IR 05000315/1984020
| ML17321A375 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 12/10/1984 |
| From: | Wright G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17321A374 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.B.1, TASK-TM 50-315-84-20, 50-316-84-22, NUDOCS 8501080042 | |
| Download: ML17321A375 (12) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-315/84-20(DRP);
50-316/84-22(DRP)
Docket Nos.
50-315; 50-316 Licenses No.
American Electric Power Service Corporation Indiana and Michigan Electric Company 1 Riverside Plaza Columbus, OH 43216 Facility Name:
Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and
Inspection At:
Donald C.
Cook Site, Bridgman, MI Inspection Conducted:
October 14, 1984 through November 16, 1984 Inspectors:
B.:L. Jorgensen J.
K. Heller Approved by: < G.
C. Wrig t, Chi ef Reactor Projects Section 2A Ig lo 9 Date Ins ection Summar Ins ection on October
1984 throu h November 16 1984 Re orts No. 50-315/84-20 DRP 50-316/84-22 DRP Areas,Ins ected:
Routine unannounced inspection by the resident inspectors of licensee actions on previous inspection findings; operational safety; reactor trip; surveillance; Licensee Event Reports; maintenance; independent inspection areas; and management meeting - Regulatory Performance Improvement Program (RPIP).
The inspection involved a total of 184 inspector-hours by two NRC inspectors including 35 inspector-hours off-shi.ft.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8501080042 841210 PDR ADOCK 05000315
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
Mana ement Meetin
-
Re ulator Performance Im rovement Pro ram on October
1984 J.
E. 'Dolan, Vice Chairman, Engineering 8 Construction M.
P. Alexich, Vice President, Nuclear Operations W.
G. Smith, Jr., Plant Manager R.
F. Kroeger, Manager of guality Assurance J.
G. Feinstein, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing P.
A. Barrett, Senior Licensing Engineer B.
H. Bennett, Assistant Manager, Nuclear Operations Other members of the corporate and plant staff were also present.
U.
S.
NRC Personnel A.
B. Davis, Deputy Regional Administrator W.
D. Shafer, Chief, Projects Branch
E.
R.
Swanson, Senior Resident Inspector J.
K. Heller, Resident Inspector B.
L. Jorgensen, Senior Resident Inspector b.
Other members of the Headquarters staff were also present.
Ins ection October
1984 throu h November
1984
"W.
G. Smith, Jr., Plant Manager
"E. Townley, Assistant Plant Manager
"B. Svensson, Assistant 'Plant Manager T. Kriesel, Technical Superintendent-Physical Science
"A. Blind, Technical Superintendent-Engineering
"K. Baker, Operations Superintendent D. Dudding, Maintenance Superintendent
~J. Stietzel, guality Control Superintendent T. Beilman, guality Assurance Supervisor The inspector also contacted a number of licensee and contract employees and informally interviewed operation, technical and maintenance personnel during this period.
"Denotes personnel attending exit interview on November 21, 198 Licensee Ac'tions on Previous Ins ection Findin s
(Closed)
Open Item (315/81-03-01; 316/81-03-01):
The inspector noted during closeout of IEC 80-03, "Protection From Toxic Gas Hazards" that the control room filter train was not redundant and apparently does not meet single failure criterion.
In a safety evaluation dated February ll, 1982 from Steven A. Varga (NRR) to John E.
Dolan (IMEC) the NRC concluded the control room habitability system meets the design criteria of NUREG 0737 Item III D. 3. 4.
and will provi.de safe, habitable conditions during toxic gas and radiological releases.
(Closed)
Open Item (315/82-22-02; 316/82-22-02):
Henry Pratt butterfly valves developed leakage and closure problems after limited use due to poor bonding of the elastomer seat.
The inspector provided this informa-tion to the NRC Vendor Program Branch.
The Vendor Program Branch reviews and recommendations were documented in Report No. 999000056/83-01 and IE Information Notice 83-79.
(Cl osed)
Unr esol ved Item (315/83-01-09; 316/83-01-09):
Plant Manager Instructions (PMI), Department Head Instructions (DHI) and Department Head Procedures (DHP) required approval of the AEPSC guality Assurance Supervisor prior to use.
However, Temporary Procedure changes (TPs)
issued for these procedures did not require approval of the gA Super-visor.
PMI 2010 "Plant Manager and Department Head -Instruction, Procedures and Associated Indexes" was changed to require approval of the guality Assurance Supervisor for TPs.
The inspector reviewed the TPs for the PMI and found no TPs that were issued prior to guality Assurance Supervisor approval.
However, the inspector did find examples where the guality Assurance Supervisor signature was dated after the PSNRC and Plant Manager signature.
Paragraph 1.7.2.2.4 of the FSAR requires reviews of PMI changes by the guality Assurance Supervisor and then review by the Plant Nuclear Safety Review Committee prior to approval by the Plant Manager.
Discussions with cognizant plant personnel and reviews of committee meeting minutes revealed that the required reviews are being performed but that a minor documentation problem may exist.
This was discussed with the Plant Manager.
(Open)
Open Item (315/82-04-01; 316/82-04-01):
The licensee committed to complete biannual reviews of the Annunciator Response sheets by May 1, 1982.
This commitment was made in response to a previous item of non-compliance.~
The inspector verified that the May 1, 1982 date was met, but the subsequent biannual review which was required by May 1984 has not been performed.
While reviewing other Departments for control of biannual reviews, the inspector was informed that licensee gA had recently audited this area and documented a number of findings.
The inspector will re-inspect this area in a subsequent inspection after reviewing the gA Audit Report.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Noncompl iance 315/81-03-04; 316/81-03-03
0 erational Safet Verification The inspector observed control room operation including manning, shift
" turnover, approved procedures and LCO adherence, and reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the inspection period of October 14 through November 16, 1984.
Observa-tions of control room monitors, indicators, and recorders were made to verify the operability of emergency systems, radiation monitoring systems, and nuclear and 'reactor protection 'systems.
Reviews of surveillance, equipment condition, and tagout logs were conducted.
Proper return to service of selected components was verified.
Tours of the auxiliary building, turbine building, and screenhouse were made to observe accessible equipment conditions, including fluid leaks, potential fire hazards, and control of activities in progress.
By observation and direct interview it was verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
On October 23, 1984 the inspector was informed that a
driver had improperly negotiated a turn along the south perimeter of the protected area fence causing damage to the fence.
The inspector verified proper licensee compensatory measures.
The inspector performed a review of the Unit 1 control room ventilation system using drawing OP-1-5149-7 to verify that:
each accessible flow path valve was in its correct position; power (visual breakers and fuses)
was aligned to actuate on automatic signal; essential instrumentation was operable; and no condition existed that degraded the system.
The inspector found some minor discrepancies between the installed equip-ment and the drawing.
These were of the type currently being identi-fied and corrected by licensee's system walkdown teams - as evidenced by inspector review of Condition Reports for the completed control room ventilation system walkdown on Unit 2 ~
The licensee voluntarily derated Units 1 and 2 to 80K power on October 25, 1984 because of an apparent error in the main feedline break analysis, in which the assumed single failure turned out not to be the most limiting single failure.
The error was found in the Unit 2 analysis but since it was not clear that Unit 1 was not similarly involved, both units were derated.
Re-analysis with correct (most limiting) auxiliary feedwater flow rates showed that flow was adequate to remove decay heat.
The analysis was submitted to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, which concluded in a letter dated October 30, 1984 that the revised analysis does not preclude operation at licensed power.
Both Units were then returned to licensed power on October 30, 1984.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie k II
4.
Monthl Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed and/or reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifica-tions.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from -service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were imple-mented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented.
I Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding 'jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment mainte-nance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed:
""12 MHP 5021. 001. 031 MHI 5030 Attachment
Job Order 32070 Job Order 73177 Installation of Fire Barrie~ Penetration seals.
Plant Winterization Frequency checks of Unit 2 CCRP (Critical Control Room Panel)
Replacement of Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Discharge Check Valves.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Monthl Surveillance Observation The inspector reviewed Technical Specifications required surveillance testing on the systems listed below and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumenta-tion was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of'he affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel'~12 THP 6010 RAD. 435 Self - Contained Breathing Apparatus Inspection
""12 THP 6010 RAD. 598 Calibration of 'the Stack Monitor Iodine Channel
~
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l1 IP l
ll Jl J'
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""01 OHP 4030 STP.005 Emergency Core Cooling System Operability Testing Ol OHP 4030 STP. 015 Full Length Control Rod Operability Test No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Licensee Event Re orts Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following Event Reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accom-plished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
These items are considered closed.
Unit 1 RO 83-010/04X-2 RO 83-120/03L-0 RO 83-122/03L-0
'O 83-123/03L-0 RO 83-124/03L-0 RO 83-125/03L-0 RO 83-127/03L-0 RO 83-129/03L-0 Two unplanned radiological gas releases
,Fire door inoperable Ice condenser doors inoperable PORV acoustic monitor inoperable Fire detection system inoperable Fire doors inoperable Fire doors inoperable Fire doors inoperable Unit 2 RO 83-116/03L-0 RO 83-118/03L-0 RO 83-119/03L-0 RO 83-120/03L-0 RO 83-121/03L-0 RO 83-122/03L" 0 RO 83-123/03L-0 RO 83-124/03L-0 RO 83-125/03L-0 Lower containment airlock door inoperable Fire door inoperable Hydrogen analyzer inoperable Containment sump flow recorder inoperable Fire door inoperable ESF fan coupling loose
.Steam flow bistable inoperable Power range NI control power fuse blown Flux penalty module inoperable No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Unit Tri /Safet In ection Unit 2 was manually tripped from about 73K power at 0736 hours0.00852 days <br />0.204 hours <br />0.00122 weeks <br />2.80048e-4 months <br /> on November ll, 1984.
During the previous shifts the plant became unable to maintain programmed pressure due to a partially stuck open pressurizer spray valve.
Plans were formalized to reduce power, cycle the spray valve and manually trip the plant if primary coolant pressure dropped below a pre-established limit.
When the valve was partially stroked the pressure dropped below the established limit and the plant was tripped.
Approximately a minute after the trip, safety injection was automatically initiated due
I lt
to low primary coolant pressure.
The safety injection was reset approxi-mately two minutes later when established reset criteria were met.
The inspector ascertained the status of the reactor and safety systems by observation of control room indicators and discussions with licensee personnel concerning plant parameters and emergency system status.
The plant was made critical on November 13, 1984 at 0245 hours0.00284 days <br />0.0681 hours <br />4.050926e-4 weeks <br />9.32225e-5 months <br />.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Inde endent Ins ection Areas a e TMI 0 en Item NUREG 0737 Item II.B.1.3 involves requirements for Reactor Coolant System (RCS) high point vents.
This matter was reviewed previously and the review documented in IE Inspection Reports 315/84-06; 316/
84"06(DRP).
At the conclusion of that inspection, Technical Specifi-cations for the installed system had yet to be issued, and the licensee procedures and training were not completed to support declaring the installed systems
"operable"
~
Technical Specifica-tion Amendments 81 (Unit 1) and 65 (Unit 2) were issued August 24, 1984, to take effect sixty days thereafter, with performance of specified surveillance requirements on the first entry into Modes 5 or 6.
Discussions with licensee personnel during this inspection established that procedures have been prepared, but had not been reviewed, approved and issued.
This applied to both operating and surveillance procedures.
Operator training had consisted of a Department memo covering the newly issued Technical Specifications.
The physical systems remain isolated and de-energized.
Following discussions of this matter concerning the sixty-day effective date of the Technical Specifications, the licensee voluntarily took steps (Temporary Procedure changes and operator instructions) to upgrade the vent systems'vailability for emergency use insofar as permitted at this time.
This matter will remain "open" pending completion of surveillance testing to support full operability status of the systems.
b.
Incore Instrument Thimble An event at another licensed facility involving incore instrument.
thimble ejection during an at-pressure maintenance activity was brought to the attention of the inspector through the NRC Region III Office, along with a request to review the record at the Donald C.
Cook Plant f'r occurrence of a similar problem.
The inspector determined an incore thimble had been observed to move during an at-pressure mainte-nance activity in October 1983, but the movement was restricted to about 4 or 5 inches.
The thimble was not ejected, nor did primary coolant system leakage occur.
The contractor performing the activity reported the thimble tube "slippage" to the licensee so there was no question of suppression of the information.
The licensee indicated at-pressure maintenance on this system similar to that performed in 1983 would no longer be permitted at D.
C.
Cook.
This information was provided the Region III Offic c.
Techni cal S eci ficati on Clarit A violation was recently identified at another licensed facility regarding the LCO for Accident Monitoring Instrumentation (AMI);
i.e., the requirement to have direct, positive position indication for the PORVs.
The violation apparently occurred because the facility's Technical Specification did not clearly state the acceptable method for fulfillingthe monitoring requirements.
The inspector reviewed Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications and discussed this matter with the licensee.
Both Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications require PORV Position Indication and specifically identify the acceptable means of'eeting the monitor-ing requirement.
No additional action is considered necessary concerning this matter.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
9.
Mana ement Meetin
-
Re ulator Performance Im rovement Pro ram A management meeting was "held on October 26, 1984 at the Donald C.
Cook plant site to update the status of the Regulatory Performance Improve-ment Program (RPIP) dated February 23, 1984 (AEP:NRC 0625F).
The licensee stated that the items contained in Appendix C to the RPIP are on schedule.
In addition the licensee discussed programs that are not part of the RPIP but that the licensee has initiated to improve plant performance.
Prior to the meeting the NRC Deputy Regional Administrator presented new/requalification Reactor and Senior Reactor Operator licenses.
Subsequent to the meeting the Senior Resident Inspector, Operation Superin-tendent and Deputy Regional Administrator toured the site.
10.
Exit Inter view The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the inspection and on November 21, 1984 and summarized the scope of the inspectio (mW 'i H
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