IR 05000259/1976012
| ML18283B618 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 06/24/1976 |
| From: | Gilleland J Tennessee Valley Authority |
| To: | Moseley N NRC/RGN-II |
| References | |
| IR 1976012 | |
| Download: ML18283B618 (18) | |
Text
~p1 UTIQy+rO F76 19%6 830 Power Building TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORlTY CHATTANOOGA.
TENNESSEE 37401 JUN 2 4 1976-Mr.Norman C.Moseley, Director Office of Xnspection and Enforcement U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region XX-Suite 818 230 Peachtree Street,Ãf.Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr.Moseley:
This is in response to P.J.Long's June ll, 1976, letter, XE:XX:RFS 50-259/76-12, 50-260(76-.12, which transmitted for our review an XE Xnspection Report (same number).He have reviewed that report and do not consider any part of it to-be proprietary.
Very truly yours, I2.pM.E.Gilleland A'ssistant Manager of Power An Equal Opportunity Employer
~PQ RE00 0+)t*++In Reply Refer To: IE:II:RFS 50-259/76-12 50-260/76-12 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR'REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II'30 PCACHTRCC STRCCT, N.W.SVITC 818 ATLANTA, GCORGIA 30303 Tennessee Valley Authority Attn: Mr.Godwin Williams, Jr.Manager of Power 830 Power Building Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Gentlemen:
This re'fers to the'nspection conducted by Messrs.H.A.Wilber and R.F.Sullivan of this office on May 6-7 and 10-13, 1976, of activities authorized by NRC Operating License Nos.DPR-33 and DPR-52 for the Browns Perry Units 1 and 2 facilities, and to the discussion of our findings held w'ith Messrs.J.E.Gilleland, H.J.Green and J.G.Dewease at the conclusion of the inspection.
Areas examined during the inspection and our findings are discussed in the enclosed inspection report.'Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examination of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observations by the inspector.
During the inspection, it was found that certain activities under your license appear to be in noncompliance with NRC requirements.
Thi's item and references to pertinent requirements are listed in Section I of the summary of the enclosed report.Enforcement correspondence relative to this noncompliance,has been sent to you,under separate cover from the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Headquarters on June 8, 1976.In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's"Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosed inspection report will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.If this report contains any information that you believe to be proprietary, it is necessary that you submit a written application to this office requesting that such information be withheld from public Tennessee Valley Authority disclosure.
If no proprietary information is identified, a written statement to that effect should be submitted.
If an application is submitted, it must fully identify the bases for which information is claimed,to be proprietary.
The application should be prepared so that information sought to be withheld is incorporated in a separate paper and referenced in the application since the application will be placed in the Public Document Room.Your application, or written statement, should be submitted to us within 20 days.If we are not contacted as specified, the enclosed report and this letter may then be placed in the Public Document Room.Should:you have any questions concerning this letter, we will be glad to discuss them with you.Very truly yours,~~~C./~~.J.Long, Chief Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Enclosure:
IE Inspection Report Nos.50-259/76-12 and 50-260/76-12
~"~P,II REC0+>>*<<~UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I I 230 PEACHTREC STRICT, N.W.SVITC 8I8 ATLANTA, G CO RG I A 30303 IE Inspection Report Nos.50-259/76-12 and 50-260/76-12 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 818 Power Building Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Facility Name: Browns Ferry 1 and 2 Docket Nos.: 50-259 and 50-260'icense Nos.: DPR-33, DPR-.52 Location: Limestone County,, Alabama Type of License: 3293 Mwt, BWR (GE)Type of Inspection:
Special, Unannounced Dates of Inspection:
May 6-7, 10-13, 1976 Dates of Previous Inspection:
April 21-23,,28-30, 1976 Principal Inspector:
R,.F, Sullivan, Reactor Inspector (May 10-13, 1976)Inspector-in-Charge:
H..A, Wilber, Reactor Inspector (May 6-7, 1976)Reactor Projects Section No.1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Accompanying Inspector:
J.W, Hufham, Radiation Specialist Environmental and Special Projects Section Fuel Facility and Materials Safety Branch Principal Inspector:
..r'.i.-,/~'I', F.Sullivhn, Reactorj Inspector Reactor Projects Section No.1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch W.C, Seidle,~Chief Reactor Projects Section No.1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch'Date IE Rpt.Nos.50-259/76-12 and 50-260/76-12
'SUMMARY OF FINDINGS I.Enforcement Items Infraction ,Contrary to Technical Specification 6.3.A procedures were not adhered to on May 4, 1976, as'ollows:
1.The procedures set forth in BFM 8"Cutting, Welding and Open Flame Work Permit" were not followed in performing an area survey, removing or protecting combustible materials, or requesting a fire watch.(Details I, paragraph 2.g.)2.The procedures defined in Section III of Radiation Control Instruction No.1 were not followed in documentation of entry into and'xit from the drywell of Unit 1.(Details I, paragraph 2.g.)II.Licensee Action on Previousl Identified Enforcement Matters Not inspected.
III.New Unresolved Items None IV.Status of Previousl Re orted Unresolved'tems Not inspected.
V.Unusual Occurrences None VI.Other Si nificant Findin s None VII.Mana ement Interview The interim inspection findings were discussed with Mr.Dewease on May 6, 1976, and the inspection results were discussed with Mr.Green and members of'his staff on May 12, 1976.On May 13, 1976, the inspection findings were reviewed with members of TVA management.(Details II),
i'
IE Rpt.Woe..50-259/76-I2 eed 50-260/76-12 DETAILS I~!7 Pzepeved by: z/<f.:.-,-~f Ai-R', F.SulTiyan, Reactor Inspector Reactor Projects Section'ko.1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Date A.Wilber, Reactor Inspector Reactor Projects Section No.1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear.Support Branch Date J.W.Hufham Radiat n Specialist Environmental and Special Projects"ection Fuel Facility and Materials Safety Branch Da e Dates of Inspection:-
May 6~7, and 10-12, 1976:Reviewed by: W.0, Eeidle,"Chief Reactor Proj ects Section No.1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch+/f/yd: Date-2 R.L, Bangart,ghief D te Environmental and Special Projects Section Fuel Facility and.Materials Safety Branch 1.*Persons Contacted Tennessee Ualle Authozit.TVA H.J.Green-Plant Superintendent C.Cantrell-Outage Director T'.P, Bragg-QA Staff Supervisor J.Morgan-Safety Engineer J.Bryant-Safety Engineer B.Campbell-Boilermaker Foreman T.Jordan-Assistant Shift Engineer J, Glover-Training Coordinator G, Brown-Assistant Shift Engineer R, Carpenter-Assistant Unit Operator A.Webb-Assistant Unit Operator J, Putman-Fi;re Watch J.G.Dewease-Assistant Plant Superintendent IE Rpt.Nos.50-259/76-12 and 50-260/76-12 I-2 2.Dr well Fire-Unit 1 At ll:00 a.m.on May 5, 1976, the licensee informed a Region II inspector by telephone, that a small fire had occurred in the drywell of Unit 1 at approximately 12 noon on May 4, 1976.The fire was declared out at approximately 12:40 p.m.Two Region II inspectors arrived on site at approximately noon on May 6, 1976.a.Se uence of Events The following sequence of events was developed from discus-sions with plant personnel and reviews of shift personnel logbooks and internal documents:
May 4, 1976 7:00 a.m.A boilermaker foreman entered Unit No.1 drywell to inspect work area 563'levation prior to obtaining a cutting, welding and open flame work permit.He did not log his time of entry into or departure.
from the drywell (See paragraph 2.g.,"Pro-cedures").
He did not go to the level (549'levation)
below the work area to survey for combustible
, material.He did not say that he made a survey of the 585'levation although the pexmit called for work at that elevation.(See paragraph 2.g.,"Procedures")8:00-ll:45 a.m.Workers were in the Unit 1 drywell at the 563'levation modifying floor grating.At ll:45 a.m.the workers left the drywell.Noon The roving fire watch was informed by an unidentified person that there was smoke in the Unit 1 reactor building.He attempted to call the Shift Engineer (SE)and;was unable to do so;he then called the Unit Operator (UO)for Unit 1 and requested help in locating the source of the smoke.
IE Rpa.Eos.50-259/76-12 and 50-260/76-12 I-3 12:15 p.m.Two Assistant Unit Operators (AUO)and an Assistant Shift Engineer (ASE)were in Unit 1 Reactor Building and established that the location of the fire was in the drywell.An AUO dialed the fire number that initiates the fire alaxm but no voice contact could be established even though the code call for"fire" was sounded.The UO in the control room announced a false alarm.12:18 p.m.The AUO successfully initiated the fire alarm and established voice con-tact with the control room tc5 define the location of the fire.At this time, another AUO and an ASE were in , the drywe11 and the AUO had located the fire at the lower level of the drywell.The Unit No.1 UO secured the Reactor Protection System (RPS)*and the Rod Position Indicating System (RPIS)to remove electrical power in the area of the fire.The fire was first repoxted to be an electrical fire because there were two extension cords in the fixe zone;these cords were disconnected from the electrical outlet by an'AUO.The first person to the fire described it as hot embers with very little flames.The firefighting equipment used was 1 dry chemical extinguisher, 4 CO units.The material was then dispersed with a plank, that was at 2 hand, and the coals were quenched with demineralized water supplied through a section of 3" ventilation hose that was available.
Regular fire hose had been laid outside the drywell for use if it was xequired;a total of 150 feet had been connected and a man was stationed at the fire header valve.12:50 p.m.All clear was sounded.
IE Rpt.Nos.50-259/76-12 and 50-260/76-12 I-4 b.Immediate Licensee Action The Plant Superintendent initiated a survey program to deter-mine the extent of the deposit of combustion products.A preliminary survey showed chloride contamination levels higher than the plant limit of 0.08 mg/d2 and a cleanup procedure was implemented on May 5, 1976.The Plant Superintendent directed the Safety Engineers at the site to investigate the fire.This investigation was started on May 4 and continued through May 5.On May 6, a team made up of TVA personnel from outside the plant was formed to investigate the fire.The Plant Superintendent then directed his in-plant group to discontinue their investigation effort.The Plant Superintendent issued an interim order that a fire watch will be required for all cutting, welding and open flame work permits issued for work in the restricted operating areas of the plant.C~Subse uent Action The findings and recommendation of the off-site investigative group were not available at the.conclusion of the inspection.
These will be reviewed during a future inspection.
Cause of Fire The findings of the Safety Engineers are that the fire was started by slag, or hot metal from modification of floor grating, at the 563'levation of the drywell.This slag or.hot metal slid down an I-beam onto a pile of airline respirator hoses and extension cords.The inspector requested'that the residue from the fire be retained for possible analyses.Dama e from Fire The damage from the fire consisted of deposition of the combustion products over a limited area of the interior of the drywell and melting and charring of the exterior coating on some flexible conduit that contained the leads of the equip-ment drain sump level sensors.The operation of the level sensors was not impaired.Ins ector Observation at Site of Pire The area at the 563'levation was.viewed and the inspector observed scaffolding and wooden planks below the area defined Oi it<Qi IE Rpt, Nos.50-259/76-12 and 50-260/76-12 I 5 as the work area, The inspector was informed that this scaffolding was observed in this position immediately after the fire.The doorway where the fire occurred could not be seen from the defined work area on the 563'levation, There was a cable tray with small, 2 to 5 inch, gaps in the cover plates under the work area.go Procedures Procedure BFM8,"Cut ting, Welding, and Open-Flame Permit" requires that a survey of the work area shall be performed prior to obtaining a work permit.The foreman did not state that he surveyed the 585'levation although this level was specified on the work permit.The foreman stated he did not survey the 549'levation where the combustible material was located except to look down through the grating.He did not request a fire watch as required by Item 4 of the"Requirements-Division of Po~er Production" section of procedure BFM-8, These are considered examples of an item of noncompliance sin'ce he did not follow procedures as required by Section 6,3A of the Technical Specifications.
The foreman did not.sign in or out on the Special Work Permit as required by Item 5c of the document entitled"Special Work Permit Procedures."Section III of Radiological Control Instruction No.1 states"It is the duty of each employee to adhere to these procedures and protective measures...," This is another example of the item of noncompl'iance for not following procedures.
The foreman informed an inspector that he had never seen a complete copy of BFM8;he was aware of only the form that is required for welding, cutting, or open flame work.The licensee stated that, in the future, the foreman will be informed of procedures and practices in a more controlled manner rather than relying on the informal program that has been used in the past.h, Review of Cuttin Weldin and 0 en Flame Permits The inspectors reviewed the cutting, welding and open flame permits required for work in the drywells to determine how many times a fire watch had been requested.
The review covered the period from April 1, 1976 to May 4, 1976, Thirty permits were reviewed and twenty of them did not have a fire watch assigned.Of the nine supervisors identified, 4 always requested a fire watch, 4 never requested a fire watch and the remaining supervisor requested a fire watch for one time out of five different gobs.
XE Rpt.Nos.50>>259/76-12 and 50-260/76 12 I>>6 Since May 5,.all permits that were reviewed had fixe watches assigned;this demonstrates adherence to the interim order issued by the Plant Superintendent.
Communications Since the inspectors learned from interviews with licensee representatives that the telephone/fire.alarm system did not function properly, on the day of the fire, the inspectors made an attempt to detexmine the weakness in the system.The inspectors met with electrical technicians who had confirmed the operability of all"PAX" telephones that could have initiated the first fire alarm that was considered a false alarm, The inspectors were informed that of the four telephones that were checked out, one was inoperable due to a loose wire and another had a bad receiver.The inspectors expressed to management the need for a periodic performance check of the telephone system, especially since it is used to actuate the fire alarm.The licensee stated that the present conditions at the plant have xesulted in a temporary overloading of the communications system.This overload condition will be alleviated when the construction forces leave the site, Histor of Recent Pires The Shift Engineer Journal (log)was examined for the period from March 22, 1975 through May 4, 1976, to review all entries of reported fires at the facility during restoration work, The appropriate Assistant Shift Engineer's Journal was also examined to obtain additional information relative to the identified fires.There is no other formal record of fire reporting, investigating or instituting corrective action, The above journal entries were brief and provided little information beyond the immediate response required to ex-tinguish the fire and the required cleanup.The inspector was informed that the lack of formal reporting was not reflective of the considerable management involvement in the review of each fire, Since the March 22, 1975 fire, there were 8 recorded small fires which could be considered associated with construction or restoration related activity on'Units 1 and 2, The fol-lowing'lists those reported in the journals except the fire of 5/4/76 which is described in above sections in detail: (1)10/26/75-Small trash fire in Unit 2 reactor building at elevation 593'aused by worker dropping cigarette on dry mop.Dry chemical fire extinguisher used to put out fire, i><
IK Rpt, Nos, 50-259/76-12 and 50-260/76-12 I-7 (2)10/28/75-Small fire in ring header in Unit 2 torus.Fire alarm was initiated.
Pieces of scaffolding in header had ignited.(Inspector had been verbally informed that weld heat-treating was in progress).
Scaffolding was extinguished and then removed.(3)11/1/75-Rope and trash in the Unit 2 torus ignited from welding sparks.A can of dye penetrant exploded.Per-sonnel in the torus used portable extinguishers to put out the fire.Trash was removed in a welding bucket.(4)ll/17/75-Smoldering rags observed near"D" RHR motor in Unit 1.Fire alarm sounded.Fire put out by per sonnel on the job.Cause attributed to hot metal from cutting work.(5}(6)12/2/75-Coveralls in Unit'drywell ignited by welder'sparks.Smoldering coveralls were removed.from the drywell and doused with water.12/9/75-Smoldering fire located in Unit 1 drywell near B recirculation pump.Metal from cutting above ignited'duct tape and plastic giving off bad odor.(7)1/28/76-In the Unit 1 drywell a welding cable grounded causing a four inch section of insulation on the cable to burn, The fire alarm was sounded.No damage reported.Not included in the above list was the auxiliary boiler stack fire of'9/18/75 which was the subject of, an earlier TVA press release.k.In-lant ualit Assurance Surve The in-plant QA staff has conducted surveys of the imple-mentation of the TVA procedures which established the fire watch patrols during the restoration program and the implemen-tation of the added controls on welding and open flame work which were initiated 6/26/75.The implementation of these added controls were by Standard Practices BFS28, Fire Atten-dants, and BFM8, Cutting, Welding, and Open-Flame Work Permit, ,Surveys (as distinguished from the audits conducted by the Office of Power QA staff)were performed as follows:
IE Rp t.Nos.50-259/76-12 50-260/76-12 I 8 (1}EPS 28 9/8/75 1/26/76 (2)BFH 8 12/11/75 12/31'/75 2/12/76 3/16/76 4'/5/76 The records of the surveys were examined and discussions were held with three members of the QA staff involved in the surveys.The first survey of the fire watch program identified some unsatisfactory areas in that personnel assigned fire watch detail were not performing all assigned duties nor were they always wearing the proper fire watch identification.
The second survey showed considerable improvement and did not identify any unsatisfactory areas.The first survey of implementation of BFM 8 (welding permit)performed on 12/ll/75 indicated considerable deficiencies in the use of the welding permit as well as in the procedure itself, BFHS was revised on 12/19/75', apparently as a result of this survey, to correct identified shortcomings.
The revision required that the work location be specifically identified and limited the period of work authorization to a single shift with the provision that the permit could be extended one additional shift upon proper authorization, The revision also defined the duties and responsibilities of the fire watch.more clearly.A followup survey'of BFMS was made on 12/31/75, to check implementation of recent revisions and correction of iden-tified deficiencies.
The survey results indicated improvement but some provisions were still not being fully implemented.
Another survey on 2/12/76 did not-reveal any unsatisfactory areas in the use of the permits except for some laxity in the disposition of the paperwork.
The surveys on 3/16/76 and 4/5/76 did not identify any unsatisfactory areas in the application of BFHS procedures.
IE Rpt.Nos.50-259/76-12 and 50-260/76-12 II-1 DETAILS II-..rP Prepared by:./R.F.Sullivan~Reactor Inspector Reactor Projects Section No.'Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch'ate Date of Management, Meeting: May 13, 1976 Reviewed by: W.C.Sezdle, Chief Reactor Projects Section No.1'eactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Date Persons Attendin TVA J.E.Gilleland-Assistant Manager of Power J.R.Calhoun-Chief,, Nuclear Generation Branch J.L.Currie-Supervisor, Safety Engineering Services NRC D.Thompson-IE, HQ T.V.Wambach-DOR, HQ N.C.Moseley-IE, Region II F.J.Long-IE, Region II W.C.Seidle-IE, Region II H.A.Wilber-IE, Region II R.F.Sullivan-IE, Region II 2.Mana ement Meetin Members of TVA management met with NRC representatives in the IE Region II office in Atlanta on May 13, 1976, to discuss findings of the IE inspectors relating to the Unit 1 drywell fire of May 4, 1976.The results of the inspection were discussed as were the IE ex-pressed concerns relative to the circumstances comprising the y noncompliance'nd other identified weaknesses.
The specific IE concerns included the following:
a.The noncompliance for failure to adhere to procedures based on the several examples noted by the inspectors.
IE Rpt.Nos.50-259/76-12 and 50-260/76-12 II>>2 b, Foreman and craft personnel not having adequate training in or familiarity with the contents and requirements of BFM8 and SWP procedures.
c~Apparent inconsistencies among foremen on whether or not a fire watch was required for cutting and welding work in the drywell.Some appeared to give inadequate attention to work area surveys prior to and after welding or cutting, the need to remove or cover flammable material and the use of qualified fire watch.d.Lack of formal reporting and review procedures for fires, even though small.e, Overload of the plant phone system during the balance>of restoration work activities and plans to improve reliability when plant returns to opex'ating status.TVA's initial reaction was that shortcomings in the implementation of BFM8 had been recognised last December and that positive manage-ment action, was taken and resulted in a great improvement.
IE acknowledged that the improvement had taken place but felt there was need for further improvement relating to BFM8 and the othex identified areas as evidenced by the inspector's findings.TVA stated that the IE concerns were understood and would receive prompt consideration and attention by TVA.IE indicated that prompt followup inspection and review would be made of actions taken to strengthen the areas discussed.