IR 05000157/1993001

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Insp Rept 50-157/93-01 on 930329-31.No Safety Concerns or Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Reactor Operations Program Including Status of Previously Identified Items, Compliance W/Lco,Recordkeeping & Mgt Oversight
ML20044D660
Person / Time
Site: 05000157
Issue date: 05/12/1993
From: Bores R, Dragoun T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20044D657 List:
References
50-157-93-01, 50-157-93-1, NUDOCS 9305200123
Download: ML20044D660 (4)


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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

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Report Nos.: 50-157/93-01 Docket Nos.:,50-157

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License Nos.: R-80

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Licensee:

Cornell University

241 Camenter Hall

Ithaca. New York 14853

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Facility Name: Ward L.aboratorv j

Inspection At: Ithaca. New York l

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Inspection Conducted: March 29-31. 1993

i Inspector:

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/2 93 Thomas Dragoul Pmjedt Scientist, Effluents date Radiation Protection Section (ERPS), Facilities

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Radiological Safety and Safeguards Branch (FRSSB)

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Approved By:

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Robert J. BMes, Chief, ERPS, FRSSB, date

Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

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Areas InSDected: Reactor operations program including status of previously identified items, installation of new nuclear instrumentation channels, compliance with limiting ccaditions for operation, recordkeeping and management oversight.

Results: No safety concerns or violations were identified. The quality of operations procedures and records were significantly improved but the assignment of health physics responsibilities between groups remained unresolved.

9305200123 930513 PDR ADOCK 05000157

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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted H. Aderhold, Reactor Supervisor B. Cady, Chairman, Ward Laboratory Safety Committee D. Clark, Laboratory Director A. Garcia-Rivera, Director, Office of Environmental Health T. McGiff, Radiation Safety Officer Above personnel attended the Exit Interview on March 31,1993. Other personnel were contacted or interviewed during this inspection.

2.0 Status of Previousiv Identified Items 2.1 (Closed) Followup Item (91-01-01) Revise reactor system surveillance procedures to include acceptance criteria. All appropriate procedures were revised. This matter is closed.

2.2 (Closed) Discussion Item. Manual scram buttons located near the beam ports should be operationally tested. These buttons are now operationally tested every three months.

2.3 (Open) Unresolved Item (92-01-01) Develop policies delineating the health physics responsibilities of the reactor operations and campus radiation protection organizations. This issue was escalated from the Ward Lab Safety Committee to the Campus Safety Committee which appointed a subgroup to draft a policy. A target date of December 1992 was missed due to illness of a member but no new target date was established. The inspector met with the recently appointed Director of Environmental Health to discuss this matter. He stated that he will participate in the policy-making process. This matter remains unresolved and will be reviewed in a future inspection.

i 3.0 Reactor Console Upe.-ade Just prior to this inspection, the licensee replaced the major reactor console safety system hardware (vacuum tube equipment) and readouts with new, solid state, analog equipment. Equipment changed out included the linear reactor power channel, the i

j wide range power channel, and both fuel temperature channels. Equipment was provided by the original reactor manufacturer, General Atomics, was plug-in I

compatible with existing wiring and met Technical Specification requirements.

System schematics, maintenance, and calibration procedures were readily available.

The Safety Committee approved the review of these changes, as required by 10 CFR l

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50.59, on March 1,1993. Handwritten changes were made to appropriate procedures and checklists.

The inspector noted that the new equipment was inconvenient to use in some respects.

For example, the linear reactor power channel could not be run-up to perform the high power scram setpoint test. The Senior Reactor Operator fabricated an external

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test circuit to enable the test to be performed, but this technique necessitates

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unplugging the detector while the test is accomplished. In addition, the wide range fission chamber channel reads out in " log percent," with no conversion factor given to relate to the normal " counts per second" neutron level used during reactor start-up.

There was no provision to test the low count rate start-up interlock, again requiring the operator to unplug the detector to verify the interlock function. The licensee stated that formal incorporation of the handwritten changes into the revised operating i

procedures will be delayed until these and other hardware problems are resolved with

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the manufacturer. The inspector concluded, however, that while these problems constituted an inconvenience to the operator, they did not create a safety problem.

Within the scope of this review, no safety concerns were identified. This area will be

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reviewed in a future inspection.

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4.0 Safety Limits

Technical Specification (TS) Section 2.0 pmvides safety limits and limiting safety system settings for fuel temperature. The specifications are met by use of an

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automatic scram function that is triggered by a high reading from either of the two channels measuring fuel tempemture in the most limiting core location ( E-ring). In addition, the reactor operator logs fuel temperature on reaching criticality and hourly during power runs or rod position changes. Within the scope of this review, no deficiencies were noted.

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5.0 Limitine Conditions for Operation Section 3.0 of the TS provides operatimal limits on core reactivity, power level during routine and pulse operation, safety channel requirements, rod drop times,

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argon-41 releases, building ventilation, experiments, fuel integrity, and reactor pool water. Compliance with these requirements was determined from observation of installed equipment, verification oflicensee calculations, review of records and i

procedures, and interviews with reactor operators. No deficiencies were noted.

Compliance with the limits was good. The control of the movement of fuel in July 1992 was found to be good. The inspector noted that the test of the control rod withdrawal inhibit interlock for a low neutron count rate during start-up did not include the transient rod. Although the transient rod is not part of the " safety

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system," the licensee stated that movement of this rod is interlocked as a good practice. The licensee also stated that a step would be added to procedure OP-101 Operational Checklist (revision 1 issued 1/14/92) to verify this function. The inspector noted that requirements related to " Restricted Mode Operation" were no longer applicable since no aluminum-clad low-hydride thermocouple elements were in the core. The licensee stated that the need to include this mode of operation in the TS would be reviewed.

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6.0 Recordkeenine Section 6.10 of the TS specifies the plant operating records that shall be prepared and retained for at least five years. The inspector determined that all required records

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were available in the bound console logbook, other bound logbooks or in separate

folders. The quality of the maintenance logs, trouble report forms, and records of surveillances have significantly improved since the last inspection. All surveillance and reactor startup checklists now specify the acceptance criteria for the parameter being tested. New reactor operating procedures were issued with more detailed information and improved format. However, additional changes will be required due to the replacement of the safety channels. Within the scope of this review, licensee performance in this area was found to be significantly improved.

7.0 Mananement Oversicht Interviews with personnel and a review of minutes of meetings indicated the Ward Laboratory Safety Committee met at the required frequency and provided oversight as required by TS Section 6.2. An independent audit of reactor operations was conducted by representatives from the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI) in December 1992. Similar audits have been done by AFRRI the past few years using different personnel each year. The current audit was thorough, found no safety concerns, and provided several improvement suggestions. Within the scope of this review, management oversight was found to be good.

8.0 Exit Inten'iew The inspector met with the licensee representatives indicated in Section 1.0 at the conclusion of the inspection on March 31,1993 and summarized the scope and findings of this inspection.