IR 05000277/1991006
| ML20029B458 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 02/26/1991 |
| From: | Chawaga D, Lance R, Pasciak W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20029B454 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-277-91-06, 50-277-91-6, 50-278-91-06, 50-278-91-6, NUDOCS 9103080021 | |
| Download: ML20029B458 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 1 Report Nos.
50-277/91-06 50-278/91-06 Docket Nos.
50-277 50-278 License Nos.
DPR-44 Category C
DPR-56 C
Licensee:
Philadelohia Electric q9mpany.
Correspondence Control Desk
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P.,0. Box IM Wayne. Pa 19087-0195 Facility Name:
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station. Units 2 and_3
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Inspection At:
Delta. Pennsv1vania Inspection Period:
February 4 - 8, 1991 I-2 //4 5'/
Inspector:
no-D. Chawaga, Radiation Specialist Date Facilities Radiation Protection Section 2' / k/
inspector:
' cec R. Lance, Radiation Specialist Date Facilities Radiation Protection Section Approved by: h(
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W'. Pasciak, Chief
/ Date Facilities Radiation Protection Section Inspection Summary:
Inspection on February 4 - 8, 1990 (Combined NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50 277/91-06; 50-278/91-06)
Areas inspected: The inspection was a routine, unannounced radiological controls inspection during the Unit 2 refueling outage.
Areas review?d included organization and staffing, contamination control and other applied health physics program aspects, radiological control of outage activities, and ALARA performance.
Result s: No violations were identified.
9103000021 910226 PDR ADOCK 05000277 O
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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted 1.1 Philadelphia ElecLtje Company W. Downey, Supervisor of Radiological Engineering C. Hoffmaster, Tech. Assistant, Radiological Engineering S. Lee, Engineer, Radiological Engineering
- R. Leddy, Senior Health Physicist
- D. LeQuia, Superintendent of Plant Services G. McCarty, Staff Health Physicist
- J. Franz, Plant Manager
- A. Fulvio, Nuclear Quality Assurance Engineer
- K. Powers, Prospective Plant Manager
- J. Pratt, Nuclear Quality Assurance Manager
- H, McCrory, Corporate Radiation Protection Lngineer
- R. Moore, Nuclear Quality Assurance Engineer
- R. Smith, Regulatory Inspection Coordinator
- J. Wilson, Superintendent of Maintenance Engineering 1.2 NRC Personnel J. Lyash, Senior Resident inspector
- L. Myers, Resident inspector
- Denotes attendance at the exit meeting.
2.0 Purcose The purpose of this routine unannounced inspection was to assess the licensee's radiological controls program during a major Unit 2 refueling outage. Areas reviewed included organization and staffing, contractor qualifications, contamination control, external and internal expcsure control, AlisRA, TLD control, and housekeeping.
3.0 Oraanization and Staffina The inspectors reviewed the qualifications of contractor health physics technicians. Senior technicians exceeded the requirements of both ANSI N18.1 (1971) and ANSI /ANS 3.1 (1981). Records indicated that many of these contractor technicians had prior experience at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS).
In addition to reviewing qualification records, the inspector interviewed several technicians at various work locations within the plant. Within the scope of this inspection, the health physics organization was found to be adequately staffed with qualified health physics technicians.
A qualified ind vidual who currently works at PEC0's Limerick facility has been selected to fill the Technical Support Supervisor (TSS)
position at PBAPS. The position had been vactnt for approximately five
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months.
The responsibilities of the TSS position have been assumed by the Assistant Health Physicist (AHP) which decreased his ability to assist the Senior Health Physicist (SHP) with overall department responsibilities.
It is anticipated that the SHP will have more time to focus on his essential duties (i.e., supervision of directly reporting staff members) once the vacant position is filled and the AHP is fully avail able.
During conversations with licensee personnel, the inspector communicated one area of concern regarding organizational responsi)ilities.
The six HP Supervisors each retain responsibility for their non-outage crew of technicians during outages. Although on the same crew, these technicians were assigned to work on separate projects at various locations in the plant.
Supervisors were not assigned the respon-sibility for projects or areas.
The inspector found that HP technicians
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assigned to support work in a given area, although directed by one lead technician, reported to different supervisors. As a result, there is no supervisor who is clearly accountable for the overall performance of a technician team assigned to a gi w n area.
Interviews with personnel indicated that this system did not provide strong supervisory awareness of technician concerns in the field.
Additionally, supervisors appeared unsure of their outage goals and objectives and Radiological Engineering
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personnel were not clear about which HP Supervisor to contact for support of specific issues.
Radiological Engineering personnel are responsible for technical aspects of radiological controls for specific areas of the plant.
The Radiation Protection Department has recently undergone significant changes in organizational philosophy.
Some changes appear to have enhanced communication and cooperation within the organization.
However, conversations with HP Technicians, HP Supervisors and Radiological Engineering personnel support the concerns stated above and suggest that some attention is warranted in this area.
4.0 Noble Gas Contamination incidsph A significant number of personnel contaminations have resulted during the outage as a result of noble gas leaks in the Unit 3 Offgas System.
in response to worker concerns about the contamination incidents, the health physics organization issued a memo to plant personnel which equated the risk of exposure from the noble gas cloud to a dose equivalent of 10 millirem for 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> of exposure (0.25 mrem /hr).
The inspector reviewed licensee calculation of doses to personnel from immersion in the noble gas field.
The inspector noted that the memo communicated an appropriate risk estimate to workers.
The memo also stated that the TLD badge would adequately monitor specific exposure from noble gas to each worker. According to station personnel, the corporate radiation protection group will evaluate TLD response to this noble gas field in greater detail.
The results of this analysis will be reviewed during a future inspection.
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All contamination events are being documented at the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA) exit point when identified by the automated whole body personnel contamination monitors (PCM). When the monitor alarms personnel are required to manually frisk using a thin window " pancake" probe.
Personnel are released from the RCA and no Personnel Contamination Report (PCR) is initiated if manual survey indicates all areas of the body are less than 100 net counts per minute above
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background. The inspector expressed concern that plant employees might become desensitized to PCM alarms. Health physics personnel were observed to be closely monitoring frisking practices at the exit from the RCA and were readily available to assist workers as required.
Although efforts to aggressively locate and contain the source of the noble gas leak were undertaken, the problem had not been solved at the close of this inspection period. Helium was used as a tracer gas to determine potential points of release.
The inspector observed efforts in the field to tighten offgas charcoal bed manways identified as leak
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paths. The efforts were well planned and efficiently executed but h
failed to significantly reduce overall noble gas concentrations in the plant.
Further licensee attempts to resolve this issue will be subject to future inspection.
5.0 Main Condenser Tube Replacnent The inspector observed work in progress during the condenser tube replacement. Worker efforts were well coordinated and the radiological controls were observed to be adequate during inspector tours of the area.
Condenser internals were hydrolazed to reduce contamination levels. However, several 'orkers became' contaminated during the tube removal process.
These contamination events have received significant management attention and corrective actions were rapidly implemented.
In the early stages of tube removal, the tubes and tube stakes were removed dry which increased the probability of spreading airborne and surface contamination.
Licenso personnel decided to wet the tubes and stakes to control contamination on the condenser internals and provide lubrication for easier component removal.
Another factor which may have contributed to personnel contaminations was the use of insulating clothing under protactive clothing (PC).
The abrasion of those two materials is suspected to have released contamination embedded in the PC layer resulting in personnel contaminations. The licensee is limiting the use of underclothing on the condenser modification.
The rate of contamination events in the condenser area was declining during the course of the inspection period.
Several HEPA units were connected to the side of the condenser opposing the work area.
These HEPA units were aligned to draw potentially contaminated air away from the work area and to lower air pressure within the outdoor work tent.
The HEPA units caused outdoor air to flow into the work tent and effectively reduced the potential for environmental release of contamination.
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6,0 ALARA Performance The inspectors observed several shielding installations within. the.
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drywell, Records: indicated that shielding packages were well planned.
Those installations inspected were observed to be well secured and effective..in reducing local area-dose rates.- Efforts.are being undertaken to streamline the administrative process associated with shielding requests and approvals.
For example, a' new specification,-
" Nuclear Safety Related Specification for the use of Temporary Shielding m
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at Philadelphia Electric company Nuclear Facilities" was recently-issued (1/14/91) which allows for the use of generic standards for pipe loads, approved scaffold loads and design, floor loads, structural support
loads, floor load distribution plates, and seismic transportable shadow
shields.
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The inspector observed remote welding operations.during chock valve replacement within the drywell. This process reduces the number of persons required at the valve during welding. Other crew members were able to review.and assist with work efforts from a low dose rate area.
_ ALARA program performance was considered good in all areas reviewed
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c during the inspection period.- Personnel exposures-recorded foi outage activities closely _ approximated the_ pre-outage estimates.
7,0 Radioactive Samole Assav EauiDment The inspector reviewed procedures and records for operation, calibration and daily performance checks for the internal proportional counters used in the radiation sample counting room.. All records reviewed were in compliance with: station procedures.
No weaknesses were found in station
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-procedures and no violation of station ~ procedures.was noted.
8.0-Instrument-Trackina During the last inspection period (combined NRC Inspection Report Nos.
50-277/90-21 and 50-278/90-21), the insrector observed weaknesses in the instrument tracking process used at the-station.- Specific technicians are assigned to the instrument. issue area during-the current outage.
Improvement in the consistency of the instrument tracking-process has resulted and no shortage of health physics instruments was noted.
9.0 Advanced--Radworker Proaram Concern was expressed in combined NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-277/90-07 and 50-278/90-07 regarding.the implementation of the Advanced Radiation Worker (ARW) Program.
The inspector reviewed the implementation of-the ARW program during this inspection period.
Licensee management-personnel have implemented this program in a prudent and cautious fashion.
No violations or weaknesses were found in -this area, r'-
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- 10.0'-Review of Divino Incident The inspector reviewed material provided by licensee personnel regarding
- the October 26, 1990 incident where a diver was allowed to enter the Spent fuel Pool without extremity dosimeters. The corrective actions immediately implemented were found to be adequate (Combined NRC Inspection Re) ort Nos. 50-277,'90-21; 50-278/90-21).
Long term program enhancements have also been implemented as a result of this incident.
One procedure now governs diving in the Spent fuel Pool and Reactor Cavity while another procedure governs diving operations in all other locations.
These procedures have been modified to include figures,
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check-off lists and acknowledgement / approval signatures for major--
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decisions. Technician training on these enhancements is expected to begin.in June of 1991. This-Item-is. closed (NCV 50-278/90 21-01).
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11.0 -TLD Control TLD badges are controlled and issued to plant workers on a daily basis
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by the security department.
Security measures undertaken during the TLD
change-out process are similar to those found at other stations.
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the TLDs are-exchanged at the end of.a use cycle,-dosimetry personnel
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' perform the-change out within the security issue area and assume responsibility for interim storage of TLDs during this period.
TLDs are o
temporarily: stored in the dosimetry office and the office is kept locked L
after normal office-hours..-TLDs are processed at PEC0's corporate office.
12.0 Postinas and Other Radiolooical Controls
Tours conducted within the-RCA' indicated that compliance with the-L posting requirements of 10 CFR:20,203 was achieved in all areas of the L
planttinspected. Housekeeping was generally found to be good.
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in.some areas -lack of attention to. detail potentially impacted L
_ radiological controls.
Items were found_ lying across contaminated area boundaries and-Radioactive -Material-Storage-Area signs were-found at locations where no-radioactive material'was stored.
The inspector observed HEPA units exhausting a strong air flow out of a posted contaminated area within the plant.
Licensee personnel redirected the~
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_ exhaust :to a more appropriate location and no spread of contamination
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The items observed by the inspectors would likely have been identified during " Management by Walking Around" '(MBWA) tours.
- Management personnel are required to tour the. facility, but no requirement is established-to assure'that any specific areas is visited.
Discussions with plant personnel' indicate that areas of the plant (i.e.,
drywell) are' almost never toured by HP Supervisors and senior HP management personnel'. The inspector noted that the effectiveness of the MBWA program may not be fully realized if some areas of the plant fail to be visited on a routine basis by management personnel.
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7 13.0 [dt Meetino A meeting was held with licensee representatives at the end of this inspection on February 8, 1991.
The purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed and the findings of the inspection were discussed.
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