b.
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