IR 05000212/2003011
| ML17301A188 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie, 05000212  |
| Issue date: | 05/07/1985 |
| From: | Bibb H, Crlenjak R, Elrod S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17301A186 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-85-07, 50-335-85-7, 50-389-85-07, 50-389-85-7, NUDOCS 8506210055 | |
| Download: ML17301A188 (8) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-335/85-07 and 50-389/85-07 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-335 and 50-389 Facility Name; St.
Lucie 1 and
License Nos.:
DPR-67 and NPF-16 Inspection Cond cte
.
February 12 - March 11, 1985 Inspectors:
R.
V.
rle ak, Senior Resident Inspector Date igned A~
H.
Approved by:
ib Re ident Inspector Date igned S.
A. Elrod, Section Chief Division of Reactor Projects Da Signed SUMMARY Scope:
This routine resident inspection involved 146 resident inspector-h'ours onsite in the areas of plant operation, surveillance observation, maintenance observation and reactor trips.
Also, an enforcement conference was held on March 28, 1985.
Results:
Of the five areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in four areas; one violation was identified in the area of plant operations (paragraph 6, failure to implement the procedure for equipment out of service).
One Unresolved Item was identified for potential missile sources as addressed in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), paragraph 5.
850h2i0055 850507 PDR ADOCK 05000335 Q
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
"C.
M.
"J.
H.
, L.
W.
N.
G.
- R. J.
C.
F.
C.
A.
E. J.
J.
G.
- J J
Wethy, Plant Manager Barrow, Operations Superintendent Pearce, Acting Operations Supervisor Roos, Quality Control Supervisor Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor Leppla, Instrument and Control Supervisor Pell, Acting Techni'cal Department Supervisor Wunderlich, Acting Reactor Engineering Supervisor West, Security Supervisor Walls, Quality Control Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,
'operators, shift technical advisors, security force members and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interviews The resident inspectors attended entrance and exit 'interviews conducted during the inspection period by Region II inspectors P.
G. Stoddard, A.
C. Stalker and T. Conlon.
The resident inspectors also conducted interim interviews with licensee management during the inspection period and held an exit interview at the conclusion of the inspection.
The inspector discussed the scope of the inspection and findings with the licensee.
Persons indicated with an asterisk (*) in paragraph 1 above attended one or more of interviews.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector( s)
during this inspection.
3.
Enforcement Conference An enforcement conference was held with the persons listed below in attendance on March 28, 1985, in the Region II Office.
The topic was the events surrounding the discovery on February 28, 1985, of Containment Isolation Valve HCV-14-7 inoperabilit Licensee Personnel C. 0. Woody, Vice President - Nuclear Operations K. N. Harris, Vice President C.
M. Wethy, Vice President D. A. Sager, Plant Manager L.
W. Pearce, Operations Supervisor P.
Pace, Corporate Licensing NRC Personnel J.
A. Olshinski, Deputy Regional Administrator R.
D. Walker, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
P.
R. Bemis, Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
V. L. Brownlee, Branch Chief, DRP C. A. Julian, Section Chief, DRS T. A. Peebles, Senior Resident Inspector, DRS K. N. Jenison, Project Inspector, DRP The licensee presented a detailed discussion of the event, its causes and safety significance.
The meeting concluded with discussions which were beneficial to the understanding of the event and the licensee's corrective actions.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
Unresolved Items An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.
The Unit 2 FSAR discusses sources of potential internally generated missiles (Standard Review Plan (SRP) 3.5. 1. 1 and 3.5. 1.2)
and protection of safety-related equipment and systems from internally generated missiles (SRP 3.5.2).
During the Appendix R inspection/walkdown (IE Report No. 335, 389/85-06).
A member of the inspection team noted that Unit 2 has two control element assembly (CEA) drive motor generator (M-G) sets which were not properly identified in the FSAR as potential missile sources.
The
"C" charging pump breaker, which is safety-related, is located in the room with the M-G sets.
Other licensees have identified similar M-G sets as potential 'sources of internally generated missiles and have installed appropriate missile barriers.
Until the licensee provides an analysis justifying the lack of missile barriers for this equipment and Region II technical staff completes a review of the current design and the completed analysis, this item will remain an Unresolved Item (UNR 389/85-07-01).
Operational Safety Verification r
The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the report period.
The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems,
'reviewed tagout records and verified proper return-to-service of affected components.
Tours of the reactor, auxiliary and turbine buildings were
'onducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks and excessive vibrations, and to verify that mainte-nance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspector, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented.
Gn February 28, 1985, the licensee notified the resident inspector that they had discovered a Unit 1 containment isolation valve which had been out-of-service for two months (since 12-31-84).
The valve, HCV-14-7, is in the component cooling water (CCW) supply line to the reactor coolant pumps.
In 1980, plant modification (PC/M)
121-80 was completed.
It installed pigtail air hose jumper s to the four CCW containment isolation valves so that, in the event of loss of instrument air to these valves, an operator could quickly reopen the valves by jumpering them to the nitrogen header or to a local nitrogen bottle.
On December 31, 1984, a ground appeared on the DC bus and the operators implemented procedure 1-0960030, Rev.
13, DC Ground Isolation.
Paragraph
calls for installation of the mechanical jumpers to HCV-14-6 and 7 prior to lifting fuses 27 and 30 to check this area for the DC ground.
This prevents HCV-14-6 and 7 from closing during the ground check.
After fuses 27 and
are reinstalled, the procedure calls for removing the mechanical jumpers.
Upon attempting to remove the jumper from HCV-14-7, the quick disconnect was jammed and the operator could not remove it.
He then went to the control room and wrote a plant work order (PWO) to have the disconnect repaired.
At this point, the valve HCV-14-7, should have been placed in the unit's
"out-of-service" log as described in Operating Procedure OP-0010129, Rev.
5, Equipment Out-of-Service-Class I.
Upon discovering this out-of-service condition, the Nuclear Plant Supervisor immediately implemented the PWO and notified the resident inspector.
It was discussed and Metermined that no testing of the valve was necessary, since the nitrogen header pressure was no greater than the air pressure the valve sees in normal use.
The preceding is a violation of Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.3. 1 Limiting Condition for Operation and also a failure to implement the procedure for equipment out-of-service (50-335/85-07-01).
Survei 1 1 ance Obser vati on During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant operations in compliance with several TS requirements.
Typical of these were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor coolant chemistry, refueling water tank level, containment pressure, control room ventilation and AC and DC electrical sources.
The inspector verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, tests results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the, test, and that any deficiencies identified during the'esting were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
One problem occurred on Unit 1 while performing a monthly surveillance..
This is discussed under reactor trips.
The inspector observed portions of Instrument and Control ( I and C)
procedure 2-1220050, Rev.',
Safety Channel Quarterly Calibration, in Progress.
No violations were identified in this section.
Maintenance Observat,'ion Station maintenance activities of selected safety-related systems and components were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance'ith requi rements.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operations were met, activities were accomplished using approved procedures, functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service, quality control records were maintained; activities were accom-plished by qualified personnel, parts and materials used were properly certified, and radiological controls were implemented as required.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
Specific work items observed/reviewed included the following:
PWO-3085 -
2C Charging Pump Packing Leak PWO-3225 - 2A1 Safety Injection Tank Check Valve - Replace Internals PWO-3077 Electrically Driven Diesel Generator Air Compressor No violations were identified in this section.
Reactor Trips On March 7, 1985, a licensed operator was performing the monthly reactor protection system logic matrix test.
The procedure was completed satis-factorily through step 8.3.3.
Upon performing Step 8.3.4, the Nuclear Operator (NO) assisting in the Cable Spread Room noticed that the indicator
arm on the undervoltage (UV) trip unit on TCB-5 did not return to the full down position when TCB-5 was closed.
The NO reported this to the licensed Control Room Operator (CRO) who then decided to place the matrix relay trip select switch in;, the "Off", or safety position until the UV trip arm could be reset.
In attempting to do this, the CRO went through position "1",
tripping TCB-1 and 5,
and through "Off" to position "4", thereby tripping TCB-4 and 8 and causing a reactor trip.
The plant was returned to the grid about seven hours later.
No violations were identified in this section.
10.
Plant Administrative Changes The resident inspector was notified by the plant manager of the following management changes effective March 1, 1985:
a.
Mr.
K.
N. Harris, Vice President on site at Plant Turkey Point (PTP)
will be reassigned to Vice President at Plant St.
Lucie (PSL)
b.
Mr. C.
M. Wethy, Plant Manager, PSL will become Vice President PTP.
c.
Mr.
D.
A. Sager, PSL Operations Supervisor will become Plant Manager PSL.
d.
Mr. L.
W. Pearce, Nuclear Plant Supervi sor PSL, wi1 1 become Operations Supervi sor PSL.