IR 05000305/1993010
| ML20044E101 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
| Issue date: | 05/13/1993 |
| From: | Creed J, Kniceley J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20044E095 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-305-93-10, NUDOCS 9305210275 | |
| Download: ML20044E101 (6) | |
Text
_ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ - - - _
__
.
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-305/93010(DRSS)
Docket No. 50-305 License No. DPR-43 Licensee: Wisconsin Public Service Corporation Post Office Box 19002 Green Bay, WI 54307-9002 Facility Name: Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At: Kewaunee Site, Kewaunee, Wisconsin Inspection Conducted: May 3-7, 1993 Date of Last Inspection: October 20-23, 1992 Inspector:
$ 0 m f-N g 6-13' "
James R. Kniceley
Date
!
Physical Security Inspector l
l Approved By:
/3 6 Japes R. Creed, Chief Date'
h4feguardsSection Inspection Summary Inspection on May 3-7, 1993 (Report No. 50-305/93010(DRSSI)
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced physical security inspection involving Management Support and Effectiveness; Protected and Vital Area Barriers, Detection and Assessment Aids; Access Control-Personnel, Packanes, and Vehicles; and Followup on Previous Inspection Findings.
,
Results: The licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements within the areas examined. Two previously identified fitness-for-duty program implementation concerns were reviewed and closed.
The security program is well implemented and well managed.
Regul atory requirements and security plan commitments were well implemented.
Licensee i
management attention and involvement in the security program were excellent.
Contingency response training exercises were excellent.
Resources are ample and reasonably allocated. The training and qualification program is effective I
and met regulatory requirements. Security personnel observed were knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities. The professionalism, attitude, appearance, and performance of the security organizatior, continues I
to be excellent. The licensee has received and is reviewing NURFG-1485 entitled " Unauthorized Forced Entry into the Protected Area at Three Mile Island Unit 1 on February 7,1993."
In addition, the licensee is reviewing 9305210275 930513 PDR ADDCK 05000305 O
'
_ _ _ _
.
.
.
f their " Vehicle Bomb Threat" contingency procedure and is considering ways of upgrading their facility.
i i
f
!
I f
.
.
_
.
. _. _ _
__
- - _
__
_
.
t
.
-
.
REPORT DETAILS 1.
Kev Persons Contacted In addition to the key members of the licensee's staff listed below, the j
inspector interviewed other employees, contractor personnel, and members of the security organization. The asterisk (*) denotes those present at the onsite Exit Interview conducted on May 7, 1993.
l i
- M. Marchi, Plant Manager j
- K. Evers, Manager, Nuclear Plant Support Services
,
- D. Nalepka, Security Director
'
- J. Fletcher, Security Operations Supervisor l
D. Peters, Security Administration Supervisor
D. Molzahn, Assistant to Nuclear Licensing, Carporate
-!
H. Duquaine Jr., Quality Assurance Auditor l
- J. Dressen, Plant Nuclear Engineer i
- T. Webb, Plant Licensing i
- M. Daron, Administration Manager, Burns Security l
l E. Cobb, Training Manager, Burns Security
.
i l
K. O'Brien, Resident Inspector, USNRC Region III
j
- T. Kobetz, Reactor Inspector, USNRC Region III
_
i 2.
FollowuD'on Previous Inspection Findinas a.
(Closed) Open Item (ReDort No. 50-305/90018-01): This item was i
!
discussed in Section 4 of that report and pertained to the lack of a programmatic requirement for an individual to provide an
!
observed urine sample for analysis prior to being returned to work j
after evaluation or treatment following a confirmed positive test i
result. The inspector verified through interviews and procedure
'
review that the licer.see's General Nuclear Procedure (GNP) and Nuclear Administrative Directives (NAD) addressing their FFD
program requirements have been revised and now require observed t
testing prior to ret 1rning to work following a confirmed positive
test result. This item is considered closed.
,
i b.
(Closed) Unresolved item (Report No. 50-305/90018-02): This item l
was discussed in Section 5 of that report and pertained to
laboratory test results being sent to the FFD Program
'
Administrator prior to an evaluation by the MRO. The inspector verified that the licensee's Fitness-for-Duty program procedures and directives have been revised and now require the laboratory to send all test results directly to the MR0 and not the FFD Program Administrator. This item is considered closed.
.
-.
.
.
..
-
-.
.
'
I i
-
.
-
'
!
3.
Entrance and Exit interviews a.
At the beginning of the inspection, Mr. D. Nalepka, Security
'
Director, and other staff.nembers were informed of the purpose of I
this inspection, its scope, and the topical areas to be examined.
f
.
b.
The inspector met with the licensee representatives, denoted in Section 1, at the conclusion of the onsite inspection activities.
'l
'
A general description of the scope and conduct of the inspection
<
was provided. Briefly listed below are the findings discussed l
!
during the exit interview. The licensee representatives were invited to provide comments en each item discussed.
i i
'
(1)
The licensee was informed of and acknowledged the
!
inspector's comments that no violations, deviations, or
'!
unresolved items were identified during this inspection.
l (2)
The licensee was informed of and acknowledged that two
previously identified items (90018-01 and 90018-02)-
i regarding Fitness-for-Duty program implementation concerns
!
were reviewed and were closed (Refer to Section 2).
l (3)
The inspector commented that the management and program l
changes which were implemented throughout this SALP
!
assessment period have had a positive effect on the. morale
!
'
of the security force, increased management oversight, and j
became a program strength (Refer to Section 5).
j
,
i (4)
The inspector commented that the security program is well I
implemented and effective. Security force members who were
'
questioned and observed were knowledgeable and proficient'in
performing their assigned duties.
!
(5)
The inspector acknowledged the licensee's comments that they
had received NUREG-1485 entitled, " Unauthorized Forced Entry into the Protected Area at Three Mile Island Unit 1 on-
,
February 7,1993," and were considering ways of upgrading their facility to better protect against the vehicle bomb threat.
j i
(6)
The inspector commented that good progress is being made in
their tactical response training in preparation for an j
'
unscheduled Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (0SRE) (Refer to Section 5).
~
!
4.
Procram Areas Inspected l
Listed below are the areas examined by the inspector in which no
findings (strengths, violations, deviations, unresolved items, or i
inspection followup items) were identified. Only findings are described in subsequent Report Details sections.
1
\\
.
.
-
-
,
_
- _ _ _ _. _ _. _ __ _.-.._, _ -._. _ _ J
.
-
.
.-
The below listed clear areas were reviewed and evaluated as deemed necessary by the inspector to meet the specified " Inspection Requirements" (Section 02) of the applicable NRC Inspection Procedure (IP). Sampling reviews included interviews, observations, r - Mcument reviews that provided independent verification of compliant with requirements. Gathered data was also used to evaluate the a/uquacy of the reviewed program and practices to adequately protect the facility and the health and safety of the public.
The depth and scope of inspection activities were conducted as deemed appropriate and necessary for the program area and operational status of the security system.
Additional testing of security systems was not requested by the inspector.
IP 81700-Physical Security Inspection Proaram for Power Reactors 01.
Manaaement. Plans. Audit:
(a) Degree of Management Support for Program; (b) Security Program Plans Changes; (c) Audits Program Corrective Action, Auditor Qualification.
02.
Protected and Vital Area Physical Barriers. Detection and Assessment Aids:
(a) PA and VA Barrier Resistance; (b) Isolation Zones Maintained; (c) PA and VA Detection Functional and Effective; (d) Assessment Aids Functional and Effective.
03.
Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel. Packaaes and Vehicles:
(a)
Personnel Access:
(1) Identification and Authorization Checked Before Access; (2) Trustworthiness, Reliability Determined By Background Investigation and are Part of Behavioral Observation Program; (3) Changes Made for Terminations; (4) List / Computer Are Protected; (5) Personnel Are Searched; (6) Badges Are Displayed; (7) Visitors Are Escorted; (8) Rapid Ingress and Egress in Emergencies; (9)
Access Limited for Need.
(b)
Packaae Control:
(1) Packages Authorization Checked; (2)
Handcarried Packages Searched at PA; (3) Material Controlled at Containment.
(c)
Vehicle Control:
(1) Vehicles Are Searched; (2)
Authorization Verified Prior to Entry; (3) Two Officers at Open Gates; (4) All Self-Propelled and Towed Vehicles Are Controlled.
04.
Security Trainina and Qualification:
(a) Each Individual Is Trained, Qualified and Equipped For Each Task Prior To Assignment; (b) Security Personnel Have Knowledge and Ability To Perform Duties; (c) Response Capabilities Are Adequate and Effective To Meet Plans and Protect Against Design Basis Threat; (d) Size and Leadership of Response Adequate.
,
l
.
i
'
'
.
.
l 5.
Physical Security Proaram for Power Reactor (IP 81700)
l l
The following positive observations were noted concerning the licensee's
!
security program.
The inspector determined through interviews and observations with security and plant personnel that there is a high level of security awareness within the plant work force which contributes to a positive attitude towards security. This is attributed to involvement and support of site management to continually strive to improve security performance and include security personnel in daily plant operation activities and planning.
Since the selection of the new Security Director and the addition of a
-
!
Security Operations Supervisor and Security Administration Supervisor, the management oversight and program implementation have been excellent.
There has been an increased awareness of security performance and the morale and professionalism of the security force has increased.
Communications with the resident inspectors and regional security staff is excellent.
Continued management support is evident as security tactical response training continues in preparation for an unscheduled Operational i
Safeguards Response Evaluation (0SRE). The classroom and field exercises are well received by the security officers and the training department is knowledgeable in defensive strategies and response tactics. The licensee also utilizes the expertise of a contractor to validate and test their response program. The licensee has also purchased some new contingency equipment to include body armor, helmets, and weaponry.
i i
6