ENS 42641
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
18:00 Jun 14, 2006 | |
| Title | Leaking Decay Heat Removal Isolation Valve Bypass Line |
| Event Description | On 2-21-06, during a tour of containment during normal operation at 100% power, a small leak (one (1) to three (3) drops per second) was noted from a 1/2 inch line connected to the decay heat removal (DHR) drop line. It was identified as being a body-bonnet leak on valve 1LP-167 subject to a TS limit of 10 gpm.
At approximately 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br /> on 6-14-06 following a shutdown for an unrelated issue, the source was identified as a leak at a weld in a "tee" joint adjacent to 1LP-167. This is considered RCS pressure boundary leakage, subject to a TS limit of zero leakage. The leak was isolated by closing a normally open valve in the 1/2 inch line and the leakage stopped. Initial Safety Significance: The leak is in a 1/2 inch line which provides over pressure protection from thermal expansion in the volume between 1LP-1 and 1LP-2 (the main pressure boundary isolation valves between the high pressure RCS and the LPI (DHR) system). The leak rate (1 to 3 drops per second) was not significant, except that it was RCS pressure boundary leakage. 1LP-1 is normally closed, but must be opened to establish a DHR path. Valve 1LP-167 is a 1/2 inch check valve which would have limited RCS leakage. Thus, if the leak had grown, it would have been limited to the amount of seat leakage past either 1LP-167 or 1LP-1. It would also have been limited by the 1/2 inch size of the line containing the leak." Technical Specification LCO 3.4.13 applies to RCS leakage in modes 1 to 4. The licensee plans to fix the leak prior to entry into mode 4. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
On 6-14-06 at 1908 hours0.0221 days <br />0.53 hours <br />0.00315 weeks <br />7.25994e-4 months <br /> Oconee reported an RCS pressure boundary leak in a 1/2 inch line connected to the decay heat removal (DHR) line near valve 1LP-1 inside containment. Oconee has reviewed the event in greater detail and has concluded that the event is not reportable. The Basis for TS 3.4.13 states that RCS LEAKAGE includes leakage from connected systems up to and including the second normally closed valve (or outermost isolation valve for systems penetrating containment). However TS 1.1 contains a definition of LEAKAGE which includes 'Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE: LEAKAGE (except SG LEAKAGE) through a nonisolable fault in an RCS component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.' The leakage in this event was isolable, and therefore does not meet the definition of Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE. Therefore the zero leakage criterion of TS 3.4.13 does not apply to this leak. The applicable criterion is 10 gpm identified LEAKAGE. Since the leak does not meet the criterion as Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE, the leak was isolable, and the applicable TS LEAKAGE limit was not exceeded, this event does not meet the reportability criteria for 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73 and event notification 42641 is hereby RETRACTED. Additional information and clarification: "During normal operation the leak was isolated by one barrier (valves 1LP-167 and 1LP-1, closed in parallel). The leakage observed on 2-21-06 during a containment tour at Mode 1 was recorded as 1 drop per second. As stated in the initial notification, at that time the leak was believed to be a body-bonnet leak. It was observed at Mode 1 again on 5-25-06 and recorded as 3 drops/second. On 6-14-06, the leakage was recorded as one drop/second while at reduced pressure in Mode 4, before the DHR systems was placed in service. At that point, the leak was isolated by closing an additional valve (1LP-166, normally open), and the leak stopped. The Low Pressure Injection system was placed in service for DHR, which opened 1 LP-1. Later, with system pressure at approximately 285 psig in Mode 5 (outside the applicability of TS 3.4.13), 1LP-166 was reopened to allow additional verification of the leak location. At that time the leak was described as a 'spray' but no leak rate was measured before 1LP-166 was reclosed. The leak rate at that time was estimated as well less than 10 GPM. Corrective Action: The affective section of 1/2 inch pipe and associated fittings have been removed for transfer to a Duke laboratory for analysis. Repairs will be completed prior to return to mode 4. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Bonser). |
| Where | |
|---|---|
Oconee  South Carolina (NRC Region 2) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+1.13 h0.0471 days <br />0.00673 weeks <br />0.00155 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Randy Todd 19:08 Jun 14, 2006 |
| NRC Officer: | Pete Snyder |
| Last Updated: | Jun 16, 2006 |
| 42641 - NRC Website
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Unit 1 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Not Critical |
| Scram | No |
| Before | Cold Shutdown (0 %) |
| After | Cold Shutdown (0 %) |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 562212022-11-14T11:30:00014 November 2022 11:30:00
[Table view]10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure Boundary Degraded ENS 561972022-11-01T18:33:0001 November 2022 18:33:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure Boundary Degraded ENS 495272013-11-11T10:20:00011 November 2013 10:20:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded Unit 1 Commenced a Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Rcs Leakage ENS 426412006-06-14T18:00:00014 June 2006 18:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded Leaking Decay Heat Removal Isolation Valve Bypass Line ENS 414132005-02-16T18:31:00016 February 2005 18:31:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded Degraded Condition - Reactor Building Normal Sump Level Increasing 2022-11-14T11:30:00 | |