IR 05000288/1997201
| ML20212C513 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Reed College |
| Issue date: | 10/09/1997 |
| From: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212C506 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-288-97-201, NUDOCS 9710290259 | |
| Download: ML20212C513 (11) | |
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t U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Docket No:
50 288 License No:
R 112 Report No:
50-288/97 201 Licensee:
Reed College
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Facility:
. Reed College Reactor Facility Location:
3203 S.E. Woodstock Boulevard
- Portland, Oregon - 97202 8199 Dates:
August 28 and 29,1997 Inspector:
Craig H. Bassett Senior Radiation Specialist Approved by: Seymour H. Weiss, Director Non-Power Reactor and Decommissioning
- Project Directorate Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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9710290259 971009 PDR ADOCK 05000288 G
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Reed College Report No: 50-288/97 201 This announced inspection involved onsite review of the licensee's actions in response to a
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suspected leak from a fuel element !a the reactor core.
Ooerations Based on a review of the operatir.,ns and maintenance logs, selected videos of fuel inspections, and the approved procedures, the actions taken by the licensee fol'e" dog the event on August 22,1997, were acceptable and were in accordance with the procedures and the Emergency Plan of the facility.
Radiation Protection l
Based on a review of the licensee's calculations of activity released, the Radiation Work l
Permit developed to control work, and the calibration records of the monitors at the facility, l-the radiation protection actions taken by the licensee in response to the event on l
August 22,1997, were acceptable and accomplished in accordance with the approved procedures and the Technical Specifications.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.0 Event Follow-up - Operations a.
Insoection Scoce (40750)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions following indications that a fuel element had leaked gaseous radioactivity into the facility reactor room following eight hours of research reactor operation on August 22,1997.
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Observation and Findinos (1) Event Overview On August 22,1997, at 5:45 p.m., a reactor operator (RO) and a reactor operator trainee at the Reed College TRIGA Mark l research reactor facility tripped the reactor following an 8-hour run at a power level of approximately 240 kilowatts (kW). Just before the reactor was tripped, the RO noted that the airborne radioactivity levelin the reactor room was rising
according to the instrumentation readout of the stack Air Particulate Monitor (APM) which (
samples air leaving the reactor room. Because the APM readout continued to increase and l
the Gaseous Stack Monitor (GSM) was also above normal, the operators implemented Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 90, " Elevated Radiation Levels." The operators also began an analysis of the stack APM and the reactor room continuous air monitor (CAM)
filters. The analysis of the APM filter confirmed the presence of rubidium 89 (Rb-89) and cesium 138 (Cs-138) which are decay products of the fission product gases krypton 89 (Kr 89) and xenon-138 (Xe-138) respectively. Within five minutes of the initiation of the event, the Director of the Reactor Facility took charge of the situation as Emergency Coordinator, initiated the use of the facility Emergency implementation Procedures, and calculated the off-site dose. The estimated off-site dose was calculated to be five microrem. At about 6:15 p.m., the licensee initiated courtesy notifications of the Oregon State Department of Energy, the Radiation Control Section of the Oregon State Health Division, and the NRC.
An NRC inspector arrived on campus on August 28,1997, to review the event and monitor the licensee's actions in response to the event.
(2) Operations Review The inspector reviewed the licensee's activities and the faci.2 operating logs documenting those actions prior to and following the event. The inspector determined that the licensee was involved with routine operations prior to and during the event. The logs did not indicate any activities which might result in damage to the fuel elements, it was noted that the licensee experienced two apparent fuelleaks in the past, in November 1991 and January 1994. On November 23,1991, the reactor was at full power with the reactor pool water temperature at 36 degrees Centigrade ( C) when the gaseous stack monitor (GSM) alarmed. The reactor was promptly tripped, the incident was declared an Unusual Event, and notifications were made. Reactor room air samples showed evidence of rubidium-88 (Rb-88) and reactor pool water sam)les indicated the presence of gaseous
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fission products krypton 88 (Kr 88), krypton 85 metastable (Kr 85m), and xenon 135 (Xe 135). On November 25,1991, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL)
requiring the licensee to develop a plan to locate the leaking fuel element, submit the plan to the NRC for approval, and cease from operating the reactor until the cause of the radioactivity release was understood and the NRC granted approval to resume reactor
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operations. The Reed Reactor Facility staff developed a recovery plan and constructed a
" sniffing" apparatus to search for radioactive fission products in the reactor pool water coming from the leaking fuel element. On April 10,1992, the NRC concurred with the recovery plan and the licensee resumed reactor operation. The reactor was brought up in
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power in slow steps of increasing power levels. At each level, reactor power was held steady for at least an hour while the " sniffing" apparatus was used to search for evidence of fission products. Trace amounts of sodium 24 (Na 24) and iron-59 (Fe 59), activation products from the aluminum and steel cl6d fuel elements, were easily detected but no indications of fission product activity was noted. The reactor facility altbome monitors, which had responded during the initial event, also showed no response. After several hours
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of continuous operation at 240 kW steady state power,it became apparent that the fuel
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element leak was not recurring, in recognition of the fact that the fuelleak incident could not be reproduced and a repeat of the incident would not pose a radiological hazard to the reactor facility staff or the pub'ic, the NRC permitted the Reed Reactor Facility to resume normal operations. As part of the recovery plan, the licensee revised thth Emergency Plan so that its Emergency Action Levels were more consistent with standard regulatory practice. The threshold for reporting emergency events had been too low previously, causing unnecessary declaration of an Unusual Event. The licensee also agreed to maintain the fuelleak detection equipment and procedures so that,if the fuelleak should repeat,it could be dealt with quickly.
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On January 20,1994, a second fuelleak occurred. The reactor was at full power when the failsafe light on the stack APM went out indicating an increase in activity in the reactor stack effluent. The CAM failsafe light also went out indicating the presence of radioactivity in the air in the reactor room. The reactor was immediately scrammed and the filter papers from the APM and the CAM were collected and analyzed. Fission products Rb 88 and cesium 138 (Cs 138) were identified and effluent calculations were then performed.
Because the reactor was shutdown immediately, the radioactivity levels in the reactor room remained very low and none of the radiation monitors in the bay alarmed. Calculated concentrations at the site boundary indicated a maximum gaseous activity of 3.7E-10 millicuries per milliliter (mci /ml) and an air particulate activity of 1.0E 12 mci /ml (The corresponding Unusual Event concentrations requiring notification were 4.5E-7 mci /mi and 1.0E 9 mci /mi respectively; thus, an Unusual Event was not declared.) The licensee again initiated testing for the fuel element leak on January 24,1994, using the previously designed " sniffing" apparatus and recovery plan. An air sampler equipped with a charcoal cartridge for the detection of any possible iodine isotopes was operated in the reactor room during the testing. No additional release of fission products was detected by the " sniffing" apparatus, the air sampler in the reactor room, nor the reactor facility monitors. Because a fuelleak did not recur, the f acility staff completed the leak testing without locating any leaking reactor fuel. With concurrence from the NRC, the licensee resumed normal reactor operation _
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3-(3) Experiments The inspector reviewed the irradiation results for the samples being irradiated on August 22, 1997. These were recorded on irradiation Request Number (IR No.) 3288 and IR No. 3289 and consisted of samples of samarium oxide and iron flux wires respectively. The licensee indicated that the samples should not contain any natural uranium that could cause an increase in fission gases in the reactor room. A review of recent irradiations by the inspector indicated that all experiments had been reviewed by the reactor staff and all were conducted in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the applicable procedures.
The inspector reviewed the procedures governing irradiation of samples: SOP-50,
" irradiation Request Forms," dated September 1995, and SOP 52, " Lazy Susan Irradiations," dated September 1995. The procedures appeared to be acceptable to provide
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for the safe irradiation of samples.
(4) Powsr Hist,.f and Fuel Pool Temperature The inspector reviewed the operating history as recorded in operating logs and maintenance logs mMntained by the licensee. Logs from January through August 1997 were reviewed.
The inspector noted that the reactor was operated on six occasions at power levels greater than 50 kW for a period of time from 3.4 to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, However, typically when the reactor was operated at a power level greater than 50 kW,it was only operated at that level for 1 to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, it was also noted that, during all other operations during the period reviewe,d, the maximum pool water temperature did not exceed 30'C except on August 22 when the leak occurred and on August 26 when the licensee made a conscious effort to cause the fuel to leak in an effort to locate the leaking element. Although the leak appeared to be somehow related to the temperature of the pool water, the relationship was not readily
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apparent. The licensee was in the process of reviewing the issue further. The resolution of this matter will be followed by the NRC as an Inspector Follow up item (IFl) and will be reviened during a subsequent inspection (iFi 50-288/97 201-01).
(5) Event Response The day following the event on August 22, the licensee decided to operate the reactor in an effort to identify which fuel element had leaked. The licensee initiated SOP 91, "Looking for Leaking Fuel Elements," dated February 1995. The procedure involved the use of the
" sniffing" apparatus which consists of a funnel connected to a tygon tube and a peristaltic pump. The funnelis placed over an area of the core where a leakis suspected. Water is pumped through the tygon tube to a marinelli beaker which sits on top of a high purity germanium (HpGe) detector. Following analysis, the water is retumed to the pool. There is a long delay loop in the tygon tube which runs through a lead shield located before the water reaches the pump to allow for nitrogen 16 (N 16) decay. The HpGe detector is located inside the reactor room while the multi-channel analyzer (MCA) computer is located in the control room. The licensee was not successfulin re-creating the leak on August 23.
On August 25, the licensee again ran the reactor to search for the leaking fuel element.
After about four hours at full power operation, with the water temperature above 30'C the licensee again began to detect the decay products of fission product gases on the APM
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filter. - The results of an analysis of a silver reolite breathing zone filter in the reactor room showed similar activity but no iodine 131 (1131). The operators noted that the airborne increase was relatively gradual as opposed to the sudden increase observed on August 22.
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reactor room and directing the air flow through a HEPA filter. With indications that a leak was in progress, the licensee used the " sniffing" apparatus to search for the leaking fuel element but again without success. This was due in part to the " dead time" of the HpGe detector and the need to allow the water sample to decay for about 10 minutes. The licensee terminated operations that day without any success in locating the leaking fuel element. Calculations indicated that a total of about thirty percent (30%) of an Effluent Concentration was released. The airborne cor. centration in the reactor room was approximately one Derived Air Concentration (DAC).
On August 26, the reactor was again operated for about 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> at 240 kW. Pool temperature was over 40*C and decay products from fission product gases were once again detected on air filters in the reactor room. However, the " sniffing" apparatus again failed to provide any useful data on the location of the leaking fuel. When this proved unsuccessful, the licensee terminated reactor operations and decided to begin reviewing videotapes of the fuelinspection completed in January and, based on the review, to select the fuel elements that appeared to be most likely to be the cause of the problem. These would then be i
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replaced in an effort to replace the leaking fuel element.
The inspector reviewed the license 6's efforts to locate the leaking fuel element and the procedure for this work evolution, SOP-91, "Looking for Leakir'g Fuel Elements," dated February 1995. Both the licensee's actions and the procedure appeared to be adequate.
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The inspector reviewed the specific response of the operators and Facility Director to the event. The operators responded to the indication of increasing airborne activity in accordance with approved operating procedures and the Emergency Plan. Although several entries were made into the reactor room to take samples and contamination surveys, no internal contamination was ingested as indicated by the results of a whole body count of the individualinvolved. The event did not fallinto a category that required an emergency classification but courtesy telephone calls were made. The inspector determined that the licensee followed the approved procedures and the Emergency Plan.
(6) Fuel Inspection Technical Specifications require the licensee to inspect one-fifth of the fuel elements annually such that all the elements are inspected after five years. The inspector reviewed the results of the last fuelinspection performed in January 1997 by the licensee. The inspector also reviewed selected portions of the videos the licensee had made of the fuel inspection. Although discolorations, some pitting, and some scratches were noted, the inspector could not determine whether any of the abnormalities would be of such a nature that would cause the fuel to leak. It was noted that the licensee had no specific criteria for determining whether or not the abnormalities were of significance.
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5-(7) Further Actions As indicated in Paragraph 2.(5) above, the licensee planned to remove a given number of fuel elements from the rasctor core and replace them with new or dummy fuel elements.
The reactor would then be operated and the air in the reactor room and the water in the reactor pool would be checked for the presence of fission products. The licensee anticipated that switching out the fuel elements in this manner would likely result in the removal of the leaking fuel element. The results of these actions will be followed by the NRC as an IFl and will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (IFl 50 288/97 201 02).
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C;nclusion As a result of reviewing operations and maintenance logs, selected videos of fuel inspections, procedures, and the actions taken by the licensee following the event on August 22,1997, the inspector concluded that the licensee's response was acceptable and was in accordance with the approved procedures and Emergency Plan of the facility.
2.0 Event Follow-up Radiological Controls a.
Insoection Scooe (40750)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to indications of increasing levels of radioactivity in the reactor room on August 22,1997, the licensee's calculations of the amount of radioactivity released into the environment, and the calibration of the monitoring equipment.
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Observation and Findinas Following the August 22 event, the licensee implemented SOP-90, " Elevated Radiation Levels," to calculate the airborne concentration at the site boundary (a distance of two hundred and fifty feet from the reactor room). The licensee determined that the gaseous altborne concentration at the site boundary was 7.0E-9 microCuries per milliliter (pCi/ml)
based upon the reading from the GSM and the particulate concentration was 7.84E-12 pCl/ml based upon the reading from the APM. This is well below the effluent concentration limit specified in 10 CFR 20 of 5.68E 8 pCi/mi and 3.37E-8 pCi/ml respectively based upon the assurnptions that: 1) the gaseous fission product isotopes released were fifty three percent (53%) Xe-135,30% Kr 88, an! 17% Kr-85m for the GSM and,2) the fission product isotopes released were 64% Cs-135 and 36% Rb-88 for the APM. (These ratios of the specified isotopes were identified and quantified during previous fuelleaks.) The inspector also reviewed the licensee's calculations of the total cumulative activity released during the initial fuel leak including the activity released during the subsequent attempts made to find the leaking element. The licensee calculated that 220 pCi were released on August 22,1300 pCi on August 26, and 480 pCi on August 27, for a total of 2,000 microCuries or 2 milliCucies. This appeared to be conservative.
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The inspector reviewed the Radiation Work Permit (RWP) developed by the licensee for use during the " sniffing" operation. RWP No. 4, dated August 23,1997, indicated that the procedure to be followed for the " sniffing" operation was SOP 91; specified the use of personal protective clothing, survey instruments, and personal dosimetry; projected the maximum dose rate workers would be exposed to would be 100 millitem per hour; and estimated that the total dose received during the operation would be 60 millirem. The RWP app 6ared to be adequate and provided proper precautions and limits to maintain the safety of the workers. During the work, the licensee also took air samples using silver zeolite breathing zone air filters. Analysis of the filters indicated that there was no radioactive lodine present as a result of the " sniffing" operations. Analysis of water samples taken during and subsequent to the event also did not indicate the presence of iodine.
The inspector reviewed the calibration of the GSM, the APM, and the CAM, Calibrations are required annually by Technical Specifications. The licensee typically calibrates the monitors seml annually in practice. Calibration of all the monitors had been completed in January and again in July 1997. The calibrations appeared to be adequate, c.
Conclusion Based upon a review of the licensee's calculations of activity released, the RWP developed to control the work during the " sniffing" operation, and the calibration of the monitors at the f acility, the inspector concluded that the licensee's response to the event, control of the work following the event, ano the monitor calibrations were acceptable and accomplished in accordance with the approved procedures and the Technical Specifications.
3.0 Follow up on Previously identified items a,
lasaggtlon Scone (92701. 92702)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions taken in response to a previously identified Inspector Follow-up item and a previous Violation, b.
.Qhiervation and Findinos (1) (Closed) IFl 50-288/94-0101 - During a previous inspection in December 1994, it was noted that certain health physics procedures had not been updated to reflect the "new" 10 CFR Part 20 references and requirements, in response the licensee indicated that these procedures would be updated by June 30,1995. The inspector reviewed various health physics procedures as follows:
SOP-20, " General Health Physics," dsted February 1995.
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SOP-21, " Health Physics of High Radiation Areas," dated
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February 1995.
SOP-22, " Decontamination," dated Fisbruary 1995.
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SOP 23, " Health Physics Wipo Tests," dated February 1995.
- SOP 24, " Environmental Sampling," dated February 1995.
SOP 27, " Reactor Waste Disposal," dated February 1995.
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The procedures appeared to contain the "new" 10 CFR Part 20 references and requirements as required. This item is considered closed.
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(Closed) VIO 50 288/94-0102 During a previous inspection in December 1994,it was noted the licensee had failed to perform arinual training of Emergency Response personnel as required including the Reed College community safety personnel, the l
Portland Police Bureau, the Portland Fire Bureau personnel, and the Good Samaritan Hospital emergency room personnel, in a response to the violation dated February 16,1995, the licensee indicated that the training had been completed and that it would continue to be performed. During this inspection the inspector verified r
that the training had been completed as indicated by the licensee. Emergency i
Response training had been completed as follows:
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Portland Fire Bureau on April 3,1996, and September 12,13, and September 16,
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Portland Police Bureau on April 4,1996, and October 16,1996.
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Community Safety Personnel on November 22,1995, and October 16,1996.
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The licensee indicated that a meeting had been held with the director of the Good Samaritan Hospital it was determined that the hospital emergency room personnel and others had participated in the hospital's own training program regarding handling radiological 4mergencies. The licensee concluded that training was adequate for support of the Reed College program.
The licensee also had revised their security procedure, SOP-12, " Security," dated Feoruary 1995, to require that training of off site personnel be conducted. The procedure was reviewed and appeared to be acceptable.
In a further response to the violation, the licensee also developed a facility planning calendar to indicate when periodic events should be conducted. This was reviewed by the inspector and the planning calendar appeared to be acceptable.
The inspector also reviewed the Letters of Agreement that the licensee had established with the entitles mentioned above. The Letters of Agreement had been updated in September and October of 1996. This item is considered closed.
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Conclusion:
These items are closed.
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'4.0 Exit Meeting. Summary The inspection scope and results were summarized on August 29,1997, with licensee representatives The inspector discussed the findings for each area reviewed. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensea S. Frantz, Director, Rea: tor Facility C. Melhus, Assistant Director, Reactor Facility Z. VanHoover, Reactor Supervisor INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 40750: Class 11 Non Power Reactors IP 92701: Follow-up on Inspector Identified items IP 92702: Follow up on Items of Noncompliance or Deviation (
ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
.QA0n 50 288/9) 201-01 IFl Follow-up on the licensee's resolution of the suspected relationship between the temperature of the pool water and the fuel element leak, 50 288/97 201-02 IFl Follow up on the results of switching out various fuel elements
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l to resolve the fuel element leak problem.
Closed 50 288/94-01 01 IFl incorporate new 10 CFR 20 requirements into health physics procedures 50-288/94 01 b2 VIO Failure to perform annual training of emergency response personnel as required LIST OF ACRONYMS USED APM Air Particulate Monitor RO Reactor operator CAM Continuous Air Monitor RWP Radiation Work Permit CFR Code of Federal Regulations SOP Standard Operating DAC Derived Air Concentration Procedure
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GSM Gaseous Stack Monitor VIO Violation HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air (filter)
IR Irradiation Request HpGe High purity germanium (detector)
kW kilowatt IFl Inspector Follow-up Item IP inspection Procedure l
mci /mi Millicuries per milliliter pCi/mi Microcuries per milliliter l
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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