IR 05000062/1994002
| ML20029E097 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | University of Virginia |
| Issue date: | 05/03/1994 |
| From: | Bassett C, Mcalpine E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20029E096 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-062-94-02, 50-62-94-2, NUDOCS 9405160254 | |
| Download: ML20029E097 (7) | |
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v UNITED STATES f
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MAR!ETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 '
7, ay ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199 k.....j#
Report No.:
50-62/94-02 Licensee: University of Virginia Charlottesville, VA 22901 Docket No.:
50-62 License Nos.:
R-66 Facility Name:
University of Virginia Reactor (UVAR)
Inspection Conducted: April-18-22, 1994 Inspector:
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C. H. Bassett.
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Date Signed-Approved by:
Of d b hot lY tw E. J. McATpine, Chief I
Date Signed Radiation Safety Projects Section Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
This special, announced inspection involvcd onsite review of operations at this Class I non-power reactor including review of the licensee's records of receipt of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) and preparations for and loading of the
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LEU fuel into the reactor to replace the High Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel that had been used previously.
Results:
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Fuel receipt inspection records indicated that all the fuel had arrived intact
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and no problems were encountered. The receipt documentation and the shipping papers were completed as required.
The licensee's preparations for converting.to LEU fuel involved removing the HEU fuel from the core and installing the appropriate instrumentation, graphite reflectors and plugs, and special fuel elements, with control rods inserted, into the desired grid positions.
Then, using electronic measuring equipment, fuel loading was initiated using normal fuel elements and the licensee began collecting the initial loading measurements including the subcritical multiplication (1/M) data. After.various prcblems were encountered and corrected, the fuel loading and data collection were completed.
Criticality with the new fuel was achieved on April 20, 1994, with fourteen elements in the core.
Reactor operations and fuel installation were carried out adequately.
The fuel handling was performed properly and radiological surveys were completed as necessary.
9405160254 940504
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REPORT DETAILS l
1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees P. Benneche, Services Supervisor T. Doyle, Reactor Operator
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Farrar, Reactor Administrator B. Hosticka, Senior Reactor Operator D. Krause, Senior Reactor Operator
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- R. Mulder, Director, University of Virginia Reactor (UVAR) Facility N. Wilson, Senior Reactor Operator Other licensee. employees contacted during this inspection included technicians and administrative personnel.
Other Organizations
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- D Steva, Reactor Health Physicist, University of Virginia Environmental Health and Safety (EHS) Department NRC Headquarters A. Adams, Senior Project Manager, Non-Power Reactor & Decommissioning Project Directorate, Division of Operating Reactor Support, Office of i
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
D. Westall, Australian Assignee, NRR
- Attended exit interview on April 22, 1994 2.
Procedures (42745)
TS Secticn 6.3 stipulates that the licensee have written procedures that are reviewed.and approved by the Reactor Safety Committee (RSC).
The licensee uses a series of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS) to operate the facility.
These SOPS generally cover personnel responsi-bilities, reactor operations and fuel movement, checklists to be used in
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conjunction with reactor operations, material irradiations, system calibration and maintenance, surveillances, radiciogical controls,
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actions to take to correct specific and foreseen malfunctions, and emergency conditions involving potential or actual release of radioactivity.
Although various portions of the licensee's existing SOPS dealt with operations such as receipt of radioactive material and fuel movement, specific procedures were not available for performing the activities that were anticipated during receipt of the new LEU fuel and loading of the new fuel into the reactor.
Consequently, in mid-1993 the licensee began writing a special procedure for this process.
As the procedure was being developed and reviewed, it appeared that the fuel might be delivered before the entire procedure could be reviewed and approved by I
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the RSC.
Therefore, the original procedure was split into two procedures, one for use in receiving the new LEU fuel and one for establishing the new LEU core. The first procedure, " Procedure for Receiving Fresh LEU Reactor Fuel", was reviewed and approved by the RSC on November 1, 1993, as indicated by the minutes of_the RSC meeting of that date. The procedure provided guidance in various aspects of fuel receipt that were not part of the established receipt of radioactive material procedure.
The second procedure, " Low Enriched Uranium fuel Core Conversion Program", was reviewed and approved by the RSC on February 14, 1994, as indicated by the RSC meeting minutes. This procedure or program provided additional guidance for loading an entirely new core into the reactor.
The inspector reviewed the new procedures written for receipt of the LEU fuel and loading of the new fuel into the core.
Discussions and training had been conducted on the various aspects of the receipt operations and fuel handling and facility personnel acknowledged that they had the training and had read the procedures by means of signing the appropriate sign-off sheets.
The procedures appeared to be adequate.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Receipt of New Fuel at Reactor Facilities (81403)
As noted above, the licensee had written a new procedure to deal with receiving the new LEU fuel at the facility.
The procedure indicated
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that the UVAR license and Technical Specification limit for possession of U-235 was established at less than eleven (11) kilograms (kgs) of LEU fuel.
The procedure also includea instructions and verification sign-offs for establishing a confidential shipment date, physical protection for the shipment, and mode of communications with the transport vehicle during transit. Also included were instructions and sign-offs for checking container integrity, package type, and appropriate Transport Index and for completing radiation and contamination surveys.
Fuel shipment documentation was also addressed and included directions for signing copies of DOE /NRC Form 741, " Nuclear Material Transaction Report" and notifications of various agencies of the safe arrival of the fuel.
Instructions were included for emergencies or unusual event response.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's documentation of the receipt of the new LEU fuel and the documents that accon;panied the shipment.
The paperwork appeared to be adequate and complete.
The total amount of fuel received by the licensee was. approximately 8.1 kgs (the licensee had none on hand before receiving this shipment).
Verification sign-
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offs had been made for the various tasks outlined.in the procedure.
The shipment arrangements were apparently made as required and the information concerning the package integrity, type, and other shipping information was completed as required.
Survey results did not show abnormal levels of radiation or contamination on the fuel packaging.
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Copies of Form 741 had been signed by the Reactor Administrator on January 13, 1994, as required and DOE /NRC Form 742, " Material Balance Report" forms had subsequently been completed on April 1,1994.
Review of the forms indicated that there was no unaccounted or diverted material and that no damage to the fuel or shipment had occurred. All the documentation appeared to have been completed and signed-off as
required.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Class I Non-Power Reactor Fuel Movement (60745)
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a.
Initial Preparations The licensee's new procedure for conversion to LEU fuel addressed the preparations necessary for fuel loading and the tests that were required to be performed following establishment of the new core.
The preparations for converting to LEU fuel included:
1) removing the HEU fuel from the core, 2) installing an auxiliary fission detector in the designated grid position, 3) placing the desired graphite reflectors and plugs in position in the grid, 4) inspecting and installing the control rods in the ' fuel elements designed to accommodate them, 5) inserting these elements, with'
the control rods installed, into the correct grid positions, and 6) completing control rod drop tests.
Then, electronic equipment was set up and fuel loading was initiated using normal fuel elements so that the licensee could obtain initial loading measurements including subcritical multiplication'(1/M) data.
The inspector reviewed the procedure and verified that the initial preparations had been performed prior to initial LEU fuel loading.
The lieu fuel had been removed from the core and was stored in a fuel storage rack located at the opposite end of. the pool from the reactor.
The auxiliary fission chamber had been installed in the designated grid position, as had the graphite reflectors and plugs.
The inspector observed the inspection and gaging of the control rods and their installation into the appropriate special fuel elements. The special fuel elements were then placed in the
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pre-designated grid positions and rod drop tests were conducted in accordance with 50P 7, " System Calibration and Maintenance",
initially approved in November 1970 with various revisions, the last one being Rev. #59 dated February 1994. While these actions were being completed, the licensee set up the equipment to take subcritical multiplication measurements.
I b.
Fuel Loading.
On April 19, 1994, the licensee initiated loading of the normal LEU fuel elements into the reactor grid in accordance with 50P 5,
" Operating Procedures", which the new procedure relerenced for normal fuel movements. The fuel elements were brought from storage, taken to an inspection area near the reactor pool, and
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unwrapped.
A contamination (swipe) survey was taken on the element and the coolant channels were gaged.
The fuel elements were also measured with a micrometer and the information recorded.
Following this the element was cleaned with a wipe and alcohol to remove any foreign material from the surface.
Then each element was closely inspected for any defect or damage. No problems were noted with the fuel.
Each element was subsequently lowered into a graphite storage rack near the grid to await installation into the proper grid position.
After each regular fuel element was loaded into the core, counts were taken, using input from the auxiliary fission chamber, with the Regulating Rod fully withdrawn and the other three Safety Rods withdrawn to ten inches.
Subsequently, counts were taken with the Safety Rods fully withdrawn to twenty-six inches.
These data were then plotted to begin determination of when criticality might be achieved.
After two fuel elements were loaded into the core, it was noted that the electronic equipment was not set up correctly and that the data obtained for subcritical multiplication determination were invalid.
This forced the licensee to terminate core loading for the day.
This problem was discussed with the licensee.
They indicated that the equipment had been set up in a laboratory and tested prior to be installed for the fuel loading operation.
They were not certain what had caused the problem to occur between the time the system was tested and when it was set up for fuel loading but indicated that any number of things could have happened to make the equipment malfunction.
The licensee also stated that the system that malfunctioned was not part of the permanently installed equipment but was an auxiliary system being used only for the fuel loading operation.
The system was subsequently analyzed and the problems corrected.
The next day fuel loading and data collection resumed from the point where loading had stopped the previous day, with two elements already in the core.
Sub-critical multiplication data were obtained and used to predict when the core would achieve criticality.
When the data indicated that the core was
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approaching criticality, the licensee began to alternately install partial fuel elements which contained only about half of the l
normal quantity of uranium as a normal element and then a full or normal fuel element.
This allowed a more gradual and controlled approach to criticality.
With fourteen normal fuel elements installed in the core, criticality was achieved at approximately 3:35 p.m. on April 20, 1994.
At that point the Regulating Rod and two of the three Safety Rods were fully withdrawn.
The third Safety Rod was withdrawn to a height of approximately 23.5 inches.
Following this, another partial fuel element was added and the rods withdrawn to determine whether or not another full / normal element could be added.
From the data received, it appeared that
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at least one more full fuel element could be installed into the core.
This was done and more data were collected.
Following i
this, the auxiliary fission chamber was removed and the control rods withdrawn.
It was determined that the fission chamber had actually added negative reactivity to the core while installed.
Therefore, the optimum final core configuration was determined to be fourteen normal fuel elements and two partial fuel elements.
With the new LEU core established, the licensee began obtaining integral and differential control rod worths in accordance with S0P 7.
c.
Radiological Controls Various radiological controls were used during the fuel receipt and handling operations.
Each individual used their assigned film badge for the work.
Because this was new, unirradiated fuel, no special dosimetry was necessary.
Radiation and contamination surveys had been conducted on the fuel containers upon receipt and, as noted above, a contamination survey was completed when each element was unwrapped and inspected.
Airborne monitoring inside the reactor room was performed by the constant air monitor beside the reactor pool. During the fuel movement operations, no airborne particulate concentration above the limits specified in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table 1, Column 1,.were noted. The area inside the reactor room was (and is) maintained as a controlled area.
Individuals leaving the area were required to perform a personnel survey before exiting.
Each day during the operation, the reactor room was surveyed as required by procedure.
No personnel contaminations occurred and no contamination of the floor was detected.
d.
Security The inspector also reviewed the security for the new LEU fuel.
It was determined that the licensee was in compliance with all portions of the security plan related to the transfer and shipping of the fuel elements, identified in the plan as irradiated Special Nuclear Material (SNM).
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on April 22, 1994, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. No-dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector.
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l Fuel receipt inspection records indicated that all the fuel had arrived intact and no problems were encountered.
The receipt documentation and i
the shipping papers were completed as required.
The licensee's preparations for converting to-LEU fuel involved removing the HEU fuel from the core and installing the appropriate instrumentation, graphite reflectors and plugs, and special fuel elements, with control rods inserted, into the desired grid positions.
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Then, using electronic measuring equipment, fuel loading was initiated using normal fuel elements and the licensee began collecting the initial loading measurements including the subcritical multiplication (1/M)
data. Af ter various problems were encountered and corrected, the fuel loading and data collection were completed.. Criticality with the new fuel was achieved on April 20, 1994, with fourteen elements in the core.
The operations involving reactor operations and fuel installation were carried out adequately. The fuel handling was performed in accordance with procedure and radiological surveys were completed as necessary.
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