The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
On March 7, 2024, at 1142 PST, an operator trainee operating the reactor under the direction of a licensed operator initiated a planned manual scram. Following the planned manual scram, the licensed operator did not switch the console switch to 'off' or remove the key from the console. The reactor did not meet the definition of 'reactor secured' and thus the staffing requirements of technical specification 6.1.3 were still required to be met. The licensed operator then left the control room, securing the door on their way out. At 1200 PST, a licensed senior reactor operator (SRO) entered the control room and found the key in the console with the switch in the 'operate' position. This SRO placed the switch in the 'off' position, secured the key, logged the action, and notified the Director. Throughout the duration of the event, all control rods were fully inserted.
Project Manager (Wertz) will be contacted.
Oregon Department of Energy and the
Oregon Radiation Protection Services will be notified.