IR 05000498/1992029

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Ack Receipt of 921218 & 23 Ltrs Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-498/92-29 & 50-499/92-29
ML20127G644
Person / Time
Site: South Texas  STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Issue date: 01/15/1993
From: Beach A
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To: Hall D
HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
References
NUDOCS 9301220025
Download: ML20127G644 (5)


Text

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JAN I 5 l993 , Docket flos. 50-498 50-499 License Nos. tJPF-76 flPF-80 Houston Lighting & Power Company ATTN: Donald P. Hall, Group Vice President, Nuclear P.O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77251 Gentlemen: SUBJECT: f4RC INSPECTION REPORT (10. 50-498/92-29; 50-499/92-29 Thank you for your letters of December 18 and 23,1992, in response to our letter and Notice of Violation dated November 25, 1992. We have reviewed your replies and find them responsive to the concerns raised in our flotice of Violation. We will review the implementation of your corrective actions during a future inspection to determine whether full compliance has been achieved and will be maintained.

Sincerely, I t , \\ L ueN d Bill Beach, Director l Division of Reactor Projects l l CC: l Houston Lighting & Power Company ATTN: William J. Jump, Manager Nuclear Licensing P.O. Box 289 Wadsworth, Texas 77483 l l l l h l (fl' r j , - , _-

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< . . Houston Lighting & Power Company-2-City of Austin Electric Utility Department ATTN: J. C. Lanier/M. B. Lee P.O. Box 1088 Austin, Texas 78767 City Public Service Board ATIN: R. J. Costello/M. T. Hardt P.O. Box 1771 San Antonio, Texas 78296 Newman & Holtzinger, P. C.

< ATTN: Jack R. Newman, Esq.

1615 L Street, NW Washington, D.C.

20036 Central Power and Light Company

ATTN: 0. E. Ward /T. M. Puckett P.O. Box 2121 Corpus Christi, Texas 78403 INPO

-Records Center

1100 Circle 75 Parkway

Atlanta, Georgia-30339-3064 Mr. Joseph M. Hendrie

50 Bellport Lane Bellport, New York 11713 - Bureau of Radiation Control State of Texas 1101 West 49th Street Austin, Texas 78756-Judge, Matagorda County Matagorda County Courthouse - 1700 Seventh Street Bay City, Texas 77414 . Licensing Representative Houston Lighting.& Power Company , Suite 610- -Three Metro Center -- Bethesda, Maryland 20814 L . ! \\; -1 )

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ATTN: Rufus S. Scott, Associate v General Counsel ' P.O. Box 61867 .; Houston, Texas 77208 > i I

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.- - . __ -.. . - _ ' ' .. , i The Light . c o mp a ny"""'h I*'"I"'3": unnic cenconne i.oon s P. a lion m W.d.noh, Tein 77m flouston 1.ighting & l'ower 116 ft 8 W [I T ' ! December 18, 1992 < l N 30 j9fd ST-!!L-AE-4 27 8 y File lio.: G02.04 10CFR2.201 M IV U.

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liuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 South Texas Project Unit 1 and 2 Docket llos. ST!i 50-498; ST11 50-499 Reply to 110tice of Violation 9229-01 Regarding Failure to Declare an Unusual Event in Accordance with F2qrgency RenP.QDEC.. Procedures !!ouston Lighting & Power Company (IIL&P) has reviewed flotico of Violation 9229-01 dated flovember 25, 1992, and submits the attached reply.

If you have any questions, please contact 14r. C. A. Ayala at (512) 972-8628 or no at (512) 972-7921.

. ' s W. 11. Kinse , . Vice President liuclear Genera',lon RAD /ag Attachment: Reply to liotice of Violation 9229-01 lTh 93-D% IR\\92 339.00.' A Subidi'ny of llouston Industrin incorporitted .. - . ._.

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g . ' llouston Lighting & Power Company ST-i!L-AE-4 2 7 8 , South Texa: Project Electric Generating Station Filo No. t G02.04 Page 2 cc: Regional Administrator, Region IV Rufus S.

Scott Nuclear Regulatory Commission Associato General Counsel 611 Ryan Plaza Drivo, Suito 400 !!ouston Lighting & Power Company Arlington, TX 76011 P. O.

Box 61867 Houston, TX 77208 George Dick, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission INPO Washington, DC 20555 Records Contor 1100 circle 75 Parkway J. I. Tapia Atlanta, GA 30339-3064 Senior Resident Inspector c/o U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Dr. Joseph M._Hendrio Commission 50 Bo11 port Lano - P.

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Box 910 Bo11 port, NY 11713 Bay City, TX 77414 D. K. Lacker J. R. Newman, Esquiro Bureau of Radiation Control Newman & Holtzinger, P.C.

Texas Department of licalth 1615 L Stroot, N.W.

1100 West 49th Stroot Washington, DC 20036 Austin, TX 78756-3189 D. E. Ward /T. M. Puckett contral Power and-Light Company P.

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Box 2121 , Corpus Christi, TX 78403 J. C. Lanior/M.

D.

Leo City of Austin Electric Utility Department P.O.

Box 1008 Austin, TX 78767 K. J. Fiedler/M. T. liardt > City Public Servico Board P.

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Box 1771 San Antonio, TX 78296-Rovised 10/11/91 L4/NRC/ . 'ywye- -er-= V# y-F-e wpwsc m y wh*q + - -v-- -#-og-y-rs---y* -g-yy-4- www we&Wy'- y*

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, ______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _. _____ . . Attachment 1 ST-llL-AE-4 2 7 8 Page 1 of 2 I.

Statement of Violation: failure to follow an Approved Procedttr.c _.

Technical Specification G.8.1.d requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained for Emergency Plan implementation.

This is accomplished, in part, by Procedure OERP01-ZV-I!101, Revision 0, " Emergency Classification."

Addendum 1 of Procedure OERP01-ZV-I!i01 requires that an - Unusual Event be declared when all engineered nafety features diesel generators are inoperable.

Contrary to the above, on October 12, 1992, Unit 1 control room operators failed to declare an Unusual Event until 4 hours and 22 minutes after it was determined that all three engineered safety features diccol generators were inoperable.

This is a Severity Level IV violation.

(Supplement I) (498;499/9229-01) II.

Itouston Idghtina & Power Position: IIL&P concurs that the cited violation occurred.

III.

ILeason for Viojation: The cause of the failure to immediately declare an Unusual Event was that Control Room operators did not recognize that the Emergency Classification prc.cedure, OERP01-ZV-IN01, required entry into an Unusual Event.

Operators are trained on the requirements of the Emergency Classification procedure, however, they are not required to memorize it.

When a component is declared inoperable it is entered in the Operability Tracking Log (OTL). The standard.OTL for Standby Diesel Generators (SDGa} did not provide any guiCance which would prompt operatorc to review the Emergency Classification procedure.

In addition, there is no requirement in the Technical Specifications for an SDG to be operable when the Unit is in no mode (no fuel in the reactor vessel). If all three SDGs were inoperable in Modes 1 through 4 then a shutdown and/or cooldown to Mode 5 would be required by Technical Specifications.

Operations personnel are confident that if this event occurred in Modes 1 through 4 then Control Room perconnel would have recognized that an Unusual Event should be entered.

The Emergency Classification procedure does not account for the different mode requirements of Technical Specifications.

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Attachment 1 ST-llL-AE-4278 l Page 2 of 2 IV.

Corrective Actionn:

The following actions are being taken to prevent recurrence 1. The Operability Tracking Log for SDGs was revised to require the operators to review the Emergency Classification procedure for possible Emergency Plan entry requirements.

2. The Emergency Classification procedure was reviewed to determine if any other conditions could exist which would result in the f ailure to enter the proper Emergency Action ' Level.

As a result, OpOp04-DJ-0001, Loss of Class 1E 125 VDC Power, was revised to reference the Emergency Classification procedure.

! 3.

Shift Supervisors for both Units completed required , reading of the Emergency Classification procedure.

4.

This event will be included in Licensed operator Requalification training.

Training will be completed by March 12, 1993.

5.

Lesson Plans for Emergency Plan implementing procedures will be revised by January 25, 1993 to ~ emphasize that Emergency Plan requirements are in effect at all times, including no mode.

V.

Date of Full Comollance: HL&P is in full compliance at this time.

Future training will reinforce Emergency Classification requirements.

. IM 92-339. 001 - - - - - - - -, _, .. ,_. - _. _,. . ,_.

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'U'"** - R II ~ ' ~ " m[[ , (' December 23, 1992 a, J, O gg j' ST-ilL-AE-4 2 8 3 File No.: c02.04 L 10CFR2.201 REGtON nr ~ U. S. liuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 South Texas Project Unit 1 & 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499 Reply to Notice of Violation 9229-02 Regarding Two Examples of Failure to Follow Approved Procedures Resultinct in the Inadvertent Start of ESF Eq.uipment flouston Lighting & Power Company (llL&P) has reviewed Notice of Violation 9229-02 dated November 25, 1992, and submits the attached reply.

Example 1 of the violation has been addressed as the subject of Licensee Event Report 92-016 (attached).

If you have any questions, please contact Mr.

C. A. Ayala at (512) 972-8628 or me at (512) 972-7921.

. N.N.

W. II. Kinsey Ur.

Vice President, Nuclear Generation RAD /ag Attachments: 1) Reply to Notice of Violation 9229-02 2) Licensee Event Report 92-016 (Unit 1) anz g} ^ o l l 96-0499 1R 92 w,001 A Subsidiary of Houston Industries incoti) orated

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' . , . Houston Lighting & Power Company ST-HL-AE-4 2 8 3 South Texas oject Dectric Generating Station Pilo No.I G02.04 Page 2 ces Regional Administrator, Region IV Rufus S. Scott Nuclear Regulatory Commission Associato General Counsel 611 Ryan Plaza Drivo, Suito 400 Houston Lighting & Power Company Arlington, TX 76011 P. O. Box 61867 Houston, TX 77208 George Dick, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission INPO Washington, DC 20555 Records Contor 1100 circio 75 Parkway J.

I. Tapia Atlanta, GA 30339-3064 Senior Resident Inspector c/o U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Dr. Joseph M. Hendrio commission 50 Bollport Lano P. O.

Box 910 Bo11 port, NY 11713 Bay City, TX 77414 D. K. Lacker J. R. NcWman, Esquiro Bureau of Radiation Control-- Howman & Holtzinger, P.C.

Texas Department of Health 1615 L Stroot, N.W.

1100 West 49th Street Washington, DC 20036 Austin, TX 78756-3189~ D. E. Ward /T. M. Puckett Contral Power and Light Company P. O.

Box 2121 Corpus Christi, TX 78403 J.

C. Lanior/M. B. Loo City of Austin Electric Utility Department P.O.

Box 1088 Austin, TX 78767 K. J. Fiedlor/M. T. Hardt City Public Servico Board P. O.

Box 1771 s San Antonio, TX 78296 , ' Revised 10/ll/91 ' L4/NRC/ i

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_ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . & Attachment i ST-HL-AE-4283 Page 1 of 3 ' I.

Statement of Violation: Failure to Follow Anoroved Procedures Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained for those activities recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978.

Three (sic) examples of violating this requirement are stated below: 1.

RG 1.33, Appendix A, Item 3.e, recommends operating procedures for the component cooling water system.

This is accomplished, in part, by Procedure 1PCP03-ZC-0002, Revision 0, " Chemical Addition to Component Cooling Water System."

Step 4.2.11 of Procedure IPCP03-ZC-0002 requires plant operators to place the control switch for the Domineralized Water Makeup Valve 1-CC-LV4501 to the proper position for plant operation (automatic) following chemical addition to the component cooling water (CCW) surge tank.

Contrary to the above, on October 3, 1992, Unit 1 control room operators fai. led to restore Valve 1-CC-LV4501 to the automatic position - following chemical addition to the component cooling water surge tank.

Consequently, on October 4, 1992, the Train A component cooling water system automatically isolated on low surge tank level and the Train C CCW Pump started because of low system pressure.

2.

RG 1.33, Appendix A, Item 3.s(2) (a), recommends operating procedures for onsite emergency power sources.

This is accomplished, in part by Procedure OPOF02-DG-0002, Revision 0, " Emergency Diesel Generator 12(22)."

Step 4.11 of Procedure OPOP02-DG-0002 requires depr_essing-the release pushbutton prior to resetting the emergency stop pushbutton.

Contrary to the above, on October 15, 1992, a Unit 1 control room operator failed to depress the release pushbutton prior to resetting the emergency stop pushbutton.

Consequently, Emergency Diesel Generator 12 inadvertently started when the emergency stop was reset.

This is a Severity Level IV violation.

(Supplement I) (498;499/9229-02) IRt92-345.001 ., - - - -- ...

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ l Attachment 1 ST-HL-AE-4283 Page 2 of 3 II.

Itouston Lichtinri & Power Position: 11L&P concurs that the cited violation occurred.

III.

Roacon for Violation: 1.

Sco attached LER 92-016.

2.

The cause of the inadvertent Standby Diesel Generator (SDG) start was the failure of the Reactor Operator (RO) to follow the procedure precautions.

The RO reviewed the procedure in preparation for the evolution, however, he did not consult the procedure during restoration of the SDG and did not recall the procedure precaution.

IV.

Correqtive Actions: 1.

See attached LER 92-016.

2a. The SDG operating procedures were revised to include specific steps to restore the SDG, including releasing the SDG from the emergency modo prior to resetting the emergency stop pushbutton.

2b. The personnel involved were counseled in accordance with the Constructive Discipline Program.

2c. Engineered Safety Features (ESP) actuations were discussed with each crew by Operations Management.

2d. A Unit Supervisor mooting was held on October 19 to discuss supervisory oversight expectations.

2c. A new interim procedure review and feedback form was developed to be completed prior to and after each evolution.

The form provides ESF awareness questions and spe'ific feedback for procedure improvement.

c 2f. Engineering will evaluate a design change of the SDG circuitry to automatically release the SDG from the emergency mode when the SDG is tripped using the emergency stop pushbutton by January 31, 1993.

The design change will be dispositioned by management by February 26, 1993.

IR\\92-345,001

_ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Attachment 1 ST-llL-AE-4 2 83 Page 3 of 3 IV.

Corrective Actions: (Cont'd)

This event will be covered in Licensed operator Requalification training.

Training Will be completed by March 26, 1993.

V.

Date of Full Compliance: IIL&P is in full compliance at this time.

_ IR\\92-34$,001 a

---. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _..__ _ _ _ l* . T h ATTACHMD)4f3 ST HL AE '/ "." ' on The Light c o mp a ny 5"'hI'"' f",jen accuic ceneniing statin P.o. non m wadi-onh, Ton 77m llousion Lighting te l'ower tiovember 03, 1992 ST-IIL-AE-4252 File lio. : G26 10CFR50.73 ' U. S. Iluclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 South Texas Project Unit 1 Docket llo. ST!I 50-498 Licensco Event Report 92-016 Unplanned ESF Actuation of a Component Cooling Water Eu.pn on October 4, 1992 due to an Inadeaunto Procedure.

Pursuant to 10CFR50.73, llouston fighting & Power (IIL&P) submits the attached Unit 1 Licensco Event Report (LER 92-016) regarding an unplanned Engineered Safety Features (ESP) actuation of a Component Cooling Water (CCW) pump on October 4, 1992, due to an inadequate" procedure.

This event did not have adverse effect on the health and safety of the public.

On llovember 3, 1992, an extension of the duc date of this letter to llovember 5, 1992, was requested and granted, by Mr. M. A.

Satorius of NRC Region IV.

If you should have any questions on this matter, please contact Mr. C. A. Ayala at (512) 972-8628 or me at (512) 972-7205.

k.

)(1, William J. Jump General Manager, Nuclear Licensing UMP /ag Attachment: LER 92-016 (South Texas, Unit 1) ~ gg waTJt~ o t LER\\92297002,tJ1 A Subsidiary of llouston industries incorporated _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - - - a

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_ _ .. _ ..- _ _ ' . , ' ' i ATTACHMEf4T h ~ ' ST.HL AE. WaA0 ,PAGE A DF0 lloustonlighting & Power Compar.y ST-HL-AE-4252 South Texas Project Electric Cencrating Station File No.: G26 Page

CC: Regional Administrator, Region IV Rufus S. Scott Duclear Regulatory Commission Associate General Counsel 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Houston Lighting & Power company Arlington, TX 76011 P. O. Box 61867 Houston, TX 77208 George Dick, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission INPO Washington, DC 20555 Records Center 1100 Circle 75 Parkway J. I. Tapia Atlanta, GA 30339-3064 Senior Res3 dent Inspector c/o U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Dr. Joseph M. Hendrie Commission 50 Bellport Lane P.

O. Box 910 Brillport, NY 11713 Bay City, TX 77414 D. K. Lacker J. R. Newman, Esquire Bureau of Radiation Control Newman & Holtzinger, P.C.

Texas Department of Health 1100 West 49th Street 1615 L Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20036 Austin, TX 78756-3189 D. E. Ward /T. M. Puckett Central Power and Light Company P. O. Box 2121 Corpus Christi, TX 78403 - J. C. Lanicr/M. B. Lee City of Austin Ilectric Utility Department P.O. Box 1088 hustin, TX 78767 E. J. Fiedler/M. T. Hardt City Public Ser ice Board P. O. Box 1771 San Antonio, TX 78296 Revised 10/11/91 L4/NRC/ .. .

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LICEN5tf CONTACT #0m TMis (ta (121 itLEPh0NE NUwetM NAwg AntaCODE Charles Avala - Supervising Licensing Engineer 5 11 12 9 17 12 l-18 16 12 18 Co6tettif CNE LINT Fbd EACH COMPONENT F AILUAE o!$CAltt0 tes THis REPCAT 183) Y i CAvlt SY5ftM CoMPQNENT .gg'g h ' ^ "lv t[ CAust sv$t tu COedPONENT YO PA dQp %' m m @na '< NW i i i i i t i zw e,m i i i i l i ns; q W @?lg '9Rb @$9 l l 1 1 1 l l' AfdWB i 1 l l l l l MONTM L4V YEAR $UP9LtW4NTAL mtPORT tartCTto (143 SUtutS5 SON 4tS 199 e. e.nwoon IJr!!CTED sv0uts$s0N psits No l l l AufmaCfm em - w.,,,..- ,,e ,,.-. -. ie,on On October 4, 1992, Unit 1 was in Mode 6 during a refueling outage.

The Demineralir.ed Water makeup valve to the Component Cooling Water (CCW) surge tank had been isolated the previous -day, in preparation for an addition of' corrosion inhibitor.

At_approximately 0318 hours, Unit 1-experienced an unplanned Engineered Safety Features (ESF) actuation due to an automatic pump start of CCW components caused by a low level in the-CCW surge tank. The appropriate of f-normal procedure was implemented and.

level in the surge tank was restored without further incident.

All ESF equipment operated as designed.

This event was the result of a failure to reopen the CCW surge tank makeup valve following a-chemical addition.- The immediate iause of this event is less than adequate communications.

An additional cause was the lack of a procedural step to verify valve position.

This event will be included.in requalification training for licensed and non-licensed operators,_ chemical operators and chemistry technicians.

The procedure associated with this surveillance will-be revised to include a requirement for verification when - manipulating.

safety related valves.

Additionally, a review will be performed-of - procedures that contains Operations and Chemistry interfaces to ensure adequate independent verification is specified for those systems that-require-verification of valve-positioning.

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0b ob 0F O l4 015 l0101014 b b 9 12 - 0 li l6 - South Texas. Unit 1 7 EXT M par, anos. & W se eddrmmst NAC,orm Jena 'st (17) DESCRTPTION OF EVENTL On October 4,1992, Unit 1 was.in Mode 6 during a refueling outage.

At approximately 0318 hours, Unit 1 experienced an unplanned Engineered Safety Features (ESP) actuation due to an automatic pump start of Train "C" CCW components caused by a low level in the CCW surge tank.

On October 3, 1992, at approximately 1530 hours, the Domineralized Water makeup valve to the Component Cooling Water (CCW) surge tank was isolated in preparation for an addition of corrosion inhibitor.

The procedure in use directed the Chemical Technician to notify the control Room upon the completion of the chemical addition and to further instruct the Control Room Operator to place the makeup valve in the proper position.

From the statements made by the Chemical Technician, the requirement to reposition the valve was relayed by the Chemical Technician to the Control Room and acknowledged by an unknown individual.

No Control Room Operator on shif t at the time recalls receiving direction to close the valve but all personnel interviewed acknowledged that-multiple refueling outage activities were in progress.

The CCW system supplies both ESF and non-ESF loads and contains a surge tank to maintain system inventory.

The CCW surge uank is compartmented into three equal volumes by internal baffles such that a leak on any one train will not disable all three.

Makeup to the CCW surge tank is automatically initiated from the Domineralized Water header at a preset value through the Domineralized Water makeup valve.

In the event that the level continues to decrease, non-ESF components are isolated and the CCW trains are isolated from each other via automatic valve closure.

Automatic start of the Standby CCW pump occurs when the CCW common header pressure drops to a preset setpoint.

At approximately 0318 hours,on October 4, 1992, Unit 1 experienced a low level in the CCW surge tank and an automatic start of the C Prior to this time, CCW pump 1A was providing train (1C) CCW pump.

while IC needed CCW header flow for refueling outage heat loads, was in standby, and 1B was in maintenance.

The low level was caused by normal system losses coupled with the lack of makeup flow.

Prior to reaching the non-ESF isolation setpoint, an alarm should have been generated.

However, this alarm was inoperative LER\\92297002.U1 -..

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"^a 01116 - 010 0h 0F 0 l4 Unit 1 0 l5 l 0 l 01014 19 18 912 - South Texas c stxwe ,u < ~ m m w m<wsm DESCRIPTION OF EVENT: (Con't) Once the level reached the due to a loose microswitch connection.the required valves closed isolating non-ESF isolation setpoint, Low pressure on the header caused the non-ESF header from Train A.

The off-normal procedure, Loss the actuation of the Train C pump.

of component Cooling Water, was implemented and level in the surge tank was restored without further incident.

CAUSE OF EVENT: 'This event was the result of a failure to reopen the CCW surge tank The immediate cause of fill valve following a chemical addition.

An additional this event is less than adequate communications.

cause was the lack of a procedural step to verify valve position.

Reliance on a single procedural step notifying the operator of the need for valve restoration ir not sufficient.

This event indicates the potential that other procedures involving operations and Chemistry interfaces may not have adequate verification specified.

The cause of the annunciator failure was a loose microswitch connection was repaired and tested This connection.

The level switch that generates the alarm had not satisfactorily.

for been calibrated since 1987 and the Preventive Maintenance (PM) both units had been deleted.

ANAI,YSIS OF EVENT: The CCW pump start is considered to be an ESF actuation and is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (iv). The CCW system supports the ESF functions of systems as described in the STPEGS All ESF equipment operated Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.

as designed.

The failure of the annunciator exacerbated the incident but did not constitute a significant challenge to the CCW system.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: 1. CCW surge tank level was recovered and the CCW system was realigned in accordance with procedure.

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"a 0F 014 O li l 6 -- O 10 0 l4 0 1510 l o l o 141918 9 12 - South Texas, Unit 1 YEXT or swe spee e s.ea.4 ese e***ua*%8C #wm 20Wim CORRECTIVE ACTIONSt (Con't) 2. This event will be included in requalification training for licensed and non-licensed operators, chemical operators and chemistry technicians.

This action will be completed by June 11, 1993.

The procedures associated with chemistry activities concerning the Component Cooling Water system will be revised to include 3.

a requirement for verification when manipulating safety related 1992 These procedures will be revised by December 2, valves.

A review will be performed of procedures that contain Operations and' Chemistry interfaces to ensure that adequate independent 4.

verification is specified for those systems that require posiviening.

This review will be verification of valve Any discrepancies identified will completed by June 3, 1993.

be corrected in a timely fashion.

low level alarm level switch has been PM for the 5. The Unit 1 The Unit 2 PM will be developed by January 28, reactivated.

i 1993.

HL&P will perform a review of ems associated with control room annunciators to determine whether the annunciator instrument 6.

loops receive a periodic calibration. This comprehensive review 1993.

will be completed by August 11, ADDITIONJT,INFORMATION: Unplanned ESF actuations involving CCW pump starts that have been reported to the NRC within the last two years were: Unit 1 LER 92-005 Unplanned ESF actuation due to a CCW pump , ' start due to an inadequate procedure.

e Inadvertent ESF actuation due to a CCW pump Unit 1 LER 92-010 start due to lack of procedural guidance.

  • Unit 1 LER 92-015 Unplanned ESP actuation due to a CCW pump start due to operator inattention.
  • IIR\\92297002.U1

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