ENS 58042
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
14:11 Nov 17, 2025 | |
| Title | |
| Event Description | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
At 0911 EST, on 11/17/2025, it was discovered that both trains of the control room emergency ventilation system were simultaneously inoperable due to an unauthorized door breach of a door in the control room envelope; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). At 0913 EST, the door was closed, and both trains of the control room emergency ventilation system were restored to operable. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: Based on further engineering analysis, sufficient time margin existed to allow the control room emergency ventilation system (CREVS) to successfully mitigate the impacts of an accident. The duration of the breach was less than the analyzed time for accident conditions to impact the control room envelope. Operations has revised and retracted the technical specification entries after evaluating that CREVS remained operable during the breach event. Therefore, the NRC non-emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) report was not required and NRC event notification 58042 is retracted. No licensee event report under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) is required to be submitted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Nielsen) |
| Where | |
|---|---|
| Sequoyah Tennessee (NRC Region 2) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+1.9 h0.0792 days <br />0.0113 weeks <br />0.0026 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Brian Jaros 16:05 Nov 17, 2025 |
| NRC Officer: | Sam Colvard |
| Last Updated: | Jan 6, 2026 |
| 58042 - NRC Website
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Unit 1 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Critical |
| Scram | No |
| Before | Cold Shutdown (0 %) |
| After | Cold Shutdown (0 %) |
Unit 2 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Critical |
| Scram | No |
| Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
| After | Power Operation (100 %) |