BSEP-85-0592, Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-324/85-03 & 50-325/85-03.Corrective Actions:Operating Procedures for Transfer of Solid Radwaste to Mobile Processing Unit Via Radwaste Loading Dock Revised
| ML20127K093 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick |
| Issue date: | 04/03/1985 |
| From: | Dietz C CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127K079 | List: |
| References | |
| BSEP-85-0592, BSEP-85-592, NUDOCS 8505220040 | |
| Download: ML20127K093 (3) | |
Text
. --
l.
~
Cp&L Caroling PodeN& Light Company
'}h'
?
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant P. O. Box 10429 f
Southport, NC 28461-0429 April 3, 1985 FILE: B09-13510E SERIAL: BSEP/85-0592 Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street NW Atlanta, GA 30323 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324 LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 AND DPR-62 RESPONSE TO INFRACTIONS OF NRC REQUIREMENTS
Dear Dr. Grace:
The Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP) has received I&E Inspection Report 50-325/85-03 and 50-324/85-03 and finds that it does not contain information of a proprietary nature.
This report identified one item that appeared to be in noncompliance with NRC requirements. Enclosed is Carolina Power & Light Company's response to that violation.
Very truly yours.
- y C. R. Dietz, General Manager Brunswick Steam' Electric Plant RMP/shb Enclosure cc: NRC Document Control Desk B505220040 950415 PDR ADOCK 05000324 0
PDR L._
Violation Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires the licensee to establish implementing procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, November 1972.
Item G.2.a of the guide specifies that procedures required for control of radioactivity to limit material released to the environment and limit personnel exposure for spent resins and filter sludge handling.
Contrary to the above, the licensee did not establish adequate procedures for transferring powdered resin slurry to a solidifying and dewatering system.
Operating procedure OP-06.12, Condensate Phase Separator Operating Procedure, did not contain any instructions or actions for the Radwaste Control Room operator to follow in the event of a major resin spill.
This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement I).
Response
I.
Admission or Denial of the Alleged Violation:
Carolina Power & Light Company acknowledges that OP-06.12 was not adequate in that it did not contain instructions or actions for the operator to take in the event of a major resin spill.
II.
Reason for Violation:
The Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. (CNSI) technician, upon noting the rupture in the flexible hose, did actuate the closure of a solenoid-operated valve (SOV) located at the junction of the flexible hose and the carbon steel line which isolates the flexible hose. He also notified the Radwaste Control Room operator (RWCO) to "stop the pump," which the RWC0 did.
This caused the automatic flush to occur. The RWC0 is aware of the fact that a flush occurs automatically when the pump is stopped. Also, OP-06.12 addresses the fact that an automatic flush occurs when the pump is tripped or is turned off. The RWC0 was aware that a problem existed, but at that time he was not aware of a line rupture.
Periodic test PT-45.1 is designed to leak-test the flexible hose at a pressure greater than the operating pressure encountered during transfer operations. This was felt to be adequate as the line was tested prior to operation; therefore, operating procedures to be used in the event of a line rupture were not in place at the time of the event.
III. Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken:
A.
Operating procedures which are used in the transfer of radioactive
' solid wastes to the mobile processing unit via the Radwaste loading dock have been revised. These revisions incorporate cautions to direct operating personnel to close key-operated loading dock isolation valves from the Radwaste Control Room upon indication of unusual circumstances or conditions.
g;-
,y
~"
- .i !
.s
e B.
PT-45.1, Loading Dock Transfer Lines Leak Test,:has'been revised.to
-reflect'the following:
--4.-
1.
.If temperatures are less than 10 degrees Fahrenheit,~the.
Supervisor,-.Radwaste must authorize the test to be performed.
2.
The carbon steel lines exterior to-the Radwaste loading dock must be heat-traced, with the~ heat trace serviceable and in operation at temperatures less than 38 degrees Fahrenheit.
3.'
The test will be performed within one hour prior to start of transfer operations.
4.
.The flexible transfer lines are rated at 350'psig and hydro-
-statically tested at this rating within the last six months.
(CNSI is to provide documentation.)
C.
The flexible transfer lines are to be disconnected and drained wh'en not in use.
D.
The area of the CNSI process equipment has been illuminated.
IV.
Corrective Actions Which Will Be Taken:
.Radwaste personnel will be trained on the procedural changes resulting from this event.
V.
-Date Full Compliance Will Be Achieved:
The training of Radwaste personnel will be completed by April 19, 1985.
+
I i
I L