IR 05000312/2004008
| ML17301A192 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie, Rancho Seco  |
| Issue date: | 05/08/1985 |
| From: | Bibb H, Crlenjak R, Elrod S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17301A190 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-85-08, 50-335-85-8, 50-389-85-08, 50-389-85-8, NUDOCS 8506210518 | |
| Download: ML17301A192 (8) | |
Text
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UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos.:
50-335/85-08 and 50-389/85-08 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-335 and 50-389 Facility Name:
St.
Lucie 1 and
I License Nos.:
DPR-67 and NPF-16 Inspection Conducted:,
March 12 - April 8, 1985 Inspectors:
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R.. Crlenjak S.
A.
lrod r
Approved by:
S. A. Elrod, Section Chief Division of Reactor Projects Date igned
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Date igned 4j Date'gned SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 175 resident inspector-hours onsite in the areas of plant operation, surveillance observation, maintenance observation, installation and operation of safety related batteries.
Results:
Two violations were identified in the area of installation and operations of station batteries (paragraph 8).
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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
"D. A. Sager, Plant Manager J.
H. Barrow, Operations Superintendent
"T. A, Dillard, Maintenance Superintendent
- L. W, Pearce, Operations Supervisor
"N. G.
Roos, Quality Control Supervisor C.
F. Leppla, IKC Supervisor C. A. Pell, Technical Staff Supervisor (Acting)
E. J. Wunderlich, Reactor Engineering Supervisor (Acting)
H.
F.
Buchanan, Health Physics Supervisor J
~
G. West, Security Supervisor J. Scarola, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- Electrical
"J. Walls, Quality Control Staff J.
Krumins, Engineering Supervisor D.
L. Howard, Quality Control Staff Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, technicians, operator s, shift technical advisors, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview Exit Interview The resident inspectors conducted interim interviews with licensee management during the inspection period and held an exit interview at the conclusion of the inspection.
The inspector discussed the scope of the inspection and findings with the licensee.
The two violations were discussed in detail.
The licensee did not disagree with the violations.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
V'ersons indicated with an asterisk (") in paragraph 1 above attended one or more of the interviews.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio Operational Safety Verification The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operator during the report period.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency
- systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the reactor, auxiliary and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations,and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
Surveillance Observation During'he inspection period, the inspectors verified plant operations in compliance with at least sixteen different Technical Specification (TS)
requirements.
Typical of these were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, containment pressure, control room ventilation and AC and DC electrical sources.
The inspector verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, tests results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of selected safety-related systems and components were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with requirements.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met, activities were accomplished using approved procedures, functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; and radiological controls were implemented as required.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
On Wednesday, March 27, the chemistry department reported an increase in radioactivity in the Unit 2 steam generator secondary water.
The content was well belo'w allowable limits, but a decision was made to bring the plant to cold shutdown and plug the leaking steam generator tube.
Eddy current
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testing was performed and revealed about 45 tubes in each steam generator which met FP8 L's criteria for plugging.
To bound the defect area completely, it was decided to plug 138 tubes in the "A" generator and 130 tubes in the "B" generator.
The plant was shut down on Friday, March 29 and was being returned to power on April 8.
Other items worked during the shutdown included J1B room crane installation, refueling machine upgrade, condenser water box cleaning, component cooling water and turbine cooling water heat exchanger cleaning, diesel generator fan belt modification and numerous valve repairs.
The inspectors made selective observations of work in progress.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
~
Safety-Related Battery Inspection During this period, safety related battery installation and operation were inspected for conformance to the installation drawings, technical manual, and TS.
Site personnel generated nonconformance reports
'(NCR)
to obtain engineering resolution for the conditions found.
The evaluated NCRs were reviewed by the inspector in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Region II office after the inspections The NCRs were then returned to the licensee.
Literature and applicable Revision (Rev) reviewed included Drawing 8770-9998 Rev
~
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Rack Assembly LC-33 Batteries Drawing 2998-14664 Rev.
-
Rack Assembly LC-33 Batteries Technical Manual 2998-15749
-
Stationary Battery Installation and Operating Instructions Instruction 2-0010125 Rev.
13 -
Schedule of Periodic Tests, Checks and Cal ibr ations Instruction 1-0960060 Rev.
18 -
125V DC System Periodic Maintenance and Tests Instruction 2-0960060 Rev.
-
125V DC System Periodic Maintenance and Tests Nonconformance Report 140 (1A battery),
141 (1B battery),
142 (2A battery)
and 143 (2B battery)
and resolutions.
When inspected for installation in accordance with the technical manual and drawings above, several nonconformances were found as shown below.
These have subsequently been evaluated as satisfactory or have been corrected.
The missing parts condition affecting 1A and 1B battery caused a concern that both might have been seismically inoperable since installation.
This was specifically evaluated by both the Architect/Engineer (EBASCO)
and the battery/rack vendor (C&D Batteries).
They found that the qualification tests applied to the battery and racks were far more strenuous than the
seismic forces expected at the plant.
Test accelerations were from 17 to 27 times greater than on-site required accelerations.
The batteries were evaluated to have been seismically operable as installed.
The inspector has no further questions concerning the existing'attery installations.
Nonconformances included:
Battery 1A (NCR 140)
As found condition 4 Missing tie rods and hardware 48 Missing cap screws and washer Tray END Clearance 1~~ in to 2~~ in Tie rod pattern not-to-drawing Resolution Replaced Replaced Clearance Reduced Satisfactory 1B (NCR 141)
2 Missing tie rods and hardware 48 Missing cap screws and washers
- Tray End Clearance 1~ inch to 2~~ inch Tie rod pattern not-to-drawing.
Replaced Replaced Clearance Reduced Sati sfactory 2A (NCR 142)
2B (NCR 143)
- Tray End Clearance 1',inch 2', inch
- Tie rod pattern not-to-drawing Clearance Reduced Satisfactory
- Tray End Clearance 14 inch to 2~ inch Clearance Reduced
- Tie rod pattern not-to-drawing Satisfactory Failure to install safety-related batteries in accordance with the drawings is a violation of
CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V which requires that activities affecting quality shall be accomplished in accordance with instructions, procedures, or drawings (335, 389/85-08-01).
The battery surveillance instructions referenced above were reviewed, in part, to ascertain that TS were being implemented.
This inspection addressed Unit
TS 4.8.2.3.2.a and 4 '.2.3.2.b and Unit 2 TS 4.8.2. l.a and 4.8.2. l.b. It was found that the licensee's surveillance program and procedures did not include correction of specific gravity for electrolyte level.
This is required on both units by TS table 4.8-2 note (a).
This table applies to the above mentioned TS.
Failure to implement these TS is a violation (335, 389/85-08-02).
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