DD-86-11, Partial Director'S Decision DD-86-11,denying & Deferring, in Part,Vm English 841213 Motion to Institute Proceeding Per 10CFR2.206 for Imposition of Civil Penalties & to Vacate & Reverse Insp Repts & Schedule Hearing

Partial Director'S Decision DD-86-11,denying & Deferring, in Part,Vm English 841213 Motion to Institute Proceeding Per 10CFR2.206 for Imposition of Civil Penalties & to Vacate & Reverse Insp Repts & Schedule Hearing

ML20212P589
Person / Time
Site:	07001113, 05000113
Issue date:	08/29/1986
From:	Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
To:
Shared Package
ML19303C910	List: DD-86-11, Partial Director'S Decision DD-86-11,denying & Deferring, in Part,Vm English 841213 Motion to Institute Proceeding Per 10CFR2.206 for Imposition of Civil Penalties & to Vacate & Reverse Insp Repts & Schedule Hearing
References
2.206, DD-86-11, NUDOCS 8609030199
Download: ML20212P589 (500)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:_ _ _ DD-86 11 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT James M. Taylor, Director In the Matter of Docket No. 70-1113 GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY (10CFR2.206) < (Wilmington, North Carolina ) . Facility) ) PARTIAL DIRECTOR'S DECISION PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 2.206 Introduction On December 13, 1984, Mozart J. Ratner and Arthur M. Schiller, as Counsel for Vera M. English (Petitioner), filed pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 a " Motion to Institute Proceeding Pursuant to 10 CFR 9 2.202, for Imposition of Civil Penalties and to Vacate and Reverse Inspection Reports and to Schedule Hear-ing Thereon." The Petitioner, in part, requested the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to impose civil penalties against the General Electric Com-pany (GE or Licensee) for alleged serious violations occurring at its Wilmington, North Carolina fuel fabrication facility. Specifically, the Petitioner referred to five NRC inspection reports and argued that certain conclusions in those reports were in error. The Petitioner requested that the inspection reports be withdrawn and be re-issued with the appropriate Notices of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties. The Peti-tioner also requested that a hearing be scheduled to inquire into these mat-ters. By a letter dated January 10, 1985, the Deputy Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, informed the Petitioner that her request was being reviewed by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement and would be 8609030199 860829 PDR ADOCK 05000113 D PDR l . i

responded to by that Office. Consideration of Petitioner's request by the NRC was also noticed in the Federal Register (50 FR 2634, January 17,1985). The Petitioner subsequently supplemented her original request. On February 28, 1985, the Petitioner filed a supplement discussing alleged deficiencies in additional inspection reports received by Petitioner subsequent to her initial filing. Again, the Petitioner sought the issuance of new " corrected" reports, Notices of Violation, and assessment of civil penalties. A second supplement, dated March 12, 1985, further discussed earlier inspection re-ports and identified additional inspection reports which the Petitioner sought to have withdrawn and new " correct" reports issued. Again, the Peti-tioner sought the issuance of Notices of Violation for substantiated allega-tions and assessment of civil penalties. The thrust of these three filings by the Petitioner is to challenge the ade- { quacy and findings of certain NRC inspection activities. The technical ade-l quacy of the review by NRC inspectors of a wide variety of activities is I questioned. Not only 15 the technical assessment questioned, but in many instances the Petitioner suggests, and in some instances expressly alleges, that NRC inspectors have acted improperly by either overlooking matters or failing to make findings warranted by the facts. As a result, the Petitioner claims that numerous violations have either been categorized incorrectly or have gone undocumenteo. The Petitioner further claims that alleged viola-tions which have occurred at the Licensee's Wilmington facility have been categorized at irtappropri tely low severity levels under the Commission's

Enforcement Policy 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C. The Petitioner claims that violations that have occurred should have been categorized at severity levels justifying the imposition of civil penalties. The Petitioner alleges this is particularly the case with respect to violations which she claims were willful on the part of the Licensee. On April 11, 1985, the Petitioner provided additional information to the NRC for consideration. The point of this submission was ostensibly to provide the NRC with additional information which surfaced in a Department of Labor proceeding conducted in Wilmington, North Carolina from December 17 to December 19, 1984, and March 19 to March 28, 1985. y In her April 11, 1985~ submittal, the Petitioner submitted GE documents which were alleged to con-stitute admissions of previous claims that GE violations at the Wilmington facility were willful, that GE had made material false statements to the NRC,  ; and that GE had failed in its reporting requirements to the NRC. A variety of relief was requested including a renewed request to the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, to find violations, assign them the highest severity level, and assess civil penalties, and furthermore to condition y This proceeding was before an Administrative Law Judge pursuant to 9 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 5851 and styled Vera M. Enalish v. General Electric Company, Case No. 85-ERA-2. The Petitioner was complainant in this proceeding and alleged discrimi-nation by GE as a result of her initiation of and the participation'in NRC investigations at the GE Wilmington facility. The Administrative Law Judge issued a decision favorable to the complainant on August 1, 1985. On May 9, 1986, the Under Secretary of Labor remanded the case to the Administrative Law Judge for the limited purpose of taking certain further testimony.

retention of GE's license for the Wilmington facility upon immediate removal of specifically named facility officers, officials, managers, and supervisors. Finally, on June 20, 1985, the Petitioner submitted to the NRC documents pertaining to another pending Department of Labor proceeding initiated pursuant to Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. 2_/ In her June 20, 1985 supplement, the Petitioner asked the NRC to conduct its own investigation or cooperate with the Department of Labor in its investigation into the alleged violations of Section 210. The Petitioner asked NRC to take independent action against GE to assure that employees would be free to exercise their rights without any fear of reprisal. On July 12, 1985, the Petitioner submitted a motion addressed to the Secretary of Labor which con-tained further information regarding alleged GE interference with the rights of employees. 3/ The Licensee also made a submittal on May 29, 1985 discussing issues raised by the Petitioner's filings. The Licensee argued that the Petitioner's sub-mittals represented a direct and unjustified affront to GE, the NRC, the in-tegrity of the NRC regulatory and licensing process, and the objective facts 2/ On May 23, 1985, a complaint alleging violations of Section 210 was filed with the Department of Labor by Joy Malpass and John Clarence Lewis alleging discriminatory conduct by General Electric Company (85-ERA-38 and 39). On August 30, 1985, the Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, made a determination. Complainants appealed. On January 20, 1986, the Acministrative Law Judge sitting in the matter dismissed the proceeding with prejudice at the prehearing stage. 3/ I have also given censideration to the comments of Mr. Ratner re Inspec-tion Report 85-04 contained in his March 28, 1986 letter to the NRC.

of record. GE argued that the Petitioner's requests should be denied in their entirety. 4/ Discussion Prior to discussing the allegations of the Petition, a brief discussion of the activities conducted at the Wilmington facility is appropriate. The function of the GE Wilmington facility is to produce nuclear reactor fuel. In the production areas of the facility, incoming uranium is converted chemically to a powder and then, in a ceramic process, to pellets, which are assembled into fuel rods and bundles. These production operations are sup-ported by the Chemet Laboratory, which provides metallurgical, environmental, chemical and spectrographic analyses. Some of these analyses are performed on small uranium samples brought in from the production areas of the plant. If not controlled carefully, analyses could result in uranium contamination on laboratcry surfaces and in laborato-ry air. Equipment, procedures, and training are designed to minimize such contamination. Surface and air monitoring are intended to detect significant contamination. Bioassay measurements are used to determine whether workers have inhaled, ingested, or absorbed measurable uranium. Thermoluminescent -4/ The five submittals made by the Petitioner (i.e., the submittals of December 13, 1984; February 28,1985; March 12,1985; April 11,1985; and June 20,1985) will be herein after cumulatively referred to as the Petition.

dosiveeters (TLDs) are worn on workers' clothing to measure exposure from radiation outside the body. As described in NRC inspection reports discussing inspections cor. ducted at the Wilmington facility, minor uranium contamination has occurred in portions of the Chemet Laboratory while performing analyses. However, radiation and contamination survey records, supported by personal exposure records includ-ing bioassay measurements, have indicated little uranium exposure to Laboratory workers. Nevertheless, NRC inspection reports have identified a variety of minor regulatory violations, procedural weaknesses, and other matters, the correction of which have improved Chemet Laboratory safety. Some of these inspection report findings are attributable either directly or indirectly to concerns expressed by the Petitioner while other inspection findings, particularly those that discount Petitioner's allegations, have been challenged by the Petitioner. The Petition makes many serious allegations regarding operation of the Li-censee's Wilmington facility and the conduct of the NRC's inspection and enforcement program. Consequently, at the outset, I determined that a com-mitment of significant resources would be necessary to examine these issues and assure that they received appropriate consideration. Accordingly, I assigned senior Headquarters staff essentially full time to oversee activities of personnel in Region II in resolving the allegations raised by the Petition. Specifically, I assigned John T. Collins, then my

!                                               Special Assistant, to oversee preparation of the response to the Petition.

Having been assigned overall responsibility for the response to the Petition, Mr. Collins became the focal point at Headquarters for communications with Mr. Ratner. To the extent possible, without compromising NRC investigations, Mr. Collins responded to Mr. Ratner's requests and provided him material, such as inspection reports. Mr. Collins was assisted by William L. Fisher, a Senior Health Physicist. Together tney worked with Region II to ensure that adequate inspections had been or would be undertaken to confirm or deny each allegation, a time-consuming process performed concurrently with other required inspections at NRC licensed facilities. This involvement of senior Feadquarters staff provided additional assurance that the review conducted by Region II was a i balanced one. i On March 13, 1985, Region II personnel met with the General Electric Ccmpany at GE's request in Atlanta, Georgia to discuss health physics and account- ! ability violations at the Wilmington facility. The Licensee took that oppor-tunity to oescribe the actions that it was taking pertaining to allegation follow-up. The NRC stated that it would continue to follow up on the allega-tions in accordance with agency policy. l On May 6,1985, I and other flRC staff working on the Petition met with Nessrs. Ratner and Schiller in Washington to respond to questions regarding I

the process whereby the response to the Petition was to be prepared and the status of that response. 5/ On May 24, 1985, Region II management assigned a Project Manager to ensure that the allegations raised by the Petition had been reviewed properly. This unusual assignment was necessitated by the number of allegations; by the overwhelming volume of related correspondence, inspection reports, and other pertinent material; and by the Petitioner's frequent contacts with the re-gion. The region's efforts in addressing the allegations raised in the Peti-tion were substantial. Among other things, a new computer-based tracking system had to be developed to relate inspections to allegations. Since late 1982, 19 inspections by Region II have addressed the Petitioner's concerns. 6/ Some of those inspections were devoted entirely to that purpose. During calendar years 1984 and 1985, the region devoted about 4,000 man-hours to pursuing the Petitioner's concerns. (This figure does not include NRC Headquarters assistance, nor does it include investigations by the Office of Inspector and Auditor or the Office of Investigations.) About 4,000 more

 ~5/

Executive Director for Operations William Dircks, I, and other NRC staff also met on July 11, 1985 with General Electric corporate management and Wilmington plant management in Washington, at General Electric's request, to oiscuss the Wilmington plant but not the allega-tions raised in the Petition. A transcription was made of this meeting. 6/ The Inspection Reports which address to varying degrees NRC's review of the allegations raised in the Petition are: 82-18; 84-04, 05, 08, 13, 15, 16, 17, and 18; and 85-02, 04, 05, 06, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, and 17.

                                - - , .                ,     ,            ,e,    -,m-

regional man-hours were devoted to normal inspection activities related to this Licensee. On May 20, 1985, I referred to the Director of the NRC's Office of Inspector , and Auditor those portions of the Petition that raised allegations about the conduct of the NRC in general and about some NRC employees. In short, the NRC has given the allegations raised in the Petition a long, hard look. For purposes of dealing with the many issues raised, the Petition can be divided into four categories.

1. The Petition makes numerous assertions regarding violations of regulato-ry requirements in the conduct by GE of its operation at the Wilmingten facility. Numerous inspection reports are referred to as failing to make appropriate findings with respect to alleged violations; or when violations are identified, the Petition alleges that the assigned sever-ity level is inappropriate.

2. The Petition alleges wrongdoing on the part of the Licensee in conduct-ing its operations at tne Wilmington facility. The Petition alleges that the Licensee knowingly permitted and/or fostered noncompliance with the Commission's regulations.

3. The Petition alleges that certain NRC employees, especially NRC inspec-tors, were remiss in their duties by, for example, failing to inspect adequately GE's activities at its Wilmington facility and, on occasion, deliberately downplaying known violations.

4. The Petition alleges that the Licensee discriminated against the Peti-tioner and also against others in violation of Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and consequently that the NRC should take independent action against the Licensee to remedy such conduct.

Some of these issues will not be addressed in this Decision. Specifically, issues relating to the propriety of conduct by NRC employees are handled within the NRC by the Office of Inspector and Auditor and do not fall within the scope of 9 2.206. See Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 & 2), DD-84-16, 20 NRC 161, 164 n.3 (1984). Accordingly, allegations made by the Petitioner in this regard have been referred to that Office for its consideration. I am also not prepared, at this time, to take action with respect to the allegations of discrimination raised by the Petitioner. The NRC and the Department of Labor have agreed to coordinate and cooperate concerning the employee protection provisions of Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization

Act of 1974. 7f Generally, when a complaint has been filed with the De-partment of Labor alleging discrimination by an NRC licensee, the NRC defers its consideration of the matter until the Department of Labor has acted. This policy avoids duplication of effort and the needless expense of resources by deferring NRC actions until the Department of Labor has fully considered the issues. In the case of the Petitioner's complaint before the Department of Labor, which was resolved in her favor by the Administrative Law Judge, this means deferral of NRC consideration until the matter has been determined by the Secretary of Labor. Should litigation result from the complaints filed by Ms. Malpass and Mr. Lewis, see Footnote 2 supra, the NRC likely will await a final determination by the Secretary of Labor. Consequently, I do .iot reach the discrimination issues in my Decision today. It should be noted that deferral of NRC consideration of any potential dis-crimination issues at the Wilmington facility is appropriate in this matter in light of the extensive inspection activities which have been conducted at I the facility, as discussed below, with generally acceptable results. Nor do I make a determination regarding all of the issues regarding Licensee l wrongdoing raised by the Petitioner. Certain of the wrongdoing issues raised by the Petitioner are so clearly without factual substance and foundation that they may be dismissed without extensive investigation. Such issues are l l 7/ " Memorandum of Understanding between NRC and the Department of Labor; Employee Protection," 47 FR 54585 (December 3, 1982). l 1 - - -- - _ _ _ _ _

discussed in the attached Appendix A, " Resolution of Certain Issues Raised by Vera English in Her Petition Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206," hereinafter referred to as Appendix A and incorporated herein by reference. Certain other issues alleging wrongdoing by the Licensee will require further investigation by the Commission's Office of Investigations (01) before I can determine what ac-tion, if any, is appropriate. These issues currently are being addressed within 01. When that effort and the D0L proceedings are complete, I intend to issue a supplement to this Decision. My Decision today deals with those issues falling into the first category described above; i.e., issues related to the sufficiency of the inspection reports and NRC inspections conducted over the past several years of the Licensee's activities at its Wilmington facility and those issues within the second category found.to be without factual substance. As was discussed above, extensive staff efforts and resources were committed to reviewing these issues. Appendix A discusses their resolution. With respect to the issues addressed in Appendix A, no significant health and safety problems were identified requiring action by the NRC. Generally, the findings of the inspection reports which were the subject of the Petition were substantiated, while most of the allegaticns contained in the Petition were not substan-tiated. However, allegations did lead directly to the following six Notices of Violation: Inspection Relog Violation Severity Level C4-15 Visible contamination not cleaned up IV

13 - Inspection Report Violation Severity Level , 84-17 Termination exposure report not V timely f 85-02 Lab coats worn improperly and IV failure to perform uranium powder sampling inside a hood 85-04 Failure to measure airborne concen- IV trations during pellet cutting and polishing 85-04 Failure to provide a complete IV termination exposure report 86-01 Failure to have an approved V procedure for transportation i The intensive inspection program conducted during 1984 and 1985 in response to the allegations resulted in the following eight additional items of noncompliance: Inspection Report Violation Severity Level 84-04 Improper frisking V

             ..rw. , , ,, ,  , _ .      ...--,, ..., ._ .,..,
                                                              -e      .., , - .r , , ,. . , - , , ,. , , ~ . - - -       ,-4-- _ _, ...- -   -r--

Inspection Report Violation Severity Level 84-16 Failure to investigate and correct IV when control limits were exceeded 84-17 Failure to perform proper air sampling IV 84-18 Failure to provide for certain emergency IV preparedness procedures 85-02 Failure to label shipment properly IV 85-02 Failure to instruct individuals IV 85-02 Failure to post one gate as required V by Part 19 85-04 Unauthorized transfer of uranium IV dioxide samples The severity level assigned to previous violations, to violations identified as a direct consequence of the allegations, and to violations resulting from intensive inspections pror.pted by the allegations were classified appropri-ate,1y as Severity Level IV or V. Under the f4RC Enforcement Policy, civil

penalties usually are not proposed for Severity Level IV violations, unless such violations are similar to previous violations for which the licensee failed to take effective corrective action or are willful. This was not the case here. Civil penalties are not proposed for Severity Level V violations in the absence of willfulness which was not found here. Consequently, no civil penalties are being proposed at this time. To the extent that further NRC investigation determines that certain viola-tions committed by the Licensee involved wrongdoing, further enforcement action may be warranted. Consideration of these matters is being deferred until 01 completes its investigation of these issues. The Petitioner requested, among other things, that Inspection Reports 82-18, and 84-04, 05, 08, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17, and 18 be withdrawn and reissued. Our review of these inspection reports has identified no reason to do so. The above inspections appear to have been properly performed and adequately documenteo. The Petitioner referred to, but did not request withdrawal of, Inspection Reports 81-11, 82-10 and 16, 83-05 and 85-04 which we also find adequate. l

• As noted above, certain issues will be addressed later in a supplement to this Decision. Specifically, wrongdoing issues which have been identified as requiring further investigation and issues related to employee discrimination i

i

will be addressed later. No actions need be taken at the Wilmington facility regarding these issues in the interim, as the regulated activities at this facility generally have been found to be well-controlled and the NRC inspec-tion oversight will continue to be sufficient to assure that this remains the case. Accordingly, I decline at this time to grant relief requested in the Petition. . Conclusion For the reasons given above, certain issues raised by the Petitioner are deferred pending further investigation by the NRC or further determinations by the Secretary of Labor. Based on the review of the issues which are con-sidered herein, operation of the Wilmington facility has not created an undue risk to the public health and safety, including the employees at the facili-ty, and the issues do not raise substantive health and safety concerns war-ranting regulatory action. Consequently, I decline to take the actions requested by the Petitioner with respect to these issues. To this extent, Petitioner's request for action pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 is denied. As pro-vided in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this Decision will be filed with the Secretary for the Comission's review. 9

                                                                           /

A sw ./n / V James M. Taylor, pJrector

                                  ,    Office of Inspection and Enforcement l

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 29th day of Aug_ Ult 1986. l i l

APPENDIX A " Resolution of Certain Issues Raised by Vera English in Her Petition Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206" The Petitioner, in addition to raising questions as to whether the factual findings in referenced inspection reports demonstrate violations, also argues that violations exist because the Licensee did not meet certain reporting requirements. To the extent the reporting requirements are relevant to the subject reports, they are discussed below. However, it should be noted that the Petitioner has incorrectly cited and relied on 10 CFR 50.73 concerning reporting requirements. That provision does not apply to a materials licensee, such as General Electric. 10 CFR 50.73 applies only to the holders of operating licenses for nuclear power plants. The Petitioner also argues that, unless a violation meets the standards in Section IV of Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 2 (hereinaf ter the NRC Enforce'nent Policy), a Notice of Violation must be issued for the violation. Although as a general matter the Commission does cite all violations which it identifies, the I appropriate action to be taken in a given case depends on the circumstances of the case and requires the exercise of discretion after consideration of the policies and procedures set out in the NRC Enforcement Policy. Thus, there is no case in which the Commission must issue a Notice of Violation or a

Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty. The institution of any enforcement action is within the discretionary authority of the Commission. 1 While the Petitioner suggests that the NRC is " legally bound" by the NRC Enforcement Policy (Petition, p.7), the policy actually serves only as a guide and announces this agency's intentions. As was stated in the Statement of Consideration for the policy, the policy we.s adopted as "a statement of general policy rather than as a regulation." 47 F.R. 9987. (See In the matter of Consolidated X-Ray Service Corp. , ALJ 83-2,17 NRC 693, 705 (1983)). It is the essence of a policy statement that the agency remains genuinely free to exercise discretion in carrying out its statutory responsibilities. A number of the Petitioner's concerns appear to arise from a misunderstand-ing of what is required of NRC licensees. Enforceable requirements for which i a Notice of Violation S may be issued by the NRC include on'ly requirements i specified in statutes, NRC regulations, license conditions, or orders of the NRC. Commitments by licensees or recommendations by NRC inspectors are not properly the subject of a Notice of Violation. The NRC encourages 1/ The concept of prosecutorial discretion on the part of the Commission has been recognized by the D.C. Circuit. See Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nuclear Regulatory, Commission, 711 F.2d 370, 382 (D.C. l Cir. 1983). S A Notice of Violation is a prerequisite for the Proposed Imposition of-Civil Penalty. l

l licensees to use the best practices available and, while pleased when a licensee exceeds regulatory requirements, the Commission does not take enforcement action when a licensee does not take additional actions. The only exception to this would be when a licensee has formally committed to the NRC to take certain actions. In that circumstance, a Notice of Deviation may be issued if the commitment is not met. [See NRC Enforcement Policy, Section IV, E.(2).] However, such failures, though subject to remedy by agency orders, are not violations which could result in issuance of a Notice of Violation or a Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty. With these general observations, the majority of the concerns of the Petitioner are organized and discussed under the following categories:

1. Chemet Laboratory Operations (pages.4 to 9)

2. G.E. Policies Procedures and Actions (pages 9 to 20)

3. NRC Inspections, Findings, and Enforcement

a. Inadequate Inspection (pages 20 to 31)

b. Improper Findings (pages 31 to 89) c Improper Enforcement (pages 89 to 97)

Where possible, the issues are quoted as presented by the Petitioner. Other-wise, for clarity and brevity the NRC has characterized the issues. References to source documents are provided to assist in a fuller under-standing of the matters raised by the Petitioner.

                 ~. _.           .           ._ . .     . -      _  - - - _ -       _-_- - _ _ -

_4-

1. Chemet Laboratory Operations Petitioner made several comments in reference to Chemet Laboratory operations. Those comments and NRC resolution of them are as follows:

-a. Concerning an October 21, 1983 memorandum from a Chemet Lab Supervisor to the Chemet Lab Manager, the Petitioner states that the memo shows that management knew that Chemet Lab personnel felt under inordinate pressure to cover up out-of-alarm limit (OAL) and out-of-control limit (OCL) results and to release only results " acceptable" under " biased" standards established "in order to satisfy production oriented egos." (Chap. I, p.13)

Response

From the review of the referenced memorandum, the NRC concludes that the supervisor was advising his superior that there was a problem in the Chemet Lab and believed the best way t.o correct the problem was to meet with the affected employees. Note the last sentence of his memorandum: "I feel a meeting is needed to address employees' concerns and reduce self imposed

                                              ~

pressure to produce." While production pressure may be unpleesant for employees, it is present frequently in any production-based operetion. This pressure becomes of concern to the NRC when it leads to employees failing to follow procedures which implement NRC requirements.

The NRC found nothing during its review to indicate that management deliberately adopted and enforced on employees a policy to increase production and adhere to delivery schedules and to ignore safety consider-ations. Further, the violation identified in Report No. 84-16 during the NRC review of the out-of-alarm limit (OAL) and out-of-control limit (OCL) areas was not attributed to production pressures.

 -b.

Petitioner also asserts that violations documented in reports by the NRC continued after October 21, 1983, (Chap. I, p 13).

Response

It is not clear to what " reports" the petitioner is referencing. The two viola-tions identified in Report No. 84-17, which was the subject of that section of Chapter I, were not " continued" in the sense suggested by the Petitioner. One violation dealt with failure to use suitable measurements of concentrations of radioactive materials in air. The issue of air samplers, which became a point of contention between the licensee and the NRC, was ultimately resolved by the licensee adding four more air samplers. The other violation involving Fetitioner's termination exposure report was admitted by the licensee and the licensee revised an existing computerized termination dose reporting program in an effort to avoid such violations in the future. Therefore, the violations were resolved to the NRC's satisfaction.

c. In an attempt to " clean up" the lab, a portion of the flooring was ripped out only to find that the foundation actually was " hotter" than the floor.

Nevertheless the foundation was not torn out but rather a new floor was laid on the " hot" base. Further, after working all night to clean , contamination from a lab wall, the workers were instructed to paint over , a heavily contaminated wall. (Chap. I, pp. 13-14)

Response

The Licensee performed a special contamination survey in the LEA measurement system (counting) room at the request and in the presence of an NRC inspector. This special survey identified low level contamination on parts of the floor (not in the normal walk areas), counting equipment, and table tops. No visible contamination was observed on the walls during the survey, Some visible contamination was observed on the walls.when equip-ment was moved to facilitate decontamination. The contamination was not

 " vast," as characterized by the Petitioner.      However, the contamination levels 2

were above the Licensee's contamination action level of 220 dpm/100 cm for an uncontrolled area, which was specified in Licensee's procedure, Nuclear Safety Instruction 0-6.0. As stated in Inspection Report 85-02, neither NRC regulations, License No. SNM-1097, nor any specific Licensee procedure estab-lishes specific contamination limits for this room. Only action levels at which cleanup should be initiated are established. A small section of tile was removed to decontaminate the floor. Equipment and walls were wiped down and repainted. During Inspection 85-02, the Licensee removed several pieces of the new tile, at the request of the NRC inspector, and performed removable and fixed contamination surveys to determine the extent of contamination remaining under the new tile. The contamination levels were less than the Licensee's action level for an uncontrolled area. Contamination j surveys were not performed before or after decontamination of the wall. However, if one assumed that the contamination levels on the wall were equivalent to the maximum level identified in the actual survey performed in l

December 1984 under the observation of the inspector, they would not represent a significant exposure source. Painting over low level contamina-tion that cannot be easily removed is a method of ensuring that contamination remains fixed. Painting over contamination fixes the uranium in place and removes its potential to become airborne. It should be noted that no NRC requirements prohibit the painting of contaminated surfaces. -d. On December 5, 1984, a Chemet Lab employee inspected six employee chairs and found them to be " hot" with radiation. When confronted about the matter by an employee, McLamb (supervisor) became agitated and angry, denied the chairs were " hot," and said "Whoever discovered they were hot had better clean them up." (Chap. I p. 14)

Response

The fact that some chairs in the Wet Lab were contaminated with low levels of fixed contamination was confirmed by an NRC inspector through independent surveys, the results of which were reported in Inspection Report 85-02. This independent survey found that one chair had fixed contamination above 2 the Licensee's action level for fixed contamination of 2200 dpm/100 cm . The removable contamination levels were all less than the Licensee's action level of 220 dpm/100 cm2 . The presence of contamination on the laboratory chairs was discussed in Inspection Report 85-02 as evidence that spills in the Chemet Lab had not been cleaned up. This was identified as an example of failure to follow procedures, for which a Notice of Violation was issued as discussed previously in Inspection Report 84-15. As McLamb did order the cleanup, it is not of concern to the NRC that he might have a temper or poor management

 , - _ _ _ - ,     _ _ , _ , - . - . , - , _ . , , ,         . , , , - . - . . . . - - , _ .   - . , , ,  . . , + , , . ~   ,,,,c     , - , - - --..m.___  ,-._   , . -   ,

style unless he intended to and did prevent the reporting of such contaminations. The Petitioner offered no clear indication or evidence that this was the case.

 -e. The "Hendry Report," a March 29, 1984 memorandum titled " CHEMET LAB SAFETY REVIEW" from W.J. Hendry to E.A. Lees, establishes that personnel were not monitoring the isotopic room as a result of GE management orders nct to do so.  (Apr 11 ltr, p. 29)

Response

The Petitioner is incorrect in assuming that the microwave work area mentioned in the Hendry Report was in the Isotopic Area where the Petitioner previously worked. As stated in the Report the microwave oven was in the Spectrometer Lab, an entirely separate room from the Wet Lab where the Isotopic Area is located. The microwave oven in the Spectrometer Lab was used only infre-quently. Documenting the locations where smear surveys were taken in no way limits the discretion or authority of radiation safety technicians to monitor as they believe necessary in the Isotopic Area. Although the radiation safety technicians most frequently took smears in the walk patterns, they occasionally took samples in other areas. Survey results documented by the Licensee indicated that surveys had been taken in the Isotopic Area. There is some rationale for using surveys of walk patterns to detect spread of contamination. However, in Inspection Report 84-17, the inspector suggested that the Licensee routinely survey the work areas where there was a greater potential for a contaminating event. Based on recorded survey results reviewed by the 1

                                                  -g-inspector the Petitioner's contention that radiation safety technicians were under management orders not to monitor in the Isotopic Area was not substantiated.

2. G.E. Policies, Procedures, and Actions

a. At several points, Petitioner made the point that ALARA was not adhered to by the Licensee nor addressed by the NRC. (Chap. I, 6-7, 11, 15, 18-20; Chap. II, 3; Apr 11 ltr, p 28). More specifically, the Petitioner asserted that the Licensee willfully breached ALARA.

Response

Before addressing the Petitioner's complaint, a brief disccssion of the origin and meaning of ALARA is useful. ALARA is an abbreviation for the phrase "as low as is reasonably achievable." The Petitioner addresses ALARA as though it is a readily identifiable and precise regulatory requirement. This in fact is not the case. ALARA is a regulatory goal, which in practical application may lead to more' conservative actions, in terms of radiation safety, than those otherwise required by NRC regulations [10 CFR 20.1(c)]. The NRC strives to protect the public health and safety against unnecessary exposure to radiation by setting limits to those exposures in a given period of time. The radiation exposure limits referenced in 10 CFR Part 20 are considered to be safe; but to ensure additional margin of safety the NRC has adopted the concept of ALARA as published by The International Commission on Radiological Protection in 1973. An underlying principle of ALARA is that

Radiological Protection should be pursued to reduce exposures to a point where any furthar reduction in risk would not justify the effort required to accomplish it. It must be noted that the application of the ALARA goal involves highly subjective value judgments, which may also include economic and other sociological factors. From the above it should be clear that ALARA is a goal or objective and not in and of itself a requirement. Accordingly, it would be an error to talk in termsofa"breachofALARA."2/ The question is whether GE pursued an adequate ALARA program. We now will address the Petitioner's complaint. Although not specifically addressed in the inspection reports mentioned in the Petition, reviewing the Licensee's program for maintaining radiation exposures "as low as is reasonably achievable" is one aspect of the radiation protection inspection program. Guidance to inspectors contained in the inspection procedure Ef or radiation

                                                                                                              ~

protection programs at fuel fabrication facilities is discussed in Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10. 2/ It is noted that Petitioner's mischaracterization of ALARA as a

                               " standard" may have arisen out of a mischaracterization of the concept by Plaintiff's attorney in the Karen Silkwood case while questioning an NRC witness, which was later picked up by the trial judge as dicta in his opinion denying defendants a rehearing in that case (Silkwood v.

Kerr-McGee, 485 F. Supp. 566 (1979). The error was then repeated, as dicta, by the U.S. Supreme Court in its review of the case (Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 464 US 238, 78 L Ed.2d 443, 104 S Ct. 615 (1984). 4_/ IE Manual Chapter 2600. l

A .--, - - 11 - While License SNM-1097 does not refer directly to the ALARA principle, the license is subject to 10 CFR Part 20 and to the conditions of Part I of the licensee's application dated May 14 and June 20, 1984. Part 20 (20.1,

                         " Purpose") states that licenstes ". . .should. . . make every reasonable effort to maintain radiation exposures . . . as low as is reasonably achievable." It l

defines that ALARA ". . . means as low as is reasonably achievable taking into account the state of technology, and the economics of improvements in relation to benefits to the public health and safety, and other societal and I socioeconomic considerations, and in relation to the utilization of atomic energy in the public interest." Section 20 103(b)(2) requires " precautionary procedures" under certain conditions, essentially to achieve inhalation exposures ALARA. Other than in this limited circumstance, 10 CFR Part 20 does not elaborate or require licensees to achieve exposures ALARA. 4 Part I of the Licensee's application (Section 2.3.1) requires a Wilmington Safety Review Committee, whose responsibilities include an " annual ALARA ! review which considers the following: I Programs and projects undertaken by the radiation safety function and the operational radiation safety committee. i Performance including, but not limited to, trends in airborne l concentrations of radioactivity, personnel exposures and environmental monitoring results. l l 1 i

  ..--,n-   - - - - - - - - - - , .    , , , , . - - ,, ,         .----.,-,-_----.---,c....-,,,----c.-n---n-..--      - - ,,-   . - . , - , . , , . . - - - - . - - - - - , + - - - - - - , . - , ~ . , , - - ,

Programs for improving the effectiveness of equipment used for effluent and exposure control." Section 2 3.2 requires an Operational Radiation Safety Committee to ensure that ". . . the occupational radiation exposures of employees are kept as low as practicable and within established limits." (The term "as low as practicable" is synonymous with ALARA.) Section 2 7.1 states that the radiation protection program is designed to establish and maintain written instructions for radiation health and safety practices "so as to maintain occupational radiation exposures at levels as low as reasonably achievable." Finally, Section 3.1 2 states. "WMD [Wilmington facility] has established a radiation protection program designed to ensure that occupational radiation exposures are maintained at levels as low as reasonably achievable." There is no question of GE Wilmington's obligation to work toward the objective of maintaining exposures ALARA. Inspectable evidence of such effort includes (1) minutes and correspondence of the Wilmington Safety Review and Operational Radiation Safety Committees, (2) exposure reduction aspects of operating procedures, and (3) the fcur aspects of the ALARA Program described in Section 3.1.2 (management commitment detection and measurement systems information systems, and major facility and equipment changes).

To maximize available inspection time, NRC inspection reports concentrate on actual and potential problems and on matters of greatest safety or regulatory significance and focus on radiation protection subtopics, such as air sampling internal dose control, etc. The subject of ALARA, which deals with making the already low even lower, is not ignored during NRC inspections but it evokes little inspection report discussion as a separate topic. The ALARA goal is considered in inspections in all radiation protection subtopics. i Nevertheless, there are two fairly recent examples of ALARA discussions in GE Wilmington inspection reports: i 85-07, in which the inspector reviewed the activities of the Wilmington Safety Review Committee and the Operational Radiation Safety Committee. 83-24, in which the inspector reviewed ALARA aspects of ventilation and whole body counting concerns. Thus, the NRC does examine the licensee's ALARA Program and believes that it is in keeping with the goals of the program. j b. Petitioner complains that samples received from the production area for analysis were found to have external contamination on the container. (Pet., p. 13) I 1

Response

l There is no NRC requirement that samples transferred from one area of the plant to another be transferred in contamination-free containers, as long as the transfer is not to an area where there are no precautions applied to protect against radiation or radioactivity. In fact, the Licensee recognizes that samples from the production area may be contaminated, cautions Chemet Lab personnel by plant procedures that samples may be contaminated, and requires the use of appropriate protective clothing by laboratory personnel. The Licensee's procedures stated that visibly contaminated sample containers are not to be received in the laboratory. Although Inspection Report 84-04 stated that samples from the production area had been externally contami-nated, the contamination was not visible. Considering the nature of the uranium material handled in the laboratory, the absence of visible contamin-ation would indicate that contamination levels on the container were low.

 -c.        Petitioner also complains that the Licensee procedures and notices regarding protective clothing requirements failed to require employees to wear protective gloves when handling radioactive material. (Pet., p. 13) j l

[

Response

Inspection Report 84-04 specified that the Licensee's written procedures and notices regarding protective clothing requirements failed to require employees to wear protective gloves when handling radioactive material. However, l Licensee management indicated during the inspection that they expected personnel in the laboratory to wear gloves when handling radioactive material.

It is good health physics practice to wear protective gloves when handling potentially contaminated items, but it is not a regulatory requirement. In fact, the inspector observed that personnel in the Chemet Lab wore plastic gloves when handling potentially contaminated material. Since the Licensee intended to receive potentially contaminated material in the laboratory from the production area, the inspector indicated it would be prudent to clarify the plant procedure specifically to require that gloves be worn when handling radioactive samples,

    -d.

Petitioner believes that the "Wieczorek Report," an April 26, 1984 memo-randum titled " EMPLOYEE ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLATIONS TO COMPANY PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES" from F.J. Wieczorek to E.A. Lees, substantiates her allegation that isotopic results are accessible in the computer and can be altered. Petitioner also addresses the issue of computer acceptance of out-of-control results. (Apr 11 ltr, pp. 15-18)

Response

The Petitioner has combined inspect. ion results which addressed several separate allegations. The allegations addressed in Inspection Report 84-05 and the Wieczorek Report concerned the accessibility of analytical results in the computer, the use of transaction codes to alter existing data, and the falsifi-cation of data. Inspection Report 84-05 and the Wieczorek Report concluded that measurement data were accessible in the computer, that transaction codes had been used to carrect data, and that no falsification of measurement data could be found.

 --                                         - -        - -- -    ~-e,,     - - - . - ~ _ , - . - - - - - - - - --------e---.

Because NRC has no requirements in the area of computer security, no violation was issued. However, the Licensee agreed to improve the control of access to measurement data. Inspection Report 84-15 addressed the allegation that the computer was program-med to accept out-of-control results. In Inspection Report 84-15, the inspec-tor concluded that the computer had not been programmed to accept out-of-control results and that the computer was reasonably protected from unauthor-ized changes,

e. Petitioner asserts that GE made no reports to the NRC between May 22, 1980 and June 1984 of such events as--

(1) the "UF release" on September 15, 1981; 6 (2) the July 29, 1982 dumping of " internally contaminated" 2-1/2 inch Pipe; (3) failure, as of February 11, 1982, to record standards and sample data on bench worksheets, sample reports, control logs /or control charts; (4) Cheme l evels during 1984 ranging "from 317 dpm/100cm)to5100dpm/100cm; Lab contaminatiof (5) 902/903 password system subject to abuse both long before and long after early 1984; (6) April 1 - May 311984, "both the alarm limits and out-of-control limits were not in agreement with (LMCS) computer limits;" (7) constant exceeding of out-of-control limits during 1984; (8) increasing " weaknesses in the contamination control program in the Chemet Lab" and "the fuel manufacturing area" during the period 1978-1984; and, (9) failure in 1984 to provido projected dose information and recommendations to off-site organizations. (Apr 11 Itr, p. 38)

Response

Based on NRC review, all of the incidents referenced by the Petitioner, except one, involved conditions below the threshold specified in NRC regulations for reporting and, therefore, were not reportable. Data on the September 16, 1981 UF6 gas release were provided to NRC Region II by telephone. Additionally, inspectors went to the plant the week after the incident to verify conditions. No written report was submitted because NRC indicated that they had obtained the necessary information and did not need a written report.

 -f.             In general terms, the Petitioner asserts that the NRC inspectors did not consider that the Licensee did not make timely and voluntary identifica-tion of violations to the NRC. More specifically, the Petitioner noted that GE reported the Petitioner's allegations to the NRC more than one month after GE received them from the Petitioner. (Apr 11 ltr, pp. 38-39)

Petitioner asserts that a NOV must issue if violations were not identified to the NRC in a timely manner. (See also Pet., pp. 7, II)

Response

l l With respect to the timeliness of the verification to NRC of allegations received by a licensee, the licensee is not required to report allegations until they are determined to have substance and to be reportable. The Petitioner's allegations did not concern reportable matters. Nevertheless, the NRC was notified telephonically by the Licensee on the morning of March 23, 1984 that they had received allegations from one t.' l l I __.._ __ __ __ __ _ , , . , _ _ _ - - _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ . , _ , _ , . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ . . , _ .-._._c- _ . _ _____._.

their employees concerning safety and accountability issues. At that time, the NRC had already received the allegations from a confidential source. The Licensee was told that a detailed discussion of the issues was not appropriate but that NRC would review the issues and the Licensee's investigative findings during a routine inspection. Unknown to the Licensee, NRC had already arranged to visit the site unannounced on March 26, 1984. NRC inspectors arrived on site on March 26, 1984, and the meeting described in Inspection Report 84-05 took place.

g. Dr. Kenneth Mossman, Associate Professor of Radiation Medicine and Director of the Graduate Program in Radiation Science at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C , testified at Petitioner's Department of Labor Hearing. Petitioner characterized his testimony as showing serious deficiencies in certain radiation practices, including frisking, training, contamination surveys, and air sampling. (Apr 11 ltr, pp. 39-42)

Response

In regard to frisking as was noted in Inspection Report 82-10, "the inspector stated that it appears that licensee personnel who audit the frisking activi-ties may not know what constitutes a thorough frisk for personnel contamin-ation. The inspector further stated that there is no reason to believe that what he observed on May 20 and 21 is not typical." Having cited GE for the frisking failures observed by him the inspector, nevertheless, found no evidence which indicated misrepresentation on the part of GE in regard to the GE audits in this area.

The danger of improper frisking depends on the contamination potential of the area being left. The low levels of contamination typically found in the Chemet Lab suggest that improper frisking is not likely to be dangerous to the worker or to the public. However, that does not excuse anyone's failure to use safety equipment as intended. The low levels of contamination found in the Chemet Lab during Licensee surveys, including special surveys performed under the observation of the NRC and the small quantity of material handled in the laboratory indicate little chance of significant exposure to uranium. NRC audits of the Licensee's training programs have confirmed that training generally is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR,19.12. NRC inspections have found training weaknesses but these findings have not been frequent or severe enough to label the training inadequate. As discussed previously, the contention that radiation safety personnel were excluded from monitoring certain areas was found to be without merit. Air sampling and contamination surveys are discussed in responses at paragraphs 3b(11), (12) and (14), and 3c(4). The NRC does not find in Dr. Mossman's statements a basis for concluding that "if the condition found at WMD were allowed to exist and persist in his own research laboratory, this would be serious grounds for possible civil penalties and even temporary revocation of the license." No radiation protection program, whether at fuel facilities, universities, or other licensed

facilities, is without some weaknesses. Imperfections generally are found, documented, and corrected without resorting to civil penalty or license revocation. No significant health and safety problems were found at GE Wilmington. Therefore, consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy, inspectiori findings at GE Wilmington have not required such escalated enforcement action.

3. NRC Inspections, Findings, and Enforcemen_t

a. Inadequate Inspection Q1 In regard to Inspection Report 84-05, Petitioner asserts that the Petitioner told GE of password access violations but was ignored. (Pet.,

p. 16)

Response

As part of the inspection conducted March 26-29, 1984, the inspectors investigated the Petitioner's assertion that data associated with isotopic analyses that were stored in the Licensee's computer system could be altered and falsified. The inspectors investigated the possibility of laboratory technicians using each other's and their supervisor's passwords to change or falsify data. The inspectors determined that there was liberal use of employee passwords by other individuals but that the use was necessary to maintain laboratory access to data across several shifts. The software in this computer system required the use of the sample preparer's password to release data over the

,                                                                          time span of several shifts.                                       However, once apprised of the Petitioner's concerns, the Licensee modified the computer software to facilitate the release of sample results by individuals other than the sample preparer.

A " laboratory policy memorandum" dated January 19, 1984 was issued by the

Licensee to inform laboratory personnel that use of passwords of other indi-viduals was unauthorized. The inspectors viewed the referenced memorandum as a recognition by the Licensee of a problem in the use of passwords and trans-action codes. This memorandum clearly addressed the types of concerns raised by the Petitioner and indicated corrective actions to preclude unauthorized use of passwords and transaction codes, t The inspectors found no evidence that data had been falsified either inten-tionally or accidentally. Further, there is no NRC requirement for computer system security. No enforcement action was appropriate concerning the lack of

! password control. The accessibility of computer data also is discussed in the response at para-graph 2d. i I U2 As to Inspection Report 84-13, Petitioner noted that the inspector failed to identify and review Petitioner's termination radiation exposure report. (Pet., p. 21)

Response

NRC inspections routinely involve a sampling of records. During Inspection 84-13, the inspector reviewed selected licensee records of termination reports

but did not indicate whether the Petitioner's report was or was not included. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Petitioner's termination radiation exposure report was reviewed and specifically commented on by the inspector in Inspection Reports 84-17 and 85-04. Further, Notices of Violation related to the termination radiation exposure report were issued as a result of both inspections. Q3 Petitioner attacks NRC " assumption" that because of unannounced Inspections, the NRC observes " normal" conditions because management has no opportunity to " clean up" and alert the workers to be on good behavior. (Chap. I, p. 3)

Response

Most NRC inspections are unannounced, meaning that the Licensee is not informed ahead of time about a forthcoming inspection. Upon arriving at the GE site, the inspector will present himself at the guardhouse and will conduct an entrance interview with the plant manager or his designee. During the entrance interview the inspector will outline the scope of his inspection and will specify any requirements he may have before or during the inspection. The NRC believes it is not inappropriate that the security guard notifies site management that an NRC inspector has arrived on site for an inspection. Site management has a right to know who is on their site in order to carry out their responsibility for the safety and the emergency accountability of all people on site, including NRC inspectors. To our knowledge, this common practice in inspections has not led to covering up significant safety problems. L-- _- -

The Petitioner implies that unsafe conditions are charged to safe conditions in 15 minutes. Although minor remedial actions could occur before an inspector observes the facility or operations, it would be extremely unlikely that serious conditions could be corrected in that time. In this instance, the inspectors found no evidence that an unsafe condition was changed to a safe one during this entry period. In addition, NRC inspectors not only observe work being performed, they also interview workers and review the Licensee's  ; records to determine conditions that existed at other times. {41 Petitioner implies that employees of GE talked to by NRC inspectors were inhibited from talking freely and candidly with the inspector because of the presence of GE management representatives during such interviews. (Chap I, pp. 4-5)

Response

During NRC inspections, the Licensee's employees have been interviewed by inspectors off the site and on the site. While onsite, interviews frequently are conducted in rooms supplied by the Licensee (usually without management attendance). Regardless,10 CFR 19.15(a) and (b) provide for private consultation between inspectors and workers concerning occupational radiation protection and other matters. Form NRC-3, which must be posted in accordance with 10 CFR 1911(c) and (d), describes the employees' right to talk privately and confidentially with an NRC inspector, i At times it is necessary for the inspector to be accompanied by a Licensee representative to assist the inspector in securing necessary information for h s inspection, to act as a guide in parts of the facility with which the I _ - . _ , . - - _ _ - _ . _ - , . _ - . ~ , . - . - , __._..___.__m . . - - - _ _ _ _ _ . - . . . - , - . _ . , . m ._.. -. .-

inspector may not be familiar, and to answer questions related to the inspection. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that inspectors have essentially free access to the Licensee's facilities and usually are not escorted by the Licensee. Additionally, 10 CFR 70.55(c)(3) requires licensees to afford inspectors unfettered access, consistent with identification and access control requirements. The NRC inspections associated with the Petitioner's allegations did not reveal instances of licensee accompaniment having interfered with communication between employees and NRC inspectors. O5 Petitioner observes that the ALARA " standard" is not mentioned in IEreports. (Chap. I, pp. 6-7)

Response

See again discussion of ALARA, paragraph 2a, pages 9-13. Petitioner believes that the inspector mainly accepted management Q}lanationforallegedfailuresinsteadofconsultingrelevantdocuments. exp (Chap I, p. 23)

Response

Contrary to Petitioner's belief, the inspector made an independent assessment of the pertinent documents. Further, the Petitioner was incorrect as to the meaning and application of the documents cited by her to the issue raised, l See a fuller discussion of the matter at paragraph 3b(17), page 59. l l l l t i

U7 Petitioner charges that the inspector responsible for Inspection Report 84-17 was gratuitously insulting, disparaging, and misleading in his treatment of a Fetitioner allegation concerning the failure of some lab personnel to monitor themselves for contamination when leaving the lab. Petitioner also charges that the inspector failed to consider prior violations concerning frisking. (Chap II, pp. 17-19)

Response

From a review of the inspection findings and discussions with the inspector of record, the NRC believes, regarding the technical aspects of this allegation, the follow-up to and disposition of the allegation was handled in an appro-priate and professional manner by the inspector. The inspector's conclusion that the allegation was not substantiated was correct. The inspector did not observe or find any evidence which would indicate that individuals are leaving the controlled area without proper monitoring. The NRC believes further that the Licensee acted responsibly by establishing a disciplinary action program for personnel who are observed not to frisk or who frisk improperly as deter-mined by detection of contamination on personnel by the radiation prctection staff during the special checks. While the employer is responsible for the action of its employees, the employee, once trained, also has an obligation to adhere to regulatory requirements and Licensee procedures. With regard to Petitioner's concern for the inspector's alleged failure to consider prior violations, the NRC Enforcement Policy is silent with regard to repetitive Severity Level V violations, but repeated similar violations could result in further enforcement action. However, during Inspection 84-17, the 1

I l inspector was unable to substantiate that Chemet Lab personnel were not frisking and so the issue of repetitive violations did not arise. U8 Petitioner asserts that the inspector failed to find that GE violated 10 CFR 19.13(b) and (c), 20.408(b), and Nuclear Safety Instruction E-6.0, addressed in section "n", Inspection Report 84-17, by classifying the matter as a technical violation and leaving the matter as " unresolved." (Chap II, pp. 19-22)

Response

During the inspecticn (84-17), the inspector reviewed available radiaticn exposure data for the Petitioner. However, there was some question as to the retrievability of some of the data that were not in the computer file. At the time of the inspection, the inspector had not determined whether a regulatory requirement had been violated regarding the Petitioner's termina-tion exposure report. Based on these uncertainties the inspector left that issue as unresolved, but he did cite the Licensee for violating 10 CFR 20.408(b) by not furnishing the NRC a copy of the termination report within 30 days. An unresolved item is one for which more information is required to l l determine whether the item is acceptable or may involve violations or i deviations. The unresolved item was followed up during an inspection conducted April 8-12, 1985 (Inspection Report 85-04) and a' violation of l 10 CFR 19.13 was identified. (Nuclear Safety Instruction E-6.0 was merely a Licensee procedure intended to implement the requirements of 10 CFR 19.13 ) l l l { l l

Regarding the need for the Licensee to provide external radiation monitoring devices (film badge /TLD) to people employed in the Chemet Lab, the film badge /TLD data reported by the Licsnssa's dosimetry service since 1976 indicated that radiation exposures for Chemet Lab personnel were less than 25 percent of the applicable limit specified in 10 CFR Part 20.101. Thus, personal monitoring would not have been required by NRC regulations. _(_91 Petitioner asserts that the inspector's " selective" review did not HTscover rejection by JNF, a vendor customer, of a GE product and

therefore did not find what Petitioner believed to be multiple violations of 10 CFR 70.57 and 70.58. (Chap. II, pp. 26-27)

Response , The Petitioner did not properly characterize the scope of this inspection. The referenced sections of Inspection Report 81-11 dealing with transporta-tion, on pages 3 and 4, were taken out of context and applied to a completely unrelated matter. i The inspection concerned the shipment of radioactive waste to a licensed burial facility and focused on DOT requirements (49 CFR 173.393) and the site disposal criteria. The inspector did not avaluate shipments to a customer nor ,m,aterial control and accounting requirements as suggested by the Petitioner's reference to 10 CFR 70.57 and 70.58. The Petitioner makes an incorrect statement regarding who selected the documentation to be reviewed. The NRC inspector had available at the time the documentation for all waste l

shipments for the period January to August 1981. Consistent with NRC practice, the inspector selected only a portion of the documentation to review in detail. 10 Petitioner maintains that the inspectors did not find " crucial"

    .vio ations of 10 CFR 70.57 in GE's failure to determine metal impurity and improper verification of out of centrol conditions.

content (Chap II,inp.U0,7)2

Response

The Petitioner concluded that a violation of 10 CFR 70.57 occurred since the Chemet Laboratory "does not know the metal impurity content in the UO2 being assayed," and therefore reports only the oxygen to uranium ratio. This is not a correct conclusion. Total nonvolatile metallic impurity (TMI) analyses and oxygen to uranium ratio (0/U) analyses are performed routinely and independently by different groups in the Chemet Lab. The two analyses are combined subsequently to obtain a corrected uranium factor, which is used in accordance with the Licensee's FNMC Plan. Consequently, no violation was appropriate. As a result of a corporate audit review, GE's Product and Quality Assurance Operations raised the issue of not always using the same standards to verify correction of an out-of-control condition. They suggested changes in the GE Nuclear Fuels Manufacturing Department special nuclear material control program to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 70.57. In a letter dated April 9, 1982 to

the NRC Fuel Facility Safeguards Licensing Branch, GE attempted to clarify its procedures. The NRC considered the clarification unnecessary because GE's FNMC Plan (Section 4.0 and Appendix C -Section 4-0) contained sufficient procedures to verify correction of an out-of-control condition. Therefore no violation occurred. (11) Petitioner notes the inspector's failure to interview Petitioner resulting in the inspector not getting supporting evider.ce (both testimonial and documentary) supporting her allegation concerning improper tag removal from an analyzer. (Chap II, pp. 28-29)

Response

The inspectors who conduct'ed the inspection interviewed Mrs. English by telephone on several occasions before the inspection and covered many issues, one of which was the out-of-service tag issue. Pertinent information on that issue was obtained during these interviews. Although the inspectors had not seen copies of the out-of-service tags before the inspection, subsequent review of these copies did not provide the inspectors any unknown information or change their original conclusion. During this inspections, the inspectors applied an accepted inspection technique by interviewing the laboratory personnel. Based on the best recollection individuals had of the event, it was determined that the subject equipment had been tagged as a precautionary measure and that the tag probably had been removed by a supervisor (based or the supervisor's rememberance) in accordance

with a Licensee procedure entitled " Administrative, Lock, Tag and Try, No 302." This procedure did not require the Licensee to maintain a log of out-of-service tag use and did not require the Licensee to retain used tags. The " shift logs" referenced in the inspection report were informal logs or notes maintained by some shift supervisors but not required by NRC regulations or the Licensee's procedures. The logs maintained for equipment trend analysis were informal shift logs used by the Technical Equipment Support Unit to monitor equipment failure rates and maintenance time. These logs also are not required by NRC regulations or the Licensee's procedures. The logs were referenced in Inspection Report 84-16 to describe the scope of the inspection and the leads the inspector developed in his effort to draw a complete conclusion regarding the incident. Because the Licensee was not required by NRC regulations or the Licensee's procedures to maintain Equipment Support shift logs, laboratory supervisor shift logs, or logs documenting the use of out-of-service tags, no violation I was issued. (12) Petitioner notes that although inspector found no such requirement in GE documents, GE rules did require the wearing of protective gloves. (Apr 11 ltr, p. 19) l l i l l

Response

At the time the allegation was made and at the time of the 84-04 inspection, NSR/R 6.1.0 specified the radiological controls for the Chemet Lab. The documents referenced by the Petitioner in footnote 5 on page 19 of the April 11 letter were either not considered required procedures by the NRC or were out of date and had been superseded by other documents which did not have a require-ment to wear protective gloves. In either case, since there were no violations of regulatory requirements no discussion of severity level was appropriate.

b. Improper Findings

[1] The Petitioner alleges that the conclusion in Inspection Report No. 82-18 that no violations or deviations were disclosed is in error because (1) the General Electric Fundamental Nuclear Material Control (FNMC) Plan does not reflect GE's actual practice in responding to out-of-control conditions and (2) the FNMC plan does not reflect a license condition. (Pet., pp. 7-8)

Response

During an inspection conducted March 15-18, 1982 (Inspection Report 82-07), the inspector observed that the Licensee's practice concerning initiation of investigations was more conservative than required by the facility's FNMC plan. The plan required an investigation whenever (1) two or more measured values of a standard or (2) the difference between duplicate analyses fell outside the warning limits. (Warning limits are those established at the 0.05 level of significance.) The Licensee's actual practice, not reflected in the

FNMC plan, was to investigate each time the warning limits were exceeded. Because that practice was more conservative, compliance with the FNMC plan requirement was being maintained. The NRC inspector believed that the licensee should modify the FNMC plan to be consistent with current practices, because those current practices were superior to the FNMC plan requirements. A recommendation to this effect was forwarded to the Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) in a memorandum dated April 15,1982. As a result of this memorandum, NMSS issued License Condition 4.10, effective immediately, by letter to General Electric dated July 20, 1982. The July 20, 1982 letter stated that the requirements of License Condition 4.10 should be incorporated into the Licensee's FNMC plan as soon as practical. General Electric submitted to NMSS for approval the revised pages to its FNMC Plan pursuant to 10 CFR 70.34 on December 9, 1983. This submittal occurred after periodic, extensive discussions with NMSS concerning the subject matter. The December 9, 1983 submittal also addressed the Region II concern originally raised in Inspection Report No. 82-07. The revised pages were approved by NMSS on November 30, 1984. l The purpose of requesting the Licensee to put the essence of License Condition 4.10 in its FNMC plan was to have a comprehensive, inclusive document containing all pertinent Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) aspects. While this is ideal, it is not required. Therefore, during this time

period the Licensee was considered to have an acceptable MC&A program based on the commitments in the FNMC plan and the requirements imposed by license conditions. {21 In regard to Inspection Report 84-04, Petitioner-- Da believes that GE committed identical violations in the past. Fet., pp. 9-10)

Response

Ouring the previous 2 years, only one similar violation was identified, as documented in Inspection Report 82-10 for an inspection during the period May 17-21 1982. However, the corrective action taken by the Licensee in response to the 1982 violation was in most respects effective in preventing recurrence. In response to the violation cited in 1984, the Licensee took corrective action, including disciplining the individuals, conducting special training sessions, and issuing to Chemet Lab personnel a written notice that stressed the need to survey. Consequently, escalated enforcement was not considered necessary to achieve adequate corrective action. (b) asserts that violations and civil penalties should have been issued for failure of the licensee to incorporate certain calibration requirements into its formal procedures and for failure of the procedures to require calibration with sources " traceable to National Standards." (Pet., pp. 10-12)

Response

Neither a violation of a regulatory requirement nor a deviation from a Licensee commitment was involved with regard to the Petitioner's contention that a Notice of Violation or Deviation should have been issued for the Licensee's failure to approve formally the procedure used for calibrating the whole body counter and high volume air samplers. Paragraph 4.1 of Appendix A to NRC License SNM-1097 requires area managers to establish written operating procedures incorporating radiation and criticality safety controls and limits. Neither License SNM-1097 nor the license application specifies what type of procedures are required. The Licensee is permitted to use judgment in determining what procedures are needed for operation. Consequently, the Licensee's administrative procedures permit area managers to determine what procedures are necessary for operations. At the time of the inspection, an adequate procedure was in use for calibrating the whole body counter and high volume air samplers. The Licensee did not have an administrative procedure to raquire management approval of calibration proce-dures for the whole body counter or the high volume air samplers, nor was such a procedure required. The NRC inspector indicated in the inspection report that it would be prudent for Licensee management formally to approve

the procedures to ensure adequate technical content and to prevent l

significant changes to the procedures without the knowledge of appropriate Licensee personnel. It should be emphasized that the inspector did not disagree with the technical content of the calibration procedures. i

l l The NRC inspector found that controlling documents (procedures) for onsite calibration of instruments used to determine internal exposure, exposure rates, or radioactivit:y released from the facility did not require that the instruments be calibrated with a source traceable to national standards. It is a good practice that calibration sources be traceable to national standards and the inspector was encouraging this. However, there is no regulatory requirement that instrument calibration be performed using such national standards. Therefore, the inspection report is correct because no violations or deviations from NRC regulations or license conditions were identified. (c) notes that paragraph 6 of the report discloses circumstances at odds with the inspector's conclusion of "no violations were identified" in light of the fact that the inspector did note that GE's fuel shipment of February 8,1994, was labeled with RADIOACTIVE WHITE-1 labels rather than RADI0 ACTIVE YELLOW-II labels. (Pet.,

p. 12)

Response

As noted in Inspection Report 84-04, the NRC inspector reviewed the Licensee's program for surveying and labeling fuel shipments, including calibration of survey instruments by an independent vendor; observed the techniques used by a Licensee technician to perform the survey; reviewed records of previous fuel shipments, including a February 8,1984 shipment to a utility; and performed an independent radiation survey of a fuel shipment. Although it was not possible for the NRC independently to confirm the results of the survey performed by the recipient of the February 8, 1984 shipment, no evidence was found by the inspector that surveys performed by the Licensee were in error or

that data recorded by the Licensee were incorrect or falsified. Thus, it could not be concluded that the shipment was improperly surveyed or incorrectly labeled, and a Notice of Violation was unwarranted g l also notes, along with item #(4) above, that the inspector found some 1983 Department of Transportation and NRC changes to transport regulations which had yet to be incorporated into GE's shipping procedures.. (Pet., p. 13)

Response

The Licensee's failure to incorporate certain 1983 changes to the Department of Transportation and NRC shipping regulations into shipping procedures was the result of an administrative delay that had been recognized by the Licensee. A draft procedure had been prepared and was being used, but had not been approved formally. The individuals responsible for shipping radioactive Necessary materials were well verted in the contents of the new regulations. form changes had been made, and shipments were being made in accordance with the appropriate regulations. The Inspection Report 84-04 specifically st.sted that the inspector reviewed shipping records for shipments made in 1984 and found no violations of DOT or NRC regulations in any of these shipments, nor did it identify any violations with regard to failure to incor-porate the 1983 changes into GE's transportation procedures. I l f f

l However, in response to the Petitioner's concern, a specific NRC requirement j for preparing shipments of radioactive material using approved procedures was identified. 10 CFR 71.0(d) states that the transport of licensed material or i delivery of licensed material to a carrier for transport is subject to the quality assurance requirements of Subpart H of 10 CFR, Part 71. 10 CFR 71.113 of Subpart H requires the licensee to establish measures to control the issuance of documents such as instructions, procedures, and drawings, including changes, which prescribe all activities affecting quality. 10 CFR 71.113 also requires that the measures must assure that documents, including changes, are reviewed for adequacy and approved for release by authorized personnel. The determination that the Licensee did violate NRC requirements by not having changes to procedures formally approved before use in preparing shipments of radioactive material has led to the issuance of a Notice of Violation in Inspection Report 70-1113/86-01. I Since the shipping records indicated that the shipments met DOT and NRC requirements, as reported in, Inspection Report 84-04, failure to have manage-ment approval for the procedural changes is of only minor safety concern and the violation was categorized at Severity Level V. Q1questionsafindingof"noviolationordeviationswere identified" when an inspector requested survey disclosed three work areas which exceeded GE's administrative dose limit. This was particularly questioned in light of previous surveys which had also confirmed contamination above the " administrative limit." (Pet., pp. 13-14)

Response

The Licensee's " administrative limit" is a self-imposed action point used to initiate cleanup. Th'is " administrative limit," approximately one fifth the removable contamination limit for releasing an item for unrestricted use imposed by Condition 14 of the License in effect at the time of the 84-04 inspection, was used for uncontrolled areas. This indicated the Licensee's intent to keep the contamination level in the Chemet Lab low. The inspector's review of weekly contamination surveys performed by the Licensee's Radiation Safety Staff in January and February 1984 indicated that when contamination was identified in the Chemet Lab, prompt decontamination and resurvey was performed as required by plant procedures. Prompt decontamination and resurvey also occurred after the survey requested by the inspector, which identified three work areas above the action point. During tours of the Chemet Lab, discussed in Inspection Report 84-04, the inspector did not identify visible contamination which could have indicated 1 that spills had not been cleaned up. Licensee procedures required that spills be cleaned up immediately. Licensee radiation safety surveys, an independent check of the Chemet Lab housekeeping program, assist the laboratory in identifying problem areas to lessen the potential for internal deposition of radioactive material. During the inspection, the inspector found no evidence that the Licensee's program for identification and prompt cleanup of radioactive contamination was not in accordance with license conditions and plant procedures. Finding contamination does not form the basis for a

violation. The instances of contamination levels in the Chemet Lab exceeding the action level, noted in the survey records reviewed, did not indicate a breakdown in the contamination control program in the laboratory and no viola-tion of NRC requirements occurred.

       @ In regard to Inspection Report 84-05, Petitioner alleges that the conclusion in Inspection Report 84-05 that no violations or deviations were identified is incorrect because (1) the Licensee failed to follow certain procedures when calibrating enrichment analyzers, and (2) the Licensee failed to maintain certain calibration logs.           The Petitioner also alleges that Licensee management misled NRC inspectors and that all of these concerns should have been identified as violations of NRC requirements. (Pet., pp. 14-15)

Response

During the inspection conducted March 26-29, 1984 (Inspection Report 84-05), the NRC inspectors reviewed the Licensee's records to evaluate the Petitioner's assertion that proper calibrations were not completed following detector changes for analyzer #4 on August 20, 1982 and for analyzer #3 on June 22, 1983. The inspectors reviewed the computer generated records, tapes, handwritten logs, and procedures. The inspectors' review determined that the applicable procedure was not written clearly. To ensure that they were interpreting it correctly, the inspectors discussed the procedure with the individual who had prepared it. Also, although not documented in the inspection report, the inspectors interviewed several laboratory technicians. All of the. technicians interviewed had the same interpretation as the authcr of the precedure. Inspection of the computer tapes revealed that, for the two l

detectors on the dates specified, the Licensee had performed the calibrations consistent with the intent of the procedure. The inspectors concluded that the Petitioner had misinterpreted the procedure to require six complete calibrations rather than the analysis of the highest standard six times. The inspectors further determined that the procedure used by the Licensee was adequate. During the same inspection, a review of Licensee procedures and discussions with Licensee management did not reveal any requirement for the Licensee to maintain information or data in the calibration log. However, a subsequent inspection (Inspection Report 84-15) in this area revealed that one step in a Station Control Plan which was in effect between April 29, 1979 and September 15, 1983 specified that this log was to be maintained. The log was used to provide the Licensee rapid indication of the status of equipment, thus precluding the need periodically to examine the computer tapes. During the inspection documented in Inspection Report 84-15, the inspector determined that because of an oversight the Licensee had failed to withdraw the Station Control Plan requirement to maintain the calibration log. In any event, the

                                          ~

l Station Control Plan was not a procedure used to implement NRC requirements; the Licensee used the computer system for maintaining the records required by l NRC. Thus, statements of Licensee management that the log was not required l were not false and no Notice of Violation was issued.

                                                             . $ In regard to Inspection Report 84-08, the Petitioner identifies the inspector's statement of "no violations or deviations" as worthless when it was determined that tests to analyze UO, were not actually performed nor was the iten kept "open" or reserved f8r subsequent inspection.
 ,        Further she views as " illegal" a report comment that in the case of examination of analytical control chart data for the period April 1 -

May 31, 1984, it is a " matter currently being addressed by Licensee." (Pet., pp. 17-19)

Response

!  During the inspection conducted on June 25-28, 1984, the inspector obtained samples of special nuclear material (U02 ) scheduled for export by the Licensee.       These samples were sent to the New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) for analysis under NRC contract. Although not clearly specified, "84-08-01" in the inspection report is the identification sequence for this open item.

Open items are closed during future inspections, and, if appropriate, enforcement action is taken. This particular item was reviewed during and

closed by Inspection Report 85-14 when data analysis showed no significant i

difference between the Licensee's and NBL's results. l Control chart data were reviewed during the-inspection documented in l Inspection Report 84-08 to determine whether the Licensee was complying with NRC regulations relative to measurement quality control. The inspector noted l that one of the Licensee's computer reports (a graphical representation of the data) was not properly graphing the control chart limits. Further investi-( gation revealed that this was an anomaly with that particular computer report 1 i I i

and that the computer had been programmed with the proper limits. This was verified by the inspector by reviewing a second type of computer report, which was produced using the same data base. No violations were detected because the Licensee was controlling measurements properly and was taking appropriate action when limits were exceeded. The inspector reviewed an internal Licensee report (the Wieczorek Report) covering employee concerns relative to the Licensee's efforts to follow procedures when detecto,rs were replaced. This review was in addition to previous inspections of data, records, and procedures in the Licensee's labor-atory by NRC inspectors, as documented in Inspection Reports 84-08 and 84-05. The conclusions in the Licensee's report, as in the NRC inspection reports, were that the Licensee's procedures were adequate. The Wieczorek Report, referenced in Petitioner's Exhibit F, is discussed in detail in the response at paragraph 2d above. (5) In regard to Inspection Report 84-13, Petitioner-- (a) asserts that the following examples show willful deviations by the Licensee, making a conclusion of "no violations or deviations" not only " incomprehensible" but " patently illegal." (Pet., p. 20) (i) Having only one air sampler in the laboratory. (Pet.,

p. 20)

Response

It should be noted that Inspection Report 84-13 carried this issue as an unresolved item, a matter about which more information was required to

determine whether it involved a violation. As noted in Inspection Report 84-13, the Licensee stated that documentation should be retrievable from old files to indicate that the single air sampler collected samples that were representative of the concentrations to which workers in the laboratory were exposed. In a subsequent inspection during the period November 27-30, 1984 (Inspection Report 84-17), the documentation was found to be inadequate. It also was determined that the location of the air sampler was inadequate to provide representative samples of breathing air concentrations for workers in the area. Therefore, a Severity Level IV Notice of Violation was issued. Based on the low contamination levels in the Chemet Lab and the low potential for the material to become airborne, there was only a small probability that the exposure of a worker would even approach the intake limits of 10 CFR 20.103. Therefore, in the absence of a finding of willfulness, which would be examined by 01, the violation was appropriately classified as a Severity Level IV Violation. (ii) Defective hoods and inefficient ventilation equipment and the absence of licensee identification of the problem to the i NRC.

Response

The statement made in Inspection Report 84-13 that flaps covering hood openings on several hoods needed repair or replacement pertained to rubber l l L l l

devices through which an individual inserts his hand and arms in order to work inside enclosures or hoods in the fuel manufacturing area. This enables the individual to handle material which would potentially become airborne if it were not for the enclosures or hoods. The enclosures or hoods are connected to a filtered ventilation system that draws air out of an enclosure and creates a partial vacuum in the enclosure. In other words, the pressure is less inside the enclosure than outside. This differential pressure causes air to flow into the enclosure, thus keeping airborne radioactivity inside the enclosure. Damaged or missing flaps over openings in the enclosures would reduce the differential pressure but not necessarily to the extent that airborne radioactive material would leak out of the enclosure. The Petitioner apparently misunderstood the finding when she stated that air flow into a hood was evidence of a malfunctioning hood. In this case, there was no violation and the Petitioner's belief that the inspector's findings were inappropriate is incorrect. (b) questions the inspector finding of no incidents of exposure or contamination for the previous year, when, in fact, Petitioner was transferred for an alleged failure to clean up a radioactive spill. (Pet., p. 21)

Response

Although the Petitioner did not provide specific information (e.g. , contamination level, size of contaminated area, and location in the laboratory) concerning the event characterized as a spill, most spills of radioactive

material in powder or liquid form at the plant typically would not be reportable under NRC regulations or license conditions. A review of the Petitioner's bioassay data for 1984 indicated that the

     ' Petitioner had no detectable uptake of radioactive material. The absence of positive bioassay data supports the conclusion that the Petitioner was not exposed to radioactivity in excess of the limits specified in Subsections 20.103(a)(1) and (2) as a result of the alleged spill and, therefore, the event was not reportable. A review of the Petitioner's radiation exposure records for the last 4 years indicates that her radiation dose for that period was minimal and well below NRC limits. The exposure re:ords of other Chemet Lab personnel indicate their exposure to radioactive material also was minimal.

Reviews of routine contamination surveys performed by the Licensee and special surveys performed at the request of the NRC indicated that loose contamination levels in the laboratory were low. A review of monitoring records for the Chemet Lab exhaust system indicated that there was no release of radioactivity to unrestricted areas in excess of NRC limits during the period 1983-1984. The NRC review did not confirm that the alleged spill in the Chemet Lab, descriled in the Petition, met any applicable reporting criteria. Consequently, there was no violation identified and no " knowing or conscious" failure, as the Petitioner characterizes it, of the Licensee to report. The

Petitioner has incorrectly cited and relied on 10 CFR 50.73 concerning report-ing requirements. That provision does not apply to a materials licensee, such as General Electric. 10 CFR 50.73 applies only to the holders of operating licenses for nuclear Power plants. On the basis of the above, the Inspection Report is correct in stating that there were no reportable incidents.

        @ In the Introduction to Chapter 1, the Petitioner contends that a number of inspection reports were in error or deficient because the inspectors (1) found no violations in their follow-up to many of the allegations, (2) refused to find a violation on the ground that there is no legally binding requirement, (3) paid no attention to previous violations in the same area, (4) did not find that offenses reflected deliberate or careless disregard and willfulness and were not reported to the NRC as required, (5) did not pursue dereliction of duty on the part of GE management, (6) never assigned severity levels more than a IV or V, (7) drafted findings to make it appear that violations were only
        " technical," (8) never considered the actual effect on worker health and safety, and (9) never considered the economic advantage to GE of noncompliance.    (Pet., pp. 2-3)

Response

i (I) It is true that no violations were found in many areas where allegations were made. Either the allegation was found not to have merit or, in some cases in which the allegation had merit, no regulatory requirement was violated by the Licensee. In areas where there were no regulatory i requirements but where practices could be improved, the Licensee in many cases voluntarily improved the program. When there were no regulatory requirements, this lack of reouirement did not lead to a 1 t

situation that adversely affected the health and safety of workers or the public. (2) It is 'true that in many instances no violations were issued because there was no legally binding NRC requirement. The NRC cannot issue a violation for failure to do that which the Licensee is not required to do by regulation, license condition, or other requirement. However, NRC does comment to licensees where improvements can be made beyond regulatory requirements. If there is a lack of requirements in an area that could significantly affect public health and safety, the NRC can impose requirements or terminate operations, as necessary, to ensure the public health and safety. During inspections of the GE Wilmington facility, NRC inspectors found no instances where worker or public health and safety required actions other than those taken and documented in the inspection reports. (3) Although the contention.is made several times throughout the Petition that the NRC did not consider a particular violation in light of previous violations, the NRC did, in fact, consider previous violations in the area. Violations for the preceding 2 years in each technical area were considered to determine if there were repeat violations or trends. None were found that indicated the need for enforcement actions different from those taken.

(4) The NRC has not identified any instances where a violation required to be reported to the NRC was not reported. The Petitioner has alleged several instances where the Licensee did not report when required. Based on NRC's review, in each instance the Petitioner's position was based on a lack of understanding of NRC reporting requirements applicable to the GE Wilmington facility. (5) Neither the NRC review of the Petitioner's concerns nor NRC inspections of the Licensee s facility revealed dereliction of duty on the part of the Licensee. (6) See response at paragraph 3c(2), page 93. (7) Violations must clearly describe the regulatory bases and, where appropriate, a discussion of technical issues. In many instances, infor-mation concerning the health and safety significance of issues was included in inspection report details. In all instances it was considered in assigning severity levels.

(8,) It is true that not all NRC inspection reports speak directly of worker 1

or public health and safety. Rather, NRC inspection reports frequently refer only to NRC regulatory requirements, the main purpose of which is protection of workers and the public. Thus, in fact, inspection reports do concern issues relevant to worker and public health and safety or national security. 1

(9) The NRC Enforcement Policy states that sanctions should be designed to ensure that a licensee does not profit deliberately from violations of NRC requirements. Whether a matter is deliberate must be determined by the Office of Investigations. Their investigations are pending on matters that may involve deliberate violations. Q Petitioner criticizes IE Inspection Reports in that they are expressed in terms of conditions on the date of the inspection and not on the date(s) of the reported deficiencies. (Chap I, p. 3)

Response

It is true that inspection reports generally describe conditions that existed during an inspection. Inspection reports also may discuss conditions that existed when the inspector was not onsite, as determined from discussions with workers and from review of Licensee records. The fact that an inspection report does not specifically discuss conditions alleged to have existed on dates referred to in the allegation does not mean that the inspector ignored those dates. It is normal practice for inspectors to interview people who may or should know of the alleged conditions. Also, inspectors review Licensee records to determine plant conditions that existed when NRC inspectors were not onsite. (8) Petitioner complains that when the investigators are unable to find physical evidence which was under the control of management, they conclude that they are unable to prove the case. (Chap. I, p. 14)

Response

The Petitioner implies that there should have been some evidence provided to the NRC that was not and that this lack of evidence was not discussed in NRC reports, but the Petition cites no examples of where this was the case. If through follow-up of a specific allegation NRC inspectors become aware that a Licensee may have destroyed records required by the NRC, with the intent of withholding such evidence from the NRC, this information is turned over to the Office of Investigations for appropriate follow-up. NRC inspections of the GE Wilmington facility have found no indication that the Licensee destroyed records with the intent of withholding such evidence from the NRC. L91Petitionercomplainsthatcoveringletters"virtuallyalwaysassume that the report is ' privileged and confidential' and invite the licensee to forward his response as a separate document to avoid disclosure." (Chap I. p. 5)

Response

Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.790(d), correspondence and reports which contain information or records concerning a Licensee's or applicant's physical protection or material cont'o1 and accounting program for special nuclear material not otherwise designated as Safeguards Information or classified as - National Security Information or Restricted Data are subject to disclosure only in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 9.12. Accordingly, inspection I l

reports of General Electric's fuel manufacturing facility, Wilmington, North Carolina that contain material control and accounting information or physical protection information generally are nat released by the NRC. All other NRC inspection reports, Notices of Violation, ar.d Licensee responses to inspection reports are posted at the plant site and are available in the Public Document Room in Washington, D.C. (10) Petitioner complains that although the NRC was officially notified on September 26, 1984, that Mrs. English waived confidentiality, every report written af ter that date has still referred to her as ' alleger.' (Chap I, p. 5) Resoonse This method of referring to allegers in inspection reports is common practice in the NPC. It helps avoid inadvertent identification of confidential sources. (11) Petitioner asserts that GE's highest management " willfully, calculatedly or by ' careless disregard,' and by deception, for its own profit, destroyed the utility of at least four of the systems it was required by law to maintain to guard against exposure to radiation hazards (1) air intake monitoring; (2) Rad. Safety Inspections; (3) frisking and (4) body counts. In consequence, GE was, at the time of Mrs. English s complaints, and at least until December 6,1984, unab_le_ to ascertain or accurately to report the intake of radioactive centamination by wet lab employees." (Chap I, p.11) l

Response

The inspection reports discussed by the Petitioner do not demonstrate that GE management willfully, cciculatedly, or by careless disregard and by deception

destroyed the utility of air intake monitoring, radiation safety inspections, i frisking, and body counts. The NRC expects licensees to adhere to NRC

,  requirements and license conditions and holds the Licensee responsible for the acts of their employees.                The inspector identified areas that could be improved in the Licensee's program relative to air monitoring, radiation safety inspections, frisking, and body counts, but the inspector did not find the Licensee's program to be ineffective.                 In most cases the Licensee's program was in conformance with NRC requirements. Where violations of NRC requirements, j

license conditions, or required procedures were identified, appropriate Notices 1 ' of Violation were issued. 1 The Notice of Violation issued regarding air monitoring was for not performing suitable measurements of concentrations of radioactivity in air, not for . exposing individuals excessively or unnecessarily. The inspector reviewed the Licensee's records of contamination surveys, operations, techniques, ! and the results of bioassays, and found that excessive exposures had not occurred. The statement by the Petitioner that the utility of the Licensee's employee protection program was destroyed as it applied to the Chemet Lab, is not supported by fact. Based on NRC inspections the Licensee's radiation protection program did have the necessary controls commensurate with the potential hazards, and the health and safety of the employees was being protected.

(12) Petitioner asserts that the exit interview described in Inspection Report 84-17 established willful per se violations of the entire contamination control program. (Chap I, pp. 11-13)

Response

It is normal practice for NRC inspectors during the exit interview to point out to the Licensee weaknesses in a particular program. Observed weak-nesses are not necessarily violations. Usually they are potential problem The areas that if left unattended could possibly result in violations. Licensee may be requested to respond to these concerns, addressing partic-ular actions taken or planned to improve the effectiveness of its program. The NRC constantly strives to improve the effectiveness of licensee programs. An inspector's finding a problem does not mean that management knew of and The had deliberately ignored the problem or had carelessly disregarded it. NRC does not interpret management willingness and commitment to take Rather, NRC corrective actions as an admission.of a willful violation, per se. views it as an indication of a responsible and responsive licensee. The premise stated by the Petitioner that the admission of a violation was an 10 CFR a'dmission of willfully violating NRC regulations is not correct. 2.201(b) states that licensees may be required to admit or deny a viola-In admitting a tion when formally responding to the Notice of Violation. 1

violation, a licensee is acknowledging that the violation occurred essentially as described in the Notice of Violation and that corrective action is or was necessary to correct the condition that led to the violation. It is not an admission of willfully violating NRC requirements. (13) Petitioner asserts that McAlpine signed reports for Clay and Bates because they might have objected to signing a " white wash." (Chap I, pp. 14-15)

Response

Inspection reports are reviewed by several levels of NRC management before issuance. It is normal NRC practice (Exhibit 3 (page E3-1) IE MC 0610) for supervisors to sign inspection reports for inspectors when the inspectors are out of, town, so as not to delay issuance of the reports. In the cases cited, recommended changes were coordinated by telephone with the inspectors, and their concurrence was received befcre the reports were issued. When the inspectors returned to the regional office, they again reviewed and concurred in the inspection reports. (14) Petitioner questions finding of "no violations or deviations were identified" in Inspection Report 84-17. Section 4.f., in light of l showing as Petitioner puts it, that "the Rad Safety inspectors monitor l frequently enough but only in the wrong places" (p. 19); believes the l licensee procedures provide the " illusion" of radiation safety protec-tion which belics reality; questions why the ALARA obligation imposed by 10 CFR 20.103(b)(2) was never mentioned; and, charged that the isotopic room was the " hottest spot in the lab." (Chap I, pp. 18-21) l The applicability of ALARA is discussed in paragraph 2a above,

pages 9-13.

s

Response

Requirements for contamination surveys are described in the Licensee's license application. The surveys specified in the license application were being performed. The rationale behind contamination surveys of the walk areas to detect spread of contamination was sound. The NRC inspector was indicating that the Licensee also should consider surveys of the work areas in which there are operations with high potential for the spread of contamination. The inspector was encouraging the Licensee to consider improvements in the contamination survey program in the laboratory, though such improvements were not specifically required by NRC regulations. The inspector was not implying that the Licensee's program was not in compliance with NRC regulstions. The contamination action levels used by the Licensee in the Chemet Lab were the same as those for " uncontrolled areas" of the plant. These action levels were conservative and were much lower than the action levels used for

      " controlled areas" within the plant. Therefc-e, the NRC concluded that the Licensee has used extremely conservative administrative action levels for contamination control in the Chemet Lab.                             The Chemet Lab administrative action level of 1000 dpm per 100 cm 2 1/ or                 f smearable contamination is the E

Before May 21, 1985 the administgative action level for the Chemet Laboratory was 220 dpm per 100cm , approximately a factor of five below the unrestricted area limit. i

same value specified in Section 1.8.2 of the license application for acceptable contamination on articles released for unrestricted use. Inspection Report 84-17 does not say that radiation safety technicians monitored in the wrong places. The inspection report at page 6 states, "The review of the contamination survey results and observations by the inspector indicate that surveys performed by the radiation safety technicians are generally in the same locations which are often not the areas with the highest potential for becoming contaminated." The NRC inspector was pointing out to the licensee a weakness in the radiation survey program. At the time of the inspection, the NRC inspector did not observe any violations. The administrative limits referred to by the Petitioner are administrative action levels for contamination that are contained.in the license. The Licensee is required to take corrective action if surface contamination levels exceed these values. Contrary to Petitioner's assertion, exceedir,g the surface contamination action level is not a violation of 10 CFR 20.103(a)(3) and (b)(2) because those subsections pertain to NRC requirements to perform suitable measurements of radioactive materials in air and to perform bioassays as appropriate. 10 CFR 20.103(b)(2) requires licensees to limit the intake of radioactive material by an individual by the use of respiratory protection devices or other precautionary procedures if process or engineering controls are impractical. l l l l l

The Petitioner's statement that the Isotopic Room was the " hottest" spot in the Chemet Lab'is not supported by the facts. Records of contamination surveys performed by the Licensee and those requested by and observed by NRC inspectors indicate that contamination levels in the Isotopic Room are similar to other work areas in the Chemet Lab. Records of contamination surveys performed by the Licensee which were reviewed by the inspector indicate that radiation protection technicians routinely went into the Isotopic Room and conducted surveys similar to those conducted in other parts of the laboratory. (15) In a footnote, the Petitioner concluded that an NRC inspector had inferred that Rad Safety personnel did not know where to look for contamination which showed that they were ' unqualified' or inadequately trained under 10 CFR 19.12, and 20.206. (Chap. I, p. 19)

Response

The inspector did not infer that radiation safety personnel did not know l where to look for contamination and that they were not qualified. Each technician met or exceeded the minimum qualifications specified in Licensee's application for license renewal. The inspector's comments indicated how the l Licensee might improve the prograin. Thus, the basic premise for the Petitioner's statement is incorrect. The referenced regulations, 10 CFR 19.12 (Instruction to Workers) and 10 CFR 20.206 (Instruction of Personnel), do not define the qualifications and l

training of radiation protection technicians. As stated in Section 2.5.3.3 of the license, radiation protection technicians at the GE Wilmington facility must meet all requirements for a radiation protection technician trainee (which includes 2 years of college or completion of high school and adequate experi-ence plus at least 6 months experience in the field of nuclear safety). The individual also must successfully complete a comprehensive General Electric training program, including the Rockwell International " Radiation Protection Technologist" course, and pass tests independently administered by Rockwell International. Written and oral examinations covering radiological / criticality control procedures are administered by the Licensee. The Licensee's require-ments for a radiation protection technician are more stringent than the qualification requirements for radiation protection technicians specified as part of the NRC license SNM-IO97. This area has been reviewed previously and found acceptable by NRC. (16) Petitioner asserts that the finding that GE had no policy requiring notification of rad safety in.the event of a spill in the lab was false because GE did have a written policy on the matter, which indicates to the Petitioner that the inspector probably took the word of GE management on the issue. (Chap I, pp. 21-22)

Response

During inspection 84-17, the inspector reviewed Nuclear Safety Release / Requirement (NSR/R) 6.1.0, which he believed to establish general radiological safety requirements for the Chemet Lab NSR/R 6.1.0 required that spills be cleaned up, but not that they be reported. At that time, the l _ , _ _ ,.m. ___ ., ,

inspector, being unaware of a Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) for the Chemet Lab, which stated that Radiation Protection was to be notified of spills, encouraged the licensee to establish a notification requirement and to correct an apparent deficiency in the procedure. During a more recent inspection (85-02), the inspector determined that Chemet Lab Personnel had not been notifying Radiation Protection of spills. Job Hazard Analyses are not required by the Licensee except for maintenance operations, where JHAs are used to establish radiological controls. Therefore, failure to notify Radiation Protection of spills was not a violation of NRC requirements or license conditions. The Petitioner referred also to the General Electric Course for Hourly Workers. Although training course outlines or handouts may discuss NRC requirements, license conditions, or procedures, such outlines and handouts are not formal procedures. Thus, the inspector properly concluded that the licensee had no policy requiring notification in the event of a spill. U17 Petitioner asserts that the finding in Inspection Report 84-17 that GE does not have a procedural requirement, nor do they rope off or otherwise mark contaminated areas, is false. (Chap. I, p. 22, Chap II,

p. 11 Apr 11 ltr, p. 20)

Response

Before reaching the stated conclusion, the inspector reviewed appropriate NRC regulations, license conditions for the facility, and required procedures. The inspector did not " naively" accept the verbal statements of GE manage-ment, but he reviewed procedures and interviewed individual non-management

           . - - - -                               ,  ,          , ~ - - ,       ,- ,, -- -

employees. Contrary'to the Petitioner's statement that the finding was predicated upon GE's misrepresenting, the inspector's independent assessment of Licensee documents determined that the Licensee s documents discussed in the Petition had no relevance to the issue of marking off radioactively contaminated areas. Contrary to the Petitioner's assertion, the Course for Hourly Workers is not a formal procedure. It also should be noted that NRC has no specific requirements for rcping off contaminated areas. The Petitioner's discussion of " dead zones" and " safety zones" pertains to criticality safety. The document entitled " Criticality Safety Control Chemet Lab" pertains to the general criticality safety rules, practices, and procedures and does not pertain to radiation safety or to the marking-off of radioactively contaminated areas. The GE document C2.0-QA-201, " Criticality Safety Control - Chemet Lab" (in use betwe.an 1973 and 1976), also concerned criticality safety, not contamination control. At the time of the inspection, Nuclear Safety Release / Requirement 6.1.0 was the effective document for specifying radiation safety practices in the Chemet Lab. This document also did not address marking off contaminated areas. The " Hourly Course Outline" referenced in the Petition was not a procedure, l but instead was an outline for a radiation safety training course given to plant personnel in the early 1970's. The NRC requires licensees to adhere to NRC regulations and license conditions and to license application commitments which are maae a part of the license by reference, including specific procedures. Failure to adhere to statements made in course outlines is not a l violation of these requirements. i

Petitioner's comment regarding the red line on the floor refers to a line below the personnel survey station that persons will step across as they survey themselves and leave the area. Such a line is common in the nuclear industry at controlled area entrances to indicate the boundary of an area where radioactive materials are handled. No such convention regarding a red line applies to marking of spills. In conclusion, the inspector was correct in stating that no violations or deviations were identified. (18) Petitioner asserts that the inspector's conclusion is false that allowing open cooling of uranium sintered pellets is neither prohibited nor a radiation safety problem. (Chap. I, pp. 23-27)

Response

The inspector observed laboratory technicians performing hydrogen determina-tions on sintered pellets during inspections 84-17 and 85-02. During these periods, the inspector observed the removal of pellet pieces from the analyzer and the placement of them in a stainless steel can for cooling. The inspector did not observe any emission of particles of uranium dust while the pellets were being transferred to the can for cooling or from the cooling pellets. In addition, as discussed in Inspection Report 85-02, the inspector had the Licensee collect an air sample approximately 1 foot above the cooling can and in a position such that the air flowed from the source to

the air sampler while a laboratory technician performed four analyses. The results of this air sample showed that the air concentrations in the immediate vicinity of the cooling can were less than 1 percent of the concentration listed in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table 1, Column 1. Any airborne radioactivity that would be released would be in an insoluble form. If an individual remained at this station for the entire working time in a calendar quarter (520 hours), the calculated intake from this operation would have been less than 1 percent of the limit specified in 10 CFR Part 20.103(a)(1). Reviews by the inspector and discussion with Licensee representatives indicate that Standard Operating Procedure 0.3.4 was discontinued as a procedure for the Chemet Lab operations during the period 1977-78 and replaced with Nuclear Safety Release / Requirements. In addition, Calibration and Operation Instruction (C0I) 409 and Analytical Test Method 5.2.9.6 are not applicable to the hydrogen determination and subsequent cooling of sintered pellets, but rather pertain to the analysis of liquid solutions. Thus, open cooling was not prohibited. Based on review of the inspection reports for the GE Wilmington facility and from interviews of the NRC Region II inspectors assigned to this facility over

the past several years, the NRC has found no evidence to support the Petitioner's statement that workers in the Chemet Lab are receiving

 " unnecessary exposure to radiation or to radioactive material."

(19) Petitioner claims that G.E never made any tests for contamination by examining feces and took care to assure that these measures would be unrepresentative, inter alia, because it took body samples only after the absence of the worker for several days from the lab and did not make or keep required historical records. (Chap I, p. 27)

Response

License No. SNM-1097, Part I, Paragraph 3.2.4.3.3 permits lung counting, in lieu of fecal analysis, to evaluate the uptake of insoluble uranium. Regarding soluble uranium, the Licensee's bioassay program, including sampling fre-quencies, is consistent with Regulatory Guide 8.11, " Applications of Bioassay for Uranium," as required by the license. Review of bioassay program documentation by the inspector showed no instances where required historical information was not maintained. (20) Petitioner asserts that the inspector conclusion that neither NRC regulations nor license conditions prohibit dichromate titrations outside a hood is false. (Chap. I, p. 27, Chap. II, p. 11)

Response

i The Petitioner implies that the use of contamination survey data for the titra-tion work station was inappropriate because radiation safety technicians surveyed in the wrong places, the Licensee used inappropriate contamination action levels, and contamination above the action level was found at the work l station. Inspection Report 84-17 stated that radiation safety technicians i generally survey in the same location often not in the areas with the highest

potential for becoming contaminated. The inspection report did not state that radiation safety technicians surveyed only in the wrong places. In the case of the titration work station, surveys were performed routinely in this area. Contrary to the statement made by the Petitioner, and as stated in the inspection report, contamination levels were not found above the Licensee's action level. In addition, the Petitioner misunderstood the statement in the inspection report concerning the administrative limits for contamination used by the Licensee. In the inspection report the inspector pointed out that the administrative limits used by the Licensee for removable contamination in the Chemet Lab were very low. In fact, they were less than the removable contamination levels parmitted on material and equipment that is unconditionally released from the facility to the public in accordance with license conditions. The Petitioner incorrectly states that the Licensee is required by NRC regulations to keep radiation exposures as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). (See earlier discussion of ALARA.) During a more recent inspection (85-02), under direct observation of the inspector, the Licensee took an air sample approximately 1 foot above the titration beakers. The air sampler was positioned so that the air flow was from the source (beakers) to the air sampler. The total sampling time selected was based on collecting a large enough sample to ensure that the minimum detectable level was small compared to the concentration specified in 10 CFR l

                                  .-    -.           , - ,     n .,.. --. ., ,, . -. --- r-,- -

c -

                                                                                                    ------r --

Part 20, Appendix B, Table 1, Column 1. The air sampler. operated while the Licensee's technician performed four separate titrations. The air sample results indicated that air concentrations in the vicinity of the titration work station were less than 1 percent of the concentrations specified in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table 1, Column 1. The NRC advised the North Carolina Department of Labor, Division of Occupational Safety and Health, of the nonradiological safety matter (i.e. , the potential for inhaling noxious fumes) by letter of November 8, 1984. Following their investigation of January 29, 1985, the North Carolina 00L concluded that detector tube samples taken in the breathing zone of workers showed no exposure to acid during dichromate titrations. No violations of Occupational Safety and Health Administration Standards were found; hence, no citations were issued by the state. The statements in Chapter II, page 11, of the Petition indicate that the Petitioner reached an invalid conclusion by putting together unrelated facts. As previously stated, the document " Rad Safety Lab Operating Procedures, 1973" was not in effect at the time of the allegation or the inspection; therefore, the Licensee was not bound to follow it. The Petitioner states that (surface) contamination surveys performed at the work station were unreliable because an air sampler (for monitoring airborne contamination) in the Chemet Lab is improperly located. These two survey methods are not related in this l manner. In addition, special air samples performed at the dichromate titration l l work station during Inspection 85-02 demonstrated that the airborne radio-

activity levels resulting from the titrations were less than 1 percent of the concentration specified in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B and are, in fact, extremely low. l The Petitioner's contention that during Inspection 84-17, the inspector

    " ignored" the air sampling finding of Inspection Report 81-11 as it relates to performing titration is correct.           However, the subject of air sampling in the Chemet Lab had been discussed and identified as an unresolved item in Inspection Report 84-13.         As noted in Inspection Report 84-I7, the inspector followed up on the unresolved item and determined that air sampling in the laboratory did not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 20.103(a)(3). A Notice of Violation appropriately classified as Severity Level IV was issued.

Because neither NRC regulations nor license conditions address industrial safety in the laboratory, the nonradiological concerns noted in the allegation were referred to OSHA. (21) The Petitioner alleges that the inspector overlooked Part 20, App. B, footnote 4, in finding that "because 'the procedure contains no precaution concerning the inhalation of acid fumes that evolve from the titration,' G.E. was not obligated by its license to take any precautionary action against that danger."

Response

Chemical toxicity referred to in footnote 4 to Appendix 8 refers only to the chemical toxicity of uranium, not to the toxicity of other materials which might be present.

U22 Petitioner cites a memorandum dated November 9, 1981, from Bowman to Hendry stating that "' analyses of the 9 air sampler filters in the ADU vaporization room' showed airborne contamination levels ' exceed 300 times the maximum permissible concentration.'" (Chap. I, p. 28)

Response

The Petitioner's contention that a Licensee memorandum which discussed the analysis of air samples collected in the ADU Vaporization Room was evidence 4 that radiation safety surveys in the Chemet Lab were inadequate is not only incorrect, but it is irrelevant to the discussion of radiation safety aspects of titrations in the Chemet Lab. The referenced memorandum pertained to the analysis of air samples collected during an accidental release of uranium l hexafluoride gas in the fuel manufacturing area, an area far removed and physically separated from the Chemet Lab. The release resulted from the failure of equipment. 4 Information and data concerning the release were reviewed by an NRC inspector and the findings were discus'ed s in Inspection Report 81-11. In addition the Licensee conducted an appropriate investigation of the event and provided a

detailed report to the NRC. This report included a description'of actions taken to improve the Licensee's timeliness of the assessment of dose to

! the general public, as requested by the NRC in the cover letter to Inspection 4 Report 81-11. 1 I i

Q3}PetitionerquestionedfindingsintwoseparateInspectionReports regarding contamination on vials, etc. , received into the lab. (Chap 11. pp. 3-5, Apr 11 ltr, p. 21)

Response

Inspection Report 84-17 Section 4(d) sta.es, 'The Licensee recognizes that samples that come from the production area may be contaminat,ed. Plant procedures caution Chemet Lab personnel that samples may be contaminated and require the use of appropriate protective clothing for lab personnel." Nuclear Safety Release / Requirement 6.1.0 does not prohibit receipt of contaminated samples; but it does require that containers and equipment in the Chemet Lab be wiped clean of visible contamination. NRC inspectors did not observe visible contamination on samples sent to the laboratory from the production area. The Petitioner incorrectly claims that Inspection Report 84-04 substantiates that a violation occurred in stating that samples received from the production area for analysis were found to have external contamina-tion on the containers. The contamination on containers from the production i area discussed in Inspection Report 84-04 was not visible contamination, but was determined by wiping the surface of the container with a piece of filter paper and then measuring the removable contamination with a radiation survey instrument. Visible contamination was not observed on samples sent from the production area to the Chemet Lab during unannounced visits to the laboratory by the inspector during the periods February 21-24, 1984, November 27-30, 1984, or January 7-11, 1985. (

With regard to the issuance of the February 19, 1985 memorandum by the laboratory manager alerting workers to the acceptance of sample items from the production area with external contamination, its issuance does not alter the fact that the Licensee had no procedures (nor were they required) which prohibited the receipt of visibly contaminated samples in the Chemet Lab. In sum, receipt of such samples was not a violation of NRC regulations, license conditions, or Licensee procedures. Inspection Reports 84-04 and 84-17 were correct in concluding that no violation or deviation was identified regarding accepting visibly contaminated sample vials and paperwork into the laboratory. 24 Petitioner believes that the inspector's finding that allegation e " (concerning deliberate contamination of the work area) could not be substantiated results from inspector misrepresentation of the allegation

                                            ~

(Chap II, pp. 5-6)

Response

With regard to the Petitioner's contention that the inspector misrepresented the allegation, attention is called to the Petitioner's interview with an NRC investigator on July 11, 1984. On page 190, line 16 of that transcript, the Petitioner indicated it looked like her work area was deliberately being contaminated by someone. On page 255, lines 2-14, she again indicated that someone was attempting to harass or irritate her by deliberately contaminating her work station. The nature of the Petitioner's allegation as stated to the NRC, was not misrepresented.

                                     ~        .__ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ __ _   _

Contrary to the statement in the Petition, individuals interviewea did not identify the specific individual who was observed using poor wark practices by name. The individual who stated that the Petitioner contaminated her own work station voluntarily stated he was told this by the Petitioner. Without witnesses or records to confirm the Petitioner's allegation, the inspector rightly concluded that the allegation could not be substantiated. The NRC's review could not conclude that management condones contamination of any work area. (25) Petitioner believes that the inspector finding that management did not discourage employees from answering questions by NRC inspectors is erroneous. (Chap. 11, pp 6-8)

Response

10 CFR 19.15(b) permits an individual to bring privately to the attention of inspectors, either orally or in writing any past or present condition which he/she has reason to believe may have contributed to or caused any violation of the Act, NRC regulations, or license conditions, or any unnecessary exposure of an individual to radiation from licensed radioactive material under the Licensee's control. It enables the worker to bring concerns to the attention of the NRC. It does not prohibit the Licensee from requesting employees that questions from NRC inspectors should be referred to the appropriate supervisor. Otherwise, a worker may feel compelled to answer an NRC inspector's questions, even though the worker may not have the

I requisite knowledge in the area. Nevertheless, the worker is free to talk to an NRC inspector at any time. The Petition indicates a possible conflict with the number of individuals in Inspection Reports 84-16 and 84-17 who stated that they were told to refer to their supervisor questions asked them by NRC inspectors. There is no conflict in the two reports. Each inspector independently selected 12 laboratory employees to interview. Several individuals were interviewed separately by both inspectors. The individuals interviewed during inspection 84-17 were interviewed in private with no other Licensee employee present. They were asked if the Licensee had told them they could not talk with an NRC inspector and that they should not answer the NRC inspector's questions. Out of the 24 interviews conducted by the two inspectors, two individuals indicated that at least once their supervisor told them to refer questions from NRC inspectors to the supervisors, but that they were not discouraged from talking to NRC inspectors. The Petitioner was not one of the 24 interviewed because she no longer worked at GE at that time. As noted in Inspection Report 84-17 the inspector on a number of inspections at the facility, had never encountered a Licensee employee who refused to answer his questions or one who referred the inspector to a supervisor. Of the 12 individuals interviewed during the inspection docu-mented in Inspection Report 84-17, only 2 were supervisors or management. (26) Petitioner believes that the inspector finding that Petitioner's

     " posting" allegation is not a violation is legally and factually in error because GE failed to post conspicuous notice.      (Chap II, pp. 8-10)

Response

The Petitioner's contention that a violation should have been issued for failure to post the document required by 10 CFR 19.11 is not correct. From a review of the inspection findings, the Region agrees with the inspector that the Licensee was meeting the requirements of Section 19.11. Due to the volume of documents required to be posted in accordance with 10 CFR 19.11(a), the Licensee properly implemented the requirements of 10 CFR 19.11(b), which states that if posting of a document specified in subsections (a) (1), (2) and (3) is not practicable, the Licensee may post a notice which describes the document and where it may be examined. The inspector also found that those documents required by 10 CFR 19.11 were conspicuously posted and had been neither defaced nor altered. Contrary to the allegations of the Petitioner, the inspector did not find that even the portions of the documents visible through the plexiglass were barely legible during the night hours without improved lighting. The inspector found that - the postings were legible during night hours, although lighting in the area could have been improved. As a result of the inspector's findings, the Licensee agreed to install better lighting in the vicinity of the bulletin boards. From discussions with inspectors who have inspected GE facilities during the past several years, the NRC found no evidence that the Licensee made any attempt to monitor or observe personnel reading materials posted.

I i The Licensee's reduction of the number of locations within the plant where l i the documents or notices required by 10 CFR 19.11 were posted is not a l violation, since posting at the gate house fulfills the requirement to post the documents, notices, or forms such that an individual is permitted to observe them on the way to or from any particular licensed activity. (27) Petitioner believes that the inspector carclusion that the dumping of 1 uranium powder outside hoods is not a violatio'. is untenable. (Chap. 11, pp. 10-11)

Response

The Petitioner's use of the phrase " dumping uranium powder" misrepresents what actually occurs. The operation in question involves use of a spatula to S remove a small quantity of uranium powder from a sample container and to place the sample on ar, analytical balance for weighing. The weighing of uranium powder outside of hoods was prohibited by proce- ] dures at the time of the allegation and at the time of the inspection only in the Spectrographic Area of the Chemet Lab. As noted in Inspection Report 85-02, a Notice of Violation was issued for handling uranium powder outside the hood in the Spectrographic Area of the laboratory. The document referenced by the Petitioner was issued in 1973 and was superseded in 1978 by Nuclear Safety Release / Requirement 6.1.0. Therefore, the Petitioner was in error in stating that GE was " legally bouild" to comply with the obsolete document. Further, the inspector never concluded that weighing uranium i

                                                                                                                                                                ~

powder outside hoods was not a violation. The inspector did state that from interviews with 12 laboratory personnel he was unable to establish any association between weighing uranium powder and sinus problems. The question of the release of fumes into the laboratory and sinus problems was referred to OSHA. 4 U28 Petitioner contends that the inspector finding on airborne radioactivity having been minimal is based on a GE survey characterized by the inspector, himself, to be worthless and conflicting with the finding. (Chap 11. pp 13-16) j

Response

! Inspection Report C4-17 states, "At the request of the inspector and under the direct observation of the inspector, the Licensee performed a surface contamination survey in the recirculation system intake ducts prior to the high efficiency filters. The highest survey result was 300 dpm/100 cm2 , These results indicate that general airborne radioactivity levels in the laboratory have been minimal. The recirculation system has been in operation since the laboratory started up." According to Licensee representatives, the ductwork had never been decontaminated. The inspector also found no evidence to substantiate the allegation that an airborne hazard was created by cooling samples outside a hood. In addition, the inspector found that bioassay data indicated very little uptake of radioactivity by Chemet Lab personnel, in most cases not significantly greater 4

   - - - - _ . . - , - . - - - - - , .mm-..r.---...--                            .
                                                      ,.--..-.-,-..,...-,-,_y-,..----,_%.----,.,..,.--m.                           ,-_.-- - - - , . _ . - , - - - . - - . , - - - -

than the minimum detectable level for the instrument used for the analysis. In sum, contrary to Petitioner's observation, the inspection did not find the GE survey to be " worthless," nor did he even question its validity in Inspection Report 84-17. (29) Petitioner raises again her allegation regarding failure to place cooling racks under a hood, which was addressed by the NRC in Inspection Report 84-17. (Chap. II, p. 13)

Response

The Petitioner's original allegation, which was addressed in Inspection Report 84-17, was that an airborne radiation hazard was created when bubbly hot uranium material was removed from a microwave oven and allowed to cool in the open and not in a vented hood. Three of twelve Lab personnel inter-viewed indicated that the trays of samples were not cooled under a hood. Ten of the individuals stated that they had not noted any pro 5iems with fumes from cooling samples. It should be noted that Calibration and Operation Instruction (COI) 409 required that watch glasses be placed over the crucible while they were heated and cooled, thus reducing the possibility of radioactivity being released during the cooling process. During tours of the Chemet Lab, the inspector did not observe the cooling of samples outside the hood. The inspector could not substantiate the allegation that "an airborne hazard" was created by cooling samples outside a hood.

(30) Petitioner contends that Inspection Report 84-17 " condemned" (Chap 11. p. 14) GE's bioassay program as " inadequate and deficient."

Response

The Petitioner misinterpreted the cited inspection report. The discussion referenced in the inspection report pertained to a question of whether the Licensee performed whole body counts during the early days of the Peti-tiener's employment at the plant and the Licensee's explanation of why some The bioassay data had been omitted from the Petitioner's exposure records. inspector did not find the Licensee's bioassay program to be unacceptable. The The inspector did not identify noncompliance with NRC regulations. Petitioner's statement that the whole body counting system was found to be Inspection Report deficient in Inspection Report 84-04 was also incorrect. 84-04 simply stated that the procedure used to calibrate the whole body counter, although technically adequate, had not been formally approved by plant management. . With regard to the Petitioner's questions regarding the internal management report evaluation of the Semitrex UA-3 analyzer, these findings by the Licensee were the result of their early internal evaluation of the equipment. A review of Licensee's bioassay program and equipment in use, including the Semitrex analyzer, as documented in Ir:pection Report 85-05, showed the equipment had been operating adequately when used for bioassay analyses and was providing accurate results.

Q11PetitionerclaimsthatInspectionReport84-17excusedGEviolations on the basis that " general radiation levels in the lab have been minimal." (Chap. II, p. 14)

Response

In fact the cited report stated that a particular survey indicated "that general airborne radioactivity levels in the lab have been minimal" (empha-sis added). As noted in the report, the flow of air from the microwave oven area was toward the Chemet Lab recirculation ventilation system. If airborne radioactivity had evolved from the cooling of samples, it would either fall out on the floor along the path of the air flow or be taken into the recirculation system. Contamination surveys performed by the Licensee and reviewed by the inspector indicated that surface contamina-tion was not identified along the air flow path. Additionally, surveys in the recirculation system housing before the high efficiency filter indi-cated that there had been no build-up of significant amounts of uranium in the housing as the result of airborne radioactivity in the laboratory. Years of operation of the recirculation ventilation system without a build-up of contamination in the ducts is a valid method of assessing the extent of airborne radioactivity in the laboratory. The inspection report stated that the single air sampler may not be adequate to measure the concentra-tion to which individuals were exposed while working at some stations where loose powder was handled. The inspection report further stated that even if the Licensee could produce evidence of an evaluation and could prove that the single air sampler in the laboratory was representative of the concentrations to which individual workers were exposed, it would

not be relevant, since modifications of the Chemet Lab exhaust ventilation system could have altered the flow in the laboratory. The Peticioner argues that the findings noted in Inspection Report 84-04 contrast sharply with the results in Inspection Res.t 84-17. The fact that 2 the surface contamination levels ranged from 317 dpm/100cm to 5100 2 dpm/100cm is not unanticipated when one considers the various operations being performed in the Chemet Lab. Since the inspections were done at separate times it is not surprising that the results would be different. The Petitioner also tries to equate airborne survey results with surface contamination survey results, although the two surveys are not equivalent. (32) Petitioner believes that the inspector finding in Inspection Report 84-17 that GE had not violated safety rules by removing posted instructions concerning required monitoring of small items when removed from controlled areas cannot stand. (Chap. II. pp. 16-17)

Response

The Petitioner's contention that GE violated safety rules by not posting requirements concerning monitoring of paper, notebooks, and personal items removed from the laboratory is invalid. The Procedure (50P 0.3.4) referenced in the Petition as requiring tha maintenance of a " log for clearance of small items from the lab" was not in effect at the time the allegation was made. Discussions with Licensee representatives and reviews of Licensee records indicate that this 1973 procedure was replaced in 1978 with NSR/R 6.1.0. There was no regulatory requirement that the instructions be posted. 1

- Additionally, as stated in the Inspection Report 84-17, the inspector did not obcerve anyone removing items from the laboratory without monitoring them. i

      .(_3J 3    Petitioner contends that the inspector failed to make a proper inding concerning GE's "out of control" testing requirements.

(( hap 11, pp. 22-23)

Response

The Petition states that the number of "out-of-control" measurements was unacceptably high, in that 104 out of 1197 (or 9%) and 5 out of 32 (or 16%) exceeded the 0.05 control limit and one out of 1197 exceeded the 0.001 control limit. The Petitioner asks ". . .what happened to the obvious, substantive, violation of 70.51, 70.57, and 70.58. . . ?" Licensees are required to establish statistical control limits at the 0.05 and 0.001 level of significance and NRC inspects to assure that those requirements are met. The inspections documented in Inspection Reports 84-15 and 84-16 were conducted, respectively, by a specialist in nondestructive assay and a chemist. The scope of these inspections was to determine whether the Licensee had taken appropriate action when centrol limits were exceeded. One inspection revealed that the Licensee had taken all system related actions that were required but failed to make a notification; therefore, a Notice of Violation was issued in Inspection Report 84-16. As part of both inspections.

NRC evaluated the data subjectively at the time the reports were issued and concluded that 104 of 1197 and 5 of 32 measurements outside the 0.05 control limits and one of 1197 outside the 0.001 control limit were not of sufficient statistical significance to establish that the limits were unreasonable. For this reason, no other Notice of Violation was issued. The data from Inspection Report 84-15 could not be reanalyzed, because they represented a composite set of data from several instruments. However, the Licensee's original data were re-examined and re-analyzed again during an inspection documented in Inspection Report 85-17. This inspection confirmed that the licensee was accurately calculating control chart limits for the enrichment analyzers. During Inspection 85-17, control data for enrichment analyzers for the period February 1983 to October 1985 were analyzed. Eight cases were identified where the observed number of. measurements which fell outside the control limits differed from the number predicted by theory. In five of those cases, the licensee had established limits tighter than required, which resulted in better control than required by NRC. In the other three cases, the observed number of measurements outside the control limits differed from the theoretical value by only one measurement in two cases and by three measurements in the other case. Statistically, the hypothesis that the control chart limits are stated accurately is supported by the data. Based on the above, the Petitioner's contention is incorrect. (34) Petitioner objects to the fact that Inspection Report 84-15 finds that the password system is ' reasonably protected from unauthorized changes' and that Mrs. English's ' concerns' were therefore 'not substantiated.'" (Chap. II, p. 30)

Response

As reported in Inspection Reports 84-05, 84-15, and 85-06, several weaknesses in the Licensee's overall internal program for controlling and using password designated accessibility to computer information have been identified. Once apprised of these weaknesses, the Licensee took prompt and It should be noted, however, that the Licensee's effective corrective action. control of passwords for the identified computer equipment was and is solely No NRC regula-to protect company proprietary information and processes. tions require the Licensee to have specific protective measures, such as password control, to protect this type of information. Accordingly, no enforcement action was taken concerning the lack of password control. (35) Petitioner claims that knowledge of the Wieczorek report would have led the inspector to the same conclusions about enrichment analyzer calibration as reached by her. (Apr 11 ltr, pp. 8-11)

Response

As reported in Inspection Reports 82-18, 84-05, 84-15, and 84-16, during an NRC review of the Licensee's internal investigation (Wieczorek Report) reported in Inspection Report 85-12, the subject analyzer was properly calibrated following a detector change. The Petitioner has incorrectly characterized the Licensee's employees' interpretation of the procedure. The NRC has never reported or indicated in any way that only one " counting of the standard" was required to constitute

a properly calibrated and " ready to use" analyzer. The NRC interviewed the author of the procedure to positively remove any element of interpretation and then verified that the calibration in question was properly performed using the procedure-specified combinations of calibration standards and verification standards. The highest standard was analyzed for an aggregate total of six times before the certification of equipment function, stabilization, and the counting release of unknown samples, consistent with the intent of the author of the procedure. (36) The Petitioner contends that the inspectors obtained information about calibration / verification logs, as reported in Inspection Reports 84-05 and 84-16, solely from Licensee statements and without reviewing procedures or previous inspection reports that referenced a violation in similar related areas. (Apr 11 ltr. pp. 11-12)

Response

The inspectors interviewed Licensee personnel, reviewed procedure COI 411, and examined the referenced calibration / verification log for the period under review. The NRC staff admits that the varying nomenclature used in the inspection reports regarding log books may have confused the reader, but calibration / verification logs and equipment support shift logs are two different log book references. Regarding the calibration / verification log, the inspector interviewed Licensee personnel relative to maintenance of the log, examined the log book for the period referenced by the Petitioner, and reviewed procedure COI 411. The persons interviewed were the laboratory manager, two laboratory supervisors,

a licensing specialist the measurement control specialist, and three Lab technicians, all of whom were considered to be very knowledgeable regarding laboratory operations. As a result of these interviews, procedure reviews, and document reviews, the inspector concluded that the calibration / verification log was maintained as required. - The inspector's review of Procedure COI 411 determined that log maintenance was required for standard changes and amplifier setting changes but was not required for the routine recording of calibration / verification counting data. Therefore, the Licensee was found to be in compliance with the operating procedure. The fact that the Licensee did not record verification / calibration data during periods when production samples were not being run was not a violation. Equipment support shift logs, which are different from the calibration / e verification logs, are maintained by the Technical Equipment Support Unit for a variety of reasons, including trend analysis of equipment failure. These logs were reviewed by inspectors in an effort to obtain additional information relative to the Petitioner's concerns about improper removal of an out-of-service tag. Equipment support shift logs are not required to be maintained by Licensee's procedures or NRC regulations. The findings in Inspection Report 84-05 are not related to calibration and verification data recordings that qualify an analyzer for production use. Those results dealt with a different analytical technique having different procedural requirements.

                                                                                                                           )

i i W37 The Petitioner asserts that the Wieczorek Report substantiated the allegation that " calibration and verification were not completed before samples were run and material released during 8/20/82 and 6/22/83" and that this is in " irreconcilable conflict" with NRC inspection reports. (Apr 11 ltr, p. 13)

Response

Wieczorek and NRC inspectors determined that the Licensee's Procedure COI 411 was worded such that several interpretations were possible, but each took a different approach in reviewing this allegation Wieczorek made his own independent interpretation of the intent of the procedure, whereas NRC inspectors interviewed the author of the procedure and several technicians who used it to determine the Licensee s intended meaning. The Wieczorek interpretation and the Licensee's intended meaning were different. Either method of implementing this procedure would have been acceptable to the NRC. Since it was the Licensee's procedure, NRC used the Licensee's intended meaning and determined that no violation had occurred. (38) The petitioner believes that the "Hendry Report" should have led to other than "no violations" findings by inspectors regarding the following matters-- (a)) the microwave oven leak problem (p. 24);

Response

This concern of the Petitioner regarding the microwave oven pertains to the removal of a shield which could result in the leakage of microwaves out of the

oven during operation. This area is outside the purview of the NRC and was turned over to OSHA to followup. As noted in Inspection Report 85-02, dis-cussions with 12 laboratory employees failed to substantiate the Petitioner's allegation that fumes are given off during the processing of samples. In addition, observations by the inspector during the processing of samples failed to disclose any emission of fumes while samples were being heated. With regard to the violation of requirements of Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) CL-JHA-12, it should be noted that the JHA for routine analyses performed in the laboratory is not a procedure required by NRC regulations or license conditions. Therefore, failure to adhere to this document would not be a violation of NRC requirements. During a subsequent inspection, inspectors reviewed the Hendry Report and determined that even if they had seen it before the inspections, the results of those inspections would not have been different. (b) housekeeping of the lab (pp. 26, 28);

Response

The violation cited in Inspection Reports 84-15 and 85-02 pertained to a failure of the Licensee to clean up spills in the Chemet Lab immediately and did not address general housekeeping in the laboratory. The reference to housekeeping in the Fuel Manufacturing Area in Inspection Report 81-11 for the most part is irrelevant to the discussion of housekeeping in the Chemet

Lab. Only in a broad, laboratory-wide, general sense is housekeeping in the The fuel manufacturing area relevant to housekeeping in the Chemet Lab. discussion of " powder on the floor" in Inspection Report 82-10 was the result of a change-out of a high efficiency filter in the exhaust of a powder handling enclosure in the Fuel Manufacturing Area. This discussion also is not relevant to activities in the Chemet Lab. As stated previously the contamination above action levels found during the special survey reported in The Licensee Inspection Report 84-04 did not represent a significant hazard. took prompt action to reduce the levels below the action level. The Petitioner combined several unrelated events and concluded incorrectly that housekeeping in the Chemet Lab was a " substantive violation." {c} spills in the lab (p. 30); Respor,se See again paragraph 3b(17), pages 59-61. i {dl surface contamination (pp. 31-33);

Response

The Petitioner is correct when stating that swipes and smears can measure only loose surface contamination. However, the Petitioner is incorrect in the

87 - assessment of the significance of fixed contamination measurements in the Chemet Lab. Measurements performed by the inspector and the Licensee indicated that fixed contamination levels in the Chemet Lab are low. Additionally, fixed uranium contamination is not in itself a safety hazard, because the direct radiation levels are low. Fixed contamination will not result in personal contamination if brushed against and will not become an airborne radioactivity hazard in normal laboratory operations. The surveys performed frequently in the Chemet Lab provide adequate evaluation of surface contamination hazards in the Chemet Lab. The total amount of surface contamination present on a surface may be underestimated if only removable contamination surveys are performed. However, in the case of uranium, the amount of fixed contamination remaining after the removal of visible contamination is small and, as previously stated, does not constitute a radiological hazard. Therefore, in terms of radiological significance, the use of removable contamination surveys was reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the extent of radiological hazard. (e) installation of sufficient air samplers (pp. 33-34);

Response

l See paragraph 3c(5), page 102. t

                                                                ,-  --,,.en -
                                                                                    ---n

{_fl f radiation safety training (pp. 34-35).

Response

In Inspection Report 81-11, the inspector documented a discussion with the Licensee regarding an IE information notice about geotropism, which is the difference in response resulting from different orientations of the survey instrument during a survey. The Licensee indicated that special training on this topic would be given to radiation safety technicians in the event they needed to use instruments affected by geotropism. However, there is no reason to believe that geotropism had any bearing or the radiation safety technician's ability to detect contamination at the Petitioner's work station on March 5 1984. Observations by the inspector during a number of inspections indicated that radiation safety technicians did, in fact, know how to use radiation survey instruments. The Petitioner's statements that the general employee and radiation safety training were inadequate are not correct. The reference to employee safety training in Inspection Report 82-10 was a recommendation that the Licensee modify its training to improve the presentation. The training met the requirements of 10 CFR 19.12 in content.

The statement in Inspection Report 84-17 concerning survey techniques used by technicians did not imply that technician training was inadequate but that the training should be expanded to include familiarization with Chemet Lab operations so as to improve survey techniques in the Lab. (39) Petitioner alleges that contamination on the switch box and on the legs of her table were cleaned up at the command of supervision before Radiation Safety was called. (Apr 11 Itr, p. 35)

Response

The NRC was unable to verify the petitioner's statement that the switch box and legs of her table were cleaned before calling Radiation Safety and, therefore, was unable to substantiate the allegation. (40) Petitioner claims that the Hendry report provides some new evidence about frisker violations. (Apr 11 ltr, p. 37)

Response

See paragraph 3c(1)(a) pages 89-92 for a discussion of frisking.

c. Improper Enforcement Q1InregardtoInspectionReport84-04, Petitioner--

(a) believes that Severity Level V should have been Level I (regarding failure by GE to follow survey procedure when exiting controlled area). (Pet., p. 8)

        ,m             ----a           - - - - -m.,

                                     - 90

Response

It is a prudent, well-established industry practice for individuals to survey themselves for contamination when leaving potentially contaminated areas. The Licensee has incorporated this practice into plant procedures. Individuals frequenting the controlled area have been trained in the proper methods to comply with this requirement. Appropriate survey instruments have been placed at the exit points for performing such surveys. Notices that such surveys are required are posted conspicuously at exits from potentially contaminated areas. In addition, Licensee representatives periodically observe survey techniques and conduct unannounced spot-check surveys of individuals after they have performed self-monitoring and have left the Chemet Lab as well as other controlled areas. Disciplinary actions can be and have been taken by the Licensee against an individual who fails to survey or who surveys incorrectly. The above actions show that the Licensee was acting responsibly. Despite possible disciplinary actions, there may be occasions when an individual neglects to survey upon leaving an area. Without an indication that an individual knowingly failed to survey such circumstances are not considered willful acts on the part of the Licensee, but are considered violations of the Licensee's procedures. Consequently, a Notice of Violation for failure to follow procedures at the appropriate severity level would be issued if observed by an NRC inspector.

As noted in Inspection Report 84-04, a Notice of Violation (Severity Level V) was issued because of two individuals who failed to perform personal contamination monitoring in accordance with plant procedures. These individuals were visitors to the Chemet Lab, not regular laboratory employees. The Petitioner's statement is incorrect that the Licensee contended and the NRC accepted the contention that laxness and even violation of the self-monitoring procedure for the Chemet Lab would be excused "because of the lower probability of personnel being contaminated." A Licensee representative did state, as noted in the inspection report, that inadequate attention may have been given to the Chemet Lab because of the lower probability of personnel becoming contaminated. This statement was made in the context of a discussion of the actions taken by the Licensee to ensure that personnel leaving the fuel manufacturing area, where the potential for an individual becoming contaminated is significantly greater, properly surveyed themselves. The Licensee noted that while concentrating on the fuel manufacturing area it unintentionally may have overlooked a similar problem with personnel leaving the Chemet Lab. It should be noted that the violation was issued as a Severity Level V, which, according to the NRC Enforcement Policy, is reserved for matters that have minor safety significance. Contamination levels in the Chemet Lab were low and those individuals who failed to survey were found not to be contaminated. Observations by the inspector of many individuals leaving  ;

contamination controlled areas during the inspection showed no other examples of failure to survey. In 1984 approximately 1,000 spot-check surveys were performed plant-wide by the Licensee's Radiation Safety Group, including several spot-checks at the Chemet Lab exit. Only one individual was found who exceeded the contamination release limit for personnel. This individual came out of the fuel manufacturing area, not the Chemet Lab. This is indicative of the low potential for personnel contamination ,in the facility as a whole. During the review of this report, NRC regional management correctly concluded that failure to follow the personal survey procedure was an isolated incident of minor safety significance. Therefore, the violation was categorized appro-priately as a Severity Level V. (b) in regard to GE's failure to calibrate whole body counters, observes that the Director, IE-- (i) did not discuss the severity level of violations or deter-mine whether they were willful; (ii) did not determine whether violations were discovered and reported by GE or instead by the NRC, although crucial to the imposition and quantum of penalty: and, (iii) did not explain or attempt to rationalize his failure to find a violation (Pet . pp. 10-12).

Response

As was pointed out in the response discussed under paragraph 3b(2)(b) above (pages 33-35), no violations were found.

21 Petitioner makes the general comment that findings in inspections were illegally assigned the lowest categories of severity levels, i.e., never more than a IV or V. (Chap I, p. 2)

Response

It is true that all violations referenced by the Petitioner were Severity Level IV or V. All violations were properly categorized in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C,.or the Enforcement Policy in effect at the time of the violation. Q) Petitioner maintains that the aggregate of the violations cited should have resulted in assignment of a Severity Level I and civil penal-ties. More specifically, she asserts that the alleged " careless dis-regard violation," at a minimum, should have been a Level II violation. (Chap I, p. 16)

Response

The NRC has reviewed the violations noted in the inspection reports performed by Region II for the period 1981 through the first half of 1985 and has found that the region properly assigned the Severity Level to these violations, using the Enforcement Policy in effect at the time of the violation. With regard to those issues raised in the Petition for which the Petitioner felt the Licensee should have been cited for a violation, the region properly determined except as described herein that these issues were not violations of license conditions or other NRC requirements.

The NRC found that at the time the allegations were made the Licensee's radiation protection program was effective overall. The violations cited were indicatinns that the Licensee had areas where improvements were needed. The violations apparently were not the result of intentional or careless disregard of regulations on the part of the Licensee, but were a failure of the Licensee to adequately review and implement a completely effective radiation protection program in the Chemet Lab. Therefore, there was no " careless disregard" violation, as alleged by the Petitioner. Furthermore, the Petitioner misapplied a section of the Enforcement Policy in stating that elements of the radiation protection program constituted ". . .a system designed to prevent or mitigate serious safety events [from] being able to perform its intended function" (10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Suppl I). This particular section of the Enforcement Policy generally does not pertain to a radiation protection program. Radiation protection occurrences generally are categorized using Supplement IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The violations were assigned the appropriate severity level in accordance with the Enforcement Policy. It is noted that the Petitioner incorrectly assumed that an individual received a cumulative radiation exposure above regulatory limits. Even if the violations identified during each inspection had been aggregated, they would not have been sufficiently significant to justify a higher severity level.

(4) Petitioner makes reference to the alleged failure of GE to follow NRC advice on the air monitor, which in the Petitioner's view also should have led to an increased severity level. The Petitioner further noted that the air monitors are now installed at the wrong height and that the defects noted in Inspection Report 84-17 discredit all GE air intake contamination surveys. Also, deterioration of cleanliness, addressed in Inspection Report 81-11, should have led to a finding. (Chap II, pp. 23-26)

Response

In reviewing operations in the Chemet Lab during Inspection 84-13, the inspector observed only one sampler in the Wet Lab area. It appeared that this sampler was not located in such a manner as to provide representative air samples. The Licensee contended that there was documentation of an analysis that showed the location to be suitable and stated that they would retrieve the information from document storage. This issue was identified as an unresolved item pending review of the Licensees documentation as to the suitability of the sampling results. As noted previously, an unresolved item is one for which more information is needed to determine whether the item is acceptable or may involve violations or deviations. Until the issue is resolved, the licensee is not required by NRC regulations to take corrective actions. In a subsequent inspection l l (84-17), the inspector issued a Notice of Violation for improper sampler location, because the Licensee was unable to provide documentation showing the sampler location to be suitable. I l

The Petitioner's contention that the lack of air sampling discredits all elements of protection for Chemet Lab employees is without merit. It should be noted that the failure to provide suitable air sampling does not affect the quality of the results of other control and monitoring systems, such as removable contamination surveys, urinalysis results, or lung counts. With regard to the Petitioner's comments about cleanliness, the inspector's comment in Inspection Report 81-11 referred to housekeeping and cleanliness in the fuel manufacturing area, not in the Chemet Lab. No NRC requirements specifically address an acceptable level of housekeeping or cleanliness, so Notices of Violation were not issued in that regard. QS Petitioner holds that collective reports should have been forwarded by Region II to Headquarters, NRC for collective review and hence assign-ment of Severity Level I. (Chap 11, p. 31)

Response

10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (111) states: "In each case, the severity of a violation will be characterized at the level best suited to the significance of the particular violation. In some cases, violations may be evaluated in the aggregate and a single severity level assigned for a group of violations." Similarly, Appendix C(V)(B) states that ". . . civil penalties. . . are con-sidered for Severity Level III violations and rnay (emphasis added) be imposed for Severity Level IV violations that are similar to previous violations for which the Licensee did not take effective corrective action." There is no I

requirement that the severity level must be increased by considering violations collectively over several inspection reports. The NRC did, in the instances referenced, consider whether the violations as a group identified during an inspection indicated a trend or program breakdown for which escalated enforce-ment was appropriate. The caraclusion was and is that the violations were not of the level of safety significance equivalent to those items listed as examples of Severity Level I, II, or III in Supplements IV and VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The significance of the violations, even in their totality, did not justify referring the matter to Headquarters, and certainly did not justify a Severity Level I categorization. t

-o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [ Docket No. 70-1113] General Electric Company (Wilmington, North Carolina Facility) ISSU ANCE OF PARTIAL DIRECTOR'S DECISION PURSU ANT TO 10 CFR 2.206 Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Inspection and E nforcement, has issued a Partial Director's Decision pursuant to 10 C FR 2.206 concerning a Petition dated December 13, 1984, and supplements dated February 28, March 12, A pril 11, and June 20, 1985, filed by Mozart G. Ratner on behalf of Vera M. E n glis h . The Petitioner had requested, in. part, that the Commission take escalated enforcement actions against General Electric Company for alleged violations of N RC regulations in the conduct of activities at the General Electric fuel fabrication facility at Wilmington, North C arolina . Certain issues raised by the Petitioner are being deferred pending further investigation by the N RC or further determinations by the Secretary of Labor. The remaining issues do not raise substantive health and safety concerns warranting any action at this time. Consequently, the Director, Office of Inspection and E nforcement, has denied the Petitioner's requests concerning those issues. The reasons for this decision are ex plained in the " Partial Director's Decision" under 10 C FR 2.206 ( D D 11 ), which is available for public inspection in the Commission's Public Document Room,1717 H Street N.W., Washington , D.C .

s' A copy of the decision will be filed with the Secretary for Commission review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c). As provided in 10 CFR 2.206(c), the decision will become the-final action of the Commission twenty-five (25) days after issuance, unless the Commission on its own motion institutes review of the decision within that time. FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION s., ' . /yhe i [ James M. Tay}#, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 29 day of August , 1986 %~-- . - - - - - - - - -

                           ,n           -

   .     ~.                                                                   ~
 '                                                                          DOLEETED USHRC BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION   14- 08313 P2:46 CFFICE 3F SEL ibf*

Vera M. English Report Nos. 704]tt3782&tBFViCI and 70-1113/842W4 General Electric Company 70-1113/84-05 - 70-1113/84-06 70-1113/84-13 MOTION TO INSTITUTE PROCEEDING PURSUANT TO 10 CFR S 2.202, FOR IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES AND TO VACATE AND REVERSE INSPECTION REPORTS AND TO SCHEDULE HEARING THEREON Mozart G. Ratner and Arthur M. Schiller, as counsel for Vera M. English, hereby request, pursuant to 10 CFR S 2.206, that the Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, and/or the Director of Nuclear Material. Safety and Safeguards, and/or the Director of Emergency Preparedness and Materials Safety Programs, and/or the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, and/or the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, as may be appropriate, institute a proceeding pursuant to 10 CFR S 2.202, for imoosition of civil penalties against General Electric Company, Wilmington, North Carolina, upon violations discovered during the course of the Director's investigation but which were declared to be non-existent. Said. declarations are arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of the Director's discretion' inasmuch as they circumvent and flout the Commission's declared policy that a " licensee (should] not deliberately profit from violations of NRC requirements." 10' CFR Part 2, App. C.'I, 49 F.R. 8538 (March 8, 1984). EDO --- 000190 l

j.

    <?

This requtst relates to, and arises from five inspection reports.to which we were provided access: Report No. 70-1113/82-18 (September 27, 1982) Report No. 70-1113/84-04 (March 23, 1984) Report No. 70-1113/84-05 (May 9, 1984) Report No. 70-1113/84-08 (July 19, 1984) Report No. 70-1113/84-13 (November 15, 1984) As we have not been provided access to inspection reports covering investigations conducted prior to September 27, 1982, and ~no other ' reports have been issued in other pending investigations, this motion is limited solely, at this time, to the above-cited Reports. , , THE APPLICABLE LAW

  .                         I.

Appendix'C, II, A, " General Statement of Policy and , Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," as amended March 8, 1984, 49 F.R. 8587,31 seg., states in part: i "Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act authorizes NRC to impose civil penalties for knowing and conscious failures to provide certain safety information to the NRC." 10 CFR S 50.73, " Licensee event report system," provides:

                                             "(a) Reportable events. (1) The holder                                                               of an operating license for a nuclear power plant (licensee)'shall submit a Licensee Event Report (LER) for any event of the type described in this paragraph within 30 days after the discovery of the event.          Unless otherwise specified in this section, the licensee shall report an event regardless of the plant mode or power level, and regardless of the significance of the structure, system, or component that initiated the event.                                                                                  .

      ?t*         e e

(2) The lictusee shall report: (B) Any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical, Specifications; or (C) Any deviation from the plant's Technical - Specifications authorized pursuant to S 50.54(x) of this part. (ii) Any event or condition that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded, or that resulted in the nuclear power plant being: l (A) In an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromised plant safety; (C) In a condition not covered by the plant's operating and emergency procedures. , (v) Any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (C) Co'ntrol *** the release of radioactive material; .

    .                 Appendix C, Section III, fd., at 49 F.R. 3588, provides:

1 -

                                                                     "The severity level of a violation may be
                                                          , increased if the circumstances surrounding the matter involve careless disregard of requirements, deception or other indications of willfulness. The term " willfulness" as used here embraces a spectrum of violations ranging from delib~erate intent to violate or falsify to and including careless disregard for requirements. Willfulness does not include acts which do not rise to the level of careless disregard, e.g., inadvertent clerical                                                            ,

errors in a document submitted to the NRC.

                                                                                          ~

In determining the specific severity level of a violation involving wi11 fulness, consideration will be given to such factors as the position of the person involved in the violation (e.g., first-line I

 ~,           - - - ,     ----,,v     ,,e     - ,mvrr,,,-                -m--,-,-      - - - - , - , , , - - , , , , - - , , , , - - - - - - , , -   ---e-n,

7 supervisor or senior manager), the significance of any underlying violation, the intent of the violator (i.e., negligence not amounting to careless disregard, careless disregard, or deliberateness), and the economic advantage, if any, gained as a result of the violation. The relative weight given to each of these factors in arriving at the appropriate severity level will be dependent on the circumstances of the violation. The NRC expects licensees to provide full, complete, timely, and accurate information and reports. Accordingly, unless otherwise categorized in the Supplements, the severity level of a violation involving the failure to make a required report to the NRC will be based upon the significance of and the circumstances surrounding i the matter that should have been reported. A licensee will not normally be cited for a failure to report a condition or event unless the licensee was actually aware of the condition or event which it

.                                                           failed to report. However, the severity level of an untimely report, in contrast to no report, may.be

• reduced depending on the circumstances surrounding

         .                                                  the matter."

Section IV A, id, at 8588-8589, provides in pertinent part: i "NRC uses the notice of violation as the standard method for formalizing the existence of a ! violation. * * *

                                                                 "Because the NRC wants to encourage and support licensee initiative for self-identification and co'rrection of problems, NRC will not generally issue a notice of violation for a violation that meets all of the following tests:

(1) It was identified by the licensee; (2) It fits in Severity Level IV or V; (3) It was reported, if required; (4) It was or will.be corrected, including measures to prevent recurrence, within a reasonable time; and (5) It was not a violation that could reasonably b'e expected to have been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for a previous violation.

     ~
                                                                 " Licensees are not ordinarily cited for violations resulting from matters not within their control, such as equipment failures that were not 4

_4_ y, - , , .. - - . , . - -

         ,       t                                                  .

i

   .       .       e avoidable by reasonable licensee quality assurance measures or management controls. Generally,
                              -    however, licensees are held responsible for the acts of their employees. Accordingly, this policy should not 'be construed to excuse personnel errors."
     .                             Emphasis added.)                       ,
                                       " Civil         Penalty," id., at 8589, provides:

Section IV B, -

                                   " Civil penalties are designed to emphasize the need for lasting remedial action and to deter future
                                  ' violations.            ***
                                         " Civil penalties will normally be assessed for knowing and conscious violations of the reporting requirements of Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act, and for any willful violation of any Commission requirement including those at any severlhy level." ***
                                   "The deterrent effect of civil penalties is best served when the amnounts of such penalties take into                                                                    i account a licensee',s ' ability to pay. '"                                   (Emphasis                        -

added.) This subsection further provides:'~

                                         "NRC attaches great importance to comprehensive licensee programs for detection, correction, and reporting of problems that may constitute, or lead to, violation of regulatory requirements. This is
             .                     emphasized by giving credit for effective licensee audit programs when licensees find, correct, and

. report problems expeditiously and effectively. To encourage licensee self-identification and correction of violations and to avoid potential concealment of problems of safety significance, application of the adjustment factors set forth below may result in no civil penalty being assessed for violations which are identified, reported (if required), and ' effectively corrected by the licensee. (Emphasis added.) on the'other hand, ineffective licensee programs

                            -       for problem identification or correction are unacceptable. In cases involving willfulness, flagrant NRC-identified violations, repeated poor performance in an area of concern, or serious breakdown in management controls, NRC intends to apply its full enforcement authority where such action is warranted, including issuing appropriate 9
                                             --ww,---       -~,w-em   ,,o   ------p.- - - - ,,,-mw,----4   ---wep-w-,--,rer----,s,-,,-w y-           - --n

orders and assessing civil penalties for continuing violations on a per day basis, up to the statutory limit of $100,000 per violation, per day. In this regard, while management involvement, direct or indirect, in a violation may lead to an increase in the civil penalty, the lack of such involvement may not be used to mitigate a civil penalty. Allowance of mitigation could encourage lack of management _ involvement in licensed activities and a decrease in protection of the public health and safety. (Emphasis added.)

                                                                                "1. Prompt Identification and Reporting.

Reduction of up to 50% of the base civil penalty may i be given when a licensee identifies the violation

                                                     .               and promptly reports the violation to the NRC. In weighing this factor, consideration will be given

to, among other things, the length of time the violation existed prior to discovery, the opportunity available to discover the violation, the ease of discovery and the promptness and - ,

completeness of any required report. No consideration will be given to this factor if the licensee does not take'famediate action to correct the problem upon discovery. ,

                                                                                "2. Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence.

Recognizing that corrective action is always required to meet regulatory requirements, the promptness and extent to which the licensee takes corrective action, including actions.to prevent recurrence, may be considered in modifying the civil penalty to be assessed. Unusually prompt and i extensive corrective action may result in reducing the proposed civil penalty as much as 50% of the base value shown in Table 1. On the other hand, the civil penalty may be increased as much as 50% of the base value if initiation of corrective action is not prompt or if the corrective action is only minimally acceptable. In weighing this factor, consideration will be .given to, among other things, the timeliness of the corrective action, degree of licensee initiatives, and comprehensiveness of the corrective action -- such as whether the action is focused ( narrowly to the specific violation or broadly to the general area of concern." (Emphasis added.) i~ 6-

     -,,---_y.,           . . - - - - .- _, - -- .             %., ,. , , - - _     .,.7,   ,y,. ,,m.e-.n-,,.-,._,,       ,,- ,- -.- , - ,y,   -,---____,,----,.,,___.,---_.w..,-     ,,

It is self-evident from the quoted regul,ations read collectively, and particularly from Apppendix C, paragraph "A," that at least a Notice of Violation of which the licensee was

                                . aware must issue unless a Severity Level IV or V violation of which the licensee was aware, "was [ tim.ely) identified by the                                                                                                                                        .

licensee" before being called to the attention of the Commission by others, and "was reported (if required)." Any violation, even if only a severity level V, must, in addition be penalized civilly if the violation was " knowing and conscious." See B, " Civil Penalty." In none of the Reports cited below did the various inspectors even address the questions of (1) licensee tbnely - and voluntary identification of violations existing before identification to the NRC by others, (2) reportability of those violations. Each examiner seems to assume that regardless of the answer to these questions, mere correction, or promise of correction, after NRC identifies the unreported violation, wipes out the violation. This assumption, and its consequences -- exculpation of the licensee -- is in flagrant defiance of Appendix C, by which NRC is legally bound. , II. THE REPORTS

                                                    ~

1. REPORT NO. 70-1113/82-18 Report No. 70-1113/82-18, dated September 27, 1982, relates to an inspection of the General Electric facility for' the period of September 7-10, 1982. Under " Report Details,"

Item 2 refers to a previous unresolved item (82-07-01) carried

       , - - , - -     .,e,---    - , , -
                                             ,n,,,    - - , . - - - - , . - - . . - - - , , - - - - - - . - -              , - - - , - - - - , - - - - , - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . - - - - - - -

over to the present -- which recognizes that the licensee had failed, and still was under an obligation, "to revise FNMC plan to reflect the licensee's current practice of responding to out of control conditions;" and the report specifically pinpoints the 4.10 procedure which the NRC added on July 20, 1982 as a new License Condition. The amendment adding the 4.10 License condition was to be " effective immediately," and the licensee was directed to. incorporate the new condition into its Nuclear Material Control Plan "as soon as practicable." Yet, ove'r one and-one-half months later, when the above-referenced inspection took place, the licensee had still failed to revise its Fundamental Nuclear Material Control Plan (FMNC) to comply , with NRC directives. Bow, then, can the Report rationally conclude that "no violations or deviations were . disclosed."?

2. REPORT NO. 70-1113/84-04 Report No. 70-1113/84-04, dated March 23, 1984, finds that, of seven areas inspected, only one disclosed a violation

                     -   "(failure *to follow personnel survey procedure when exiting a controlled area)" -- and this violation was deemed to rise to only Severity Level V.             We believe that the inspector's subsidiary findings required the imposition of civil penalties and a determination that a palpably' wilful violation reached the magnitude of<a Severity Level I.                Moreover, we believe the l

report discloses other findings of violations / deviations and we therefore reques't explanation and justification for the l

1 -_ - -. . -.-. - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . -- _ _ - _ _ _ _ _

) Commission's failure to so determine and pursue appropriate sanctions. First, as to the inspector's findings (at paragraph 13), based on observations of personnel who failed to monitor themselves upon exiting the CHEMET Lab, we dispute that said violation should have been characterized as only a Severity Level,V violation. The circumstances under which one of the employees was " caught," i . e., that he returned to the Lab and monitored himself only "after noting the inspector's name tag," strongly suggests that the normal, every day practice is to disregard License Condition 9; and that the Company's own practices in policing its monitoring procedures were obviously

• either non-existent or at least sg , understood by the'amployees.

This conclusion is buttressed further by the inspector's acceptance of the licensee's estounding, and unintelligible, contention that, notwithstanding the fact that the CHEMET Lab was a controlled area housing radioactive material, laxness and even violation of the sel'f.-monitoring procedure would be

      ' '                                                                                           ~

excused "because of the lower probability of personnel being contaminated"! Such knowing laxness, at a minimum, required a severity I categorization since it reflects a careless disregard for radiation safety procedurgs. See 10 CFR Part 2, App. C, III, 49 F.R. 8588. Furthermore, the licensee committed identical violations in the past for, as found by the inspector, the licensee was very conscious of "orevious violations concerning 9-

   ,.         ,- --~, -

                 ~

personal contamination monitoring by personnel leaving cont' rolled manufacturing areas." (Emphasis added.) Jd. , B, 4 and 5, p. 8589. In the face of the foregoing deliberate evasions of this vital license condition, and the fact that the licensee was a repeat offender, it is arbitrary, capricious and irrational to classify these violations as the least serious Severity Level V. The " purpose of the NRC enforcement program is to * *

• protect * *
• employees' health and safety * *
• by [ inter alia) ensuring compliance with NRC regulations and license conditions; *** [d]eterring future violations; and * *
• to ensure that a licensee does not deliberately profit from , ,

violations of NRC requirements." 49 F.R. 8587. Indeed, as

                                       " civil penalties wil'1 normally be assessed for knowing and conscious violations of the reporting requirements * *

• and for any willful violation of any Commission requirement t

including those at any severity level," 49 F.R.'8589 (emphasis added), faildre to assess civil penalties was in clear violation of the enforcement programs which NRC must follow. Paragraph 5 a., of the " Report Details," finds , variances, as follows:

                                                                                                                          "During this review, the inspector noted that the procedure for calibrating the whole body counter has not been incorporated into the licensee's formal procedure system, nor has the procedure for calibrating high volume portable air samplers been formaliz,ed.                      The inspector also noted that controlling documents for the on-site calibration of                                                                                           !

instruments used to determine internal exposure, exposure rates in areas or radioactivity released r- ,- e-, ,, - - - --.m., . - . . - . - - , - , , , , _ _ _ _ _ . - . , - - , , - . . , _ , , , , , _ ~ ,,.w--, . . _ _ - . __..___,,-.,_.__n., ,_-r- ,.e,,,,,mm- ,- ,,.,_ _- , . , - - - , , , , -,

from the facility did not require that the i instruments be calibrated with sources traceable to National Standards; although, evidence was available (sic) which indicated traceable standards were being used. During the exit interview, the Manager,

                               ,           Regulatory Compliance committed to having the whole body counter, urinalysis instrumentation, counters for air samples, portable alpha survey instruments, personnel contamination monitors and high volume                                                                     -

portable air samplers calibrated in accordance with licensee-approved procedures and that when radioactive sources are used to perform calibrations, these sources will be traceable to National Standards." (Emphasis added.) In the face of the Director's express request for the licensee

,                         to confirm any disagreement with the inspector's characterization of its oral " commitment," and the admitted need to monitor compliance with the oral commitment "during a subsequent inspection," the inspector incredibly found "no-

• violations or deviations" as to this item, and treated it as 4

                          " closed."                                                                                          .

Furthermore, the Director did not discuss the severity level of the violations identified in the above-quoted portion of the Report, or determine whether said violations were

                          " wilful."       49 F.R. 8588, 8589.                                Additionally, the Director did not determine whether the violations "were identified" and
                          " reported" by "the licensee" or instead discovered by the Commission during the inspection,je9 F.R. 8589 (V. A.                                                             (1), (3) and B.1), although the Commission's Regulations establish that this fact is crucial to the imposition and quantum of a civil penalty.        Finally, the Director did not explain or attempt to'                                                                               ,

rationalize his failure to find a violation on the basis of the 11 -

          .       . . , -    - - . ~   _. y.-,-.-,.4 .-,------.,,-,.%----.--.-,-,y       _      ,,.-,-,,---,-wi..,,ww.y.     .v-w,--mv.e   y-,- -----+--em
                                                                                                                                                    .               ,3,,w-yn

   ,   g        ,
 ?

licensee's commitment to correct and improve its deficiencies in the future, with the declared policy and intent of the Commission "that sanctions should be designed to ensure that a licensee does not delierately profit from violations of NRC - requirements." 49 F.R. 8587. At least, in the absence of adequate and convincing explanation, the conclusion reached by the Examiner is illegal on its face. Paragraph 6 of the' Report, relating to Transportation of Radioactive Material, clearly discloses circumstances which are totally at odds with the inspector's " conclusion" that no deviations or violations were identified. To the contrary, the inspector first noted that the licensee's fuel shipment of. February 8, 1984 was " labeled with , RADIOACTIVE WHITE - I labels, rather than RADIOACTIVE YELLOW - II labels." This deviation from, and violation of Department of Transportation (DOT) labeling requirements (49 CFR 172.403 (b)).was explained away in the Report as possibly being the result.of different survey equipment used by the licensee vis a vis the receiving utility, differing techniques, reading differences, etc. The inspector further stated that during the subject inspection on February 21-24, 1984, he "reviW W calibration records * *

• observed a licensee representative perform a survey on a fuel shipping container awaiting shipment, reviewed records of previous fuel shipment made in 1984, and performed

     .            independent surveys."                       However, none of this post-shipment review nullifies the uncontested " FACT"-THAT SHIPMENT, BEARING
                                       --.--,.--,-,v.wv--,-,w                      ,w-.,,            - - , - - - - v,,,,v,-.,--

e WHITE I LABELS, MADE TWO WEEKS EARLIER WAS MEASURED BY THE RECEIVING UTILITY AS EMITTING RADIATION LEVELS FROM 1.0 mR/hr to 1.2'mR/hr, WHEN THE STANDARD AND REGULATIONS MANDATE THAT ANY PACKAGE MEASURING ABOVE 0.5 mR/hr MUST BE LABELED WITH RADIOACTIVE YELLOW II LABELS. Additionally, the inspector ! found that certain 1983 changes to DOT and NRC regulations had not yet been incorporated into the licensee's shipping procedures, and that the licensee had previously been advised by the NRC to revise its procedures accordingly. (84-04-02) In the light of the above clearly described defects, the report contradicts itself when it says that "no violations t r ~ deviations were identified." , Paragraph 12 of the Report, relating to Rad'iological Surveys, reflects various specified incidents of,diIrect violations: Review of contamination surveys disclosed that "on several occasions work areas in the CHEMET laboratory were found to be contaminated above the administrative limit"; "that at the inspector's request, a special survey was then conducted wh'ich revealed "three work areas * *

• which exceeded the licensee's administrative limit"; that even the samples received from the production area for analysis were "found to have external contamination on the containers"; and that the licensee's procedures and. notices regarding protective clothing requirements failed to require employees to wear protective -

gloves when handling readioactive material. In the face of these explicit findings, it is simply beyond belief that the

            ~                            -
't .

inspector concluded that "no violation or deviations were identified."

3. REPORT NO. 70-1113/84-05 Report No. 70-1113/84-05, dated May 9, 1984, refers to

                                                                                                                                                                                                        ~

an inspection conducted March 26-29, 1984, and purports to deal with specific complaints raised by a " concerned employee" to both the licensee and the NRC. That " concerned employee" is Mrs. Vera M. English, our client, and for the reasons stated above, as well as others, the disposition of her complaints in this report is illegal. Under " Report Details," item 2.a, paragraphs 3-5, the employee's complaints of licensee pract, ices which violate - - established safety and calibration procedures were dismissed by the inspectors as erroneous " misconception [s]" on her part. We find this explanation simply nonsense, since Mrs. English had actual; " hands-on" experience with the licensee's procedures, and was personally charged by the licensee with applying NRC regulations to those procedures and activities taking place l within the CHEMET Lab. Based on her personal observations, she documented her complaints of violation with specific references to dates,. times, incidents and the individuals involved. The defense that such employees -- who are the real experts -- do i not know what they are talking about is a typical refuge of guilty licensees caug,ht with their pants down. Any examiner

    -                           who accepts such an explanation is either a fool or a tool of G.E.

i 14 -

         . - - - , , , - . ,          . - , ,  ---_y ,,- . - , _ , _ _ . -ww w , r   y,-, , - , _ , , _.,w-w  --
                                                                                                                  -..m_,  ,.,__wmm,,   ___---,.    , - , _ - - , - . - _ , , , _ ,   y, - - ,    ,_,,_m,m--,.---_.-,

The inspector's conclusion that Mrs. English complaints were based on " misconception" simply does not square with the facts; and although a copy of her documented complaints were provided to the NRC prior to the" inspection, the inspectors obviously did not independently seek to verify Mrs. English's allegations through resort to licensee documents and/or witnesses identified in her submission. Instead, as stated by the inspectors, they sought to ascertain the truth "[t]hrough 4 inquiry of laboratory managers." We ar'e attaching hereto, as Exhibit A, a copy of Mrs. English's February 21, 1984, complaint filed with both the licensee and the NRC. If the examiner, as appears, based his " misconception" finding on.a

• resolution of credibility without,h,olding a hearing at which the licensee's officers could be cross examined by Mrs.

English's counsel, his finding that "no violations or l

l deviations [could be] identified" is flagrantly arbitrary, capricious and unlawful, being predicated on a denial of due process. '.. Indeed, in considering this Report, we request htat you specifically address the allegations of Mrs. English that, irrespective of what the inspectors were told by " laboratory managers" regarding what the calibration log was " intended" to record, the proper calibration procedures were not followed after " detector" change on several occasions; and that, as - established and recognized elsewhere in the report, the " logs" and other licensee records could be, and were altered to l

l.

• l reflect anything which the licensee wished, and which would verify to NRC inspectors any condition which the licensee deemed necessary or desirable to show. (See, e.g., licensee Memorandum to Test Operators, November 7, 1983, attached hereto as Exhibit B).

Under Item 2.b. (1) and (2) the report fin'ds violations, i.e., specific identification, as alleged by Mrs. English, that a technician's personal password for access to LMCS was indiscriminately used, not only by supervisors, but by other tech'nicians as well, to change data and falsify results. We specifically call to your attention the inspector's findings that such practices were known and condoned by laboratory . . 4 management; that beccuse of different shift operations, one technician "could innocently allow incorrect data to be transmitted"; and that under this breach of safeguard practice,

                     " traceability for deermining who actually corrected the data or why the changes were made" could not be undertaken or established.

It is significant and certainly relevant as to the issue l of " willfulness," that these violations / deviations were, over a period of. time, brought to the licensee's attention by our client, and were ignored. Indeed, what the inspectors refer to l . as the January 19, 1984, " laboratory policy memorandum," was l actually a memorandum. written by licensee in response to our

   -                 client, in which the licensee purported to set forth what the

! future procedures should be and, by self-serving assertions, l 16 -

                              .                      --n.---             ,,  ,---,,,,,..,_,---,-------,,.m,  .

l- , sought to create a " record" as to what past procedures had been. (Attached is January 19, 1984 Memorandum as Exhibit C. Cf., Memorandum of October 24, 1983 from Mr. Coke McLamb, a licensee supervisor, attached as

• Exhibit D.)~ However, we do

                                                                                             ~

not believe there.is any relevance or validity to the inspectors' findings that " software limitations" excuse indiscriminate use by technicians of each others' paswords; or that the absence of technician tracing and responsibility and alleged falsification of test and production reports should somehow be overlooked because of supervisory " verbal delegation [s]" to technicians to use the supervisor's transaction code and actually alter results. See notes and. - attachment of August 17, 1982, atta,ched hereto as Exhibit E. Failure of the inspector to " identify" these wil,ful violations is illegal.

4. REPORT NO. 70-1113/84-08 Report NO. 70-1113/84-08, dated July 19, 1984, refers to an inspection conducted dune 25-28, 1984. Under " Report Details," Item 3 deals with the licensee's role under an export license granted to Marubeni America Corporation, and i

i particularly as to its procedures in regard to shipping special nuclear material which was then scheduled for shipment July 25, t 1984. Paragraph 6 of this Item states:

                                      "The low enriched UO2 samples will be forwarded to the New Brunswick Laboratory under NRC Form 741 transfer series YLJ-CBJ dated July 13, 1984. The low enriched U02 samples will be analyzed for i

( . , 4 percent uranium and percent uranium-235 (84-08-01)." . Since the inspector / Director finding that "no vio1'ations or deviations were identified," was. admittadly made without actually performing the tests and in the absence of data - generated by the above-referred to analyses, the conclusion is worthless. If one doesn't look at the relevant facts, one can hardly expect to identify a violation or deviation. Moreover, we note that contrary'to procedures for handling other items which require follow-up review, this item was not even kept "open" or reserved for subsequent inspection, verification or evaluation. This report is simply illegal. . Item 4, paragraph 2 identifies violations of severfby category A2, occurring between April 1 and May 31, 1984, as follows: -

                                                       "An examination of analytical control chart data for the period April 1-May 31, 1984, indicated that both the alarm limits and out-of-control limits were not in agreement with with the Laboratory Measurement Control System (LMCS) computer limits. It appears from a review of the data that the control chart limits were being printed for a prior period rather than the current period.                     Although the computer limits are the correct limits and are the limits applied to the measurements of standards on a day to day basis for control purposes, the control chart limits should be in agreement with the LMCS computer
                                            ' limits. Also, among other reasons, the control chart data are used by the NRC inspectors to evaluate measurement performance.                         The matter is currently being addressed by the licensee.

(Emphasis added.) The only stated bas.is for the Director's conclusion that "no

     ~

violations or deviations were identified," is that the " matter 18 - _yw_.-,_,,m,,.,,,-,.,y-,_. ,,,---w,,,,,,--y, - __m,w..pyw - . ,_m,,,,.,~.v--e,--wwe,.m.,-,,-

{.. , W is currently being addressed by the licensee." . That explanation is illegal. Item 5, in its entirety , is reported as follows:

                                                               "As referenced in Report No. 70-1113/84-05, dated                                                                     _

May 9, 1984, the inspector followed up on the licensee's investigative efforts related to allegations received by the licensee regarding calibration / verification measurements in the chemical laboratory. A review of the licensee's

                            .                                 on-site investigative evaluation was as follows:

the report by Mr. B. J. Kaiser, Senior Engineer, General Electric, indicated that having reviewed the procedure followed in replacing failed detectors for the laboratory found no fault with the technique

                     ,                                         used in determining the minimum uranium-count limit for the high enrichment standard; and that the
                .                                              procedure followed by the laboratory for the burning-on-line of an enrichment analyzer, after the replacement of the detector, is and has been                                                                        ,
                                                              , adequate."                   (Emphasis added.)                                                                 -

We again refer you to Mrs..English's complaints (Exhibit A) filed with both the licensee and the NRC, specifically identifying incidents of violation addressed to the same subject covered by the above-quoted excerpt of the inspection report. While we are unaware of the contents of any alleged evaluation report performed or reported by Mr. B. J. Kaiser, we submit that a characterization by a representative of management that. it has pro.cedures for replacing failed

                                                            ~

detectors and for burning-on-line of analyzers is a far cry from, and unresponsive to, the allegations that such procedures were not followed! Indeed, the licensee itself admitted to Mrs. English that her complaints with respect to Analytical Practices and Procedures had " substance." See attached memorandum from licensee to Mrs., English dated May 21, 1984, l

   - - - , ~ - <       -,m-     - ,     ,  ,---an,-,---             n--,-.w. . . . - - - , -
                                                                                                        --.,----a-,-_,n---,,,---_------,-_,,,,-----nn-,.--w,-,~.,                    - - - - , , - , - - - , , , --

(- . 3 Exhibit F. We submit that this item, as with prior items which reflect,an absence of investigation of witnesses and licensee , l records as identified by Mrs. English's complaints -- but which apparently are based on unverified acceptance of licensee

                                                                                                                                                    ~

representations -- constitutes arbitrary, capricious and illegal agency action in refusing to find, much less even

                           " identify," violations and/or deviations.

5. REPORT NO. 70-1113/84-13 1

Report No. 70-1113/84-13, dated November 15, 1984, is the final report ~ which we have' received to date, and it covers an inspection conducted September 17-21, 1984. Under " Report Details," Item 4b. reflects the Inspectpr's observation that . there was only one (1) air sampler ,in the Chemet Lab and that "one air sampler in the lab may not be representptive of the concentrations [of airborne radioactivity) at all work stations in the Lab." At the same time, at Item 4d., the Inspector reported finding "that the flaps covering hand openings on several hoods needed repair or replacement (and that the] flow

throu,gh the hand openings was at a negative pressure into the hoods and through a filtered ventilation system." In the light of Mrs. English's previous allegations conce-ing safety hazards in the Chemet Lab due to malfunctioning hoods, confirmed by the .

inspector's current finding of defective hoods and inefficient ventilation equipment, and the absence of any finding of I- licensee identification or report to KRC, this Director's report is an admission of wilful deviation. The inspector's 20 -

   -,c..    - .,,-_y..         , . - -   .,-m,.--.m.,,w-,,--.,m.v-,_-~...--.,-,-----_,..--.,..-....------,,,.,,--w,o                          -

   .                   t l           .

D conclusior, of "no violations or deviations," and failure to impose senctions, is not only incomprehensible but patently illegal. Moreover, at Item 4c., the Inspector accepts and flatly states that while 10 CFR 20.402, 403 and 405 require the licensee to report, inter alia, " incidents," which clearly cover exposure and contaminations, "none of the above have occurred since the last inspection in February 1984." Yet, as the Inspector and Director well know, Mrs. English was transferred out of the Chemet Lab in March 1984 allegedly for failing to clean up a radioactive spill! And, as Mrs. English i was subsequently terminated by the licensee in July 1984,-well .

                                                                                  ~

before the instant inspection took, place, the Inspector,

although referring to 10 CFR 20.408 and the requ,irement for i reporting on terminations, nowhere identifies Mrs. English as having been the subject of his review of licensee termination reports.

While we do not know if any such termination report was filed, we do know that the Inspector's incorrect and unwarranted statement that no " incidents" took place since February, 1984 reflects tso significant facts: (1) that there is no basis for the Inspector to have concluded that "no violations or deviations". existed, for the alleged " spill" is

clearly an " incident" for which the licensee is responsible (49

                                          " licensees
                           .F.R. 8589:                are held responsible for the acts of i

their employees"); and (2) the Inspector's finding that no i

         ,----w,

o t

                                               " incident" occurred since February 1984 indicates that the NRC did not' receive any report from the licensee in connection with l

the " spill," and/or the alleged failure of Mrs. English to clean it up. (See, 10 CFR section 20.403 which requires notice . to the NRC within~24 hours and 10 CFR sections 20.405 and 50.73 requiring notice within 30 days.) In view of the fact that the NRC is well aware of Mrs.

                                                                                                                 .                                                                                                         \

English's allegations and role as a " whistle blower," and her discharge from employment by the licensee upon alleged grounds of failing to clean up a radioactive " spill," the licensee cannot claim ignorance of the " spill" or avoid the requirement for imposition of civil penaltie's for its " knowing and .

                                                                                                                                                                                            ~

conscious" failure to repart the Mincident" as required by 10 CFR Parts 20 and 50. And, as Mrs. English's allegations relate to repeated deviations from safety procedures which resulted in exposure of Mrs. English and other Chemet Lab employees to radiation haz,ards, we demand that all five reports discussed herein be withdrawn and reversed to find the existence of violations / deviations as identified herein and in the attached exhibits, and to issue a Notice of Violation and commence 4 0 i 6 . e

   - - - - - ,               ,w,-   ,     m..__    . - - - . - --
                                                                         ,-.--.,--,._.-,.,--,._._,,,,,,,,m-,y,                       ,_r e      ,--_.w     . _,,, , , . _ . , _ . . . - , ,            .,,,e..     - - , ,

appropriate enforcement action, including the assessment of civil penalties adequate to deter General Electric from further

        ,                    wilful violations.                                                                  ,

Respectfully submitted, - YY LN MozartV G. Ratner Suite 610 W ' 1900 M Street, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20036 (202) 223-9472) bA La. , Arthur M. Schiller Suite 1301)  % 1000 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20006 (202) 331-8508 . Counsel for Vera M. English December 13, 1984 b

                                                                                           *8 e                                                                                                                                                       4 l

\ I e l 23 - 9

        -     >>         . v   m. ,   ---en,     .r--,-,-   ,- -

nn--- ..,,-----r---,-,--n~~e---w,--.-m - - , - - , n-~.,.-- v,.-,-e-,---

\ . '. - February 24, 1984 To s' E. A. Lees. Ngr.. Quality Assurance General Electric _ Re: Allegations of Violations to Company Practices and Procedures

Dear Mr. Lees:

In reference to your February 15th letter to me con-cerning the above subject. I have enclosed a copy of my

                   " Allegations of Violations to Company Practices and Proce-duret in Chemet Laboratory."

In it. I refer to dated documents available in the Chemet Lab for your insnection. They confirm the violations I have listed. You will note that. over a period of a year.

• I have brought these violations to the attention of my supervisors"to no avail. -

In our December' 14th meeting 'you said you .would in-vestigate my verbal allegations of falsification of records. When I questioned you on the outcome of your investigation. , you stated that you found nothing. Had you personally

                  'followed up on these allegations, you would have found them to be valid. just as I stated them.

Since I am a concerned employee of Genera 1' Electric and, up to this point. have been unable to get.any recogni-tion or resolution of this problem. I hereby present to you l my allegations of violations in written form. . I sincerely hope that y.our investigation of these allegations will eventually insure that the Chemet lab's practices and procedures will be above repute which, in turn will enable the lab technicians to regain their sense of .-self es. teem. .

                                    .              Yours truly.

Oh.~ P. Engikk Vera P. English Y EXHIBIT A

r- > J l

                                                                                                                                                                                                                      ~

ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLATIONS TO COMPANY PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES IN CHEMET LABORATORY by Vera P. En611sh 1 February 21, 1984

                                                                                                                        *8 e

e l . I i e* l l 4 1

             , , - - - . -                  n -..m w ,,   ,m-   . . . _,-n-.--,,-,,,-n,       - , - - , , . , . _ , - , , - , , , . . -           ,,n,-- - . ,, , , - --_, , ----,,__n..         - - -n,-_,n,,,,,n...   - - , , ,,

I. Chemet Lab Isotonic Data Is Inaccurate.

                        ,                   A. Analyzers are not properly calibcated following                                                                                                  l
                                                     " detector" change j

1. On 8/20/82, analyzer 44 was not recalibrated after detector change.

a. Detector was changed on 8/19/82 at 1000. _

b. Six (6) calibrations were to be run starting at 1000 on 8/20/82, following a 24-hour burn-off.

c. According to the calibration / verification log onli four (4) calibrations were run the first at 1121 the second at 1558, the third at 2145. and the fourth at 2328 on

                                                 ,                        8/.20/82.

d. At 0700 on 8/21/82. I noticed that two (2) sets of samples had been released at 0243 i

L and 0524 on 8/21/82 and noted that the analyzer

                                                                       . was.not., tagged.out.....At that time.; Robert I                                                                        Hudson, a level 9 technician, verified the 1           -

tape and the enrichment, log and stated that the analyzer was not oualified for release' i of samples and suggested that I call this

;                                                                        situation to Mr. Winslow's attention by telephone.                   Mr. Winslow's response was " Tag out the analyzer" which was done at 0725 on 8/21/82.

i'

e. Coke McLamb. my supervisor, approached me soon afterwards and said "The analyzer is all right.

Mr. Winslow just didn't know what we were doing."

f. Within a short period of time. the tag was found i

to be removed from analyzer 54 which was a violation. I brought this to Carl Rochelle's

!                                                                        attention - a level 9 technician - and he

• verified my findings that calibrations had not been done for minimum U count and then he re-

                                                                        . tagged the analyzer at 1030 and not.ed on the tag "Needs new slope and intercept data.                                                          Not to be

used for production."

g. See " Table for SCP-401" (Station. Control Plan).

, please note date issued - 8/20/82 by R. Parnell -

J and date that new minimum U counts were estab-lished - 8/23/82 by Carl Rochelle. But, please 4

'                                                                        note on calibration / verification lor that on dates 8/21, 8/22. and 8/23 there wire no cali-brations run.                                                                                          ,

j -

    , ,          - . - , .      y - , , -     _m----   -,._c..,,,,.-#           ..,_,m___.w___,,.         ,.,re,.-__--,-_-.,__,-..-.r      __-..,,--v-.-...________

h. R. Parnell auproached me at apuroximately

 ,                                                                           1300 that same day in my area and said  Paul tells me you're worried about the standards.

I wouldn't worry if I were you. I would forget about the standards. 'It would do vou well to forret the standards!" and then abruptly left me. Shortly afterwards Robert Hudson told me that Pete Jahinski, a super- - visor, aporoached him and told him " Don't get mixed up in this - it would be better that you - stay out of it."

2. On 6/22/83, a new detector was installed in analyzer

                                                            #3 and no calibrations were run.

a. Detector was installed at 1300 on 6/22/83 and the 24-hour burn-off was started.

b. At end of the 24-hour period, no calibration standards were run.

c. Calibration standards were first run at 0125 on 6/24/83 After only two (2) calibration standards and one (1) verification standard,

• t . . ... samules_were run.and material released at -

064D on 6/24/83 . lL .. . B. Results from isotopics are accessible in computer and can be altered. . 1 902/903 transactions allow for changing of data. 1

2. All lab personnel were told in,round-table meetings that 902/903 transactions could be

, performed only by. supervisors. I i 3 902/903 transactiBns were carried out by certain

                                                          . technicians and .not by sunervisors only, as prescribed by procedure.

a. F,iany 902/903 transactions occurred on -

weekends when no supervisors were present. 1 (1.) For instance. on weekend of 1/15-16 1983. 902/903 transactions were used seven (7) times by #13675 and j #13677 (technicians' clock numbers).

4. Use of 902/903 transactions are condoned by supervisors.

a. Supervisors must give~cassword for these transrctions to be carried out.

l . 9 0 0

   --,,-,--r-------                            -------------n-----,-----,                 ,-,e-aw----,-.,-,-.    ,.,--,,----w,

f . .,'

b. Sutervisors randomly gave out and con-( 'doned use of these transactions admit-tedly on 12/30/83 at 2121.

5. Abuse of 902/903 transaction, when brought to the ettention of middle and upper management. was ignored.

a. In early January. 1983.I brought a week-end 902/903 transaction to the attention -

of my supervisor. Coke UcLamb who said *

                                                                 "You can't prove it." I told him there was a printer in the lab that carried this data to prove use of 902/903's. That afternoon. I checked this printer and found it had been turned off and paperwork, repre-senting two or three months' work, was re-                                                       S' moved. No action was ever taken by Coke to correct the misuse of the 902/903'c.-

b. On December 14. 1983. I met with Mr. Lees at 0800 and with Mr. Winslow at 0900 to present them with paperwork showing the possibility of misuse of passwords. Mr.

                                                                . Lees refused to look at.the panerwork and                                                     .

said he would investigate tMe problem.. Mr. Winslow looked at the canerwork and ' copied some of the data *from it. We dis-cussed my doubts about the indiscriminate use of the 902/903's. On 1/12/84. Mr. Winslow set up a meeting with me at 0200. We discussed changes in the use of the 902/ 903 transactions and casswords and, on 1/19/84. he sent me a letter stating the corrective action he was going to take per our 1/12/84 meeting. (See contents of letter and note that he just took a good run around Robin Hood's barn and then left the barn door wide opent) C. Supervisors input data under technician's password and create false data.

1. On 12/17/82 Paul Hann inputted data under my password and released false data.

a. Dana McAtee called to ask about pellet-handling procedure because he had wrong

• data from the lab.

b. Wrong da'ta carried my clock number, but I had not released any results into LMCS system that day!

  - - - ~ , , - - -
                               ,,,--,-,,,w,,,w,em,m,w_,y                ,y   --e.,e-m.mw   v.m-,,-,-.m,,,~mm,,,--o-e,         v,----  --w   a   _.aev.,,ae--n          -,--.--e-------

y"*.

 \

e ( c. Investication showed that Paul Mann had rel5ased this data using my password. 2..On 4/22/83. Paul Hann used Alberta Neil's pass-word and shut down the LNCS system by inputting false data.

a. In presence of Doris (GAD. inspector) and me.

Alberta Neil stated that Paul had out wrong - standards in LNCS using her password which resulted in shutting down the system. II. Tab Sunervision Is Aware Of and Condone Inaccurate Procedures. A. Supervisors were informed of data prob'. ems.

1. On 8/21/82, when analyzer #4 had just been tagged out by order of Mr. Winslow and in direct defiance of Mr. Winslow's order. Coke McLamb was condoning the ure'of the analyzer when he stated to me "The analyzer is all right. Mr. Winslow just doesn't know what we are doing." At that noint, I re-turned to the isotopic 3ab and, to my surprise. -

found .that -the : tag which Mr. Winslow had ordered ' to be put on analyzer #4 was now missing!- I was getting ready to re-calibrate the analyzer when Carl Rochelle appeared with a paper in his hand. I asked if he was planning to put in thu minimum U counts and he answered "Yes." At my reouest, he verified my findings that calibration had not

                                  'been done and thus minimum U counts could not be entered. I asked him that if he had 'put the mini-mum U counts in, what would he be doing? His answer was "I would be falsifying."                               I then asked "What are you goihg to do with those counts?"                               He j                                   answered "I'm going to take them back to Mr. Parnell."

l At that point, he re-tagged the analyzer. B. Measurement cont'rol engineer. R. Parnell, allowed wrong calibration data into 9825 software. -

1. On 8/23/82 Carl Rochelle put minimum U count data into 9825 software for analyzer #4 while log sheet revealed that analyzer was down and tagged

                                  .out for that date.    .

2. False minimum U count data was obtained from

• R. Parnell although no log record exists to support the fact that any calibrations had

       .-                          been run.

C. Supervisors condone use of non-standardized analyzers.

                                                               -w..---,,,,,,-,,-,v.,,,._,,--,,                         ..,,m,,c - . . - . ,

1. On.6/24/83. 9on Brown was utset because he ,

was aware of a new detector havinr been in- ~ stalled in analyzer *3 on 6/22/83 and asked Coke McLamb if the analyrer was 0. K.- Coke

                                                    , assured.him that "everything is fine - it'r all yours."

2. Ron Brown ran two (2) calibrations and one (1) verification followed by two (2) G218 samples at 0640. -

3. I was not informed that this analyzer had not been calibrated and proceeded to put samples on at 0999 and 1204. The verifica-tion standard failed at 1446. It was only the following day that I found that I had run and released samples on an unqualified analyzer

                         .            ,4. Calibration was done at 1546 and minimum                                                                                        '

U counts were calculated with only two (2) standards and one (1) verification standard with supervisor's knowledge and consent. Procedure called for six (6) or more cali- . bration standards to be run. . III.Suoervisors Have Tenored Safetv Fazards In Tab . A. Microwave oven leaked radiation through vent.

1. Lead shield within microwave was removed at Winslow's order to prevent clogging of vacuum duct.

a. On 4/27/82, while cleaning our micro-wave. I noticed no lead shield, screen over vent to duct within the microwave.

b. Microwaves were leaking into lab which affected Netler balance six (6) feet from oven and this was brought to Mr.

Parnell's attention who then reported

                                                               'this fact to Paul Hann on 5/4/82.
                                                                                ~

l , c.- Shield was replaced after it was called i t6 Paul's attention.

2. Door on microwave was shown to be leaking.

      *                                         ~a. Technicians comolained of uranyl nitrate fumes leaking into lab while microwave was in use in Anril, 1982.                                                                               .

I b. This was brought to Pete Janinski's attention

 . _ ___._. _ ____._                        _ . _ _.___,... _.. _.                _ _ , ~ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . . . _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . .                     . _ _ _ _

ru

                                                                                         -      ~

and he was shown crystallization at the

- bottom of door on two (2) occasions.

c. I checked microwave on 7/1/82 for safety inspection seal and found no seal of anproval.

d. On 7/2/82. I checked microwave for leaking door with a clothes monitor and found leaks. i

e. On 7/14/82, a professional inspected the .

microwave, found three (3) leaks. and suggested that the oven be tagged out. It was tagged out by supervisor.

f. Mr. Winslow immediately ordered the tag re-moved and the oven was out back into use with no repairs being made at that time.

B. Uranium-enriched powder was beine dumped in areas other than those located under hoods nrovided in the lab for that purpose (in ISO are'a and GAD area).

1. From June, 1o80 until Pay. 1982, U2 inplasticcentainersinareasoth}5powderwasdumped than under hoods with supervisors' consent. I repeatedly brought _this .

to- the attention of the supervisor and Rad Safety. I also mentioned safety hazard to Mr. Winslow., Sunervisors ignored the safety hazard prior to May.

                            '982.

C. Supervision ignored safety ha::ard of lever on high-temperature even.

1. Location of lever as safety hazard was brought to the ettention of the supervisors on several occa-sions following m.inor "bumpings" of heads on lever.

2. On April 23, 1983"at 1450. I suffered a concussion after having hit my head on the oven handle which projected out from the front of oven. -

3. Following my concussion, management padded the '

handle and labellyd it a safety hazard.

                   .-  4. Sup,ervisor. Paul Hann, told H1B operators to accept into the lab contaminated paperwork with samples
                           .from a " controlled " area, after the H18 operators complained to him about this hazard.

5. chewing gum. eating candy. not wearing safety shoes by some of *1ab personnel and not monitoring them-selves (including supervisors) takes place on a daily basis, seemingly overlooked or dgnored.

6. Uranyl liquid spills on counters, carts. etc..

often and this is ignored by supervisors.

 ,u .w . _                . 1_ ._. .
                                          ........_u-o

_ . . n. c , , . .

                                                                                                                                                                   > _ - . . . - _. w                                              n-ym

_ m.,_ _ _ _._ _ _E _. E IIEIHX3 , .

  "0$iMS"ii2ii w~ -:~~nD_K.%;a
                                         . - . :'". -'!'T                                                                                                                                                                                              j sn ly*.5::'?

W.

                                                                                               ~ m "= ---w
                                                                                                                                       . i. i' w w

• m t"C+>m=ct& h m 'llty

                                                                                                                                                             -                                                    2 w.s   ,- *!

id".

         ,' M                                      ;*f jsC 5i8{*2'                                                                                                                               ;r,:.* e M *;y&Ni;i.?
      ;. ~                                             .ii                                      ' ';.g:J:'-

vig:6.f:i+f W.p g:9'ig%s.;fi; "*- - :i"l*p;w"p*.,iV4g.**

h*we:i:D-iip'?+'2.j.J .W* ip't,'li}.'?

5. **

      ..                                                            , .. . . ?'            .                                                                        :                                     ?                             -        -

g,5. . - - -

                             .'hia.lict:mur u:'.5% . . .-                                                                                                                             .

6 .. O '

  .       0'                        !                                                                                                                            ~1                                               ..        gO W                         -

f 4 1 1  % u c- c> z e y

                                                                                                                                                                 -f ,?                                ,

3' J- - d. lg M J ,

a. . v , . ,a W

e: ,

                                                                                                                                                                    .J 3                         T           !

6. g s.. 4 I =

, . 3 0-y k .I-3gf H 1{~. I, i

            .c t
            '$ i li s

s t i

                                                            'g N

9 0

                                                                                      .j di i

B i ' $ 3 f C f;g .

                                                                                                                                                                                                                              'i I'

! @i ,h 4, s1

                                                             .                                             !a ;.          I T f~J U .-3 Y

• 3

             ;                                                  ' ,g. . . . .. .                     -                                                                                                              i i f_s-{                                     A. D w,                                                                                                                                .

J ~\

                                                           '**,k s

N> . .s k s s Y ,

                                                                                                                          .                      A                                      g**

U L --4. t ' g ~

 $l                                                                                                                                                                                                                           ;i-I 5.0 3 3 0                                               =

(, = a c p f. . , 416 - 304 1 '

 $I                                                             9                                                                                                      .      M            ,'.i 3                     3                                                                                                i   l                                                                                        3 i                                                                                                                                                                                                      2 i

i 1'8 .a Ji j r .; 4y,, u\s- 4 g

                                                                \-                    ,*

3

                                                                                                                 ., , ; t-t oq y                               5 5                                                       4                     %}fh                                                                                     h                                     n
                                   & A, 1
                                                                                                                                \                                                                                   &

h Q s 6 0 lt ' j -d'"

                                                                                         %                     y.,                                                                        ..t -L. o's -s e                 \                                                           3                /       s 3

o } 'h$- m

                                 ,l
                                          -                       1 A                            ,              e              ,
                                                                                 .1
                                                                                                                                                                                                           .$ aJ
    -            u                                                                                                                                                                                                                             .
                                                                                                                                                                               " ))
                                                                                                                                                                                               \
    ;      g     "g' a s              %                      *k                          j                      7t,                                                                                                                           f N

T *

          -Q$ m nOW e

a

                                                                                                          .u..                                      .t J                                                                                  a O-u;a o                                   N a   a.                                                                 .

L:

       ,__ m                         _a___.                                                                 --

im e: w .

e -

                      =S                                                           3               3     3                                                     "

E3 4 d E ( g ,,, 4 __. . . . _ ...

                             ,     t,  ___  -                                                              .                                                     l
                           "        '                                                                                                                            1
                          =
                .                 4                                                                                       .

i  ;

            -          -                                                                                 vi                                        -J,           I y ,.,.

r, yr wn - e ... < ~ x= c. f,

r. 1>

2 {- p " ~ W

                      =-

y a> ;i E m 9 n m $

                                                                   @ N a            $ m n

t 3 >9 cs e 3 s n o ,a o s o e v .a e ,3 4

                                                                                        .                                 e st                       e
                      +3 4'   '

o I. M-g s 5 - a

                      #8                                                                                                                             4*

38

   - o r.                                                                                                       s                                      =

bad + E E E== t~ s,t3 o W 3- M. g =e .. "! l as h up e. .

                                                                                                                       !                             g m y                          .
                        ~

8 4 g I

                                                                                                                                                      =
                                                                                                                  ')   o7 s'y                                                                                                                            ii-
                                                                                                                              )-h a

3, r i

                                                                                                                        =                            -
                                                                                                                  $x - % .
                                                                                                                 ' J; g

M n l-  : o '3 >.

                                                                                                                                 ?)

a n  : i u- a Do g w N n . . e 6 e m o d N O v

n s L

g 3- s G 6 n w  % a w a - f m rw aw s o a 'a'u a t w e

              -       5 5 -a 'R"           1-      a,    e     a    aa m ~           R     =a            b         ~
   ---                                                             n s                      s
                                                                                                                            . k> n!

g

    !!g".                         e n 3              3s           4             Qn E                  ur9                  " "

n: a s P- Q 3 a

    >                 e .,,                     n            ce
                                  <%                  ec                 n   iQ                  m                e         gME 3..gsa            3          '> >q % 4                 ':f - 4    w w,      u % u 4                          %          m ;: 5 O      Q           9 O          P     ct. 9                   't vs w @e u'~r 4 6        %"5 4%            e                                    *9
                                  'r-                                                                            -                  -           -

i e i ,

                                                                                            .                        -                                          3 m:

w

. +.

g

                                                                                                                        .y         O.          o.      <.r.
                                                                                                                                                                    'y              ?

n

.r.s ,y ~' '::a. m# s ~

s <> .

      .i s                                             n                                                                                                                                                             ~

6 El.e u 3 S. & M9 a Rm- H ~n c< - e e6;t n- g g

                            ,a N                                        -

g.g l S an

        ,o                    j                                        s.         1         Tr         *g 4. <,, 'a., 'ec 4,
                                                     $                     D
                                                                                                            '+                      k                     N
      -=                      .g                     ~
                                                                           ,>y.. o.             m, 4                    ns %%                 %           %                                                                -
                                           ==                                                                                                                                                                       .a                                 I
            ~

[ t

                                                                     '         '       O        N           d          M N yy                 gq W                   m%                                  .

( g ; GEo8 unne l

                              +i h3 ho w                a       j               $'o ,                 O          #

w0

                                                                                                                                                                                                                     -       - c
                                                                                                                                                                                                                             " ^              il. M  .

l

                 +t +e +e                  g=g
                                           "                           y.       i' 0-
                                                                                                .g 4           -

as V a tri = .%- p., o 880% o c- "- & r' -

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            .41 CSCy                                                                                                                                                                                                                               -

n e %l' g a. -s ,

                                                                                                               .          q          L          y         a          a   .                                                                    %-
                .c 7S
                    .e ,i md               =3 s                                            k       ,3 s

6

                                                                                                               -         %          .do        e.
                                                                                                                                                          'd
                                                                                                                                                            .7 4

r . -

I as ea : o . - - - - . - o dyj d U d M N d B 4 7 e%; w, M -vvN g I 6 a. c.

                                           +$m 1F '1 6                                  '3 W     ,3

> . 'O

                                                                                                                                             86 q         y it)
                                                                                                                                                                     %

• 4 gef 't. .jtu l g,M1 *$

a- 3 0- O

• q%

                                                                            'l i*s a

o *>. 4 m od e 0".' J y8 , q e n

                                                =                         i n

i n d g1 7 D. W ,"** f% %w c > . N

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              =
              $n

a. m o H -ly.. N"

             $ e.I                        +f                      o         3       h                      4            -           O          O                    o                                                                        "i

9, N ga (a o 40  % n  ? 3 Y c.., >

d -

                                          <S                       -
                                                                           "       d          9'
                                                                                                                        $ C o. e-                                    % J g%        '#
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                $'          i
            .,N,,,3.

m=

              ,   3
                                .a        9              g C1 tv
                                                                          'T); %
                                                                                               *O Nk        O.'

O *O p O'

yQ <

g . a

                                                                                                                                  .T m di u                 4.     -
                                                  - L.                         '

01 "1

• m j ."

2 " " ' " " " ' ~ -

                           <:f                                                 !
                                           ~.

e nN a o. q .s

                                      '~ o u                  M                                                                                         4 cal a           ,                                                                              M            ca:        o'          N                               D3                                          N
              -                           ab                                          ol q                                                              '4                                                     m                            of o
                                                                                                            $j g       S                        .
                                                              ,Q)r      %                                   9                                                                                                                               o q                                                                                                                           9 e                                                                                ,oj to                                        9                    9#         %                                           0
   ]                                         ? [-- -S, 9 -i                                                                      ] '1                                                                                                       E

. 6 . - _ _ - . i f t T. 4 J o  : o.

1 u , .

a

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       .e u I

i .

1 l MC J " N' I

hl s k  % I

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       -    "l L.

J ". .3! A N n $ll s% o h a i 2 w e (5 4U=l i: y. $ $ g& 4, . ,: Mm w, 3 > y a n w n N e l g o s E-m; . si n w 6 n n n- s n ni 3 , ' um o.I 52 ~ " " * *

• m e e o l

e u k, ! - nf

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           .e    ,

oc

                       -   %           g                                                                                                                       .

4 2-

-- - 8 . . , l e . i I

                 $ >g s$                             ,
                                                                         -                                                          l                      '

ua .

a i i l

                                                           %'          :.ci ' .,
                                                                                                           T                   $                   t           (         *O'            ,
                                  , ,ius
                                                                                             *~.

o

                                                                                                         .s, e
                                                                                                                     .:t l s               -> :.                 c.,
                                                                                                                                                                                    $.                           u u 5-7i                  6
                                                            'Si         or         #-       ".,!
                                                                                                        .as           <ai        o        '::o g ' o' f

o 8 .. u - 9 :: < . _.,.. - .N. _ . . T:. . T4 y N - tr. 'o @ l . y C. :, ' '. .

\. .* .

     ..~..

n .u. ;. :. . , GENERAL h ELECTRIC  :

       ,,n  cou . 8*292-5461           >

oast. January 19, 1984 t o"t 5- C.G. McLamb, H-92 L.A. Sheely, K-10 espi. WILMIN,GTON MANUFACTURING DEPARTMENT E.A. Lees, J-02 acontas. M/C H-92 szestet. ACTION PLANNED PER OUR 01/12/84 MEETING

                                                                                                       ~

1 TO: Vera M. English M/C H-92 As indicated to you in our meeting of 01/12/84, actions have/will be taken in the following areas. e Flexibility for you to change your password has been limited due to th,e required interactions of two computers, LMCS and HP9887, both of which require

              ,                  exact password matching. Specifically, J. Garris, the only Lab LMCS authorized password accessor, will.

ebe set up by- 01/25/84 ito also be the only authorized

                     .           HP9887 password accessor.         At any time you are scheduled off for more .than 48 hours, your in-process work on the HP9887 should be cleared such that you                      e may contact John to effect a password. change for you.

Based on your 4-shif t rotation, you should be able to change your password upon reporting to either the 3:00 - 11:00 shift or the 7:00 - 3:00 shift.

            .                e   LMCS 902/903 transaction password control, when initially set up, involved the ability to change values for standards results and, consequently, access was restricted to supervisor passwords only.
     '                           Sometime ago, these transactions were modified to eliminate access to changing standards results. 'Use of the current .902/903 transaction by qualified lab personnel is app.ropriate for routine correction for                 -

input errors. However, if intentional falsification of results o_qElirJ.e_a . tra @ Ri.ty in _w ho/ wnyvnanpEs were m d y o_u_ld not be available. Therefore, trans-actions 902/903 will not be made~available to others until they are modified to record and print out_9n eay enauweri-casu.tueportjo document tlie person , i reason and date of the changes. In th~e interim, al1 l s'upervisory passworcs will be' changed on a continuing i basis to climinate indiscrete use by others. , gw... ., n.m . -. up EXHIBIT C

7

             '      .Y u' :                                               .                                                             ..

i ' I Vera M. English January 19, 1984 -page 2- l l e When the HP9887 computer was implemented in November I 1962, the pay number of the operator performing the sample solution weighing was used as the pay number - to be reported on the LMCS results report. Since the i possibility does exist that tha ch47* aparatnr who ~

                                                                                                                                                                                                                  }

Eransacts the data on the HP9887 to LMcs may allow incorrect data to be transmitted, the LMCS results i report will then show this incorrect results and the pa_y number of the non-transmittina coerator. Since it is not possible to enter one pay number which will represent the performance of the total steps in completing a sample, I have decided to change the pay number reported to LMCS to be the pay number of the

                                                              , operator releasing the results.                                                                 This change was implemented effective 01/17/84.                                                                 '

With respect to samples which you have i_dentifi-A ^= *ka rerun log as requiring r_erun_and subseque,ng y being deleted #*"' C,, f by enocoe_r__Qpeu,1;gr , from the ~ Lab' vie @lnt ,,I am. ~confidenY j Ehat the deletions are _ being properly handled. Per procedure  ; a sample outside the expecteo ran'ge is to be rerun if C&R ~ personnel indicate it is from a source which was expected to tmeet the range. Your Csn contact advises to rerun tha sample land a submanne* ND enntact advises not to rernn. The _

                                   ' problem lies" _with differing C& R _decisinn? . From a qu3 ity        _
                                                                                                                                                                                ~

viewpoint, samples _ outs 1de tne _ expected range which are not  ! r geru .wil1 An * - he r.e.laasah_,%f.EJt. Frpm a _ Lab viewpoin_t ,; we - 1Bhould not. expend _ the re.ttst JabgI,,,tg.AgI.pngAes riot reguiring reruns. As an overview of the total isotopi_c m'easurement/ quality release system no specific problems are a'pparent d ue ,,,.;.p t AAmples not being rertm whi ch _nhould have be_en ' l'e r u.1.. l

                                  .]f 4h lOL
!                                  T.P. Winslow, Manager Chemet Iaboratories, M/C H-92                                                                                            ,
       .                           TPW/dyc                                                 -                                                                                           '

1

                                                                                                                   .      . .. . s *% ,

i na .-l i ~ 1 1.** . 'l ..h h

                                                                                                   ' * *.ici ~.*

• I en-..,- - - - ,- , , - . - - - , , . , - . . -

_.. _ - _ -,.,.-.-. , n -. .,.,,_-,m ._.n.a-_,.-,._.n-..e.,,,n,- , _ - - - ,

              ,..e                                             ...
            *O.                                                                                                                                      -

v

      . o          .laeaf -               -                 .                                                                           --
                                                                                                                                                                                     .- m -
                                                                                                                                                                                   .o.                       o - M- D                                                                        .
                                                                                                                                            . .                                   , cc.              :,~.s. L..:g/:

EG.. - -

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         .sn.,- :.,

t/

       "                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                ~ '
                              $< a. n E) C n . } (il.r ?~L_A_ a. .:.,7 . ._                                                         .
                                                                                                                                         . C#
          .$'d.
                                                                           ...en-a < n..l.. 0 -s.: A                                                                                      ? 4 6 .. .a a .. . : . .                                                                       .

u kV/.A.-d .~fj .. . mO

          ..                         :                                                                      ...a                                                                         . . ,                                    s               ..c              -

G.. .d.

         . .. ..aa(/..              ..

s.j .. m... .. awa a.. . .

                                                                                                                                                                                                                    < n i*                                     .                     .. .
   .    . . .,. i      ' u.-          !             . a.a.en ..                                - .. .$. ..u.La... Jt..                                                                                                              . . . . . . .              . .             ,.
             ... ..f..                                 / ...
                                                                                    ...,. /               ...
                                                                                                                   /

g/

                                                                                                                                        ...a.+....                           ..' s -s..--c..,/                . . .
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            ./
                                                                                                                                                                                                                           . . . . . .... . m.

h .. ...M.. .W. .e.c..? ..... I .

                                                                                                   ,d.. .              n $h . . oO                                                               ... .. ... . /.                       .hS_. .. . ..
            .         a.                       e.:A..a.c                           ... m.-e             .. 2d?                       .h.'c.',<. ... .,:.. de...                                                                    . . . . . . . .

.v -

                                                                                            ~-
                                                                                                                                                                                                         .                     p
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     //

p. *'.. . . . . . . . -, .. v .-

                                                                                                                                                                                       -..a- ,.....a.a                             .,.

w.. e+.. - r.,.. . , V . .. . . . . . . .-. .

                                                                                     . g*1 a . ...
                                                                                                                                    .. u . ..n..

e. A ..s. ' ..'

                                                                                   .                                                                                                                                                            . ~ d't .                              .
                                                                       .s-u.a.,

s.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  >v               . . . . . .
                   ..          . . . . . ,                   .          .d..          -.........s..r..,
                                                                                                                                                                   ,/.7..L..

A ,f. ..W.......s............

                                                                                                                                                                                                      / .- f &.                                                  .
                                                                                                                   ~
                      .. ... ~. ..g m.'_..q. .n. .. . e.u.
                 ....u...
                                                                                                                         .. . ..~.. m.da-
                                                                                                                                                          ...._....a.J.. ... '-'-f.           - .

J . . ... . . . . .

                                    .w p.                        .
                                                                          ... .. p.A                                         .......                 . . . . . .                   . . .             . .          ..

O e g

       ..     ...................-...p........                                             .        . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                          . . . . . , . . . . . . .                                                . .                                .

s

              .-.         . . . .           . . . . . . - . . . . .                                    ..         m.....   .                            . . . .                 . . . . . . .           . . . . . . . . . . .                     ...s                   .
                                                                                            .                                                                                                                                      .l
                                                                                      ...y.............                                                                                                      .

1

  .....e              . .. . . . . . . . .                          . . . . . . . . . . . .            .           ...          .                                g.                   . . .                .         ...&     ..

4 . e e iJiii,,7, ,ttsuy - - -- - worema--- -- EXHIBIT D

n

                                                                                                  &, j 1, j f D-
                ,...r'[.                           --         .

(' (.6 w ?n A-. L' -M(/ . A% wM w +/.c.- a n t.- e V.<-<-w .i3

                                         !                                                                   -e< <- ~                            , ).stD ' d .
                              . 4 7 w //u. ~ k y - ~[I                             .
               .                    m                   4%.#                                A-<             b wa~ HL. m&

>. M -+- / -~p d' _.

                              . X P' 7 & $ A                                      - Vt / /w / a q .,-f y - 4
                                 <-s.-s        s c./w._..                  ., e.. a.~.      .   -< .s us,.b m- m&

f. ..

                                        ~ )Y.f 5 H                        w          & o s. y ~r p c*1-7 W                          ..

u./- w ,' = . , y g

                      ._ 9(,p

, .._ . . . . / .. . . . .. ... ___. . - _ . . . .: W /' d CM  % t.,

                                                                                                                                                       /%._                                              ..           .

>. _ . _...4 M c-<w M- [%,

h. b .._... ..._.___.

A. . . . .s . Y.d m <

                                                                                                                           %. .                         i.

> . . _ . ... _ . , ~ , -

                                                                                                           .                                       ..c

_ _ A __ . . . _ _ __

                         . ....k.l.,r$  .             .         /.dVff*..ts.

M ;.=4 ".__ 5._ -..... - tw/ Q'2 5-~J Md. 09 / 7, / 7 Y2- y W /cl.1.' N _-. ... .-

                                                                                                                                                       .                            EXHIBIT E

        ,,,,e..     -

l' s CHEMET LABORATORIES SAMPLE REPORT

                                                                                   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * :r .t r * * .t * * * * >

• MAIL TO: KB7 CR

                               .                                                   ***********************v*t***zs                                         '

PAGE: 1 SAMPLE 4 : 303083 NO. OF TESTS *, , DATE: 17-AUG-82

                              ========

TIME: 22:35 DATE SAMPLED  : 16-AUG-82 SAMPLER'S PAY t: 23875 TIME SAMPLED  : 04 41 REG. COMPONENT : 987 AREA  : PPU DOCUMENT NO.  : PROD 10.50 MATERIAL CLASS : 1 UO2 l CONTAINER / LOT 4: 3305RM0554 SOURCE  : SLUGGER l ANLS METHOD CODE EX NAME RESULT UNITS TECH COMPLETED

                 ==== == ================ ============ ==========                                    =====         ==_======                ===-:_

60 00 PROD IS0 TOPICS 3.,4.43,  % U-235 16488 17-AUG-82 22:2E 205 00 0/U in U g .443) O/U RATIO 16488 17-AUG-82 22:25 N , b r.C -h' 9.. e % -

                                                                                                         's..A sea w L wy
                                                                       .m )

7

                                                            *\ l'j            .}~~

{ &

                                                                     &L.ble-:(i.#*p-/

Q &<>^ Y)%5 W. T b .w x.1: W kd ,4 tG w . C% b an.lL% com pute. - , YY\q O.as.8

• Jb VQt

n ** . . GEY ER AL h ELECTRIC STRICTLY PRIVATE 8*292-5747 '" May 21, 1984 " " "

• WILMINGTON MANUFACTURING DEPARTMENT M/C J-02 ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLATIONS TO COMPANY PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES

Reference:

Your letter of February 24, 1984,.same subject 1 1 Vera P. English I received your referenced correspondence and have had it reviewed

            .in deta.11 by two.different independent review teams. The first review, led by Mr. F. J. Wieczorek, Consulting Engineer, Analytical and Test Methods, investigated those allegations which referred to violations to Company Practices and Procedures relative                        to Laboratory analytical equipment and peripheral computer based information systems,. A. second . review team, headed by W. J. Hendry, '

Manager, Regulatory Compliance investigated alleged violations of GE WMD Safety Practices and Procedures. This team was composed of experts in radiological safety, indust' rial safety, health physics _ and industrial hygiene. 'You participated in both o( these reviews by interviews with the team leaders. The results of these reviews have shown that in the area of violations to Analytical Practices and Procedures there appears to be some substance to your allegations. With respect to your alleged violations to safety Practices and Procedures, none were observed. I have reviewed these reports and have determined that they are complete and accurate. I, therefore, conclude that_the problems that you have brought up were due largely to miscommunications and misinterpretations of some procedures among Laboratory personnel. Consequently, I have recommended the development of a program to improve communications among persons working in the Chemet Laboratories through either additional training or improved written procedures, or a combination of both. This $ction closes my' investigation into the alleged violations included in your letter and documentation as referenced above. p

  .                     gW                         -

E. . Lees, Manager Quality Assurance ' EAL:dh . EXHIBIT F

            - _ _ , _ _ _ - - - - .        _ _ . _ . . --     ... _ _ , . .._-._._m._   - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _                                  - _

7 f^ I i

       .I

i

                                      ~

t i THIS DOCUMENT MAY CONTAIN . 10 CFR 2.790 INFORMATION i .s, t l i t c 9 1 'l t t

    ?

I 1 i - i i t

    +

e e I i t il . _ _ _ - . . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ .

 ..   :m_.;w          -

_._  : u --- _;;;z -  ; r - 4 . . REF: EDO 190 Action: Taylor, IE l

Cys: GCunninoham, ELD i' Davis, NMSS

. Denton, NRR ! BEFORE THE Grace, RII 4 . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ? Vera M. English NRC Inspection Reports Nos. j and 70-1113/84-17 ! General Electric Company 70-1113/84-18 _, SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION UNDER 10 CFR 5 2.206 FOR WITHDRAWAL ! OF REPORTS 84-17 and 84-18, ISSUED JANUARY 18, 1985; i ISSUANCE OF NEW REPORTS CORRECTLY DOCUMENTING AND FINDING J - ALLEGED VIOLATIONS AT THE WILMINGTON FACILITY IDENTIFIED j HEREIN; ISSUANCE OF NOTICE OF VIOLATION ON ALL SUBSTANTIATED j ALLEGATIONS, ASSIGNMENT OF APPROPRIATE SEVERITY LEVELS TO EACH , j FOUND VIOLATION, AND COMMENCEMENT BY NRC OF APPROPRIATE l l ENFORCEMENT ACTION, INCLUDING THE ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL PENALTIES 8 i CHAPTER I l This petition supplements our petition of December 13, j 1984, incorporated herein by reference, as contemplated therein, p. 2, by discussing reports thus far issued subsequent , to the filing thereof. The new reports were received by l counsel on February 11, 1985. See letter of Deputy Director James M. Taylor to Ratner, dated January 10, 1985 with { enclosures. As of this writing, we have not yet received Mr. - l . i Ed Clay's report, based on his investigation of December 3-6, l i 1984, and his subsequent inspections, nor have we received any 1 [ report of 01 investigations of Mrs. English's allegations which are within the " area of its expertise." (App. 1, infra).M j j1 Reports 84-15 and 84-16 were received on February 25,

T985. Because of the exigencies of time, we defer comment on i those reports and submit this document, which is only a j fraction of our petition relating to 84-17 and 84-18, labelled l

Chapter I. 1 i L_ -. - -.-- ._ - - _ _ _ - --

                                                                                         - - - - - - - - - - - - - =

i . . l' , s 1 t I. INTRODUCTION A. Report Errors and Deficiencies Before turning to No. 84-17, it is important to observe (1) that this report itself establishes that earlier reports, insofar as they find no violation in many allegations, are factually and legally in error; (2) that the reports often erroneously excuse failure to find a violation on the ground that "the commitment involved has not been made a legally binding requirement" (49 F.R. 8591, E (2); (3) that the reports show that no attention was paid to the fact that several of the violations previously found were repeat and/or uncorrected offenses which require civil penalties (49 F.R. 8589, B, 4, 5); (4) that such offenses, and offenses which should have been found, reflect deliberate or at least " careless disregard of ( requirements," i.e., " willfulness," (49 F.R. 8588), and were not identified by the licensee or reported to the Commission as i required (id., at 8588-8591); and (5) that the findings clearly f l demonstrate " dereliction of duty on the part of [ highest i l, management] personnel involved in licensed activities" (1d. 8591, VII, Supplement I, C, 3). Yet, even those findings which were made were illegally assigned the lowest categories of severity levels. The severity level assigned to the offenses { found was never more than IV or V. Moreover, it is patent that the findings were carefully i draf ted to make it appear that the violations found were only i l " technical." In none of the reports, including 84-17, was the i i i 4 I

=x

4. w - .u . .a w ... _ . . . . . :. . . -

l l l , , i i .s [ actual effect on worker, health and safety of the found breakdown of protective systems and of avoidable uranium f contamination evaluated or considered in the light of "the cumulative total for all violations." I_d. at 8590. Nor was f a crucial factor, " economic advantage * *

• gained [by

                                                                                         ~

management] as a result of the violation [s]," anywhere considered. Yet it is self-evident that the only explanation of highest management's willful non-implementation of G.E.'s radiation protection program, for which Stohr naively requested an explanation in his letter of January 3, 1985 to Vaughan enclosing Report No. 84-17, is solely economic benefit to G.E. i restiting from disregard of safety requirements in the interest 1 of meeting production schedules. f B. Defects In NRC Investigation / Procedures And Assumptions some general observations concerning the 1 methodology of the NRC inspections are also required. The Inspectors assume that because their visits were not announced i ir. advance, management had no opportunity to " clean up" and alert the workers to be on good behavior, and that, therefore, the conditions they observed during inspections were normal. l This is a totally false assumption. The inspectors must identify themselves at the guard house. The guards immediately l notify management of their presence. It takes at least fifteen 8 minutes for the inspectors to get from the guard house to the i j wet lab. That is plenty of time for management to " cover up" l 3-

                                                                                 . . . ~ -

h' and instruct workers to comply with regulations while the inspectors are at the plant. Moreover, the Inspectors' reports almost invariably J speak of conditions as they existed on the dates of , investigation; not as they existed on the dates referred to in i j the charges. Such " investigations" are meaningless, because management may meanwhile have changed procedures, destroyed evidence, instructed workers to " clean up" and " shape up" j during NRC investigations, or " corrected" conditions. The investigations typically occur only many months after the charges. When the investigators are unable to find physical evidence which was under the control of management, they conclude that they are unable to prove the case, instead of applying the universal legal principle, " contra spoliator," under which management is presumed guilty of spoliation if it cannot produce evidence which once existed or should have ( existed. The Inspectors' conclusions are discussed only with management at an " Exit Interview"; neither the conclusions nor management's " explanations" are discussed with the complainant. i This prevents complainant from pointing out factual errors and i i erroneous inferences drawn by the Inapectors from information l supplied by management and by G.E.-intimidated employees and by ' employees hostile to complainant. To the extent employees are interviewed, they are seen on the plant site, in the company of a representative of [ l l

  ..a..--..              ~~.- : - _ a -          ~       _.      a        -         -
)

i management. Knowing management's vindictiveness, employees. typical'ly fear management reprisal, in the form of selection l i for layoff and other means, if they tell the truth about l ! management-laxity, cover-ups and subtle threats of reprisal. , ! Further, the covering letters from NRC to the licensee l forwarding investigation reports (particularly those finding any violations), virtually always assume that the report is l l " privileged and confidential" and invite the licensee to forward his response as a separate document to avoid , disclosure. We submit that practice is in flagrant violation

of 10 CFR 5 2.790(b).

Lastly, although NRC was officially notified on September 26, 1984, that Mrs. English waived confidentiality, j every report written after that date still refers to her as ,

                " alleger" (84-17, par. 4 " note"), sometimes, in context, to the confusion, if not mystification, of the reader.

C. The Reports Reveal Region II Inspectors' } And Supervisors' Bias and Prejudice In i Favor of G.E. And Against Complainant On the basis of our analysis of defects in No. 84-17 (and the prior reports analyzed in our original petition), which we discuss in detail below, we charge that (1) , the technical inspectors who issued, and the supervisors who signed, these six reports are guilty of cover up; of shielding and protecting G.E. against, inter alia, required civil penalties and accompanying press releases (49 F.R. 8591 (VI, l .  ! l l

m .. - _ _ . _ _ _ _ a__._. _ _ _ _ _ m ._ _ .. _- - . _ . _ - _, l* -

                         -             second and third sentences);E/ and (2) tailoring their findings to create evidence against complainant in her current DOL hearing not only by minimizing the nature, number and significance of the violations found, but by making it appear l

that Mrs. English's charges were largely unsubstantiated and that Mrs. English is, therefore, an unreliable witness. A material allegation of Mrs. English's Complaint in DOL Case No. 85-ERA-2 is that " General Electric's violations of safety standards were endemic and constant" (Tr. 412). DOL issued a probable cause finding in that case that Mrs. English was discriminatorily transferred out of the Chemet Lab and subsequently discharged for revealing G.E.'s violations to FRC, in violation of Section 210 of the ERA. If sustained, that is a severity I violation. 49 F.R. 8593, Supp. VII, A, 4. II. NO. 84-17 ESTABLISHES A PER.8E HIGH SEVERITY VIOLATION OF MANAGEMENT'S (ALARA) OBLIGATION A. The ALARA Obliestion NRC rules, 10 CFR S 20.1(c), require that "in addition to complying with the requirements set forth in this part, [ management must) make every reasonable effort to maintain radiation exposures, and releases of radioactive materials in effluents to unrestricted areas, as low as is l reasonably achievable." (Emphasis added.) This obligation is  ! I l 2/ Appendix 2, infra, Attachment 2, shows Region II NRC 4 Director J. P. O'Reilly's improper concern for shielding G.E.  ; from " potential inquiry by the press or others" about a serious i safety incident. , i l  !

                                                                             -  6-I i
     -w.-   - --

m,. . - - _ , - - #-. - . - . - _wc,_mm.. - - , ,.-.~,.--v.-

c a . . .--- .:

                        = ... w       -- .. ... ; u .a .: :   r     - :- --

iz 1 . . .

                                                                                                             )

l 'l i i known as ALARA. According to the Supreme Court in Silkwood v. 1

!                 Kerr-McGee Corp., 81-2159, 52 L.W. 4043, 4044 (January 11, 1984), ALARA is the " standard" to which licensees must conform s                                                      .

i their conduct. Not one of the reports we have been furnished l so far so much as mentions this obligation.

;                         G.E.'s Criticality Safety Control, Chemet Lab, C I

2.0-QA-201, in effect since at least 1976, provides, p. 1, 2.1 l (App. 3, infra), "proceduras must be written as part of the j criticality safety progran and become a part of the license. t The procedures shall be strictly adhered to in order to comply j with safety requirements and to assure criticality aafety in

 !                our operations."      (Emphasis added.)   10 C.F.R. 3 19.12 requires l                 that licensees not only instruct workers "in precautions and 1

procedures to minimize exposure" to radioactive materials or radiation, but instruct them to report to management "any ( condition which may lead to or cause unnecessary exposure to f radiation or to radioactive material." See also, S 20.206.  ; Section 19.11 requires management to post copies of "the operating procedures applicable to licensed activities." , Section 21.6 requires posting of " procedures adopted pursuant l

!                 to the regulations in that part."

Appendix to NRC Regulatory Guide 8.29, " Instructions Concerning Risks from Occupational Radiation Exposure" App. 4, infra) defines ALARA to require (p. 8, par. 13, see also, p. 14, par. 7, last sentence): t

       ,-          =     a.  -.. . . -.     :.a w     .
                                                          ..u-   -
                                                                     -             =- -

7 .. . f , . 1 "All * *

• operating prcia ares should be reviewed with the objective of reducing unnecessary exposures."

The Instruction explains the health risks involved in acute and chronic exposure to radiation, pp. 3-4. At par. 5,

p. 4, the Instructions state:

                                     " Chronic exposure, which may cause delayed effects but not prompt effects, refers to small doses received repeatedly over long time periods; for example, 20-100 mrom (a arem is one-thousandth of a rem) per week every week for several years.

concern with occupational radiation risk is primarily focused on chronic exposure to low levels of radiation over long time periods." Further (p. 6, par. 9), " cancer resulting from exposure to radiation usually occurs 5 to 25 years after the exposure i The Instructions warn (p. 7, par. 9):

                            "A worker * *

• should make every effort to keep exposure to radiation ALARA to avoid unnecessary risk. The worker, after all, has the first line i responsibility for protecting himself from radiation hazards."

B. The Radiation Hazards Against Which Licensees Must Establish and Enforce i Protective Systems, e.g., Air-Intake Monitoring; Rad Safety Inspections; Body Monitoring and Frisking 10 CFR (rev'd as of January 1, 1984),

              $$ 20.101-3, specifies the maximum " occupation dose" of radiation to which workers may be subjected,           i.,e., 1 1/4 rems per calendar quarter, or 5 rems per year.            The " air dose" must be " measured by a properly calibrated appropriate instrument in air    at or near the body surface in the region of highest dosage rate."          10 CFR 20.4(d).    (Emphasis added.)      '

                                           "[I]ntakes must be evaluated and accounted                       for by
                               -           techniques and procedures as may be appropriate to                                   ,

the circumstances of the occurrence. Exposures so l evaluated shall be included in determining whether the limitation on individual exposures in 5 20.103(a)(1) has been exceeded." (10 CFR 5 20.103, n. 4). (Emphasis added.) - 10 C.F.R. 5 20.103(a)(3) provides:

                                                   "For purposes of determining compliance with the requirements of this section the licensee shall use suitable measurements of concentrations of radioactive materials in air for detecting and evaluating airborne radioactivity in restr:                  ,cted areas and in addition, as appropriate, sha..I use measurements of radioactivity in the body,                                         ,

measurements of radioactivity excreted from the body, or any combination of such measurements as may we necessary for timely detect:,on and assessment of

                                           , ,nd :,v: ,dua;   ,,ntakes of radioact     ,vity by exposed

,nd : ,v: ,dua ,s." (Emphasis added.)

j i ! 5 20.103(b)(1) provides: I

"(b)(1) The licensee shall, as a precautionary trocedure, use process or other engineering controls, to the extent practicable, to limit i concentrations of radioactive materials in air ~~to j levels below those which delir.it an airborne j radioactivity area as defined in

5 20.203(d)(')(ii)." (Emphasis added.)

l The licensee must also maintain the records required by I j 5 20.103(b)(2), last sentence, and 5 20.405. subsections ! 405(a)(1), (1) and (2), require reports to individuals and to I j NRC of exposure in excess of applicable limits. 5 20.405 1 (c)(2) requires that reports "must describe l ' i "(i) The extent of exposure of individuals to

!                                          radiation or to radioactive material; 1

j (ii) Levels of radiation and concentrations of 1 radioactive material involved; ' i l (iii) The cause of the exposure, 13vels, or j concentrations; * * *." I t l j -,-

u a.a= - z.-- - .w: -

                                                                                    =   -

4 subsection 405(a) (iii) requires that the licensee report to i ' l NRC I

                              " Levels of radiation or concentrations of                  !

j radioactive material in a restricted area in excess of any other applicable limit in the license." 10 C.F.R. 5 20.201(b)(1) and (2) requires that every licensee 1 make " measurements of levels of radiation or concentrations of l i ' radioactive material present" as "are reasonable under the

circumstances to evaluate the extent of radiation hasards 10 C.F.R. 5 21.21 (Reporting of * *

• Non-Compliance) requires licensees to " adopt [and post 5 21.6] appropriate

! procedures for (i) [e] valuating deviations [(ii)(b)(1)]," notifying [within two days, 5 21.21(b)(2)] NRC of "information ' 1 reasonably indicating a failure to comply * *

• affecting (i) *

              *

• an activity subject to, inter alia, Parts 30, 50, 70, 71,

} 72 of this chapter; and reporting to NRC the "[n]ature of the

• i *
• failure to comply and the safety hasard which is created or

! could be created by such * *

• failure to comply." f i

5 21.21(3)(iv). 10 CFR 5 21.51 requires the licensee to j ! maintain records "as may be required to assure compliance with , the regulations in this part," including inspections and i j testing of any facility. - 1 ! In short, it is not only the legal obligation of ! management to minimise (ALARA) the danger to workers of contamination by radiat,lon, but, to that end, to adhere i absolutely to the NRC's requirtments to maintain and use 4 l i

  ,,,,,,.,._7---           .

m- -- - s . o I' accurate systems for measuritig and testing of worker radiation intake levels, accurate record keeping and reporting. The five earlier reports virtually ignore not only the former but the latter obligation. The findings in 84-17, and earlier reports, properly analysed, demonstrate that G.E.'s highest management wilfully, calculatedly or by " careless disregard," and by i deception, for its own profit, destroyed the utility of at least four of the systems it was required by law to maintain to guard against exposure to radiation hazards (1) air intake monitoring; (2) Rad. Safety Inspections; (3) frisking and (4) body counts. In consequence, G.E. was, at the time of Mrs. English's complaints, and at least until December 6, 1984, unable to ascertain or accurately to report the intake of i radioactive contamination by wet lab employees. The NRC's entire employee protection program was aborted. C. The Findings In No. 84-17 Establish Willful Per Se Violations of the Entire Contamination Control Program The Report (p. 1, par. 2) finds " weaknesses in the contamination control program in the Chemet Lab." The

                    " weaknesses" found relate to the " frequency and scope of contamination surveys, survey requirements for removing paperwork, samples and personal items from the lab, and management attention and commitment to a radiologically clean working environment in the laboratory."                  (Emphasis added.)   As we shall demonstrate below, these " weaknesses" are amply supported by the subsidiary findings.                 Indeed, stohr's covering 1

f _- , -- _

s. _ .

                                                                                                                                                                                                          -~       c-                             ,

l l s letter to Lees of January 31, 1985, voices NRC's concern "about the implementation of your radiation protection program that permitted this situation to develop." (Emphasis added.) But these " weaknesses" are reported only in the " Exit , Interview," and there only in the context of management's agreement "to review this area and to take appropriate action to improve the program." And the " concern" expressed in Stohr's letter likewise merely invites a response from G.E. , which " describe [s] those particular actions taken or planned to improve the effectivenees of your program." Now, possibly, management's willingness or commitment to take remedial action in the future might be relevant if the issue were whether G.E.'n license should be " modified, suspended or revoked" (10 C.F.R. 70.61(d)), or whether a projected civil penalty should be reduced. 49 F.R. 8589, B 2. 1 But that is not the issue. The issue is what formal violation i findings and civil penalties should be imposed for the past and ! current violations found and reported in the exit interview, I reflecting top " management's [in] attention and (non] commitment to a radiologically clean working environment," supra, p.11. If only top management's " careless disregard" for a

                                                         " radiologically clean working environment" were shown, that itself would be a willful, per se, violation of ALARA.                                                                                               49 C.F.R. 8588, III, " Severity of violations."                                                                                            Management's willingness and commitment to reform, to take corrective action in the future, is not a defense but an admission of willful f                                                                                                                                      t i

               , _.~ . _         - -- _ . _ _ _        _ . _ _   .-    - _-            -u

( * . , l *.

   .                   violation, inherent in management's attitude, "which permitted this situation to develop," unremedied and unreported by G.E.

to NRC. ( Indisputable proof that management was not only well . , aware of the deficiencies in operation of its safety protection and quality control systems, but that " inattention" and

                .      " careless disregard" was a management policy deliberately adopted and enforced upon the employees to increase production and adhere to delivery schedules, for G.E.'s profit, is a meno from Supervisor Coke McLamb to Chemet Lab Manager Preston Winslow, dated 10/21/83, attached hereto as App. 5.      That meno shows that management knew that chemet Lab personnel felt under inordinate pressure to cover up OAL and DCL results and to release only results " acceptable" under " biased" standards established "in order to satisfy production oriented egos."

Yet the violations documented in these reports all continued after that date. l Moreover, after NRC Safeguards Engineer, Ed Clay, on I i December 3, 1984, discovered chaotic contamination in the I off-Rad-Safety-inspection-limits isotopic room, the room in - which the LEA measurement system is located, and vast { contamination on a wet lab wall, floor and work benches,  ! t management's so-called " clean up" effort was designed to " cover , i up" rather than " clean up." A portion of the flooring in the lab was ripped out, but it was found that the foundation l l 13 - l e

m.. l. I l actually was " hotter" than the floor. The foundation was not ! torn out, instead, a new floor was laid on the " hot" base. G.E. personnel worked overtime all night to clean contamination from the wall. They did not succeed in removing , f a, substantial portion. Instead of stripping the plaster, McLamb instructed the workers to paint over the still heavily 1 contaminated wall. A Rad Safety man observed that NRC would ! require that the paint be removed, and effective action taken i to remove the contamination. When Ed Clay asked supervisor ! sutton why they had painted the wall, he replied "to cover up l rust spots." (Emphasis added.) Clay apparently swallowed l l this lie, because he did not require that the paint be removed. One employee, having been alerted to the presence of excessive contamination everywhere in the chemet Lab, on December 5, 1984, inspected six chairs on which employees sat virtually all day to perform their work. He discovered they l were " hot." An employee asked McLamb what he was going to do about the hot chairs. McLamb became agitated and angry, denied i the chairs wete " hot," and said, "whoever discovered they were hot had better clean them up." We infer, although without putting clay and sates under oath, and comparing their contemporary notes and the draf ts of l l l } 84-15 and 84-16 they submitted to McAlpine with the final ' I drafts of the reports in those cases that he signed on their l l behalf, we are obviously unable to prove, that the reason  ! ! l i I i ! I

         .,._, _ _. . - - ~                  . _ _ - - .- _ a-    -

(.-- i l. l McAlpine signed those reports when Clay and Bates were out of f town is 'that they may have objected, had they seen those 5 reports, to sign such a " white wash." McAlpine's motive for playing down the findings is self-evident. He was in charge of investigators and his investigators should have uncovered the i obvious defects and deficiencies in health safety protections I over the years before Mrs. English made her changes. He was covering up to save his own skin, and to disguise the immunity he had unlawfully give G.E. over the years.

!                               D. Low Severity Levels Were Illegally Assigned To the Violations Found and
;                                   Which should Bave Been Found f                            We reiterate that, whether intentional or deliberately careless, management's disregard for proper implementation of G.E.'s radiation protection systems defeated NRC's entire regulatory safety program, and must, therefore, be treated as the most serious possible violation.          The NRC Rules recognize I

(49 F.R. 8588) that "the severity level of a violation may be j increased if the circumstances surrounding the violation involve careless disregard of requirements, deception or other ! indications of willfulness." (Emphasis added.) Without considering the pending allegations of G.E. deception and other i i indications of willfulnens, top management's careless disregard for " implementation of the radiation protection system" is itself willful breach of ALARA and of each and every .l " requirement" which was not observed. Because G.E.'s found actions frustrated not only a single protection system, but I 3 l

                                                                                                -=-
                                                             .    - - _ = - - - - - -

1-I t NRC's entire radiation protection function, it is necessary to consider all together, and to " aggregate" all violations which

were, or as herein shown, should have been, found, before assigning them a severity level. JJI. Applying the " relative .

{ , importance" and "significant regulatory concern" standards, 49 t

!              F.R. 8588, the violations should all have been assigned Severity Level I, and Civil Penalties of multiples of $100,000 l

per day assessed for the entire period, thus far unascertained, of management's " careless disregard for implementation of the radiation protection system." Jd. at 5889-5890. NRC's policy on " Civil Penalties" states (49 F.R. { 8589): l i "NRC attaches great importance to comprehensive l licensee programs for detection, correction, and reporting of problems that may constitute, or lead to violation of regulatory requirements."

,              Because that is so (1d.)

l

                           " ineffective licensee programs for problem identifiction or correction are unacceptable. In

) cases involving wi11 fulness, flagrant NRC-identified I violations, repeated poor performance in an area of concern, or serious breakdown in management controls, NRC intends to apply its full enforcement authority * * *." At minimum, the " careless disregard" violation should have been assigned severity category II, for that violation disabled (,id., at 8591, B, 1), "a system designed to prevent or mitigate serious safety events [from] being able to perform its intended function." In G.E.'s case, however, several systems l were disabled. v

   ,                                                    NRC states, at 49 F.R. 8590, B(3), that:
                                                        ~
                                                                           "to focus on the fundamental underlying causes of a problem for which enforcement action appears to be l                                                                     warranted, the cumulative total for all violations I                                                                      which contributed to or were unavoidable consequences of that problem may be based on the                    _

amount shown in the table for a problem of that

  ;                                    .                                  Severity Level, as adjusted. If an evaluation of                                !

I such multiple violations shows that more than one fundamental problem is involved, each of which, if

viewed independently, could lead to civil penalty

  ?                                                                       action by itself, then separate civil penalties may j                                                                      be assessed for each such fundamental problem. In
  ;                                                                       addition, the failure to make a required report of i                                                                       an event requiring such reporting is considered a I                                                                        separate problem and will normally be assessed a i                                                                       separate civil penalty, if the licensee is aware of
  .                                                                       the matter that should have been reported."

i

  !                                   Under this test, the " laxity" violation should have been assigned Severity Level I, under Supplement IV, " Health i

j Physics," A, 1, 2, 5 (,id. at 8592), because it disabled I management from ascertaining and reporting how much radiation I exposure a worker was subject to. (cf. "B, Severity II (6), and C. Severity III, 7-9).A/ Severity IV and V were arbitrarily and illegally assigned by McAlpine, Barr and Stohr

  '                                   to save their own skins and to justify their historical f

nonfeasance against G.E. , l 3/ Under Health Physics, supp. IV, Severity III level is I assigned (id. 8593, par. 9) to:

 ;                                                                              "9. Cumulative worker exposure above regulatory limits when such cumulative exposure reflects a programmatic, rather than an isolated weakness in rad:.ation protection;"   (Emphasis added.)

L l

   --_--n.                             --.       -         ._.:                   -      ...

t  : . f;

f. .

E. The " Management Disregard" Conclusion Is

 >                                  supported By Subsidiary Findings in 84-17
 !                                  Par. 4 (f), pp. 5-6 of 84-17, finds that the allegation that " Radiation Safety Personnel were lax on monitoring for contamination and requiring cleanup * *

• was -

l partially substantiated." The allegation specified (id.):

                 " Radiation safety people * *

• do not know what to look for."

The report identifies some sources of licensee's obligations in l this area.

!                              " License Condition 9 requires that licensed material
!                              be used in accordance with statements, representations and conditions of Part I of the licensee's application. Part I, Section 3.2.4.6 discusses the minimum frequency, action limits for removable surface contamination, and maximum delay permitted in initiating decontamination action.

Plant Procedure Nuclear Fafety Instruction 0-6.0, Rev. 14, Contamination Measupement and Control, provides the guidelines for the conduct of the contamination measurement program, evaluation and documentation of the results and the required action based upon the contamination survey findings." (Emphasis added.) The section does not mention the obligation, delegated by management to Rad Safety, to make accurate " surveys," 10 CFR 1 5 20.201, although in "n" at p. 13, the Inspector acknowledges that management is obliged under 5 20.103(a)(3), to use  ! l " suitable measurements." Nevertheless, the Report concludes "no violations or dev,iations were identified." j What the Report calls " partial substantiation" are the following findings: 1 i

                                "[s]urveys performed by the radiation safety technicians are generally in the same locations l                              which are often not the areas with the highest l                              potential for becoming contaminated. .The inspector i

stated that the licensee should familiarize the l l I

                                        . _ . .                                         __ _.                 ...__-   -m 7._ _ _-                                                                                      _ _

L '. l radiation safety technicians with the operations in l the CHEMET Lab so that they can ensure that then

                                           ~

survey those areas where the potential for sipITYs

    !                                                  exist (sample preparation area, weighing area, etc.). Random surveys for contamination should be performed at least daily and detailed surveys of the entire lab should be performed weekly since the                         -
    !                                                  licensee utilizes the same administrative limits for                      -
                                ~

contamination as are required for uncontrolled areas i and there is a greater potential for a contaminating j event."jf (Emphasis added.) i

                           .                 In short, Rad Safety inspectors monitor frequently i'

enough, but only in the wrong places. In addition, G.E. uses

    !                          improperly excessive administrative limits for contamination.

i Thus, the results of Rad Safety inspections and surveys are

  ]                            utterly useless for NRC's intended purpose.                                 Like the one air I
    !                          sampler in the main work area of the Chemet Lab (par. 5, i

pp. 17-18), these procedures provide an illusion of radiation safety protection which belies reality. At p. 13, first sentence, the Inspector found:

  ;                                                     "The licensee uses an assigned airborne exposure
 )                                                     value derived from the time spent in the work area j                                                     to determine compliance with 10 CFR 20.103(b) and to j                                                     calculate the internal dose assigned to the i                                                      individual."

l i The inspector does not compare the performance of Rad. Safety Inspectors, or G.E.'s use of improper administrative 4/ Under Supp. IV, Health Physics, Par. 10 assigns to 1 Severity Category III, " Conduct of licensee activities by a j technically unqualified persons." If we accept the Inspector's ] inference that Rad Safety personnel did-not know where to look for contamination (rather than the fact that management instructed them to shut their eyes) (p. 17, lazt par.) the inescapable conclusion is that the Rad Safety Inspectors were

                               " unqualified" or inadequately trained under 10 CFR S 19.12, and

' S 20.206. . l l l f

   *-,--r,w-,mrw,,re-wv-,           en n e--    e --me-m-~-w,m-..---,-----,ecw,,--,,e m                                     ~      -e&

      .    .                                                                            l l

1 ! limits for contamination, with the obligations imposed by the documents he cites. Moreover, as noted, the obligations imposed by 10 C.F.R. 5 20.101-103, and particularly by 1 5 20.103(a)(3) and (b)(2), are not considered in this , connection. Only in another connection does the Report i

acknowledge the obligation imposed by 10 C.F.R.

1 t 5 20.103(a)(3), upon every licensee, to "use suitable l measurements of concentrations of radioactive materials in air for detecting and evaluating airborne radioactivity in I restricted areas." The ALARA obligation imposed by 5 20.103(b)(2) is never mentioned. The Report shows that the Inspector merely undertook to instruct or counsel management as te what it should do in the e future, as if management, by its failure to do what it knew or must have known was required by its license and by law, had not. violated any legal obligation. I ! The Inspector's assumption, albeit unarticulated, is t } that management did not know what it should have done, and, ( j therefore, was not culpable and rerited instruction. That assumption is utterly false, as we now demonstrate. NRC was' told by Mrs. English and other employees a long time ago that G.E. management, as well as the Chemet Lab employees, knew that 3

the isotopic room was the " hottest" spot in the lab. She had I never seen a Rad Safety inspector in that room. On December 3, 1984, NRC's Ed Clay inspected the Chemet Lab in the company of Coke McLamb, Chemet Lab supervisor, and Earl Rouse, Safety t

g_.m ~

                 .-        ._ m                     -

m ._ .

      . s l-I i  e Technician.

Ed Clay instructed Rouse to accompany him into the Isotopic Room, where they discovered enormous visible contamination. Two days later, Bob Torres, Manager of Rad Safety, asked Rouse "Why were you investigating in an - -

unassigned area?" He replied, "because NRC asked me to do it."

This incident was reported to Mr. Bruno Uryc, Region II,

 }            Supervisor of Investigations.      Torres' admission that the l             isotopic area was " unassigned," and his displeasure over its entry by a Rad Safety inspector, demonstrates that G.E.

deliberately concealed from Rad Safety and forbade monitoring l of the hottest spot in the lab. So much for the pretense that G.E.'s " careless disregard"~was innocent! On the contrary, what Torres', questioning of Rouse proves is that G.E. fraudulently concealed from NRC that its Rad Safety inspection system, like its air monitoring system, its body count system and its compulsory self-frisking system was a fraud. This requires that the violations be assigned Severity Level I, under " Miscellaneous matters," 1, 2, 3; 10 CFR S 21.21(b)(3)(iv). l 2 F. The Inspector's Finding No. 84-17, p. 6 i That G.E. Has No Policy Requiring b Notification of Radiation Safety in the i Event of a Spill In the Lab" Is Demonstrably False The Inspector does not point to Jgy( G.E. document as the source of this finding. Obviously, he Eust a have accepted G.E. management's representation to this effect. I L ] s

7- a._w -.- -

                                                                             ..u                          u =.                 .

~.

l 1 s 1 j Official G.E. documents belie the finding. G.E.'s " Job Hazard f Analysis Chemet Lab-970" dated 10/1/81, revised'3/1/84 and f 3/1/85, App. 6, hereto, provides: "6. Clean spills immediately and notify radiation protection.", (Emphasis - P added.) G.E.'s " Course for Bourly Workers," in effect since 11/13/72, when Mrs. English began working in the lab ( App. 7, l

  .                       hereto, p. 4), details the steps to follow in the event of a
;                         spill:                            " Step 2:   Warn other personnel - Call Radiation i

i Protection." (Emphasis added.) Page 5, 6 I, says "For a

!                         know[n] or possible radioactive spill, minimize its spread and l                         notify. Radiation Protection."                                               (Emphasis added.)

Had the Inspector found that G.E. did have the policy it disclaimed, he could not have escaped finding that its e I widespread violation, testified to by Mrs. English and acknowledged by G.E. management, was a serious and major l i violation. Nor, had he inspected the documents Mrs. English offered in proof of the policy, could he have failed to find L! G.E.'s denial fraudulent. G. The Inspector's Finding h, p. 7, That G.E.

!                                                                    "Does Not Have a Procedural, Requirement, Nor i                                                                   Do They Rope Off Or Otherwise Mark Contaminated j                                                                     Areas" Is Demonstrably False li The Inspector found that while Mrs. English's

] complaint was factually substantiated, it constituted no violation because "the marking off of contaminated areas is not required by NRC regulations, license conditions or Jicensee procedures." (Emphasis added.) The Course for Bourly Workers I b I 1, J

,_ - -.-_.                                _.     ~.~            .                                    _                    . .       .a       .

l . . I: I (App. 7, infra), p. 4, par. 5. B. specifies " procedures to be followed after a spill of material (liquid or solid)" and l details the " basic steps": i " Step 1. Stop the spill - - l Step 2. Warn other personnel - Call Radiation

                    ~

! Protection Step 3. Isolate the area." (Emphasis added.) l i Page 2, B, 1 (id,.) provides: " Contaminated areas [should be] l j roped off - control signs." (Emphasis added.) The Course j Outline defines " Dead Zone" as a " safety zone, usually 12" in j width, surrounding all limit areas. It is designated with a 2" 1 g wide red tape." G.E.'s Criticality Safety Control Chemet Lab, C. 2.0-QA-201, in effect since at least 1976 (App. 3, hereto),

p. 1, 2.3.2 provides " Dead zone - a safety zone shall be marked with a two inch wide red border surrounding all limit areas."

Par. 4.5.1, p. 4, says " Stay 12 inches away from any limit area." Had the inspector consulted the relevant documents, instead of naively accepting management's fraudulent , verbal misrepresentation, he could not have failed to find wilful violation of the license requirements on both the substantiated 3 practice and management's misrepresentation to him.

!                                 H.          The Inspector's Conclusion (p. 8, i) That

Allowing " Heated Uranium Scintered Pellets

} To Cool In Uncovered Containers Outside a 1- Vented Hood" Is Neither Prohibited Nor "A l Radiological * *

• Safety Problem" Is False

) The only sources the Inspector claimed to have examined in connection with this allegation are identified in j 1 i

         ._               .. : .   =. c_ .__                                               .; -                        ,   - *          --   -      --   -     -

.~ . - * . 4 I* . (-

e i

! th's first three lines of the second paragraph of his

" Discussion." He also missed the factual point. The cooling ,

i scintered pellets emit visible particles of uranium dust, which l ! settles on counters, instruments, etc., where they are - ) inescapably inhaled and ingested by lab personnel through l breathing. When originally established, the system called for covering the stainless steel container into which the pellets were dumped with a air-tight cover. Lab personnel were told by f supervision that the covered containers were to be placed under i a vented hood. The covers disappeared after a time and the l open containers were never placed under a vented hood. The

supervisors' instructions to cool scintered pellets under a i

vented hood are legally binding on G.E. under its license. The Inspector looked for rules requiring cooling material containing uranium under vented hoods in the wrong place. Safety Operating Procedure, No. 0.3.4, issued 4/2/73,

p. 2, B, App. 8, infra, provides:

! "All compounds of uranium that could become airborne f shall be handled inside of hoods with air flow of i 80-120 LFM through the apertures. Examples of this ! is (1) Opening of powder sample containers (2) ( Crushing of pellets, weighing, etc., (3) Dumping and l compositing samples for return to Shop Operations, ! (4) Dissolution and concentration of uranium samples by heating." (Emphasis added.) - l ( C01 Instruction #409, April 9, 1982 (App. 9, infra), p. 3, pt. 3.11, provides: " Remove tray from microwave oven and place in 8 l , b

i hood to cool." (Emphasis added.) Nuclear Safety Release ICR04,5ev.3issuedApril22, 1982, (App. 10, infra), j provides (p. 1, pt. 5), "take extra care to prevent airborne ! contamination." Pt. 1, p. 2, provides: " Conduct all -

                                                                                         ,   I l

l activities which could generate airborne contamination * *

• l under * *
• vented hoods." (Emphasis added.)

Analytical Test Method 5.2.9.6. Rev. 2, dated Dec. 1,

1979 (App. 11, infra), states (pt. 5.1, p. 2)

" Proper f radiation protection precautions should be taken to prevent inhalation of solid or liquid samples containing uranium during l all handling operations."

l Appendix to NRC Regulatory Guide 8.29, " Instruction I Concerning Risks from Occupational Radiation Exposure," undated, but published af ter 1980, which was distributed to all Chemet Lab personnel (App. 4, infra), explains, pp. 12-13:

                              "The uptake of radioactive materials by workers is generally due to breathing contaminated air.

Radioactive materials may be present as fine dust or gases in the workplace atmosphere. The surfaces of equipment and workbenches may be contaminated. Radioactive materials may enter the body by being breathed in, taken in with food or drink, or being absorbed through the skin, particularly if the skin I is broken.

                              "After entering the body, the radioactive material will migrate to particular organs or i                         particular parts of the body depending on the biochemistry of the material. For example, uranium will tend to deposit in the bones where it will remain for a long time. It is slowly eliminated from the body, mostly by way of the kidneys. Radium will also tend to deposit in the bones. Radioactive iodine will seek out the thyroid glands (located in the neck) and deposit there.

I

        . e
      .                                                                                              l t

1 1-J "The dose from these internal emitters cannot be measured either by the film badge or by other ordinary dosir.eters carried by the worker. This means that the internal radiation dose must be

 +                                separately monitored using other detection methods.

1

                                      " Internal exposure can be satimated by measuring          _   !

the radiation emitted from the body or by measuring the radioactive materials contained in biological j samples such as urine or feces. Dose estimates can

  ,                               also be made if one knows how much radioactive

material is in the air and the length of time during

which the air was breathed. (Sic!)

                                      " Internal exposure is controlled by limiting the release of radioactive material into the air and by carefully monitoring the work area for airborne
 ,                                radioactivity and surface contamination. Protective clothing and respiratory (breathing) protection

should be used whenever the possibility of contact

., - with loose radioactive material cannot be i prevented." (Emphasis added.) i i In short, contrary to the Inspector's conclusion,

                    " cooling scintered pellets in the open and not in a vented hood" ijs "a radiological * *

• safety" hazard. It is not only

,                   a violation of ALARA, but of management's obligation under 10
}                  CFR S 19.12, to avoid " unnecessary exposure to radiation or to radioactive material," (emphasis added), as well as of the

] _ specific rules quoted above. It is especially noteworthy that dosage from " internal emitters cannot be measured either by the film badge or other ordinary dosimeters c'a rried by the worker." Since there was no air-intake monitor over the uncovered containers, and Rad Safety did not " carefully" monitor the cooling area, if it monitored that area at all, G.E. had njg way of measuring

a - a- .. = - a - . . - - i e *+ the air contaisination content of the cooling area or the dose of conEamination to which workers in the Chemet Lab were subject as a result of cooling the scintered pellets in the open, except by measuring samples of urine. Incredibly, G.E. - never made any tests for contamination by examining feces. G.E. took care to assure that these measures would be unrepresentative, inter alia, because it took body samples only after the absence of the worker for several days from the lab and did not make or keep required historical records. The violation is of the highest severity level. I. The Inspector's conclusion (pt. J, pp. 8-9) That "Neither NRC Regulations, Nor License Conditions" Prohibit " Dichromate Titrations l ! Outside A Hood" Is False b - The Inspector admits that G.E.'s referenced !i s Manual (p. 8, par. 1, " Discussion"), requires that " proper l- radiation protection" should be taken to prevent inhalation or ingestion of * *

• uranium during all handling operations." He also found that the titration did release not only acid fumes but radioactive uranium fumes into the atmosphere. He r

! discounted the latter on the ground that the " airborne i ! radioactivity hazard" was minimal. The only evidence he offered for that was the weekly radiological contamination i l surveys performed by Rad Safety in 1984 did not " identify i contamination above the action level at this work station." ( Given the Inspector's findings under (f), p. 6, that Rad Safety inispected only in the wrong places; used inappropriate i l l

                                                                                                                                                                                              --. =
        ,              w

( '- .

 !                                               measures for " administrative limits for contamination," and
 ,                                                under 5; p. 17, that review of contamination surveys during 1984 showed contamination above G.E. 's allowable limit, this i

finding is utterly unsupportable. -

          ~

l .

 !                                                         The Inspector concluded that no violation was shown, because he found no " specific requirement that dichromate titrations should be done under a vented hood."                                                        The demand for such specificity is misguided.                                    It overlooks the general requirement that licensees use all " proper" and "necessary" means of protection against airborne radioactivity hazards, which G.E. was therefore required by ALARA and its license to 1

do. Performance of dichromate titrations under a vented hood is the most obvious measure imaginable to reduce the hazards of airborne uranium contamination. G.E. violated the law by i [ failing to do this. [ j The Inspector also found that because "the procedure i contains no precaution concerning the inhalation of acid fumes I . that evolve from the titration," G.E. was not obligated by its i ! license to take any precautionary action against that danger. j But he overlooked Part 20, App. B, footnote 4. l. The authorities cited in G above apply to handling of [ all radioactive materials which emit radioactive fumes or dust. The Inspector ignored all of these obligations, which, of 5 ? course, are legally binding on G.E. Moreover, a memorandum dated November 9, 1981, from Bowman to Hendry (App. 12, infra), states that " analyses of the 9 air sampler filters in.the ADU L [ t a__---_-. - - . - _ . . _ - - - , . . _ _ _ - _ _ . , . - _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ , _ _ _ _ _ - . - - - . _ , _ . _ _ _ . - . . - _ _ . - . . _ . _ , - - _ . -

           ~ ~

t ',

 ;                  vaporization room" showe'd airborne centamination levels " exceed l                  300 times the maximum permissible concentration."         How did it get that way if weekly Rad Safety surveys were indicative?

L In short, the substantiated allegations of pars. 4 (i) - and (j) establish that unknown, unmeasured and unmeasurable by l G.E.'s processes, amounts of radiation contamination were inhaled or ingested by wet lab employees on a daily basis. Moreover, the amounts were not timely measured by full body counts. Is this not inescapably a Severity Level I violation under Supplement IV, A, 49 F.R. 8592? END OF CHAPTER I, More To Follow Respectfully submitted, I

 >                                                     <Y14a' O 'm Mozart G. Ratner          X/ Y/

Suite 610 F 1900 M Street, N.W. ! Washington, D. C. 20036 l (202) 223-9472 i y NW d- ) i Arthur M. Schiller Suite 1300 [M7 1 - 1000 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. ! Washington, D. C. 20036 j (202) 331-8508 f Counsel for Vera M. English $ February 28, 1985 i

pm. - 1 . > ., 1 ,;; - . . e,

                  ,                ,                                     UNITED STATES J

1 {,- o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION wasHWGToN, D. C. 20555 i \,, JAN 101985 a ..... 1 i , j Mozart G. Ratner, Esq. Suite 610 1900 M Street, NW 1 Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. Ratner:

)i i This letter acknowledges receipt of the Petition of Ms. Vera M. English 4 filed 1984. on her behalf by yourself and Mr. Arthur M. Schiller on December 13, j The Petition makes reference to five Inspection Reports reviewing activities at the Wilmington, North Carolina facility of the General 1 Electric Comoany (Licensee). The Petition asserts that these Inspection i I Reports are deficient for failing to identify a variety of deviations and violations in the activities of the Licensee at its Wilmington facility. The Petition requests that all five Inspection Reports be withdrawn, that new Inspection Reports be issued correctly documenting the alleged violations and deviations at the Wilmington facility as identified in th.e Petition and its attachments, that Notices of Violation be issued, and that the Nuclear Regulatory Comission comence appropriate enforcement action, including the assessment of civil penalties, consistent with the Comission's General Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions, 10 CFR Part 2. Appendix C, as revised, 49 Federal Register 8583 (March 8, 1984). The Petitioner also requests the institution of proceedings pursuant to 10 CFR I 2.202 and the scheduling of hearings on the matters raised in the Petition.

  '                    The Petition, which has been referred to my Office for action, is being treated under 10 CFR 2.206 cf the Comission's rejulations. The NRC staff 1

will review the Petition and I will issue a formal decision with regard to i it within a reasonable time. A copy of the notice that is being filed for publication informatiot for the. Office of the Federal Register is enclosed for your .l

]

~, Sincerely, , .

                                                                          .     ; --               4 i

mes M. Tay1 , Deputy Director i ffice of In ection and Enforcement

Enclosure:

as stated cc w/ encl.: Arthur M. Schiller, Esq. Suite 1300 - i 1000 Connecticut Avenue, NW j Washington, DC 20006 I i j General Electric Company j Wilmington, NC .. Appendix

                                                                                                                                - - ~ -, --~

1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ - - -.- - - - - ~ - - - -

) l* - 1  ! s . j [7590-01] i; NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OccketNo.[70-1113] i GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY (Wilmington, North Carolina Facility) i i EEOU3TFORACTIONUNDER10.CFR'2.206?g 2 REGARDING AcT ,Vt TIES AT TME WRmmaiUN. NORTH CAROLINA j ~ FACILI"Y'UIMTHE + teENERAt,' ELE 4 I R IC' LWmu 4 Notice is hereby given that, by her Petition of December 13, 1984, Ms. Vera M. English (Petitioner) requests that the Nuclear Regulatory { Commission reviewirid7 withdraw certain Insp'ehtId5 ReidiWlwhich allegedly 5 improperly dismiss certain alleged violations and/or deviations associated 1 t with the activities of the General Electric Company at its Wilmington, North e Carolina facility. The Petition requests that new'Inspecti$n Reports be > J si M b parly documenting violations and deviations in the ac ivities carried out at the Wilmington facility. The Petition also requests that f the Comission issue Notic.es of Violation and take enforcement action as 4 ] appropriatetincluding the imposition of civil penalties. Petitioner further 1 requests the institution of proceedings pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 and the

!                  scheduling!af hearings on the matters raised in the Petition.

t . The Petitiori is being treatei pursuant' to l'0 CFR 2.206 of the

;                  Commission's regulations and appropriate action will be taken on the b

4 g I

{ .' . ,P > t .. *

                   ,                                                    si'      .

l t .

request withfA a reasonable time. A copy of the Petition is available t

a ! for inspection in the Commission's Public Document Room,1717 H Street, } N.W., Washington, D.C. 20555, and at the local Pubic Occument Room for I ! the Wilmington facility located at [ insert address J. 1 Dated at .Bethesda, Maryland this '

• day of January 1985 FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

                                                                          /          /'l 1

a s M. Tay1 , y Director 0 ice of In pection and Enforcement 3 i l O 1 . I . I ( f 1 i 3 i k

u --. : -- --

                                                                                                                              .               - = . . -                                  . . . . . . - .    = = . -

3 ,, . i

• e 37.510 TO DISTRI3CTION - November 9, 1981

_Aracy_v. INT 2 I GENERAL ELECTRIC ) 4 c.

                                   . 6 .... 8*292-5748                                          s.ri.                    September 17, 1 9 8 1 cm ,iss.

eget. WII.MINGTON MANUFACTURING OEPARTMENT t

                                         .sessii. M/C J-02 1

avencr. ITEM OF INTEREST .- t. , J j J. A. Long, General Manager Wilmington Manufacturing.Cepartment i q FOLLCMUP CN UT6 GAS RELEASE As repceted earlier, a UF6 gas release cccurred Tuesday > morning in the FMO vaporization area. Although the release was well contained, the incident had to be reported to the NRd within 24 hours because of the time required for cleanup activities. The racor vas made *iednesday morning within the recuired ' time neriod. Subsequently, J. P. C' Reilly, Director - USURC Region II, called to inquire for mors information, including details of encloyee i exposures, stack measurements, and site boundary conditions. Ne j supplied the information, which clearly indicated that there had 1 ] been no , exposures to e=oleyees or the public,in excess of 1 j 1 allowable limits. It is ancarent that Mr. O' Reilly was concerned ] for the potential inquir*/ by the press or others, and he wished to .1 1 be well crepared for it. s To che *cest of our knowledge, there has i a I been no external interest in the incident.

                                                                                                                                          .q             i
                                                              ~
 .                                                                                                                                              it                 M,

• b E. M t.aes, M 6 afer 1

Quality Assurs: Ice 3  :

                                     /stm                                                                                         '

i . __ .. L _ _ _ _ _ _ - - . _ - - - - - - - - - - -

                                                                                                                                                           ~ ~~ ~ ~ - '
                                                                                                                                                                        . . .     . ..                   Appendix * :
                                                                                                                                                                                                            ~~   '

l

u. m w .d $9, er W

 )                   .2LF.~.                      ( . d }'lY !.3.3.            d                         IAEU:I DAI6          !  INSI M 7ICli C.'

1 uss .

                                              . .. b. . . . . . . . .' 8 i " N U
                                                                                  . .u.

N'A"s

                                                                                                   .l                         t i
          ' [8.W.'N.5.C.7*3 ,

8- {

                                                                                                         ........3      .-    . C 2.0 - QA - n .

TIR.~s CP.IIICA:.ITY CAT !Y CONTT.0L  ! MEU5 217D: l I CHD IT L.d  ?

              !                                                                                       !                       i  PAG 3 i C~ 5
              \                                                              i l ISSU!I:3 t.UIT: Process control Eng.

I.* N ALS: i s 1.0 PURPOSE AND SCOPE The purpose of :his procedure is to establish and outline the general criticali:y i safety rules, practicas, and precautions for the Chemet Laboratory necessary :o ' comply with AEC regulations, licensa requiraments and General Electric policy to protect the health of eeployees and cc=pany proper:y. Separaca instruccions ' are prepared for specific t ork er operations uhere special requirements partaining tJ Criticality saf(Cy are nactssary. This precadure applits to the teac Cht is; y Lab, the Sa$ctroscopic Lab, C.C Corner, and che PCE 31spatchars Of fice. 3 2.0 DEFINITIONS i j 2.1 General Uranium enriched in the U-235 isocope to a :sximum of 4.0 weight percent is a fissile material and is processed in :he fuals =anufacturing shop. It is

 !                              capabla of undargcing a nu:las: chain rea : ion much che s=a as in nu:laar 1                                raseco: uichout bansfic of reactor cont:cis. Dus :o tha po:antially lathat nature of the resultin.3 nuclear radia: ion, physical and procedural cent::14 are established to mini =1:a :ha probcbili:y of such an occurrance. 22:ause fis sil.: caterial is procarsed in this plen:, :.11 oparacions must be *.icensac by the Acomic Ener;y Co =ission. Dus :o cha n: cur-a of cur li:ense, p cceduras must ba u:1::en as par: ef tha criticcli:y safe:y program and bacota a pse:

of the license. The procaduras shall be serie:ly adhared :o in ordar to ! comply wich :he license require =ents and to assure crici::11cy safety in our sparacions. t i l 2. 2 Primar/ Concepts u 2.2.1 Physical control-retains material in a specific location, operacion, j f or geomacry. ,

 +

t ... 2.2.2 Adminstrative control-limits the caterial to a specific operation

l. by approved procedures ONLY tihara physical controls are not prac:ical.

5 2.2.3 Area ".anager-che louest supervisory posicion fully responsible for the specific ac:ivi:y or function trich t hich the cc m is assccia:ad l (i.e. , : tant.r,er , Qu lity Astr:cn:O. i 2.3 Applica:1ons 2.3.1 Limit Area-an idancified location in which uranium can be handled, processad, or storal in accordance trich specific pescal criticali:y cefecy li=1::.:icnc. timic cra:s for por::ble equipman: shall ha :::ked

 ;                                       t ich a colid red :. ins :sfo in:h.u t:1de.

I j 2.3.2 Itacd :ena-a saf a:y :one shall bc =s:ked utch a tuo inch utda rad border ( uurroundin, all lin.: arcar. Uranium shall not be handled, scored, a j procasce.d in . . ;d c :n.'ai . Urc.nic . *.='.1 pacs chrough . do..d :::c Only :: 1

            - .---       s-.. a . _               -
                                                           ..~                      -
                                                                                                -.                       .- ~       ~.               .

1 i

             .h . C 3
 +

.- c -

           . ts - , . .                       ; ". " ;. .ii' ' . . .. . . . . ' . ' . . .                         ISE'J2 L/.Tc      INSTRUCTIC4 NO.    <

pu ;_5 - 0 - QA.::. e n; - l .. .... . .. . . g . C-

 !        ggt,;TU.'.IR*,            I -- 'd d'I I' d E "' A ' A K ' '                                      'r sv;3R5eD35                           1
                 .< ' ~ '           TITLg: CRITICALITY SAFETY CO::TF.0L                                           735U3 DATED:

l CMDET Lt.3 .

                  %~.                                                                                                                        C.: 5 4       f                                                                                                                        l  2403 2 l                               2.3.3       Safe batch-the allowable quan:ity of uranium one may handle in any dne place in the lab is defined to be:

1 2.3.3.1 A total of 635 sa:plas. l 2.3.3.2 A total of 35 U0* fuel rods. - j 2.3.3.3 45 percent of a =ini=um cri:ical mass. I j  ::0TE: IN A VOL*.I'C OT 23 Qi.~.G.!S, A LI*CT OF 3.0 L:EIGHT :: U-235 IS 1 ASSUMID IN SETTI:C !EISE LDII!S. 2.3.4 Criticality limit si;n-ca: hod of posting limits and instrue ions

;                                         concerning type of material to be handled, type of criticality control j                                          for a specific area.                         Each        safe 'aatch controlled ares must have
;                                         a criticality limit sign.

i 2". 4 Vcimetric C:linitions 2.4.1 Product containc s-cons ue:2d of ples:1c or metal, shall esssure

    ,                                     no more chan 13 inches in height by 11.25 inches in diameter and
;                                         have a volume of 23 quarts.
!                             2.4.2       Seventeen quart pail-cons::ue:od of plas:ic and shall measure 1

app *:oximately 12 inches in hsigh; by 11 inches in diameter. i

2.4.3 UO , etc. sample vialc-cont

:uct:d of plastic and of maximum size 7/3" I.O. X 2-1/4" long. For ner=:1 procass samples.

2.4.4 Sludge, etc. sample vials-construe:ed of plastic and max 1=u= si:e 2" I.D. X 3-1/2" long. For red wasta, sludge, etc., where the concentract:

                                        .of uranium is known to be < 340 gU/L.

,; 2.4.5 Ash sample vials-constructed of plastic not to exceed 400 =1. For j vorcinerator ash where the concentration of uraniu= is known to be i < 150 gU/1. 1 2.4.6 Solution sample bottles-constructed of plastic or glass not to ex:eed i i litar (5 pin:s) . For solutions where the concentration of uraniu: a is knoun to be 461 gU/1. i 2.4.7 3 Lcllen bottics-constructed of 31aas or plastic not to e:::_ad 21 1

 '               ____                    c.tv.rts of solu:1cn. For solutions for. disposal -- no: a se.=ple c:ntcinc 1.0       CT.IT10.'.LII'.' SAFETY RESPONSI3ILITIES                                                                                       *-
;                    3.1 l'.c:ponsibilities t'

/3.1.1 icch indivi.duci : re..: :ncibis :o Snr* .nd c:.ue re che e;;; qd pr:ca u-j c: . 2atteneu :o c ur nu;_c : cri:ics ity sc:aty.

4 ( 3.1.2 Ih. .r:2 M:nc .t: atr.11 a;;;;c : hat axis preceduro.s nr.d der . ;- ' r..e

                                                                                                    ~ -_                     ~

       - . _ - -                      ~ _ _..                _ _ . . , _ , _ _ . . _ -                            _-.__.m.,____--

j"" Y.. .v. l; :.,i.ly : "I 7 o

                                                                      ..         .     .-                             ISSUE DAIE     l   IllSIILOYICJ +\0.

. . t : . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

i

     } r.:.r.:.1.*.'%.'.?M
                                                %-.~A              - f' ' ' '           ~.
                                                                                           . .. h,*. * *

• r l C-2.0 - Q.s.-

0.,

                                                                                                                     .N :i?.5EDE5 7;,Lg:CR;TICALII*.* Sl.yETY C0:,iROL                            l    IdSU2 M :

Citr.~.;T LAS  ; 1. (. i I PAGE 3 0.~ 5 i 3.1.3 Tha : tanager, Cha=st Lab shall correct and resolve all nuclear safe:y procedural daviations censul:ation, etc. as nacessary.discovered by NSLL audits, requesting training, 4.0 PROCIDURI 4.1 The Spec Lab is limitad to one safe batch. 4.1.1 All incoming samples shall be placed into the slots in the marked drawer in 635 of the sac:plas. desk on the south wall of the room. Thans slots hold a total Do not stora samplas anywhera aise in the lab. Oc not accept any more sa=ples into the lab when the drawers are full.

                                /4.1.2              In the hood ramove as cuch uranium as necessary from each sample to perform lab tests ac dirsecad.

4.1.3 Return the empty or partially empty containers to the drawers. !1 hen

asting is co:plete :ska che vial, racaining contents, and all racoved portions of the semple to tha sc ple re: urn can in :he tret lab.

Chach paperwork to assura all percions of the sam, ale ::a accounced for. 50!I: Do not overfill the sa:ple return can. E=pty vials, i.e., :hesa L uhich have only. traca amounts of uranius so thsc you can see through

ha sample vial sy be reused or placad in plastic bags in the tea: Lab-naar tha halltecy for disposal.

i 4.1.4 :nventory the lab t:eekly disposing of any excess. 4.2 The 1.'at Lcb is li=1:ad to three safe bacches: 4.2.1 One of these is UO, rods. Do not accept core than 35 rods into the Cet Lab. lab. All rods ~shall be stored in the southvast por:1on of the 4.2.2 'one safe batch is the sample return can located undstr the !!ICS Termin .. 4.2.2.1 Use a standard pail (23 quart pail). Do not overfill the can. Store it in the. limit area. J. 2.2.2 Weigh the can (or add :ha traight added if knoten) each tima samples cra put in th: c:n. Ra:ord tha t.ai;ht on the shac: of the c:n; do not a:::ced 44.5 Kg.

                                  ?.2.3 Tha b'        echarofscia number                      batch is at large through :he ares and is centrollad camples.

A total of 635 estples in vials or in ::nicus

                                              .1 :ch.

llan bottlac of licuids in any cerbine.cion constitutas one e .f a f.".3.1 En:c:

Do not cc:h a;::aed ;rcup of scnplas on the 1.'at L..h Sc=ple Shset (2:P.ibi: runnin :occi of 635 czeples.

=y 5; tursd :-n:harc i. :h Thesa sctplas cr at . "at Lcb e:.: apt in the red b :: h..

m

_.wur - ,- _ e mo... - - - - - .- - . - -

                                                                                                                                             - . -                ~ . , - -             _

7-- i 1 . . .

                               .e
               ,? . ,         ,5

• D' . '

                                   ,                      , , , ,                , .     . . . . . _                    ,*=.-------
              . . . .t
                        . . -. ,                                e        .,
                                                                                                                                ..m..=

3--- ..'- .tb- o-L. .Cia. .s . s. .

                                                                          .i ...:.......                                                                I f& $                                        .*o            -..       .*          .s=*

s(..=. . . . .11. il h, .l. e e

                                                                                        .,'. . . h . . M y ,..$

e,'4=t.c,TU ,Iy,3 , ., .

                                                                                                                                .c. . . .. .- :.S C-2.0 - 0A '.31
                     /

TITL2: CRITICALITY SATI-'.* CONTP.0L I ISSU2 OI.TED: [ L .- CF.52. .a ', f ,.._ r , .. .: I u-  : e 4.2.3.2 In a hood remove as much uranium as needed frem the sample containers cuc c aru..a a.a rccorv ces' = == direc ec . ap.it - portions ci sa=ples may likewise be stored at will in the area. )i 4.2.3.3 Vnen through, dump sa:nples :

a. If solids-into a Saakar in either the sample receiving hecc or cae uccoua;.a aacc. (a max:.=us oc cnrea =ax:. cum ow :. '

cec.sers may oe in each hood.)

b. If liquids -into a c.tximum five gallon bottle. A =axt:um of one bctcle per hood as above.

e. Place 5 pint bottles on tae tray near the hallway entrance i

to the ich.

                                                            .2.3.4                Tranzfsr selids te th sa:ple return can (::eighin; the baske:

and cdjustin can t ci-h:1 and liquids. to the pressa area as accitf _. 4.2.3.5 Indiccte the nucher of sa ples dumped on the wat lab satpie sheet and figure the bal:nce. Check paperwork to assure all i pc:tions of the split sa:ples he.ve been dumped. t.

                                                        . 2.3.6                 Inventory the lab weekly disposing of any excess.

j 4.3 The QC :ornar is 11micsd to :1cht safe bacches, seven en the floor in the 3

                                       =c:ked arc:c, one in the hood.

i j 4.3.1 Ktep the seven safe batches on th: floor in standard product pails in the limit areas. Do not overfill the cans or double stack the= or place sm:11er containers of urcnium on them, etc. 1:aigh the can cith each addition (dr if you knew the weight being added just add

it) and record the ne't weight on the sheet en the can. Do not i exceed 44.5 Kg.,per een or 3.0 w/o U-233.

t . ! 4.3.2 Place ineo-ine sample vials and liquids in caxi=um 1 c= ' * ----= '-'-= l 5t2 90 ' -M m;, c:cas r.1:.r.;, anc c:.spostn; of samples usic; i the croc: dure f :the te:7.c7 c' ceve e.xtene -t anv a: cne seven . j 1 .:.c areas =ay be used for the sc=ple . >.uen can. 1 4.3.3 :nventory weekly following the saee procedure as for the wet lab.

l. 4 The hc12 ay is li:.ited to one safe batch. Place cll incomin samplaa and l'.quib in ::ni=u-. 5 gallen containers in the limit area on tha counter.

Do not ceu'le etcch cc=pler er bec: o! samples. Do not accept say =cre

ct.11 n:n this c:ca is full. 4 1 . _. . . . . _ _ . . ~

                         '3 .          :.a.ar f: eni.;: in c:cn:1: in'cnd cut of tne icb as needed.

3 j . .. ,

 )              $.*     ,
                           .e                                                                           .;'       .       .

g ..

                 ' v- -                                                                                        ISSUE DATE           INST M T:C.';tc.

l * . . r.c.h..._,. .,t- . . . . . . "' , 1 1 ., t . .a .. RJi:;.;TCING i -. t.i dqvi . h.I

                                                                  . ._ .\. 1..   . . . . . ..L,

.J....l }

C-2.0 - QA-IG-

                          .-                                                                                   SU'ERSEDES t'                            TITLE: CRITICALITY SA.ITY CONTROL                             ISSUE DATED:    .

i

                    ~

s ,j CH22CT LAD p c, 3 c,3

;                                      4.5.2            The following may be transported together as one intransic unit.

P

a. Any number of loose sample vials

b. One bag of sample vials l

j c. One 5 gallon (23 quare) or smaller vessel i

 +

d. Six capped fuel rods 4.5.3 Only one intransit unit may be moved per person per trip. Do not leave

;                                                     intransit units unattended.
;                        4.6      Posting, labeling, and marking 4.6.1 All areas shall be pected using tha for=at shown in Exhibit-2 to reflect t

he limits given in this procedure. I 4.6.2 Follow all posted instructions. L'han in doubt refer to this procedure for details or contact your supervisor. 4.6.3 .ill containers of uranium shall be identified ytth enrichment tape. ] 4.6.4 Observe limit area sud dead zone markings for: .t, .j a. Rod storace arce-limit area and dead zone around the south est ! portion of the wet lab. ] b. Each product pail storage area-a limit area around each pail and j a dead zone around each pail or group of pails. 1

c. QC corner-dead zone markings around the_ entire QC corner.

4.6.5 Do not' store materi in dead :enes. Uranium may pass through 4 4 a dead rene only to enter or leave a limit area. 4.7 Emerr,ency 3Ltuationc (ccc Exhibit 3) 4.7.1 Muclear warning clarn will sound a continuous loud cona in the even:

of a criticality eccident.

i j 4.7.2 All personnel chall evacuate as quickly as possibic to the neares: ex :.

!                                4.7.3 Cs directly ctry from the building and proceed to the stagin crea
,                                                  rhrt n on the cutcched diccrca.

t 4.7.4 reoccc'ive . clothin; thall not be re r.'ed. 2 4 1 4 . 'i . "  : enn:1 ncli r'.unin until the st:ging crea supertisor decl_: 23 i...,.,__. . . . . . . . . . . _ -

a .. . . i , , l

3. , . - ,

w . , l EXF.03:7 . i i:ETi G SMPl.IS I l . l t s l DATE I TD!! ' RECEIVED s l DGI? SALANCE . BY ! i I  ! l l 1 i i l I I l t l l l  ! l

                                               ,               .                 ,                                                         i f                I                 f                                                         I I                I                 I                                                         I l                l                 !                   I                                     I I               i                  i                  i                                       i
                                              !               I                  i                  i                                       i i               !                  !                  I                                       l I                  i                  i                                        I I
                                                              ,                                     ,                                      i e                                          8                                     l                                      l i                         .                I                  '

I l t  ? I 1

                                                                                                   .                                   .i I i                          !               !                   i                 l                                      l l                          i               i                   :                 i                                      I I                         I               i                   i                  l                                      I I                          i               i                   I                  l                                      l l                          l               l                   !                  I                                      i i                          l.              I                   i r                           .       j l                          i                                  i                   l                                      l I               I                  I                  l                                       !

l I I  : I i I - I i

                 !                         !               l                  :                   I                                     ?
           .I                              !               l                  -

i . i  !  : l I i I  ! l  ;

                                          ,               ,                                      i                                      -
                                                                                           ,     ,                                      i
               .                                          !                                      i                                      !
                                          .               i                                      !                                      -

r  !

i f ( ... y

                   *5+                                            ..

s

                                                                                   .               c           .    <

t . < t - cs.totei i

                                                                                                                    . \

u n. s *

                                                         %. ,                         \     i.          I           a-                         .g              %....            .-     t i

i e i i

= m .R ***** .s% ~ ,

z.r* & .' as , ( g \. h:'(' L {S. 4 i __ . . _ . ..__ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .. ... _ l Ie Q U' c . 0 L[u[nw _ . _ _ l l a .e= r :sm is a a c: a i f9mmum f. . , .i. s ., .tt $ ,. . a e ita= E g 3 L {;

                                                                                .m.J ii sz e' {u.:.                      s. 1.c%. g 6 !! " l,4 , * ,; i-\ C %i                                                        .

1 o ,., f.

                                                      = a-                  t        ., g
                               . l ,. \

r. . f / :; .f. .t. l} =

l .. . .

                        ...a       .          4
                                                                ..      . 6 g
                                                                                     , t; a.=              m.u                  . . . . . . - . . _ . . . _ ..                         -- ... -                    .              _ . . . . .

l i r ,. ,* e a e-- . .

                                                                                                                    .             4 s                               .

e,.. .4. ' .s.s.;4w.... . .w l. .

                                                                                                                              . u
                                                                                                                   * -*        ,. %                                                                       a%=% .            mi           %

2 ,% ,m, lt se. l .. s, s . % s s..  %. b sv.I . h - i r~. . 4, .. 8% .a ; e,. s.- m &, . $. e i *a

           .                                                                                                       Lb E I                       %                                                              \(-           .w i                                                                                                                   ===                                                                                 *-                         .g t
                                                                                                                             .                  m                                                       .Q                                  m i

j

                                                                                                                                            .N 4

s % ..Ii.Ae e

                                                                                                                                                                                                                .w.8              .

J *-

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        %, si
                        ,m,                                        0
                                                                                  '1
                                                                                                    =                                                     a0
                              * , -                                                                 ,1. ,* , e r; s.-
                              . .             .*: <= , I .y                                                                                                    -
                                                                                                                                                                             . . . g I; b .%  E % IL       ' . er3r,a      k \'a,s,ac..,yem L b b . k (*%*
                                     .'4a.%.' D I. k q.
                       '%            e.                                          e                                                                                                                 -
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    ..r m = m t

j

:a s.a.=.ei = .. ..----c .. ,-- u . . .rsam . arc.ama u . _ _ . . . a vun. - s-m s. = .-ru . . .w--w.-- e. - . .3n 5

s:ar- - - srussa =sa::a v. n t :s :- . . . a. aww r : r = a - e -- -.--- -- -. - .c. - . . : . i e s.. .4. a 2 ,. .. ;. e .w.: i s a.. t . .- .. . ..= .:: es.re--:.z ..==.a . .- . . . 4 2 : . .. --

                                                                                                                                                                                                                        .t.     . e -- .- :. r '

q ,$ s

                                                                                                .         .t                         .       .

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     .       1
                  .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         1
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             ~

0 fl L' C L E A R S A F E T Y P. ll L L E I l fi f. . O.i < Cl!!f! Call 1Y LIEF $r:8C'.* PI tXEDelltE / '

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         ~
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                ^*       k e

1.<

         ' cariched thenium is processt.d into nuclect fuel in this building.                                                                                                                                                                      #

j Enricled L'r ::1um, a fissile material, is capable of sustaining a cleain reaction. h (

     '!!th Ic.s enrichaments involved, end cafeguards that are in place, the probal.111ty of a criticality acci.!ce.t occurring is extre nely remot'e;
     !:-. ar, the poccibility resi-ino --------

h'<e efore. if the Criticality Alar.n (a pirreinn continuoun howl) sounds, evacuate insiediascly.

                                          .                                                                                              +=

e

                                                                                                                                                                                                                ~

M.

                                       .        ,f                                                                                               .r.                  _....'._          -_ _ _. . . _._                      ........_._
                                                                                                                                        *.     ..) f a ? t**w is   ._ ( -l.

g 8.ai.e * * = * ~ e J. i l g i

                                       *

• t .. . . .

g gelassera r Felleelses t I Y ~~ -* t g = = -- eun g 6 0 0f f.eeve s s e m -- $0**8*8 'eyermatala6 A*.robly * ** E ls es.8 :. e' f .ll

                       <                                                                                        !         l                                                                                         ..t..

I  ! '.' ~ l l j ._

                                                                                                                                                          ..                  .  /e                               .          <

i . t g $ * * *""*~"" ~ i lO

                                                                                                                                              .-- .                  -=..g'._.-~-.;                                 g. *.                    l. --                        R*-

g ( ,

• I.

                                                                                                                       ',,'...... , i
                                                                                                                                                                        ._.tl_                                                              .g J.

t . ,,. 1- 1 r'eut<*a. . _ i._ _ .. ___L . . _ l 49 50 4 ,*

                                                                                                                                                                          'd

( - S T s; - r > -

                                               ~

t lere..=s 144. I . rv . . . , t

                                                                      .,,..I_,_.                #                                   ..

s. 8 8 * *. s .

                                                                                             .,                                                                                                                     esw e- -.

w e u 4. . ..

                                                  .                                                                      . na e    .r-,.

STI'I'S TO F01.1.Old: -

 . 1:ur , do not w: elk.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               '

leo ,iot 1.other to remove protective cl.shinn. Cr t out of t he- 1.ullding ley t he inwest illrcre s'out e. s.u in f re c e l y t-: .iy f roin t he. liul l.li sist g

            ..     .     .     ... .. ...                   . . . .       .        . . .. e e e s..              .e-            .......     ..I    e t... e ... e e i s .. ..     .....I r e e .e l e. I !.. s e easie 1 I s e ! =                       .

• I .-

t, n. , - w - ' U.S.NUCt. EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i APPENOlX TO MIGUI.ATORY GUICE 3.29 INSTRUCTION CONCERNING RISKS FROM OCCUPATIONAL RADIA This instreedonal matertal is intended to provide the The biological effects t4at are known to occur after user wie currently the abest known besttheavailable informados health risks from espoeste concerasas to what is . exposung to high desse(hundreds loessess radiation.1 A quesdom and answer format has been discussed earty la the document: 'ilaan=aaa of the esti. used. The questions were developed by 2e NRC staff la mated risks from 2e low occupanonal dose (<S rems per coasmitation wtta workers unios representadves and year) follow. It la latended that this informadoa wGl help fle===== repressanatives esponseced la radiation protection develop an attitude of healey respect for de risks asso-tramas. Risk estimasse have been compded from ausnerous ciated with I dM . rather than unaecomery feet or lack sources genera 0y recognised as reliable. A bibliography is of concera. Additional guidance is boog or wdl be devel. oped incilided for the user interssed in further study, concermas other toptos in radianos protecnon trannang. 1

1. Whatis n.smer by eish?

asumme thatJose health effects do occur at the towar expo-save levels. 3 Riskcut be Wlat peeralas the pebsWh) of injury, iDases, or dese seeminst front some assertry. y.

!                                                                                                                                ,k,, f, ,,,,,,, g? ,,,,,, ,jy,,,,, g,g,7,g ,ff,,,,, ,,g 1                                   However. me perception of risk is affected by how the individual views its probability and its seventy. The intest of thas dosamensja to Jiaovide a===== of andesplaim the                                     a. Prompt effectsare observeble shortly afterreceives bass for pasable risk of injury, illness, oc death reenting                       a very targe dose in a short pertod of time. For example a from occupesonal radiados exposure. (See Quesnons 9 and                           whole body' does of d50 rems (90 does the annual dose to for estumates of radiation sisk and contparisons with                          Umst for roudne occampadonal expoenre) in an hour to as other types ofitsk.)

{' arence adult wil cause voednas and danarhes witaan a few hours: loss of hair, fever, and weight los withan a few

2. .

Wher e,e she possiede heetat effeca of erpen,m so weeks: and about a 50 percent chance of death wittua

                                            .sediealoal                                                               60 days without medical treatment.

Some of the besith effects that espesute ta ama,4am b. Delayed effects asch as cancer may occur years after exposure to radistipa. may cause are cancer (including leukemia), birth defects the future chddren of exposed parents and cataracts $ These effects (with the excepnos of genetic effects) have

c. Genetic effects cza occur when there is tudiadon been observed la studies of medical radiologists ursanam the pu mW h effe W 20m

{ maaers, radium wortars and radiotherapy panents who as birth defects or other conditions in the future c.*uldren the exposed individual and ascceeding generations as have received tarse doses of radiation. Studies of people demonstrated is animal experimenta. However, excess exposed to radiation from atomic weapons have also sonstic effects :learly caused by radiation have not been provided data on redistion effects. la addition. radiation observed in human populations exposed to radiation. It has

 ;'                               effects studies with laboratory aanmals have provided a                           been observed, however, that radiation can change the tarse body of data 'on radiatsooinduced health effects.                                      a cells of the humm Wy. Thus the pubdity

[ I3 * ***** exists that genetic effects can be caused in humans by low doses even though no direct evidence exists as yet.

 .                                          The obseresdons and snalles menhoned above                              4        homever.

fa .orkes'preteeries. =Aich efferirare afmort canrent j involve levels of radiation esposure that are much higher to the NAC?

(hundreds of rems) than those permitted occupationally

#                               today ( <3 rems per yeat). Although scudies have not shown a The main concern to the NRCis the delayed incidence

[ cause1(fect relatsonsato between health effects and of current cancer. The chance of delayed canceris believed to depend levels of occupational radiation exposure, it is pivdent to

- e.. . . u . ,.e r-% ~ m., % ,,, w v .n . . . -..

a.. er,,. ,.u e .a ain -e.-- .~i~a=o.1-= = m e

                                 ,, 7,ag,, g .,s.-e.e er            .s n           - .e.

2

s. ,tm. .o

a. e- . ~ .. a r

                                                ..a.a w is.      .. e ,         .
                                                                                             . , .       .e
                                                                                                              -   .ui.e.
                                                                                                                   .      r, i. .ee.,.

e , ri., ao

                                                                                                                                                  ,e. e
                                                                                                                                                         , ..u e-...

a e.- e.e

                                                                                                                                                                       - a , ..u.. e eev moi .

n... s

                                                                                                                                                                .      .u    .e    n         ,u    ..

s.a.3 AGJedto, . A___.

    <.m _ -,_ _ _ . - _.                                                        __-               -
                                                                                                                   -m_                     _ _ . s. _

t. , .

0l' CD n b f

                                          >=

c ** N u.

                                         ^
                                                                          // /
                                                                               /

o 4 /

                                                                     /
                                                          /
                        '                               /                           3
                                                   /                          o
                                             >s

\ I f 100 . \ DOSE (REMS)

                                                                                 ,                                    s            e f

e 71gure 1. Some proposed models for how theh of radiation my with doses.st low levels. I t i limitst doses should be kept as low as is reasonably achievable t (A LA AA). 1000 draws. We can say that if you receive a radiation dose, j you wdl have increased your chances of aventually developtag l We don't know exactly what the chancesare of getting cancer. It is assumed that the more radiation exposure you cancer from a low 4evel radiados dose, but we can make get, the more you increase your chances of cancer. } esernates bened on extensive scientific knowledge. The i j esamates otradiadon risks are at least as reliable as estimates for the effects from any chemical hasard. Seing exposed Not all workersincur the same Izvel of risk. The radia- ? to typical occupational radiation doses is taking a chance, tion risk incurred by a worker depends on the amount of but that chance is reasonably wou understood, dose received. Under the linear model explained above, a j worker who receives $ rems in a year incurs 10 times as 1 it is important to understand the probability factors muca risk as another worker (the same age) who receives i here. A similar quesmon would be: If you select one card only 0.3 rom. The nsk depends not only on the amount of j from a full deck, wdl you get the ace of spades? This dose, but also on the age of the workerat the tame the dose is i question cannot be answered with a simple yes or no. The received. This ase difference is due, un part, to the fact that ! best answer [s that your chances are I in 52. However, if a young worker has more time to live than an older worker. l 1000 people each select one card from full decks, we can and the ruk is believed to depend on tas. number of years l predict that about 20 of them will get an ace of spades, of life following the dose. The more years left, the targer i Each person wGI have I chance in 5 of drawing the ice of the ruk. It should be clear that, even withs the.regulatery dose limits, the ruk may vary a great deal from one worker Spades, but there is no way that we can predict which persons to anotAer. Fortunately, only a very few workers receive wdl get the risat card. The issue is further complicated by the doses , need 3 rems per year, as pointed out in the answer to fact that in ! drawing by I'000 people, we might get only iJ nascesses and in another perhape S correct cards us Quescon 19. the averste annual dose for all radiation workers is less than 0.3 rem. M

                .a.-.--..                                          - - . _ :         . . - . -              - . . .                     --                 - .-                   - - . . ---
   ;             .                           .                                                                                                                                                             I
                           .,*                   o,                                                                                                                                                        l di'                   -

l .' life espectancy lost on the average from a radiaden induced

  !                                                                                                                                                             TABLE 2
  ,                                             cancer. It has been esumated in sowral studies that the e

awrage loss of life expostancy from exposure to radiation la Esdmated t.om of Life Expectancy from Health Riska:

 ,                                             about I day per som of exposase. la other wordt a person                                                  ;

esposed to i resa of radieden asy, on the awr ge, !cas  ; I day of life. The words "os me avesage" are important. ) however, bossnes the person who geo caneer from radisson Ersamages of Days of j raay lose several years of!!fe expectancy while his coworkers Life Expectancy 1.ast,  ;

                                                                                                                          .Heelsh Risk                                              Average suffer no lost The ICRP estunated that the average number of years of life lost from fatal fadustrial accidents is 30                  Smoking 20 cigarettes / day                       2370 (6.5 years)             i while the average number of years of life lose from a fatal                  Owrweight(by 20%)
,                                                                                                                                                                               985 (2.7 years)            !

radiariosHaduced cancer is 10. The shorter loss of life AD assadents combined 435 (1.2 years)  ! expectansy is due to the deisyed oanst of cancer. Auto assadents 200 Alcohol consamptica (U.S. awress) 130

                                                       !!is haparrear to realize that these risk numbers are                Home accidents

95 only estienstes. Many difEcuttles are involves in dessning Drownang 41 rosesrek studies that can accurately messare the sman Natural background radiation, 8 1 increases is cancer cases due to low expoenres ts radiation calculated as compared to the normal rate of cancer. There is sdn Medical diagnosde x-rays (U.S. 6 uncertainty and a great deal of controversy with regard to average), calculated 4

estimates of radission risk. The numbers used here result Au catastrophes (earthquake, etc.) 3.5 from sadies involving hack doses and high dose rates, and I rom occupationalradiation dese,

,                                                                                                                                                                                   1 they may not apply to doses at the lower occupational                             calculated (industry average for levels of exposure. The NRC and other agencies both in the
 '                                                                                                                           the higher dose job categories is                                         .

United States and abroad are continuing extenave long range 0.65 rent /yr) 1 Tessarsh programs os radianos cisk. I rem /yr for 30 years. calculated JO Some members a the N.do.ai Ac.demyascisacas _

}                                         8f.!R Advisory Commattee and others feel that ask estunares                          ag g         ,        3             g g., %

l in Table I are hasher than would actuaHy occur and repressat parass,,ves. aa J %. tetc.

                                      ' an upper !!mit on the risk. Other scientists believg that i                                   the esamares are low and that the ask could be higher.                                  A second useAal companson is to look at asumates of However, these esumates are comadered by the NRC stan the average number of days of life expectancy lost from to be the best avaGable that the worker esa use to malce as                      exposure to radiation and from common industnal accidents informed decision cone =rmas acceptance of the risks asso-j                                                                                                                        at radiamon-related facGiries and to compare this number cland with exposuss to radaanon. A worker who dec' ides to with days lost from other occupational accidents. Table 3 accept this nsk should make every effort to kesp exposare                        shsws average days of !!fe expectancy lost as a resalt of

)} to radiacon ALARA to avoid unnecessary risk. The worker, after all, has the first line resposabGity for protecdag himself fatal work related accidents. Note that the data for occupa-

,                                       from radiation hasards.                                                          tions other than radiation relatad do not include death risks from other posable hasards such as exposure to toxic chem-j icals, dusts, or unusual temperatures. Note also that the P

10. /few ces we compere redleries ifrkJo otherkinds af unhkely occupational exposure at 5 rems per year for 50 henfrA risAst yesta, the maximum allowable risk level, may result in a nsk comparable to the aversse rish.s in minuts and heavy Perhaps the most useful unit for companson among construction.

health nsks is the average number of days of life expe'tancy e lost per urut of exposure to each pardcular health risk. Industnal accident rates in the nucisar industry and Estimates are calculated by looking at a large reumber of per-related occupational areas have been reistivety low dunns sons, recording the age when death occurs from apparent the entire history of the industry (see Table 4). This is i causes, and estimating the number of days of Ilfe lost as a believed to be due to the early and conttnuing emphasts on result of these early deaths. The total number of days of eight safety controls. The relative safety of vanous occupa-Life lost is then averaged over the total group observed. tronal areas can be seen by companns the probability of death by accident per 10.000 workers over a 40 year Several studles have compared the projected loss oflife working lifetime. These figures do not include death expectancy resulting from exposure to radiation with other from posable causes such as exposure to tonic chemicals or health risks. Scar representanve rtumbers are presented in radiatson. Table 2.

11. Cae a worker become trente orimpotentfrom occupe.

These estimates indicate that the health nsks from o'ccu. nonef radianon c.rpoasset 3 sauonal radiation esposure are smaDet than the nska asso- ] nated with many othereventsoractivities we encounterand . Obsetvation of radiation therapy patients who re:stve accent m normal day to day activitaea. Iocalised exposures, usually spread over a few weeks. has _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ -- __ _ --- - - -5.29 7- -- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

              - - .         --.a               _.--                 - u                         --.:, .        - a. . .                          ---.u.-                   -.

l

• d *-

di' . individual and couestive doses are reduced by reducing the i cancer for the worker population. At best, the total risk

                   ,               time of esposare or decreasing radiation levels in the

-l working ermronment. remains the same, and it may own be increased. De only 1 's way to reduce the risk is to reduce the co!! active doset that I can be done only by reducm3 the radianca lawls, the IJ. Wher de meest hp codfeeWre dear and why should it working ames, or both.  ;

i

a he mehrasised ALARA? '

17. Why doesn *r the NRCimpose voGeestre dose limits?

,l Nasieur ladmary activides espose am iacreasing msnber h of people to oesupational radiation in additicpi to the radia-li Compuance with individual dose limits can be achieved den doses they recetve from natural badtground radiation j simply by using estra workers. However, compliance with a and mediaal radiadon eaposeres. no coussem occupadonal l; couestive does urait (such as 100 person ams per year for a does (person roms) is the aim of an occupadonal radiation esposere rese ved by aR the workers in an entire worker He==) would roquare reductica of radiation lowls. H workans dmee, or both. But there are many problems poputsace. For example, if 100 workers each recem 2: ems, associated wtth setting appropriate co!!sctrve dose Haits, the individ sal dose is 2: eras and the coueenve does is 200 3 person roms. The total additional risk of cancer sat genetic 's effects la as esposed population is aamsmed to depend on For example, we adskt consider applyms a single iI the codestive desa, cousctive does limit ta au liceasses. The selectice of asch a

    !                                                                                                               coAectm does limit would be almostimposable because of lt should be noted that, from thet r,. t of risk to                      the wide variadcas ia couscuve doses among licensees.

O A power reactor could reasonably be esrpected to have an

{ a total population,it is the couestm does that must be con-1* average ananal conectm does of several hundred person-tround. For a given conective does, the number of health rems. Jfowever, a anau 89aan=1 radiography licensee effects is namented to be the same swa if a largertmsaber of i! could very weG have a couacave does of only a few person-people share the does. Derefore, sprendaag the does out rents in a year.

l any reduce the individual tisk, but not that of the population.

, Evea choosing a couacdve dose linait for a poup of Efforts should be made to maintain the callecdvs does sunGar licensees would be almost as dif!! cult. Radiostaphy A!,A AA so as not to unnecessardy increase the owrnd popula-licensees as a group had as average coGestm dose in,1977 tion nacidence of cancer atd genetic effects.

of 9 persospreme. However, the smallest codecstve dose for a radiography Lissases was less tilaa 1 persons and the fd. Is the use of eras workerr a seed wp ar reducerd:Ar? !argest was 401 person-roms.

       ,                                There is a "yes" answer to this question and a "no"                                     Setting a reasonable couecdvs does limit for each indi-'

answer. For a sma job involvmg esposure to radiattaa, vidual licensee would also be very difficult. It would the more people who share the work, the lower the average require a record of all past couscave doses on which to base dose to an individual. The lower the dose, the lower the sich Umats. $steing as anasial couecave dose limit would 1 Tisk. So, for yo's as an individual, the answer is "yes." then smaunt to an atternpt to predict a reasonable couecdve r does for each future year. la order to do this, it would be But how about the risk to the entire group of workers? necessary to be able to predict changes in each licensed Under asaamptions used by the NRC for purposes of protec- actrvity that would lacrease or decrease the collective dose. tion, the risk of cancer depends on the total amount of in addidon, annual cousctive doses vary agasfIcantly from '] radiation energy absorted by human tisase, not on the year to year according to the kind and amount of mainte-

  )                          number of people to whom this tismae belongs. Therefore,if j                                                                                                               nance required, which cannot genersity be predicted la 30 workers are used to do a job insteed of 10 and if both advance. Following an sich changes and revians limits up

]' groups get the same, couective dose (person-tems), the total and down would be very difficultif notimposable. However.

    ,                       cancer risk is the.eame, and nothing wee gained for the                              these efforts would be necessary if a collacuve dose limit j                            group by uang 30 workers. From this wwwpoint tNe answer                               were to be reasonable and help minirnize doses and risks.

1 is "no.** The risk wee not reduced but simply spread d around among a larger number of persons.

18. How are rediation dose limits essablished?

Unfortunately, spreading the risk around often res lts The NRC establishes occupational radiation dose in a larger ecllectm dose for the job. Workers are exposed timits based on guidance to Federal agencies from the as they approach a job, while they are setting onented to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and, in addition., l( do the job, and as they withdraw from the job. The dose li considers NCRP and ICRP recommendauons. Scienttfic received during these actions is called nonproduenvv. If reviews of research data on biologscal effects such as the several crew changes are required, the nonproducuve dose BEIR report are also considered. can become vety large. Thus it can be seen that the use of extra workers may actually increase the total occupational For example, recent EPA guidance recommended dose and the resalting collective naka, that the annual whole-body Jose limit be established at 5

;i                                                                                               -

rems per year and indicated that exposare, year after year, {[ ' The use of estra workers to comply with NRC dose to 5 rems would involve a risk to a worker comparacts to

• timits is not the way to reouco the risk of radiation induced, the averpe riska incurred by workers in the htsher ruk Joos h

a! da 8.29 9 I , _ , .- _ ____--.____-._.-_.s__. -.4- - _-___-__-,--,.._o,m ,_-

                                                                                                                                     - _ , , -        _.y,v -r - _ - - - . . - . _ _ - - . - - - - - . - . . - -

    ,-                    m .-w... w -                                            <        w:                         -
                                                                                                                                       - o                          w: = =.a-                                                                     = - -   -

J , . . 4

             -                                    t 4             ,.                                   g                                                         .

by radiation. The BEIR comrnittee concluded that clairas of hasher risk had "no substance." levet radiation according to the unear model explained i Question 7. Based on this approach, the regulations ia 10

  '                                                          The NRCsta# condsmauy reviews t'he results of research           Part 20. " Standards for Protecuon Against Radiation." als on radiosos risks. With respeet to large.ecale studies of                    state that Licensees should maintasa all radiation exposures, radianee.iaessed health effee s la human populations                         and releases of radioactave matertals in effluents.

wrpened to low 4evet iemanas radiados, the NRC and EPA reasonably achievable. More recent scientific restews of the have recently coastuded that there is no one populahon large body of esperimental data, sich as the SEIR 80 and I

  !                                            group avadable for which asch a sandy could be expeced to                     me recent EPA suadance. continua to support the view that provide a more menaingful estimate of the low 4evel radia-                    use of a M w-year limit is acceptable in practice.
  '                                            tion risk. This is due, in large part, to the observed and                    Experience has shown that, under 2is limit, the average
                                              ==6==*ed low incidenes of radistfos health effects from                       does to workers is neer 0.3 tem /yr with very few workers Iow doses. However, the results of ongong studies, sich as                     conastently approaching the umit.

i eat on austeer shipyard workers, win be carefuGy reviewed and the development of a rediscom. worker registry is c. There is little to asia. J bees consdered - as a possible dass base for Aaassa studies. Reducingthe dose limits. for eramplecto d.$ retriyr

;                                          2J.                                                                              has been analysed ay the NRCstaff. An estunated 2.6 minion Is%st Emdar/   ere the ressoarfor mer lowerwer de NRC                 dest person-roms could be saved from 1980 th trash the year 2000 by nuclear power plaat                                                   t!r======                         if compliance Assuming that the 5-rom-per. year limit is adopted,              with the new lianit were achieved by lowering the radiadon there are three reasons:                                                          levels, working times, or both, rather than by uang extra j

workers. Itis estimated that somethanglike $23 bHlion would j a. Hemisk riska are already low. be spent toward this purpose. Spending 523 biEloa to save

                                                .                                                                          2.6 rainion person.vens would amount to spending 530 to 190 minion to prevent each poteadal andfation.isduced The awh== tad health risks assomated with current averses occupadonal radiation doses (e.g., 0.5 remlyr for                           premature cancer death. Soesery canaderstfris costlanaccept.
)                                                                                                                          ably high forindividual protecnon.

50 years) are comparable to or less than ask levels is other j occupational areas considered to be among the safest. If a 2d. person were exposed to the mazzmum of $ rems per year Are there ery meer of costern e&out rediestos riskt for 50 years, which virtuaGy never occurs, he or site might ther mrght result la changerg she NAC dose Ilmrsr/ incur a risk comparable to the average tssks in suams and heavy construction. An occamonal 5-rem annual does might Yes. Three areas of concess to the NRCstaff are specifi-caDy identified belowt be neessaary to allow some jobs to be done without a significant increase in the conective dose. If the does lisaits [ s ' Aa independent study by Roest and Maysand other j were lowered asmficandy, theinumber of people requared to complete many jobs would increase. The causettre does biological research have indicated that a given dose of would then increase dnce more individuals would be neutron radiation raay be tutore likely to cause biological f receiving nonproductres exposare while entesing and effects than was previously thought. Other recent studies l cast doubt on the issue. The NCRP is currently studying the l,

                                 !aaving the work area and preparms for the job. The total number of health effects might go up as the collective dose                             data related to the neutron radiation question and is

/ increased. expected to make recommendations as to whetherneutron f dose limits should be changed. Although the scientific

b. The current regulations are conadered sound, community has not yet come toscreement ort this quescon.

worksts should be advised of the possibdity of hig!ter essk j  ;. when entering areas where exposure to neutrotts will occur. ? The regulatory standards for dose limits are based on the recommendations of the Federal ltadiation Council, 0 b. It has been known for some time that rapidly j At the time these standards were developed, about 1960. it was conadered unlikely that exposure to these levels duttng growing living ttssua is morescastuvo to iajury frem radiation h

• than tissue in which the cells are not reproducing rapidly, a workans liferirne would result in clinical evidence of

'                            insury or disease different from that occurring in the                                   Thus the embryo or fetus is more sonsttsve to radiation unexposed population. The scientific data base for the                                    insury than an adult. The NCRP recommended in Report standards conasted pnraartly of human experience (x-ray                                   No. 39 that spJctal precautions be taken when an occupa.

exposures to medical practitioners and panents ingescon tionsBy exposed woman could be pregnant in order to of radium by watch dial painters early effects observed in protect the embryo or fetus. In 1975, the NRC issued Japanese atomic bomb sarvivors, redon exposures of Regulatory Guide 8.13. "Instruenon Concerning Prenstal ersnium miners, occupational radiation accidents)involvuts Radiation Espasure." in which it ts recommended that try large doses delivered at high dose rates. The data base licensees instr'act all workers concerning this spectal risk. also included the results of a large number of animal The guide recommends that all workers be advtsed that the lexpenments invo'iving high deses and dose rates. The animal NCRP recommended that the maximum permissible dose to raperiments were particularly umi'u! in the evaluanort of the embryo pr fetus from occupanonal exposure of the genetic effects. The observed effects were related to low.

• mother shourd alot exceed 0.5 em for the fun 9. month

.                                                                                                                    pregnancy penod. In addition, the guade suggests optsarts
     - . . -   - - - - - - _ , _ . - _ _ - - _ . . _ _ - _                                      . _ _        h                 _..__.-__-.--,.e...,__.-..                 , , , - , - - - . . - _ . . . - . , - - - - - - . - . , . . . , - ~ , .

sn w w - - -_...-:,.a._ u. =a  := a u. -. 1 o C .; 2 51' ' may be contaminated. Radioactive materials may enter the body by bouts breathed in, taken in with food or drink, or limit. ICRP recommends that the internal and e being absorted through the skin, particularly if the skin is should be appropriately added. This recommendacon is broken. currently under study by the staffs of the NRC, tas EPA. and the Occupanonal Safety and Health Administrauen (OSHA). After entertog the besy, the radioacuve material will smigrate to particular orgaae or particular parts of the body J0. depending on thebiochemistry of the matenaL For exampia, New is a worker *s eerernatiedisse, dese determsnedt uraanam will tend to deposit in the bones where it wd1 remais for a long time. It is slowly eliminated from the A worker may weer three types of radiation. measuring body, moesty by way of the kidneys. Radium will also tend devices. A self.readias pecket dosuneter recstds the exposure to depoest la the bones. Radioecette iodine wdt seek out the to incident radiation and can be read out immediately upon thyroid glands (located la the neck) and depost there, finishing a job involving external exposure to radiation. A f!!st bedge or TLD badge records radiation does, either by The dass frcun these internal emitters cannot be mee.the amount of darkening of the film or by stor.ng energy fa sured either by the G!m badge or by other ordinary dosim. the TLD crystal Both these devices reqmre proceemas to eters camed by the worker. This means that the internal determine the dose but are eaaada=d more reliable t redisuon dose must be separately moortored uses other the pocket dosimeter. A worker's off!cial report of dose

 ,                    detection methods,                                                           received is normally based on filas or TLD badge reasings, which primde a cumulative total and are more accurate.

Inter =tal exposure can be estimated by messanns the Jf. radiation emarted from the body or by messarms the Wher me my optsons ifIdeeide ser to secept theright radioscuve materials costassed in biological samples such as essemered with osaspedoned ressories esposere! urtas or feces. Dose estunates can also be made if one if the risks from exposure to radiantes that may be knows how much radioactive materialis a the air and the length of time during which the air was breathed. expected to occur durtas your work are unacceptable to you, you could request a transfer to a job that dose not 2C Newsre thelhaistforiamennissposure ser/ involve exposure to r-d'"- _ Nowever, the risks associated

 ;                                                                                                with exposure to radianca that workers, on the average,
;                                                                                                actually recette are conadored acceptabla, compared to Standards have been established for the maximum i

permissible amount of each radionuclide that may be othee occupational riska, by virtually all the scientific j -

             , accumulated in the critical organas of the worker's body,                         groups that have studied them. Your employer is probably not obligated to guaras.tes you a transferif you deeds not Calculations are made to determine the quantify of                  to accept as asagnment requanas exposure to radianos.

radioactive matertal that has been taken into the body and j the total dose that would result. Then, based on.!imita established foi particular body orgsas staular to 1% rems You also have the opuen of seeking other employment i la a calendar it uarzer for wticle body expostre, the regule. la a sonradiation occupanon. However, the studies that l have compared occupauonal asks in the nucisarindustry to tions spectly maxinium permissible concentrations of radio. active matenal in the air to which a worker can be exposed those in other job areas indicate that nuclear work is for 40 hours per week over 13 weelcs or I calendar quarter, relatsvely safe. Thus, you wdl not necessardy flad agiuf. 1 icantly tower usks in anotherjob. L The regulations also require that efforts be made to keep internal exposure ALARA. A third option would be to practice the most effecuve Internal exposure *ss con trolled by 'imiting the release of work procedures so ss.co keep yourexposure ALARA. Se radioactive matenalinto the air and by carefully monitoring aware that reducing time of exposure, maintaining distance from radiation sources, and usms shielding can all lower the work area for aarborne radiwJ6i and surface con. your exposure. Plan radiation jobs carefully to increase tsmtnation. Protective clothing and respiratory (breathing) protection should be used whenever the possabdity of efficiency whde in the radiation area. Learn the most contact with loose radioactive materialcannot be prevented'. effective methods of usmg protecnve clothms to avoid contamination. Discuss your job with the radiation protec.

29. Is the dose a perren reeervedfrom instrnet exponere tion personnel who can suggest additional ways to reduce your enposure, added to ther retetredfrom e2rerwet espesure?

J2. Exposure to radiation that results from radioactive Whrre can Igetaddinanethformation o e rediatrar rssk? matenals taken im the body is measured, recorded, and reported to the worker separatelf from etternal dose. The The following list suggests sources of usefulinforms. tion on radiatten nsk: nternal dose to the whole body or to specific orgsas does not at this time countagamst the 3-rem.per cslendst-quarter s. Your Empioper

                     'Cneteas arven nfen w taase serw or me test 'Wawee8e toI neie-een Jamaw wen u eene. tune, invreed. and eenw swirems waen sanasa nomeason mnenais ws epaesacrate or camen ata ano neer.               "                The rsdiation protection or health physica offka in tne t'acdity wnere you are employed.

t J MN

aw s.._- -

                                            %a _ _                                            m a    .          ,                                     .

1 li' ' t 1 N SISLIOGRAPHY

t a

ha-*== Casest Sosisty,1979 Ceneer reets and figures, i 197L laternational Commismos on Radiological Protection;Andle-rson hereerfo's Recommendations of the laternadona Inderosa, T.W., "Radiados Expoeste of Hanford Workers: Consumoa on Radiolostcal .% -c.r.ic,.6,ICRP Publicadon 26 . Pergamon Press, Januany 1977. A Caldque of the Mancuso, Stewart, and Kaeale Report * *

]                  Nasith Phyaler, Vol JS, December 1978.

q Esisey, C.A.,"Companson of Relative Risk frora Radiados Archer, V.E., " Effects of Low 4avel Radiados: A Critical Exposare and Other Common Haaards," #est:A Phynes, Vol 33, Augast 1978. Review,"Mesiese Safety, Vol 21, No. I, laauary. February 1978, ,l Lapp, R.5, De Aadiation controversy, Reddy Connounica-l Atomie Energy Comausmaa, Operwetonal Accidents and tions, las., Gresawich, r*a=a=Meine 1979, Aadistfos Expomare Esperance, WASH-I192. Fall 1975.

• Lapp, R.E., A Idseter's cuide to Aedierson, Atondeindustnal Barnett, M.H., De Biologiaal Effeest oflenising Redienent An overview, Department of Health, Educadsa, and Welfare Publiandon (FDA) 77-4004,0ctober 1976. Lines. A., et at," Low Does Radiados and Leukemia Mayo C11ais and Foundamon, Raah=== Mina.," New Engiend Cohen, B.L., and Lee, l.S., "A Catalog of Riska," #eelth fournal of Medicine 1940; Vol 302, pp. 1101 1105.

          .       Physter, Vol J6, June 1979.
  '                                                                                  Mancaso, T.F., Stawart, A., and Kaeale, G "Radiados Espo-Cook. J., sed Nelson, D., occuperfonalExposares to fontring        sares of Hanford Workers Dytas from Cancer and Other 1                                                                                 Cmass," #esith # hyster, Vol 33, November 1977.

j Redienen in the Unsted States: A Comarehenstre Summary for 1975, EPA $20/4 80001, Environmental Protectica U Agency. 9haller, R.,*'Natwal Radladoalleckground vs. Radisticattom Nuclear Power Plants," Journal of Environmental Sciences. h August 1972. Department of Health. Educanos, and Welfare, Jiolette E//ecer ofIonising Radistfon, Report of the Science Work Group of the lateragency Task Force on Radiation, June 1979. Naiarian, T., and Colton,,T., " Mortality,from Laukaana and

                                                                       .            Cancer la shipyard Nuclear Workers," Leneet, I: May 1978.

Oreyer, N.A., et aL,7'he fasa6dlity ofEpidemiodesie, laser- }h tsgetions of the Heelsk E/fects of Law.l.svellenssingRadts ' National Academy of $dences, De Effrers on #6puterrows of Espeanre to Low Levelt ofionizing Radietton, Report tion, NUREC/CR.1728, Nudsar Regulitary Comammon, November 1980. of the Comosittee on the Biological Effects of lonizzag Radiadon(BEIR),1980. Gilbert. E.S., " Assessment of Risks from Occupational Exposure to lonizing Radiation," in Energy and #esteh Rossi and Mays, " Leukemia Risk from Neutrons," Health

  .                                                                                Physict Vol 34, pp. 333-360,1973.

haceedings of the Conference on Energy and Hesith, June d 26-30,1978, SIAM Publication, Philadelphia,1979. a J . Schottenfeld. D., and Haas, J., " Carcinogens in the Work-Cofman, J.W., "De Question .of Radiados Canandon.of place," CA A Cancer Journal for Clateiens, VoL 29, No. 3, May.fune 1979. 3 Cancer in Hanford Workers," Neelsh phytscs, Vol 37, h November 1979. United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Corchy, R.L. "Estimaaon of Life Shortening Resulting Atomic Radiation.1977, Sources and Effters of /onstang i Radierfon, Report to the General Assembly, UN Publica-from Radiogenic Cancer per Rem of Absorbed Dose," tion No. E.77.!X.1,1977 Nealth phymer, Vol. 35, October 1978. 1 Ha!!, EJ., Radletion and Life, Pergamon Press,1976. Upton, Arthur C.," Radiation from Nuclear Power Exaster. ated," New Englend/ournelof.stadierne, voL 302, pp.1205, 1206, May 22,1980. Intemasonal Commsssion on Radiological Protection,

l hoblems laretred sn Developnnt en index of Herm. Annel I. World Health Organstatton. Ilreith implicettons of Nuclear oftheICRP,ICRP Publication 27, Pergamen Pres, May 1937.

Arwer hoduction, Rc;rort of a %rki.is Ctoup, Decemeer 1971. p ii I lI s , >l g . 3.29.i s

                                                                                                                                                ..........,,e.                                               . . . . . . . . .                                     .                                                       .

n ' 9.

                      .O                    _
                                                                     ==~'                                                                                                                                                                  ,0.' ATE W ~ M- U .~

i s:CC $ - e4. A.,_.a_ 4 4

                              -                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       1 4                 -
                     ,                                                                                                          A =. l                                         ./ # .                              . d ,. e                   if

v 6

                                                                                             ..      baw                                                         0-                                              ..                                  .

M . .a v .. ~..:. ...

                                                                                                                               . .                 . .....f*7                        .                                                      . .
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 .. .h e .                                     ..M
                      ..:.                                             '.          2                                                 Y..                 ?.J..... A.Ar a**/ T .                                                                                                 ..                                                    .

a.. . pH

                                                        . . . .                     .                                               .         ... .         . . . .                  ...                              . , . .      _r_esu__ _                      ..4.....               . . . ..                  ..            .

i . . . 1 ,/ . . . . .. . . . . . ... ..y . . .....,p..A..,o.......g......,.....M.,e...

                                                                                                                                                                                                   .. .                               .                       ..                .........fe..-                           .            .

4.

                             . . . . . .         . . .. . . ... ..O. . .h..d. . .. . . .                        . ..                   . /.gr.. .. . bi4Rf. /. . .                                         . . . . .
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         . . . . . . . . e.         .            s,                  , e       3./*,,,.

J., d ..".7 * . .C.T* e r. .. . f*dda . . .. . d..M.M. . ...b r ... *

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  .'....l""."""'                              **

e J'# . j . .

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                -4r/.f.r.'. .. . .             . . . .         .
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       .         ,a
                                                          * .9,y
                                                                            ^ " '

4.# d[spe

         }\                   . . . . . . . . . . . .                  ..
                                                                                                              .                             ~Y s/
                                                                                                                                                             ..,..     <1,e...s="
                                                                                                                                                                                             ,a
                                                                                                                                                                                                    ..o;,,,,,'-                          .... d* ed                     . . .
   .                . . . .                                                                .\...
                                                                                                                                 ...2<,....                                  .
                                                                                                                                                                            . . .                      . . . n' ..                                                ..                 .......s.......           - /.            . . .

0, .

                 .                                          ....-A....^Q^.*.....6..*.*.9J..._.r.._.

T.. ...A 9 .A.... t - A .. . . . J.. .. ...~....n.....~.M.... .....df9......a........................................ j .

                                                                                                                                                                           ..A. ..k l                                    ..a......
                                                        '~ g.+.~. .(.g.n.m. .. ..m..                                                  ... ... . .... . .                                          .. ~.'. .& '.. . .. .
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    .                                        . . . . . ..                . .o.     ... . . . . . .           .        . . . . .

\

                 ...                              . . &x                                              .

e n.....=.e..................... . .. .. . . . 5 la .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 p . . s j . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

                                                                                           .~.........~.........................................................                                                                                                                                                       .       . . . . . . ..

j s

                                          ...............:3...........                                                                . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
                                                                                                                                                                               ..............q........................                                                                             . ..             ..                            .
                                                                                                                                   'i
                                                                                                                                                                                                .                                   s .
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 /

.I

                                                    .......................,s..                                                          .         . . . . . . . . . .               . . . . .           ..;....................                                                                     .. . . .                                .

i 1 . . ~ - . . . . . . . ~ ~ . ~ . - - - ~ ~ ~ - . . ~ ~ - ~ - ~ ~ . ~ - ~

                                                                                                                                                        .    ~...~~.~~.~..~...~~.~..~....--.......~

t

• 8

 ;                                                                                                                                                                                                                     k
                                                                                                                                        ...............~........................-............................

(* p.

  '                                                     . . . . . . .                    . . . . . . . . . .                    ................                              . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . -                                                                              . . . . . ..

_4 0Un t.4AME PLAINLY co- im . c .aosm __ _

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         ~

v. . . . _ . , . . _

1 . . . t * ... 1 JOB COMPONENT: Chemet Laboratorief - 970 '

                 -                                                                                                                                NUMBER: CL-JIIA-01 HAZARD ANALYSIS 3

h 5h i PROCESS: Nuclear liatcrials un au Prepared by: __PR Jasinski 9/18/79 Data issued: 10/01/81 ] Reviewed by: I' -c

                                                                             ?/'< 49 (indust. Safety)
)

• t.i Review date: kN l Approved by: W' # '

(Manacer) Replaces: witt c I flew Le PERSONNEL PROTECTIVE

1. Safety Glasses (Minimum) i . Rubber or Polyvinyl Chloride Gloves

                    '                                                                      3. Laboratory Coat EQUIPMENT REQUIRED:                           4. Safety Shoes t
                   ~

S. Face tiask (llalf) when scribing pellets or working wi

                  '                                                                                 airborne materials in unusual circomtances.

j POTENTIAL. HAZARDS SAFETY REQUIREMENTS vi 1. Radioactive contamination

of skin. 1. Pass L Radiation Safety Test before working in a controller 2./ 'ab sectinn, f l! 2. radia Giological tion. injury from I rotective clothing, glasses, safe y equipment are to be i  ! used.

3. Inhalation of Airborne 3. Folln"

                                                                                                          "'diatinn and cri* ienlity safety recuiraments. ~;

radioactive materials. t

                           . Introduction of Radioactivi54. Wear radiation monitoring badges as required.
                                                                                                                                                                        ~

mdterial into Cuts or f Control limits are not to be exceeded (safe batch).

4. Cleari spills immediately and notify radiation protection.

3 , abrasions.

                                                               '           7. Bioassay sample must be submitted when required.
;              l                                                           8. Only qualified personnel should handle radioactive materL                                             .

a l 9. lionitor feet and hands before leaving controlled areas. i I' 10. Notify supervision and liedical Unit of all injuries,

!                                                                      /11.
                                                                         '2. Notify                   supervision of all unsafe conditions and practice!

i' l If in doubt, contact your supervisor. l 3 See Also: JHA f CL-JHA-04, SEALED RADI0 ACTIVE SOURCES n , AND X-RAY i l' '

l .

                                                         )                                                                        '
 ,      .!                                 [ ' (v Appendip6
                                                                                                                                                               ^~         ~ ~ ~

1 3 , (,s .-

          ~

lll/1/7A l

                                                                                                                                       )
)                                   .

COURSE OUTLINE FOR ROURLY EMPI4YEES . l 4 l j 1. Radiation exposure control A. Limits J

1. Radiation External Radiation for radiation worker 5

5 rea/ year - 1250 mrea/ quarter rea = mit of biological measurement of radiological exposure i year = 52 weeks r quarter = 13 consecutive weeks

                                                                                             %.s 6/4k.

i i Non-radiation worker = 500 mram/ year.- ' if

2. Balasse Limits t

i

a. Air & Water l

10 x 10 uci/cc airborne limit for 40 hour week 400 x 10 ~11pci-

• _s 3 x 10 DCi/cc water limit I 3 x 10 uci/cc air released to the environment

b. Contamination '

j 200 dpa/100cn}: loose surface contamination 2200 dpa/100ca1 fixed surface contamination B. Seriousness of violating instructions on radiation warning signs i) exposure ) 11) contamination 4 iii) paitive measure i iv) dismissad from the company ) v) loss'of confidenca ) 1 C. Discuss procedures and methods for minimizing exposure ) 1) time - distanca - shielding ]i

11) internal L

j D. Potential sources of radiation / contamination exposure associated L, with work performed by the employee. ' e I: E. Discuss where film badge and dosisaters should be placed upon individuals body. 2.. Contamination Control A. Discuss how contamination is controlled during radioactive work. ) 1. Disposition of contaminated materials u

i .

                        ,        ,                                                              y-    ,          .

j -

3. Work tents 1 4 Personnel protection from contamination by wearing protective

   !                                                         clothing.

a. Lab costs - caps - rubbers - gloves

b. Coveralls

1) no street clothes under coveralls I

c. Respirators half mask 1)

11) full face mask 4 iii) chemical mask

  ;                                                                iv)    fresh air

d. Proper collection and disposal of. radioactive solid waste

  ;                                                         e.      Liquid weste must be collected, created and disposed of proper 1 i)    poly bottles

11) cans / buckets

                                           ^

f. A well trainer worker

g. Detected in order to control it t

_ 1. Methods to detect

1. Swipes

11. Instrumants I

,                                                                      iii. Air samplers
)                                                                                                           ,                           ,

iv. Water / soil samples

2. Detected o9 personnel

1) Self frisking  !

l ' j B. Discuss procedures for preventing contamination of personnel and } how contamination is detected on personnel.  ; i 3 . 1. Contaminated areas roped off - control signs i j ' 2. Wearing of proper protective clothing ] 3. Proper removal 'of protective clothing.  ! 4 a j 1) Tapa ll 2) Cap - j 3) Gloves

4) Lab coat /coveralla l 5) Rubbers l, 6) Fr1sk L 4. Street clothes not worn under protective coverills.

5. Contmaination is-detected on personnel with a "frisker" a) proper frisking technique t

b) location of probe away from, body I c) detect coatsmination - actions? d

,- - =             _-                                  __ _              - ..                                  .             -

o a ;;- , , I J C.

-i Discuss removal' of contamination 'from objects and personnel                                                                                  I

1. Normally removed from objects with a cloth dampened in plain water. '

i

2. Normally removed from personnel by washing with soap and water.

3 D. Discuse tho' surface cantamination limit and the meaning of the units

;                                                                   of the limit.

t E. Demonstrate proper procedure for putting on and removing protective

  ,                                                                 clothing and mask.

F. i Demonstrate proper procedures for entering and leaving contaminated area - 507

.i 3                                                           G.      Explain what radioactive contamination is.

t' Where it can saist - surface air water

3. Criticality i

                                     .                   A.        Definitions Criticality - uncontrolled fission Fission - the splitting of the atomic nucleus into t'wo or more parts with the release of energy and neutrons. This may occur with a neutron striking the nucleus and, thus, initiating the fission.

l Safe batch - the allevable quantity of uranium one may handle. 45% t j of minimum critical mass of uranium for a given enrichment. j as the enrichment increases, the safe batch size decreases. j Limit Area - an identified location in which uranium can be handled, processed, or s ored in accordance with specific posted criticality safety limitations. l Dead Zone - a safety zone, usually 12" in width, surrounding all a . litit areas. It is designated with a 2" wide red tape. u - 1 B. Rules - H"

1. Any time urani.ua is handled outside of process vessels always handle one ' safe batch at a time. *

1. Limit area

2. Dead zone

2. The limit area is the only place where you may store a safe batch.

3. Never place any uranium in a dead zone.

4. Always move safe tacches in marked aisleways

5. Never use an aisleway to "tempouarily store" uranium.

t Geometry - limits size and location. P , 9 -

                   . -  -,~--,---,ee       --w,,-w-e.-,-,-a                   -e   ,-    ,.-,,--w-,,,,,-e.,,,e,-m--,-,o.-                ,e.---r--m,-n,--m-                w-r, - -w , , - - - ----,!m w     wr,-

1 j.

                                                                        *;. c'.       .

j 6. Never make any equipment changes without specification a'uthorizacic ' of your immediata supervisor.

.                                                                               ^

j Procedureal or Adminstrative j 7. ,0 bey all posted and written criticality rules

8. If in doubt about anything - ask before you act.

J

;                       4. Wasta Disposal Discuss       how the individual workers can reduce the amount of radioactive liquid and solid wasta a

i A. One of the best ways is to minimize radioactive waste is to teach the worker the characteristics of radioactive contamination and I the proper methods for controlling contamination. B. Good housekeeping C. Take only material absolutely needed to do a job into control areas. D. Liquida of different types segregated - HUF - ADIL laundry - grinders, E. Liquid wasta not normally radioactively contaminated should be collects separately. F. Do not dump contaminated liquids into sinks or showers that are not specifically designated for radioactive contamination. 1

5. Radiological Incidents ,

A. Disuess the need for consulting radiation protection personnel when questions cr incidents occur.

1. Common sense i

2. Radiation protection personnel are trained to cope with the situation.

l  ; a. They have the material, equipment,, and tools to handle the prob: 5. l Discuse procedures to be followed after a spill of material (liquid or :: l

1. Action must be taken after a spill has occurred otherwise contaminat ;

}                                      could be spread around.

2. If action is not taken after a spill

a. Personnel could track contamination around l b. It could become airborne

                .               3. There are five basic steps to be followed in the event of .a spill.              -

O Step 1: Stop the spill i Step 2: Warn other personnel - Call Radiation Protection j Step 3: Isolate the area Step 4: Minimize your own contaminst1Ga

- .. :. . :. . -- - .- ~ . . _ it' - C. 3

• Discuss procedure to be followed when notified that airborne radioactivity is above the limit.

1.

2. Stop my operation that may be causing airborne radioactivity Leave area immediately or put on respirator.

3. Follow Radiation Protection's instructions.

6. Responsibilities of Individuals Rules to sinimize radiolorical oroblems

{ A. Obey stop work or evacuation orders B. Obey postad, oral and written radiation protection instructions C. Wear film badge ad/or desiaster and/or lapel sampler where required. D. Do not letter in controlled areas R. Do not smoka, eat, drink.,or char in controlled areas. F. Wear are required. protective clothing and respirators properly and when they i G. Remove protective clothing and respirators properly. H. Frisk yourself when leaving a control area I. I For a how or possible radioactive spill, minimize its spread and notify Radiation Protection. i J. Do not unnecessary 117 touch a containated surface or allow your clothing, tools, or equipment to do so. [ K. Placa contaminated tools, equipment and solid waste on disposal surfacas when no in use, ed inside of bags when work is finished. L. Limit the amount of material to be decontaminated or disposed of as radioactive vasta. M. Report the presence of open wounds to Radiation Protection prior to work ad report immediacaly if a wound occurs while in the area.

                                                                                                                                                              ^

N. Obey all Criticality Rulas. e

                                                                   - :a      -
                                                                                                           ---      - - - = . = - - = ~

s

       ..- ....                                                                                  a;-     ,       .

i i REDUCTION OF AIR 80 REEXPOSURE I l 1. Use of Containment I

 !                              2. Proper air flows in Hoods, work stations, and/or duct work

3. Air sampling to control exposure j 4. Notification when systems break down l 5. Preventative maintenance i 6. Following Procedures

7. Containing all contaminated Materials 1

i 8. Cleaning up Spills immediately

9. Obey barriers and flashing lights

         ,,                   10. Connon Sense

11. Use of Mask as a last resort.

B 5 8 L . Y . l 3 i l' l' l: I !- t b i, _ .. _ _ - . - - _ _. - . -__ - -_ _ ____ - . - . . . - - . . - _ - .

l '

 }'."'-

i . < FUELS M ANUFACTURINO O'PERATION l-STANDARD . i CINERAL ILICTRig OPERATING PR0CEDURE

                                                                                                                                   " '!"l.' *,' ,". '.' 

a 1 SUBJECT .

 '                         Radiation Safety - I.ab Operating Procedure                                            1..t.4        0.3.'

emesser 1.0 PURPOSE j The purpose of this procedure is to establish and outline the general { radiation safety rules, practices, and precautions necessary to prevent

                  . airborne exposures, personal contamination, and spread of contamination

, within the I.ab.

2.'0 SCOPE i

The scope of this procedure is to cover the radiation safety rules and

                                                                                                               ~

j ' practices and precautions of a very general nature for the Wet Chemical and Spectrography I. abs. Special requirements outlined in the General Radiation Safety Pescadure #1.2.2-8.2.2 ~ and SOP C-2.0-QA-101 shall'be followed .

3.0 POLICY e

e l A. Eating, storing, or preparing food is not permitted in any areas where uranium is handled. l B. Smoking and storing of Tobacco is not permitted in the controlled area. l C. The use of food containers (milk boccles, thermos, etc.) for handling ( or storing uranium is not permitted. { D. Employees-working with uranium'and all other personnel leaving the Lab i { must completely survey themselves for uranium contamination before { 1eaving the work area. A separate log is provided for individual I  ; clearance of small personal items such as clipboards and paperwork. ' l E. White labcoats, completely buttoned, and gloves, either rubber or j disposable plastic type, is required for working or handling uranium ' or touching potentially contaminated equipment, , i i

      .e-....       .......                                                                        h.                                                ,.

a u i i ' amn. er eu... ., t

                                                                                                         .. A$ 3         f t.n                       *
                                                                                     .. n inoi.         . .T

) io .....n - 3 WRMlHG

                                              -.-m   -   " - " - " ' " " " - - - - "                             N ENGINfDINl '".- --. h

  ._ _                     6._..m___                   w.-..                : _; : . ._.                                            - ...       _. . a._           -                                -

! 'l seesect. Rrdiatica Sofocy - Lab Oporating Proccdura e g

                                    *          **7                                                                                           ...
                                                                                                                                             &&               *                                     ,         o 0.3.4 j

F. All spills or leakage of uranium must be cleaned immediately. l G. Radiation Protection must be contacted to perform release surveys of l sll equipment leaving the controlled areas, i H. All compounds of uranium that could become airborne shall be handled

inside of hoods with ' air flow of 80-120 LFM throueh the acertures.

j Examples of this is (1) Opening of powder sample containers (2) Crushing j of pellets, weinhina. etc., (3) Dumping and compositing samples for return j to Shop Operations, (4) Dissolution and concentration of urma**m samoles { by heating.

                                                        ~

b u ( ! e i ? b

                                                                                     }

l Prapared By Ok k ~l!71 Authorized By . h 3 Engineering Concurrence M h XS Nuclear Safety Concurrence t'*T hMt th 4 j,ja j /73 i O . 1 i l i i 1 e I .

    -- _ _ _ - . . , , _ _ , . ~ - _ . . _ _ . _ .            - . . . . ~ .       . _ _ . . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _                         . . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . . , .

• m,

  .           p*

Wi!.MINGION - N o,.: CDI # 409 R EV~- 0 MANUFACTURING DEPARTMENT

REFERENCES:

See Sectica 6.0 4 CAUBRATICN AND CPERATION INSTRUCTION ISSUE D AT*: 04/09/82 G ENIM At. $ II.1CTRIC PAGE 1 OF 3 SUBJ'iCT: IS30pIC Am O/U PPIpARATICN USIE OPAVDETEIC TEQUIQUES. 1.0 PURPOSE-The purpoce of this. (DI is to provide inscructions fcr the preparatien of sacples fc isotopic and O/U analyses.

2.0 SCDpE

This (DI provides instructions for the preparation of sar:ples stlich are acn-gadolini bearing and do not require %U deterr.itnations by dichrecate titratica. These enteria basically fall within three strata: EAD!E001 (UO2 powders), EAEldLT4 (t02 pellets) and EAEMR005 (exi* ed powders) ,

3.0 PROGEUPI

3.1 M:en any weighings are ende, all draf t decrs are to te closed and talance stabilized befcre data is recorded. hhenever tra balance is zerced, all draft a doors are to te closed and t;he talance stabilized. 3.2 Weigh to the nearest .CColg tre tare and record cn worksheet.

    ;=              3.3 Zero talance with tare still cc pan and add 4.5000 1 0100 grar:s of sacple, i
    <c h

N Weigh sa ple to nearest .000lg and reccrd en wcrksheet. w < g 3.4 Cxidize at 900 + 25'C fcr 2 hours 115 czinutes. pellets should first be exidis at 1cw temperatEre per C.'&S Method 1.2.15.1. 2 Q W ! a ' 3.5 Rercove' frcm furnace and cool to recm ts::perature. a . 2 , , 3.8 Weigh worksheet. the tare and oxidized sample to the nearest .0001g. Reccrd weight on a

    -I     5

{ t: 3.7 Place tare and sample in dissolution tray by location ntrber cn xcrksheet. iE ,_ Dissoluticn tray tdst ccatain 12 crucibles. 3.8 Dispinse 28 hil hitric acid into all crucib'les (See 4.0). 3.9 Covis efMible *lth watch glass irmediately a.fter acid additien. N

 ' ~       FREPAREkBY QD p>$@ ATE                                         APPROVALS         l0ATEj      APPROVALS    h INDEP. REVl5Wgtrt27h                            '
                                                                //v/f9 CCE l[6/e'JA CHEMET           ;!AC / A                                                           #"fMNMMl 7/f?bt.        P OTO                             V ,"

lV/&f'/J WE' l _MM ' l J C 5_c ) lC&lS Q { p l [ Annand b o

{ v *J. S c. . mI ,, a

                                                                    . a . . . .. . ..y  . oa-.a
                                                                   ,, . t . . .: .                                                     .
                                                                                                                              .I t
                       '.                                                                                                      !               REV~-        0 I                      -

MANUFACTURING DEP ' ~'~.- NT -

    !                 ,                                                         .                                                              5 E8ERENC,c .
     *                                                                                             ,                                                                 sea s::tica s,g
                            \

f CA SU.it'..J AND GP .U, TION INST'AUCTI.CiJ l 133UE DAT.- . MM3/E2 f I CENirALh2LCCIT.lf; FAG 1 3 OF j 3 _.-...-c

                          ..        2'
                                     . *1.lEC1.: . .
                                                                . IEPIC AN. D 0/U            P?.ZPA.RATIOf
                                                                                                  - - - - ~ - - - -L'S.l%  - - -    CP.".'!E*ERIC    - TEC&  --   :0.if3. --   - ~ ~ .

i - 10  ?.acs Cissolutica tray into et'.crowave even. hrh " lie &~. t. tca a : cen i "CUIT". Eb nc; interrupt cycle at c;*1 door until "GUPI.Ird" 11%: is itt. IF] 8.11 P3o>e trcy ' rem ::ic crave ove.1 end p17ce in lu:d to emi. A1.'rs to ec i:. 1 E0 ; .R .a suras. 6~iih'dic ~ifeah'/~V"sIld1*el C.% : e.,f tp Il p, ::cpra .. at.ie;. i: I r- ui.z.. f i i

• 1 '. *t.:cra tr.tc.h gi:.rs, e.'eigh t Jea c..d coltatica ;c cc:.1 ea;

                                                                                                                                                       .0*..n.;,, .n e 2,wa. :a c
                                                        "'t*2*."C *,. ; .
                       !                   3. l*J        Isccdiately t.f ter *uighing solution, piretta *.0 + 0.1.el of wl' tiet. i.xc, i                                                    :: anti:g aba and ca.p.                      Rocced tuba nir.sv.c en ".chshc:.cc.
 'l 3.14 71.0s t.ita ca g:nrx. cc,u .ters and count par (.CI /2400. Ibccrd ca ecch.haut.
                                              .13 2 :n ::.21.:rrc::ent cat . into H.P. '                                      alcuh.ta ct: pre.pted. E ucrd cm.;t c ,

t!.~ ;;pic *::.lue en cer1*.ch act. ' C.~.!.!.?. 23 :

                    .                       4.1       Cc.1/ rer.gant grade nitric acid is to h2 ures fer d ssoluti:n of st.;:p.w.                                                    ih s acid is to be provided of the ?,:CP Technicien.

I - i . [ ,, ,

• 4 . 0per Ci=:;1utica nitric is to have a. specific g avity of 1.166 ; .005 (:s mastrtJ.

  !        , ,', , t. ,                                        1.3).

Ud.aup should be in a mS o un of 60 litcr let cize. Vi; cec.A:s

  !              r. ;            ,t

• agitation of the mixture is required. A r.ininun of 3 samples, wncae ccueen-l 2-

 ,             " w?,:I                               tritics it.113 within the required rango, must be nude to ve ify                                       e eat.c'.:p             l.gito.

ti:n chould be cado tat-een each of the racples. Pre;arctica of dissclutien j -itric. acid will be dez.a by h'sasurena.it Control Perscr.cel.

 -            .i. :s (;         .

4.3 1 ,'.- ;.

              '                                      Tae specific. gravity of the dissolution nitric acid is to be caasured cnce ;ec
                              ,f.                    ,
                                                            .,y when isotopic samples are dissolved.

t . q

                    .')Il i,
                                      ,              4.63.1 9'eigh e, dry 50 rni solumetric.

4.3.2 Fill to tG 50 ml tre.rk wita altric acid. ~ u.;

  !        't 4                  i 4.3:8 t'dg.i vo}.ts;ntdc and 50 m.1 nitric ac.'.d.

1 { o i. e a t f l 1 I 1 g .....m

_ - . - . _ - - - .. . - - . - . _ - - .. =. - - - - - -

                                                                                                                                                               -- = =-       -
                                                                                                       "                    NQ.:                CDI # 40s WILMINGTON' R EV~-              0                             '
                         . MANUFACTURING DEPARTMENT                                                                                                                            '

w

REFERENCES:

see section 6 CALIBRATION AND OPERADON INSTRUCDON ISSUE D ATE: c.;/09/82  !

GENER Lh ELECTRIC PAGE 3 OF 3

SUBJECT:

IECIOPIC AND O/U PREPARATICN USUC CRAVIMETRIC TECHNICUES. t 4.3.4 Cticulate nitric acid weight :nd cultiply by .02. Reccrd .alue cn l meriesheet as specific gravity.

                                                                 /MM   yfgggg ,_,

4.4 'Ibe 25 ml nitric acid dispensor accuracy is to be enecked once per snift. I Measurements will be rade per below:

;                !                            4.4.1 Weigh a tare.

4.4.2 Dispense one cycle frcm the nitric acid dispenser into the tare ::r.d se. I i l 4.4.3 Subtract care weight fran weight in 4.4.2 and ccrr. pare to limits porsted { 4 l , at work staticu. }

• 5.0 EQUIPMENT:

;             !                5.1 The cicrowave should be kept clean of any spills, drippings, et cetera.

5.2 Only counting tubes which ham numbers scribed near the top are to te used. f' I i These tubes should be clean end cry prior to additien of sample soluticas.

             ;                 5.3           Pipets which use disposable tips may be used for placing ccunting solutions e

l into tubes. The tips used should te dry and clean prior to use. Ca.libration j of this pipet is not required, but should be checked daily using a graduated l cylinder to assure delivery of 10 ml. i I l' 5.4 All crucibles used should be clean and dry. Crucible and v.atch glass are to t I clean, rinsed in DI water and dried no less tt.an 3 hours in heated area with temperature at 120* f 10*. i as Coors $9) and has n,o cracks. Q eck to assure it is a 50 ml valuce crucible (suc l i 5.5 All satch glasses used should be clean and dry prior to use. i i6.0 REFERDi33: i

! 6.1 T C5ES Method 5.2.9.5, "DE. EhMINATICN OF 5'.'EIGT pERGNU U-235 IN ACID t'FnIA BY l GAMMA SPECTECA!ETRY".

d 6.2 CDI-401, "ADJUSD.LT PPCCEDURE FCR IS7IUPIC ANALYSES OF U Oo BY GR.S!A k p%

        *-                    6.3 SPECTECSCOPY".

1 w CDI #408, "DRIcmLT #fALYZER OPERATICN - Cerc.T. TEST CFERATCRS". W8 1 i

              'N                            .

i k, i 0 =J

        . a t:

k_ ___ ____ _ ___..__--_ _ - -- - - - - -- ~ - ~ - - - - - - - " - - - ~ ~ ~ ~

                                                                          . . . . .                           =                -      -                                --

5 , n v % .:, n n v n r a e i n w -n w - , ...ww.,......,.. . . . . . . .. .

 ]            ~                                                                                                        a-         ,     .                      ICR04 E

SUBJECT GENERAL CONTROLLED AREA RULES

               ,                                                                                                                                                   3 e Conduct

1. No food, drinks, gum or tobacco are permitted in the Controlled Area.

2. Report all injuries to your Supervisor, to the Medical Unit (X-5333) and to Radiation Protection (X-5858).

3. Cuts and skin abrasions must be properly treated by the Medical Unit before working in the Controlled Area.

t

4. Assume that all surfaces and objects are contaminated unless Radiation Protecti advises otherwise.

                          ! . 5Take extra care to prevent airborne contamination.
 .                            6. If working under a Radiation Work Permit (RWP), carefully read and follow the i                                 recuirements.                                                Note any special instructions. If there are any questions, contact your Supervisor or the Radiatiop Protection office (X-5858)..

7. Removal of tools, equipment or materials from the Controlled Area requires

a release by Radiation Protection (X-5858).

t

8. Prevent spread of contamination -- clean up spills of uranium or uranium-bearin

              ~                   liquids as soon as possible. Report large spills to Radiation Protection (X ,,58

9. Limit the amount of material. to be contaminated or to be disposed of 'as contaminated waste.

10. Imediately report incidents of gross personnel contamination to your j,

Supervisor and to Radiation Protection (X-5858).

}                           11. Protective hearing devices (ear plugs, ear muffs, ete'.) are not to be worn j                                  due to the potantial for personnel contamination.

li j c. t- ,

l p Page 1 of 3

                                                                                                                                                            ,h
            -                          mum:~     nun muaams>

mm max -

                                                                                                                                 +,+

I PLEASE RETURN THIS PROCEDURE TO ITS PROPER LOCAT10N AFTER REA J .NF4-Ca8A (6/81) . 1 ,. o - __

• _-_ . . . _ - - . - , - - - - - - - , - - - - - - - ~ - - -

                                                                                       = - - _ - - - _

n- - .. _ _ ... _ .-

          ..g'N   f} NUCLEAR S apt- I Y nct.cNc i ncwinwiv wis , w___ - - - . _                              . . . _ . . .    ,

1CR04 SUSJECT GENERAL CONTROLLED ARE$' RULES fenWON 3 i e Warning signs / Flashing Lichts For conditions causing a high airborne contamination area, a contamina area or a high radiation area, one or more of the following may be use to alert personnel:

1. Yellow and magenta (reddish purple) rope or tape and j Yellow and magenta signs displaying varicus warnings or protection i requirements (Examples full face mask required).

i -

2. Flashing yellow light J>

only authorized personnel wearing appropriate protective clothing / equipment are permitted within the marked off area. i e Containment Requirements 1 l 1. Conduct all activities which could generate airborne contaminatiot

   !                          such as transfer or sampling of uranium, inside glove boxes or var hp

2. If it is necessary to break containment when making equipment changes, wear appropriate respiratory protection, devices and take extreme care not to spread contamination to the surrounding area, the air or to the ventilation system.

3. For work which may cause gross contamination, cover the immindiate area with paper and establish a step-off-pad to minimize i contamination spread. Contact Radiation Protection for assistance (X-5858) prior to start of work.

 ]

d 4. Keep containment hoods securely closed during normal operr.tions, a

   !                          assure that hood filters are changed as scheduled.

5. Open containers of radioactive materials only inside of approved i hoods. Wipe visible contamination from containers immediately upc 0 removal from hoods.

L 6. A full face mask must be worn when breaking containment on equipmi l- or when opening a hood; unless dpecifically authorized by your j Supervisor or Radiation. Protection to use a half mask. L Page 2 of 3 c L t p

           ~

l s b -1 l,

               ,-             ?tF40488(6/81)

Li ,

    ,_u .._ _. _ .            .____m        . -         -

i

                      -y,    t.,                                                    .
         ~*
   !             .         di                                                         .;      ,  e 1

• S P. .

5.2.9.6, Rev.2 i ANALYTICAL TEST METHOD au'*ca

.i                    ,

NUCLgAR gNgAGY DivislONg E.A. Schaef er

   ,                        AppmCVSO SY .J.weptex                    SUSJECT                          cLAS3PICATicN
                                        /CL                            DETERMINATION OF U-235 in       C****

Spectroscopy

                                                  ~
                                     -consuLTNo tNo Nesa               SOLUTIONS OF VARIABLE ANALY7 CAL a itsT usTwoos          URANIUM CONCDITRAIION.

assuso av COMPANY PRIVATE

 ;                               FRODUCT ASSURANCE MANAGER 1.0 SCOPE 1.1 This method covers the use of gamma spectrometry for the rapid measure-ment of weight percent U-235 in liquid solutions of variable concentrations.

Test parsmeters are 25-100g U/ Liter and 0.7 to 4.0 veight percent U-235. i This machod is applicable for the analysis of uranyl nitrate solutions. 2.0 PRINCIPLE 2.1 The basis for the gamma spectrometry measurement of v/o U-235 in solution i i is: "that the not gamma count in the 186 kev vindow is proportional to the number of U-235 atoms contained in the volume of solution counted." This number is fixed by the uranium concancration and the U-238 to U-235 ratic f2 CM&S Method 5.2.9.5, Rev. 4, " Determination of Weight Percent U-235 in

                 ' 'O                     an Acid Media by Gamma Spectrometry," measures the gamma count for a 5                   solution with a constant uranium concentration of (84.8g U/1) . Thus, the J                    net gamma count, at 186 kev, is a direct measurement of the U-235 weight j y                          percent.                         -
              .5 O l             .:                           In the subj ect method, the calibracing solution is fixed at 84.83 U/1 and 1        ,j rA                          the uranin concentration in the solution to be measured is permitted to 1
           ~N
               . y                      vary. The converted 186 kev net gamma count is nov a measured " apparent"
.I
 '                                        w/o U-235 value rather than " actual" w/o U-235.

I

           ..j g
           .} ;-

Knowledge of the uranium concentration in the calibracing and =casured 4,

                   -                      solution, a self-shielding factor for the gamma flux at the detector and the measured " apparent" v/o U-235 value permits the calculation of " actual" l   .

w/o U-235 in the specimen. 3.0 APPARATUS i 1 3.1 A gamma counter operating to the raquirements set forth in Ci&S Method 5.2.9.5 I 3.2 Apparatus for the measurement of w/o uranium by dichromate titration CM&S Method 1.2.21.6. 4 0 REACDITS

• 4.1 Secondary v/o U-235 standards of appropriate concentrations. New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) No. 97 is available in 100 gram units. i i

R EVIEW oATE SUPERstats f33ut cATEo IS3USDATE PAGE NQ, 1 As Required May 14, 1979 Dec. 1, 1979 1 o, 5 5.2.9.6,2 j

 .I n'

       .          6                                                                                                                               .
                   .                                                                J;-                ,        ,

Ny

,               =mico e.o.                 svaascri                                                                                         ^s       -

Deceraination of U-235 in Solutions of Variable l 5.2.9.6, Rev. 2 Uranium Concentration COMPANY p g ggg k 4.2 Reagents set forth in CM&S Methods 1.2.21.0 and 5.2.9.5. 5.0 SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS 5.1 Prope radiation protection precautions should be taken to prevent in-halation of solid or liquid samples containing uranium during all handling operations. 6.0 i DETIRMINATION OF THE URANIUM SELF-SHIELDINC EFFECT ON THE CAW.A FLIDC I 1 ' 6.1 Assume the self-shielding effect at 84.83 U/1 is zero. The experimental self-shielding factor is then a function of delta uranium concentration from 84.8g U/1. e 6.1.1 Prepara a representative number of uranyl nitrate solutions covering the range of 25 to 1003 U/1. Use one or several secondary w/o U-235 standards. 6.1.2 count a portion of each solution on the gamma counter (CM&S Method 5.2.9.5) and record the measured " apparent" w/o U-235 value. (Repetitive counting of the result will ensure a reliable as,and averaging asured " apparent"

            ,                                w/o U-235 value).

5 6.1.3 Calculate the " expected" w/o U-235 value for each solution based on the concentration change from 84.8g U/1 (assume no self-shielddag aff act). i

                                                  " expected" w/o U-235 = certified w/o U-235 x l                                    6.1.4    From the data available in 6.1.1, 6.1.2 and 6.1.3, calculate a self-saialding factor at each concentration.

t a '- self-shielding /g U/1 (Factor) = o 4., H -Q " expected" w/o U-235 - naasured " apparent" w/o U-235

                         %Z II        ;               " expected" w/o U-235 x (g U/1 - 84.8)           .

y,Uy example NBL No. 97 (2.380 w/o U-235) '

                         ,w

, ,- I o gU/1 = 63.94,(6.1.1) 5k

                         -%                                 nessured " apparent" w/o U-235 = 1.827 (6.1.2)
                              .a' 5

N =w-)J + " expected" w/o U-235 = 1.794 (6.1.3) WE - then the self-shielding factor = 0.000882 (6.1.4) 6.1.5 Deternine a straight line fit for the self-shielding factors as a function of concentration, gU/1. This is the (F) factor used in (9/0). t 4

             .a                   nao                lsvavassoasissuscarno,   issue caro 5.2.9.6 R2             3          5       v2y 14, 1979                                          i naview caro
                                         ,,                                    Dec. 1, 1979                  I as Raoutr_ed_

A 4".qS .' W SUSJaCT: *' ' COMPANY M87HOO No.

h. .P PRIVATE Determination of U-235 in solutions of variable Uranium concentracien 5.2.9.6. Rev.

7.0 SAMPLE PREPARATION m. 7.1 Uranyl Nitrate Solution

                                                '.1.1 Tilter solution to remove insolubles.

7 7.1.2 No additional sample preparation is required f.! the sample content is 25 to 100 gU/1. - 7.1.3 If the solution has a uranium content that exceeds 100 gU/1, dilute it to within the 25 to 100 gU/1 range. 7.1.4 If the solution has a uranium content below 25 gU/1, concentrate (evaporate) it to within the 25 to 100 gU/1 range.

 }                                      7.2 s

If the semple is a solid, the scrap uranium procedure is applicable (sections 12.0 and 13.0). 8.0 PROCEDURE 8.1 l l Determine g U/1 on a sample aliquot containing 100-300 as uranium by CM&S Method 1.2.21.6. 8.2

 ,                                           Pourshut.

cap a 10 al aliquot of the solution into a dry polypropylene tube and and 5.1.9.5. the subsequent measurement of " apparent" w/o U SOLUTION CONCENTRATION MUST BE IN THE RANGP 3 U/1.25 TO 9.0 CALCULATION

                                      " actual" w/o U-235 = measured 1- ,F x "aocarent"      w/o U-235 x 84.8 (g U/1-64.8)               M share F = self-shielding factor /g U/1 examole F = 0.0012-(.000005 x g U/1)
                                                                      *               (WMD factor as determined by Section 6).

o  ::E s where g U/1 = 38.42

         ' 9. $

? I Q] F = 0.0010079 j l]p._ { asasured " apparent" w/o U-;t35 = 1.124

• L

__3 . then " actual" w/o U-235 = . 84.8) = 2.370 CL- $ (1-(0.0010079)(- 46.38)J (38.42) 3E q 10.1 RELIABILITY

          --j;i!

a For solutions of uranyl nitrate relatively free of metal inpurities, an I "5 E ' accuracy of 2 0.025 w/o U-235 is readily achievable. l 11.0 NOTES l 11.1 For the range 25 to 100 to be 0.0012-(.000005 x 3 U/1).3 U/1, WMD determined the self-shielding Each laboratory should determine a factor that ts specific for the ga: mas counting system fa use. t naview cars: suranssoasissos o4rso: issue cars:

;                       Aa Required                                                                  eAca:         No.

May 14, 1979 Dec. 1, 1979 3 ., 5 5.2.9.6, Rev

                                            ~      -
                                                      .           - -. .       - - . .         .....u...u... .a.  :- = ..     . _ . .       ..n..

j 4- .i { . =oc , e

• 4'epoJ 'oo. ~ sueJac7, ,. I r

Determination of U-235 in Solutions of '.'ariable 7J 5.2.9.6, Rev.2. rUranium Concentration N ANY ,

  ;                                                                                                                                       PRIVATE        >

11.2 The periodic measurement of w/o U-235 in a uranyl nitrate solution of known of w/o U and w/o U-235 content will confirm the continued applicability the Factor. is permitted.) (A change for the factor value based on experimental data t 11.3 i At Wilmington, Production Control and Scheduling (PC&S) can authorize i the compositing of designated scrap samples prior to analysis. To pre-

  ;                                           pare the analytical specimen, weigh a 24/N gran portion of each sample i                                           in the composite group; then combine. (N = number of samples in the composite group).

2 { 11.4

  ;                                           by visual observation, prior to the removal of the 24/N Mortar and pestle (or equivalent) individual samples, as required, to achieve this condition.

12.0 SUFFt. DENT-SCRAP URANIUM 12.1 As indicated subject to labin SCOPE (1.1), the method is applicable to scrap uranium qualification. j In the qualification, the laboratory

  !                                          should address a) titration error on impure uranium, b) self-shielding j                                          effect due to metallic elements (other than uranium) in the solution.

j Tests conducted at WMD indicate the method ca'n colerate significant amounts of Gd, Fe and/or Ca. (WMD's qualification per'formance test on synthetic ash yielded an average relative percent bias of 0.4% vich a relative percent standard deviation of 3.5)-for w/o U-235 measurements. 13.0 PROCEDURE - SCRAP CRANIUM 13.1 Weigh (2 decimal places)224 gram sample and transfer to a beaker. 13.2 Addesl50 ml 1+1 HNO y .y 3 and dissolve with moderate heat. (Scrap saterial O4 can contain a significant amount of acid inselubles). C% 13.3

 )

g% Filter through volumetric flask, acid resistant paper catching the filtrate in a 250 31 t .,.m UE 13.4 d) 2 C' Wash any acid insolubles and the filter paper with 1+1 HNO . Add the veshfags to the volumetric flask. (If the w/o uranium measurement, 3 is 4; j$

- not required, dispense with the thorough washing of the acid insolubles).

] 2 Q; 13.5 Cool the filtrate to room temperature, dilute to the mark and shake the d, N flask content to misure a homogeneous solution. d 1 D t- 13.6 j E Measure the uranium concent of the flask by CM&S Method 1.2.21.6. The sample aliquot (al) should contain 100-300 mg U, (for relative pure UO [ a 2 mi aliquot aliquot). will suffice; highly impure sample will require a larger2 , 13 .7 jl Calculate tiersnt required w/o U in in sample 13.6. and g U/1 in the volumetric flask from the si 1 i 1 8

?        Iw                           eacss sustassoasissus oarsoi      issus oars:

d [ 5.2.9.6,E2 -

                                          '     ee    -.1                                                        aaview carsa May 14, 1979._ _ _ _ h h _- _ A                                                     -

                         ---                             - - - _ _ -                                    _      -              _     ..___.m             ._.
+

2 u j ., ' .J.y:p'  ;.- . [

;'                                                                     susascT:
             . . . . ,                 COMPANY                                       .

usTwoo so. j PRIVATE Determination of U-235 in Solutions of variable Uranium concentration 5.2.9.6, Rev. 13.8 If the U/1 is 25 to 100, place a 10 al aliquot in a polypropylene counting tube and seasure the " apparent" w/o U-235 on the sama counter;

!                                                    (clas Method 5.2.9.5).
+

set forth in Section 9. Calculate " actual" w/o U-235 using the equation j If the 3 U/1 concent is less than 253 U/1, the foibwing options are available:

)'

a)

Concentrate (evaporate) an aliquot of the solution and re-4 determine the g U/1 content prior to gamma counting.

j b) f Repcat than greater the sample preparation using an initial weight 24 grams. ) i

14.0 REFERENCES

l i j 14.1 t

                                                  " Determination of Uranium By Dichromate                                            /          Titration.    !

14.2 .j Chemical, Metallurgical & Spectrochemical Method 5.2.9.5, Rev. 4

;                                                 " Determination of Weight Forcent U-235 in An Acid Media By Camm Spectrometry."

1 . 15.0 REVISION HISTORY 15.1 CM&S 5.2.9.6, Rev. O, E.A. Schaefer, J:.n., 1979. 15.2 CM&S 5.2.9.6, Rev. 1, E.A. Schaafer, May, 1979. ' 15.3 CM&S 5.2.9.6, Rev. 2, E.A. Schaefer, Dec., 1979.

         .c b                                                                                                                                                  I s         a 'h                                                                                                                                                  l
!        ; C 'N l          $                                    l I

i 5#

a at l .~d O,

         .a J 3

i .

        . !          I'
        . .) $
 ;      .: ~

i i I

  ;                                                                                                          i
  ,                          REVIEW OATE:
                              , . . _ . . . ,          l $UPER$.E.CES u.-             .---   ISSUE DATEO: l is3ut
                                                                                                   -       ---   OATE:                      inn l PAGs;y

_ - . . ~ . . .

                                                    .-          - . _ - . . . - - - - . . ~ _ . . _ . - . . - - - .               . - . . . . - . .   .

1 * ' - 4 _, i *-*3.9,0 ;o DI5:3I3CTION - N3vemb : 9' 1981'

              *o                                                                                                         A N AC:-Lu. INT 1 j                 G.EN ER Al.h El.ECTRIC                                                                                                                ,

s ein es==. 3369 mars. September 15, 1981 c8"c:* 5. F. Bentley i f A. Dada oute letD QA Regulatory Compliance G. W. McKenzie

.I                                                                                                                     G. E. Powers assessa.       M/C J-26                                                                             C. F. Shipp k

i W. B. Smallav svesista SIPTEMEER 15, 1981 \ C. M. Vaughan

}

U.Ts GAS RELZASE i . . l { - .

 )

I l W. J. Hendry, Manager Regulatory compliance l 3ased on chemical analyses of the 9 air samplar filters in the ADU vaporization ce=, preliminary results reported by Ed Powers indicate that airborne levels averaged over a twenty-four hour period pechably exceed 300 times the i saximum permissibla concenc stion. In accc:fance wi:h 7/P 40-12 criteria " Airborne levels in a rescricted area averaged over a 24 hcur period in excess of 300 c. bas L MPC. (MPC is 1 X 10~13 uCi/ce) " , this has been classified as a class II incident. e y

                                                                                                  'f M G. M. Scwman, Acting Manager
                                 ;                                      Nucles: Safscy EngLnee:ing dh W

L l i t i Appendix 12

s- ' .,** 9 e ,. . , 4_M M_ - l' THIS DOCUMENT MAY CONTAIN , 10 CFR 2.790 INFORMATION e 98 9 6 e l O e e e e

 ,.$       p$.                                                      .

BE. FORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Vera M. English NRC Inspection Reports Nos. and 70-1113/82-18

                     . General Electric Company                         70-1113/84-04 70-1113/84-05 70-1113/84-08 70-1113/84-13 70-1113/84-15 70-1113/84-16 70-1113/84-17 70-1113/84-18 i

SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION UNDER 10 CFR S 2.206 FOR WITHDRAWAL OF REPORTS 84-17 and 84-18, ISSUED JANUARY 18, 1985; 82-18, ISSUED SEPTEMBER 27, 1982; 84-04, ISSUED AUGUST 23, 1984; 84-05, ISSUED MAY 9, 1984; 84-08, ISSUED JULY 19, 1984; 85-10, ISSUED JULY 27, 1984; 84-13, ISSUED NOVEMBER 15, 1984; 84-15, ISSUED FEBRUARY 7, 1985; 84-16, ISSUED FEBRUARY 13, , 1985; ISSUANCE OF NEW REPORTS CORRECTLY DOCUMENTING AND FINDING ALLEGED VIOLATIONS AT THE G.E. WILMINGTON, N.C. NUCLEAR MANUFACTURING PLANT; ISSUANCE OF NOTICE OF. VIOLATION ON ALL SUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATIONS, ASSIGNMENT OF APPROPRIATE SEVERITY LEVELS TO EACH FOUND VIOLATION, AND TO ALL VIOLATIONS CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE; AND COMMENCEMENT BY NRC OF APPROPRIATE ENFORCEMENT ACTION, INCLUDING THE ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL PENALTIES CHAPTER II J. The Inspector's Findings In 84-17 (h),

p. 7, That " Marking Off Contaminated Areas Is Not Required By NRC Regulations, Licence Conditions or Licensee Procedures" Is Predicated Solely Upon G.E.'s Misrepre-sentation To The Inspector Since submission of Chapter I, G.E. has filed in Case No. 85-ERA-2, a motion to, dismiss or for summary judgment based upon the Inspector's finding quoted and refuted in Chapter I, par. G, pp. 22-23. G.E. Motion, filed March 5, 1985, p. 11, n. 18. G.E.'s misrepresentation to the Inspector,

                                                 - f; -   .      .

upon which he necessarily relied in making his finding, was made during the investigation' on November 27-30, 1984. General Manager Lees was first confronted with the documents quoted at pp. 22-23 of Chapter I on December 15, 1984. He then admitted, under oath, that the " Criticality Safety Control Chemet Lab," (Exh. 3a in 85-ERA-2) is an authentic company instruction issued to employees (Lees' Dep. p. 24), but claimed that he had never seen it before! (Id.) Such instructions are required by G.E.'s license. (Rept. No. 84-10, p. 3, par. 8(a) (last three lines), p. 4, par. 9, penultimate sentence). Lees also claimed that he could not authenticate the

           " Hourly Course Outline" (Exh. 3b, Lees' Dep., p. 25). But           '

nuclear safety training is required by 10 CFR Part 19 (Rept. No. 84-13, p. 5, par. 7), and by G.E.'s license. Rept. No. c 84-10, p. 3, par. 7; p. 4, par. 9. G.E. has yet to produce a scintilla of evidence that Exh. 3(b) (temporarily rejected for want of adequate foundation) is not authentic. Having been caught in the lie that G.E.'s instructions to employees do not provide for roping off or otherwise marking uranium spills and areas contaminated by others, G.E. invokes the Inspector's finding to assert (Motion, p. 11, n. 18), that "the only proper action an employee must take if he or she observes a spill of radioactive, material * *

• is to immediately clean it up * * *." Thus, G.E. uses the Inspector's false finding, predicated on G.E.'s own misrepresentation to the Inspector, to disprove the truth!

O M e

Ji' . . G.E. 's argument is not only falsely premised in fact, but utterly absurd in law, since it would require " whistle blowers" to destroy the hard evidence of management's violation of nuclear safety regulations which management constantly demanded that Mrs. English produce to substantiate her charges, and without which NRC inspectors would, as their reports amply

       . show, make no finding in her favor.                                                    If G.E. 's argument were valid, the whistle-blower would have a choice only between two intolerable alternatives -- (1) destroy the proof of management's violations, about which the law gives her the right, without discrimination or reprisal, to complain to NRC and to support her charges by producing evidence, or obtaining and preserving hard evidence, at the expense of losing,her statutory protection.                      If these were the only alternatives,

• l G.E. would have discovered a loophole which enables it to violate both the safety requirements of the law and the 1

            " employee protection" provisions with impunity.

K. The Inspector's Conclusion, 84-17 (d) (pp. 4-5) That There was No Violation In Requiring Lab Employees To Accept Visibly Contaminated Sample Vials and Paperwork Into The Lab Is Patently False once again, the Insptetor's report is fatally defective in that it fails to recognize G.E.'s ALARA obligation. It is also defective in that it fails to recognize that Condition 9, Appendix A, Sec. 4.1, of G.E.'s license, binds G.E. by law to all " written operating procedures." Rept. No. 81-11, issued Oct. 26, 1981, p. 5, par. d(1) (first two

            ~~ ~ ~ ~ - - - - -       '--'- ~~~- ~ ~ ~-~~ ~ ~ ~ ^ '    ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ' ' ' ^ ' ~~ "' ~

r -', 9 4 8 [ l i i 4 l

 !                                                                                                                         l 4                                                                                                                           ;

I ( l k E 4 i 1 I 4 I i l l i 4 1 f I l I i i

?

4 1 I l 6 e n I I e 1  ; i-t I a r f I I I t I r f I I

                                                  ~        '
                                                                                                        ~
                                                                           -4..     .     ,

sentences); Rep t. No. 84-04, " Notice of Violation," first two sentences, p. 5, par. 13. G.E. 's written safety procedures and practices impose on all submitters of vials and paperwork to the lab the duty to I clean " visible contamination" from vials and paperwork before leaving them to be picked up by lab employees. (App. A hereto, Nuclear Safety Rules B, 14, issued 4/27/78). Report No. 84-15,

p. 9, c.(3), finds that G.E.'s " approved procedures" require

                                                                         ~

that "(c) equipment must be wiped clean of visible contamination." Report No. 84-04, p. 7, second par., last sentence, finds that " Samples received from the production area for analysis were * *

• found to have external contamination on f the containers." Had the Inspector in 84-17 not been blinded by G.E. 's misrepresentations, he might have recognized
• the distinction drawn by G.E. in its operating procedures between i

                                   " presumably contaminated" and " visibly contaminated."

The Inspector, however, bought G.E's purely diversionary

argument that because precautionary measures were required of i

i Chemet Lab employees, there was no violation in management's , allowing submitters to leave " visibly contaminated" vials and l paperwork for lab employees to pick up and handle, and in requiring Chemet Lab employees to accept and handle such materials. Of course, that is a complete non-sequitur. Just how bad this Report is can be judged from the fact l; that, two weeks after its exoneration of G.E. from Mrs. English's charge, Chemet Lab Manager Winslow, on February 19, l 3 1 i l

 --r-mw-,c.w,--- - - -

              .              o' f;'                   ..       .

1985, issued a notice to all "Submitters of U-Samples to Chemet  ! 1 i j Lab" stating that: "To effectively meet radiation safety 1 j guidelines in the Chemet Lab," vials and paperwork which "show

evidence of excessive or accumulated exterior contamination cannot be accepted." (App. B, infra).

L. The Inspector's Finding, p. 5, That Allegation (e) "Could Not Be Substantiated" Results From The Inspector's Misrepresenta-i tion Of The Allegation The Inspector was able to dismiss this allegation only by misrepresenting it. Mrs. English had

actually charged that her work table top and legs, and the floor of her work area, were repeatedly contaminated by Chemet 2

test operators on the prior shif t, either " deliberately," or "being sloppy" or "didn't care," and that " management was ,

condoning this." The Inspector misrepresented this charge by l confining it to " deliberate" contamination, and addressed ,

4 himself only to that. Mrs. English herself had refused so to

restrict the charge, recognizing that " deliberateness" could 1

j not be proved. The Inspector's " discussion" of this incident l l is, therefore, entirely beside the point. He asked the wrong'

questions and, not surprisingly, got answers unresponsive to

! the true allegation. Under Mrs. English's actual charge, whether the work j bench surface, legs and floor were contaminated by the prior j shift, deliberately, or willfully, or accidentally,'is utterly l irrelevant. The only relevant fact is that when Mrs. English i

                                                                                   ~

I j *

                                                                   .j;    .     .

arrived at work she repeatedly found her work place contaminated. The penultimate sentence in the " discussion,"' about an individual other than Mrs. English having used poor work practices which resulted in contamination of Mrs. English's work area, is substantiated by at least three witnesses. Yet, management did nothing about the workers en the prior shift who were doing the contaminating. The statement of "two witnesses" referred to in the preceding sentence is patently incredible on its face, since, admittedly there were no eye witnesses to Mrs. English's alleged " spill." Did the Inspector even ask these so-called

                          " witnesses" how they " knew"?

In short, the " specific cause" of the contamination of which Mrs. English' complained could have been conclusively determined, indeed, employee witnesses identified the guilty individuals to the Inspec. tor. On the facts known to the Inspector, the violation alleged was proven beyond possibility of doubt. i M. The Inspector's Finding (a), pp. 2-3, That Management Did Not Discourage Employees ' From Answering Questions of NRC Inspectors Is Erroneous The Inspector found (p. 2), that one employee (obviously Mrs. English) "did state that (her] supervisor once told [her] to refer NRC inspectors to the supervisor if they had any questions." That finding contrasts' with the finding in Rept. No. 84-16, p. 4, 3a (3), that "Two of the twelve 0 6-

                              <                      it'   -

t i 1 technicians interviewed indicated that they were told to refer any questions asked of them by NRC inspectors to their supervisors * * *." Both findings sustain the allegation of

          " discouragement."    If instructions to refer NRC investigators' ques': ions to supervision is not " discouragement" of free and          -

full discussion by employees with inspectors, what is it? Mrs. English was known by every member of management and every worker in the Chemet Lab to be the person most concerned and most knowledgeable about uranium safety hazards and violations of safety practices and procedures. Other Chemet Lab employees were neither as knowledgeable or as safety.-concerned as she. It is, therefore, not surprising that i she (and one other potential " subversive," as management characterized Mrs. English, App. C, infra) were the only ones management may have felt compelled to " discourage." The Inspector chose to overlook this obvious fact. Yet he does not articulately discredit Mrs. English or state any possible reason he might have for doing so. The 84-17 Inspector states that he interviewed a total of twelve Chemet Lab technicians, test operators and first-line supervisors, in this connection. How many were rank and file employees and how many supervisors he does not say. The 84-16 Inspector interviewed " twelve laboratory technicians." (p. 4, par. (3)), and found two, not one. Moreover, the 84-17-Inspector asked the wrong question, "whether or not they had been advised or told not to talk to 7-

n-

                                                                                                     \
                                                                                                     \

NRC inspectors." That was not what Mrs. English claimed she

                                                 .                                                   I had been told.      The 84-16 Inspector asked the right question                      l and got the answer that what Mrs. English and another technician were told was " discouragement." 84-16, p. 4, par (3). Nevertheless, incredibly, even the 84-16 Inspector found "no violations."

N. The 84-17 Inspector's Finding (b), p. 3), That the Posting Allegation, Although

                                  " Partially Substantiated," Is Not A Violation, Is Factually and Legally In Error The Inspector's assertion that "the documents required by 10 CFR S 19.11 were conspicuously posted," upon which his dismissal of this allegation was based, overlooks (1)                   '

that some of the items required to be posted by 5 19.11(a), were never posted, g.g., Parts 19 and 20 of 10 CFR; "the license, license conditions, or documents incorporated into a license by reference and amendments thereto," and "any response from the licensee to any notices of violation involving radiological working conditions." What was " posted" was enclosed in a plexiglass covered bulletin board located at the gateway to the walk to the Chemet Lab, at least 500 yards.awAy from the entrance to the Lab building, instead of at the entrance to each controlled area (84-17, pp. 10-11). The single bulletin boar,d was observable by Chemet Lab employees only on their way to and from work, at a time when hordes of employees congested at the gateway (id.), and everyone was in a hurry to punch in or get home. Any, employee e 8-

who stopped to look at what was on that bulletin board rendered himself or herself conspicuous and subject to hostile surveillance by the ever present G.E. uniformed guard. The whole point of the $ 19.11(a) " conspicuous" posting requirement is that employees shall be able to " observe" the posted documents. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, unabridged (1965), p. 1558, defines " observe" as "5: to see or sense, especially through directed, careful, analytic attention." Obviously, no employee could " observe," in this sense, the multi-page documents, which 5 19.11(a) and (c) requires the

                                       ~

employer to " post," enclosed tightly as they were in the plexiglass-covered case. If all that 5 19.11 required was that employers post " conspicuously" so as to permit employees to

                " observe" that the employer has complied with the posting requirement, and not to enable employees to read and study the posted documents, the requirement would be ludicrous and self-defeating. Fortunately, that construction is foreclosed by S 19.11(b), which specifies that "[i]f posting of a document specified in (a)(1)(2) or (3) of this section is not practicable, the licensee may post a notice which describes the document and states where it may be examined."         (Emphasis added.)

In short, the object of posting is to enable employees to examine the specified documents, not merely to ascertain that the employer has " posted" them. Since study and. analysis 4

                            ._    _.       -    - - - - - ---_-----_i._--    - - - - - - - - - --     -

~ of multi-page documents " posted" within a plexiglass covered i bulletin board is not a "prac'tical" means to accomplish the  ! 1 purpose of 3 19.11(a) and (d), G.E. was legally required at least to post a " conspicuous" notice in compliance with (b). This G.E. did not do, and this is, in itself, a most serious violation. The details to which the Inspector confined himself exclusively simply compound this real basic violation. The Inspector found the " postings [were] less accessible than in the past." Apparently, he did not even require what past practice was and why it was changed, although the effect of the

                                                                                 ~

change was to diminish the employees' right to know, which the ' Act protects. He treated minimal compliance with the literal text as fully satisfying the employer's legal obligation. This, as we have seen, he had no legal right to do. Moreover, the Inspector by implication found that even the portions of the documents visible through the plexiglass were barely legible during the night hours (when Mrs. English worked) without improved lighting. Instead of finding this a -- violation, the Inspector " advised" management to " install better lighting," as if that would wipe out management's current and past violations. O. The Inspector's conclusion (c), pp. 3-4, That Dumping Uranium Powder Outside Hoods Is Not A Vio1Etion Is Utterly Untenble Whether or not some workers develop or aggravate sinus conditions as a result of dumping uranium powder outside

hoods, the practice is a flagrant violation of G.E. nuclear . l safety practices, by which G.E. is legally bound, and, as such, should have been found unlawful by the Inspector. Sources cited, Chapter I, pp. 24-26, and appended thereto. We requote

                                                                               ~

one. Rad Safety, Lab Operating Procedures, App. D, hereto, 3, H, issued April 3, 1973, provides, p. 2:

                                                   "H. All compounds of uranium that could become airborne shall be handled inside of hoods with air flow of 80-120 LFM through the apertures.

Examples of this is (1) Opening of powder sample containers (2) Crushing of pellets, weighing, etc., (3) Dumping and compositing samples for return to Shop Operations, (4) Dissolution and concentration of uranium samples by heating." P. The 84-17 Inspector's Conclusion That G.E. Did Not Violate Procedures By Having

                                                       " Dichromate Titrations Done In The Open and Not Under A Vented Hood"

((i), pp. 8-9) Is False We showed in Chapter I, pp. 27-29, that the Inspector's conclusion that G.E. did not violate procedure by having dichromate titrations performed outside vented hoods is legally untenable. G.E. management guided the Inspector to one document which happens not to specify that such titrations must _ be done under a hood. Cf. authorities cited in "O" above. Eh then swallowed G.E.'s untenable thesis that without such precise specification there can be no violation, as if ALARA did not exist. The 84-17 Inspector's finding (p. 9) that the fumes released by dichromate titrations outside the hood do not materially increase "the radiological hazards of working at 11 -

                                                  -   . e;' -

this station" relies entirely on " radiological contamination surveys performed by the licensee in 1984, [which] did not identify contamination above the action level at this station." But elsewhere in his same Report, pp. 17-18, the Inspector finds correctly that G.E.'s radiological contamination surveys for this station during 1984 are utterly unreliable, because the single monitor was geographically far removed from the work station in question and was seven feet off the floor (at least four feet. above the level of the work station), so that the surveys were literally worthless! Moreover, the Inspector also found (id. , p. 13, first par.) that G.E. uses airborne exposure values derived "from the time spent in the work area" and " air concentration measured in the work area," to "calcul. ate the internal dose assigned to the individual." That system could not produce results relevant to contamination "at the [ work) station." Further, the Inspector ignored the findings of Rept. No. 81-11, p. 2, par. 4(a), that G.E.'s air sampling system "could (sic] result in underestimating radioactivity levels to which_ an employee was exposed," in violation of 10 CFR S 20.103.3 and S 20.401, G. 2.:

                        "a. The licensee has several work areas that contain multiple air samples individually placed at the different work locations. Timekeeping for personnel at specific work locations is not maintained by the

, , licensee and therefore for purposes of assigning MPC hours the multiple air sample activity is averaged. The inspector stated that this was not a good health physics practice and in certain areas could result in underestimating radioactivity levels to which an

u , ' employee was exposed. Failure of the licensee to accurately determine the MPC-HRS for an employee would be in violation of 10 CFR 20.103.3 and 10 CFR 20.401,G.2." (Emphasis added.) Indeed, misplacement of the single air filter must have rersulted in underestimating radioactivity levels to which Chemet test operators were exposed. The finding of "no violation" is an incomprehensible as it is illegal. Q. The 84-17 Inspector's Finding That " General Airborne Radioactivity Levels In the Lab' Have Been Minimal"- (o, pp. 15-16) Is Based On G.E. Surveys Which the Inspector Himself Found Worthless and Conflicts With the Findings in 84-04. The 84-17 Inspector admitted that " Step 3.11 of COI 409 requires the tray of crucibles to be removed from the microwave oven and placed in a hood to cool." (p. 1,5). He also found that for an undetermined period of time prior to early 1984 (p. 11), last sentence in third par. from bottom), and "until early 1984," i.e., after Mrs. English complained to NRC, "the cooling rack set outside the hood next to the microwave oven," not under a hood. Instead of finding that i this was a violation, the Inspector, swallowing G.E.'s hook, ~ embarked on a frolic and detour minimizing the resulting hazard, as if this could justify the deliberate violation. To exonerate G.E. from this charge, the Inspector found (pp. 15-16) that exposure to the fumes from the cooling l crucibles was not serious. See also, Chap. I, pp. 23-26. He relied on bioassay data (id., pp. 15-16)), which earlier (pp. 13-14) he had condemned as inadequate and deficient. See

                                                                                            ,                       0 also Rep.           No. 84-04, p. 2, a describing deficiencies in G.E.'s whole body count system.                        An' internal management' report (App.

E, infra, p. 4, par. VI A), dated December, 1981, establishes that G.E. could not even evaluate the "Semitrx UA-3 analyzer" used in," bioassay analysis." Yet, even the 84-17 Inspector's results showed (p. 15), that "20 out of 28 individuals checked had at least one positive urinalysis result (greater than the minimal detectible activity value of 5 micrograms per liter)." The 84-17 Inspector dismissed G.E.'s fdailure to include "results of urinalysis on the ground that " low levels" were i

                      "normally reported for Chemet personnel" (p. 13, last two sentences).              The results shown in those " reports" are virtually                                                                   '

worthless. The Inspector's key justifiction for excusing G.E.'s proven violations was that " general radiation levels in the lab have been minimal." (p. 16). Chap. I, p. 27, et seq. He predicated that conclusion upon a " surface contamination survey in the recirculation system intake ducts * * * [done between November 27-30, 1984]. The highest survey result was 300 s dpm/100 cm 2." (p. 16, 1st full par.). But, two pages later, the Inspector found that such contemporary survey results were irrelevant because "the exhaust ventilation system had been modified within the pa,st year," and that air flow studies of airborne radioactivity were unreliable because the air-intake monitors were misplaced so they could not detect the actual airborne radioactivity to which Chemet test operators e e 14 - '

   . _ . _ _ _ - -            _.- __      _     .-    . _ . _._ __--                  ~      _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -    _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . . _ - _ _ , . _ - _ . . - .

e;. , were subject. This internal contradiction the Inspector did

     'I not'even undertake to explain.

Further, the 84-17 Inspector's report of the survey he witnessed contrasts sharply with the results reported in 84-04,

p. 5, first two pars:

                       "The inspector also reviewed the results of airborne radioactivity surveys performed in February and March 1984 using the fixed station air samplers installed throughout the controlled area.      [ sic.,

cf. 84-17, p. 18].

                       "During the review of contamination surveys, the inspector noted that on several occasions work areas in the CHEMET laboratory were found to be contaminated     above the administrative limit of 220               -

dpm/100 cm2 At the request of the inspector, and under the direct observation of the inspector, the licensee performed a special contamination survey in the CHEMET lab. Three work areas were found which exceeded the licensee's administrative limit. The contamination levels in these areas ranged from 317 dpm/100cm2to 5,100 dpm/100cm2 2 There is some difference between "300 dpm/100cm " (84-17,

p. 16) and "317 dpm/100cm 2 to 5,100 dpm/100 cm 2,,

In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., U.S. (1/11/84), 52 L.W. 4043, 4044, n. 5, and accompanying text, the Supreme Court observed tht Kerr-McGee violated the law by failing to account for an inventory difference of .022%, the excess over the permissible inventory limit of .500%. In the instant case, the airborne radioactivity level reported in the February 21-24, 1984, survey by far exceeded G.E.'s action level, as G.E. admitted by "taking prompt action to decontaminate these

areas" (84-04, p. 5). G.E. 's conduct prior to decontamination is not only a violation of ALARA, but of 10 CFR 70.57(b)(11) and (12). The February-March, 1984, study, with all of its blatant inadequacies and deficiencies, is far more representative of the airborne radiation to which Chemet Lab test operators were constantly subject from at least 1980 through at least March 31, 1984, than the phoney results of the November 27-30, 1984, study reported in 84-17. Thus, the basic premine of G.E.'s exculpation in 84-17 is, on NRC's own finding in 84-04, disproved. The question remains, what happened to G.E.'s blatant violation for "an undetermined period" (and why was,it left undetermined) before early 1984? The Inspector's failure to address that question demonstrates that this Report cannot stand.

       .                 R. The 84-17 Finding ((k), pp. 9-10) That G.E.

Had Not Violated Safety Rules By Removing Posted Instructions Concerning Required Monitoring of Small Items Such as Paper, Notebooks and Personal Items When Removed ' From the Controlled Area Cannot Stand G.E. admitted that "at one time," signs were posted requiring that " items such as paper, notebooks, and

                                    ~

personal items" be surveyed prior to exiting the controlled area. However, the Inspector inexplicably failed to find that it has been " Standard Operating Procedure" since April 3, 1973 4 (App. 8, Chapter 1, "D," second sentence), that "a separate log t i

s . - u . , is provided for individual clearance of small personal items 1 such as clip boa'rds and paperwork." The Inspector obviously did not inquire when, or if, this Standard, by which G.E. is legally bound, was ever removed. Nor did he purport to find that the legally required procedure was followed. He exonerated G.E. from the violation solely on the ground that, during the brief time he was there, the Inspector "found no evidence that * *

• contaminated l material is being removed from the controlled area without proper control."

Again, of course, this is not the legal test which NRC

,                        must apply.                    The legal standard is ALARA, and licensee safety practices which G.E. was required by law to have followed. In point of law, G.E. 's admitted failure to follow that procedure itself establishes the violation. In point of fact, dozens of employees support Mrs. English's testimony that during her time in the lab she observed management, engineers, etc., removing items such as papers and notebooks from the controlled area without logging and frisking.                                  Again, the Inspector's "no    .

violation" conel'usion cannot stand. S. The 84-17 Inspector's Treatment of Mrs. English's Allegation ,(1) (pp. 10-11) Is Grat.uitously Insulting, Disparaging And Misleading The Inspector spends a whole page of his 16 page discussion on Mrs. English's charge that "some laboratory personnel were not monitoring themselves for contamination when e _ , - - - _ - . _ _ . .._.-- __- - . _. .- -- ~. . ._

     ,      o
                                                                                                                                       .bi'-  -

leaving the job at the nd of the workshif t." The Inspector treated the charge as'if it related to conditions at the time of his investigation (November 27-30, 1984), failing to note that the latest date Mrs. English's charge could possibly have  ; referred to was March 16, 1984, her last day in the Chemet Lab. i l Finding that G.E. had thereafter apparently taken effective l j steps to contain this endemic violation, he gratuitously ' concluded that Mrs. English's allegation was "not substantiated.' Tne Inspector ignored that Mrs. English's charge in this respect had already .been fully sustained in Report No. 84-04, l based on an investigation conducted February 21-24, 1984, pp. 5-6, par. 13, and that corrective action had been noted in No. 84-13, p. 2, par. 3. He also ignored the fact that Report No. 81-11, p. 2, found a wholesale violation [25% of the workers] (p. 5, (d)(2), in that on September 23, 1981, approximately thirty workers were observed exiting the contro11'e d area. Twenty-five percent of these workers were observed holding the probe a much greater distance than 1/4 inch, and moving the probe at a rapid rate. _ The Inspector's failure to consider prior violations in this frisking area is a violation of NRC's enforcement rules, 49 F.R. at 8585, V, B, C:

                                                               "In considering prior performance, prior enforcement history, including previous Severity IV and V violations in the area of concern, and escalated enforcement actions will be considered."

Subsection (e) (id.), provides: e

                ,---n., gn...- - - .     ,...-,,.---.-,---.,n-       - , , - .-,       . . . . - , - - , - . - - , , , , . . . . , . ,       .--..-~,---,r     , . , - - , - , - . . , , - - . , , . .     - . , - - - . . , . - . - ,

                                                                                                                          ~

i fi' .

                                    "The Commission believes that escalation of a penalty may be appropriate where multiple examples of a violation are identified, regardless of who identifies them."

The Inspector's failure to acknowledge repatitive violations in this area is a particularly egregious offense since subsection 3 of par. B provides (id.):

                                    "[C]onsistent with the addition of the . factor on past performance (March, 1984], the policy now states that in cases involving willfulness, flagrant NRC-identified violations, repeated poor performance in an area of concern, or serious breakdown in management controls, the NRC intends to apply its full enforcement authority where such action is warranted. * *

• The Commission expects management to be closely involved in the control of licensed activities to prevent violations of regulatory requirements. If management causes or condones violations of regulatory requirements, sanctions l will be appropriately escalated." (Emphasis added.)

T. The 84-17 Inspector's Failure To Find (n, pp. 12-14) That G.E. Violated 10 CFR 19.13(b) and (c), and 20.408(b) and P/P Nuclear Safety Instruction E-60, , Rev. 11, " Personnel Dose Reporting," By ' Admittedly Failing To Furnish Mrs. English and Other Employees Upon Request With

                                                               " Complete Radiation Exposure Results" Is Flagrant Error A perfect illustration of Region II Inspectors' ,                                                                                  j propensity to overlook and bury meaningful, substantive, 1

violations under a diversionary finding of purely technical violation is the 84-17. Inspector's treatment of allegation "n",

p. 12. Mrs. English reported to NRC that the report she received on July 17, 1984, pursuant to her request, immediately 4

before her termination, was incomplete on all factors: radiation exposure, film badge (or TLD), urinalysis and whole

                   .                                                                                                                           -        1;'    .

body counts. The Inspector found that her allegation was correct in all respects (pp. 12-14). He even found that furnishing an incomplete report to a terminated employee was a violation of 10 CFR S 19.13(a), 20.401(a) and (c), and 20.408(b) (p. 14). Nevertheless, he avoided finding this major, substantive violation 1 Ue excused non-resolution on the absence of film badge or TLD results between 1972 and 1976 merely because "a [G.E.) representative stated that'he believes Chemet Lab personnel were not issued film badges prior to 1976" (p. 12, last par.). Admittedly, 10 CFR 20.202(a) has always required dosimetry equipment for workers who "are likely to receive a dose in a calendar quarter in excess of 25 percent of the applicable value specified in paragraph (a) of 5 20.101." To determine whether 202(a) was applicable, the Inspector reviewed the exposure data for Chemet Lab personnel since 1976 (p. 12),

         ,     either failing to note or to remember that those re~ cords had been conclusively found grossly to understate Chemet Lab test operators' exposure levels.                                                                    Relying exclusively on those defective records, the Inspector concluded that the " personnel monitoring required by 10 CFR 20.202, probably would not have been required by Chemet Lab personnel" (id., p.j l2).                    ,

On this blatantly illogical reasoning, the Inspector made the issue turn on whether dosimetry was provided between 1972-1976. Ignoring Mrs. English's plain and clear statement l

                                                                                                  . i
   *       ..y   .m, ___y_   . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . - _ , _ . , _ . . . _ _ - _ .    -
                                                                                            , . _ - - _ _ _ , - _ _ _ , , _ _ . - _ _ _ - , , , , , .                 y.,,,,   , , , ,

  .,                 o
  ..                                                                                                                                      fi'                                 .

i that it was, in favor of the G.E. representativa's wholly unsupported " belief," the Inspector classified the matter as

                              " unresolved" (p.                                14).

As for exposure records, the Inspector found that "the data for the period of February 1979, through May, 1982, was omitted from the [ report] data available on some individuals" (R. 13). That period had no data on the report given Mrs. English. G.E. admitted that " assignment of airborne exposure personnel in the Chemet Lab began in late 1973." So what was , the excuse this time for finding no violation? Simply that a G.E. spokesman said the omission was due to "a change in

comput.er programs and the data for the period was available" (p. 13). But what does this have to do with whether G.E.'s failure to furnish a complete report to Mrs. English on July 17, 1984, and again on October 19, 1984, was a violation of 10 CFR 20.408(b), (cited at p. 14)? Absolutely nothing!

With respect to whole body counts, the Inspector found that no data appeared on Mrs. English's report for the period from 1972 through 1977 - 5 years. G.E. representatives " told the Inspector that they began using whole body counts for evaluating the uptake of insoluble radioactivity in 1977," but "they could not provide any evidence to support this belief." (Emphasis added.) Mrs. English reported unequivocally that G.E. began making whole body counts in 1972. Instead of finding that the burden of proof was on G.E., which was legally l required to maintain records of all body counts (records would l - 21 -

have revealed precisely when the practice started), the Inspector left the issue " unresolved" (p. 14), first full par.):

                 "pending establishment by the licensee of the dates when whole body counts, external monitoring, urinalysis and assigned airborne programs began and the preparation of revised dose reports for CHEMET Lab personnel and a review of the reports during a subsequent inspection (84-17-01)."

This basic, substantive, violation of Mrs. English's rights was manifestly overripe for a finding. Why was it not made? Instead, of making that finding (which could hardly have been discounted to severity level IV or V), the Inspector fixed on a d'iversionary timeliness technicality -- failure to provide the report to NRC within 30 days "after the exposure was determined." He found this a violation of 10 CFR 20.408(b). G.E. may well savor its temporary, tactical, victory over truth and justice. U. The 84-16 Inspector's Treatment of G.E.'s "Out of Control" Situations As A Mere Technical Violation Is Unlawful

                     .Another excellent example of Inspeccors' proclivity for substituting technicality for substance is the finding, implicit in 84-16 (pp. 4-5, b, Table I), that the number of G.E.'s "out of control" measurements was unacceptably high (p. 5) (e.g., 5 out of 32 for the TMI method         or 16%. Cf.

Rept. No. 84-15, p. 6 (e), ("104 (9%) items exceeded the 0.05 alarm control limits and only one exceeded the 0.001 control limits"). Those results meant that G.E.'s entire quality control testing system was out of whack. So what did the Inspector do? Did he cite G.E. for violating 10 CFR S 70.51? No indeed. Instead, he pointed to a letter dated May 14, 1984, from NRC to G.E. instructing G.E. to make timely internal reports

       ,         when "a single or two consecutive data points * *

• fall between the .05 and .001 control limits." And he found a violation, classified as Severity Level IV, for violation of this interal reporting requirement.

But what happened to the obvious, substantive, violation of 5 70.51, 70.57 and 70.58, which resulted in so large a percentage of out-of-control concitions? What was G.E. doing to reduce that percentage? Of course, those question were not asked by the Inspector, and he made no findings on that! V. The Failure of the Inspectors in 84-17 And 84-13 To Find That Use and Placement Of a Single Air Monitor In the Chemet Lab Was a Flagrant Major, Substantive, Violation, . Which Destroyed the Validity of All of G.E. 's l Airborne Uranium Intake Surveys, Is Unlawful Report No. 84-13, based on an inspection dated-September 17-21, 1984, issued November 15, 1984, p. 3, shows that on September 21, 1984, Inspector Perry discussed "in detail" with G.E. representatives (p. 4, par. 2) the fact that "one air sample in the lab may not be representative of the concentrations at all work stations in the Lab." (Emphasis I added.) G.E.'s response was irrelevantly diversionary.

                                                                                 ~

23 - g - , _ . . . , , - . . . _ . . , , _ _ - - - n,,,y, , , _ , , , _ , . , - , - _ _ , _ . _ , _ , ,, _ _ . _ . .

    .            e                                              -

al'

• Company representatives " stated that documentation should be retrievable from old files that would furnish information on evaluations made to determine the air sampling program in the Chemet Lab."

How was that in any way responsive to the observed deficiency? Were the "old files" going to reveal that at one time.G.E. had more, and better placed, air monitors in the Chemet Lab? If so, why did they reduce the number? If not, what conceivable relevance do the "old files" have? But that G.E. song and dance was enough to deter Inspector Perry from making the requisite violation finding. He did no more than flag this as an " unresolved" item (p. 3, (b)). Report No. 84-17, based on an inspection dated November 27-30, 1984, issued January 31, 1985. On September 21, 1984, Inspector Hosey had warned management that the single air monitor in the Chemet Lab may not be enough. In the two-month l interval between September 21 and November 30, G.E. did precisely nothing to increase the number of air monitors or

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        \

improve the placement of the single air monitor in the Chemet  ; Lab. That Inspector Hosey did not mention, although j management's failure to take corrective action after being  ! n l advised by NRC of a potential violation must materially - l l increase the severity level of the violation. I True, Inspector Hosey did find (Notice of Violation in  ! 84-17, pt. 1, second par.), that this illegal " condition * *

• was believed to have existed from early 1984 to November 30, 24 -

    ----   r--. r  -e---,       ,,.--,---.e.,.-        - , . - - - , - + - - , - - - , - - - -   -.,y,.,-   , .. , , - . - - - - - - - ,      - - - - ,    m.--+s- - - ,-----,.w---s.       . . - , , . . - . - . , - - . . - - - - - -

1984." But, in point of fact, there is no evidence whatsoever tosuggestthattheperiodobviolationbeganin"early1984." l The only evidence is that it existed at least since 19721 And it continued into 1985. Although G.E. has now installed more air monitors, they are still 7 feet off the floor, where they canr.ot possibly measure Chemet test operators' air contamination intake. 1 I As already noted, Inspector Hosey (and all Inspectors who issued reports after his) ignored the vast ramifications of this violation of 10 CFR 20.103(a)(3). The defects noted at 84-17, pp. 17-18, necessarily discredit _all G.E. air intake contamination surveys and results in the Chemet Lab from 1972 on. Is this not a most serious, deliberate, willful, violation . of NRC nuclear safety regulations? Did G.E. thereby not destroy the whole NRC plan of nuclear safety protection for Chemet Lab employees? Proof of historic management laxity and willful indifference to enforcement of nuclear safety standards referred to in 84-17 (cover letter, par. 4; Report Details, pp. 1-2, Exit Interview), is found in Rept. No. 81-11, issued October 26, 1981. There, the same Mr. Hosey, then Acting Section Chief, Technical Inspection Branch, Inspector in 84-17, noted in the " Exit Interv'ew" on September 25, 1981, "that housekeeping in the fuel manufacturing area was in need of improvement. Cleanliness appears to have deteriorated over the past several years"! This completely corroborates Mrs. e 25 -

                                                                        ~

l

                                                                              ~

English's statement to NRC that G.E. management's nuclear housekeeping and safety and quality concerns deteriorated from 1978 on. Why was this not found? And why did Region II inspectors fail to uncover before i l Mrs. English filed her charges even the violations they reluctantly found afterwards? Report after report before February, 1984, purport to have looked into every aspect of G.E.'s Standard and Special Operating Procedures, without finding a violation or deviation. Is the manifest 1 unwillingness to find violations on Mrs. English's charges a defense mechanism designed to shield the Region II Inspection Staff'against charges of incompetence or worse? E.g., 81/11, pp. 3-4, pars. 6-9 a through c. W. The Inspector's Failure In Report No. 81-11, p. 3, par. 1, To Discover And Condemn G.E.'s "JNF Blend Isotopic Reject" Is Inexcusable The Quarterly Management Report for Fall, 1981, (App. E, p. 2, par, c, hereto), describes rejection of a G.E. shipment by JNF "for failure to meet the isotopic acceptance plan.. This required rework at JNF and associated communication / negotiation that goes with a failure. WMD must pay approximately $6000 to the Japanese for the required rework and the image of WMD as a vendor was not improved." Report No. 81-11 issued October 26, 1981, was based on an inspection conducted September 21-25, 1981. That Report says (p. 3, last sentence), that " Radioactive material shipment

                                                                             - 11 '    -

1 records for the period January 1980 to August 1981 were selec( 7ely reviewed." Obviously, G.E., not the NRC Inspector, must ". ave made the " selection," for the Inspector did not discover the JNF rejection. If the Inspector had done his job

competently, he could not have failed to find the multiple violations of 10 CFR S 70.57 and 70.58 by G.E. which this JNF rejection reflects. See particularly 70.58(g)(2), (3)(4).

X. The Inspectors' Failure In All Reports To Find And Condemn G.E.'s Improper Assays Of U02 Content and Improper Verification of Out of Control Conditions Is Inexcusable A. The Quarterly Management Report for Fall,

                                                        ~

1981 (App. E, infra, p. 3, III, D, 2), notes th'at the Chemet Lab reports "only oxygen to uranium ratios" because it "does not know the metal impurity content in the U0 being 2 assayed." "P&OAO" requested "LMCS to make a percent uranium calculation." The request was' not honored, however, because

         ,                         "LMCS does not know the impurity levels of the UO 2 being assayed either"!      What kind of a farcical " measurement" system                        '

is this that G.E. operates in flagrant violation of 10 CFR S 70.57? Why didn't any of the Inspectors find this crucial violation? B. The same G.E. internal Report admits, (16., III, D, (3)), that .

                                               "The Chemet Laboratory does not always verify that an Out-of-Control condition has been corrected using the same standards which indicates the condition.

P&OAO is concerned that, if other than the same Out-of-Control standard is used for verification, O 27 - 4

                                          --..u           .                                                          -              ~               ,.n            _ .                  .a    a  >-     -a . -.-.-- -.__..~..a            a a.

the analytical region initially indicated as out-of-control will not be checked. Neither Federal

Regulation #10CFR70.57 nor the FNMCP require more than one level be checked by standards after calibration or that the same standard (or region) be used to verify control. To resolve this concern, a request will be made to revise the FNMCP to

• specifically allow the use of multiple verification standards and the verification of return to control using a certified standard which the responsible Engineer / Chemist feels.is appropriate." (Emphasis added.)

What happened to this projected scheme for exempting G.E. from legal requirements which, as P&OAO knew, are explicit, let alone implicit, in S 70.57 b (8), (9), (10) and (II)? The Report is signed by Chemet Lab Manager Winslow. So far as we are aware, Winslow is not a lawyer. Where does he get the chutzpah to interpret what 10 CFR S 70.57 and'FNMCP do or do not legally require? The only rational explanation is that Winslow believes G.E. can get away with anything! Y. The 84-16 Inspector's Failure i To Find Improper Tag Removal (pp. 1-3, par. 3) For Want Of Physical Evidence Can Be Ascribed

     ,                                                    Only To His Failure To Look At That Physical Evidence Provided NRC By Mrs. English A.      The 84-16 Inspector dismissed Mrs. English's charge that "an out-of-service tag was improperly removed from an analyzer on August'23, 1982, in violation of a General Electric procedure" on the " basis of discussions with licensee employees (who ostensibly couldn't remember the incident

although the laboratory manager and the technician who O

t 1

• I.___,._--__--_

      .-- . , - , - _ _ _ -          ..-        _m__.,,_y       , _ _ _ . , , , , . - _ _ , ,- _ _ _ _ , _ - _                           _ ., - _ _, _- . _ _ . , _ . , _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ -..                                  --     - .

                   .                                                                                                   - it'                                                           -

t . l originally placed the tag on it did), and " lack of physical evidence," i.e., the tags themselves, pp. 1-3, par. 3(a)(1). Obviously, the Inspector did not even purport to interview Mrs. English, the charging party, because, at th*e time of the investigation, November 27-30, 1984, she was no longer a " license employee." If he had, she would have provided him not only the testimonial verification the Inspector looked for elsewhere, but the physical evidence he claimed he needed to examine, zeroxed, photographed, copies of

                                                                                                             ~

the tags themselves, which she had supplied to Mr. Uryc and which we append as Appendices F and G, hereto. B. In the course of disposing of this allegation, the Inspector reflects his naive acceptance of another of G.E.'s legal fairy tales. He says " applicable shift logs" reflecting out-of-service equipment, while maintained by the licensee pursuant to a procedure entitled " Administrative, Loch, Tag and Try, No. 302" (p. 2, 1st par.), are not " required to be maintained by the licensee and are used primarily for trend analysis related to equipment failures." (Emphasis added.) What G.E. induced the Inspector to overlook is that license condition 9, App. A, Sec. 4.1, binds G.E. to all

                  " written operating procedures.". See "K," supra, p. 3.                                                                                                                                                                 What G.E. chooses to use this " log" for is as irrelevant as the flowers that bloom in the spring.
 -     -n,      ~     ,   - - - - - - , - - - - - - , - - - - - , , - , - . . - -                 , - _ - - - - - - - - - - . , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - . . - - - - - - - - - - -

n . , Y. Multiplication of Additional Erroneous Failures To Find Violations Is l Unnecessary and Impractical l There~ remain literally dozens of erroneous failures to find violations in the subject reporta. We believe we have sufficiently established the pattern and that additional proof would be cumulative. I I This is not to say that we do not challenge failure to ' sustain every one of Mrs. English's charges. Proper investigation of the facts and correct application of the law would sustain them all. We shall cite only one more example. Rer. ort No. 84-15 finds that the password system is " reasonably protected from unauthorized changes" and that Mrs. English's

      " concerns" were therefore "not substantiated."         But Mrs.

English complained that in fact her results were changed behind her back and without informing her, to make her work look bad. Winslow admitted this could have happened! (App. H, p. 1). How can'it rationally be said that her " concerns in this area were not substantiated"? Moreover, even if an exhaustive list would be helpful, the exigencies of time simply do not permit. The hearing of Mrs. English's case before ALJ Brissenden is scheduld to begin on March 18, 1984, and, at present, is scheduled to conclude March 27, 1984. We hope you will have reached a decision in this matter on or before that date. As for ourselves, we must from now on spend every available moment in other phases of preparation for hearing. ,

AA. The Violations Found Must Be' Viewed Collectively,.To Assign Appropriate Severity Levels ' NRC's March 8, 1984, revision of its Enforcement Policy explains that (49 F.R. 8584, III,,2):

                                                                      "this change is being made to recognize that individual violations, when viewed collectively, may have a greater significance than when considered separately. . Be aggregating the violations to evaluate the severity level, the Commission hopes to focus attention on the underlying problem or programmatic deficiencies where appropriate."

We understand that under the Rules (VII, Responsibilities, 49 F.R. 8591), only the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, subject to Commission review in certain cases, can assign Severity Levels I, II and III to a licensee's violations, individual or cumulative, and attach 1 4 civil penalties thereto. In our opinion, the Administrator of l 1 Region II should have forwarded all of the subject reports to you, without assigning any Severity Level, but with

                       ,   recommendation that you view the found violations collectively, and in the light of "B. Civil Penalty, 1-t," assign to them Severity Level I, and impose the heaviest possible civil penalty.

Our instant petition seeks more than that. It requests that you re-examine all the failures to find, particularly those addressed in th'e original petition and Chapters I and II,

,                          cumulate all the violations so found and assign the appropriate Severity Level and civil penalty.                                                                                     Short of that, as a 2

l temporary measure, in part to satisfy the emergency needs of 1 I .

       .,--,--rm.m,--~        , , - - ,--n.--n    , - - - - - , - - -         - - - - - - -. , . , - - - - - - - , - - - - - - - - -                        -n.--,-- - - - , ,          ,--.-..,---.------m--w.--,

the DOL litigation, we suggest that you select those violations which, without further factual investigation, we have demonstrated that the Inspection Reports erroneously fail to find. Adding these to the found vioiations, properly considered, establishes a pattern of Severity Level I dimensions, calling for the most severe civil penalties. We appreciate your understanding and cooperation. NRC's I interests, and the public interest, in effective enforcement of the Act, and Mrs. English's interest as " private attorney general" for enforcement, depend on your prompt decision. Please address your ruling (and any correspondence, or telephone inquiry) to me at my temporary Wilmington, North Carolina office: c/o Rountree & Seagle, 11 South Fifth Avenue, Wilmington, North Carolina 28401 (Telephone: (919) 763-3404). Respectfully submitted, i

                                                                                           '} l( 4 h -f; )c.f'/ cW~~                                      ,   l MOZARTOG. RATNER Mozart G. Ratner, P.C.
                                                                                                                                                        / Q'/

v. l Suite 610 1900 M Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 223-9472 cs . (ARTHUR vs W M. SCHILLER m pq Suite 1300 i 1000 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. l Washington, D. C. 20036  ! (202) 331-8508 j March 12, 1985 -

  ,,,,--,,-,-----.--,-----,--,.,-.-n,,,,e-                      g,, , - , . , , - - ,              - ~ - - - , ,       ---        ------.,_,w       ,.-        ------mn,---,,----   --

p m-m <m - _ m . n. ;_ . ,c;_

w. % .

                                                                 ~        .
                                                                                                  .w-HUCLEAR SAFETY RELEASE : General Requirements -- Chemet'i.ab y/'>7{11,j' Page                                                                                                    g8-
                                                                                                         .l
                                      '3.         RADIOLOGICAL
                                                                                                                         'l
                                                                                                                                ~

1. Chemet Lab operations must be planned and undertaken in such a manner as to limit the spread of radioactive materials. Unnecessary movement of radioactive materials and personnel handling radioaction mat'erials must be avoided.

                                            / 2.

Work areas involving radioactive materials must be monitored frequent with a properly calibrated detecting instrument.

3. Laboratory access by non-essential personnel must be limited when the Lab operations are in progress which involve radioactive materials.

4. Equipment, glassware, and. tools which are used with radioactive mater f

must be warhed regularly and kept in labelled / posted controlled areas

5. Major items or large pieces of equipment which come into contact .

with radioactive materials may not be removed from the Chemet Lab as non-contaminated items until decontaminated and released by Radiation Protection.

6. Care must be taken to avoid contamination of items not required by operating procedures to come into contact wi'th radioactive materials.

This especially applies to expensive equipment. -

7. Operations involving liquids outside of approved enclosures must be performed over trays with sufficient absorbent material to contain

             .                                           possible spills.                       -
                                          ' 8.         All partially contained, radioactive materials (solutions and dry material) must be kept and/or transported in secondary containment.

9. Sources of external radiation (beta or gamma) must be kept in approved and significantly shielded containers.

10. Pipettes, stirring rods, etc. must not be placed directly on bench or table tops but nust be placed on absorbent paper in trays. .

11. All equipment and supplies no longer required must either be decon-taminated or discarded as radioactive waste.

12. Radioactive wastes must be disposed of in containers lined with polyethylene bags which are labeled with a " Radioactive Materials" or " Contaminated Waste" sign .

c. Solid' wastes (with the exception of sharp objects, glassware, heavy objects,11 uids, aerosol cans, etc.) that are known. to be contaminated. ;nall be placed in the radioactive waste

                           ,                                  container.                                                                       '

n-

         &)V8        . . -                 .-         ..

vr = .,.=~:-. := = w: .: e _m = Appendix A

a u .

 ~..c    .
           .., .; .%                                      (
                       . ,[ NUCLEAR SAFET .lELEASE: General RequWements -- Chem 6t Lab Page *                      -

p. .

b. Contaminated glassware, sharp objects, etc., shall have a separate container. The best container is a cardboard box with a polyethylene bag in it. When the bag is full, it is tied off and the box is taped shut, labeled, and disposed.

This technique eliminates handling the bag with possibly broken glass in it.

c. hastes known not to be contaminated shall not be placed in the radioactive waste container but shall be placed in ordinary trash cans located such that the janitorial service can dispose of the contents. This applies toL cardboard boxes that once contained new equipment, chemicals,' etc.

13. Spills of radioactive materials must be cleaned up inmediately. -

14. Containers and equipment used to handle radioactive materials must be wiped clean of visible contamination.

           ~                             ~15. Chemet Lab personnel must wear lab coats, glasses, and other applicable protective clothing (gloves etc.) when engaged in Chemet Lab operatior or activities involving radioactive materials.

16. All personnel exiting from laboratory controlled areas must monitor themselves for radioactive contamination. If radioactive contaminatfor involves personnel-(skin, hair., etc.) and cannot be removed, Radia. tion Protection must be notified immediately.

Ih. Eating and smoking in the Chemet Lab' semi-controlled area is prohib l Approved:[)/f7Md4 W2 78f Ref. Instr.uction(s) - d//d I .. . - YN.F.ohrbache rJana car. __ ___ - __ ._ _-

gyy , v:c+ . . .

                                                                                    -si      -

t * ' SENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY' . NUCLEAR FUEL MANUFACTURING DEPARTMENT - QA SITE SUPPORT QUALITY - CHEMET LABORATORIES Wilmington, NC 28402 ' F eb'r uary 19, 1985

          .                                                                                      cc :   CL-85-ll8 T0-       SUBMITTERS OF U-SAMPLES TO CHEMET LAB                                                  '

SUBJECT:

CONTROL OF CONTAMINATION To effectively meet radiation safety guidelines in the Chemet Lab, sample containers, request forms or secondary containers (bags) which are associated with nuclear material sampling and show evidence of . excessive or accumulated exterior contamination cannot be accepted by the Chemet Lab. Samples determined not to be acceptable will remain at the sample window and the submitting unit notified to correct. the excessively contaminated submittal . - Additionally, to assure that lab paperwork contamination level s .are

                      ' maintained as low as practic'al, the current practice of placing the lab request form in plastic bags with uranium containing samples must be' discontinued. The use of separate plastic bags should be used when mutiple sam'ples/ requests are delivere,d at the same time.

Your assi, stance is requested to instruct personnel responsible for sampling of this change by 03/11/85. Af ter this date, request forms will samples. not be accepted when received in bags along with uranium The submitting unit will be notified to destroy the s.ub-mitted. forms and initiate new request forms. Your timely co-operation in this effort will be appreciated. Thanks. N ,*_ d 2 T.P. Winslow, Manager Chemet Laboratories Mail Code: H-92 - Di al Comm : 8*292-5461 y TP W/dyc Appendix B 1

                                                                                                                                      )

c-- ~~ ~#m~===~~' " " ' ~ ~ ~ " " ~ - ~ ~

                           '                         ^
  .hw.i.                     -- .

J- -- - L.-  : L- - . i. u..' ~ ... - - r V af.' , STRICTLY PRIVAF . SENERAL IlICIRIC . Hat num. 5461 eats. Ma ch 13, 1984 senses. . se,r. WMD-QA-FQ-Chemet Labs ansates. M/C K-10 , svenst. VERA ENGLISH SAFETY CONCERNS L. A. Sheely, Manager ~ Fuel Quality - Hall Code K-10

             .During the morning shift on 03/08/84, Pete Jasinski, Acting Supervisor for Paul Bann, was informed by Carl Rochelle of Vera English's concern that the microwave oven used for isotopic dissolutions was operating improperly due to salt accumulations being found on the inside of the oven door. Mr. Jasinski completed a check-out including surveying the microwave ' oven with the microwave radiation detection instrument.

Mr. Jasinski found no indications of improper operating conditions - ' a) Normal salt deposits within the oven which are cleaned during each shift and b) No measurable microwave radiation readings. After complet-ing these checks, Mrs. English stated she still felt the oven was operating improperly as she could smell nitrous exide fumes coming from the unit. Mr. Jasinski reported that he and others could not small the fumes, but to be positive of the unit's proper ventilation. to the 3"

!.          vont duct he decided to have Maintenance recheck the ventilation. Just prior to' the erd of the shift, Maintenance personnel, including Bennie Beane, checked the system and confirmed the ventilation was working properly.

At this point, .it was the and of day shift and Mrs . English had not pro-cossed any isotopic samples through the microwave pending Mr. Jasinski's check-outs for each,of her concerns. Additionally, C. F. Shipp, Plant

         ' Safety Specialist, advised that nitrous oxide at the OSHA air limit of 5 ppm would be very nauseous wit.h an obvious odor.                   Since no problems were i
'         found, the microwave was used by other assigr:ed operators on the follow-ing shifts with no unusual conditions being noted.                                           -

At 11 :00 p.m. , March 09, 1984, when Mrs. English reported for her first night of graveyard shif t, Mr. Coke McLamb reviewed with her the quick letter written by BVAC Specialist, Bennie Beane, stating the ventilation principles and the basis of salt formation. Mrs. English asked why the Maintenance review was not done on Thursday, March 08, when she was complaining. Mr. McLamb stated that the review vas made on Thursday and Mr. Beane's letter was . based on his review of the oven on Thursday. During' the weekend shif t very little isotopic work was available and Mrs. English performed her assigned duties using the oven Friday and saturday nights (March 09 and 10) without incidence. i j -

                                              ,                      Appendix C

w w :_._ _ _ _ ,

                                        -     - ~.___                    ._._.:.__._....
                                                                                                      - ._ n . ._ -

Y ,, .

   ^

L..A. Sheoly - l' - March 13,198 However on Sunday night (March 11) when Mr. Bill Lacewell, shift Super-visor, microwave.reported to work, Mrs. English again raised concerns about the Mrs. English removed the alpha monitor used for personnel contamination surveys at the exit of the chemet Lab and reported that she had found contamination on an exterior back panel of the microwave. Mr. Lacewell contacted Radiation Safety; they reported no contamination was found on the oven. Mrs. English raised many concerns to Mr. Lacewell such ast the microwave is creating radiation that is harmful to her, that the door was loose and fumes escaped from the door, that fumes were affecting her ainuses and she was afraid of breathing radiation from the even and that if a man was complaining then the problem would get fixed. Mr. Lacewell assured her that each of these concerns had been investigated by con-tacts with Maintenance, Radiation Safety and the Saf'ety Specialist, etc., and that her discrimination accusagion was unfounded. In addition to these assertions, she told Mr. Lacewell that Radiation safety did not find the contamination on the oven since she knew that they do not do a thorough job on their routine cheeks. She said 'Last week I smeared some sample on a table before their cheek and they could not find it. They had to come back to find it.' Mr. Lacewell states Mrs. English's use of the word ' smeared' was used in the con. text to in-dicate she had contaminated a table surf ace with uranium sample material. It is extremely difficult for Supervisors and other lab personnel to work ef fectively with Mrs. English 's current continuous accusations,. assertions, allegations, etc. . to promote her concern. First, removal Of extr'eme concern is her direct actions of the personnel sonitor from an essigned survey station without specific supervision approval and second, purposely contaminating an area which could potentially create hazards for others. Her action may be bordering on being considered subversive and her rela-tionship is rapidlywith Supervision and certainly her creditability for management deteriorating. Consequently, it is i= perative that specific steps be taken to reassign Mrs. English from the Controlled Area of the Labconcerns. hor to preclude any potential prrposeful action on her behalf to support* M' & - es 1  %,/w T. P. liinslow, Manager W. Lacewell Date Chemet Laboratories gn. %% d,6+ . dAaMA ex P. R.f5asinska Date C. G. Mc La::.o Date

                   ,,7m  __
                             *]=  _T 2L     *77_      I *--       *    -

i

       .                      FUEL.S       M ANUFACTURING OERATION

u. . . s t

i STANDARD ' GENERAL ELECTRIC OPERATING

                                 .                                                                             nactea awa suns PR0CEDURE
                                                                                                                 "'""",."."w"*
                                                                                                                    ...a bbf *                                .                                  -
                                                                                                         ' O.3.4 Radiation Safety - Lab operating Procedure                                    -

i 1.0 PURPOSE } The purpose of this procedure is to establish and outline the general ' j radiation safety rules, practices, and precautions necessary to prevent j airborne exposures, personal contamination, and spread of contamination k within the Lab. 2.' 0 SCOPE . j The scope of this procedure is to cover the radiation safety rules and practices and precautions of a very general nature for the Wet Chemical l

'              ,    and Spectrography Labs. 'Special requirements outlined in the General I

Radiation Safety Procedure #1.2.2.B.2.2 and SOP C-2.0-QA-201 shall be followed . 3.0 POLICY A. Eating, storing, or preparing food is not permitted in any areas where uranium is handled.

• B. Snoking'and storing of Tobacco is not permitted in the controlled area.

J i C. The use of food containers (milk bottles, thermos, etc.) for handling j or storing uranium is not permitted. ' l D. Employees working with uranium and all other personnel leaving the Lab

'                      must completely survey themselves for uranium contamination befcre I ~

leaving the work area. A separate log is provided for individual clearance of small personal items such as clipboards and paperwork. [ E. White labcoats, completely buttoned, and gloves, either rubber or disposable plastic type, is requi. red for working or handling uranium ' or touching potentially contaminated equipnent. I L 1 Lka compawr essvar: !l q - ( t- . d' Jd) -* _ APR  ;

nerassa er 3 w s:

'                                          invio av          !aats issuno

[ env ] sues.caces "' WILMING N ENGINEERIN j .

                                                           -b__          _,a-             L-2 suo.ss
                                                                                                            -1    Appendix D
                                                                                  ._--a.--

y ..

                                                                                                                         ~s           -.
                                                                                                                      ; ce v 3                           .

9 * .t . 1 F. All spills or leakage of uranium must be cleaned immediately. G. Radiation Protection must be contacted to perform release surveys of l all equipment leaving th.e controlled areas. j ,

               \

H. All compounds of uranium that could become airborne shall be handled

.j                             inside of hoods with air flow of 80-120 LFM throuch the acertures.

Examples of this is (1) Opening of powder sample containers (2) Crushing of pellets. weighing d e., (3) Dumping and compositing samples for return

                                               ~

to Shop Operations, (4) Dissolution and concentration of uraM"m samoles

 $                             by heating.                                                                               -

2 3 ,i 1

  't

.I i . -

                                              }

Prepared By ChIk k ~l!7 '5 Authorized By / "k 3 -

                    ,    Engineering Concurrence                                          /4.,         h     /$

Nuclear Safety Concurrence M a>" y)Mt 4 gjjsf73 1 0 _ u - 't lJ l1 l! P ll 4 . q I

 .i 1                                                                                     .

I f 'e 4 4 COwe om

                                                                                               ~ . . ~            a- -        .

i .. t

   ;                                                                                                                 e - -

GENER AL h ELEC1.10 . W - ' ' } . 1 n:at coup. 8*292-5461 satt. December 16, 1981 ~

   !                                                                                           cour s..I.W.

3.ti.[Bric[t lein.M7,'.,f sept. WILMINGTON NANtfFACTIfRING DFpARTNENT Currwr, H-40 U.C. Yeller, F-45 annerss. H/C H-92 S .C. Laufer, F-10 F..D. Singer, F-20 svancf. Ol'ANTERLY W!!ACEVFNT pep 0FT (Oct ./Nov ./Dec .1981) CL Staff,F-C?(1 cy cire) CL-El-219 To: L.A . Sheely, Manager Fuel Ouelity, F-10 i I. CENERAL BUSIt7.SS Not!DITIONS:

A.

Reorganization of 1.ab personnel to XYZ except for ABCD shift support of l weekend 12/21/81. criticality and environmental requircerents will beenne offective operate f.abWith the reorranization as H-16 ,Te a_reali:nment e n r- -" + - e of houriv eersonnel to }

 '                                                      test ecuinment
                                                                                                     -was implemented a f ter ~

several months of delay to allow salaried personnel af fected bv lack-of-vork to be considered for the Tee ona r - P a* j persons volunteered raaie % . Ftve solaried~ but for the positions of which two had not previously held hourly positions will now have improved job security as an hourly. II. CURRENT OPERATING TREUDS: 6 1 A. ..

• Product Test Support :

e Workload charts are attached (Exhibits 5 11-5) for the Chemet Lab sections. The "BACFLOG" data plott+:d represent the number of deterninations avait-

                                    . ing   to be made multiplied by a standard time for each determination. The
                                        " APPLIED" curves repr.csent plied by the standard time. the number of determinations performed r ulti-the Leb from week-to-week. factors to give the relative wore effort of H.

Reduction in Workload - Met Lab: - I A reduction in test voluee has been noted by the Pet Leh in rwo rifajor

• test areas which will facilitare the planned year-end monpower reductions:

(!) The long pirnred test reduction for rire tubing lots was impicmented l , FW-46/81. The new sorrple plan is expceted to reduce ,f.sb efforts for 1 the relec :n of :nbing 1.ns by approximstely FO%. .

(2) 400/500*C corrosion testing - For the seven (7) vecks cf the last i

• 4 quarter, the Liberatory has tested a total of 701 tubeshell se::t:les .

The total te'st capacity for this period at one run/ wack is 2,760. i. r 1 j . i I . I Appendix E i

                                                         -      ~                 ~ - ~
     .                       t

• i . - ' .

CUARTERLY !!ANAGEMEhT REr0l: 1 - 7(Oct./Nov./Dec.1981{

                                                                                                                                                           . pare 2-III. PP.03LEPS AFD INCIDENTS:

J* A. Calibration Standards for Enrichment Analyzers: Due to a lack the National of sufficient Bureau of Standards, quantity of Standard calibrs *- Reference Materials rom f

                                                                                                                                       --M--d-1
                                                                                                                                                 " = ati on th_a j

enrichment analyzers were fabricated frem in-house verkier and ca

 ;                                                  test macW zars
                                                   " Die NBS and meet               WCTM all Federal                 's) . These requirements        for WCTM's.          WCTM's have been _{

required revisions of planning in the Fundamental Nuclear This transition Materials Co  ! j trol Plan, COI's, SCP"s; five days of counting time to establish cont ( rol { and bias limits; one .manweek of work to fabricate the uranyl nitrate , and l i seal the standard containers; and numerous LMCS database changes. i i R. LlDi Outase: 1 3 i Fore than 100 samples for U ppm snalysis on the Linuid Urrnium Monito i

 '                                                 (LIDf) accumulated due to damaging of the detector during maintenan 11/03/81.                                                                                                        n 11/07/81, i new detector was expedited by C&IS from the vendor on establishedand   on verification          of statistical control for return to operation 1                                                                      11/10/81.

The damaged detector was repaired and feturned

                                                .future.

Fir!-50/61 as a back-up ' spare to minimize analytical service delays in

                                        'C.       J!.T 51end Isotopic Reject:

• A. blend was rejected at JNF for fail'ure to meet the isotopic acceptance plan.

tion that goes with a failure.This required rework at JNF and associat WMD must pay approximately $6,000 to the Japanese, improved. for the required rework and the image of .WPD at r. v andor wa However, this is the only blend failure in the pact 1 k blends shipped and falls within the ekpected producer's/ buyer's r,000 isk 1

• projected by the sampling plan. The Otemet Laboratory has undertaken a study as nique to investigate spelled out modifications to the present "G-218" isotopic tech-in the JNF specification.

studied should improve. measurement reliability with little increase inTh recuired manpower. - 4 D. 1, P&OAO Saferunrds Audit : ' iI FF/39-40/P,1, PACAO conducted thnir Safeguards Audit tory. in the Chemet Lah' ora-2,0'00 measurementA review was made nf over 40 control charts coverint approx

                                               ':tarderd certificat ions, Verifications, and Calil,rction Procedures well en the technicrl basis for certain proceditri's .

after this intense-, week-Incy asid it were: The items of concern q 1 N -1' . . _ _ _ _ _ ___ _. _ - - _ . _ - - _ - - _ ._

3 - i * ' 4 ' t i OUARTERI.Y MANACEFENT RFPORT . l'181.) '(Oct ./Nov ./Dec page 3-III. _PP.03LIMS AND INCIDE!.*T.M (Cont 'd ): _ D. , P50A0 Kofnitords Andit ICont 'd): 1. Some COI's and Tf'.P'c issued ; rior to 19e I had

   '                                                                           approval date.s and used format sheets differentissue dates prior to                                                                                                        '
   ,                                                                           in the latest P/P. No procedure issued                                                                      then'those specified deficiencies.                                                                           in Ir81 exhibiteel tha*.n r

unresciv*d advisory.This was still docint.ertad by en l*s.'; Aft a e e.e r e.r n sind si e t'.e tr n*.e .tt No1.' action

                                                                                                                                  . red *-is: Sit i* red i

• r* * :^ *
• e- *' * * * *

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 'r +r ! * *e r y h                                                                 *
                                                                     ..         ..t ~ -r-=

• tr .: r :  ; e- -

s..--

  !                                                                             rw.,u .                                                                             r- s-       -*- -

j r c::.e , cr..':. ; cyrv. tt urs:..:  :.< s--.-**.- t*..u tre  : *;.v r ;e : . 1 N t is duecont impurity was issued tc _ent theinfact the UIG that ostnathe assaved. Che' met Laboraterv does n culation. No from P&OAO reauesting L11CS to make a percentAn unrecolved a

  ;                                                                                                          action is' planned =iaa.                                                                                uraniu:n cal-I levels of the UO 3 being assaved aither.i m does rot imnv ek . 4-anetry j
  '                     -                                          3.' [The chemet Laborarn-v A e -ar s t u=n ve-i fv ebar an 1

condition has been corrected using

                                                                                 -                                                                                                                           n"t -o f-cen e -_n l i
                                                                            / tne conau. ton.                                                             the se,me standard which indicates -

rwhu is concerned that , if other than~the same Ouc-l t

                                                                        .      ot-con-      .Undard isasused initially indicated                         out-of-control    for verification,     will not        the anal-ytital region Federal Regulation #10CFR70.57'nor the FNMCD reonira                                                     be checked. Neither                ,

level be checked by standerde sfeer more than one entibrntion or that the satte ~ ~ stancard

                                                                            .cern,            (or-rcrion) b_t used t% verifv on_t ol.

e request To resolve this' con-will be made to revise the _FNMcP eq _=,mei Fica 11v allow the use of multip1'e verification standag4s..and the

 -                                                                           tYohn~1!T return li!I Fontroi= sing a lieYtTfid standsrd eh'rM.ve-i Fiem-s W T T6gTacen cnemist feels is aporopri.nce.

Er ' 1 E. Atomic Absorption (AA) Outare: I, - 4 j . Due to acid fune deterioration, the unit beene inoperable W-40 and .. . . 4 was sent to Fisher Scientific in Raleigh, N.C. for repair To support j precess conitoring of the irgoons and to reeet . the .'rd Quarter State i chrough Law & Co . onreporting deadline, copper, chrome and nickel analy [; 10/13/81. Repair of the AA unit 10/16/81 was completed 1 with return to norcial in-hnuse analysis during W-43. Duc.to - 1 the current maintensnee conditions and limited capabilities of the AA an. AR(ICP) was unit submitted and approved W-46/81 to obtain an Inductive coupl Plasm: J with . advanced technology and capability. IV. FINANCIAL: ] 1 No input. h 3 * .o

e 1

r w, v v . -*,w...we, ww,e,-,-,v,..-w%,,w e ,w - w w- ..w,- e w, ,w-

                                                                                                                           ,u,-,.,w,-w-w,',w    -

es, . w ,e , d a w ,w w-se r. -w,w s m .wer,-gw+ 3 eownwe+ -c.,gry e e-----

a p. i OUARTFRLY !*.\NACEFF.NT REPOPT (Oct ./Nov ./Dec .1981)

'                     ?-                                                                                                                                                 page 4 V.
                                                                                                                                                                                                 \

PELATICUS: l  : A. l - Het Lab Technician, Darrell Pope, accepted a temporary assignment at VMC working with FC0 personnel in relocating the " getter manufceturing ope f ation" to WMD. j to Wilmington toUpon assistcompletion of the VNC work FW-47, Darrell returned { in the set-up of couipment at FCO. He is pro-1 jected to return to the Het Lab by FW-01/82. - a' B. j V.E. FW-03/82. until Dean, Lab Spectroscopist, is on temporary assignment as Shift PCT.

                          ,                                                                                                                                                                      l C.

Illinois on October 27-28,P.R. Jasinski attended the Analytical Lab C 1 D. R.I. Parnell went l

• to Thermeraft ,. Inc ., Winston-Salem, N.C., October 30-31

 ,                                                 to    discuss fixtures.          drawing             modifications of the isotopic oxidation furnace and
}                             VI.        PROJECTS:                                                                                                           .

s' - j , A. Biosssay Ancivsic: , i

,t                                             'An ottempt                                                                                                                     ..

I semotes ca 4. t .r>F . .eveleste Fehem.-*-a- the e-inerer t' A-3 annivrmr hv anhmieral of sniked r,iled . Pather than puraua this approach,1 the Lab will turn en, Utah Internationni, Sunnyvale. Onli fornia for help . Utah in urine Internationsi and cuoteSrnutinely uses the scintrex t' A-3 to measure uranium planned "- r-'a- 18 . ahedetection level of <5 mg n/t . A trip to Utah is di teh na fa- to verify their capabilities end

                                              'obtain details of their methods.                                                                -
                                                                                                                                                                       ~
                                   .B.

The Latoratory has evaluated its chloride procedure, pyrohydrolysis/lon chromatogra'ph, against a rir,caloy specimen furnished by Wah Chang, j e Our measurements show excellent correlation: apprnximate 14 ppm F vs. W.C. values of 13.5 by atomic absorption, and 16.3 + 0.8, by x-ray flucrescence. With this successful verification, the pyrohydrolysis/lon i chromatograph approval.- method will be submitted to the Analytical Lab' Council for t . {; C. Lab Supplies Rearrangement: 3 The Lab supply Cage in TH0X is undergoing extensive renovation and reinventorying. This has r<asulted in more efficient use of available f space, consolidation of equipednt versus censummable supplies, and i a neater appearance. { Area is about 992 complete In addition, the new Lab Supply Room in the Stacker I with official release expected n?-51/C1. i, i 1

,i A

e - I

• 5 *

            .s     *                              .

i . .

              -                     OtfARTEELY NANACFWNT RE.*0!!T (Oct./Nov./Dec. lapin

_ ppg,3 1 - j - t VI. PROJECTT (Cone 'd): D. AEBC Microstructure Work: i i Approval has been obtained for two'heurly H-18 Test operators to perform microstructure grain clarsification for AE8C meteric.ls. Advertisements j j of positions, to be completed selection and by FV-04 qualifications of personnel erc anticipated of 1982. i 1 E. 1 - O)'NfCON (I.5 FACE ANALY2En) TRAINING: A specially arranged,* two-day seminar on the coperation and applicreion of

 ,                                        the Lab's Image Analyr.er was held on-site durfmg F1?-51/81. Training ves j              .7                       conducted       by Fausch        and tomb's    Analytic =1 Syst: ems tpplication Manager, B.E. Frnssnar.           Subject   matter    included:

Operation, PAFTC Preyr r e in;* vnd Specific Appl'.ications . Simple Meas Classes were ettended by all Nt 1.nh ideekly Salaried Persetnr.el rnd Control acd Instru-I, ment Support F9ecialist, D. Smith, who is resp:nnsible for programming and general maintenance of the Cbemet Leb 's omnicorn. 1 j In addition to the trainics program, tine uma rallotted for consultation 91th Mr. Fressner,on "Special Hessurement Fun =:tions" cnd "Eculpment Operation Problems". Following the daily ekasses, Pfr. Fressner conseilted with F.C. E P.F. Elliot and D. Smith on the application of special measurernent tech-

                                       .niques, various propram*cting considerations for VIous and existing . operation problerns.                       future projects and pre-All personnel involved

• felt that the seminer amd discussions verc very informat'ive and beneficial to current and futur:e business neeos, f

VII. SIGNIFICANT PROCESS CHANCES: 4 No input. t b A ap f s - T.P. Winsinw, Manager Chemet i.cberstories ,11-92 . i TPW/ rive Attachmenrn - *. ' q - 1 j .- i

 }

i l '

4 0

          ,    ;                                                          'V.                                                                                         -
                                                                           <                                                               es                                                                    .

l

• t
• n

,  %- t .

                                                           .             !                  I                l      .i                                       :               .

i i  ! - i

                                                           ;             I                                                 !               ;                                               .,                               i 1                                             .            ,              ,                               . . .                                               .               i
                                                                                                                                                                                                       ~

d

- F. ,

                                                                                  '                                                                                                                       L I      g.)                                        -
                                                                                                                                                 )

j  : i .. - ,-

• k.[r ., .

                                                                                                                                         ...c .

g  : l /( 0 T.h*h. 1 $ 'y '. Y ~)C i , 4 T*a .;

                                                                                                     .24gf.y q:                                                                          6                             ~~ x g -                                                   t 9,.4
                                                                                              . a,st, i'                                                                                                                                                  ..

i.mpc.

                                                                                      ^
                                                                               .-                  6                      1. . ,                                                                  ..

r r

• iM3.L., -

119 % L." ~

                                                                                              ' %, R&lk                                                                       *.u.mLES 1                                                            r.,.g                                               y                                           a a

q u.. v..... .mn ._ a

                                                                                                                                        .f..-n            . = .s k . 9,,t
~                       '                 '
   '                                                                                                                                                                                                        N
                                                        .I.#g:.E,?...>..

p hy i L N'y:SE'&,(W.d.'Sf'%d,i;...lk

                                                                                                                  . .m.o.w.::.k . ..a e
                                                                                                                                                                          %,g,p. . n j,.n.i.%."

t - 4 ..Iy '~ >- 1 * - -

                                                                     $t

( - - l F-----

                                                    ".i W E M 4 M M E R R W
                                                           -y           ?,.                                         9'                .                                                   h                             
                                                                             . , - - u ....c . ... m , ~ . a .                                        o. m . . . . , ,,s.

fT .. m , a'l g  ;

                                                                                 .J:uPhCyujpFEP4WG,APPARATRS &p,ypDCE s .Tassaid.W                                      '~

on qr.o,q'uz, ?dh t25 5 i  ! l(h.x2TA ki{$k ,vness%fl .-i tf . . l g . . . 1 1 ' Appendix F i

  !l         -
                                                       ._____.l                         '

A-- - - - --- - - - - - - - - - ~ ' ' " ' ' ' ' - ~ ' " ' ' ' " ' ' ' ' " ' -

r- L. .

                                                                                                                  . z. . . . . g                      . _             _ .
   , l)                                                   l

__ -:s ,.

   ;                                     :P                                                                            $ . *' ; . i:.

t r r- . .. ., y .y; n ; i .

   ~ . %. e--- J                                                          5   -

3 a

                                                                                                                                                                                                      ,a
                                                                                      ,-                              1                                                                                                                                        9"
                                                                                                        .g                           1-                     f             E, ' H                                                                 y s.
   )
      . @-j ._. 7.9 . . .j L                '"'2! .                              4               '

I j 5 h) '

                                                                                                                                                                                                                        ~
   ' : n. M._. Q y .' L Q... c?                                                                                   .",i
      ,w9                                          -              f                  g.       .
                                                                                                     .k       4                      ) g%          4              fgl.._d.nQy. : [ h j ,'~,,j8                                                           _-

1< g s -} .

                                                                       ~
                                                                                  >                qG . .\ x 4 l
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               }.

v

       -Q-}

a

                           ._.g
                                          .-l.
                                             ~          ,
                                                                  ,q y

g-c

                                                                                                                                                                                                                        .-..go.
  ;.  . _ __._.                                                                                     o;;                        y                     g-_                             -       -

yt -

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               <y
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  .... . z e {_.
           ,f .___ _q. . _.... _ .g.                                         .. q .                                  -
                                                                                                                              .i.          .      ..            .

h.n i . . . . ..,__

                                                                                                             .. e              _w_... s....a._g                                                                                                            J, g:_._._t

_y .._. t. ..

                                                                                                                                                                                                                    ..'j d.3De-     g_..)_h..
                                                                                  . .l .
                                                                                                                                              ..h                               . . ;d. .
   ;                                   i
                         !                            :                i               I                               i
   ;.                                                                                                                                 i                 i                 i
                                                                                 .g                      t                                                                                                                   i

_: . ... l .. . _ _

                                                                     .l               -

1 . .. . . . . i. S _. t . . .:_.......

                                                                                                                          $'~~ ,:                                                          QfY+IO*W
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       )

lI . .' ['= f:If( Ik,j . w i . _ : . .. f4; (_P ,'". . 4 gM< .gg; . - .. . w$$gyB)@

                                                                                                                                                                           .ed ggs @                                               _   ..
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  ,p n

b*  ; l j'.:

• f.

                                      'w, e,       p'#f.v.
                                                        ,     I s.:                                                                  -
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                .                 $,3 g)        ==

ifL.* 6%

                                                                                                                                                                                                           ')            @           )
                                                                                                                                                                          $M g                            i.             ;                                i
                                                                                                                                }}.                                , , ,
                                                                                                                                                                                                          )                   -

ff, 3

                                    $fi$p'-@$.$$:$4h                   ~

J 5 . f$ --

          *               ' ~ ~ *
                                                            .5$ 1.5                                                      .B.              I.

,l 1 - i , i - i 8- . l l '

                                                                                                                  '                l                  1 l
                                                                                                                          . . s ---

l --

       ...l...                                                               . -

l- t .. t-3- ,,) - F

• i I l ..

I p 8

                                                                                                                                  !                  i                                  !                   !              .

i l l i l $ L i i i  !  !  ! - i  ! p. i

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            ,a L'                                                                  -

i u i i I

                                                                                                                                                                                                                           , Appendix G n    t

p ,, , '

   \  ~-           ~
                                                                 . .m.1y .n , ,' ..1 C ~

2 - ' dsaks:o r } l'. . . GENERALO ELEC.dlC. - osatsome. 8*292-5461 sats. Janu'ary 19, 1984

  .i                                                                                                  cents

• C. G. McLamb , 5-92 j L. A. Sheely, K-10

                                 ~

e pr. WIIMINGTON MANUFACTURING DEPARTMENT E.A. Imes, J-02 { asoness. M/C E-92 ti suesast. ACTION : PLANNED PER OUR 01/12/84 MEETING - b 1 TO: Vera M. English 1 a . M/C B-92

   ?

ii ij j As indicated to you in our meeting of 01/12 I

                             -     have/will be taken in the following areas. /84, actions
]  i e

Flexibility for you to change your password has been ' il limited due to the required interactions of twe il computers , LMCS and HP9887, both of which require 1 , exact password matching. Specifically, J. Garris, - ho theset be onlyupLab by LMCS authorized password accessor, will 01/25/84 HP9887 password accessor.toAt also any betime the only you authorized are scheduled off for more than 48 hours, yout in-process work on the HP9887 should be cleared such that you may contact John to effect a password change for you. Based on your 4-shift rotation, you should be able to . change your password upon reporting to either the 3:00 - 11:00 shift or the 7:00 - 3:00 shift. e

                        -                     LMCS 902/902 transaction password control, when initially set up, involved the ability to change values for standards results and, consequently, access was restricted to supervisor passwords only.
                                             .Sometime ago, these transactions were modified to eliminate access to changing standards results. Use 9,

of the current 902/903 transac. tion by qualified lab p personnel input errors. is appropriate for routine correction for Bowever, if intentional falsification d of results occurred, traceability to who/Uhy changes 3 were made would not be available. Therefore, trans-actions 902/903 will not be made available to others ! until they are modified to record and print out on

• each changed result report to document the person, -

e reason and date of the changes. In the interim, all supervisory passwords will be changed on a continuing 1 il basis to eliminate indiscrete use by others. l \ __ ' l g ,/[,M (/) 10

.a,                                                        .-f'-}au    .. #". ,' f. .'
                                                           . .:      ~..

l, l 'I Appendix H I .- _

            . q, .

g ,,,

                                                                          ,              ., . ,     ,        7            ,
   .: .   . y, . ,                                               . . :i'. : .          .

o - s - Jt'

           .                  Vera M. English' -                                January 19, 1984
                                                                                                                                       -page 2-l t'

e When the HP9887 computer was implemented in November { 1982, the pay number of the operator performing the i sample solution weighing was used as. the pay number

!                                          to be reported on the utCS results report. . Since the possibility does exist that the shift operator who transacts the data on the RP9887 to DICS may allow

• incorrect data to be transmitted, the taMCS results

!                                         report will then show this incorrect results and the i                                        pay number of the non-transmitting operator. Since
!                                        it is not possible to enter one pay number which will represent the performance of the total ~ steps in completing a sample, I have decided to change the pay number reported to LMCS to be the pay number of the operator releasing the results. This change was implemented effective 01/17/84.
        -                  With respect to samples which you have. identified on the rerun log as requiring rerun and subsequently being deleted by another operator, from the lab viewpoint, I am confident that the deletions are being properly handled.. Per procedure,
!                          a sample outside the expected range is to be rerun if C&R personnel meet the range. indicata it is from a source which was expected to Your. C&R contact advises to rerun the sample-and a subsequent C&R contact advises not to rerun. The problem lies with differing CsR decisions. From a quality viewpoint, samples outside the expected range which are not rerun will not be released by C&R. From a IAb viewpoint, we should not expend the retest labor to rerun samples not requiring reruns.               As an overview of the total isotopic measurement / quality release system, no specific problems are

{ - apparent due to samples not being rerun which should have been rerun. .. I I f .

                        . WA N r

T.P. Winslow, Manager

• Chemet Laboratories, M/C H-9 2 .

j TPW/dyc i e o j& V

                                                                                  ...i....

3... . ' . - c

                            .                                                                                                                O I

   -                         l LAW cFFICE3 MOZART G. RATNER, P. c.

1900 M STR E CT, N. W. ' ~

                                                                  ~

SulTC 610 w

                             ,    WASHI N GTON. D. C. 2 O O3f.,       AmeA coot sea April 11, 1985 Mr. James M. Taylor, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Re    Vera M. English DOL Case 85-ERA-2 NRC Case No. 7590-01 Dear Mr. Taylor I an enclosing herewith a letter to you which concludes our submissions in NRC Case No. 7590-01, and lists no "ce's."

I suggest that you or Ms. Axelrad call me on Friday, April 12, 1985, to set a time for a meeting on Monday, April 15. Meeting no later than Monday is dictated by my long planned, projected departure 1985. for Spain for a two-we,ak family vacation on April 17, Very truly yours, f Y$ k I Mozart G. Ratner MGR/hej . Enclosures  ! cc: Ms. Jane Axelrad (w/o enclosures) l

  ,  .,,                                                                                             J!'      .      .

i.4'w OrricEs, MOZART G. RATN ER, P. c. 190 0 M STREET, N. W. SUITE SIO WASHINGTON. D. c. 2 0036 ARCA coot aoa 233-e47a April 11, 1985  ! Mr. James M. Taylor, Director ' Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Re: Vera M. English DOL Case 85-ERA-2 NRC Case No. 7590-01

Dear Mr. Taylor:

In ny letter of March 15, 1985 (Attachment A),

                                                                  ~

responding to yours of March 14, 1985 (Attachment B), I undertook to stop making submissions to you, in the interest of expediting decision before the end of the trial in DOL Case No. 85-ERA-2. I said: "if additional material becomes available upon production by General Electric at the hearing, * *

• those documents will be introduced into evidence * *
• and will be open to your inspection." You had no representative at the trial and, consequently, cannot be aware of the newly _

discovered documentary evidence which G.E. was compelled by cubpoena duces tecum to produce at trial, or of G.E.'s testimonial admissions, or of the testimony of Dr. Kenneth Mossman and Joy Malpass, among others. Your failure to have an observer present does pose the following question: if you were not sufficiently interested to send an observer currently to appraise the evidence being adduced at the trial of an alleged ~ Severity I violation (49 FR 8593, Supp. VII, A.4, March 8, 1984), in which the merits and

             .                 _ . - -             .       -                    _ _       - _ ~ = . - _ -                           .               ,

significance of Mrs. English's charges in NRC Case No. 7590-01 4 are squarely in issue, what do you perceive the role of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement in a 10 CFR S 2.206 proceeding to be? Is it perhaps only to. rubber stamp the findings and actions of your Regional Office? Or does it i rather reflect over-enthusiastic promotion of the illegitimate interests of your regulatee, G.E., and of NRC itself, in t 4 avoiding adverse publicity of wrongdoing? My reasons for i suspecting that the latter is the case are set out, with documentary proof, in my accompanying letter to Bradley W. Jones, Esq. .See also Wilmington Morning Star Editorial, ) Attachment C. In any event, since you have issued no report, although 4 the trial in 85-ERA-2 concluded on March 28, 1985, to refrain now from submirting to you newly discovered evidence produced at the trial could serve no useful purpose. Appended as

         ,   Attachments 01-D8, hereto, is the daily series of Wilmington Morning Star articles about the trial.                                          Appended as Attachments                                      '

{ El-8, is the series published by the Raleigh News and Observer . l These , provide a bird's eye view of some of the highlights. 1 I. INTRODUCTION - LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE Preliminarily, I wish to point out that the newly i j discovered G.E. documents constitute admissions of our

 !           previously documented claim that G.E. 's violations were j             " willful" within the meaning of 10 CFR S 2. 201(c), 49 FR 8585, f
                                                     ^

l a M W

si' *

 ;                       B, 3; and id., at'8588, III, second full par., middle col.:
                         "The term ' willfulness' * *

• embraces a spectrum of violations ranging from deliberate intent to violate or falsify to and j

including careless disregard for requirements" (emphasis added). -

 !                                They also constitute admissions of our previously l

documented claim that G.E. by " materially false statements" (49 FR 8587, II A; id., 8593, A, 1, n. 15 and accompanying text), deceived NRC investigators: l "(A) Material False Statement is a statement that is false by omission or commission and is relevant to the regulatory process. As can be seen in the examples, in determining the specific severity level of a violation involving material false statements 4 ~ or falsification of records, consideration will be given to such f actors as the position of the person involved in the violation (e.g., first line supervisor or senior manager), the significance of , ! the information involved, and the intent of the i violator (i.e., negligence not amounting to careless disregard, careless disregard, or deliberateness). 3 The relative weight given to each of these f actors in arriving at the appropriate severity level will be dependent on the circumstances of the violation." (Emphasis added.) . They also establish that G.E. violated its statutory obligation

by " failure to provide [to NRC] full, complete, timely and accurate information and reports" (id., at 8588, III, third ,

full par., middle col.; id., at 8593, A, 1, n. 15). 'hese T are all Severity Level I violations ( 49 FR 85 93, "S upp. VII - Severity Categories," A, 1, 2, 3). Official NRC enforcement policy, by which NRC is legally bound, is that "[c]ivil pen,alties will normally be assessed d

       ,                                                E  '

• i

           * *

• for any willful violation of any Commission requirement

          ***"     .   (49 FR 8589,   "B. Civil Penalty," last sentence, first col.)      "The deterrent effect of civil penalties is best served when the amounts of such penalties take into account a licensee's ' ability to pay.'"       (,Id.,  first par. middle col.),

i "In cases involving willfulness, flagrant NRC-identified violations, repeated poor performance in an area of concern, or i serious breakdown in management controls, NRC intends to apply its full enforcement authority where such action is warranted, including * *

• assessing court penalties for continuing violations up to the statutory limit of $100,000, pjgt .

violation, per day." (Id., final full par. , middle coi. ) . (Emphasis added.) Deliberate continuation of licensee-known violations properly results in daily fines for each violation: "(1) If a licensee is aware of the existence of a condition which results in ongoing violation, and fails to initiate corrective action, each day the condition existed may be considered as a separate violation and, as such, subject to a separate additional -- l penalty." 49 FR 8590(1). Further (id., first full par., middl.2 col.), ,

                         "[i] f an evaluation of * *

• nultiple violations shows that more than one fundamental problem is involved, each of which, if viewed independently, could lead to civil penalty action by itself, then separate civil penalties may be assessed for each such fundamental problem. In addition, the failure to make a required report of an event requiring such reporting is considered a separate problem and will normally be assessed a separate civil penalty, if

r

                                   ,                                                      Ji'        -

t the licensee is aware of the matter that should have been reported." II. THE DOCUMENTARY ADMISSIONS

On May 21, 1984, Mr. E. A. Lees, Manager, Quality Assurance, soon to succeed Mr. James A. Long as General Manager of G.E.'s Wilmington Manufacturing Department (WMD), wrote to Mrs. English, Attachment F, hereto. In his letter, Lees stated that he had reviewed the Wieczorek and Hendry reports and determined that they are " complete and accurate." He characterized the Wieczorek report as showing "some substance" to your allegations, and the Hendry report as showing none.

, such " substance" as was found in the Wieczorek report, Lees i , attributed entirely to "miscommunications and misinterpretations of some procedures among Laboratory personnel." (Emphasis added.)1/ He proposed to remedy this problem through " additional training or improved wr'itten procedures, or a combination of both." He ended: "This action closes my investigation into the alleged violations included in your letter and documentation * * *." A. The Wieczorek Report

At trial,' Lees was compelled to comply with subpoenas duces tecum 'for the Wieczorek and Hendry reports. It

                                                                                   ~

l 1/ It is common knowledge that " Utilities dismiss most such  ! i complaints as ' communications problems,' disagreements over 1 judgment decisions or grumblings from disgruntled workers." l

 !                                      The Wall Street Journal, Wed., November 7, 1984, Vol. CCIV No.

91, p. 1, first col. on left, Ron Winslow, " Quality Quandry," tenth par. - i

        ,                                                        J .* '   .

t i j turned out that the Wieczorek investigation had been conducted 2

           "during the period of March 26 through March 30, 1984," ten i

i days after Mrs. English's expulsion from the Chemet Lab, and that his report, labelled " Strictly Private," had been submitted April 26, 1984, four days before the Long hearing on her appeal from that expulsion ( Attachment G (Wieczorek Report)). Mr. Wieczorek is identified as " Consulting Engineer, Analytical and Test Methods," " Quality Assurance and Reliability Operation," San Jose, California. His " team" t members were Thurston Davis, an " employee relations representative," and C. R. Ogle, a " Quality Audits and Customer . l Service" official, both from WMD. At the beginning, the Wieczorek report summarized its conclusions as follows (par. 2):

                            "The four alleged violations of Company Practices

1. and Procedures related to Quality presented to E. A.

• Lees [by Mrs. English] were investigated by the review team and were found, for the most part, to have substance." (Emphasis added.)

In point of fact, as the report detaiIs show, five English allegations were investigated, and four of the five were found i

          " trues" " correct" or " confirmed" (4 a)-3), pp. 2-4). At the f

end of the report, the Wieczorek " team" stated its conclusion unequivocally (5. Conclusion, p. 4):

"As the result of this review, the team has concluded that, as discussed above, V. P. English's allegations have substance." (Emphasis added:. )

Cf. Lees' deliberate understatement, "some substance," supra. j

                                                   ~

l

1. The first of Mrs. English's allegations --

          " Analyzers are not properly calibrated following detector change" was found true "if one uses [Mrs. English's]

interpretation of the applicable procedure" (4.a), p. 2). Mrs. English's interpretation was found to be not only reasonable (p. 2, last par.), because "[d]ifferentiation between the definitions of ' Calibration' and " Minimum-U-Count' was not clear in the Procedural Instructions, C01 411, Rev. 2 and Rev. 3," (Attachments H and I) and because other analyzer operators interpreted the applicable procedure as Mrs. English did (,[d.), but correct (Comments, 4 b), p. 3). The report enumerated the consequences of operator interpretations which differed from hers (4 a, p. 3):

                      "- inconsistencies among operators
                       - possible violations of procedures
                       - possible questionable validity of results
                       - possible perceptive management countenance of operator deviation from procedure
                       - needless loss of time because work would have to be reperformed."
   ,     It is to be noted that the last four consequences are listed as         -
         "MCA Allegations" 2, 5, 6, 7 and 10, in the list of English ~

allegations attached to Mr. Bradley W. Jones' letter to me of January 25, 1985 (Attachment J, hereto). G.E. claimed at trial that NRC found the first of the Wieczorek investigated allegations "No violation - unsubstantiated" ( second allegation, p. 1, AL7 11, Attachment K, hereto). The chart appended to the Puckett affidavit o .

         ,           ,                                                                                                    51'              >

t

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 ]

(Attachment L), agrees (p. 6, item 4). Both charts cite Reports 82-18, 84-05, 84-15 and 84-16.2/ Report No. 82-18, 3,E! approves, p. 2, third par., the procedure followed af ter "repeaking" of enrichment analyzer No. 14 on August 20, 1982, as " required by a written proced ure . " The procedure referred to is not identified, but, according to the Inspector, "the procedure states that the ]- RIP-005 standard be counted six times or more in succession, or counting the standard by running the calibration in order to determine a minimum uranium isotopic count limit." The latter i technique was used by "G.E., * *

• in which at least two attempts were made to analyze data on EA No. 14 prior to

! rederiving the minimum uranium isotopic count limit." (Emphasis added. ) However, unlike' the Wieczorek Report, the Inspector apparently did not examine or analyze the terms of COI-411,

                 .                Rev. 2, Attachment H, cupra.                                     4.2 " provide's the standard change criteria which impact the U-count limit and require the limits i                                  and related limits to be rederived through multiple counting _of the RIP 005 (3.978) standard." (Emphasis added.)                                                                            5.1 states that "The RIP 005 (3.97,8) standard is to be counted six (6) 2/          Neither chart considers any report prior to 1984 other j                                 than 82-18, but both refer to unpublished 85-02.

i 3/ Attachment 2 contains all cited inspection reports, l Tndexed chronologically (omitted from the original). 4 8-I w -

           -y-_.-m,- w_-,------_.      y  _,,y-   __,,,,,-_m_e%,       ,,,e,,,,m

__-_% _ . _ , , , , - _ _ , . , , _ . _,,__%, . , , __m,_,_,_.,,.,y._- - . _ _ _ . _ , , . _ _ , , , _ _ . , _ , .

        ,                                               Ji'     .

• times through either running the calibration six or more times or counting the standard using the utility program provided by Control Systems." (Emphasis added.) Mr. Wieczorek concluded that Mrs. English and other like-minded analyzer operators had correctly interpreted COI-411, Rev. 2 and Rev. 3, to reguire that "six acceptable calibrations or six verifications * * *

[be] run after a detector change." (4 b) Comments, p. 3, emphasis added.) This means that under either system -

           " running the calibration" or " counting the standard" six acceptable tests are required.           The NRC inspector never even addressed this issuer he took management's misinterpretation, that only one " counting [of] the standard" was , required, as gospel.

Report 84-05, 2 a, an investigation admittedly sparked by the English charges, conducted between March 26-29, 1984, made the crucial determination that Mrs. English's

          " understanding * *

• concerning the calibration procedure (I]sotopic-U-Count Limit Change Criteria No. COI 411, Revision 3, dated February 9, 1983 (Attachment I)] was in error."

(Emphasis added.) of course, this " determination" could only have been based on top management's misrepresentation to that effect, since it utterly ignored 4.1, 4.3 and 5.1 of Rev. 3, and the evidence on which Mr. Wieczorek, in his virtually simultaneous investigation, predicated his diametrically opposite conclusion that Mrs. English's interpretation was

                                            ~

right.

                                                                                                                                                                                                   ~

f;' . . 1 Report 84-15, 3. a, p. 2, the result of an inspection conducted November 13 through 16, and December 3 through 7, 1984, broadly approved G.E.'s " evaluations of the Chemet Laboratory's LEA measurement system," as being " performed in accordance with approved operating procedures." According to the Inspector, G.E. "is using and maintaining LEA standards under controlled conditions and in accordance with the facility FNME plan and approved standard operating procedure." (Emphasis added.) Had the Inspector seen the Wieczorek report, then seven months old, it is safe to say that be could not conceivably have concluded, as he did, that "No violations or - deviations were observed in this area." Further, the Inspector noted, id., that G.E. "is preparing a revision to these operating instructions that will expand on the use and control of LEA /NDA standatds," to 'be i ready for review by December 31, 1984." 84-15 was issued Fe,bruary 2, 1985, 10 months after Lees' letter to Mrs. English (Attachment M) announcing projected " development of a [ remedial] program." As of the end of the trial in 85-ERA 22, March"28, 1985, G.E. admitted that COI #411, Rev. 3, had not been revised. See, 49 ?.R. 8590(1), quoted p. 4, supra. Report 84-16, 3a (2), is another prize example of management's defrauding an NRC Inspector. The Report discusses the " clarification" of procedure between Rev. 2 and Rev. 3 of COI-411, which made it unacceptable "to measnre production samples during the period of collecting the six high standard

                                                                               --~
                                                                                                                                                           ~

l . .

               ,                                                                                                                                              L' '     -

counts data used to determine the minimum U-count 1Luit." But it fails to mention the language in both Revisions upon which Mr. Wieczorek predicated his determination that Mrs. English's interpretation was correct and her complaint was valid. Had top management dirclosed the " strictly private" Wieczorek . report to the Inspector, he could not conceivably have concluded that "this allegation could not be substantiated. No violations or deviations were identified." Lees' " omission" to disclose the Wieczorek Report to the Inspector, knowing that that disclosure would be decisive 2 is, by NRC definition, a

 .               " Material False Statement."                                                                    49 FR 8593, A,                                          1, and footnote 15, quoted p. 3, supra.

2. Report 84-05, 2 a., p. 2, attributes to Mrs. English another " misconception" -- that absence of entries in the counting logs for periods when " calibrations were being performed" established that " calibrations / verifications were not being properly performed." Both the G.E. chart, p. 4, last item, and the Puckett chart (p. 7, last item) list the English allegation that'"G.E. management had misled NRC inspectors by.

saying that the calibration logbook was not an official record required by procedure." The Inspector's conclusion that this allegation was due to a " misconception" on Mrs. English's part was admittedly derived only "[t]hrough inquiry of laboratory managers." It was they who persuaded the Inspector that G.E.

                 " categorized" the " calibration log book entries" as mere
     --. -         . . . - - - . - . , - . - , . - - - - , , . , . - - , --        n-   - - - . . - .      . - - . - - - - - - - - . . _ , - - . - - - , , . , . - , -     . - - - - , - - , . , - , _ . .     ,,    , - - - -

Ji' -

            "wo'rking documents," which were not intended to record all calibration and verification standards data * * *."

Apparently the Inspector accepted these Lab Manager misrepresentations at face value. There is no indication that the Inspector examined either COI #411, Rev. 2 or 3, . Attachments H and I. Had he done so he could hardly have failed to observe that Rev. 2 (4.3.2), requires that: " Changes in the standards, including either solution or vial changes, are to be noted on the log" and that 4.4, requires that

            " Amplifier settings following any repeaking shall be recorded on the Equipment Change Log for the assigned analyzer" (emphasis added). Cf. Ref. 2, 3.1, 4.2, 4.3.                                       Similar misinformation about G.E. 's asserted lack of obligation to maintain shift logs was given to the Inspactor in 84-16, pp. 2-3, by a " measurement systems specialist in the l           Calibration and Instrumentation Support Unit."                                               In consequence of an interview with this unnamed management " specialist," the Inspector "noted that logs of this type are not required to be maintained by the licensee and are used primarily for trend                                                .

analysis relating to equipment failure." The first clause of this sentence is belied by COI 411, Rev. 3, 3.1 and 4.3, and the second is a purely diversionary cock and bull story. It is all the more surprising that Inspectors Todd and Bates in 84-05 and Bates in 84-16, fell for this management

fabrication, inasmuch as Sabados in 83-05, issued March 9, 1983, pp. 2-3, had found a violation of COI 20, Rev. 1, on the

51' . e basis of management's failure to " record [] on bench worksheets and subsequently to enter into the computer system providing retrievable documentation through the generation of sample reports, control logs and/or control charts."1/

3. The second English allegation investigated by Wieczorek's " team" (4 b), p. 3, was that

                      "[c] alibr ation and verification were not completed before samples were run and material released
                      'during 8/20/82 and 6/22/83.'"

The Report found the allegation " correct." It said:

                     "The investigation revealed that, during 8/20/82 and 6/22/83, six acceptable calibrations or six i                    verifications were not run af ter a detector change as required by Instruction COI 411, Rev. 2 and Rev.

3." The G.E. chart (Attachment K, item 1, p. 2) asserts that NRC found "no violation-unsubstantiated," citing 82-18, 84-05, 84-15, and 84-16. The Puckett chart agrees, p. 7, item 1. 82-18, 3, 2, 4th par., finds that after the August 20, i 1982, detector change, procedure was satisfied "by running the calibration in order to determine a minimum uranium isotopic count limit." (Emphasis added.) The Wieczorek Report .. demolishes the Inspector's perverted misconstruction of COI-411, 5.1, as requi, ring only a single " counting [of the , standard]," supra, p. 9. 4/ It is interesting that this investigation is the only one of the cited investigations of G.E. in which Sabados participated. .

[ t Under Wieczorek's construction, whether the system of " running verifications," or the system of running " calibrations," is used, each must be run six times. As noted above, supra, p. 9, 84-05, 2, a, p. 2, was predicated on the fatal fallacy that Mrs. English's

                   " understanding * *

• was in error." Beyond that, however, I without specifying who made the determination or how it was made, the Inspector reported (M.):

                                "It was later determined through verification of counting data records that combinations of calibrations and verifications were measured during the period when isotopic anilyses of production samples were performed. These measurements of calibration / verification standards were performed a     -

total of six times as specified by the licensee's procedure." (Emphasis added.) . Where the licensee's procedure specifies that measurements by ' the different techniques of running " calibrations" and running

                   " standards" can be combined to reach "a total of six" the Inspector does not say.         Obviously, management sold the Inspector a bill of goods.          The Wieczorek team interpreted COI Rev. 411 Rev. 2 and Rev. 3 as requiring either "six acceptable l

calibrations or six verifications," not six calibrations / '

                  . verifications combined.

84-15 asserts -(3. a, p. 2) that G.E. " periodically changes. calibration and verification standards and may or may not change the isotopic content of these standards." This I blithely ignores the prohibitions, limitations and conditions upon changing calibration and verification standards, which is

1 i . . .

            ,                                             Ji'  -

t the major theme of COI-411, Rev. 2 and 3. The balance of the Report page is irrelevant; a product of Lab management's subtle diversionary tactics. 84-16, 3 a (2), again dealt only with the alleged release of production samples on August 21, 1982, and not with the alleged release of June 22, 1983, although both were recognized as English charges and covered by the Wieczorek Report. The Inspector's description of G.E.'s "prtecedure for this measurement method" is not supported by COI 4 1, Rev. 2, the rule he cites. He does not find specifically that six calibrations or six verifications were counted during a "24 hour time period." It is evident from the text details and from his conclusion that (p. 4), "[p] roduction samples were not released prior to equipment stabilization. They were not measured until af ter stabilization of the equipment had been completed," that management led him a merry chase away from the number of counts that were actually made. The Inspector's conclusion that "[n]o violations or deviations were identified" is in irreconcilable conflict with Wieczorek's report, which' Lees obviously deliberately withheld from the Inspector.

4. The third English allegation investigated by Mr.

Wieczorek's " team" was that "Results from isotopics are accessible in computer and can be altered." The G.E. chart, 4 item 3, p. 2, identifies this charge as "no violation-unsubstantiated," citing 84-05 and 84-15. 'The Puckett affidavit agrees, second item, p. 2.

N *

• 84-05, 2.b, pp. 3-4, buys Lab management's story wholesale. It appears to be based largely upon the Winslow to English memo of January 19, 1984 (Appendix H to Chapter II).

It claims also to be based upon " inquiry of laboratory management and selected laboratory technicians" (p. 3).. Selected by whom, the Report does not say. The Wieczorek - Report states that "Except for one supervisor and one operator, seven individuals interviewed who work in the area near V. P. English confirmed" her allegation. (Emphasis added.) An Investigator who looks only to biased sources must overlook the truth. i 84-15, Sa, p. 7, concludes, without explanation, that , the LEA computer software program is ,

                                    " reasonably protected from unauthorized changes and is designed to permit changes of operating parameters, including standards control limits that do influence the values of analytical measurements, to be input to the system.

Worker concerns .in this area were not substantiated." The Wieczorek Report concluded, p. 3, that the programs did not reasonably guard against " altering of results," and that worker i concerns in this area therefore were substantiated.

5. The fourth 'English allegation addressed by the Wieczorek Report is that "Use of 902/903 computer transactions are condoned by supervisor." G.E.'s chart lists this third l among the English allegations (p. 2) and describes the NRC's-findings in 84-05 and 84-15 as "no violation -

a Ji' , unsubstantiated."- The Puckett chart lists it second on p. 7 and agrees tha~t the reports cited find "no violation." 84-05 finds that .

                                                    "The transaction codes * *

• allow the user to correct data input errors associated with production samples but cannot be used to change measurement results for standards. Additionally, modifications of results of production samples were restricted to use by laboratory supervisors only."

(Emphasis added. ) The underlined portions of these findings are disproved in the immediately following paragraph of 84-05, in the first par. on

p. 4, and in the Wieczorek Report, p. 3, last par.

.. In the penultimate paragraph on pp. 3 and 4, 84-05 , described the strictures placed upon supervisors and employees by a laboratory policy memorandum dated January 19, 1984 (E-6) (Attachment N), which would ostensibly prevent unlimited access to other employees' passwords. The inspector deemed this "an appropriate system improvement to the administrative controls" (p. 4, second full par.). 84-15, p. 7, Sa, found:

                                                    "The program is reasonably protected from                                         ,.

unauthorized changes * * *. Worker concerns in this area were not substantiated." (Emphasis added.) 1 The Wieczorek Report exploded both NRC Reports. 4. Comments, p. 4, states:

                                                    "Even though instructions were issued on 2-22-83 and 1/25/84 to reemphasize that there should be limited access to 902/903, non-supervisor access continued."

e 0 17 -

                 .                                              AE'               '

t See also, Chapter II, p. 30; English Affidavit (Attachment O, 13, p. 8, last two sentences).

6. The fifth English allegation addressed by the Wieczorek Report is that

                                " Supervisors input data under technician's password and create false data."

The last three words of this allegation is the only portion of any English allegation found unsubstantiated by the Wieczorek report. Cf. 4.c, second comment. That Report's finding that supervisors and employees, known and shown at trial to have been hostile to Mrs. English, who admittedly could have used her password to alter results, did not in fact do so is based only upon the accused's denials, and fails to consider or account for Mrs. English's recorded substantiation of her claim (Attachment O, pp. 6-7, d , , e , pp. 8, 12.) False denials of animus-inspired falsifications are only to be expected.' A presumably impartial NRC inve,stigator, of only moderate competence, should not have been misled.

7. Report 84-04, based on an investigation conducted

                                                                                                   ~.

February 21-24, 1984, of one of Mrs. English's charges (Attachment J, Letter Jones to Ratner, dated 1/25/85, Enc. 2, Item 10), finds that " Nuclear Safety Release 6.1.0 (spproved 4/27/78) * *

• did not specifically require personnel to wear protective gloves;" reports the Inspector's advice that wearing of gloves should be required, and Vaughan's. promise that "the documents specifying clothing requirements for the Chemet Lab 18 -

L' ' . - e would be revised to require the wearing of protective gloves." Because the Inspector found no requirement in NSR 6.1.0 for the wearing of gloves, he found "no violation." .Neither the G.E. chart nor the Puckett chart acknowledges this "no violation" finding. - But the truth fs (although no doubt concealed from the ' Inspector by Vaughan), that at least since 1972, other Chemet Lab rules plainly required that Chemet Lab personnel wear protective gloves;E/ that those rules were in full effect in February, 1984, and that Mrs. English's charge that some Chemet Lab employees, including occasionally Lab Manager Preston Winslow himself, when handling possibly contaminated material, did not wear them ( Attachment O, pp. 13-14). This should have been found a Severity Level I safety violation, because it set so bad an example for employees. If the Chemet Lab manager could handle possibly contaminated material barehanded, presumably without health hazard, why should workers observe any safety rules?

8. Another of Mrs. English's allegations, Letter, Jones to Ratner, Enclosure 2, 19, was that " Spill Areas, 5/ Attachment P (C-72 (Course Outline for Hourly Employees, T1/13/72, p. 2, 2.A 4.a; B 3.3); Attachment Q (C-82, Job Hazard Analysis, Chemet Lab-970, NO. CLJ11A-01 (issued 10/01/81; revised, 3/01/83) " Protective Equipment Required 2. ,

Rubber or Polyvinal Chloride Gloves"); Attachment R (C-77,

                     " Safety Rules:                 11. Comply with the Safety requirements of your job including Job Hazard Analysis and Chemical Job Hazard Analysis").                                               ,

19 -

1 contamination areas were not marked off to caution other people in the analytic area." Both the G.E. chart (Attachment K, p. 5, fifth item), and the Puckett chart (Attachment L, p. 5, first item) agree that no violation was found in 84-17, h, p. 7, because, according to the Inspection Report, "the marking off of contaminated areas is not required * *

• by license procedures."

But, it is and always was, if not required, at least permitted, by Chemet Lab procedures. (Attachment S, C-23, p. 1, 2.3.1, last sentence; b. 2.3.2., first sentence; p. 4, 4.5.1; Attachment P, C-72, p. 2, 2, B.1; B.3.1); p. 3, 3A:

            " Dead Zone" - a safety zone, usually 12" in width, surrounding all limit areas.") , such a zone is designated with a 2" wide red tape , id., p. 3, 5.B.3.; in the event of a spill, " Step 3.

Isolate the area." (Id.) Indeed, the Bendry re, port , (Attachment T, infra, p. 11, par. 2), places the matter beyond controversy: "A red line on the floor demonstrates the boundry between ' cold' and ' bot.'" G.E. 's argument that earlier documents and procedures .

- not listed in CHES methods dated May 31, 1979, are no longer in effect, is demolished ,and proven to be a fabrication by E-8-C, Attachment U, which states

                               "These are general Lab methods and are considered good practice. WMD Chemet Lab may have other procedures that are more suitable to our operation, if so WMD procedures are to be used in detail.                   l
                                                                                                \

i l

a 4 The CM&S or other methods not on the floor are kept in the Supervisor's Office and are available to you at any time for reference as needed." See also, lists of operative documents in Hendry Report, p. 11; E-8-(a), 2.0 (Attachment V); 84-15, p. 5, d.

9. Report No. 84-04, finds that, " Samples received from the production area for analysis were also found to have ex'ternal contamination on the containers," but no violation was found, presumably because the Inspector thought that G.E. did not have a rule or procedure forbidding transfer to or handling by Chemet Lab testers of visibly contaminated vials.

Both the G.E. chart, p. 3, item 2 (Attachment K), and the 4 Puckett chart, p. 3 (Attachment L), say that only 84-17, 4(d) addresses the issue, and that it finds "no' violation - unsubstantiated." At trial, we introduced C-44, a memo from Winslow to "Submitters of U-Samples to Chemet Lab," dated Februry 19, 1985 (Attachment W). Under the title " Control of Contamination," the memo begins:

                                    "To effectively meet radiation safety guidelines'in the Chemet Lab, sample containers [i.e. vials) ,

request forms or secondary containers (bags) which are associated with nuclear material sampling and ~i show evidence of excessive or accumulated exterior contamination cannot be accepted by the Chemet Lab." (Emphasis added.) This constitutes a flat admission that prior to February 19, 1985, " radiation safety guidelines in the Chemet Lab" prohibited presentation or acceptance of vials showing evidence of excessive or accumulated exterior contamination.

                                                                              = _. _ - - _ . . . _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _     _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . - _ .                  ____-   _ _ __-- - _ - --_--,,- _ _ _

 .          o                                                                          -

si' . . M Furthermore, the memo contains an admission that G.E. knew that

                   " contamination levels [must be] maintained as low as practical
                   ***=              ,

10. In Chapter II, p. 26, we said:

                                                       "Is the manifest unwillingness to find violahions on Mrs. English's charges a defense mechanism designed

• to shield the Region II Inspection staff against charges of incompetence or worse"?

G.E. 's introduction near the end of trial of ALJ 11, for the avowed purpose of showing that NRC had sustained only one (1) of Mrs. English's charges, and that those charges which were sustained were unearthed not by Mrs. English but by NRC inspectors themse17es, casts additional light on the subject. We demonstrated, particularly in Chapter II, that NRC inspectors had turned somersaults to avoid basing findings of violations on Mrs. English's charges, and that, where they felt compelled to find violations, they took the credit for

                                                     ~

themselves. An illustration is G.E. 's failure to perform its obligation under 10 CFR S 19.13(c), to provide Mrs. English on reques,t upon her termination of employment, with a complete (in content and duration of employment) " report of the worker's exposure to radiation or radioactive material." 84-17, n. p. 14, first full par., first sentence; second through fourth pars., finds that G.E. did not perform its obligation to Mrs. English in this respect, thereby violating 10 CFR 19.13(a) (id., Finding, first two sentences; cf. Attachment O, pp.

                                                                                                      ~

r . \ li' -

• I 2-3). Yet, instead of finding a violation, the Inspector left this major substantive issue " unresolved," and seized upon a related procedural technicality, " identified [by the Inspector]

during the review of this allegation, although timely reporting j of information was not a part of this allegation," (id.) upon which to predicate a linding of violation. Even though comparison of G.E.'s ALJ 11 (Attachment K) with the list of English's charges forwarded to me by Mr. Jones (Attachment J) shows that G.E.'s attempt to reduce the findings of violation based on Mrs. English's charges is

• based upon a false, premise -- disregarding relevant 1982 and 1983 NRC reports -- G.E.'s very making of the argument' suggests

       -        a conspiracy between G.E.               and the Region II inspectors to make Mrs. English's 55 charges, on the whole, appear meritless, and thereby discredit her for the benefit of G.E.                    in the DOL litigation.

B. The Hendry Report The so-called "Hendry Report" (Attachment T) is actually a series of reports which we have numbered '~ ~ consecutively at the bottom of each page for ease of reference. In his covering memo,.p. 1, Hendry concluded that " safety conditions * *

• are quite adequate * * *." However, the details in the Hendry reports, read together with NRC Inspection Reports on the same topic, belie this claim. Had the NRC Inspectors been aware of the factual admissions in the Hendry Reports, they could not possibly have found "no 1

51' - 1 violation" on English's health safety charges, and the true significance of the violations they did find could not have been overlooked.

1. The first report, by one Landry, Plant Automation, discusses the microwave oven leak problem. The G.E. chart (Attachment K), lists English's allegations on this score at p.

3, items 4 and 5. According to G.E., NRC has taken "No action" on this allegation, but will address it in forthcoming report 85-02. According to the Puckett chart (Attachment L), this allegation was addressed in 85-02, but not. finally resolved, and also-in 84-17, 5, where a violation of 10 CFR was

• found. In the latter respect, the Puckett chart is in error.

The Landry report, ignoring that the microwave oven was modified and structurally adapted to nuclear fuel testing operations, so that it resembles only superficially a

                  " microwave oven [] used by the public," admits that " Operation

, of an oven without a screen in place is dangerous and implicitly prohibited by the Job Hazard Analysis" (p. 2). Mrs. English testified at trial, without contradiction, that Chemet Lab Manager Winslow, between-April 27 and May 4, 1982, removed the (lead shield) screen from the microwave and continued to operate it (Attachment O, p. 5, a; p. 5, English Allegations, 2/21/84, Exhibit A to Petition to Institute Proceedings, etc.) in violation of Chemet Lab rules which - Landry claims - requires that when the screen is removed the oven be tagged out. J_ .

i;' .

                                             ~

Landry also admits that " leakage of material through the door [of an oven] * *

• may indicate ventilation weakness ,

caused by poor attention to the cleanliness of the screen," and that "[i]t is conceivable that condensed salts on the interior of the door may fall down to the table top while the do'or is closed, with no microwave leakage." Accord, Felton-Shipp Report, p. 5. Landry's conclusion that "the detection equipment available for detecting leaks provides safety assurance beyond the level available to the general public" (p. 3) is cold comfort, since micr.owave ovens used by the general public do not carry the hazard of " leaked microwave radiation,"

             " dangerous magnetic radiation," and " condensed salts on the interior of the door [which] may fall down to the table top while the door is closed," as Landry admits, the Chemet Lab microwave oven does.

The Felton-Shipp Report (p. 5), adds that adherence to

     ,       " documented and established work practices * *

• make it highly unlikely that employees would be exposed to even low level --

concentrations of harmful emissions." But, in undisputed fact, the rules were not adhered to." chemical Job Hazard Analysis , CL-JRA 12 (Attachment X [C-71 ] requires that one must not attempt to operate the microwave with a "8. B. Door that does not close properly. C. Damaged door hinge, latch or sealing j surface."

                                                         ~

1 25 - l r,------o-w- ----y ,n'- - - - - --

l o . .

           ,                                            di'    -

t Among the " hazards" listed is "A. Dizziness and B. Nausea." This Rule was admittedly operative and in effect on March 23, 1984 (Hendry Report, p. 11). Undisputed testimony at trial (App. English Aff. pp. 12-14, 16), confirmed by a " strictly private" memo from Winslow to Sheeley (Attachment Y [C k 8] ), p. 2, par. 2, shows that on March 7 and 8, 1984, this is exactly what management knowingly and deliberately violated this rule. Exhibit A to Petition, III A.

2. The Felton-Shipp Report, dated March 10, 1984, concludes (p. 6) that "The processes do not subject employees to significant safety or health risks." Among the " elements" it points to as supporting this conclusion are:

                           " Housekeeping * *

• very clean and neat Safety procedures and related documents are thorough and complete."

(a) Testimony at trial not only from Mrs. English (Attachment O, pp. 5-6, 11-12), but from Joy Malpass (Attachments D1 and E1), and the affidavits of Lewis, Hudson _ and Bullard, Attachments Z, AA, and BB, destroyed the assumption that " Housekeeping was very clean and neat." If that is what Felton and Shipp observed during their review "from 3/8/84 through 3/21/84," they were either following G.E. management's policy of not looking for contamination in the most likely places or their observations prove that Mrs. English's additional allegation (Puckett chart, item 3, p. 3, I

                                                                                                                                                                           .         \
                                                       ~                   ~                          '
                                                                                                                                                                                     \
                                                                                                                            ;r          .

l item 1, p'.' 4; G.E. chart, p. 7, first and third items) that housekeeping was good only during outside official inspections, and that clean ups are effected before inspections by Rad Safety or NRC inspectors (Attachment Z, pp. 3-4) is correct. The G.E. chart claims (p. 7, first item) that the " poor housekeeping" issue is addressed only in the as yet unpublished l l 85-02. Puckett's chart says it was sustained in 84-15 (Sc) and tentatively sustained in 85-02. Puckett's chart is the more l correct. 84-15, c, pp. 8-9, finds that procedures by which G.E. is bound

                                                    "(3) * *'* require:                              (a) activities which produce contamination that exceeds PAL shall not be undertaken; (b) [self-made) spills must be cleaned up immediately; and (c) equipment must be wited clean of visible contamination."

Neither chart refers to (1) 84-17, cover letter, par. 4, finding " loose surface contamination * *

• above the licensee's administrative limit for initiating cleanup" (5, p. 17, last sentence; (2) noting " weaknesses in the contamination control program in the Chemet Lab (" Exit Interview," p. 1) and

                                                                                                                                                                             ~
                                                                                                                                                                 ~

expressing concern "about the implementation of your radiation l protection program that permitted this situation to develop"

(cover letter, par. 4); (3) 81-11, p. 1, Report Details, Exit Interview, " housekeeping in the fuel manufacturing area [is) in need of improvement. Cleanliness appears to have deteriorate'd over the past several years"; (4) 82-10, p. 4

"the Inspector

                                                                                                  ~
           ,_._.-,.g     ,_-y.-.      - . _ _ . - - -     . , - _  , , , , ~ . . . - . . - _ - -         _ . - - _ _ , - - - - . -        - - - - - - - - - . -        --
                                                                                                                                                                               -r---

D' - t observed loose uranium powder on the floor * * *"; (5) 84-04:

                   "on several occasions work areas in the Chemet laboratory were found to be contaminated above the administrative limit of 220 dpm/100cm2 .                      ***

Three work areas were found which

                  * *

• ranged from 317 dpm/100cm to 5,100 dpm/100cm ." See also, Attachments 0, Z, AA and BB.

With singular perversity the Inspector in 84-15 translated this " bad housekeeping" into a mere procedural violation instead of finding a substantive violation of ALARA, and NSR 6.1.7.38, 1/8/80 (Attachment CC), which it undisputably is. He thereby provided a plausible pretext for the Regional ' Director's assigning to this known, outrageous, highly _ dangerous, ongoing violation only Severity Level IV. Chapter I, pp. 11-15, 18-21; Chapter II, pp. 25-26. (b) The second conclusion, " safety procedures and related documents are thorough and complete," is also refuted by 84-15 C (2), p. 9: ..

                                                 "The licensee procedures do not provide clear and concise guidelines for prevention of contamination within the LEA measurement room."

(c) The findings, and findings which, on G.E.'s newly discovered admissions'should have been made in 84-15 C(4), sustain other English allegations, one -- that " Radiation surveys are inadequate in Chemet Lab" (G.E. chart, citing 84-13 and in 84-17 (holding "No Violation - unsubstantiated" 9

di' - t Puckett chart, last item, p. 3, citing 84-17, 1.4 (f), p. 5, f item 3) although fixed contamination was found to be " embedded in the floor tiles and cracks between floor tiles."- (G.E. chart, p. 8, " Violation, 84-15"). The Puckett chart describes an English allegation as " Radiation safety personnel were lax on monitoring for contamination and requiring clean-up," which it claims was found not to be a violation in 84-17, 4 F. But cf. Chapter I, pp. 11-14, 18-21. Discovery of the Hendry Report established that it was not the Rad Safety rank and file personnel who were " lax" in failing to monitor the Isotopic room; they were acting under . management orders not to monitor in that room. The Murray Report admits that " Smears are not normally taken around the microwave work area in the Spectrometer [ Isometric] L ab . * *

• Each smear location is documentated on a chemet Lab floor plan." Thus, it was not within any Rad Safety Inspector's discretion or authority to monitor in the Isotopic room. That is why Torres inquired of Rouse, "why were you investigating in an unassigned area?" Chapter I, p. 21.

Had the Inspector in 84-17 been shown the Hendry report, he would hardly have made the naive recommendation (p. 6, i middle of last par.) "that the licensee should familiarize the + radiation safety technicians with the operations in the CHEMET Lab so that they can ensure that they survey those areas where the potential for spills exist (sample preparation area, weighing area, etc.)." The suggestion would have been idiotic l l

I because the Inspector would have known that this is precisely what management had deliberately refused to permit or to educate Rad Safety personnel to do. This willful and deliberate breach of NSR 6.1.7.38 (Attachment CC) and ALARA by highest management could not have been buried under a "No violation" finding because of "no NRC requirement" (Puckett chart, p. 5, third item from top of page) . See also, (e), infra. (d) 84-17 also states, p. 6, last par, "The licensee has no policy requiring notification of radiation safety in the event of a spill in the Lab." , Obviously, G.E. top management , must have concealed from the Inspector Job Hazard Analysis, Chemet Laboratories 970, CL-JHA-01, issued 10/01/81, revised, 3/01/83 (Attachment Q), which provides "6. Clean [your own] spills immediately and notify radiation protection." This

                           " Analysis" we obtained by discovery during trial. G.E. top management must also have concealed the Course Outline for Hourly Employees, in effect at least since 1972, which lists as
                           " Step    2,"           following a spill, " Warn other personnel -- Call                                       --

Radiat-ion Protection." And, p. 5, "6.I, For a known or possible radioactive spill, minimize its spread and call Radiation Protection" (Attachment P). Had the Inspector in 84-17 known the Rules, he could hardly have gotten away with a recommendation that

                                                    " surveys performed by the radiation safety' technicians are generally in the same locations

, which are often not the areas with the highest 1 - potential for becoming contaminated. The inspector

  '                                                 stated that the licensee should familiarize the radiation safety technicians with the operations in

_ . ____. _ _ - ._. _ . _ . _ _ _ . . _ ~ _ - - __ _ _.______._.-- _ _ _ ._ _ . - . . . . . .

                             -         -               ~~               -

it' -

• the CHEMET Lab so that they can ensure that they survey those areas where the potential for spills exist (sample preparation area, weighing area, etc.). (Emphasis added. )
• The substantive violation would have been patent.

(e) The Hendry Report also reveals a vital flaw in G.E.'s technique for measuring contamination. That report states that G.E. 's only method of measuring surface contamination is " swipes" or " smears." (18., p. 9). Swipes or smears can measure only " loose surface contamination." (82-16, par. 9, pp. 4, lines 1 and 2, last par., 6, second full par., second sentence). Swipes or smears cannot reach or measure

                 " fixed" contamination,                     i,.e.,     contamination between cracks in marble tables, and be* tween cracks and crevices in floors and walls. Only by placing a sensitive and operative frisker directly upon a surface containing fixed contamination, can the amount of such contamination be measured.

84-13, Nov. 15, 1984, states that the Inspector

                " reviewed the results of licensee contamination surveys during.

l 1983 and through August 1984 and found that the surveys were . being made as specified in licensee procedure." It also states tht the licensee procedures "are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the extent of radiation hazards that may be present." 84-17, (f), Jan. 31, 1985, pp. 5-6, states that Part I, Section 3.2.4.6 of License Condition 9, discusses the " action limits for reasonable surface contamination." The

                                                                      ~

report states that the Inspector " reviewed the weekly O

contamination survey results [by swipes or smears) and the licensee performed special surface contamination surveys, under the direct observation of the inspector." How the "special surf ace contamination surveys" were conducted, and what their result was, the report does not disclose. - Only 84-13, issued Feb. 7, 1985, p. 9, comes to the point (4)(b):

                                          "There is no rad safety program employed for                  -

measuring fixed levels of contamination in the Chemet Laboratory." Since this Report also finds that (p. 8, c(1)) .

                                          "[o]f the eighteen measurements performed, six                         .

measureEents exceeded PAL for fixed contamination levels and three measurements exceeded PAL 'for

                                                                                    ~

qpearable contamination levels," i and that " contamination in the [ Isotopic] room was visible, having been embedded in the floor tiles, wall surfaces and equipment cabinets," it is claar that G.E.'s estimates of - surface contamination were grossly understated, to a degree unknown, and were not, as 84-17 states, " reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the extent of radiation hazards '

                ***=    ,

j No. 81-11,. 5, Part 5, issued October 26, 1981, found that a problem in the use of portable friskers exists by virtue of the "geotropism of certain instruments." According to this i report

                                         "[t]he licensee has a small inventory of instruments that can be effected by this problem but these instruments are not normally in use. A licensee representative stated that training on this problem

                  .                                                                                        iI'      '

t d will be given to radiation protection personnel."

                                                 ,  (Emphasis added.)

What Mrs. English established by her experiment on March 5, 1984, was that Rad Safety did not in fact know how to use a frisker to find even visible, movable, contamination (English Aff., p. 13, (a)(3)). , Obviously, management had not kept its 4 promise to the NRC inspector to train radiation protection personnel on this subject. The conclusion of the Hendry Report, p. 9,

                                                    " Based on the low frequency of smears indicating contamination, and relatively low levels of contamination reported, .the survey program appears' adequate for contamination control and                                                                             .

reporting," is false,. because the premise on which it rests, that smears accurately reflect the level of contamination, is false. (f) The Hendry Report (p. 10) also confirms that up until March 23, 1984, there were only

                                                   "[t]wo stationary air samplers * *

• located in the Chemet Lab, one in the Wet Lab near the isotopic balance and one in the spectrometer Lab near the metal impurities hood." l i

The Hendry Report itself recognized that at least one - additional sampler located "by the powder hood on the east side of the Wet Lab" should be installed. On June 15, 1982, Inspector Hosey, in 82-10, p. 4, par. 7, penultimate par., - had

                                                   " stated that fixed air samplers located 10-15 feet away were not suitable to determine air concentrations in the breathing zone of workers

j;' , . during maintenance activities with high potential for producing airborne radioactivity." On September 21, 1984, Inspector Perry " informed [G. E. ] representative * *

• that one air sampler in the Lab may not be representative of the concentrations at all work statiohs in the Lab" (84-13, p. 3, b), but it was not until March 16, 1985, almost.two months after issuance of 84-17, on January 31, 1985, that G.E. moved to install any more samplers in the lab (Attachment 3, p. 4, 10c).

Significantly, they installed them at the same Lnproper height,

seven feet off the, floor. .

(g) The Hendry Report concludes (p. 11) that " worker e training and posting for the Chemet Lab Operations is appropriate." But 82-10, p. 5, pt. 10, and 82-16, p. 6, first full par., sharply criticize G.E. for its level of both safety i and quali.ty worker training and rad safety personnel training. 82-10 relates that "the inspector stated that the training should be modified to better emphasize the worker's responsibility for radiation and nuclear safety, to clarify the part 19 requirement that workers should report violations or potential violations of NRC regulations to plant management and to emphasize the procedure for removing material or equipment from the controlled area ( 82-10-04 ) . (Emphasis added.) Still, on January 13, 1985, almost three years later, 84-17 found 4(f):

                              " surveys performed by the radiation safety technicians are generally in the same locations which are often not the areas with the highest potential for becoming contaminated. The inspector Jt'        -

t i

                          -stated that the licensee should familiarize the
 ;                         radiation safety technicians with the operations in i                         the CHEMET Lab so that they can ensure that they survey those areas where the potential for spills exist (sample preparation area, weighing area,
 ,                         etc.). Random surveys for contamination should be performed at least daily and detailed surveys of the entire lab should be performed weekly since the licensee utilizes the same administrative limits for                                                           ,

contamination as are required for uncontrolled areas  ! and there is a greater potential for a contaminating event." (Emphasis added.) By her experiment on March 5, 1984, Mrs. English established not only that Rad Safety did not know how to use a frisker, supra, but that the .; Rad Safety Inspector literally closed his eyes to light but nevertheless visible yellow contamination on the legs of her table. By her experiment on March 9, 1984, she proved that Rad Safety either did not monitor the Wet Lab from March 9 through March 11, or closed its eyes to the warning red tape on the heavy yellow contamination on the legs of her table. She also established  ; that the contamination on the switch box and the contamination on the legs of her table were cleaned up at the command of  ; t

       . supervision before Rad Safety was called (Attachment I,                              pp.

3-4.)  ! (h) On the matter of attitudes instilled by training, 1

the Hendry Report, perhaps inadvertently, gives the show away.

Felton and Shipp state management's view (p. 6) that "The processes do not subject employees to significant health or safety risk," but, inconsistently insist that "[e]mployees'

overall perception of lab management's safety concern and

D' . safety emphasis is quite high." If risk is so low, why is the

                                     " employees' perception of management's concern and safety emphasis" relevant?                 Because that carefully indoctrinated perception gulls Ehe workers into a sense of security and relieves them of responsibility for adhering to safety standards themselves.                  Compare GPU management's NRC found " bad attitude":             an attitude "that contributed to ' disrespect' toward the training program among its licensed operators." Wed.

April 10, 1985, Vol. CCV No. 70, The Wall Street Journal, Ron Winslow, " Nuclear Decision," front page, far right column, cont, on p. 25, second and third full par. , left hand col. The consequence of management's carefully indoctrinated 2 propoganda is to lead workers to believe, as reported, that complaints such as Vera English's cannot be VLiid - "no amount of evidence to the co'ntrary will change her mind." Thus, a i phalanx o,f hostility is built up against the safety-conscious employee and she is shunned and regarded as "gueer" and

                                    " obstructive" and " subversive" by her fellows.                                                  That she may be i

right never enters their minds. - l 1-Yet, a portion of the truth does emerge (id.): "most  ; employees don't really understand the effects of fumes * * *." l 1 Rather than being "very cautious," however, as Mrs. English's experience with the microwave oven shows, they are contemptuous l

of those who are " cautious." That employees may be " aware of procedures and documents relating to safe work practices" (id.), is, as the Wieczorek~ Report finds, supra, by no means

enough, for the procedures and practices are often ambiguous and applicable documents (Hendry Report, p. 11) sometimes give arguably inconsistent instructions -- for example, as between immediately cleaning up (self spills) and marking others' a

• spills with red warning tape.

(i) Friskers The Hendry Report (pp. 12-13) provides some new evidence about the scope and consequences of frisker violations. It states that a review of audits performed i

                   "during the fourth quarter of 1982 through April, 1983," showed that "on three occasions persons were documented for not surveying when leaving the Chemet Lab."     In April, 1993,
                   " change room audits were replaced with spot overchecks.    ***

One individual was found contaminated in 1983." After the NRC audit on 2/21/84, 84-04, 13, pp. 5-6 "Over a two week period, 131 individuals were re-surveyed upon exiting the lab. Of these, three individuals showed slight contamination (500-600 dpm)." Compare Dr. Mossman's insights and evaluation, infra.

                                                                                    ~

III. G.E. NON-REPORTING VIOLATIONS T i In consequence of discovery, G.E. submitted to i plaintiff a verified iirt purporting to show all reports of reportable events given to NRC by WMD between 1/1/78 and i 7/27/84 (Attachment DD). The list shows a grand total of six -

none between May 22, 1980 and June, 1984. If this list is complete, as the law requir,,es it to be, it means that no report

                                                                            ~~

i . . . to NRC was made of, for example: (1) the "UF6 Release * *

• at approximately 12: 00 ' p.m. on September 15, 1981" (81-11, pp.

5-6, "10"); (2) the July 29, 1982, dumping of " internally contaminated" 2 1/2 inch pipe (82-16, pp. 4-6, "p"); (3) failure, as of February 11, 1983, to record standards and sample data on bench worksheets, sample reports, control logs /or control charts (83-05, pp. 2-3, "3"); (4 ) Chemet Lab contamination levels during 1984 ranging "from 317 dpm/100cn 2 to 5,100 dpm/100cm 2 (84-10, p. 5, "12"); (5) 902/903 password system subject to abuse both long before and long after early 1984 (Wieczorek Report); (6) April 1-May - 31, 1984, "both the alarm limits and out-of-control limits were not in agreement . with (LMCS) computer limits" (84-08, pp. 2-3, "4"); (7) constant exceeding of out-of-control limits during 1984 (84-16, pp. 4-5, 3b); (8) increasing " weaknesses in the contamination control program in the Chemet Lab" and "the fuel manufacturing area" from 1978-1984 (84-17, pp. 1, 3, Report details, 2, 6, 4 (j), n. 5; 81-11, " Exit Interview" 2); and (9) failure in 1984 to provide projected dose information and recommendations to off-site organizations (84-18, p. 3, "4"). At trial, Mr. Vaughan testified that he had telephoned the Region II of fice on or about the date Mrs. English filed her written charges with Mr. Lees, February 24, 1984, to apprise NRC of the Company's receipt of her allegations. However, 84-05, "2," states that:

i -

                                                     "During the initial meeting with licensee management

[on or about March 26, 1984), to discuss the scope of the review relative to the receipt by NRC of allegations pertaining to the GE facility, the inspectors were apprised that GE management was also in receipt of certain alleged improprieties from one

         .                                           of their employees. Since the allegations received by NRC and the- allegations received by GE were in similar areas [ sic), the inspectors incorporated the                                                           '

stated concerns from bo.th sources into their. review. (Emphasis added.) , If 84-05 is to be credited, Vaughan first informed NRC of the English charges on or about March 26, 1984, more than a month'  ! after she gave her charges to Mr. Lees, and 10 days after she had been discriminatorily transferred out of the Cheaet Lab. IV. DR. KENNETH MOSSMAN'S ANALYTICAL APPRAISAL AND EVALUATION Dr. Kenneth Mossman, Associate Professor of Radiation Medicine and Director of the Graduate Program in Radiation Science in the Graduate School, Georgetown University, Washington, D. C., former Radiation Protection Officer,

Georgetown' University, testified as an expert witness. Insofar

, as here relevant, he confined his testimony to appraisal and evaluation of the implication and significance, from the point of view of the ALARA standard and NRC enforcement policy, of_  ! eight violations found in NRC reports 81-11, 82-10, 82-16, I 84-4, 84-15, 84-17. The substance of his testimony on these l points is accurately described in the newspaper accounts of the ) trial, Attachments D4 and E4, and need not be repeated here. Dr. Mossman's original contributions include: i (1) His observation that management's comprehensive weekly frisking audits conducted for a period of twenty weeks t

                                                                                                            , ,     ,-.,---e,,,,_-___e-,w--,               ,a-,----w    ,,-,,-,---,,--m,      - - - - - + - , , -   ,a-,en
                                                                                                                          -   --,--,,,,-c-e->         -p.c ---,m, r-

                                                                          ,l' -

in 1982, was a misrepresentation to the NRC because the management audits identified only "15 people" out of 1000 as having surveyed themselves improperly, whereas on May 20, 1982, the NRC Inspector in 82-10 " observed three out of approximately ten workers exit the uranium area change room after performing an improper frisk," and on May 21, he observed two out of ten do so. Since the Inspector in 82-10 stated "that there is no reason to believe that what he cbserved on May 20 and 21 is not typical," Dr. Mossman concluded that becauce the disparity in ' results was so great, management's so-called " audit" was calculatedly designed to gull and mislead NRC. -

2. His explanation that the consequences of failure to frisk, or to frisk properly, before leaving a contaminated area is dangerous, not only to the worker himself, but to entirely innocent and unsuspecting members of the public (not employed in a nuclear facility), with whom a contamination-carrying worker may come into contact.

3. His insight that the high percentage of workers failing to frisk, and to observe other safety precautions, is a j consequence of deficient worker training in the health hazards of uranium contamination (cf. 82-10, p. 2, 6, penultimate sentence, 7, 8, last sentence), which is attributable to management's professed and expressed -- but scientifically untenable -- belief that there is little or no risk or danger in uranium contamination.

9

si' . * ,

4. His perception that the found inadequacy of training l of Rad Safety personnel (e.g., 81-11, p. 3, Part 5; 82-10, 1st full par., see also, 82-16, 2, 9; 84-15, C (4); 84-1 7, (f); see also, 34, supra), coupled with their exclusion by management t .

from the " hottest" areas, such as the Isotopic Room and. floors beneath free standing counters and ' tables, is calculated to conceal from NRC the true level bf contamination 'in the Chemet Lab. l

5. His insight that the combination (a) of air samplers inadequate in number and more than 10-15 feet away from work i stations (84-13 (b)-); (b) their placement seven feet above the floor (84-17, 5, third par. from bottom)," where they cannot possibly measure the contamination content of air breathed by workers sitting at their work tables; ( c) the proximity of the samplers to exhaust fans (82-16, 8 and 84-17, 18), and (d) the use of " swipes" or " smears," but not sens,itive friskers to monitor fixed contamination, destroys the , validity of management's surveys of air and surface. contamination levels in the Chemet Lab, because they are not produced by " suitable" '

measurement methods and do not pr%$u, e representative samples. Inasmuch as management (and FAC Jar;.ctors) rely so heavily >on , the low contamination measurements pro #uced by management's air ~ I and movable surface contamination surveys, even going so far as to reduce, on that basis, protection in other areas, such as urinalysis (84-17, p. 13, last sentence on page); bioassay data (84-17, "0", pp. 15-16); whole body counts (id.); maintenance

          ,_.u                                                                              _
   .i .      - -

,1 !d ' 3 il 3

   ]                    of exposure hi' stories in accordance with 10 CPR 20.102, 84-04, J
   ))                    8; and " monitoring" (84-17, n), the entire system of NRC

[ protective measures against uranium contamination is undermined a and evaded. g; 6. In Dr. Mossman's opinion, if the condition found at

   'i                   WMD were allowed to exist and persist in his own research
 ;l laboratory, this would be serious grounds for possible civil

'q penalties and even temporary revocation of the license. In this. case revocation of the license would require " shutting down" of the laboratory. Despite the defense's openly announced intention to do 4 so, Dr. Mossman was not cross-examined, nor was his testimony ' challenged by any other expert witness, although G.E. had two of its health physics experts at the trial as advisors. Dr. Mossman's testimony stands unchallenged and uncontradicted on the record.

                                   .              VI. RELIEF REQUESTED

1. The Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement,

. should exercise his power and responsibility in NRC 7590-01 under 49 FR 8591, to grant the relief prayed for by movants,- y in their Petition, Chapter I and Chapter II, as further 7 documented herein, by finding the violations Region II i , 3 erroneously failed to find; explaining their collective drastic impact on safety hazards and quality control in WMD, and assigning the highest Severity Level to all the violations, j 2. Af ter consultation with the Commission (id.), the l Director should issue to G.,E. , pursuant to 10 CFR S 2.201(c),

     }

4 an Order to Show Cause under 10 CFR S 2.202. Said Order

     ,                should not only allege all the violations with which G.E.'s WMD
<j h.d . . .          ,,. - ,            -     --         -A ~          ~          +   =       ' ~ ~ -

Ji' - t l l

                                                                                                                    \

l

                .is charged, or has been found guilty, from 1981 to date, but                                       l should explain fully the basis and rationale of said violations and the assignment to them of the highest Severity Level, pursuant to NRC's enforcement policy, 49 FR 8583-8594.                                               .

1

3. Inasmuch as multiple willful violations are '  ;

involved, raising many different " fundamental problems," impose daily civil penalties from the inception of the violations "in amounts greater than 3 times the Severity Level I values shown l in Table 1A" (49 FR 8591), for violations perte'ulng to each l distinct fundamental problem. 49 FR 8590. The basis for treating each viol.ation as pertaining to a particular

               " fundamental problem" should be articulated.
                       .4. Condition retention of G.E.'s WMD license upon                                  ,

immediate removal of all WMD officers, officials, managers and ' supervisors, namely Lees, Sheely, Winslow, Vaughan, Hendry, Torres, Parnell, Hann, McLamb, Jasinski and Lacewell, who have l conspired to mislead NRC by Material False Statements and to flout and defeat compliance with NRC safety and quality control regulations ' I

5. G.E.'s reaction to Mrs. English's complaints of safety and quality control violations is apparently endemic to the nuclear power industry. As reported in The Wall Street Journal article cited above, April 10, 1985, p. 25, far left column, third par. from bottom:

                             "[I]n investigations over the past two years,                                          l the NRC staff hat concluded that GPU harassed a                                        '

worker who raised safety questions about the Unit 2

i J!' . t j . ft d

      ,1
       )

cleanup; failed to submit to the NRC, as required, 3 two consultant reports, including one that j criticized operator training; deliberately violated its own cleanup procedures; and suffered repeated -r 1 lapses in its radiological safety program. j In the interest of the nuclear power industry itself, of d its employees and of the general public, NRC pust put an end to i these practices by assessing the highest possible fine and

     .I cleansing the industry of those who, by their contemptuous attitude toward safety and quality control rules, have proved l                     themselves unfit to perform the responsibilities which are the conditions of service in this industry.

6. The Director should provide in the Order, pursuant -

to S 2.202 (f), that because the public health, safety and interest so require, and because the violations are willful, the action proposed in 4 above shall "be temporarily effective

      ;                    pending further order."
         .                              7. Grant movants herein, and their client, Mrs.

l English, the status of intervenors in the 10 CFR 2.202 ' . proceeding arising upon the order to show cause, to enable them [j to protect their interest in any proceedings for settlement ind 4 .

1,.

      !                   compliance under S 2.203, and in any litigation under said yj, order.          S 2.714.         Movants are entitled to this status because il
 ]                         the projected 2.202 proceeding is not a proceeding instituted

. i' . or initiated by the Staff, but is rather a proceeding instigated and initiated by movants. Their interest, and Mrs. j English's interest, as " private attorneys general" for enforcement is predominant. Moreover, Petitioners' interest k . ,m. m - . .. , m ,-._-.---:~;------~:.-. .:-  ? * ;" . : ~ 2 = *- . ' '

• m *~ ' * *

                                                                                                                      ~r*Y

c..- . .

             ,                                                                       si'          .                    -

cannot and will not be adequately represented by the

               " Staff."                                                                                                             ,

Very truly yours,

                                                                                 .                  -r                     ,-   .
                                                                           .     {        '$o )j        [ y.

Mozart G. Ratner Counsel for Vera M. English Attachments (1 Volume) v

                                           #                                 t I

i .

                                                                                                                                    ~.

O 45 -

e - a . .e- ese.5. .. 6 c... . . . . .. . L;. . _. ..,

          . N    .                                                                                                                     -
 ..           # .*                                                                                                                         a es                       ,
    .         .      .                                                                                                                     4          -

INDEX TO ATTACHMENTS Attachment A - Letter from Mozart G. Ratner to . James M. Taylor, March 15, 1985 Attachment B - Letter from James M. Taylor te Mozart G. Ratner, March 14, 1985 Attachment C - Wilmington Morning Star Editorial, April 2, 1985 Attachment ' D1-D8 - Wilmington Morning Star Articles,

      ,                                                                           March 20, 1985 - March 29, 1985 Attachment E1-E8                                          -

Raleigh News and Observer Articles, March 20, 1985 - March 29, 1985 Attachment F - Mem61andum from E. A. Lees to Vera M. English, May 21, 1984 Attachment G - F. J. Wieczorek to E.A. Lees, April 26, 1984 Memorandum re Employee Allegations of Violations to Company Practices and Procedu,res (Wieczorek Report) Attachment B - COI-411, Revision 2, February 10, 1982 Attachment I - COI-411, Revision 3, February 9, 1983 Attachment J - Letter Bradley W. Jones to Mozart G. Ratner, forwarding English Allegations, January 25, 1985 Attachment K - Allegations Reported By Vera M. English to NRC (G.E. Chart) i l ! Attachment L - Affidavit of John M. Puckett and Attached Chart Entitled " Disposition of General Electric Company Allegations (Puckett Chart) Attachment M - Memorandum from E. A. Lees to Vera English, re Allegations of Violations to Company Practices and Procedures, May 21, 1984 1 . . . I

si' - t Attachment N - Memorandum from T. P. Winslow to Vera M. English re Action Planned Per Our 1/12/84 Meeting, January 19, 1984 Attachment 0 - Affidavit of Vera M. English*, March 24, 1985 .l Attachment P - Course Outline for Hourly Employees (C-72) Attachment Q - Job Halard Analysis #CL-JHA-01 (C-82) Attachment R - Wilmington Plant Safety Rules (C-77) Attachment S - Quality Assurance Administrative Instruction No. C-2.0-QA-201 , Attachment T - Memorandum from W. J. Hendry to E. A. i Lees, March 29, 1984 (Hendry Report) Attachment U - Memorandum to Chemet Lab Personnel re CM&S Methods, May 31, 1979 l Attachment V - Standard Operating Procedure No. 0.3.4, re Radiation Safety - Lab Operating Procedure Attachment W - Memorandum from T. P. Winslow to Submitters of U-Samples to Chemet Lab, February 19, 1985 Attachment X - Chemical Job Hazard Analysis No. CL-JHA-12  : re Microwave Oven- ' Attachment Y - Chemet Lab supervisors' Memorandum to L. A. Sheely re Vera English's Safety concerns, March 13, 1984 -- Attachment 2 - Affidavit of John C. " Buddy" Lewis, March 27, 1985 Attachment AA- Affidavit of Robert Hudson, March 28, 1985 Attachment BB- Affidavit of Bill R. Bullard, March 24, 1985 Attachment CC- Nuclear Safety Release, Control No. 6.1.7.38, January 8, 1980 Attachment DD- General Electric Company's List of Reports of Violations to NRC From January 1, 1978 to July 27, 1984, submitted by Charles M. Vaughan, December 14, 1984 1

                                                                    .          J1'          .

t i.aw orricES MOZART G. RATN ER. P. c. 1900 M ST R E ET, N. W. SulTE SiO WASHI N GTON. D. c. 2 O O3G amEA Coot aca 233.e47a . March 15, 1985 Mr. James M. Taylor, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Re: Vera M. English v. deneral Electric Company

Dear Mr. Taylor:

This will reply to your letter of March 14, 1985. As stated on page 30 of Chapter II, the exigencies of time require that I cease submissions to you as of this moment in order to . assure that a decision is made on the submissions as soon as possible. Because of those exigencies and because of the indispensability of integrating your decision with the DOL hearing, which is, after all, designed to effectuate a most imperative and overriding policy of the ERA, I am compelled to adopt this course. Any further s'bmissionsu that I would make to you are by and large already contained in the NRC's files in 70-1113. I. would assume that under the rules you and your staff must t,ake judicial notice of all documents in that file. If additional material becomes available upon production by General Electric at the hearing, which opens Monday, March 18th, I can assure you that those documents will be introduced into evidence. Whether or nor they will be of public record, they will be in evidence and open to your inspection. 1 I repeat that we have "sufficiently established the i i pattern and that additional proof would be cumulative." 1 Immediate decision by you at the earliest feasible moment is I the only way in which NRC enforcement policy can be meaning-fully effectuated on behalf of complainant, the " private attorney general" in this case. l Sincerely,

                                                                                           /4
                                                         $' C-w}t Mozalr Ratner G{

G.a. ilh/fR~),

                                                                                               ,                                1 Attachment A

ii' - [ i

   !              l'j,,                       UNITED STATES g

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION wAsmaalrow, o. c. anses MAR 161995 (10 CFR 2.206)

• Mozart Ratner, Esquire 1900 M. Street, N.W. '

Suite 610 Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. Ratner:

On January 10, 1985, I infomed you that I had received the Petition of Ms. Vera M. English dated December 13, 1984. I further informed you that the Petition was being treated under 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission's regulations and that a femal decision with regard to it would be issued within a reasonable time. On February 28, 1985, you filed a Supplemental Petition with.the Connission. The Supplemental Petition deals primarily with recently issued Inspection Reports Nos. 84-17 and 84-18. Additional supplemental material dated March 12, 1985 (" Chapter II") was received on March 13, 1985. The NRC staff will review the Supplemental Petitions as it did the original Petition to'see what actions are appropriate. The Supplemental Petition makes clear that additional supplementary inf.ormation concerning this matter will be filed by you on behalf of Ms. English. See Supplemental Petition, p. 1 and p. 29. Please forward any such supplemental infomation directly to me to expedite its consideration. In order to insure that all relevant information you may wish me to consider on this matter is before me and has had NRC staff review, I intend to with-hold issuance of a formal decision in this matter until you inform me by letter that you do not intend to submit any further information on this issue. Of course, as noted above, the NRC staff will review supplemental information as it is provided to assure that appropriate actions are taken where warranted. Sincerely, W' nos M. Tay1 , Director fice of In pection and Enforcement Arthur M. Schiller, Esq. Suite 1300 - 1000 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 - General Electric Company Attachment B  : Wilmington, North Carolina

v o 4 . g .

;4
        'l u                                                                  .

t

     ;l a;                                                         . . .

a_s_

                                                                  .n+ e tw

) .GE,XRClax . a aboutsafety e . w ave a

e. e, a ,a b .

 .]j Electne plant. ht's about &
                                                                                                                .s-                                              .

eseelemen a lay pernes saa draw hem days ef t =ri yin the

                                                             .amas of Vern English, who is suing GE for Aring 1                                                      her..

J ~ " Careless handling of redsenetive materials would pose thrusta not saly to GE werkers and their families, but also to the public. Yet the Noclear Regulatory e'-en whieb is esp.

        'l                                                               to praect workers and the public, seems-us say-less than enthusiastic about doingits 1                                                      bh.

j m ~3itosenes testined under enth that the ham. ,1 Wing of radioactive materials has been sieppy. Most of these witnesses work for GE. A quality control emplope said it was enmasen

                                                          *.to End radionetive saetanuesties la ese laborano.

p. A renner plant manager said that Mre, Eag.

4fah made *a stro ease that la her werk Bom "4tme to time h and ceramies" were sea.

                                                         * hainated. A laborotary superviser aald same om.

ees best test results beesuse they have *)re. . eriented ages." -

                                                       '-* A mapany lavesti tar esecluded that Mrs.

English's complaints found for the meet

                                                      - part to have substaase."                                -
                                                     .4 A radiation e
                                              **            .testined that NMrt hem Georgetown University the plaat has violated federalradia on sta                    consistootly.

1

.For

                                                     .:              instance, la 1982 NRC investigetare found
                  -

• ht bets een 20 percent and 30penest ofempley.

e ..ees were mt checki huselves to make sure s did twt carry to esetive materials eutade , c plant. . t

; }1                                                   . bre also have been accidents that pased so.
 >J                                                   . tential threets to b public. For instaase, in 1978 and 1981 the pfant accidentall released radiene.                                                                      '-             '

i M 1

                                                        *tive gas, and la 1984 it spil                   700 gnBees of .

i redienstim liquid. .. . . ., l rh <. 'Yet, as reasotly as Janu'ary of this year, the NRC found that CE was not prepared te warn the

 ?

l public adequately when accidenta escur.N NRC that notential problems imeluded spills of

• leaks of gas and, if too much urnaium

                                                         .were e Now,put        there'slaaone place, a nuclear assion reaction.
                                                   ~.*f ** 1**'.b**0-possibility to make the haire stand
                                                   ~ 'he Georgetown professer s'ald that if the NBC t

i g-hed fbund such violations la li.s laboratory, it g esuld have closed his down. ,

                                                                                                                                                                                                )

• What has b NRC done fe GE? Not much,

,q - :a tly.The ageo claims it has not complet.

                                                *: its investigations. t says some of the informe.

l-- f ties in its reports belongs to OE and --e be ,

                                               ;j released to the public.                                                                                                                       l
                                               .5 .' Aapo oAen happena, the governe'est adency set

. up te protett h public from a hasardous redustry

seems le worry esore about the industry tim it l  : dees about the publas.

                                                     ,% any orthi. Interest g                     __mY                            !
         !                                                                                           . charlie Rene er
                                                                                                                                           ~
                                                                                                                                                                " ' '                           l L_ _ _ _ _     _ - - ---       - -
                                                 .                  ,inee Helm @                        ?_          _ - - - - - - - -        - - ~ - - - -         - - - - - - ~          -

al e: 2A woningian uoening sier i w.dn day, March 20,1985

                                                                                                                                                                                                      ,@j o

3 s

                                           $1tneSS
              ~

C'&*m.1"Al n"N'0 removed Asaa Mm. English's pietal. w'ished she could remember Fa She was uncertain of the date of the cette s esset words, but resiembers I Continued hese IA . break in, but said Mrs. English be- I '" lieved "it was someone at h com-

                                                                                                                                 ;,                              ,h'{ I"I Mrs. English's hearing began.                    ny who could possibly be out te wekw toId Me. Malpass in late A Asked wh she did not report vie. - urt her." Ms. Malpass said Mrs. . cembw Vbe careful where you go                                                        ,

lations to ifw NRC,'Me. Malpass -English also thought she was being and what you suaeyouen am t L mid, Sir, we have been told ng watched," Malpass test - watched b eesseone freen OE. through the years we have the right' Ma. Mafpasa slee testified that' , God. .. . to talk to the NRC, but it would be Jeff Faucette, GE's director of em- Underpreneurs hoaiOE etterne t L 3est if you 'did not answer their ployee and community relations,. William Sturges'of Charlotte. Ad- - qu*etiens without referring the to delivered a veiled warning after she . ministrative Law Judge RJ. Brie- [ your supervisor er having your au - testified in December. Ms. Malpass senden required Ms. Malpass to { porvisor present." - said Faucette told her he and the identify the co. worker ass Rickie "I know that we can talk to the new plant manager, E.A. Ime,had Wood. Briesenden then said, "I i NRC although the company deson't discussed th trial and that.*we .want the record to reflect that I . really want you te," she said. ehould be very careful and very don't want anythmg to happen to'. Ms. Malpass testiSed that essee- elow.That there eeuld be a lapse of .these people."- . '

                                                                                                                                      ,, g [.

1- .-.]... . . . .... .

                                                                                                                               ,                        ,.         ;,.]
                          'W    h                 58            5'hfId#                                                                                                                            #8 eam

• ca.A } g hg.g/d E -I= i

                                                                                                  .!f.N3"$.h;.Q88[8'hUI8'D5I.8ij
                                                                                                     ..s38 c- h: "Pd Ex. a3gJ sa                                                                      g.;

DLI. !? G $ f j } p.l,.,a i  ! - i hii JL

         !.Ndikj{jjk@eN'li i,

ma9@d)iMNMl i hl i $1F: $.,7w,!$.s[11))! lki i4MiMi]ese i Iidi

                                                                                                                                                                                             .=v .        1 l! i$jlh M M8       si u        *                    -

W f$o3h[

                                                                                                                           .                     n
                                                                                                                                                 *y                                                     .
  -                     -                            -~~.              -
             - ~                                                                .                                                                                                                         ,
                                                                                                                                                                      ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ '~

y **y~y K '*v'lvw -~ 1,'.

                                ,[ W~ ***Tme" 7*T~ ~~~'

• 7 - , , r-

[]

                                                                                                      . - - - .                                           ^-

a D* . 1 1 . t 1 i g " i

  )1                                                      Wilmington Moming Star / Thursday, March 21,1985 2,

i .

,e 1.i Standards disputedin GEtrial i

B ,ad d R Bei'w Hayne. i Mrs.Englishchargo thatGEde nation on her work table. She told the NRC that GE em-Some General Electric Co. em-ploews have " production-oriented fired her July 30 becau,se she in began mamoted her eges" and use unapproved proce- formed h Nuclear Regulatory yearsago.The kingNRCthehas charges three investigat-

    ;                     dujes to increase nuclear fuel pro.       Commission that GE employees duction at GE's Castle Hayne plant,.. routinely violated rulesspokesmen                in handling    ed none 39 afofher    charges, but N say that          the ih-according to evidence in a U.S. La- radioactive materials. She also bor Department hearing Wednes- charges thatplantmanagement                             NRChas  vestigations spokesmen      alsohas told kn thefinished. t day in Wilmington.                         covered up the violations and har Morning Star that no reports have A laboratory supervisor's letter tie. assed  her because she was a "whis- been completed in the case, but sev-blower."                                                                                -

read in court said some employees eral have been entered into evi-would run purity tests on uranium' Mrs. Englishis suing GE under a dence in the hearing of Mrs. Eng-until they got acceptable results 1978 " whistle blower statute de-

                         " biased to meet production. oriented signed to protect nuclear                        industry lish's suit this week. Those repo willnot be madepublic because the egos."                                      employees from retribution by their NRC has mied they contain sensi.

Theletter, signed by GE's labors- employers if they report safety vio- tive information. tory supervisor, Coke McLamb, was lations.

  ;                                                                   GE cc,ntends Mrs. English was             Mozart Ratner and Arthur Schil-

'j . submitted in the wrongful firing hemoted and fired because she de- ler, Mrs. English's attorneys from suit filed by Vera English of Castle liberately left radioactive contami-Please see FUEL,9A

t. .

4 j -. _ to get false results. They were "en- I

-L FHe1                                      couraged not to go that extra step and bias the results," Winslow testi-fled.          .

>j Continued from 1A Louis Sheely, manager of GE's

• Washington, obtained the reports fuel quality division, said manage-after promising to keep them secret. ment tried to respond to Mrs. En-i They contend that GE manage- glish's reports of safety problems.

ment pressured employees to sacri. He said that on March 8,1984, Mrs. flee bsting procedures and safety English's work area was filled with

• considerations to increase efficien. employees from the radiation an'd industrial safety divisions and fron't cy.Bul t T. Preston Winslow, another maintenance.

laboratory supervisor, denied the "No work moved across her work charge. *1 think it was a self.im. station all day," Sheely said. "We

"                                         posed press fre," Winslow said.            tried to respond to the lady's con-i He testified that some quality cerns." He said the workmen found control testers would altar calibra- no evidence of safety hazards that tion procedures for test equipment day.

                                                                                                                                            .y    . _ _ - - ----_ -_--_ _
       .u......-            ,

GE4whte G allegation y onsafety

 ')

By Ray Belew sener wreser j S Lawyers for a fired employee of General Electric Co. Thunday at-5 tempted to cast doubt on the compe-j tence of the Radiation Safety divi. j sion at GE's Castle Hayne plant. G Inspectors from the division over. . 2 looked radioactive contamination i that was marked with red tape, ac.

      ',                   cording to testimony and legal pa-pers filed in the wrongful firing suit
   ]                       by Vera Enghsh of Castle Hayne.
    .;                         Inspectors also said a table bear-                               .

ing a film of uranium dust was free f of contamination, a witness said. - l Mrs. English, who reported 55 al-i leged violations of federal safety Wilmington Moming Star / Friday, March 22,1985 7A t regulations at GE to the Nuclear

    .j Regulatory Commission, is suing the company under a 1978 " whistle-blower" statute designed to protect"~

nuclear industry employees from retribution by their employers if e they report safety violations. dE contends Mrs. Enghsh was ' demoted March 16.1984, and fired July 30 because she deliberately management pressures employees j left radioactise contamination on to keep production hi h ever. if it her work table. The hearing by the U.S. Department of Labor is being held by Administrative Law Judge dh nicans ascrificing quafity.

                                                                                                                                   " Quality is No.1. Production is not even close to the top," McLamb j                       R.J. Brissenden of San Francisco.

Mrs. English's former supervisor, William Lacewell Jr., told the court Continued from 1A March 18 notes say. testified. Ratner argued Wednesday that quality control is sacrificed to pro-I that GE safety inspectors inspected Mozart G. Ratner, one of Mrs. mote penduction. He quoted an Qct. the table but did not find the cen- English's attorneys, asked Bnssen- 23, 1983, memorandum from I .. tamination until the next shift be-l1 gan. Mrs. English told Lacewell of glen to rule that the March 11 notes McLamb that reads in part. "Fpr-thed been destroyed. The judge re- sonnelfeelthey are being presstred

. the incident March 11,1964. 8 fused. to meet production needs."

                              "She stated that she left a visible                        ' Quality control employee Joy             McLamb acknowledged that the area of turaniumi powder and Rad                              Malpass and Lacewell have testi- memorandum seems to say that Safety did not pick it up," Lacewell                          fled that the outer surfaces of vials management pressures employees
  .I                     testified. "They had to come back,                            and crucibles used to hold uranium to keep production high. "I can tell l                       and find it."             .

samples frequently are contaminat- you thatis not the case." His memo-I Lacewell also testified that Mrs. ed with uranium. randum also called for a meeting"to

    .!                   English told him she put red tape                                 Coke McLamb, supervisor of the addresa employees

• concerns and re-d-

    )

around the spill. She told Lacewell test laboratory where Mrs. English duce self. imposed pressure to pro-that she " thought they at least worked, disputed claims that GE duce."

 "                      would have wondered about the red tape "Lacewell testified."It was my assumption that she purposefully left it there to entrap" safety inspec.
       .                tors.

i Lacewell's notes of his March 11

       !                meeting with Mrs. English could not be found, but his March 18 notes                                ~

l say Mrs. English asked him to say i that she had not intentionally con-l taminated the table, a violation of

aarety regulations. She told l; Lacewell that the contamination ,

<) came from vials and crucibles, the _I - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- -' - - Attachment D3 -- ~ - ~

                      ,              : ,                                     _,;_                              ~_.                                   - _ , _ -

7.f - _ a . .

                                                    ~     "

4 l discharged. EI' ' asid they were of. A confidential GE investigative u ===n also nas "y f4 v vse (hQ report introduced Friday also taen found heavy conta"*aa'ian on inspec.

                           )                        --

backed up Mrs. English's claims. the floor of the plant's chemical.

    ;:                                               Continued from 1A                            The report by FJ. Wiecaersk of Saa metallurgical laboratory, where
  .jj                                                her demotion on March 16, 1984, Jose, Calif., said her charges of vie. Mrs. English worked. GE's i and her dismissalJuly 30. She told lations at the plant"were found, for tien program was improperly ne 3                                               the NRC that many work areas the most part, to have substance." because only specific areas were

,: were enstaminated with radioactiv. GE lawyers protested niease of checked. That means that "eertain

         ]

ity,that safety workers were unable the NRC investigative information ' hot' areas in the lab may not have to find contamination and that em. but were unsuccessfulin preventing been survsyed as often as thev N ployees handled radioactive materi. Its disclosure. should have been" Mossman tol'd' ' j g als unsafely. "Your honor, we have got the the court. g% Mrs. English also charges that press here and those an confiden. The NRC also ruled that equip- l

;] plant management has covered up tial documents," said Scott Klion, a ment to check for uraniumin the air l the violations and harassed her be. GE lawyer from San Jose. in at least one lab was improperly I

, q cause she was a " whistle blower." But Brissenden, who has earher placed. Mossman said. The monitor

a . The com y contends she was prohibited disclosure of any NRC there.he said,was seven feet off the '

i1 fired for faiFing to clean contamina. violation nports, allowed Mossman snand. i tion from her work table. to summanse the NRC's findines. 'Thatmaybeoutofthebreathing ' 4 j Mossman bolstered Mrs. Eng. He cautioned him not to quote di. sone ofmost people,unlessyou have lish's contentions that the com. rectly from the documents. a Patrick Ewing." Mossman asid. <

-{                         .                        pany's charge against her was a pn.              Mossman said one aport showed Ewing, who is 7 feet tall, plays cen '

text for firing her. He said the GE inspectors did not find contami, tar en Georgetown's basketball j ( ( charge against her was equal to dif. nation in pipes shipped out of the team.

        ),

e0 ferent violations committed by oth. plant for disposal. Mossman did not He also said the NRC determined 'j . er plant employees who were not say where the pipes were taken but that GE employees frequently do ,j not check their clothing for radioac. i tive contamination before leavie.g I, areas where radioactive materialis i j W1tness . haded. .

                                                                                                                                           % cheeks, called " frisking," are
  .I                                            1                            ... tigative reports.The NRC has ruled                    not done by 20 to 30 percent of the

,j

  -{                         g{                         g                        that the reports, and several others mentioned in,the hearing. contain plant's employees who handle ra-as , rive materials. Mossman said.

e, pr h rt says GE management doprie ary information, and are= m s-.

(, GE plant' , marizedi from NRC reports were: e Twenty percent to 30 percent

f m a v e ir a

• Messman said.

Violations -:'3le drs-a $**,",e's check themselves for ra ioactive a J c'o L"e"ipo

t. . ' ' m72 clothing an not d,etected ... the g contaminated clothing can come in contact wi peop outaide the EM,Belew e o are poorly trained , g

                        'Nie Nuclear Regulatory Com-                                  e Radiation safety workers are                       The NRC further said GE em.

!J ployns did not know the proper ; ~; mission has found numerous viola- inadequately trained. method for frisking and recom 1

      .            tions of radiation safety rules at                                  e Contaminated areas are infre-                 mended that they be tramed.

Ii General Electric Co.'s Castle Hayne quently checked for *adiation. 'l plant, according to testimony in a e The plant improperly disposed "Apparently,the NRCinspectors, I 'j court hearing Friday in Wilming- of pipes contaminated with radi- aRer nviewing 6perations at the ,4 ton. . ation. Wilmington plant, have got . . . the The violations include contami-

• High levels of radioactivity conclusion that the radiation safety .

nation of work anas with radioac- were found on a laboratory floor. program is lax iueme.way," Moss.

, , tivity and inadequate measures to e Monitors to check for air borne man told the court.

t protect workers and the public from radioactivity are inadequate. . _ . _ . jl contamination. e Uranium detection tests have '7 NRC spokesmen have said the been improperly performed. /d Egency's investigations of some vio- The information was reles. Sed lations are not finished but that no during the trial cf Mrs. English's

           -       fines have been levied against the                               suit against GEunder:1978"whis-company.

tie-blower" statute designed to pro. Asked about the significance of ees tect nuclear industry emplofrom who report safety violations the violations the NRC found at GE.

i Kenneth Mossman testified, "I retribution by their employers.

! could tell you what would happenin The U.S. Department of Labor i my lab. They could take my li- hearing is being conducted in Wil- ! cense." Mossman is a Georgetown

• mington by Administrative IAw l University professor and has a doc- Judge RJ. Brissenden of San Fran-

             -      torate in radiobiology. He drew up                               cisco. Mozart G. Ratner and Arthur

! j' the radiation protection program Schiller, both of Washington, D.C., , for the Washington. D.C., school's represent Mrs. English. laboratories. Mrs. English contends that her research Ma eman.and teachin'ine in the testifv many reports to the NRC prompted Attachment D4 o

 =                                                  =                       -                                  --                              --

i . . , ' Ex-GE worker. ~

                                                                                                                                                 ~

Wilmington Morning Star / Tuesday, March 26,198s 5A r jl' i

weens f e on stand)- m-1h 2 = =..e-r,'m working at Generablectric7" i l

I I

          ~

lawsmthalfover By Ray Belew English said.

                                                                                                       "Then let's asked Arthur Schiller, one of Mrs.

e *-

                                                                                                                                                "No, sir.It would be a very foolish M [.

with uranium. The case before the ! Ll.S. rtment of Labor is being of here," Mrs.get every English ,, . re-said she hood out thing to do, because I would be ex. l hear y Administrative Law posing myself" to radiation Mrs. , , Vera English, who is suing Cen- Judge RJ. Briamenden. Plied.She then began to weep on the English answered. ! eral Electric Co. For firing her, wept

                                                                                                   tness stand.                                                                             i Mrs. English's attorness rested          Mrs. English later sa.di she did        Winslow testiGed late m, the day, quietly Monday as she testified that their case Monday but protested             'not deliberately smear uranium on       "I am   n9t aware of any past or cur-supervirces and co. workers har- Briseenden's ruling' that the trial anned her.

the work table sa the company ori- rent practice to tase red tape to iden-must end Thursday.The trial began Lify contaminatic,n." He quoted i 1 -

        ?'           Mrs. English, 59, of Castle in December. It adjourned after ginali charged.She,said,she found umny acid. a radioactive hquid CE's radiological rules and a job                           i Hayne, said T. Preston Winslow, three days and resumed March 18.                 Compound of uramum, on her work hazard analysis that say contami-manager of the GE laboratory               Briesenden said it will take at       table when she came to work Ma'rch where she worked, stood an inch                                                                                           .gegnation y,      should be cleaned immedi-away from her face and ridiculed least 20 days to prepare a tran-                5,1983.             ,

i her fears of being contaminatea script. Lawyers for both sides will "This was one time I was going to But Mrs. English test,ified that with uranium because of co. work- then have a month to submit legal show management" that co. workers she showed the contamination to - k' briefs. He was uncertain how long left contammation in work areas, her shift supervisor, Bill Latewell. , i ers' unsafe handling of uranium ~ he w powder. ' ill deliberate before ruling in the case t she testified. Mrs. English said she lie did not clean up the spilled marked the area with red tape, as  !, She also sobbed while testifying Mrs. Englis5 originally asked for she contenda company rulee re- uranyl scid,or tell her to clean it up i l that she frequently found her work teinststement, but has since quired. or remove the tape, Mrs. English,. ' { said. i table sty. contaminated with radioactive dropped the request. She now asks , l for back pay, the pay she. would

• i

{ Winslow, who testified for two -have earned had she worked until hours, did not address Mrs. Eng- retirement at 65 and retirement i lish's harassment claim, but said benefits.

• she violated company rules by not I cleaning u Mrs. English testified Monday -

L work area.p radioactivity fem her that one day in late 1983 a co. work- t I Mrs.English is suing CE under a er dumped uranium powder in a l, disposal area that did not have u . 1978 " whistle. blower" statuta de- , ventilation hood me the NRC re-1 signed te protect nuclear industry quires. "I could taste it," Mrs. Eng-employees who report safety viole- lieh said of the uranium powder, Lions frome retribution by their em-i players. adding that she walked away from Mrs. English was demoted froen the work area and told Winslow of i the violation. r herjob as a quality control inspector ' i on 4farch 16,1984, and fired July She said Winslow asked the man ! 30. She contends that GE fired her who had dumped the uranium,"Do 'i because she filed safety complaints you smell any powder?" The man - that led to a Nuclear Regulatory answered that ne couldn't. "Then i

            ,   Commission investigation.                Mr. Winslow walked to an inch of my face and smiled and said 'He

[ The company maintains that she didn't smell any uranium,'" Mrs. i-l was fired because she deliberatelyr 2 [t left her work table contaminated pt,... ... rn ia r =a

                                                           +                         .

i .. Ji' 1 ', ,, 1 GEblames j rules neglect \- 1 fordismissal h O Related sto ss.1A

                                                                                                       \-      #

4. t

                                                                                                                         'I i

).i c:, na, sen., Mrs.English - I A General Electric Co. official char es that GE . 1 testified Tuesday that Vera English [iredherheCaUSesbe was fired because she violated safe-ty rules by leaving her work area informedtheNRC contaminated with radioactivity. 9,g l L.A. Sheely, manager of fuel that CEemployees quality for GE's Castle Hayne , plant, said Mrs. English told him routm, elyFlolate that she knew she should have

• cle:ned the work surface.

Mrs. English is suing the com-Sa[elfrules, pany for firing her. She contends she complied with safety rules by reporting the contamination to her rules that she knew existed," Shee. supervisor and marking it with red ly testified.

n. EnIlish, of Castle Ha e onSheely and Mrs.English disa, gree when the area was contaminat-4

          **8. demoted Mr.rch 16,1964,      m' ed. He testified Tuesday that the

• h:r b as a quality control inspec- incident happened March 6. Mrs.

ter or GE and barred from areas of English said Monday that it oc- )l4 the plant where radioactive ma, ten. cur-ed Mah 11*

 $        clis handled. She was fired July 30.

She.is suin:: GE under a 1978 While Sheely said he was un- et r, wr 1

          " whistle-blower" statute designed aware that other employees left to protect nuclear industry employ. work areas contaminated, he told 6.1M Worker ees who report safety violations the court that Mrs.English told him                i 1

I from retribution by their em loy- - before she wu demoted - that .OrOke es , a ers. The Nuclear Regulatory om- ahe frequently found contamination mission is investigating 55 allega- on her work table. She told him the Et A General Electric Co. 1

  !       ti:ns she made against GE. 'lhough contamination, for which she was                      D official testified Tuesday.
  !       some investigations have been fin- fired,was left by a technician on the             that Vera English was fired        e ished, no fines have been levied previous shift, Sheely testified.                   be:ause she viciated safety rules cg inst the company, NRC spokes-        T. Preston Winslow, manager of               by leaving her work area
          "'" ** Y'                                                                            contaminated with radioactivity.

the laboratory where Mrs. English Mrs. English charges that GE formerly worked, Monday contra- l

.l fired her because she informed the dicted her claim that she had fol-                                                           l 1          NRC that GE employees routinely lowed ecmpany regulations in deal-                                                              ;

!. viilate safety rules in handling ra- ing with the contamination. J disactive materials. She also -

                                                  *1 am not aware of any past or ch*rges that plant management has current practice to use red tape to
   ,      covered u the violations and har-cssed her      ause she was a "whis- identify contamination, Winslow tie blower."                          said.

Mrs. English's attorney: Tuesday Sheely, testifying in the U.S. La- introduced documents that show bor Department hearing's ninth day in Wilmington, also 'said he would red tape was used to indicate the h:ve been more lenient with an em. Estion of radioactive materials pl:yee who had worked only a short *nd th818 pills of radioactive mate-

'l'       time than he was with Mrs. Eng nalsw9re supposed tobe reported to lish, who had worked at the pl=,- sunervisors.

I for 12p _ ,_ ,, ., , _,GE attomeys producyd Jogt!....

                                                                                           .... ,_    ... ,_.. J q% % hm.ent,D6

                   .~_.c                                           - - - -
                                                                                            .-                  -~

j . . 4

  -i                                                                                                         Jl'             -

t 1 ,. - A.; 1 J

 .]                                          Wilmington Morrung Star / Thursday, March 28,1985 H

a -

 +.

' :'? S,.! .

3 lj GEemployeestestify 1 o l tness notpressured By Ray Belew ately left contamination on het k.a rnw work table.

Mrs. Mal ss a quality control *

             ' General Electric Co. employees worker at the p,lant, corroborated fenied under oath Wednesday that                                                               a                                              = .5 E         T9 Ae compan was hayng a witness Mrs. English's claims that many a o whist e blower suit watched areas of the laboratory where Mrs.

T < 1 [* I' AFg" 2Eg* E2= g *4 p.

                                                                                                                                      **I
                                                                                                                                      .         'OI""g r7 g .4
                                                                                                                                                              *E    cia I E=                         )

En l s" 7 - BBFEs- [- ' r that a compan official had ree- wit $ish worked because are contaminated i radioactivity emplo g by:E E _. E FE,II*E SEd. lg Eg EwE g k N *! i 3mmended

           ***077     I *P'*-   that,,t e witness   Company  have officialsa ses           do tnot dispute    e handle

• uranium

                                                                                                                        'l g: *safel[y-

• Th L{bg *! [

GE employee Joy Malpass testi- . gS'9"'.I. l g ood a e Eo ke , I er n nmber to "be careful what you say contamination claims. Wood contra. i g(Pa imony that lI(( g

                                                                                                                        !.4      g g

7IF. a.

                                                                                                                                                     'o"L

{ 5' F i

                                                    . Sir the first time I realized that und wh: ou do. You are bemg I was, involved in this case was he had ven the court 2,9 m k a e E [ sy * *I *o E
                                                                                                                                'eq *hF F E.Eg '           E"I"                     @         l ql Vood 2

ctched.,t s name only a r being pres- when it came out and I read itin the 3

• T g*"2-e'E wg E $ l per," Wood said. He said he went 5 I p. g [ I  ! *$ T ] 4k F 2,

          ""d-                                                                                                         m.

'. . y Mrs. Malpass' home Dec.18 to 5: L9E C? ' I" "I never said anything like that." deliver her paycheck.

',1 Nood testified Wednesday. He was Wood said he did not know in                         g,3 e g ra 3                                g. a:                 r

j peaking in the suit by Vera Eng. December that Mrs. Mal 1 ish,59, of Castle Hayne, who con- was Ig8 > [#g;g co2"'*1gz rl* E < FS-g r *3 cnds that GE demoted and fired testifying for Mrs. Englis *S2 *E 4 .

Mozart Ratner, one of Mrs. Eng. ier last year because she told the lish's attorneys, asked ifit was not @ fw'8 *4 z".1"* '( {I

• 8 g !' I'E F; g?{g 5 s

- a fuclear Regulatory Commission " common knowledge, common gos- ' $ h F " s ,,$ " E

 .s hat the company commits many sip around the plant that Mrs. Mal.

t afety violations. E:h E[, Eg.8 Egg F e gE[{ e t1

                                                                                                                                                            *p pE..ye 3

a s

• 3 She clso contends that omeials at pass was testifying for Mrs. Eng- a s. g[2,s 3 he Ccstle Hayne plant , harassed lish. Lf'f'E'r g.g jcne = g,s E! .[gg3 E B g A r 3 tr cnd covered up the violations.

S r, there were a lot of rumors eg gg [ ,l*{w.g'!'.Eg [ n. g E "IEE4 E - I n n. - g.g.# *.3 g"3

• ige - $1 {

mg 4 *g E. r !. qc. drs. En lish testified that the om. around the plant,"manager Jeff Faucette, Wood answered.of em- . W

 ;j ial,s h: her watched and that she
     - dpved her house was broken into ployee and community relations for                                    E lM"- 8.i3$gE 8 YEE .[iT

• R E the GE

  -le:ause af her reports to the NRC. Malpass' plant, also disputed Mrs. l'ii! 3.                                      *8                     .}            5'  E  g. a  =il     2 s *I.E contention that he made a                                    [a g g.g'5 a=5                kE 8 = = 3 14               ?EE DE contends that Mrs. English veiled recommendation that she
       - vas demoted March 16,1984, and                                                               --           -

ired July 30, because she deliber- Please see WITNESS,7A 4 e- e

 'f 1         _.____u__--_--._-              -
                                                                           - - - - -               - - ~ - - - - - -                           ~'W""'---"-                             =

                                                                                                ~

E.Z.U._ 7 AZu_ .haaM J- w._.mu.wKim A.n&m.nc m p so . s a  ;

                                                                                                                                             .                                    a

n. t

                                                                                                                                                                                  .rl:

m

                                                                                                                                                                                   %F
                                                                                                                         '                                                         a 9 1

9 ,

                                                              "                                                                                                                    #    i i                                                                                                                                                                                        ,

t e informed a supervisor, Wumington Morning Star / Friday, March 29,19ss 9A l en C4, em f-O E,A E. L mreten Davis, on. .p i.ust - in shop personnel relations, testi. fied Wrsday morning that Presented employees in disputes l Firedemn veeweeps f ./ Continued from IA m, right to p,oduce . . . to gi.e m, best to my employer. But these men

                                                                                                                                                -"eetid,.meThadm.,emt.

ings with Mrs. English than with Q O E hp v e g were determined I was not goipg to any two other employees at the k be able to do it."

                                                                                                         "There are men who,if they had kant.

l Davis said rs. English he her appeal tried to help I'. demotion Ir

      -u                                                                                             guta enough, would be down here to and firing.

By Ray Bolew  % company contends she was testify about it. Now, pie,ase, I can't l si.sr w.m.,

• fired because she left contamination take any more," she said and dis- .Di h *ta W % M W . Pp son, Mr. Carpenter and Mr.14wis l en her work table.The 11. day hear. solved into tes,rs. ggg ,g J,'

, Slapping the witness stand and ing ended Thursday. No ruling is Admmistrative Law shaking her finger Vern English eng until mid. summer. Bnseenden. who is hean, case contamination ng the Judge RJ. on the lege of her ! swore she had been a good worker I had been threatened by Mr. and responsible citizen, then col- Sheely (LA. Sheely, manager of for the U.S. Department of Labor, recessed court. A friend and her g,dg*gg'Y**",

                                                                                                                                               ,        g         ,

7 y 7, f lapsed in tears as she testified fuel quality) that if I couldn't pro. lawyere assistant comforted Mrs. Mozart Ratner, oneDavis. of Mrs. t Ro Enk I against her former employer. English for nearly 30 minutes be- lish's attorneys, asked duce I was no good to him or any. fore court resumed. ert Hudson, Robert Ce nter and i Mrs. English,59,of Castle Hayne body," Mrs. English said."Why, sir? J.C. " Buddy" lewie wo ked with , is sums General Electric Co., con- I was producing. I was putting out . She testified earlier that her tending that the company fired her good work.- work table was often contammated Mrs En8li e B*" **'W h h ! July 30 because she told the Nucle- She said she was ' harassed by- . when she came to work and that she same lab on a different shift. [p ar Regulatory Commission that co- company officials and co-workers always cleaned it - until March 9 "No, I remember Ron Brown's L !

• workers at the Castle Hayne plant because she slowed production by 1984. name not being mentioned at all," k. .

] did not handle uranium safely. - reporting violations. That day, Mrs. English said, Davis answered. He said she men- L i Mrs. English is suing GE under a "I was scared to death," she said, someone spilled radioactive liquid tiened only 14wis as being able to [ 1978 " whistle blower" statute de- almost shouting at William on thelegs of her work table and left say who contaminated the table. signed to protect nuclear industry Sturges, GE's attorney. "I needed it for her to clean. . "Did you ever talk to Buddy Lew. l employees who report safety viola- my job. . . . I'm a widow." '"I made up my mind - no more." is about this?" Ratner asaed . Liens from retribution by their em- "Do you see what kind ofenviron. Mrs. English said. She said she de- "No, sir," Davis answered. ! players. N NRC is investigating ment I was in -harassed on every cided to stop being a " wife, . .. Davis also said he knew who had ! 55 charges ehe made sseinstGE but side?" Mrs. English said. "That is has not completed its work, NRC mother ... and janitor for grown accused Mrs. English of violating men."She testified that she marked company rules, but that he refused 3 spokesmen say. Please see LAWSUIT,9A the uranyl acid with red tape and to tell her their names, i

                                                                                                                                         .-=.:.                                        }'

r

                                                                                                                                                                    .                  5.

J - i - t .

l , ,- ,

 ...                                                                                    u-                  .

e .

                                                                   .                                     V                   *
                        ~                                                                                                       ,

ranium dust loose in lab at GE ga20MH plant, worker says - By JIM y0IJON' 55 allegations of NRC violations. ' s=w s n. s e ens ommemr Since 1982, the agency has in-vestigated 12 allegations involv. WILMINGTON - Radioactive 'ng i radioactive material control materialwas handled soloosely at

                    . ' the General Electric nuclear fuel and accountability and 27 allega.
        .                                                            tions of unsafe radiation prac-

_ plant in Wilmington that a brown tices. No fines have been levied film of uranium dust sometimes against the plant,'NRC spokes-settled on lab equipment, a em. man Kent Clark said in a tele-playee testified Tuesday at a U.S. phone interview. labor Department hearing. '. The hearing Tuesday was con-Joy Malpass, a fuel chemical . tinued from December, when inspector, testified at a hearing on Brissenden heard three days of the efforts of Vera P. English,60, to receive back pay and other plant testimonyfrom administrators. Mrs. Malpass and, j benefits from GE.Mrs. English . was fired in July 1984 after she : Mrs. Malpass said she had felt - reported violations of Nuclear " intimidated" by J.H. Faucette, Regulatory Commission regula- the plant's employee relations tions at the plant.She has sued the director, after her testimony in company under a 1978 " whistle- December. "He said we should be - very careful and slow with what blower" statute designed to pro . we say because there can be a tect nuclear industry employees v ho report safet;' violations. lapse of memory,"she said. GE lias said it fired Mrs. En- Attorr.cys for GE and plant g!!sh after she violated NRC pro- offietals have denied that the firm cedures. ' encouraged safety violations or mistreated Mrs. English,who had Mrs. Malpass testified that worked at the plant for 12 years. stains on a laboratory floorleft by a spill ofliquid uranium remained c'E's Wellington plant produces fuel rods that power nuclear for months and that uranium sometimes was spilled from sam- dust , plants that generate electricity. ple containers intended for test .

• ing.

                                          ~
                                                               .                                                               ~

Mrs. Malpass said she had not reported the situation to the NRC. Beg your pardon

                   " *'We have been told through the                  In a story Tuesday on insurance years we have the right to talk to' of deposits at savings and loan the NRC, but it would be better if associations, The News and Ob :

you would not answer their ques. Lions withcut referring them to server did not say what agency insures deposits of the 47 state-your supervisor," she said. chartered S&Ls not insured by the In sw'orn statements filed.with private FinancialInstitutions As-Labor Department Administra. surance Corp. Those S&Ls are tive Law Judge Robert J. Brissen. Insured by the Federal Savings den of San Francisco, NRC inves. and Loan Insurance Corp., an tigators said the agency had sub- agency backed by the federal . stantiated somaof Mrs. English's government. ..

                                                                   ^
                                                                                             .            . .. .... ba.

Attachment E1

                                                                                                             =--   .
    .                                                                  41'          .

1 GE defends firing gorker 2 1 1985  %,,,_m g ' who sued  ;! WILMD(GTON - Supervisors at General Electric Co.'s - nuclear ~ fuels plant'in Wilmington Wednesday defended their firing of an employee who said she had found $5 violations of , federal regulations at the plant . Vera P. English,60, a former quality control employee'at the plant, is suing GE for wages and retirement benefits under a tris  ;

• federal statute designed to protect nuclear industry employees who report violations. . I T. Preston Winslow, manager of the lab in which Mrs. English  !

worked, testified in a U.S. Department of Labor hearing that she had admitted to a supervisor that she deliberately smeared uranium on a work table to test radiation safetylnspectors. When the inspectors passed over the radiation, she left the. job without cleaning up the contamination, he said. yinslow called her actions "a seriously unprecedented" breach of safety procedure. Joy Malpass, one of Mrs. English's co. workers, testified

                           % day that contamination was commor in the lab and some rautu.Ltive stains had remained for months.                              -

Attachment E2

   ..                  .. .         .  ~                .
      .                                                                                                        'i'                           .

t Wilmington GE pIfdk . c - - -' MAR. 2 31 riolated stan8ards,

                                                          . i      . e professor testifies                             *                                                                           '

By JIM P0130N 30 percent. s=w = n. men eas om=w a Discarded pipes etaian WILMINGTON 'I'he General radioactive material were found lectric Co. 'apparently '. violated in a trash bin by NRC inspectors deral radiation standards con- in 1982. . . 8

                                         ,c$e Y fuel rodue o pl t                               .e Radiation c'ounts 25 times
                                         'ilmington, a Georgetown Uni- higher than allowable limds were arsity professor testified Friday. found by NRCinspectorsin one of Dr. Kenneth Mossman, director . the plant s labs in 1m. kne ruons of the lab itself were
                                        'onlabs,said safety for he    Georgetown's could notexplain           radia-  found        to be radioacuve, Win ==

by the Nuclear Regulatory Com- said. , iission h'ad failed to revoke GE's a Placement of airborne radia-perating license based on its tion monitors in the lab was too acord of safety violations be- high to measure adequately the seen 1982 and 1964. air workers were breathing. Mossman's testimony came in a a The lab's employees who con-I.S. Department of Labor Hear- duct chemical assays of. uranium sg on efforts of Vera P. English are exposed unnecessarilytotoxic

                                        > receive back pay and retire- fumes.

tent benefits from GE. Mrs. - - a GE,s safety p'ersonnel ap.

nglish, who was fired after she

• ported violations of NRC regu- Pearediax in cleanmg up contam-

[tions at the plant, is suing the mated areas. In 1984, ,certain ompany under a federal law ' hot' areas may have nd been esigned to protect nuclear indus- surveyed dor radioacdvity) as, ty employees who rert viola- often as they should have been, ions. Mossman said. . Mossman said his comm'ents ' If Georgetown's radiation labo. nre tiased on 15 NRC reports ratories had accrued a similar hat showed investigators had record, Mossman said, the NRC aund violations or deficiencies in "could take my license away." mployee training and in the Robert Torres, managerof radi- -

ontainment of radioactive plate .. ation safety at the plant, testified tal at the plant. Friday that GE and NRC inspee.

He said NRC investigators had tors in November 1984 had found ound tha: widespread, visible radioactive a GE had misled the NRC in contamination in the same lab 982 about the percentage of the Mossman had referred to. The

                                      .mployees who failed to check.. cor.tamination included a stain in hemselves for radioactivity after the middle of the lab floor that caving areas where uranium was                            may have been overlooked by

• iandled. Mossman said failing to inspectors the previous week, he '

heck for radiation is a serious said.

iolation because it can allow' GE h,as said that Afrs. English adioactive contamination to be was transferred out of thelab and pread outside the plant. subsequently fired because she GE had reported that 1.5 per- deliberately left'a uramum spill ent of employees failed to check on her work table to test the temselves, but an NRC inspec- competence of the plant's radia-

                                      . ion put the figure,at 20 per.     .         cent to   tion technicians.                              . , v.

Attachment E4

                                                                                                   ,_.. w .

( _._ _ - . . .. m ._ . - P: - m

                                                                                                                    ~

se a c-

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    .h i                                                          u 4

a i

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    #                 f 4                  :

I

         .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            y p.x-worker's noss says she aanntted brealang plant stannari,.

By JIM pot. SON Nu p .Itt$~ .h Before she was fired Ipst sum- compelence of the plant'a 'radia. of the reports affected by Brissen. of Mrs.' English's.allegat mer, Mrs. English had reported tion safety inspectors. "If there ls den's order are on file in the ment by J. Philip Storher, t - according to a March 15 j

                           *-e viis a          s en-0      IlNG'lT)N - An employee                what shelsaid were safety,and contaminadon, it is the responsi. NRC'p public document room in                                           tor of radiation safety and fired trom General Electric Co.'s                -material handling problems at the bility of the individual to clean it Washington.'The judge said he issued  the   order at the  request   of. guards for NRC Region 2,;

l Nuclear INels Prrductions plant plant to the Nuclear Regulatory up immediately," he said, admitted having violated plant Commission in 1982 and 1984. She Mrs. English subseq'ar.tly was an NRC attorney. , ine.ludes North Carolina. C is suing GE under a federal demoted and transferred from the the reports is 2 years old, a f safety standards, her former su. G.E. attorneys said portions of ing to the statement whic

                ' pervisor testified Thursday,                      whistle-blowerstatute that guards ' lab. She was fired July 31 NRC informants from reprisal.                Lacewell also disputed testime.               the  reports   contain              ary      submitted    Tuesday to Briss Vera P. English, 59, failed to                                                                                                           information    exem          from  dis.      in  lieu of testimony.                    }-

.I clean up radioactive contamina. Informants may be fired if they ny earlier in the trial by a lab In courtroom discussies . tion at her work table, knowing it commit NRC violations, however. employee that contamination of closure by federal law. Lacewell said Mrs. English told work areas is common and some. Brissenden said one of the re. Judge said one NRC repos j was there, said William Lacewell Ports had been placed in the closes that two plant emp

             . Jr., a supervisor in the quahty                      him on March 11, 1984, she had times ignored. Mrs. English's at spdled uranium en a work table torney, Mozart G. Ratner, has s. Public documents by mistake and .were caught by NRC insp i                  control laboratory-in which she                                                                                                                                                           leaving an area in which ra i

worked. and left it there to test the argued that safety violations are.,,.had been withdrawn.. endemic at the plant and that she NRC spokesmen have given live material is handled a j . was fired on a pretext to end her . confileting =-ata about the . checking themselves for ces reporting to the NRC. ==ldaa~ of NRC reports based on nation. "It makes a strong m e a w :r3' pp' ~ ~,~~- A w .,m J

                                                                                ~*4   W yIWrW-                                                 .

Mrs.English's allegations against ence" that the action was di Ratner had sought to release to ate, the judge said.

                      . uj4                                 -

mg/gSj *****"" '""*' G.E. On Friday, NRC spokesman l

                      % 3.N(. h.APOol
                                                          &. n!)Phhbi   @f .M'e'.-        *A9d gygg           gative reports, but Admimstra-tive Law Judge Robert J. Brissen-
                                                                                                                                                               "*"" C " **id !" *" 'a'*rvi'*

that no such reports existed.

                                                                                                                                                                                                               "***'$*r=    *ad the M briefly excluded from the bi But the NRC has issued seven . Wednesday night during c l                      i      pg$
                             /t                                                           .w%'%%!L          den stopped him 'lhursday.Some                    reports that " substantiated some sion of another NRC.."i

!  % N M!. A ~ gR g

                                                                                    ,Qpg MY.:!dW : W$d..w ~.

i ~ ,j QS5$Qi%W&$W%. ma :s2.abm.r,!m&& Adlikb$ sdk. . b 1l - f i 1  ! l

                                                                                                                                                           ~

1 . l 1 r

1 . .. l. j _x - m . s.s isi - s. - 1 _ i . . Complaints. ridiculed,.ex-worker sayst . 3 1i,.C syseu coulow -.=w. . .': e meetsasalmetnerises bymapany. ers. he transtweed fran ws lab be-

                                                                                                                                               -came her emiuimed comphiep                        -

wn.Muestow - sepervisers Mrs. angthm denied ,i.h by aheat safety were "dierupuve. . q g at h General Electric Cs.suele . her supervisers that she delber- B8rs/ ish lesNiled that " . [ at fisst ymaximateleg pisat at', stelyaestainientedherworkarea rehseedla up uranium le ! ., W5adesten reassenanae gneptaints with uramhamn h testined that by aneGier werker March 11,1949,

                  ...ahaut reestion safety, a . fired ;, she new apparent NRC violettese                                               anershe had found her' work taine                            -

testshed .- . ~_. front 1975 unt8 she was'reneoved heavDy centaminated on her gi.

                 *y-
                               *d esamein en say                ands,es? fress a testing lab at_the. plant is                                                                        t mainep                                   shut uanarch sea. ,                                                                                    . . ,4 a                                                                                          .
                                                                                                                                                -s.,sr.cr.p.e.sc                            -
     ;.        ~

a deada.owderfrom e e astere, s eats and the fleer " Vera P. a instru.h A pient rimetismans ty teshal.. -' "I ' . -3f* . c i ~* :" ' 8 v88

                                                                                                                                                                 ,                b.. .

• ni aa

     -o                                                                           clan enee laid her he couhl de 1 aglish testined. "'fhere were                          netWag about the spule if he did                                                                                                                                  y i ipsid uranium spills en the wans,                      not'see them take place, she said.                                                                                                                                c en the fleer, en the immeruments,i . GE says Mrs. EngHsit was fired                                                                                                                                                        *'

an .the .egsipement, alm.=8 en- a, har==== she adenitted seriously j da2y basis." violating safety standards by u l Mrs. EngNah, se, was dired by - spining uranima to test the emn-

• ce test year aner sew lodged- ,

t' 4ssagialets with the Nacisar Reg grs and .t' potence by refusingoftorauhauen eleen it up. afety work. 4 usatory c===w.h she is ner: ; v_ .Winismtacew-the gagnpeny under a- , ell Jr., testified Monday that he s8441499,;that pserds,NIIC inier- mm =hms that Mrs. English

                   . g .J"      gard t- .p.C* ,, .3.s.4. . + ,.y.      t l
                                                                                ' u' . .        '

t ExmGE worker says. safety cdmplaints ridiculed), ~ CakeMet.aseb,twetedher allegaJ

                      -    c ss dpe-pgenr - -                                          he lied @ en hWh sides test . 'emdd               laboratory    'tasta   it.'" $heT.said manager         Preste,  the e tions that quality entrol . test week. Atteriwys for GE asked
                        - revel ser seer cemensettve days,                             c ,w              t m ,. ins the case,            winssew,. 'made smide reinarts" ' resulta had been falsified "as a
                           'the spie sesnahmed Ier two mese                            but he refused. GE witnesses "wenen she neuved away la avel( .~ laughing matter.". Plant managa days baisse itv'essisoned up,she                                                                                                                 ~ , . ' " . >'ershady,n--d testing emply began testifying tienday and are -the dust., ' . . . 4                                                                                              a qstined.

e ,,,,egeg g ,==86==a ustE 'neurs. 1.awJadgeItab- - When her work table esatinual. . ees,gto falsify

                                                                                                                                                                                                                       -a.=,   results she said.- in order' ,,,g, g,#* .' <- - -                  -'-~~'            Iy was c==8aminated by other' -

a t J' Geweenden halted Mrs. - M b M b W W b st, E *s testissemy.at at:IT a.m. ~ RArs. English said that en one workers, ters. Engush said, "I* apaaHty is num 31 an

                            .te,est.d esessed                 her att.er- seessions                      anemployeed.isposingofsaid                 t.e is.-

m.yself, se snore. I -am

e. fed ' . week

                                                                                                                                                                                                                        = -t     -- e si,cese.ortseen                      ,,anism .em,les              M. -t u,              u, .

to the top.,,. said be wasenforcing a theelismit smach radioecGwe dust **that I . ,She mise said a lab supervaser, l { l _

                                                                                                                                                                                                              *1 9
,                                                                                      .                                                                                                          .            .s:

i

~

                                                                        %:             --e              r.           ..=.              t.. .     ,                                                            u 1           -

!~ t Lahchiefurged transfer of woman suingCE . ] ' - By JfM POtJON

• Mrs. English testifled Monday 'to preclude any potential purpose. way without permission.

1 n e.s = n. es e en n., hefest a federal administrative fut action on her beha'l to support Lacewell has testified that Mrs. , l . WILMINGTON - T. Presten law judge that she would not her concerns." English did not say 'she had i { ..Winnient testifled Tuesday that he -deliberately spread radioactive In testimony hesday, L.A. deliberately contaminated her

!                       urged in March 1984 that Vera P.             contamination because it would , Sheely, manager of fuel quality, worktable and that he had autho.

L English he barred fresa areas he a "feelish" risk to her health. 'said he reassigned Mrs. English rized her to remove the radiation

.' .where uraniums was handled after She slee accused Winslow of ridi after hearing Mrs. English's com.' monitor from the entryway to

s'ne adsdtted leaving a uranium culing her concerns about safety. plaints en March 16. check -=W contamination la

spill en her work table to test tne Winsiew said Wesday that he Portions of Winslow's account .the lab.

I competence of plant radiation had ordered investigations into differed from that of William Winslow also testified that lab 4 anfety

• M , several of Mrs. English's com- Lacewell Jr., one of Mrs. En. employees covered their lab ta.

                           "My concern was: Where does plaints and found that they were                       glish's supervisors at the' Wil.. bles with disposable paper to                             -

it leave eff? Does the nest step unsubstantiated. The NRC . dis ' mington plan, and from a compa, avoid contaminating the tables as I levolve taklag uramhun out of the closed last week, however, that it ny report on possible health haz. f**luired by company rules. But

lab?" said Winslow, who man. had verified some of Mrs. En- ards within the laboratory. according to a March 1984 GE aged the lab in which Mrs. En. glish's allegations. Winslow testified that Lacewelt report, lab employees said spills glish werked for 12 years. ,' A company memo dated March. had told him Mrs. English had often were wiped directly off the l Mrs. English was transferred . 13. 1984, and signed by Winslow . admitted spreading contamina. tables with liquid cleaner and

! from the lab Mareh 18,1984, and characterized Mrs. English's ac- tion on her worktable to entrap disposable towets. . fired July 77. She is suing GE, tiens as " bordering on being radiation safety workers. He also '. " Larger spills are normally under a federal " whistle blower" autr.orsive. ... It is imperative said Lacewell told him Mrs. En- cleaned up with a vacuum," said

,, act that protects NRCleformants ... to . reassign Mrs. English lish had removed a radiation the report by S.P. Murray, GE's .

against reprisals. from the controlled area of the odection device from an entry. senior nuclear safety engineen

                                               ;a , ., - , -.

[

                        . + .s.;.. e ..

, ~ - , ... . .. -

                                                                          ........a...,,.
                                                                                     .                      ;                            , , ,_, ,, ,, ,                             ....           1 i
                   ~

i f i i 1 e

       ,, ,,      . , .m u.             . ene-  ,.
                                                                    ^ --           *N                                                                            *             '     '
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             ~

1 i - { M s pe>

s. r GP

                              }             .

i j{[, s g s*

                              . a:;. .

e of _ m M. - .

e. e i

                                                                                                                                                                                                                        %gnesiM5                                   .

a: t p .lan. t f o. ..... . .. ...r.3 yiolations, o_ fficial says :

            ~~
                              !.i[* NRC sited.GE..

nyJIM Peta 0M y-  : l1 .. 4 *1.: T- t*. . i. 2 . ' '

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     . .       ,        og       .
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         )t freen the (wanium) material umano,Vaughan said.                                                                    . Jefferson H. Faarsaea, the plant's n.=. a= ====,

t overalifetimeef werg. Mozart G. Ratner, an attermey -employee and connounity rela. . I'* ~ 'WII.MINGTON -De U.S. No-. with it.he testified.  ;. for Mrs. English, said that the j tiens manager,' dauputed earlier l

                             .         '

• clear Regulatory f*====a3==i== eit. He low. enriched wanissa han. .' NRC requires that radiation lev. testimony that he had intimidated ' gi i

i ~e d General Electric Co. Ahree .ded at the Wilenington plant is ; els he kept as leur as. reasonably' ;a witness for Mrs. English. Fau. *l

                                       ) 'thnee in 1984 for ramaal== patetF about three tinnes amore radiose.                                                         meh3*vable.          .                            .eette said he had met cautioned,                                        t

' .a vietations at KsWdmingtentssele , ti e than natural wanium, he , Dat "is very difficult to define l 'ar feels' plant, a eennpany official [sa,id. Plutaansen, a radseactive .h a standard,"snemory Vaughan as Ms. said.He Malpass , poy had Malp* as

                                    . 6j - teettiled WednesdaF-GE is centesting                                       oneisviolation..              smetal         handled                                                asid.          --          -                 -
         !?                                                                                                                                                           lists whoatcontend sense nuclear that there'.saidhedisagreeswithsentescien.

• heel plants, see to 1,e00 tienes is In an interview, Faucette said l P. and the NRC said that the eempa- miere r=nhanctive than high en. Mrs. English had not been fired l

                                        . ny had tried to avoid committing riched wannen, he said. . ,                                                             :. human exposure to radiation.some degree of alsk from any ' {;                                                        fr l                                       #. a ascend weas=8&==i, said Charles                                                                                             GE says Mrs. English serseusly g

Vaughan said the NRC in' 5984 said she had beee transferred to a j

                                        * ' N.Vaughan,the plant's manager . had etted GE for inadequatel
                                                                                                                                                                    . violated NRC standards by leav.                     temporary position away from                                    J      '

.  : ,.et regulatory compliance. ing herwork station contaminated nuclear materials and later tiid l ;f. Vaughan said only one NRC sanipling the air thd en, ,

                                          . violauen was based en sIIegations h a pimd hb m W med testified that she marked the spill expired. temporary,positaen ;  wdh    wanium.         Mrs. English         has  aff  when    the                                                      'l
                                          ; unade by Vera P. English, a also for excessive radiation levels and later called R to the attention                                                                             Robert J.,.Brissenden, a D.S. .

whois suing GE h the hb. NRC. Wm &

                                        * - former
                                                                                                                                             - fail .h < of a supervisor to demons

• rate Department ef Labor administra.

g*/ under a al act guarding NRC g ' ,,,,gg g _ _ g.y g that employees en previous shilts tive law judge hearing the case,.

                                             .inferunants from reprisal. De g g ,g,, ,, ,,, % gg, had                                                                      been leaving spills for her to .has said he will end the hearing .

e ,

                                        ** NRC         . discovered         the   Ather   two - ' nun      was,hmuDed'                   .       ..4                 clean up.          .                  .             taday but will not nale immediate.                                

vietations en its own, he said. In other testimony Wasta== stay, ly.

• 4 t. .

n . , u. Mrs. Raglish has testNied that ', Vaughan said that GE .'ylil .,;. . 4' '

                                       *kher superlers ridiculed her con '. contest the NRC fieuhng that air                                                                               ~ * '     p.. ,'  '
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            .-                H I                                      s   P,eerns shout r=A=86a= safety and                          sampling was inad6 quale but that *                                                                                                                            *-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 =

l <l'later discharged her hae==== ef . It has installed entra air nienitars.. '

                                ' "0: thesa. Vaugham said none of the Excessive radiation was found in allegations Mrs. English made to enly one apet in the plant, while p* *;ber superiors has been ==h=8==81.
                                                                                                 . average radiation levels were f .inted by the NRC.                       '
                                                                                             . , well within beensang lunits.,he '

7 -Vaughan said uranissa handled said. . - f, r en the plantis only a slidt hasard On a separate occasion, the .

                               -l ;ea eenployees' health.                             . .

NRC found radiation greatlysex. * ' j l- "You receive a let more radia. . ceeding an " administrative stan. r, g .; dien from a single (desdall X-ray dard" set by the cosnpany but well

                                     ; emana then you weedd smeelve within .the lisnits set by QS's                                                                                                                                                                                             -

a 4. h an.i: a ..s .%4 . e -

                                                                    .r.                                    .s   .t     .: . . . .          .         en* .

• m - se. .k m t . m. . t- . di GE not ready to alertpublic ofcrisis .

at Wilmington plant, NRC r,uled inJan. my JtM POLSON prepared .ess rules was submitted as evidence in the s sees se va ====.se e===reer case by CE. . Wit.MINGTON - General Electric Co. .is not GE spokesman Jeffersen 11. FauceHe said proce.

     ..                      adequately prepared to notify the putdie in the event   dures for notifying local law enforcement agencies of of a radiation accident at its Wilmington nuclear        a plant accident had not been included in the plant's fuels plant, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission emergency guidelines. The procedures are outlined found in January, docuenents released Thursday in the company's procedures for day-lo<iay opera, said.                                                    tien, he said.

The NRC cited CE Jan. 31 for placing a " low "We thought we were covering it all right. They priority" en notifying the public of the esistence and just want it added to the (planti emergency passatde risks of a plant accident. director's guidelines," Faucette said. Pessade emergencies at the plant include spBis of 'Ihe NRC report characterized the company's a radioactive thydds, accidental emission of radiose- emergency notification prae =Ame as " vague" and tive gas and - if isranium is stared in escessive " lacking in content." quantity - a nuclear fission reaction, according to

• Licensee (GE) representatives were unable to testimony by plant efficials in a U.S. Department of provide implementation precedures describing ap-Labor hearing this week.

propriate licensee actions for promptly notifying Vera P. English, a former ,.4 ant employee. is suing off. site agencies and providing protective action

           '                GE under a federal statute that protects informants recommendations," the NRC found.                            ,

to the NRC from reprisal. In iMe and 1981, the GE plant accidentally released During creasesamination en the lasIt day of the radioactive uranium hesafluoride gas, es Z to . hearing Thursday, Mrs. English broke down and NitC documents. A sput of100 gallons of radioactive i wept after testifying that supervisers and co-workers liquid accurred June 4,1984, the NRC reported. had sabotaged her work "le get me eut" after she The gas leaks resuNed in " negligible" radiation reported safety violations to the NRC. doses to the general puhdie, the NRC said, but the A company efficial testified' Wednesday that the agency chided GE isr "not assessing promptly" the

• NRC substantiated only one of 55 allegations made by stat leak. GE initially reported the liquid spilled in Mrs. English and that the NRC * ' ;- ' fly found June went down a storm drain, but the NRC said several vietations while investigating her cialais. The company workers spparently had contained the spi!!

NRC report describing the violation of emergency with a temporary dam. i . I *

     *!'                                      S                          ;-          .Ot SENERALOitierwie                                                T 1cTLr P  T.

8*292-5747 ' ""* May 21, 198 4 bac: a rancette 4 WILM1NGTQM MANUFACTURING DEPARTMENT asoness. M/C J-02 ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLATIONS TO COMPANY PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES l

Reference:

Your letter of February 24, 1984, same subject

,                Vera P. English I received your referenced correspondence and have had it reviewed in detail by two different independent review teams.                         The first review, lea by Mr. F. J. Wieczorek, Consulting Engineer, Analytical and Test Methods, investigated those allegations which referred to i                 violations to Company Practices and Procedures relative                                 to i                 Laboratory analytica1 equipment and peripheral computer based                                     -

information systems. A second review team headed by W. J. Bendry, Manager, Regulatory Compliance investigated alleged violations of GE WMD Safety Practices and Procedures. This team was composed of experts in radiological safety, industrial safety, health physics and industrial hygi'ene. You participated in both of these reviews '

y by interviews with the team leaders.

        .        The results of these reviews have shown that in the area of violations to Analytical Practices and Procedures there appears to be some substance to your allegations. With respect to your alleged l         ,

violations to Safety Practices and Procedures, none were observed. l I have reviewed these reports and have determined that they are

     .           complete and accurate.                 I, therefore, conclude that the problems that you have brought up were due largely to miscommunications and misinterpretations of some procedures among Laboratory                                  '

i ! personnel. Consequently, I have recommended the development of a ! program to improve communications among persons working in the Chemet Laboratories through either additional training or improved written procedures, or a combination of both. This action closes my investigation into the alleged violations ! included in your letter and documentation as referenced above. AA !- E . A .7 Lees, Manager ! Quality Assurance ' 1 EALtdh ] {< Attachment F i

 /,.         .                                                                  ...

Q, -

g\

GENERAL $ ELECTRIC 1 NUCLEAA ENGtGY SUSINESS OPERA 110NS 1 GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY

• 17S CURTNER AVENUE e SAN JOSE, CAUFCNtNIA 95195 ,-

STRICTLY PRIVATE QUALITY ASSURANCE & RELIABILITY OPERATION San Jose, California . Aprit' 26, 1984 E. A. Lees, Manager Quality Assurance Wilmington Manufacturi'ng Department

• M/C J02 WLM

Subject:

EMPLOYEE ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLATIONS TO COMPANY PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES

                ~

The enclos,ed report is issued as a result of an employee's " Allegations of violation to Company Practices and Procedures" review which was held during the period of March 26 through March 30, 1984 I F l Js , ,,

                                            ~

F. J. Wieczorak l l Consulting Engineer , l Analytical & Test Methods ! M/C 860. Ext. 56243 . FJW:11s Attachment Attachment G

       .          s                                                                          -

li' - t e

                                                                                                                            ~

STRICTLT PRIVATE Quality Assurance Review of Emproyee Allegations of Violations to Company Practices and Proceduren 1

1. Purpose and scope o

This review was performed as a result of E. A. Lees'_ reques t to investigate allegations which were presented to E. A.14es, Manager. Quality Ascurance, Wilmington Manufacturing Department (WMD), in a letter dated February 24, 1984, and a copy of a document titled,

                          " Allegations of Violations to Company Practices and Procedures in                                        '

Chemet Laboratory," dated February 21, 1984, by Vera 7. English. . This document is attached as Attachment 1.

2. Sununary of Conclusions 1 l

The four alleged violations of Company Practices and Procedures l related to Quality presented to E. A. Lees were investigated by the i review team and were found, for the most part, to have substance.

3. Conduct of Review '

The review covered only the specific allegations presented by Vera P. English related to Quality and was in response to request' ' letters from T. P. Winslow, Manager, Chemet Laboratories, dated February 1,1984, and I. A. Lees, Manager, WMD Quality Assurance, dated March 13, 1984. The review team did not investigate beyond the scope of V. P. English's Quality allegations. The review team members consisted of the following: T. C. Davis, Employee and Consnunity Relations, Te'am Member C. R. Ogle, Quality Audits and Customer Service, Team Member F. J. Wieczorek, Consulting Engineer, Quality Assurance & Reliability Operation, Team Leader 4/25/84

bi' - t 7 e STRICTLT PRIVATE i An examination and investigation of WMD Ins tructions , Procedures. Logs, and A.aalytical System Readout Tapes were conducted during the week of krch 26 through krch 30, 1984 Interviews were conducted with the following personnel. s l T. P. Winslow, knager, Chemet Laboratory 1 R. I. Parnell, Control Programs Engineer P. E. Hann, Supervisor, Chemet Laboratory W. Lacewell, Supervisor, Chemet Laboratory C. G. McLamb, Supervisor, Cheaet Laboratory , C. E. Rochelle, Technician, Chemet Laboratory R. W. Rudson, Technician, Chemet Laboratory R. L. Brown Test Operator, Chemet Laboratory V. P. English, Test Operator, Chemet Laboratory S. W. Sloan, Test Operator, Chemet Laboratory J. R. Sutton, Test Operator, Chemet Laboratory . Pre-review and post-review meetings were held with the following management personnel: H. O. Covington, Mana'ger, Rourly Employee Relations C. W. Doyle, Manager, Qual. Audits & Cust. Serv. - Acting for E.A Lees J. R. Faucette, Manager, E.aployee & Conmaunity Relations

             ,                      W. J. Hendry, knager, Regulatory Compliance L. A. Sheely, Manager, Fuel' Quality                                                         .

C. ft. Vaughan, Manager, Licensing & Nuclear Materials Management P. T. Winslov, knager, Chemet Laboratory -

4. Allegations and Review Team Comments a) Allegation I.A.: " Analyzers are not properly calibrated following detector change." ~

,

• f m ats:

e This allegation appears true if one uses the claimant's ' interpretation of the applicable procedure.

• Interviews of individu las involved with analyzer operation revealed a variety of opinions as to the possible meanings of the sese procedural Instruction.

Differentiation between the definitions of " Calibration" and

                                         " minimum-U-count" was not clear in the Procedural ^ Instruc-tions COI 411, Rev. 2.and Rev. 3.
                           . , , ,        ._--,-,y_   . -     --,.___.,_~.__.-__-__.m____,.                   ~ ,     ._-_y-       _ . . _
                                                                                                                                             ,--_,._.,.,,,,,__y-   , , - _ _ , - _ _ _ , _ _, . , .

         ,                                                                                                                l

a. Jt' . '

e STRICTLY PRIVATE

                                                                                                              .           I
                                                                                                           -              I

4. (Cont'd)

                  ,         e -Varied     interpretation     of  these   procedures         could easily 1

create: ' inconsistencies among operators possible violations of procedures possible questionable validity of results possible perceptive management countenance of operator deviation from procedure

• needless loss of time because work would have to be reper-

                                  ' formed b)     Allegation I.A.1.d:       " Calibration and verificati,on were not I.A.2.c:      completed before samples were run and

' material released" during 8/20/82 and 6/22/83. Comments: .

                          .e   Allegation appears correct. The investigation revealed that,                         -

during 8/20/82 and 6/22/83, six acceptable calibrations or six verifications were _not run af ter a detector change as required by Instruction COI 411,' Rev. 2 and Rev. 3. c) ' Allegation I.B.1-4: "Results from isotopics are accessible in computer and can be altered." Commeaes: e Except for one supervisor and one operator, seven individuals interviewed who work in the area near V. P. English confirmed this statement. e The investigation determined that any " altering of results" was merely the correcting of data input errors. d) Allegation: b h'Use of 902/903 computer transactions are condoned by supervisor.**]- Commeaea e Us e of 902/903 transactions by someone other than a super-visor occurred when a supervisor was not present and that supervisor authorized access to the system by shift personnel. Thereafter, such individuals continued to use the 902/903 transation because they perceived that they had authorization to do so.

   .,,.*                                                                  Ji'  -

1 e STRICTLT PRIVATE

4. (Cont'd)

(Cont'd) Comments :

                                 / {Even though instructions were issued on 2-22-83 and 1/25/84 to reemphasize that there should be limitad access             to 902/903, non-supervisor access continueQ A e)       Allegation I.C:    1("Supervisorsinputdataundertechnician's password and create false data.% #

Comments: Supervisors acknowledged using another person's password but only with that person's consent and in that person's presence. - e Supervisors who use another person 's password merely make corrections in the input to make it more accurate. There was no falsification of data.

5. Conclusion As the result of this review, the team has concluded that, as discussed sbove, V. P. English's allegations have substance.

1 h$

• W
• v 8

V 7 F. J. Wieczorek ~ T. C. Divis k C. R. le

                   ' Consulting Engineer                 Employee & Corsnunity     quality Audits Qus.lity Assurance Audits             Relations, WMD            Customer Services Review Team Leader                  Team Member               Team Member N/C 860, Ext. 56243                  M/C A09-WLM               M/C J28 WLM D

h

F :_ . ~- .: La -

                                                                                                      #        NV: CDI-qll a,E                                      WILMINGTC 1
       ,            +       -

REv 2 a .' MANUFACTURING DEPARTMENT ij

REFERENCES:

0

                 ' AtlBRATION AND OPERATI0N INSTRUCTION ISSUE DATE:            2/10/82
      ,f                                  GENER AL h ELECTRIC                                                  PAGE 10F .2

SUBJECT:

Iscr.opIC U-COi.m Lr41T ctANG: Citm;RIA c -

           !            1.0       FultPOSE:

1' ' This COI procides criteria by which eqitioment and/or 5 ta r.-

  ];                              dard         chang.:.s   will         require             the    rc.Mriving of thr: minimum                                    1 U-count 1imit t e r the RIFJT. ( 3."sa                       ris..n.,s. nl on the Enrictw.esit                               !

Analycar .:yr.t.u:r ;.

   /                    2.0       SCOPE:                                                                                      .
                                 .This .;OI documents the equipmerit                             and/or counting standard j                          . changes         which either will or will not require the limit on
      ':                         'the U-count for the ItIP005 (3.978 W/o U-235) standard to be re-Ej       -

halculated. Responsibilitics arri defined irrt.wwn ther TCST E(WJIP:4CITT

, SUPP02:T un tt. as..! the Olleti;T IAcut:ATOR11.S s'r.r !:1 ccific actionirs under thi:

COI.

                       ,3 . 0     RESPONSIBILITIES:

J

           .r
          'g                                The' Test Equipment Support is responsible for communica-4 3.1                                                                                                                            l e

tion of equiprdnt changes on the Enrichment Analyzer sys-  ;

           '                                tems to the Chemet Laboratory Lab Supervisors and for com-                                                           !
           ,                                pletidn cf the Equipment Change Logs as pers 4.3.1 nrid 4.4.

l

    ,      !                      3.2       Lab Supervisors are responsible                             for      recalculation             of                    i
  ,        l                                the U-count lihtit for the RIP 005 (3.070) standard as provid--                                                   gi gd by this COI.

J]\I d 3.3, MCP Technician is responsible for the maintenance of .a '

 ,4                                         U-ccunt history for five (5) years.                                                                                  !

3 .. - 1 j 4.0 PROCEDURE: , g 4.1 Equipment Changes: Table 4.1 provides the equipment change cri tie r ia which impact th

 '.3}l$s
  ;)

limit and requires the limit to be ,e RIP counting of the RIP 005. (3.978) standard. Where new limits 005 redcrived (3.078) U-count. through multiple C ia arh not specified in Table 4.1, limits are not to be rederived C$ unless spdeifically authorized by the Manager of the Chemet 29 Laboratory.1 -l id ) i , .- .

                                                                                     !                    i
             #4                                                   !       ,

i

      ;         gEh'/l      RED BY ~My pJ/a// SATE                                            APPROVALS           DATE           APPROVALS           DATE
    ' ' [-}i Mi', REVIEW h                                                     s/t/*      OCE lFEff,J,,,         2-fs A N/AM          M%             %/t' I .

idiETA iT -::J.rL_ L' \T- 4/o//.z WE lM7 a _#ji j

     ,; OTO                                 M         .,,,2                 l            C ").1S                    QL_T:1,.Y                    0             '

               .               _.~-                 --

o- - c.- - _ .. 2 - 1 i m . t

                                                                                                                .          e.o.: un-4u i, G   '.?
                        **                  WILMINGTO'                                                   .

REV 2 I tiANUFACTURING DEPARTMENT

,j                                                                                   ,               .

REFERENCES:

0 a

  ~, NAll6 RATION AND OPERATION II45TRUCTION
   .                                                                                                                       ISSUE DATE:         2/10/82          .

i  ;  ; . GEN,E A AL $ ELECTalc . I PAGE2 OF 2 2 j SU BJECT: 15cnOPIC U-CLXNT LIMIT CWGC CRI*IERIA i 4.2 Standard Changes: Table 4.1 provides the standard q change criteria which impact the U-count limit and re-1 quire the limits and related limits to be rede' rived throingh multiple counting of the RIP 005 (3.97U) standard.

  ]

4.3 Equipment Change Log: A log is to'be kept at each ana- - 1

                                     .         lyzer with equipment changes noted.

4.3.1 Equipment Information: The log is to contain

^,

the model numbe r', serial number, pay number of

                                          .                            person making the change and date/ time of the module changes made to the system to which the log is assigned.

4.3.2 Standard Information: Changes in the standards, i ncl.udi_og ailb_tI__ E lpt' ion or vial changes, are

• to be noted in the loa. -

4. 4. #331;Lli fie r se t ti g,gs following._any reneskinq shall be re-

       &g                                     corded on th e;_qalibI4.t,. ion /v.c r i f i c a t ion _[ma i n te nance log
                                             ~ tot d ~t h e .u n io nqd a naly ze,r .                                .

5.0 LIMIT REDC(IIVATION: 1 N' 5. 3. The RIP 005 (3.9 78) ctandard is t.o be t ounted hix (6) times ti through either running the calibration six or more lj ' ~

                                             . times or counting the standard using

• the utility pro-j gram provided by Control Systems.

,q , y 5.2 The minimum U-count limit is to be recalculated for i f,  : SCP-401 by the. Lab Supervisor using the following: i Is O

• g Minimum limit = Average U-count - (95/99 tolerance

                                                                                                                                                        ^

factor) X y

j g = Average U-count - 5.775 x @

          ,g o                      5.3       The new limit is to be posted at each analyzer by                                                           the la                         -

Lab Supervisor and a copy of the changed limit is to be fC1. given to the MCP Technician for the history file along i f ..*.: with the 9820 computer tape printout for U-counts. 'I ,e f ,: aV . 8 - j\2C

     +
          --.J     *t l
     ! .' 4 E
  -j yQ p'

i !E _ _ _ _ - _ _ . . - . _ . _ _ _ . . . _ . . _ _ . 1 ._ __- - _ .

                                                            .            ,          .                    ,       ,   =

. . -4 .

  .       1         . ~ .                 .    .                  .
                                                                                      -        r             .
                                                                                                                           ,- u ., w -       .,_s_u.  -

~ si' -

                        '                                                                                                                    1
       ,. s. . .

g . 'l

• 3 D, _

a . TABLE 4.1 CDI-411 EC!MPMENT CHANGE CRITERIA

$]                                                   .

EQUIPMENT ACTION '. I . _______ _ ______ RESPONSIBILITY .' .] ,_ ,,_ ,__ =b o

  'l
  /                             Detector                      The detector is changed out and an d                                            '

Test Equipment

   '                                                          appropriate twenty-four (24) hour                                             Support burn-in is completed.                    The Lab Super-visor is to be notified to rederive                                         .

RIP 005 (3.973) U-count ilmit fuliowin,; ic;v.:aking of the syctum. Preamp- Repeak the system and request the Lab TES 4 - lifier Supervisor to have the system recali-J brated. - ^ Ampli- Allow the system to warm up for one TES fier (1) hour and repeak the system. Notify the Lab Supervisor to recali-

         ..                                      d brate the system.

G. - , Single Allow the system to warm up for one TES Channel (1) hour and repeak the system. Analyzer Notify the Lab Supervisor to recali-brate the system. Counter Observe tha t the self-test is com- TES (scaler) , pleted per the manufacturer's manual and notify the Lab Supervisors to recali-J

  ]~                                        ,               brate the system.                                                                                          -

a

 ]j Preset                         Observe that the self-test is com-                                              TES pleted per the vendor's manual and h

q I o ,gI notify the Supervisor to recalibrate the system. I'

       $ g Actuator                                         No action required.                                              h     ,        N/A High.                          Allow the system to warm up for one

[3O Voltage TES J, hour and repeak the system. Notify 1 a- Power the Lab Supervisor to have the system j g T, Supply recalibrated. ,I ' t.h Change of Standard Rederive the RIP 005 (3.978) U-count limit. [ Lab Supervisor ' Q 6 4 vial .

                                                                                                     ;                  l-                     **
   ;l,4                    Change of                                                                                               .-             -

Roderive the RIP 005 (3.970) U-count Lab Supervisor

 -[                        Standard _. lim 6%

 .:l              .

ea . ..

   .t              .

3' ". .. . 4 I 1 _J i:.. l- l ,i ; 'l . .- j i p _

    .:                          w i         1: -
                                                                                     =-
                                                                                              .14-l

{=-

                                -                                                                                                                             5                .                     )       ,-

t 1,

                              ~                                  i                                                                                                 1           I
        .                                                        s          s.a v

l d

                       -                                                                                                                                                       g
                                                                 ! 5                                i                                                                          1                                  -

q a u

                                                                           =

t . i y , E ., 1 -

                        .e
                                                                                                                                                                                        ~

a ~ r w

                              -                                                    I                                                                                                                                                                     -

w e *\ s I n - .

  ,3. .                 -                                                                                                                                                                          i

y. w u. ,

m - ,,..

j _ 1), -.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  ,,. e ,_. ,. . .

6. =~ z cl - -

2559-

    )         .

g

                                                                                                                                                                                        -_L                                      . g 5 g .9 w                                                                                                                                                       2e 2:3.:

1

                                                                          %* E                                                                                                                                                             * **

e

  'f .4 E

g = l  : ,.,., taf

d. -

A - n.s . - - g [  % e " C **

                                                                                 .c, t

g ,,

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                ~r
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    \

E p:. m_ 8, 3t R

                                                                        .                                                       \ I                                          -

k ,r._; w .E e' ,N  :- ) 5

                              =

5  !

                                                               -                                                                CA-l I

M& 1 g

                                          -                      c k'                                                                                                             g u,                                                 !

g $ , I i M r:. g 3; .- w 6

                                                                           .                                                              g                                 ;

1 s -, 2g i

                                                                        ~                                                                                                                                                                                                                           !
                                                                                                                               ,b k- W                              $h               2                                                      '

A O 5 -S 5 71

                                                                                                                            .        (                                             .                     .

lb E s \. - - -

                             .C.                               - N J

C .

                             =            e                                     w                    ;                                                                                                                                                        i i-1- A                                                                                                                         I
                             %            4.

x ._ . .

                             =            -                                                                                                                                                                                                                  i e

en w at 3

                                                                       .n                                                                                                                                                          ..        ..

l. 2' sc' i

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    .      au-a>.i 1
                                                                       -                                                              .f,                                                                                                             .-
                                                                                =           -l eiw                                                                                                                        i

e. a.gi W= g --

                                                                                                                                                   -l                             ,                             I s y p=        (". r. .
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            ~

b! 5 --kE .A u m

 -l                                       #i                           7
 ,                                                                    -                                                  l-a -                         i                                                                    .

E = le,k 8 w ... W I g) , llg l 1 I e

                                                                               =                                                             -

[ g K g) I 7 %1 _ S .; w e N 3, l .  ;

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           ?.

e p-

                                                                                  - -.-                                                       i e

_i

                                                                                                                       -u                       -

g - _ a - -  !  ! s -

l < d m

                                                                                          \
                                                                                          '                                                         :\

l , I a 5 g

• g8

[ i . i U,.. ,h. - I

a. e 3 =. e fa . - -

I j W:i g l E B - ~

a. . i wg C ii; g a g ,

a a- q"., a - t-- Os .i.5 - y 44

n . m o - ~ a r a a .= ? - '- --

                                           **                                                                                                     ^
                                                      -                 ~_.                 ..u.     -
                                                                                                                 . . - . .        _ . - -                ~.-

r _ . , -,--- _. M.

           ' -                                                                                   NC     O n

• 411 WILMINGTON -

R'SV- .) [nANUFACTURING DEPARTMENT 3 . ts

REFERENCES:

ufa ig - CALIBRATION AND OPERATION INSTRUCTION ISSUE DAT'E: ~e 02/09/83 .j .G EN E A AL h ELE CTHIC PAGE j DF 3

               $UBJECT:. ISOIOPIC U-COUNP LIMIT CHANGE CRITERIA 1.0 PURPOSE                                                                                    -

-J q mis CDI provides criteria by which eculpment and/or standard changes will require the rederivirg of the minimum U-count limit for the RIP 005 (3.978) j j standard on the Enrichment Analyzer Systems. t .

     ,;          2.0 SCOPE:                                  -

e j nis CDI doeurnents the equipment aM/or counting standard dances shich either . I wn1 or will not require the limit on the U-count for the RIP 005 (3.978 w/o U-235) . standard to be recalculated. Responsibilities are defined between the C&IS Unit

      .                    and the Gemet Laboratories for specific actions under this COI.

J .

3.0 RESPONSIBILITIES

I -1 3.1 ne CsIS Unit is responsible for cournunication of equipment changes on the j J Enrichment Analyzer Systems to the Chemet Laboratories' Lab Supervisors and/or Test Operator and for completion of the hyuipnent Change I.ogs as per 4.3.

          .a 3.2 Lab Supervisors or Test Operators are responsible for recalculaticn of the /                                                   ,

U-count limit for the RIP 005 (3.978) staMard as provided by this .00I. '

    )                      3.3 he MCP Technician is responsible for the maintenance of a U-count history -                                      ,

for five (5) years. 4.0 PROCEDURE; ~ p 4.1 Table 4.1 provides the change criteria which impact the RIPOO5 (3.978).. 3 y the U-count limit arx5. requires the limit to be rederived through multiple Y

           -d                      counting of the RIPCOS (3.978) standard. Where new 1_imi.ts_, are _no.t_specified                                      -

4 $Q H in Tahl.e.L1,_11.mi.ts..are t not to be rederived dnless specifically authorfied 2: w by the Manager.pf, the.. Chemet., Laboratories. e r . u.s 4 . c lE o 4.2 Equipnent Change I.cg: A_Lcc is en be kent at eadi analv4gr_wi_t_h_ equipment "j changes noted. htLlog is .to contain the nodel, number,_ serial-number, pay

  /        D.                     nwbtr.cf person making, the change, and <14teLime of the rredule changes made
 } @                  ,

to_ the systemWwhich the log _is_ assigned. di 4.3 Melifier settings following any repeakig shall be reccrded cn the Equipnent 3E

  ;;                             Change Iog for the assigned analyzer.

El a z ' s ~ d , , PREPARED BY h DATE APPROVALS DATEl APPRCyAi.7 DATE INDEP. REVIEW QT. ,fM gff 3 OCE f/46,M 241.3 NMM / ;V,$$M j, CHEMET gsg8 'f[~ jgdh3 WE _M SM% - . - - - - AJF I - -

                                             - . .. L --

p . ,. . ..,, 4 . .. .

• N C, CDI g 411

   ~

u WILMINGTON

• REV- 3 e MANUFACTURING DEPARTMENT g

REFERENCES:

N/A .

    .            CAllBRATION AND OPERATION INSTRUCTION                                      ISSUE DATE: e            02/09/83 3                                            GENER AL h ELECTRIC                              PAGE 2 CF 3

SUBJECT:

IscnoPIC U-<. UMP LIMIT C!lANGE CRITERIA ', 5. 0 LIMIT RNERIVATION: .

      ,j 4
                           -s 5.1 The RIP 005 (3.978) stiandard is to be counted six (6) times through either
                                        /runniry the catinracion six or more tirnes,_us.i_nq a utility.pr.ogran ot_runniner l                    Yg verificationsJA It is necessary for these counts to be within a 24-hour time i                          .Tperiod. Analytical results may be issuod prior to finalization of limits.
              '                  5.2 'Ihe minim- U-count limit is to be recalculated for SCP 8401 by the lab
    .;                                    Supervisor usirg the Yollowing:

I Minimm limit = Average U-count - (95/99 tolerance factor) x h Minimum limit = Average U-ccunt - 5.775 x h . 5.3 'Ihe Iab Supervisor and/or Test Operator will 1:ost the new limit at each ' l analyzer, enter the new limit into the analyzed softwaie program and provide l the ICP Wehnician with a copf of the now limit for the history file along with the coneoter_p'riFit'5'ur. s u 7

6.0REFERENCES

a 6.1 N/A . .

7.0 DISIRIBUTION

7.1 Standard. . 4 , gm - . o %, .

.

. 4 u. ji - ' u . - . 9 g .. Q -t l - ci a . . . . .- .. .... ~ . . - .  % I L_ _1 +s-- *2 y6 , *- ee

j. N'

• 1 arABI.s 4.1 - EDUPMENT CllANGE CRITERIA" ajI g4}} p,.y,3 jg . Page 3 of 3 h*

(

EQUIPMNT ,_,,, ACTION RESPONSIBILITY N Detector All detectors, approximately 24-hour - C&IS / change. burn-in, ard repeak. When peakirr3 is .f successful, the Iab Supervisor is to be ,d *-

• I

~ -

• notified to rederive RIP 005 (3.978)

U-count limit. . / 2 Prearrplifier. Allow the syst'm e to warm up for eight (8) C&IS .$j , hours. Repeak the system ard roguest the ) , Lab Supervisor to have the system - recalibrated. . l, .r. . 'y . . . 1, ' ~ . Aspilfier. ' Allow the system to warm up for one (1) C&IS hour and repeak the system. Notify the Iab Supervisor to recalibrate the system. / . ,, Single . Allow the system to warm up for one (1) C&IS Channel hour and repeak the system. Notify the .: , Analyzer. Iab Supervisor to recalibrate the system. Counter Cbserve that the self-test is completed C&IS .  ? (scaler). per the manufacturer's manual ard notify g.,- the tab Sepervisor to recalibrate the ci , system. f ; .p" ;i.i. ' . J.y ., Pre' ret. Cbserve that the scif-test is co:rpleted Cl,IS T ~ '. . .I ' - per the vendor's manual ard notify the I.ab -a _ Supervisor to recalibrate the system. 1 .. . g .Q: .l, Actuator. !s. . 1 zW o \ ?b action reqdired. N/A u,. ,. .n * ;, . ~ . p~ >$ ' [ ~;,.g" ;; ~digh' f .". $W , Allow the r;ystem to warm On for eight (8) C&IS . g ta' hours and repeak the system. Nofify the -. '](t.re,,Joltage

d ** Power Lu $ Iah Supervisor to have the :ystrue

',, y. [ 2% recalibrated. , , Change of A Rederive the RIP 005 (3.978) U-count limit. Iab Supervisor d'.4 Standard .E o .. ' p.yg,3 .. 4 J ,g  ;'* M 3 a .c . d.. g ,.;*D$IuN[' 2 '"ofRederive the RIP 005 (3.978) U-count limit. Iab, Supervisor . ; ca:..Stareard n ~ j g., Solution.- .e , oi .7, . A tr gy ;;:;r ,m M . sY.;:M~ i .. .* ,  : ly-N'gT*P(dI46 ... d ,j ' .l f ,? r.cp..r.n : s . - ..;;'e- . , . g, a NOTEt- ALIe EQUIPMENT CHANGES MUST BE NCTTED, . RIP /dve/9 j:F. ... ?) j. :. . A. .g .e . ; :n . - ' ^ ,:' , l, j i ', * . *g *, .e* q .. . . - n..f,

w a

.-m_ - . .m p. . e . l * .O J ~ v).~' 5  ? fi E B - r4 P- . e's u2 ~ l' "

• e. t

" C C b w. A h 0 CU ~ n n %  % - a  : l2,j 25 - N d 6 ," N y - m s B- -

• u

,ti t

cl w

o m h w if' d D E - j 1 a x , .e . e o-

• 3 c:: 5 , e -3 4s l ul J J q 4 g g

.J f ,,, b E e o g $ m t, . y: a . = - - c< . w >i = 8 r e y o 3 A - j d

• D 4

w e f e t- D 4 i T 5 * ,$ n n " C N 4

! 1; E/ a .

gl u - s \ h- 'l $ h h. [A > m . v, .1a , Oe ~ e m n i N

i? o d  ?, . D A '

. Z. e - w + u 6  ? - o- N i)e a 5

• C,,,
• c a 'lq1 s (

ti- E - n g d y, ")  :$ m o e- 4 me g- m. ~ ~ o n A rs  % ) E " Y 4 6 5 9 k N g J' m" g W " 8 i, 6 4 . c<. v N D g ;j ' D 23 .7.. 2 E.

• o, 8 >.

h ON g 4 - s t ) $ 0 0 C 7 A jb , k h .y n - r 8 J  % 1 O e e - s wa - % s s , s s s s - - , s - - s s s s s -

1

'; c E U $ e., 2 j g U =5 9 i m 0 o"'

5 i a s s s s o - s s s 3 -

s -  % N;I 'd I., E. _ J ct h' J h

Os 6 . w .

. e 4 e 4 _, y C A n a ~ 8 a 4 A J a a a w .X J C s a a a a ~ o >- 't > > eci . ~ a -  ; 6 .:: 4 4 J 6 6 g ,-w ~ 6 .; n6 k - n k n~ .- U O e * ,,, N .p A , -- . . . , -%^ - - -..--.-,--"-l - - - - - - ~ - - - _ - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ ** ** -he*- .e -J..e. _E, . m-

• n* 2

= , s ..; g . 4 'I ae # e 4 . . .s n  ! L .

c. -

. a , e i~ N M

• 8

~ N l }4 d A h ' w d C h $ i1 ~ $" I. , n n %w ~ 1 si aa . .:. < m. Q  : 8 . e s *

C i I  !

4 . . ,J m

• a ir

* , w i *s * =

1 -

e. et w u s Q n.. j .1 O m n N =

• 1-3 l O  % k -

. i ci u , e. n i g Q I* ,I . $ g M } h ==. ct g u e  ; s .a a u g - M O Q u " . m g es ne n o d .E. '\ f1  % N M m: .a E > W . to  % s. g O M ej E = g a I. E3 ' O "H . . 3- m > 4 , - m , o e 4 g si De e to n

• t-( o.-

tr- . &. w w . N . ms N b J b D ' e d n d d E c ": y n M N i . 4 8 n " " w 6 ri ci I  ? E et o u N o. a e4 a d r k . t -t

• O i

9 a . . o i A $ ~  %  % 1)  % . % .  %  % - .  %  %  % - - .  %  % I u 3 .i g N x  %

A N U we

.a U . 4 .4 m g - .  % . . - -. ,. . . - 9  % m. i g .)- . m - < 1 .e O h wb { . f'%, f*'>b he

as m = a ,

j f , <1 e =o O

• X g m g Wa Na m F to @ P- e e f/ N m .t to @

P @ ""8 M 4. ~ a =o a a a a a .a -. - - - - .EP. ~ ~ ~  ; [5 4 e ,- . 5 *t M 8=P D ,_ p- p =9 W ', n W Mt==N.e-**v ee'u% wey*,e P gggf _ag , . W_"one W**Nwgy N . m . _ - =_ u- .a em g- - e W .i W s i g ga . B i n . T. 1 4 .'u e , I M EC m: e ') N C' e ', ->. D . 1 W .J W g . - 1 55 u :t - I g . ~ , 's be e g* a . m o

• 'J *8 s.

- =J E * .. ? . y 4 J - ^  %. Z e l e cr, ,- c m 1, 3 a e v 3: E D O V s =4 m M " , s . P g. J. @ " p j C

• q Y &
• u I. .a w +

a

=- m .B M ci . 'i: ' ^ O .se ao e Y r ,A v h O I.) d D

• f p P h C F W g I Q .

. m m n o = gag .E g.s - g i 4 * >* *" l n n t > 0 l 5 n e E  ::.: a. 0 N . , O .* $ N ~ , N N N f 3 1 D n. 'f 1 E- ol 0 'l] ... 5 e

q. p.,

o ,j  ;;' r* t- - R $. o '{  ; C .

e

. e

• o' a ao O e.4 e

 ! ""' *%  % *.= =  %  % *% $l N  %  %  %  %  %  %  % *% %  %  %  %  %  %  % > 1 o d E j G 3 1 n a . O o & .-l 3 g 1 .T i I A% g 3 l M - * , - \ e ' s=0 ' I"* O T Q M 68 i'. I M e4 N Q eq - - - - - - D - W M O me N M W m @ N W p O e-. N M q W @ P% W D O d " e One N O O O O O O O O O O == == == = = = * * * "" " " " -4  ; . se >< .  ; c ' . .k

• I g

,m*j g e 0.._____.,__.)..__._._._..___._,...___. . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ . - - - , , , _ _ _ . - _ - _ - _ . . . _ . . - - - - - _ . . . . . ~ . - - - . . . - , - - . - .,-. , ., . - - ~ ^ *.. u . . - - . - - ~ ~ - - - - - - ' - * - - ~ - ~ ~ ' " " ~

-4~

g D " . .s. '. . C s. ~:I *  % &

1. qq

.l !  ?  ; ~ I' E 9 g h # b n i!G = 2 s - 2 5 1- zu g q A t. 3 - "O i W 6 e. . . k s2 k ,- E

• s o o st, w 4 -.

%1 a

! 3 .

.:!,h  !

o k ks %s s. b n N.8 .... h  % k w" - . s . .. E \ g a  % ~ n s n s .g - y = a $ g > W g 'l  % 8 m e 5 h: 7 Of - e l 1 e \ f\ d i. a g * , =  ! A \ \ 4 9 \4 - k n em E & h m ~ w a m ~ k kb- . , , o

• g 4 . s h 7 'T 1

 % N ' @q '

3) '

~; a g i s g w a P d r-A% D b t% t o - ) [ 4 .i 3 - - - u 4 : , .', g g N  % N N N N  %  %  % ' e we ..v'

• O

,e ti , . g . :. *3 g O , 4 a$m g . e, g - -  % s  %  %  %  %  %  % k 3 s. k e , . . . . 5 . ' '.; 1 , e e u s .". s g e ~ g a ~ a e a a m a a ~ a a .a .~ e . ~ >a ~ ~ - ~ ~ 7l , *( .' t .. 1 2 , ,P T i -i - . _ . i #9...<. . .- m .~. 4_ .. - . . . . . . . . . . ...-.m-..,......n-e.m . ----.._.-----.---n.-- l - g .

p. - . -

't *

• N. Q I M '

a Oun b '*"** f ' a . tr0 .- , .j ]=,, of'4 h T'"" ~ "p. A * .e b P' r .. l 4 ug W y  % , i ~~  ; == * .: B 2- ,t

a -

t) g ,  % 3 G. n.; - - a ~ g

'. a '

. e . .w ) .r-g e. ft e.ie ) . \ ~3 ,'< < .( A 4 .O e C <3.}i A f., c te % . g es . 3 E '$u i d o ' .. I' W w . $ 5 a, , .i a ~ b - = 3) 1*5 g m u.t W(<t 'i, .~u. .a . *f 1.> W a. n N r- i- .s dii . 8"8 P* $A k p b e C ke kh k (> h M g D k 3 b a u B M s D D '91  %' 1 84 6 >* y ) k E m N d O m 4 y  % A ~ 4 3 4 E " U " g\ .% \ k n - N N A ,k ej 6, g . b 5 N Yh. b. a, ( % s <.t s N, . ,, II .> r~ sN ~ P'* b* b O O s ' ~ y, j } s s s . j:a. = . 3 J A I; <1 - ~. ~~ ~- . ~ . ~ , . Y ' he . O ,.' ,,,3 ,( . C<. -l 3 4 C + -- o s . s .. - . . .. . . . Y 1 h ' i ;Qi 2 E Ge sa e O - ~ m 7 q O d ..,. ..,. . ~ 4 O h - ~ N O O O O O O O O O O .=e .~s .n.e =. .. == .s -e =* N N N * ,, i ' .l , .. .( ,.l 2 . .e , . *

• i: 4 ,

1 . tu~ .= -, n_ a = ,, m n- w_n ~. - --e.-~~m===~-~*=**--~~ ' " ~ ~ ' * * ^ ~ ~ ^ ~ ~ 2_ ~ ;w - - ?f. . . ._. - _. . . .- - . . . . --... ..-- -- 1 3 . . . . . . . . . * ' Ji' .

f. p= ' . ' . ' . . -

4. . ..

. .t , . l re j ". ' ,dj. , i@ ' I-

• TAntz roR scr,-40t

,. 't '. . n s . .. . .. , .  ;- a} f.{.,

. - s ... .  :

, y. , .. , . . ., .so.}. 2 S STANDAP.D VERIFICATtot! I.1 HITS ('#H25A) ** 9 ANALYZER #011 ANALYZEK #312 ANALYZER 8013 .ANALYZEP. f014

ij .911 f.am ar .9erf ein . 7a 9 9 . e n s

'] 2. 9 2 4 5 *eraf 2 21's4 ,014 7/s f.ee9 l s.212.$aurs 1.11 t.1 i .o rg l I 3. 9 70 $ eez / 7,127 f.aa3 . p.fg2I.cf7 i .* 2. 9 72 I .e a s /1 i j . t .1 . ,i ~~ REClu'SSION mDE1. Col:FFI CI'.NT (IIP-RO) ,_ A*RLYZER Fuli>E 1ttrEld:r.ier 011 - /, 6 e y 3 4 -) .o a yryo 012 /. oa 2 s Vs ,oorver

013'

~ ).00/&L/ . ec // S$* ~' ' ~ 014 /. c o //d . aa67We .s . s . e . :.7-9 I . . .% . BIAS ADJUST?D:NT FACTOR ANI) MINI:1UH "U" COUNT LIkITS (9825A) ' S AfMI.YZEM SiOPE Iffil:lCI:l'r M111tMutt "u" culmT V) f 011 /.oa791 .ee M21 2 s 2 & G1 .  ?, 012 s. o s Tot. - d o s 2 1. a 2 715~27 j 013 , o o 1-19 i . on rdv 2 - ~4 1&f 7 E- >! 014 - /. o os a9 . o / o 3 9* 2 4 / s a/.2. s. ;g

-t . -

 ; NOTI : C!icek ua;:h cal li.ratia:t. Tlie "4" t uun tu l'...- t .ii- lows .! . uri l .. .t i au::t havo .. "!;" c.., nit greater th.in the "r." . . unit l ur t h. le s '

n r.1clunen t . ,

 ! Al'i'!;0VEI) ItY .- - - ---- i i DATi; ISSUED-- -- / FP j _. - - - . =

• N* ' ""'"#- - - - ~ ' ' - - " " " ~

,&,_ e*- ~ +c , < ~ - . g UNITEo STATES ,f NUCLEAR REGULATORY c0MME$ ION *

• a assioN u

,I , 1e1 MARIETTA ETREET,NM. j ;u ATLANTA,0EoAGI A 30323

• t
• 1 ..... m 25 m ...

Mo: art G. Ratner. Esq. ~ , 1900 M. Street, N.W.  ! -i Suite 610 j Washington, D.C. 20036 't . ]

Dear Mr. Ratner:

4

a

    !            This is in response to your letter to Mr. J. B. Lankford of our staff dated

,9 November 28, 1984, and related to concerns of your client, Vera English. ~ You

   }              indicated a concern over the referral of certain of her concerns to OSHA when they appeared to you to have radiologi. cal aspects. You misunderstood our refer-i            ral to OSHA.
   !                                   Referral aspects looking at radiological         of an issue    of theto OSHA       does not mean that the NRC is not same issue.

In the case of the referral of some of Ms. English's concerns to OSHA, all but two of those concerns are also being reviewed by NRC from a radiological aspect. The two areas which we are not reviewing relate to 1) a protruding lever on a high temperature drying even and

    ;            2) Acid containers not marked as to content.                                                                                                  ,

1 i So there will be no misunderstanding. I am enclosing a list of the concerns which the technical staff in Region II is reviewing. As I discussed with you on the phone, the Office of Investigations (01) has reviewed information provided by Ms. English and are reviewing items within the areas of its expertise. Items being reviewed by OI are not included on the enclosed list. Because the enclosed infonnation ipvolves protected infonnation under 10 CFR 2.790 the enclosure is being sent to you through Neal Abrams of ELD. If you have any questions concerning the above information, please call me at (404) 221-5611. .

                                                                                                                                                              .i 0
                                             ,                              Sinc'erely,                                                                       :

fd.

J.

[ . _ - hi - Bradley . Jone

u - Regional Coun '

.a ?) Enclosura: -

.:             1          Allegations - MCA j              2.         Allegations - Rad Safety                     .

fi .d 9

                                                                               ~_                                                                            !

A

.a          .

Attachment J

s *

]
~.i L ___                       _
                                                                                                                                                         ~

                                                          - .                    . .       .   ~.    -                         .

q 3

                                                                                                                           ~

t.; . . 1 a .' '. 1 *. - j '1 .'. -

    $                                                .         ENCLOSURE 1

'i: l ALLEGATIONS - MCA

 -\

1. Employees were told not to talk to of answer questions of HRC inspectors

  /;                    when they came to the laboratory.

J

 .i       ' 2.          The analyzers were not properly calibrated after change of sodium iodide
   ;                    detectors.

I3 3. An out-of-service tag was imprbperly removed from an analyzer which was in

 .]                     violation of GE procedure. Technician tagged it out and someone else j             . removed tag at her supervisor's instruction.

') 4. She had never seen an NRC auditor or GE auditor check the calibration logs.

  'i i         ' 5.           Supervisors were allowing the release of production samples on the basis of old, previous detector, minimum uranium counts.

.. 6. The computer is progranned to accept out-of-parameter results. *

7. There was a release of proif'uction samples during the stabilizing period for a new detector. ,

B. A supervisor and others used her computer password to alter the isotopic values on samples. .

9. People en crutches and in casts 'were allowed to work in the FHO building where at times, during drills and. criticality tests, they were required to evacuate quickly. (Emergency Preparedness) q 10. Laboratory personnel were in violation of laboratory procedure by not

                         ....n.. au. ---..a .a a.....a. a...

y -- .... .s..r. -

 ~1 a             11.       In the case of criticality evacuation there might be a problem of workers 3                      getting out of the plant. She referred specifically to one area of the '

C plant where " Fat Albert" and fuel bundles hang. Here, the corridors are -- f) blocked by bundle carriers. (Emergency Preparedness)

12. GE managsment had mislead NRC inspectors by saying that the calibration

.1                    logbook was not an official record required by procedure. She learned of
?                     this by her review of one of the NRC inspection reports.
   .1 3

3l 1 ?~1 e ,l 3 d - Extwt peou otsctoWet j . 10 cra n.no veoamarme 1] -

1;I r . j szawr room imetos me . so cra 2.m anon v. . - t

    .{              .
   .J i

ENCt.05URE 2 l 3 ALLEGATIONS - RAD SAFETY

l

  '!{

1. Employees were told not to talk to or answer questions of NRC inspectors

' .i1 when they came to the laboratory.

  .i 1               2.          An airborne radiation hazard was created when bubbly hot uranium material i

was removed from microwave oven and allowed to cool in the open and not in a j vented hood. -

  .i

3. I.eeks around a microwave oven, used for quick dissolution of uranium samples in cubicles lined up in trays, created an airborne hazard from uranium gas

.i vapors.

4. The Company would not give WBC results to her or to another lab technician.

5. 10 CFR 19.11 required posting has become less accessible to employees than '

in the past. At the near guard house location it is dust and dirt make posted material almost illegible. poorly lighted and also

6. Uranium powders were dumped from crucibles outside hoods causing airborne l contamination and surface area contamination and supervision was reluctant to correct it. '

1 1 7 , a The dumping of uranium powders outside hoods and the releasing of gas fumes j in the lab may be the cause of sinus problems and other nasal difficulties , j experier.ced by lab personnel. i 1 .

  .}            B.           There was a violation of a laboratory procedure in' accepting contaminated 1                       sample vials and paper work in the lab. Supervision was lax and condoned this.
],                                                                                                        --..
                                                                                                               ~

j 9. There were poor or sloppy contamination control practices in the analytical lab, i.e., contamination on floors and bench surfaces from spills, etc. not fi cleaned up, and no or inadequate supervisory attention to the problem. o .! p 10 The violation of GE laboratory procedures by personnel eating, drinking,

                                                                                                        ~

chewing gum, and not wearing lab coats, safety glasses, safety shoes, etc. Supervisors were resentful when informed of this.

11. The deliberate contamination of her work area by a person or persons on a j previous shift. i'

       !                                                                                                                    i
    .;          12. Rad safety people were lax on monitoring for contamination and requiring                                '

cleanup. .

i

       ,                                              e e
                                     '                         EXDAPT reoAA Di$rtotutt
                                                                                                 /..  ,

                                                                    '                           *                   ^
               - ~ _ . _ .                             ..+

-- a-y..

j .,

                       ,                                                     - moa pesacsuw 30ona.no < % ue3
                                                                                                              -        a 1       ..                     .
                                                                                                                                    ~

k G. $ v.

                                                   .          .      .    .         2                    -

i 13

 ;1                           The only tiines that lab

• personnel were told to clean up comtamination by supervision was when word came that NRC inspectors were on site. ~

$                  14.         Initial and periodic training in. rad safety had diminished and is now ly              ,e              inadequate.                In certain instances answers are given out ahead of tests.

4 9 15. The 1979 change of the analytical lab from " Controlled Area" to d -

                              " Semi-Controlled Area" was a violation of the employee relation manual.

Supervision's putting the emp1,oyee manual under lock and key was a violation J of GE policy. d 16. The weighing of uranium samples was not done in hood or a properly vented rl] hoodinviolationofthelabp;acticemethod. a

   <j
     ~

17. When she asked for her bioassay results she was given the run around by her supervisor. Another Chemet Lab technician has not been bioassay in 14 years.

18. Supervision covered up a.n. incident involving spread of contamination that .

' resulted from the cutting. . grinding, and polishing of uranium pellets in the Met lab. They called it an " unusual incident" and documented it on microfiche. ,

19. Spill areas, contamination areas, were not marked off to caution other people in the analytical area. .

s

20. The unsafe practice of dumping heated uranium pellets into open containers j

and allowi y them to cool in uncovered containers and outside a vented hood. 1 ']% 21. Rad safety people who cover the analytical lab do not know what to look for. Rad Safety visits were rare and they never got after people and told them to 9 decontaminate. 4

  ]             22. Dichromate titrations were done in the open and not in a vented hood and 1                          this was a safety hazard.                                                                                 -

1 23. Supervision became vindictive.when complaints were made about radiation

   ,                        safety hazards, t

24. t!p until about three years ago there had been uranyl gas releases in the j area of the plant where gas is converted to powder.

 ]   ,

25. While she was working in J Building she found a store requisition with yellowed fingerprints on the lower right hand corner indicating contamina-

   .i                      tion. She identified the requisition as dated March 5,1984, invoice no 112172, component no. 987-126 and filed with the J-26 weekly cost sumary report dated March 12, 1984, as page 45. It was signed by Clifford Smith and his supervisor, Bernard Rogers.

4 a . EXEMPT FaOM DG40*JfW 10 GR 2J90 INPoemM40N _. n_,..~n,-,,--~~n.>.--- "~m-~~~'- A---*~~~~ - ' ~ ~ ' ' '

s.' ':_ ' F . ... mwr,o.om ,.

               ~

8'C#8 1 N weaut g j. , , s 3- ? 1 d . C!.' ti 26. Some laboratory personnel were not monitoring themselves for contamination 1 when leaving the job at the end of their workshifts. ~.( This cama siirectly .j from one of her co-workers.)

• l a

27. She has been furnished incomplete radiation exposure results. The record M)

  !                           data is incomplete for film badge (or TLD), urinalysis, and whole body count results.
 .;.               28. Chairs in the lab were checked by personnel with the lab and found to be

'J contaminated. 4_ y 29. Lab workers are removing contaminated shoes from the lab and storing them in j personal lockers in the uncontrolled area.

      .1

} 30. Lab workers are touching potentially contaminated faucets while washing their hands in the same sinks used for washing contaminated glassuare.

31. Eiectrical outlets are being corroded by acid fumes and are a safiety and fire hazard q -

9 . E  % Ij -

 . .l a                                                                                           -

1 f i( * . :3

      'l

f

       ?
  .j i

1

  . ..l +

MMPT FROM OF.c05URE 7 30 Da 1790 woamATW '.i .

 .:)                                                                                                                                                    /

ft _

                          . - - _ _ . . . . _ - . . . . . . . . . - - - - . . - . - -                          . . . . . . . . -            - - - - -       ...~..---     -

w.b...

                                                      , ,u A.aM a.:5-

...: .L. u.:. ~ ...u. a:.u t '

                                                                                                        - m i.;,- ~ ' % %.: . a L 1 a.L. au22 a.r * ~+' L:z          .
,                                ,                                                                                                                                     c..

i i ' r-t a 1, , 5.;- )i . ALLEGATIONS 4 REPORTED r. l , G BY VERA M. ENGLISH TO THE W NUCLEAR REGULATORY d I C COMMISSION * { S u a v

  .                                                                                  \

i i .

                                                                                                                                                      ..             t-i                                                                                                                                                                     !.

1-F. [ .- i NRC INSPECTION REPORTS:

• 70-1113/82-18 .

7Q-1113/84-05 i ,i 70-1113/84-13  ; j 70-1113/84-15 K 70-1113/84-16  !. 70-1113/84-17 l-

                                                       ,                                                                             70-1113/84                  f.
                                                                                                                               /.) [ T gg

                                                                                     *     *    "                 *                 ~~
 - w L                 ..... sa.L,.. w ;w w ' M ~ M          -               -
                                                                                                          ' uk.:2    -at i .':. u                   .

ALLEGATIONS REPORTED TO GE IN DECENBER 1983 AND PEBRUARY 1984 ALLEGATION REPORTS FINDINGS Production samples were released 1. NRC - 8/30/82 1- No violation - unsubstantiated: 82-18 1 during the stabilizing period 2. NRC s 2/13/841 ,2 wo. violation - unsubstantiated: 84-05 for a n detector . 3. NRC - 5/84 No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-15 (! MgSM..,A % M 4. NRC - 7/11/841 No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-16 -

                                                                                                                                                    ^
                                                                                   /

Analyzers were not properly 1. NRC - 8/30/821 No violation - unsubstantiated: 82-18

           . calibrated after changing                   2. NRC - 2/13/841 ,2         No   violation   - unsubstantiated:     84                   sodium lodide detectors   ~

3. NRC 5/84 --

No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-15 a/A,/ ty. 4. ( .9 4. NRC - 7/11/841 No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-16 A supervisor and others used Q NRC - 2/13/84 No violation - unsubstantiated: 84 4~ # Vera English's password to alter isotopic values on

                                                        * [ 1.2.

3 NRC - 7/11/84 No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-15 I W samples d. I 3, Laboratory procedures were 1. NRC - 8/30/82 No violation - no requirementr 82-18 3 violated when required isotopic 2. NRC - 2/13/84 No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-05s g*o data was not recorded on work- 3. NRC - 5/84 No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-15 g5 sheets ,%

                                                                    \

Out-of-service tag was 1. NRC - 2/13/84 No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-16 improperly removed from an , analyzer in 1982 ha % - M~ i l Radiation surveys are inadequate 1. NRC - 2/13/84 No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-13 [ i in Chemet Lab 2. NRC - 7/11/84 No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-17

                                   $%esu i               I Incident alleged to have occurred on 8/20/82.

2I ncident alleged to have occurred on 6/23/83. } L L\ j u

                                                                                                                                              .ll 2                                                      ,           yj
 }                                                                                                                                          ,
                                                                                                                                                  'q

(a. % -

                           . ..:  u .=.a.-.2   . 2 - Q :-. w -  ~ s                        : :    w:.   .. M u x e c u._ n :__            .       La
                                                                                                                                                       ?

ALLEGATIONS REPORTED TO GE _IN DECEMBER 1983 AND FEBRUARY 1984 - CONT'D. - e i ALLEGATION REPORTS FINDINGS hi4./un. hPersonnelinChemetLab 1. NRC - 2/13/84 No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-13 4 were not frisking properly 2. NRC - 7/11/84 No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-17

                                                                                             %W f"M'y4                         *
                                                                                                                           /

• 4 h -) -

[ Lab procedures were violated 1. NRC - 2/13/84 No violation - unsubstantiated: 84 17 g I by acceptance of contaminated ' vials and paperwork in the Lab

             . which was condon'ed by supervision
   , ej 4 Lab procedures wero violated                                 1. NRC - 2/13/84   TBA in 85-023'
             ; (eating, drinking, improper                                                    -

attire) and supervision was resentful when informed i' j f, Leaks 1. NRC - 2/13/84 TBA in 85-02 l foraround microwave oven quick dissolution used of uranium 9 4 - l ~7 * . / samples in crucibles lined up in ! trays created an airborne hazard

 ,              from uranium gas vapors.

a .:r .. o % 4 '

 \                                                                                                                                          -

f V) Microwave oven leaked microwaves 1. NRC - 8/30/82 No action 9

                   .                                                   2. NRC - 2/13/84   No action               ?"      #~

C'." i

!                                                                                                                                                    [

l 4 During the period 1980-1982, 1. NRC - 2/13/84 No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-17 i i uranium powders were dumped out- 2. NRC - 7/11/84 TBA in 85-02 ( side hoods causing airborne and surface area contamination and Al#b

,              supervision was reluctant to

correct it t:

                                                                                                                                              .      k.

3fTo ha -ddr==ned in NRC Report No. 70-1113/85-02. t.

}         .

3 '

                                       ? La:A - 'm.?                       Ali.EA
                                                                         ^

L

                       ' O..l.. =. u c
                                                       -    U^                             %   . b N N -- , ,A.EdiuJ S        :

F. mf . l ALLEGATIONS NOT REPORTED TO GE' = i, i f ALLEGATION REPORTS FINDINGS i ! Laboratory employees were 1. NRC - 5/84 No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-17 [ h discouraged from talking to 2. NRC - 7/11/84 No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-13 NRC inspectors No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-16

                                                                                         %wmy"1   4         c ~he.              -

b g' Failure to comply with 1. NRC - 7/11/84 No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-13 i notification and reporting c4L-uN [ . requirements of 10 CFR C p M .< 1. f O yy,,j//7 . I ~ Failure to post Form 3 properly 1. NRC - 7/11/84 No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-13 I-j . No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-17 1 An airborne radiation hasard was created when bubbly hot

1. NRC - 7/11/84 No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-17 i , uranium :naterial was removed from a microwave oven and * *

   ,             allowed to cool in the open and                                                                                    -

not in a vented hood .

                                                                                                                                 !?

Computer is programmed to accept 1. NRC - 7/11/84 No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-15 h out-of-parameter results n .I d The company would not give NBC 1. NRC - 7/11/84 TBA in 85-02 h results to Vera English or a another lab technician - yc GE management had misled NRC NRC - 5/84 inspectors by saying that the

1. No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-05

         ,p                                          2. NRC - 7/11/84     # violation - no requirement: 15               ',t 5       calibration logbook was not an l                 official record required by                                                                                     i..*

!! procedure l . 4 l

Q w;n - =. . . ..w. w - -M u- -

                                                                                    -._ x c. w= - La      =:w w. ... c ., ~_J ALLEGATIONS NOT REPORTED TO (;E    -

CONT'D. l I ALLEGATION REPORTS FINDINGS f Dumping of uranium powders 1. NRC - 7/11/84 No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-17 outside hoods and the release of gas fumes in the lab may be } the cause of sinus and other

      '         problems experienced by lab                                                                                    c personnel
            ' Vera English's work area was             1. NRC - 7/11/84         Jh) violation - unsubstantiated:      84-17 deliberately contaminated by j            .another person or p.ersona on a
          ;; previous shift                                                                            ,

The 1979 change of the 1. NRC - 7/11/84 No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-17

  ,            analytical lab from a " controlled" area to a " semi-controlled" area                                                                   i I'              was a violation of the Employee                                                                   .             f Relations manual
                                         ~

Supervision kept the Employee 1. NRC - 7/11/84~ No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-17 j Relations manual under lock and g

   ;           key in violation of GE policy Spill and contamination areas           1. NRC - 7/11/84         No violation - no requirement:        84-17

'I were not marked off to caution other people in the analytical area

 }

t I Dumping of heated uranium pellets 1. NRC - 7/11/84 No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-17 into open containers and allowing '

them to cool in uncovered containers outside a vented hood

$         . is an unsafe practice
-l i
                                                            .              b                                             -

h

p. L_- . ul , ,:s ~ ~ F w :' d ~ '.D . O ^ *S- L;LL i -1 I>lYlL,h.Lw_..U' i ~ x'a l -

                                                                                                                                         . I:

f  : ' = ALLEGATIONS NOT REPORTED TO GE - CGNT'D. 1 i . ALLEGATION REPORTS FINDINGS I Dichromate titrations were done 1. NRC - 7/11/84 No violation - no requirement: 84-17 in the open and not in a ven,ted 2. OSHA No violation - no unsafe conditions i hood

                                                                                                                                                 ~

L i A stores requisition was found 1. NRC = 7/11/84 No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-17 I in J building with yellowed .

            .         fingerprints indicating contamination

)

                                           ~                                                                                                   .

Answers to radiatlon safety tests 1. NRC - 7/11/84 No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-17 l are available before the test is given , t I Vera English was furnished with 1. NRC - 7/11/84 No violation - unresolved: incomplete radiation exposure 84-17 l ' ! results - People on crutches and in casts 1. NRC - 7/11/84 l were allowed to work in the PNO i No violation - unsubstantiated: 84-18

!                    building where prompt evacuation                                                                                           4 might be necessary

] .. In the event of a criticality 1. NRC - 7/11/84 No violation - unsubstantiated: I evalube' ion, workers would not be ' 84-18 , able to quickly evacuate ' f I Up until about three years ago, 1. NRC - 7/11/84 TBA in 85-02

,                    there had been uranyl gas                                       s
                                                                                                       =

b j releases in the area of the plant l where gas is converted into powder . e

    . mL2. /           _ _ . . . st ' - - -w;. .a-we - C    - '       ' "- -       -     ! . .. l . C h 2 L w i 2 l.c. d ...li.. . i . _t;   w l                                                    ALLEGATIONS NOT REPORTED TO GB           -

CONT'D. , I ( ALLEGATION REPORTS FINDINGS -' There were poor or sloppy 1. NRC - 7/11/84 TBA in 85-02 j contamination control practices in the analytical lab with inadequate supervisory attention j to the problem h

                                                                                       /

Supervisors allowed release of 1. NRC - 7/11/84 TBA in forthcoming inspection report l . production samples on the . basis j of old detector minimum counts , Lab personnel were only told to 1. NRC - 7/11/84 TBA in 85-02 , clean up contamination when NRC ,, inspectors were on site H 1 d Initial and periodic radiation 1. NRC - 7/11/84 TBA in 85-02 I safety training had diminished

                . and is inadequate                       ,

l Lab practices were violated by 1. NRC - 7/11/84 TBA in 65-62 . I not weighing uranium samples in - j a properly vented hood . 5 l h Vera English was not permitted 1. NRC - 7/11/84 TBA in 85-02 to see own bloassay results and , another lab technician had not i had a bioassay in fourteen years, l t r Supervision had covered up an 1. NRC - 7/11/84 TBA in forthcoming inspection report y incident involving spread of contamination

                                                              ~

ff . f.! - ) .. . , 'vf '

o '- . O _ __. .__ _ .h au iin .a * - - " 2'- - '

                                                                                                            '   ; . ..w.::,2:.:.ht iu.                             .
                                                                                                                                                                        ' i _ ic :..z

- h . w .

ALLEGATIONG NOT REPORTED TO GE - COi4TfD. . I ,.. ALLEGATION REPORTS FINDINGS Floor of the room in which the 1. NRC =7/11/94 Violation - Level IV: 84-15 LEA measurement system is locsted is contaminated with SNM

     .and that the contascination is                                                                                                                                                                   p ew. bedded in the filor tile and the cracks between floor tiles Y

9 i 1 l

                                                                  \

• l 1

9

                                                                                                                                                                                                          'I'.  .)

V i I

                                                                                                                                                                                                              )
                                                                                                                                                                                          ~

h n e . i'

• t' h _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

l..-. d._ - f i ;7 ,

                                                 '~
 - _ _                      ._... _ . a
                                        ~
                                           -        - 3 ~, u' -                       i.. . u' u .              1 :_ T ,  . s INDEPENDENT NRC DETERMINATIONS                     .
                                                                                                      .                                          .7 I                                          '

CONCERN FINDINGS  ; Health protection instruction to employees No violation - in compliance: 84-13 i

                ~~

Maintenance of packagings No violation - in compliance 84-13 E Reporting out-of-control measurements in a timely Violation - Level IV: 84-16

                  - manner to measuressent control coordinator
                                                                                                                                                   +

1 l, Air sampling in Chemet Lab Violation - Level IV: 84-174 Furnishing the NRC with a report of an individual's Violation - Level V: 84-17 exposure within 30 days of termination of employment Radiological Contingency and Emergency Plan (RCEP) No violation - in compliance: '94-18 RCEP protective action rfotification procedures Violation - Level IV: 84-18

                                                                                                                                                     ~
                                                                      \

Emergency preparedness No violat' ion - in compliance 84-18 On-site fire protection equipment and procedures No violation - in compliance: 84-18 9 4 Cited as a result of a follow-up to an independent routine inspection reported in NRC Report j Ho. 70-1113/84-13. GE has disputed this citation. 1 p . i . - p 9

__ . = . - . 2 -

- v

                                                                                                                 /   v.       '
 'i    ..           .                                                         .        ,.

{ . 1.. , w . .

                                                .U,. S. DEPARTMtNT OF LABOR M
 ;t                                  OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES                                             -

it ' t In the Matter of ) i j YERA M. ENGLISH ) u j vs. ) CASE NO.: 85-ERA-2 ,! GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY ) 3- . I Affidavit of John M. puckett

,)

.j i s I

                                                                                                                            ~

I, John M. puckett, depose and say as follows:

1. I am an employee of the United States Nuclear -

Regulatory Commission (NRC). My place of employnent is the NRC Region II offices, ' Atlanta, Georgia. I am the Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff. I have held this !j position as . Acting Director and Director since > April 16, 1983. I am responsible for administration of the NRC Enforcement Program in ,! Region II and co' ordination of allegation and investigation activities. I report to the Regional Administrator. I am involved in the inspection and 1 t enforcement process regarding allegations made by . i . 1 - j Ms. Vera M. English concerning activities at the  ! I I i

                                                                                                ._ a             ^!TL1

it' -

                                                                                                                                                         't
    .                                                                                                      2 General                     Electric             Company,                       Fuel                     Fabrication' Facility, located in Wilmington, NC.

2. The NRC enforcement authority derives primarily from sections 161, 186, and 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, as revised, 49 Fed. Reg. 8583 (March 8, 1984), sets out'the NRC enforcement policy. A copy is attached. This policy provides guidelines for the application of the NRC's enforcement authority to particular factual situations. In this context

                                                                                                                                                                                                             ~

the policy contains several supplements which - provide examples of violations at various severity , levels for particular types of NRC licensees and/or licensee activities. Violations are categorized into five severity levels: Severity Levels I and II involve very significant violations; Severity Level III violations are significant; Severity level IV violations are significant if left uncorrected; and Severity Level Y violations are of minor concern. t The chart which is attached to this affidavit lists - the allegations made by Ms. English to date. For each allegation, the chart identifies Region II's conclusions on whether a violation of NRC requirements was found and if so, the Severity Level of that violation. In this regard, it sho'uld i be kept in. mind that the supplements are not all p _,_y% . __,.s~ y ..,,,..._,.__m,.,,., , _ , _ -,,-,,,.-_,___.,.,.y , _ . , _ . _ . . . . - , , , , _ , , , , . , , , . ,,,..,y.

                .             .                                                                         ~

t **

                                                                                                    ,     fi'         .                   .

s 3 . inclusive, but only provide guidance to th'e NRC staff in assigning severity levels. Moreover, the enforcement policy specifically provides that the exanples in the supplements are just that and that they are neither controlling nor exhaustive. The chart also ident1fies why other allegations, even if substantiated, were not considered by Region II , to constitute violations of NRC requirements.

3. Some of the inspection reports related to Ms.

English's concerns have not yet been issued, and the NRC contihues to receive information from A

                                                                                                                                                's.

English which must be evaluated. In several instances where inspection reports have not yet been issued, the inspector has made a preliminary finding that a violation has been identified , which has been orally communicated to the licensee in an exit interview a't the conclusion of the inspection. However, Region II has not yet completed its review of these preliminary findings nor assigned severity levels for such violations. This circumstance is reflected in the' attached chart. Results of this review will not be made publicly available until i the Region has issued its inspection report and Notice of Violation, if appropriate.

4. NRC Region II has issued the attached inspection

P

        ,                                                                  4 reports and notices of                   violation.             Some                        of             theso
                             .~ actions are being contested by                         both              GE                 and             Vera English.           Normally, these matters would be resolved by the Region unless the                      severity           levels                              of       the violations are catego,rized at Severity Level III or above.         Matters involving               Severity              Level                            III      or higher are reviewed by the headquarters                                                 Office                  of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) in Washington, D.C.

which has agency-wide responsibility for the Commission's Inspection and Enforcement Program.

5. NHC has received a 10 CFR 2.200 request with two .

supplements from Mozart T. Ratner, Esq. on behalf of Ns. English asking the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement to review the inspection 4 findings, violations, and ueverity levels assigned by Region II to certain violations related to the allegations raised by Ms. English. Under 10 CFR 2.206, members of the public may petition i the responsible Office Directors of the Commission

                                ~

to take enforcement action. A copy of'10 CFR 2.206 . is attached. The Office of Inspection and Enforcement is in the process of reviewing the petition with the assistance of the Region and will issue a decision in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206 which may affirm or revise the Region's action. That decipion may then be reviewed by the i l

t

                 .                                             5            ,

Commission. Thereafter, the decision may be reviewed in'the Court of-Appeals. As a result of the pending 2.206 petition, Region II's assessment of the existence and significance of violations related to Ms. English's allegations is under evaluation, and accordingly, may be altered in the future.

6. Due to the large number of allegations, their technical nature, and the limited time available to compile this information, there is a possibility that some error may exist in the ntrached ch:.rt.

It is the most accurate product that ,could be produced in the time allotted and to the best of my knowledge it is an accurate statement of the status of the allegations. i I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. Executed on March 21, 1985. ' 4 l l Jo'hn M. puckett l

EXPLANATION OF REASON CODES (Note 1 on attached chart) The attached chart, Dispos it ion of General Electric Company A / /egat ions, utilizes " reason codes" to denote the disposition of specific allegations. The following is an explanation of the codes: Code Exclanscion A Allegation was not substantiated. Factual information which supported the allegation was - not revealed by the inspection. B Not presently resolved. The allegat' ion is still being inspected at the licensee's facility, has been inspected but final NRC action has not been determined, or is to be inspected during a Future inspection. s . C No NRC requirement. Though the allegation's Factual content was verified by the inspection, no NRC requirement exists l regarding the metter. Enforcement activity is j therefore inappropriate. In these cases the allager is urged to contact the apptopriate agency For action. ,, D , Item closed by means other than inspection (se,e reFarenced inspection reports). E Violation of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations. F Violation of NRC License 70-1113 requirement. l \ eO

_.:.:. ..m w a=Liu% 2.- kn e- --.

                                                                                 -u:       :w
                                                                                                 -d..     * - ' z n.;.dA Q -

7

. c<

Dicposition of General Electric Company Allegatione page 1 l

naport No. Peregraph Description of A11egetton Violation Reason Severity Supplement j (70-1113) Humber (yes/no) Code Level I i

t (1) (2) (2) i c4-17 4e Employees were told not to.telk to no A

ne ne or enewer questions of NRC inspectors when they come throuDh

the laboratory

{ t C4-17., 4o An airborne radiation hazard won no A ne 04-17 ne . l 5 created when bubbly hot urentum yes E IV j IV meterial wee removed from.e ,

microwave oven and allowed to cool in the open and not in a vented hood ,

i 85-02 4e Leeks around microwave oven used for no O ne no  : 04-17 5 quick dissolution of urentum semples yes E IV IV In crucibles lined up in trays created en airborne hazard ,From urenlum ges vapore G5-02 4e The company would not give WBC no B ne ne results to the alleger or another .. Imb technician 7 04-17 4b 10 CFR 19 required posting hem no A ne na become leen ecceselble to employees - and at the rear guerd house it is s poorly lighted and illegibly dirty 64-17 4e Uranium powders were dumped outelde no A ne ne -. 05-02 4b hoods coueing einborne end surface yes B ne no 84-17 - 5 ares contaminetton end supervision yes E IV IV wee reluctant to correct it Natner (1) See attached explanation (2) 10 CFR 2, Appe,ndix C, Supplemente

L. a..s L .: .lm a ruia: .u.. -v n- '

                                                                       ~
                                                                            - m_.   .--.z     W L .~ L a a -.::. = _ .L i k
                                                                                                                                            .'       f:

Dicposition of General Electric Company A11eGetione Page 2 n; port No. Peregraph Description of Allegation Violation Reason Severity Supplement i I (70-1113) Number ' (yes/no) Code Level , (1) (2) (2) C4-17 4c Dumping of urenlum powders outside no A ne ne ! hoode and the release of gas fumes in the lab may be the ceuen of einue and other problems experienced by lab personnel t l 64-17 4d Laboratory procedures were violated no A ne ne

!                            by acceptance of contemine,tod vielp l                             end pepe,rwork in the Inb which wee j                             condoned by supervleion C5-02          4b         There were poor or sloppy contam-           yee          B      ne                             ne C4-15          5c         ination control practices in the            yes          F      IV                             IV enelytical lab with inedequate
;                            supervisory attention to the problem

! 05-02 4c GE laboratory procedures were yee B ns no vloisted (enting, drinking, improper . l ettire) and supervleton wee *-

renantful when informed -

84-17 4e Th' a elleger's work area was na A ne ne deliberately contaminated by e - person or persons on a previoue ,, sh1Ft , + k ~ ! 84-17 4f Radiation eaFety personne1 were lex no A ne ne . [ on monitoring For contamination and 2 - requiring cleanup ,

                                                                                                                                                        ~

Notaos (1) See etteched explanation . (2) 10 CFR 2, Appenpix C, Supplements I i * ? . e .

                                                                                                 ' ~'

r . u -. . ., _  : 24 M = - -'- Ii s  %: '

                                                                                                         ^a ha ...;;.h s:1     ' ~QM

[.y . I ' Dicpesition of General Electric Company Allegatione Page 3 Report No. Peregraph Description of Allegation Violation Reason Severity Supplement k (70-1113) Number (yes/no) Code Level } , (1) (2)' (2) C5-02 4b Lab personnel were only told to no A ne ne clean up contamination when NnC Inspectors were on alte C4-13 7 Inittel and periodic radiation { s no A ne ne j E5-02 . Ge oefety training had diminished and yes B ne ne = le inadequate C4-17 4m Answere had been' provided ahead of no g A ne ne teste . , B4-17 4g The 1979 change of the enelytical no A ne ne j lab from ' controlled nree' to

                  ,                  'eemi-controlled eree' is a violation of the employee relation                                                                      '  '

manuel Superviolon kept the employee i relation manuel under lock and key

}                                   In violation of GE policy                                                                         .
'C5-02                                                                                                                          '.:

4d Lab practices were violated by yes B ne I ne 5 not weighing urenlum semplos in a properly vented hood lC5-02 4e A11eger wee not permitted to see no B ne

'                                                                                                             no own bloeoony results and another lab technician had not had a blonesey in L

Fourteen yeare " f thne A11'eger stated that supervlelon had no B ne ne

!                                   covered up en incident involving j                                   spread of contnmination                                                                                   .

jNatcos (1) See attached explanetton (2) 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, Supplements L

                                                                                                 -                                                        ~
                                                                                                        - 3.: -.z...'.
                                   ..-..         .-.a..--

x -  : u. a. .. -- w.. .....-.-.-._:_-.. e Dicposition of General Electric Company Allegatione Page 4 i neport No. Peregraph Description of Allegetton Violation Reason Severl.ty Supplement (70-1113) Numbnr (yes/no) Code Level (1) (2) (2) C4-17 4h Spill and contaminetton areas no C ne no were not marked to.ceution other people in the snelytical eroe 04-17 4 i Dumping of heated uranium pellete no A ne no l s into open'containere and allowing . l them to cool in uncovered containere outelde a vented hood le en unnefel practice , h C4-17 4F Red seFety vielte to the snelytical no C ne na inb were rare, uneggreselve, and

• performed by personnel who did not know what to look for 04-17 4J Dichromets titrations were done in no C ne ne the open and not in a vented hood .j OT Description of allenetton le ne ne ne ne ,

reForrel senettive and its release may compromise the OI investigation 05-02 4F Up until about three years ago there no B ne ne had been uranyl ges releases in the area oF the plant where gas is' converted to powdsr _, C4-17 4k e store requisitten wee Found in J no A no na , ! building with yellowed Finge*printe j Indicating contamination [ Natcc (1) See attached ex'pinnetton (2) 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, Supplements 4 e A

                                                                          ^

aln - .. :l. z ..L w-. . -. .. l- - - . - -

                                                                                   .. . . 2.   . . -. = . ~ , u n . .. . L .:. ~ : ~
             ~

Disposition of General Electric Company Allegatione . Pegs 5 Report No. Peregraph Description of Allegation Violation Reason Severity Supplement Level b. t (70-1113) Number (yes/no) Code (1) (2) (2) C4-17 4 1 Laboratory personnel were not no A ne ne i monitoring themselves For I contaminetton at the end of (- their workeh1Ft C4-17 4n A11eger wee Furnishnd with yes BGE V IV

• incomplete radiation exposure I

resulte. 4e Ewployees were told not to talk to no A ne na , C4-17 na 3m (3) or enewer questions From NRC no A ne C4-16 , inspectore 3 Analyzers were not properly no A ne ne C2-18 ne 2e cellbrated after changing modium no A ne E 04-05 na 5b lodida detectore no A ne C4-15 C4-16 3m (2) no A ne na 1 .. An out-of-service tag wee improperly no A ne ne '!{ C4-16 3m (1) removed from en analyzer 3 A11eger had never observed en NRC no D ne na 02-18 na inspector or GE euditor check no O ne C4-05 2e ne ne 04-15 Gh the calibration lone ' no O ne ne f2 n4-1G 3e (1) no O B no ne f' na na Supervisors allowed rolemen of no production enmples on the bsole oF old detector minimum ,counto no A ne ne C4-15 5e Computer le programmed to accept out of parameter resulte [ I 1. Notos: (1) See attached explanetton . 15 (2) 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, Supplemente

                                                                                                                                                     ;b f

  -.;    .a       . .-.a. z   L:L.=~%Bh.22 0               -
                                                                        .na. i  2  a...:. J a w :a .u...u..z..   -  u ..:.          ~

e ' 7 Dicposition of General Electric Compen'y Allegatione Page s Report No. Per-egr aph Description of Allegation Violation Reason l (70-1113) Number Severity Supplement (yee/no) Code Level (1) (2) (2) ', O C2-18 3 Produc'tton semples ware relemmed no A ne ne ! 04-05 2e during the etabilizing period For- no A ne ne { c4-15 3 e new detector-no A ne ne j 04-16 3m (2) no A ne na 84-05s 2e A super visor and othere uend the no R4-15 C ne ne = 5e n11* Der's computer pseaward to alter- no A ne ne lootopic values on semples 1 ne na Persons on crutches or- In cents wer e no B 'ne ne > i ellowed to work in the FMO building , j where pr ompt evacuation might be

, necesseery i

j C2-10 3 Laborator y pr ocedures wer e violated no D R4-05 ne ne l 2e when required lentopic date wee not no D ! 04-15 ne ne 5b recor-ded on wor koheets no D ne na 64-16 3m (1) no D ne ne . ne ne t In the event oF e cr iticellty no B ne na. .

                                                                                                                                       ~

evacuation workers would not be able - to quickly evacuate C4-05 2e GE management had misled NRC no C ne no 15 Sb inspector e by saying that the no C ne ne cellbration logbook een not en u

   ,                           oFricial record required by                                                                       "                 "

procedure [. Notnot (1) See etteched explanation .a

                                                                                                                                                      'I (2) 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, Supplemente                                                                                             'l j
 !                                                                                                                                                      l h

l e i t ,

a ixLi

                                                                 ~-
                                                                                                                .-               .-           M
                                                                                                           ~'~~                     '                     ~
                    /         -
                                                                          . .gg                                             ,
                                                                                                                                      ,g',                                          '

GENERAL $ ELE ( klC , .sTR; >Lr PRIVATE

 ^1                          ..= use.

• u,,o.

g 8*292-5747 un. May 21, 1984

                                                                                  ,                                                                     boca JH Faucetta WILMINGTON MANUFACTURING DEPARTMENT 4

g M/c J-o2 ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLATIONS TO CONPANY PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES

 ..i

'j

Reference:

Your letter of February 24, 1984, same subject

.1

,3 s k ' . .] Vera P. English 3 A ' l I received your referenced correspondence and have had it reviewed .J . in detail by two different independent review teams. The first y; review, led by Mr. F. J. Wieczorek, Consulting Engineer, Analytical < , 1 and Test Methods, investigated those allegations which referred to 3 violations to Company Practices and Procedures relative to j . Laboratory analytical equipment and peripheral computer based ,i information systems'. A second review team headed by W. J. Hendry,

                                   . Manager, Regulatory Compliance investigated alleged violations of GE WMD Safety Practices and Procedures.                                                  This team was composed of

. experts in radiological safety, industrial safety, health physics and industrial hygiene. You participated in both of these reviews by interviews with the team leaders. The results of these reviews have shown that in the area of violations to Analytical Practices and Procedures there appears to d be some substance to your allegations. With respect to your alleged pj violations to Safety Practices and Procedures, none were observed. I have reviewed these reports and have determined that they are J.; complete and accurate. I, therefore, conclude that the problems R that you have brought up were due largely to miscommunications ji and misinterpretations of some procedures among Laboratory -- p personnel. Consequently, I have recommended the development of a

i program to improve communications among persons working in the )

Lij Chemet Laboratories through either additional training or improved l j written procedures, or a combination of both. This action closes my investigation into the alleged violations j included in your letter and documentation as referenced above. 4 . .5 i

                  ~

W I '! E. . Lees, Manager - I Quality Assurance , '4

      ;                             EALadh

[ {< !. Attachment M J' _ - _ . - _ _ - - . _ - - . . - . . - _ . . , - , - - - , - . - . ~ . - - - . . + - _ . , - - . - - . - - , _ _

, . .. p

                                                                          . w.wp-_
                                                                                                       - .- aw 7
                                                                                                                                              .  . c    .

l

              -                                 ~_n.
                                                       --_m_                                w-                                           .       -- -

) -9 . . . . . . l

              -af.'       ' SM                              .                                                              .

t a g;1tY. RNEsi' j q SENERALh. ELECTRIC

s 1 em comm. 8*292-5461 ears. January 19, 1984 cones. C.G. McLamb , E-92 *

    .;                                                                                                                        L.A. Sheely, K-10 d- v; eart. MIW INGTON MANUFACTURING DEPARTMENT

• E.A. Imes, J-02 r

'j . assessa. M/C 5-92

??>                            suonct. ACTION PLANNED PER OUR_01/12/84 MEETING 3                                    TO:    Vera M. English
  }j                                        M/C B-92

• j . .

   .. I As indicated to you in our meeting of 01/12/84, actions

'j] have/will be taken in the following areas. '

     ) '

e Flexibility for you to change your password has been

,                                                          limited due to the required interactions of two c                                                           computers, LMCS and HP9887, both of which require                                              '

t , exact password matching. Specifically, J. Garris, the only Lab MCS authorized password accessor, will be set up by 01/25/84 to also be the only authorized i BP9887 password accessor. At any time you are scheduled off for more than 48 hours, your in-process ,, work on the BP9887 should be cleared such that you may contact John to effect a password change for you. Based on your 4-shif t rotation, you should be able to change your password upon reporting to either the 3:00 - 11:00 shift or the 7:00 - 3:00 shift.

e LMCS 902/903 transaction password control, when f.'! initially set up, involved the ability to change

   'J                                                     values for standards results and, consequently,
    .)                                                    access was restricted to supervisor passwords only.

Sometime ago, these transactions were modified to

'l                                                        eliminate access to changing standards results. Use.

I of the current 902/903 transaction by qualified lab .l personnel is appropriate for routine correction for {}}