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Category:Inspection Report
MONTHYEARIR 05000275/20240022024-08-0606 August 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000275/2024002 and 05000323/2024002 IR 05000275/20240142024-07-11011 July 2024 Age-Related Degradation Inspection Report 05000275/2024014 and 05000323/2024014 IR 05000275/20243012024-07-10010 July 2024 NRC Initial Operator Licensing Examination Approval 05000275/2024301; 05000323/2024301 IR 05000275/20244012024-07-0808 July 2024 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000275/2024401 and 05000323/2024401 (Full Report) IR 05000323/20240112024-07-0303 July 2024 License Renewal Phase Report 05000323/2024011 IR 05000275/20240012024-04-23023 April 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000275/2024001 and 05000323/2024001 IR 05000275/20230042024-02-0909 February 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000275/2023004 and 05000323/2023004 IR 05000275/20230112024-01-12012 January 2024 NRC License Renewal Phase 1 Inspection Report 05000275/2023011 IR 05000275/20230032023-11-13013 November 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000275/2023003 and 05000323/2023003 IR 05000275/20240152023-10-10010 October 2023 Information Request for the Cybersecurity Baseline Inspection, Notification to Perform Inspection (050002752024015 and 050003232024015) IR 05000275/20230052023-08-22022 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Report 05000275/2023005 and 05000323/2023005) - Mid Cycle Letter IR 05000275/20230022023-08-14014 August 2023 Quarterly Integrated Inspection Report 05000275/2023002 and 05000323/2023002- August 7, 2023 IR 05000275/20213012023-08-0909 August 2023 Errata for Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 - NRC Examination Report 050002752021301 and 050003232021301 IR 05000275/20234022023-08-0303 August 2023 NRC Security Inspection Report 05000275/2023402, and 05000323/2023402 IR 05000275/20233012023-07-25025 July 2023 NRC Initial Operator Licensing Examination Approval 05000275/2023301, 05000323/2023301 IR 05000275/20230102023-05-11011 May 2023 NRC Inspection Report 05000275 2023010 and 05000323 2023010 IR 05000275/20230012023-05-0909 May 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000275/2023001 and 05000323/2023001 IR 05000275/20234032023-03-10010 March 2023 NRC Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000275/2023403, 05000323/2023403 (Full Report) IR 05000275/20220062023-03-0101 March 2023 Annual Assessment Letter for Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Report 05000275/2022006 and 05000323/2022006) IR 05000275/20220042023-02-0202 February 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000275/2022004 and 05000323/2022004 IR 05000275/20220102023-01-27027 January 2023 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000275/2022010 and 05000323/2022010 IR 05000275/20224022022-10-26026 October 2022 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000275/2022402 and 05000323/ 2022402 IR 05000275/20220032022-10-24024 October 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000275/2022003 and 05000323/2022003 and Exercise of Enforcement Discretion IR 05000275/20220052022-08-23023 August 2022 Updated Inspection Plan for Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Report 05000275/2022005 and 05000323/2022005) IR 05000275/20220022022-08-10010 August 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000275/2022002 and 05000323/2022002 IR 05000275/20220112022-08-0909 August 2022 Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Teams) Inspection Report 05000275/2022011 and 05000323/2022011 IR 05000275/20224012022-08-0303 August 2022 NRC Security Inspection Report 05000275/2022401, 05000323/2022401 ML22143A8812022-05-26026 May 2022 Revised Integrated Inspection Report 05000275/2022001 and 05000323/2022001 ML22118A9362022-05-0505 May 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000275/2022001 and 05000323/2022001 IR 05000275/20220012022-05-0505 May 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000275/2022001 and 05000323/2022001 IR 05000323/20214202022-03-31031 March 2022 Security Inspection Report 05000275 and 05000323/2021420 IR 05000275/20210062022-03-0202 March 2022 Annual Assessment Letter for Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Report 05000275/2021006 and 05000323/2021006) IR 05000275/20210042022-02-0303 February 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000275/2021004 and 05000323/2021004 IR 05000275/20214042022-01-13013 January 2022 Public - Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000275/2021404 and 05000323/2021404 IR 05000275/20210032021-11-0303 November 2021 Integrated Inspection Report 05000275/2021003 and 05000323/2021003 IR 05000275/20210112021-09-10010 September 2021 Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Programs) Report 05000275/2021011 and 05000323/2021011 IR 05000275/20214052021-08-0505 August 2021 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000275/2021405 and 05000323/2021405 IR 07200026/20214012021-08-0303 August 2021 Diablo Canon Nuclear Power Plant, Security Baseline Inspection Report 07200026/2021401 IR 05000275/20210022021-08-0202 August 2021 Integrated Inspection Report 05000275/2021002 and 05000323/2021002 IR 05000275/20210122021-07-28028 July 2021 Temporary Instruction 2515/194 Report 05000275/2021012 and 05000323/2021012 IR 05000275/20214012021-07-0101 July 2021 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000275/2021401 and 05000323/2021401 IR 05000275/20210012021-05-0707 May 2021 DC IR 2021-001-drk, Diablo Canyon Power Plant Units 1 & 2 - Integrated Inspection Report 05000275/2021001, 05000323/2021001, & Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Inspection Report 07200026/2021001 DCL-21-036, One Hundred Eighty Day Steam Generator Report for Diablo Canyon Power Plant Unit 1 Twenty-Second Refueling Outage2021-04-22022 April 2021 One Hundred Eighty Day Steam Generator Report for Diablo Canyon Power Plant Unit 1 Twenty-Second Refueling Outage ML21102A0702021-04-12012 April 2021 Notification of NRC Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Programs) (05000275/2021011 and 05000323/2021011) and Initial Request for Information IR 05000275/20214032021-03-31031 March 2021 Cyber Security Inspection Report 05000275/2021403 and 05000323/2021403 IR 05000275/20210102021-03-11011 March 2021 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000275/2021010 and 05000323/2021010 IR 05000275/20200062021-03-0303 March 2021 DC 2020 Annual Assessment Letter for Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 & 2 (Report 05000275/2020006 & 05000323/2020006) IR 05000275/20200042021-01-26026 January 2021 Integrated Inspection Report 05000275/2020004 and 05000323/2020004 IR 05000275/20204112020-12-22022 December 2020 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000275/2020411 and 05000323/2020411 IR 05000275/20204102020-12-15015 December 2020 NRC Security Inspection Report 05000275/2020410 and 05000323/2020410 2024-08-06
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UNITE D S TATE S NUC LEAR RE GULATOR Y C OMMI S SI ON R E G IO N I V 1600 EAST LAMAR BLVD AR L I NGTON , TEXAS 7 60 11 - 4511 July 11, 2013 Mr. Edward Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Pacific Gas and Electric Company Diablo Canyon Power Plant P.O. Box 56, Mail Code 104/6 Avila Beach, CA 93424 SUBJECT: ERRATA FOR DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 -
NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE INSPECTION REPORT (05000275/2012008; 05000323/2012008)
Reference: PG&E Letter DCL-13-060, Correction of Information Provided to NRC Inspectors During the 2012 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection, dated May 30, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13150A283)
Dear Mr. Halpin:
Please insert the enclosure to this letter as a replacement for page 13 of NRC Inspection Report 05000275; 05000323/2012008 (ADAMS Accession Number ML13038A714). This page corrects an error in the characterization of a licensee analysis referenced in the inspection report as identified in PG&E Letter DCL-13-060 (ML13150A283), dated May 30, 2013. The inspectors determined the corrected information does not alter the findings in the subject inspection report or the identification and disposition of the violation. In addition, the inspectors concluded the error on the part of PG&E was appropriately entered into the corrective action program. Consistent with the NRCs Enforcement Policy at Section 2.3.11, no action will be taken.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system, ADAMS.
ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Geoffrey B. Miller, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Dockets: 50-275; 50-323 Licenses: DPR-80; DPR-82 Enclosure: Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report Page 13 Electronic Distribution to Diablo Canyon
ML13193A278 ADAMS: No Yes SUNSI Review Complete Reviewer Initials: JMM Publicly Available Non-Sensitive Category A. Non-publicly Available Sensitive KEYWORD: SUNSI Review Complete RIV:DRS/EB2/SRI C: DRP/B RN:OGC C: EB2 JMMateychick NFOKeefe KFuller GBMiller
/RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
7/8/13 7/8/13 7/9/13 7/11/13
shutdown procedure and determined that the procedure did not provide operators with instructions on ensuring the 480V feeder breakers were closed. As noted in the next violation, (1R05.05.b.2), the safe shutdown analysis determined that operator actions were required to ensure the 480V feeder breakers were closed, but this requirement was not carried forward to the alternative shutdown procedure.
Example 4: Potential Overfilling of the Pressurizer The fourth example involved three fire scenarios that could result in overfilling the pressurizer. Two of these scenarios could also result in voiding in the core due to rapid depressurization of the reactor coolant system.
The first scenario involved a control room or cable spreading room fire with a spurious safety injection signal. The second scenario involved a control room or cable spreading room fire with the spurious actuation of a pressurizer power-operated relief valve, resulting in a rapid depressurization of the reactor coolant system and subsequent safety injection signal within approximately one minute. The third scenario involved a control room or cable spreading room fire with the spurious opening of a pressurizer auxiliary spray valve (8145 or 8148), resulting in a slightly slower depressurization of the reactor coolant system and subsequent safety injection signal within a maximum of four minutes (depending of the number of charging pumps running). In all three scenarios, the safety injection signal results in the two emergency core cooling system charging pumps starting and injecting water into the reactor coolant system through the charging injection valves (8801A, 8801B, 8803A, and 8803B).
The licensee examined the spurious actuation of the safety injection system in the Final Safety Analysis Report Section 15.2.15. The licensees analysis assumed the safety injection signal occurred at 100 percent power, the emergency core cooling system actuated, and letdown isolated. The licensee concluded that operators had 8.5 minutes to control charging prior to the pressurizer reaching a water solid condition.
The team determined this time limit was not conservative for all three scenarios. First, the time limit was based on reaching a water solid condition in the pressurizer, not maintaining the level within the indicating region, as required by the approved fire protection program. Second, the analysis was based on an injection from the charging pumps. In the second and third scenarios, the depressurization of the reactor coolant system could lower the pressure quickly enough that the safety injection pumps would also be able to inject water into the reactor coolant system, thereby reducing the amount of time available prior to exceeding the indicating region of the pressurizer or reaching a water solid condition in the pressurizer.
The team determined that operators could mitigate all three scenarios by controlling charging at the hot shutdown panel. The alternative shutdown procedure provided steps for operators to control charging and maintain the pressurizer level between 22 percent and 70 percent, and it provided steps to stop the charging pumps if level could not be maintained. Based on the timed walkdown, the team determined that operators would reach this step nearly 30 minutes after the reactor trip. Since this time exceeded the amount of time allowed for all three scenarios (even though this limit was not
- 13 - Enclosure