IR 05000275/1999001
| ML16342A742 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 03/25/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16342A741 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-99-01, 50-275-99-1, 50-323-99-01, 50-323-99-1, NUDOCS 9903300384 | |
| Download: ML16342A742 (34) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket Nos.:
License Nos.:
Report No.:
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Approved By:
50-275; 50-323 DPR-80; DPR-82 50-275/99-01; 50-323/99-01 Pacific Gas and Electric Company Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 7 1/2 miles NW of Avila Beach Avila Beach, California February 15 to 26, 1999 Lawrence E. Ellershaw, Senior Reactor Inspector Engineering and Maintenance Branch CliffordA. Clark, Reactor Inspector Engineering and Maintenance Branch William M. McNeill, Reactor Inspector Engineering and Maintenance Branch Dr. Dale A. Powers, Chief Engineering and Maintenance Branch Division of Reactor Safety ATTACHMENT:
Supplemental Information 9903300384 990325 PDR ADOCK 05000275
0
-2-
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
NRC Inspection Report No. 50-275/99-01; 50-323/99-01 The purpose of thiq inspection was to evaluate outage-related inservice inspection activities and to complete NRC's evaluation of the welding and welding inspection program at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. The conclusion regarding welding is based on the results of this inspection and previous inspections documented in NRC Inspection Reports 50-275;-323/9813 and 50-275;-323/9817.
It was concluded that the licensee had established a strong welding and welding inspection program that meets regulatory requirements.
The implemented program was well planned, articulated, and controlled. There was good understanding by all cognizant personnel with respect to requirements and responsibilities.
Maintenance
~
The inservice inspection examinations were performed in accordance with the applicable procedures.
Examination surface preparation was thorough and radiation protection personnel were sensitive to obtaining as-low-as-reasonably-achievable conditions for nondestructive examination personnel working in the containment building (Section M1.1).
The personnel observed performing examination activities were knowledgeable and proficient. The inservice inspection program supervisor was frequently involved in the observation of field examinations (Section M1.1).
The welding program was well established, well organized, and had very good instructions and guidance.
The observed welding was performed in accordance with the specified welding procedure specifications, and there was no identified instance of failing to comply with ASME Code Section IX requirements (Section M1.2).
The licensee had established and implemented a program that was effectively administering and controlling the storage, issuance, and control of welding materials (Section M1.3).
The welding procedure specifications had been properly qualified and were in accordance with the applicable nonessential, essential, or supplementary essential variables specified in Section IX of the ASME Code (Section M3.1).
The licensee had established a welder qualification/certification program that was in compliance with Section IX of the ASME Code.
The records of all selected welders were reviewed and were found to meet the required welder variables established in the ASME Code.
The observed welders performed in accordance with the requirements of the applicable welding procedure specifications (Section M5.1).
REPORT DETAILS
Summa of Plant Status Unit 1 was in Mode 6 undergoing refueling, modification, and maintenance.
Unit 2 operated at or near full power for the two weeks of onsite inspection.
II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Inservice Ins ection 73753 The Unit 1 inservice inspection program was in the last refueling outage of the first 40-month period of the second 10-year interval, and the current refueling outage was designated as the Unit 1, Refueling Outage 9. The inservice inspection program for both units endorsed Section XI of the 1989 Edition of the ASME Code, without addenda.
a.
Ins ection Sco e
The inspectors observed portions of the nondestructive examinations performed on a component cooling water ASME Code Class 2 pipe elbow weld and the internals of the secondary side of two steam generators.
Activities associated with inspection and cleaning of the secondary side of steam generators, along with reactor vessel nozzle inspections, were reviewed and evaluated.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed program documents, schedules, and examination records.
b.
Observations and Findin s The inspectors were informed that all of the visual examinations discussed below were performed by permanent licensee nondestructive examination personnel, while the magnetic particle examinations and the ultrasonic examinations were performed by contractor nondestructive examination personnel.
~Pi in The inspectors observed the magnet yoke lifttest performed on the yoke used to perform the magnetic particIe examination of an ASME Code Class 2 component cooling water 6-inch, circular pipe elbow weld. The yoke lifttest was performed in accordance with the approved procedure.
The inspectors also observed the calibration of the portable ultrasonic examination unit used to perform angle beam examinations of the above-described component cooling water pipe elbow weld. The calibration was performed in accordance with the approved procedure using the appropriate calibration blocks.
The inspectors observed the performance of the examinations listed below.
EXAMINATION TYPE WELD NUMBER COMPONENT OR WELD TYPE Magnetic Particle Ultrasonic 'IC-1357A WIG-1357A 6" Pipe Elbow Weld 6" Pipe Elbow Weld The inspectors, found that the examinations were performed as required by the specified procedures.
The inservice inspection nondestructive examination procedures had been appropriately reviewed and approved in accordance with the licensee's process for approval of safety-related procedures.
The inspectors observed that examination surfaces had been thoroughly cleaned and prepared by licensee personnel.
The examiners did not report or identify any recognizable flaw or discontinuity indications during the two examinations observed.
Steam Generator 1-3 A visual examination of Steam Generator 1-3 secondary side internals and the vessel shell in the steam drum region was performed by the licensee's inservice inspection group during this refueling outage.
The inspection was intended to determine the general mechanical and structural condition of the components.
In addition, ultrasonic thickness measurements were obtained at selected locations on the steam generator feedring and riser barrel.
For comparison, some ultrasonic thickness measurements were taken at the same locations measured during Refueling Outage 6. The inspectors reviewed the visual examination information and noted no concerns.
(At the end of the inspection, the ultrasonic thickness measurement data obtained for Steam Generator 1-3 was undergoing review by the system engineer.)
The inspector entered Steam Generator 1-3 with the licensee's inservice inspection program supervisor to observe the secondary side internals and the vessel shell in the steam drum region.
Foreign material exclusion program controls were appropriately in effect to prevent the introduction of foreign materials into plant equipment.
The inspector observed portions of the secondary moisture separator banks, riser barrel, feedwater nozzle and ring, mid-deck plates, and other internal steam drum areas to assess the general mechanical and structural condition of the unit. The material condition of these components was found to be good. The inspector also observed that no uncontrolled foreign material was inside the steam generator.
Steam Generators 1-1 and 1-4 The inspectors reviewed the scheduled steam generator secondary side upper tube bundle hydraulic cleaning activities with the licensee's staff and contractor personnel.
The inspectors were informed that this was the first time this cleaning activity had been performed at a commercial nuclear power facility in the United States.
Prior to implementing hydraulic cleaning activities in the secondary side of Steam Generators 1-1 and 1-4, a mixture of scale conditioning agents was injected into each steam generator to soften the scale/sludge material adhering to the secondary side of the steam generators.
The application of these scale conditioning agents was expected to enhance the effectiveness of the pressure wash technique implemented during the upper tube bundle hydraulic cleaning.
Contractor personnel noted that the hydraulic cleaning displaced a majority of the scale/sludge material from the steam generator upper tube bundle to the top of the tubesheet.
Once the upper tube bundle hydraulic cleaning was performed in Steam Generators 1-1 and 1-4, sludge lancing of the steam generator tubesheets was performed.
Sludge lancing removed much of the original tubesheet scale/sludge material, and the additional scale/sludge material displaced during the upper tube bundle hydraulic cleaning.
After sludge lancing, the licensee's inservice inspection group performed a cleanliness inspection of each steam generator tubesheet to assess the adequacy of the sludge lancing process.
The inspector observed portions of the licensee's cleanliness inspection of the Steam Generator 1-1 tubesheet.
Foreign material exclusion program controls were appropriately in effect to prevent the introduction of foreign materials into the steam generators.
The tubesheet annulus, tubelane, and in-bundle areas were inspected using remote video equipment installed through access ports in the generator shell. The inspector also observed removal of two foreign objects discovered during the tubesheet inspection.
One object was a piece of nonferrous wire approximately 2 ~la inches long by 1/16 inch diameter, and the second object was a small bundle of metal debris. The inspector reviewed the as-found tubesheet inspection reports issued for Steam Generators 1-1 and 1-4. The inspector noted that all loose metallic foreign material found during the inspections of the tubesheet areas was removed from the steam generators.
Reactor Vessel Nozzles The inspectors observed portions of the reactor vessel nozzle ultrasonic testing equipment assembly and disassembly activities. The inspectors noted that personnel from the licensee's inservice inspection group were also present to observe some of these contractor activities. The inspectors were unable to observe actual reactor vessel nozzle examinations.
Examination Personnel Those personnel that performed examination activities observed by the inspectors were knowledgeable and proficient. The licensee's inservice inspection program supervisor demonstrated excellent knowledge of ASME Code Section XI requirements and the licensee's inservice inspection program requirements.
During discussions and field observations, it was noted that the inservice inspection program supervisor was frequently involved in the observation of field activities.
Radiolo ical Protection The inspectors also observed that within the Unit 1 containment building, radiological protection personnel responsible for controlling activities within high radiation areas were fullyaware of radiological conditions and dose rates as evidenced by pre-job briefings with the inspectors.
The inspectors also witnessed radiological protection personnel informing workers of local dose rates and how to minimize their radiological exposures.
Conclusions The observed inservice inspection examinations were performed in accordance with the applicable procedures.
Also, the inservice inspection program supervisor spent frequent time in the field to verify adequate performance of licensee-contracted nondestructive examination personnel.
Examination surface preparation was thorough and radiological protection personnel were sensitive to obtaining as-low-as-reasonably-achievable conditions for personnel working in the containment building.
M1.2 Observation of Weldin 55050 The welding program was controlled by the Nuclear Welding Control Manual, Revision 39. This manual is a comprehensive and thorough compilation of ASME Code Section IX and AWS D.1-1 Structural Welding Code requirements and implementing procedures (e.g., welding material control, welder qualifications, welding inspection, welding procedure specifications, and procedure qualification records).
The manual was thoroughly reviewed by the inspectors.
In addition, the inspectors observed welding associated with work directed by three work orders to determine if welding activities complied with requirements specified in the applicable welding procedure specifications.
b.
Observations and Findin s Work Order C0159016, "Weld Support for Trough BPZ42A IAW FCT-21904" The inspectors witnessed welding of a quality related, but non-ASME component performed under Work Order C0159016.
The specified welding procedure was Welding Procedure Specification 11, Revision 8. The work dealt with replacement of cable tray supports that had corroded in the auxiliary salt water system.
The supports consisted of two small pieces of stainless steel (4X8X1/4 inch thick plate) intersecting each other at almost a 90'ngle.
Each plate was marked with its heat number and was to have two holes drilled. The following minor problems were observed with respect to the planning of this activity.
1)
Arc marks from previous tack welds were present on both ends of one support.
These arc marks were the result of mispositioning the two plates during initial assembly.
The plates had been initiallypositioned and tack welded and then separated.
The location for the welds was not properly specified on the drawing.
The welder subsequently obtained the correct location from the cognizant engineer.
While the specific condition was resolved, the planning activity for this work order showed some inattention to detail.
2)
The drawing did not have sufficient information for the cable tray-to-support hole locations (i.e., rather than providing the x and y dimensions, the drawing provided just a single dimension).
The planner initiated Action Evaluation 11 to have engineering specify the hole locations using x and y dimensions.
The licensee documented these problems in event trending reports issued to engineering (V0017168) and planning (V00171 71).
Work Order C0157823-03, "ECCS Flow Element - 976, Field Weld ¹8" The inspector observed automatic gas tungsten arc welding using orbital equipment during the deposition of Field Weld 8 in safety-related, ASME Code emergency core cooling system piping. The welding procedure specification used was WPS-264, Revision 4. At the time the inspectors observed the welding, the previous crew had already deposited the root pass and the first two passes.
The observed welding consisted of deposition of the third, fourth, and cap passes.
Amperage, oscillation, dwell times, travel speed, and wire feed speed were all computer controlled. The inspector observed the welders verifying interpass temperature prior to initiation of each next bead.
The inspectors verified that the digital temperature probe (S/N 1007.01.14) had been calibrated within its specified frequency.
Travel speed, primary amperage, and wire feed speed were within the parameters established by the welding procedure specification.
A welding inspector was assigned to monitor the in-process welding. The inspectors observed his actions and noted that they were consistent with the requirements of the work order weld record.
Work Order C0159822-02, "Install Slip Flanges (Welding)"
The inspector observed manual gas tungsten arc welding of a relief valve to a slip flange (socket weld) for Job CCW-1-RV-47 (component cooling water system).
This work order was identified as an ASME Code,Section III, Class 3, safety-related job. The entire job was observed, from initiation of tack welding/fitup, to completion of the final pass.
Welding Procedure Specification WPS 5 was the designated welding procedure.
The inspectors verified that the welding material, argon gas flow rate, amperage, tungsten cup size, heat input, and interpass temperature parameters specified in the welding procedure specification were satisfied.
The inspectors observed a welding inspector verify the fitup (including cleanliness), electrical characteristics (heat input), and the welding material being used.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the welding program was well established, well organized, and had very good instructions and guidance.
The welding inspectors performed their monitoring activities in accordance with the requirements specified in the work packages.
The observed welding was performed in accordance with the specified welding procedure specifications, and there was no identified instance of failing to comply with ASME Code Section IX requirements.
M1.3 Weldin Material Control The scope of this inspection was to evaluate the licensee's welding material control program, which included the following implementing procedures:
FMC-1, "Filler Metal Storage and Handling," Revision 2; and CF5.DC2, "Welding Filler Material Control,"
Revision 6.
b.
Observations and Findin s The inspector observed that the licensee had established two temporary welding material storage and issue locations to support current outage welding activities. This provided a total of four locations, two of which were manned:
Location A (manned),located inside the protected area at the fabrication shop; Location B (manned), located inside the protected area at the machine shop; Location C, located inside the radiologically controlled area at Elevation 115; and a temporarily locked storage box at Elevation 91 containing bare wire assigned to a specific job involving orbital gas tungsten arc welding on safety-injection piping.
During the inspector's tour of the manned welding material storage and issue locations, the inspector verified that current copies of the above-described procedures were available.
Allweld rod holding ovens were appropriately identified and maintained in the proper temperature range.
The inspector verified that the weld rods inside each oven corresponded to the weld rod identifications noted on the ovens, and that the material was traceable to the applicable certified material test reports.
Rebake ovens were being appropriately used for returned weld rod that had exceeded the specified issue time limits. Adequate procedural controls had been established to limit the number of rebakes, and the oven temperatures had been set in accordance with ASME Code requirements.
The two unmanned locations were suitably locked and controlled by restricted access.
The inspectors did not observe any uncontrolled or unidentified welding materials during tours and while witnessing in-process welding of safety injection piping, relief valve slip-flange installation, and cable tray replacement supports.
Welders had been issued the proper welding material as identified on the weld material issue slips and the applicable weld/work documents.
Welders and personnel responsible for issuing and controlling welding material were knowledgeable with respect to welding material control procedural requirements.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee had established and implemented a program that was effectively administering and controlling the storage, issuance, and control of welding materials.
M3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation M3.1 Weldin Procedure S ecifications 55050 a.
Ins ection Sco e
The scope of this inspection was to evaluate the licensee's welding procedure specifications and supporting procedure qualification records.
The inspector reviewed the following ASME Code welding procedure specifications and supporting procedure qualification records (the documents in which the specific welding parameters used to qualify a welding procedure specification are recorded).
Weldin Procedure S ecifications WPS 5, Revision 8 WPS 11, Revision 8 WPS 51, Revision 8 WPS 137, Revision 7 WPS 173, Revision 6 WPS 264, Revision 4 WPS 297, Revision 2 WPS 343, Revision Procedure Qualification Records 14, 15, 316, 317 201, 235, 499 201, 235, 499, 634 204 83, 268 235, 499, 538, 539, 545, 546, 634 579 219 through 222, 232, 562, 563, 580, 584, 606, 608, 680, 681, 682 b.
Observations and Findin s The inspector compared the welding procedure specifications and their supporting procedure qualification records to the appropriate process-identified nonessential, essential, or supplementary essential variables specified in Section IX of the ASME Code.
The inspector did not identify any instance where those variables were not accounted for in the welding procedure specifications or their supporting procedure qualification records.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors'eview determined that the welding procedure specifications had been properly qualified and were in accordance with the applicable nonessential, essential, or supplementary essential variables specified in Section IX of the ASME Code.
M5 Maintenance Staff Training and Qualification M5.1 Welder ualifications 55050 The scope of this inspection was to determine if welders, including the observed welders, both contract and licensee, were properly qualified and certified in accordance with ASME Code Section IX requirements.
Welder Identification DC-2 GB-061 GI-008 GP-004 GP-338 GP-385 GP-400 Process Qualified For Gas Tungsten Arc Welding (Orbital)
Gas Tungsten Arc Welding and Shielded Metal Arc Welding Gas Tungsten Arc Welding Gas Tungsten Arc Welding Gas Tungsten Arc Welding and Shielded Metal Arc Welding Gas Tungsten Arc Welding and Shielded Metal Arc Welding Gas Tungsten Arc Welding and Shielded Metal Arc Welding Observations and Findin s The inspectors verified that welders, both contract and permanent staff, were properly qualified in accordance with Article QW-350, 'Welding Variables For Welders," specified for the process in Section IX of the ASME Code.
Allcertification records were properly documented in accordance with the licensee's welder qualification/certification program.
During observation of welding, the inspectors verified that the welders were complying with the requirements of the welding procedure specifications.
Conclusions The licensee had established a welder qualification/certification program that was in compliance with Section IX of the ASME Code.
The records of all selected welders were reviewed and were found to meet the required welder variables established in the ASME Code.
The observed welders performed in accordance with the requirements of the applicable welding procedure specifications.
Maintenance-Miscellaneous Issues (92902)
Closed Violation 50-275 50-323/9704-01:
failure to include 20 systems, structures, and components in the Maintenance Rule program scope:
The licensee had identified that 20 systems, structures, and components had not been included in the scope of the Maintenance Rule program from the beginning of the Maintenance Rule implementation in July 1996 until June 30, 1997. This failure was documented in the licensee's corrective action program in Nonconformance Report N0002038, Revision 1. The licensee revised the Maintenance Rule procedure (MA1.ID17, "Maintenance Rule Monitoring Program," Revision 4) and technical basis document (Maintenance Rule Technical Basis Document, Revision 3) to prevent recurrence of this condition. The inspector reviewed these documents and considered the corrective and preventive actions satisfactory to resolve the violation.
Closed Violation 50-275 50-323/9704-04:
failure to monitor unavailability of three risk-significant systems.
The licensee established unavailability performance criteria for two of the systems identified in the violation (solid state protection and nuclear instrumentation).
The inspectors considered the criteria to be appropriate.
The licensee determined that performance criteria did, in fact, exist for the third system (control rod drive mechanism ventilation); however, they existed under the system for containment fan cooling units.
The licensee identified that the problem was related to an inadequate definition of the containment fan cooling units'oundary, in which inclusion of the control rod drive mechanism ventilation system was not clear. The boundary definition was revised to eliminate the lack of clarity. The licensee, during review of Maintenance Rule program documents to determine if other cases of inadequate definition or unclear boundaries existed, identified 19 additional cases which were subsequently corrected.
The failure to monitor unavailability was documented in the licensee's corrective action program in Nonconformance Report N0002038, Revision 1. The licensee revised the Maintenance Rule procedure and the technical basis document (Maintenance Rule Technical Basis Document, Revision 3) to prevent recurrence of this condition. The inspector reviewed these documents and considered the corrective and preventive actions satisfactory to resolve the violation.
M8.3 Closed Licensee Event Re ort 50-275/96-014-01:
the licensee determined that corrosion products in the steam generators at tube support plate/tube intersection gap would prevent movement of the tubes in relationship to the tube support plate. This condition affected assumptions regarding freedom of tube movement in the accident and seismic. analyses and created a thermal loading condition that was not previously considered.
The licensee took the following actions:
Instituted plant modifications and chemistry changes during Refueling Outage 8 to control tube support plate corrosion; Made notification of this issue to the industry; Performed additional analyses (by Westinghouse) to qualify the tube bundle for new boundary and design basis loading conditions (at the time of this inspection, the analyses had not been approved by the licensee);
'Performed analysis (by Westinghouse) and approved such analysis for the thermal loading condition; Evaluated the Nuclear Energy Institute task force findings and recommendations regarding recent degradation of French steam generator internals; and Performed eddy current testing and a limited visual inspection during Unit 1 Refueling Outage 8, which verified corrosion buildup was limited to the tube support plate/tube intersection gap.
The licensee documented this licensee event report in their corrective action program via Nonconformance Report N00019999, Rev'ision 1. There was no violation of NRC requirements associated with this voluntary licensee event report. The inspector considered the placement of this event into the corrective action program, and the actions taken to date, to be sufficient.
M8.4 Closed Ins ectionFollowu Item 50-275/9813-01:
this itemwasopenedforfurther observance of welding and welding inspection activities..
During this inspection, the inspectors observed in-process welding and welding inspection, which is discussed in Section M1.2 above.
V. Mana ement Nieetin s X1
Exit Meeting Summary
At the end of each week, the inspectors provided licensee management a status of inspection findings. The inspectors telephonically presented the inspection results to members of'licensee management on March 25, 1999. The licensee personnel acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee personnel whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary information was identified.
ATTACHMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
PARTIALLIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
- W. Crockett, Manager, Nuclear Quality Services
- S. Galati, Maintenance Planner
- D. Gonzalez, Supervisor, Inservice Inspection
- P. Grable, Welding Engineer
- D. Hetherwick, Level III Welding Inspector, Nuclear Quality Services
- H. Karner, Auditor, Nuclear Quality Services
- S. Ketelsen, Supervisor, Nuclear Safety Assessments
and Licensing
- M. Mello, Level III Welding Inspector, Nuclear Quality Services
- J. Prange, Asset Team Leader, Maintenance Support
NRC
- D. Proulx, Senior Resident Inspector
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 55050
Inservice Inspection
Nuclear Welding General Inspection Procedure
Followup - Maintenance
ITEMS CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Closed
50-275; 50-323/9704-01
50-275; 50-323/9704-04
50-275/96-014-01
50-275/9813-01
The failure to include 20 systems, structures, and
components in the Maintenance Rule program scope.
The failure to monitor unavailability of three risk-
significant systems.
LER
The licensee determined that corrosion products in the
steam generators at tube support plate/tube intersection
gap would prevent movement of the tubes in
relationship to the tube support plate.
IFI
This item was opened for further observance
of welding
and welding inspection activities.
-2-
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Procedures
Procedure AS-1, "Authorization Schedule Diablo Canyon Power Plant," Revisions 10 and 11
Procedure WQ-1, "Qualification of Welders and Brazers," Revisions 5 and 6
Procedure WI-1, "Visual Inspection of Welds," Revisions 5 and 6
Procedure WI-2, "Qualification and Certification of Welding Inspectors," Revisions 3 and 4
Procedure GWS-ASME, "ASME General Welding Standard," Revisions 4 and 5
Procedure MA3.DC1, 'Weld Planning and Inspection," Revisions 3 and 4
Procedure GWS-AWS, "AWS Structural Steel General Welding Standard," Revision 4
Procedure QCP10.2, "Inspection Activities," Revisions 13 and 14
Procedure FMC-1, "Filler Metal Storage and Handling," Revision 2
Procedure OM7.ID10, "Quality Trend Analysis Program," Revision 6
Procedure OM7.ID1, "Problem Identification and Resolution-Action Requests," Revision 9
Procedure AD7.ID1, "Use of PIMS Work Order Module," Revision 2
Procedure AD7.DC8, Work Control," Revisions 0 and
Procedure TQI.NQ5, "Qualification and Certification of Quality Control Inspectors," Revision 2A
Procedure CF5.ID3, "Issuance of Materials from Storage," Revisions 3 and 4
Procedure MA1.ID13, "ASME Section XI Repair/Replacement
Program and Implementation,"
Revision 3
Procedure MA1.ID15, "Program for Repair and Alteration of Diablo Canyon Power Plant Boilers,
Pressure Vessels and Appurtenances," Revision 4A
Procedure MIP C-6.0, "Fabrication and Erection of Structural Steel (DCP-201)," Revision 0
Procedure AD4.ID6, "Foreign Material Exclusion Program," Revision 4
Procedure
ISI SG-2ND, "Steam Generator Secondary Side Internal Inspection," Revision 0
Procedure
ISI VT-7. 'Steam Generator Secondary Side Tubesheet
Inspection and Foreign
Object Search and Retrieval (FOSAR)," Revision
-3-
Procedure N-MT-1, "Magnetic Particle Examination Procedure," Revision 8
Procedure N-UT-1, "Ultrasonic Examination'Procedure
for Pipe Welds," Revision 11
Procedure TS1
~ID3, "Steam Generator Management Program," Revision 2
Procedure TS1.NE3, "Steam Generator Secondary Side Integrity Program," Revision 0
Other Documents
Nuclear Welding Control Manual, Revisions 34 through 39
1R9 Outage Summary - Revision
Critical Path Schedule
Weldin
Procedure
S ecifications and Procedure Qualification Records
WPS 5, Revision 8, PQRs 14, 15, 316, and 317
WPS 11, Revision 8, PQRs 201, 235, and 499
WPS 51, Revision 8, PQRs 201, 235, 499, and 634
WPS 137, Revision 7, PQR 204
WPS 173, Revision 6, PQRs 83, and 268
WPS 264, Revision 4, PQRs 235, 499, 538, 539, 545, 546, and 634
WPS 297, Revision 2, PQR 579
WPS 343, Revision 1, PQRs 219 through 222, 232, 562, 563, 580, 584, 606, 608, 680, 681,
and 682
Work Orders
R01 31438-02
C01 57823-03
R0131 438-03
C01 59822-02
C0159016
Nondestructive Examination Re orts
Type of
Examination
Component or Weld No.
Examination
Date
WIG-1357A
WIG-1357A
1-1 Tubesheet/ Hot Leg-Nozzle Side
1-1 Tubesheet
/ Cold Leg-Nozzle Side
1-1 Tubesheet/ Hot Leg-Manway Side
1-1 Tubesheet / Cold Leg-Manway Side
Steam Generator 1-2 Tubesheet / Hot Leg-Nozzle Side
Steam Generator 1-2 Tubesheet
/ Cold Leg-Nozzle Side
Steam Generator 1-2 Tubesheet
/ Hot Leg-Manway Side
Steam Generator 1-2 Tubesheet/ Cold Leg-Manway Side
Steam Generator 1-3 Secondary Side Inspection Report
Steam Generator 1-3 Feedring - 1R9 UT Thickness
Measurement Data sheet
2/26/99
2/26/99
2/24/99
2/24/99
2/24/99
2/24/99
2/17/99
2/17/99
2/1 7/99
2/17/99
2/17/99
, 02/17/99
Nonconformance Re orts
N0002038, Revision
N0001999, Revision
K
N
k
r,