IR 05000126/2003013

Insp Rept 50-312/85-04 on 850126-0313 & 0412-30.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Operational Safety Verification,Emergency Electrical Sys Walkdown,Maint & Surveillance

ML20126K177
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco, 05000126
Issue date:	05/17/1985
From:	Eckhardt J, Miller L, Perez G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20126K172	List: IR 05000126/2003013 ML20126K168
References
50-312-85-04, 50-312-85-4, NUDOCS 8506100801
Download: ML20126K177 (13)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report No.:

50-312/85-04 Docket No.:

50-312 License No. DPR-54 Licensee:

Sacramento Municipal Utility District P. O. Box 15830 Sacramento, California 95813 Facility Name:

Rancho Seco Unit 1 Inspection at:

Herald, California (Rancho Seco Site)

Inspection conducted:

anua 26 - Mar.

13, 1985 and April 12-30, 1985

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-Inspectors:

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J.[ff. Eckhard e io Resident Inspector Date Signed W

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Perez, R d nt Inspector Date Signed Approved By:

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L//. Miller, /r/, Chief Date Signed Reactor Project 6 Section 2 Summary:

l Inspection between January 26 - March 13, 1935 and April 12-30, 1985 (Report 50-312/85-04)

Areas Inspected: This routine inspection by the Resident and Regional Inspectors involved the areas of opesational safety verification, emergency electrical system walkdown,~ maintenance, surveillance, follow-up on Licensee Event Reports, and independent inspection. This inspection involved 395-hours by two resident. inspectors.

Results: Of the areas inspected, no violations or' deviations were identified.

85061 1 850521 PDR A

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DETAIIS

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Person Contacted a.

Licensee Personnal

.R. R6driguez,' Executive Director, Nuclear

• P.10ubre', Manager, of Nuclear. Operations

• G.. Coward,; Plant Superintendent-

• B. Brockf Electrical I&C Ma'intenance Supervisor

• H. Canter, QA Engineer R. Colombo, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor

• S. Crunk,-Associate Nuclear Engineer,-Regulatory Compliance L *R. Dieterich,- Licensing, Supervisor.

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• J. Field, Engineering and Quality Control' Superintendent

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• • JL Jewett, QA Site Supervisor:

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fJ. Jurkovich, Site' Resident Engineer F.~ Kellie,-Assistant Chemical and Radiation. Superintendent

• R. _ Lawrence, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor

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V.-Lewis, Supervising Civil Engineer.

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• R. Miller, Chemistry and Radiation Protection Superintendent

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• R..Myers, Emergency Planning Supervisor ce

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• S. Redeker,-Shift Technical Advisor Supervisor

• L.1Schwieger, Quality Assurance Director

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T. Tucker, Planner / Scheduler

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Contract Personnel

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J..Shetler,_B&W Outage Coordinator

• W. Speight, B&W, Regulatory Compliance.

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'* Attended the Exit Meeting on March 13, 1985

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Operational Safety Verification

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The inspectors observed -control room operations,' reviewed applicable logs

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and conducted discussions with control room operators during the inspection period. The inspector. verified.the operability of selected

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emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper. return to service of affected components. -Tours of the auxiliary and turbine buildings.were conducted to observe plant. equipment conditions, including potential fire-hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations.

During this inspection period the-unit-operated at or near 95 percent

capacity-load, with the following exceptions. On February 5, the unit was

,-ra,mped.down to.41 percent power and remained at this level for three

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" days,_for.the first of.two-high pressure condenser tube leaks..The

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"-licensee-identified and plugged one leaking tube'and plugged fifteen i

'others<as i preventative measure. On February 25, power was reducted to-

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.62 percent due to instability of feedwater pump control. The licensee

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replaced aLcontrol module in the integrated control system and increased

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. power. This appeared to correct the instability problem. The second, i

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' high' pressure condenser tube leak' occurred on March 11. The power was.

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, reduced,for one day to 60 percent and one leaking tube was plugged lalong

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with seven others as a preventative measure.

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The plant-was_' shutdown on March'15 for a refueling' outage. The J.-

activitics during the outage will be discussed-in a subsequent' inspection

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report;-

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. Safety Feature System Walkdown, Emergency ~ Diesel Generator A

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'During the course of this: inspection; period,-the; inspector conducted a walkdown'of'the;"A." emergency diesel generator to examine valve and

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-~ switch line-ups. and ' system condition -including general' housekeeping 'of'

the diesel generator room. No deficiencies in the system;line-ups were

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identified, however,ythe following housekeeping items were noted:

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Idebris in floor = drains

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. tie'w' raps on' floor

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[11gh't bulb's adrif t-on various electrical junction boxes

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oil under lube. oil bypass pump

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lubeoilfilters(settingonpipesupport

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A electrical. box coversilying on the floor.

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electrical parts in a plastic.' bag on the floor-

'These items were reported to the-licensee for evaluation. The-quality -

assurance organization performed an additional surveillance of'this ares

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3and: corrective action was taken.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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' Maintenance-

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.During this inspection, period. the inspectors 'made tours of the new emergency diesel generator. (Transamerica De Laval) buildings and laydown

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' '~ areas-where the parts of the' disassembled diesels were being inspected.

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Particular attention was given to cleanliness controls and parts:

identifications. Toward the end'of the inspection period'the diesels were reassembled and were being prepared:for.their 100 hour0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> run tests.

The: inspector noted'that the space heaters for the generator end of the machines-vere energized as required.

-No violations or deviations were identified.

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350 Surveillance

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GThe inspectortobserved the' performance of portions of the following

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isuryeillances:

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MP20D.08A'

-" Monthly'RPS-Channel A' Surveillance"

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'SP200.09

" Monthly' Safety Features Actuation' System

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Surveillance' Test"-

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NSP200.01-

" Instrumentation Surveillance Performed Each' Shift" i The inspector 'noted that. the operator or technician performing the -

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- evaluation recorded the data, and the data was in agreement-with the

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observations made;by-the inspector.

No violations or deviations were' identified.

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Licensee Event-Report-(LER) Follow-Up

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-The following LER's~were reviewed and closed. The inspector.

~ verified that reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified,; corrective actions; appeared appropriate, generic

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applicability had been, considered, and the LER. forms were complete.

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LER 83-40 Rev. 1

'! Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Transmitters Not'

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Properly Calibrated."

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-Revision 1:of-LER 83-40 was issued to clarify the design error

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aspects of the auxiliary feedwater orifice plates and to clearly idefine:the cause of the improper _ calibration..The LER contained corrective actions to.be accomplished to prevent recurrence-of this-

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ievent. The licensee also intends to replace the orifice plates-during the cycle 7 refueling outage. The inspector will: continue to

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investigate the licensee's actions in' conjuction with the Linvestigations of the licensee's response to a Notice-of Violation

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(84-15-01) concerning this item. Therefore, this LER is considered closed.

LER 84-21- " Failure of Surveillance Procedure.to Satisfy Technical'

Specifications."

Technical Specification 4.8.2.2 requires the licensee to. test the.

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auxiliary feedwater pumps at least once per 18 months during a shutdowns,'to verify that each pump will start "... automatically

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.upon, receipt of each auxiliary feedwater actuation test signal".

The licensee identified that the surveillance test did not directly-verify that the pumps started on each automatic signal. The test did-verify the pumps were~ operable, but used a series'of overlapping tests.that. verified-the system's operability. The licensee revised

'and successfully completed.the surveillance-test twenty three days

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after-the situation'w'as identified.

The inspector identif'ied.that one-of the three automatic start

signals, low mainifeedwater header pressure, was not being tested

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during the' eighteen month shutdown, surveillance. However, the licensee does use this signal ~on.their monthly ouxiliary feedwater

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pump surveillance test'.

Therefore, although the pumps are not being

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started-with the' low' main feedwater. header pressure signal during

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shutdown, per the. technical specifications, the licensee has shown

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operability;of the start signal on a ' monthly-basis. ~ The inspector

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brought this situation to the licensee's attention, and.the licensee y

has committed to evaluate the present technical' specification.and

submit. appropriate changes that reflect the actual surveillance

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LThis is an open item-pending review of the licensee's action

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' including'the main feedwater header pressure start testing.

(50-312/85-04-01). The LER is considered closed.

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.LER 85-04 " Fire Dampers Not Installed" On March.8, 1985,~th'e' licensee submitted'an LER-concerning fourteen fire dampers-that were-not' installed in the auxiliary building. The fire 1 ampers were required'by Amendment 19 (dated February 28, 1978)

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, to the:0perating License. This amendment'specified that the licensee perform certain fire protection modifications, part of'

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' which were the installation of fire' dampers in specific locations; The' required. implementation date for the fire dampers of concern was-the end'of the 1979 refueling outage. The licensee recently-

. identified the missing fire dampers during an ongoing evaluation of their. fire protection program.

.Specifically, Facility Operating' License No.'DPR-54 was amended by adding paragraph 2.C-(4).to read as follows:

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"The_ licensee may proceed with and-is required to complete the-

- modifications-identified in Paragraph 3.1.1 through 3.3.40 of the

- NRC's Fire' Protection Safety Evaluation (SE) on the facility dated

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Februa ry : 28,.1978. These modifications shall be completed as specified in Table 3.1 of the SE....."

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The' paragraphs of the SE that required the fire dampers that were y'

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- Item 3.1.2 Instrument Shop ~

. Install fire dampers in'all ducts to fire' area 14 --Turbine Deck Corridor.

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Item 3.1.5 Turbine Deck Corridor - Install fire dampers in all duct penetrations except-the emergency control. room ventilation-ducts.

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Item 3.1.21 Electrical Penetration Area - Grade Level-

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- Install' fire dampers in ducts to. fire area 36.

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Item 3.1.22 Main Corridor - Grade-Level - Install a fire LG damper in duct to fire area 34.

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Item 3.1.30 Containment Penetration Valve Area East - Install fire dampers in ducts to fire area 46.

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Table 3.1ofthejSEspecifiedthecompletiondateoftheaboveitems

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as the end~of the 1979 refueling outage.

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The presentLfire protection evaluation was being performed by the licensee to comply with 10CFR50 Appendix R requirements. This ongoing evaluation apparently. determined that six of the fourteen originally required dampers.should no longer be required due to new'-

' fire area boundaries. However, the eight missing ~ dampers are still appropriate.

The basic cause-of the missing fire dampers is considered to be the failure to properly transfer the basic fire damp'er requirements

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specified in the SE to an engineering document.to en'sure

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installation. Since.the licensee identified this' problem and took

. appropriate-temporary corrective' action (established a firewatch),

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no violation will be_ issued.

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LER 85-01 " Loss of Containmen't Integrity via Open Valves" On February 25, 1985, the licensee submitted an LER concerning four hydrogen monitor system containment isolation valves which were apparently.open for a seven day period during plant operation from

. January 9-to January 16, 1985. The valves connect one inch' diameter.

lines-which form a closed loop back'into the containment. The.

hydrogen ~ monitoring system consists of supply and return line-

-penetrating the containment through larger pre-existing-penetrations. Each of.the one inch supply and return lines has-two valves in parallel inside of the containment and two1 valves in-paralle1'outside of the containment which. function as containment-isolation valves for this system. These valves _have the'following valve numbers:

Inside Containment

'Outside Containment Supply line HV-70041 HV-70045 HV-70042-HV-70046 Return line HV-70040 HV-70043 HV-70047 HV-70044

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These valves are solenoid. operated valves and are remote manually-operated from the hydrogen' monitor control panels in the' auxiliary building grade level (panels-H4PBA and H4PBB) by open and close push buttons. The valves cannot be operated from the_ control room. The valves are not automatic valves, that is, they do not actuate due to -

a system signal; they are not part of the engineered safety features-actuation system (ESFAS).

i The Technical Specification, Section 1.7, defines cont'ainment integrity as follows:

" Containment integrity exists when the following conditions are satisfied:

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The equipment hatch is closed,and sealed and both doors of

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the personnel hatch-and emergency' hatch'are closed and

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sealed'exceptias'in B.below.

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'At least'one ' door on each of'the personnel hatch and

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emergency hatch is closed and' sealed during refueling

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. operations or personnel passage through these hatches.

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All.non-automatic containment isolation valves and blind'

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De flanges are closed as required.

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All. automatic containment isolation valves are operable or closed in the, safety features position.

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frhe containment leakage satisfies Specification 4.4.1 and no known-changes have occurred.

In addition, the Technical Specification.Section 3.6.1, requires

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" Containment integrity shall be maintained whenever.all three of-the following conditions exist:

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Reactor coolant pressure is 300 psig or greater..

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Reactor coolant-temperature is 200 F or' greater.-

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Nuclear Fuel is in the core."

. Based'on these Technical Specifications these remote manually (non-automatic) operated containment isolation valves-areJrequired:

to be closed during plant operation'. This does not imply that the; y

valves-cannot be' temporarily opened for a necessary plant evolution

-or required test,'provided that they.are~ returned.to'the closed:

position afterscompletion of the. evolution.or test.

On January 16, 1985, an Auxiliary Operator.(A)) discovered valves-HV-70041, 70042, 70045, and 70046.(the hydrogen monitor. system

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supply.line valves)' indicating in'the open position as evidenced by

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their. respective'open push buttons being lighted.. The control roon

operatorsMimmediate action was to order the valves to be closed.

-The plant had been greater than 300' psi pressure.and 200'F temperature since January 6,.1985 at which time containment-i.

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. integrity was required per Technical Specification Section 3.6.1.

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The inspectors' evaluated this event, and determined that.

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' Surveillance Procedure SP205.07,'" Isolation Valve Surveillance Test"'

7vas performed on January 4, 1985'for. valves HV-70045;and HV-70046.

.The purpose of this procedure was to stroke remotely operated'.

containment isolation valves: quarterly and~ ensure that specified

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stroke times are met.

SP205.07 was performed to meet the

. ' requirements of Subsection IWV of Section II, ASME B&PV Code, Summer, 1973, " Inservice Testing of' Valves in Nuclear Power Plants".

frhe SP required that the valves of concern be stroked to their

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'cloied position,.and_theLstroke time measured.. Step 4.1.5 of'the procedur'e'specified to return'the valves to.its "as found" position

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-ifithe resulting position was _different than the "as found"

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position. The inspectors could not determine how or when the' valves -

were opened. The operators who performed the'SP on.these valves

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indicated >that the valves were left in the closed position at the y

. completion'of'the SP.

This system wasi nstalled during the 1983 refueling outage to meet i

'the requirements.of NUREG 0737. item II.F.1.

The licensee o

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. implemented this modification via Engineering Change Notice-(ECN)-

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~A-2938.

Revision 4 to this ECN, dated March 9, 1984, was'the

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. current = revision. The Design Basis-Report for this ECN, dated July.

-24, 1984,- specified the design criteria. Criteria II.B.4 required

. that:.. C' Solenoid valve position (containment isolation) and.

Y containment hydrogen concentration shall be indicated on the plant-computer. - Solenoid valve position shall also be indicated on the

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control panels". ;(Here, the " plant computer" refers to control room f

' indication and the " control panels" refers to the: hydrogen monitor-

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control panels in the auxiliary building-(panels H4PBA and H4PBB)).

Criteria II8.B.5 required that...."Since the hydrogen sample-line-

containment isolation valves:do.not receive a safety signal

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. initiation,.these valves'shall be administratively locked closed".

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These two design features, indication of valve position in the

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control room, and the' valves being administrative 1y locked closed,

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did not exist in-the system during the period-of the event. The Lrelevant. portion of the ECN was closed. The portion of the ECN

'thatfremained open did not address the' design requirements of control" room valve position indication, or administrative 1y locking

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' shut the valves. It appeared that these design requirements.of

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control' room-valve position indication andLadminstratively locking-shut the valves requirements.were not transferred from the Design Basis Report to.the ECN Subsections that' detailed the modification.

It' is ' considered that two of the principa1' contributors to this

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event were the lack of control room valve position. indication for

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these valves and fact that:they were not locked closed. AP214.03,

" Locked Valve List, section 3.3,3.4, and 3.5 specify

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" Locked" means a valve which has a wire with lead. seal,

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attached in such a manner'that thel wire captures the' valve

handle / actuator, valve: body or other fixed: structure, and the valve _ position and identification tag. When metal tags are not

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available., Caution or Danger Tags may. be used.

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necessary to use; Caution or Danger Tags, the valve must still-

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be " locked" with a' wire and lead seal.

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.4 If the seal must be broken to position the-valve, permission

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must -be obtained from either the Shift Supervisor or Senior

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- Control Room Operator prior to breaking the seal. The valve

' C-position / identification tag.will be brought to the Control Room

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where it will be hung on'the secure key locker. The abnormal

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' positioning of the valve will be logged.in the Control Room and

' Shif t Supervisor's' log giving the reason why it is in an

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abnormal position. The lock wire and' lead seal will be

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disposed of.

When the shift is relieved, the new Shift-Supervisor, Senior Control Operator and Control Operator will review those valves which are in an abnormal position to ensure

!they are aware of any time limits imposed.

.5 When the-valve can be repositioned in its normal position, the valve will be wired with the position / identification tag as explained above. This fact will be logged in the Shift-Supervisor and Control Room log."

If the control room valve position indication had been available or-if the valves'were locked closed as defined above, the probability of the event would have been greatly reduced. The underlying weakness in the licensee'sidesign control system appears to have occurred in the transfer of design requirements to the detailed engineering documents. There was apparently no ECN Subsection generated to ensure that the control room valve position indication design criteria or valve locking design criteria was implemented.

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Since the licensee identified.this problem and has taken action to lock the valves shut (with_a plastic cover lock wired over the push

. buttons), no violation will.be issued.

In addition, the licensee has committed to develop and implement a review' program to evaluate past design changes and committments to ensure implementation. This-is an open item (50-312/85-04-02).

Furthermore, the inspector's evaluation of this event revealed three additional anomalies that should be addressed by the licensee.

1)

The LER stated that the system outside of containment beyond the isolation valve of concern is not Class 1.

However, based on the following drawings, itl appears that the hydrogen monitor system is, in ' fact, Class 1, Seismic Category 1.

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Bechtel Drawing M-551, Rev.18, P, & I Diagram, Reactor Building HVAC system.

SMUD Drawing Change Notice M-551, Rev. 15, Sheet 2 of 2, Hydrogen Monitor System.

• Bechtel Drawing M-575, Rev. 2, P & I Diagram, Post Accident Sampling System (PASS).

These drawings specify the hydrogen monitor system as Class 1, Seismic Category 1 up to and including the first isolation valve (HV-53605) of the PASS supply line and up to and including the PASS return line check valve (RSS-082). These valves are normally closed. The PASS is specified on the.

drawings as Class 2, Seismic Category 2, One exception to the Class 1, Seismic Category-I classification of the hydrogen monitor system is the piping for radiation monitor R15044 which is specified as Class 2, Seimsic Category 2.

This radiation monitor is is'olated from the hydrogen monitor system by Class 1, Seismic Category 1 isolation valves (HVS-705 and HVS-704),

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' 'which shut automatically at"15 psig system' pressure to protect

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-the radiation monitor pump.

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.The inspectors consider'that the LER should be modified to'

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reflect the. actual' system classification'. Qpen item

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(50-312/85-04-03)..

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. Surveillance' Procedure' SP 205.07, Isolation Valve. Surveillance-Test, Limit.and Precaution 3.5 required'...." Dates of all '

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successful; valve' stroking per SP'205.7 shall be entered in SP 205.09, Containment Isolation Valve List."~ However, thet-inspectors were_ unable to' locate theireferenced SP 205.09., and determined from the-Table of Contents of the' Surveillance

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-Proced4re. Manual that SP 205.09 was deleted August 25, 1981.

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-It'is considered that the licensee should have. identified this

anomaly either when SP.205.09 was deleted in 1981, or at least during performance of the quarterly. stroke tests'since 1981.

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lThe inspectors consider that this procedural error should be

- corrected. Open item - (50-312/85-04-04).

3)

The inspectors. reviewed the maintenance records of.the hydrogen ~

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. monitor system isolation valves from September, 1984 through January, 1985. :The records indicated several failures of these valves during this five month period as summarized below.

Date Work Request Summary September 24,1984 90976 HV-70544'wouldnotclose.

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~ Indicating light;was~ jammed

in its' receptacle, restricting the action of

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the push button.

Re-centered indicating light.

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-September 26,1984 91053-HV-70045 open or closed.

back light not lighted.

.Found fuse DSF1-1 pulled out. ' Replaced fuse'and. fuse immediately blew.

Disconnected wires, cleaned sockets, replaced relays.

Reassembled with new fuse.

October 15,1984 91733 HV-70045 open or closed.

back lights not lighted.

Found fuse DSF1-4 blown.-

Replaced fuse.

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December 5,1984 94009-HV-70045-would not indicate that it would stroke in either direction. Replaced solenoid and switch.

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. December. 25,1984 94010 HV-70046'would not stroke open. Contacts in closed

. switch were defective.

_ Replaced switch.

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'Although'_ the : licensee did not trend.the maintenance. history of these

. valves during this period..they indicated that they.are aware lof the poor history of'these solenoid operated valves and are considering replacing Ethem during a future outage. The licensee is also developing a more-

-formal equipment trending program in response to a previous followup item (50-312/84-19-05).

7.

Followup of Previous Inspection Items (Closed)' Inspection Report (50-312/83-07) Licensee Commitment to Revise-i. Licensed Operator Retraining Procedure (83-07-01).

'The licensee had committed to a major revision of AP.25, " Licensed Operator Retraining", to agree with the requirements of Topical Report T2-80. -The licensee has since deleted ~ procedure AP.25. Nevertheless, the licensee is still crmmitted to Topical Report T2-80 and the -

retraining program has been recently inspected by a regional' based inspector as discussed in Inspection Report 50-312/84-29.- The licensee appears to be implementing the retraining program'in accordance with T2-80. Therefore, this item is closed.

^8.

Response to a Regenerative Holdup Tank Leak-On March 7, 1985,-~a leak occurred in the B Regnerative Holdup Tank

(RHVT). The tank developed a' 1 inch diameter hole approximately 2 feet above the~ ground-level. The leak occurred at approximately 3

00 p.m.,

'and was immediately noticed by licensee personnel who took immediate action to~contain and stop the leak. The leak was temporarily stopped with a wooden plug. The water contained small quantities of tritium and

'had a pH of approximately 12.5. The inspectors l observed good health physics by~ licensee personnel practices during this event. After draining the tank,La small; defect was found in thef tank liner which :is considered

.by the licensee to be the cause of.the leak.

No violations or deviations were identified.

9.

Housekeeping The inspectors observed that, to improve housekeeping at Rancho Seco,'a

' Quality Circle eqpposed of all members of the Rancho Seco Safety

Committee recommended a strict smoking policy. An extensive policy was developed, issued, and.became effective March 11, 1985; it restricted b

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U smoking to very specific areas. The policy has clear requirements for proper disposal of cigarette. butts, and includes strong disciplinary

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action for individuals not adhering to the rules. The inspectors consider this is one important and effective step to improve the cleanliness and housekeeping of Rancho Seco.

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. 10. ! Video Tape Concerning Quality The President of the SMUD Board of Directors and the SMUD Ceneral Manager

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?have recently produced a video. tape concerning safety and quality at.

Rancho Seco.<iThis tape has been presented ~to all Rancho.Seco personnel, and will be shown to all new employees as part of the new employee

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orientation training. The inspectors. consider that this presentation is

'an excellent' tool to further establish a quality climate at Rancho Seco.

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11.. Root Cause Analysis The. licensee is in the process of developing a root cause evaluation program for the purpose of analyzing events. lAt present, they.have written a draft administrative procedure that. describes the

responsibilitier. for identifying incidents that require an investigation of root cause, and provide a mechanism for that review.. They plan to use this procedure for plant trips, personnel safety incidents, NRC violations, LERs and other significant incidents. The program is currently being used on a trial basis.for recent events.

The inspectors have discussed with licensee management the conce'pt of a.

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formal critique subsequent to an event to gather facts in a timely-manner from 'the persons involved in an event. The licensee has agreed to consider this concept; and ascertain whether it will be implemented.

However, they want to first evaluate their present program prior to making any changes or additions.

This is considered a followup item pending the licensee's. implementation of the program and the consideration of the critique concept.

(50-312/85-04-05).

12. LES Implementation Status

On March 12, 1985, the Region V Administrator, Division Directors, and Rancho Seco Senior Resident Inspector met with the SMUD Board of Directors' Subcommittee responsible for implementing the LRS recommendations. The subcommittee presented.the status of the recommendations, making the following points.

Approximately 90 percent of the 122 items have been prioritized with

responsible individual and proposed completion date indicated.

Fourteen items have.been completed.

• The Quality Assurance department has been reorganized.

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The Supervisor. of Licensing now reports directly to the Executive

Director, Nuclear instead of to the~ Nuclear Engineering Manager.

Other major. personnel and organization changes will not occur until

after the refueling outage.

Additional meetings will be held for an update of progress.

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The licensee has generated a status list of each recommendation and supplied the Resident Inspectors with weekly updates of the list. The Resident Inspectors periodically discuss the proposed changes with key Rancho Seco personnel to determine the effect of the proposed changes.

13. Non-Licensed Trai-!ng The inspector verified through questioning that training and retraining activities appear to be in conformance with the licensee's Technical Specifications. Training is being given to employees on administrative controls, major' procedure revisions, radiological health and safety, controlled access, security procedures, and quality assurance.

No violations or deviation were identified.

14. Exit Meeting The resident inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at various times during the reporting period, and formally on March 13, and May 3 1985. The scope and findings of the inspection activities were summarized at the meeting. Licensee representatives acknowledged the inspectors' findings.

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